[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1997), Nationalism: Is it
definable, important and worthy of attention?, www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/971210.htm]
Nationalism
Is it definable, important and worthy of attention?
by Hans O. Melberg
Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding
Walker Connor
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994
234 pages, ISBN: 0-691-02563-0
Introduction
Why should social scientists be interested in nationalism? First of all, there has to be a
minimum of agreement on the definition of a nation and nationalism. Second, it must be
shown that nationalism has important behavioural consequences. However, agreement on the
definition and demonstration of consequences are not enough. Sometimes a phenomenon is
both well defined and important, and yet beyond our understanding. Hence, a third
pre-condition for our interest in nationalism, must be that it is susceptible to
scientific investigation.
I cannot pretend to give good answers to the three questions above. My weak knowledge
of the theoretical literature, and my less than certain grasp of the relevant historical
details, combine to make this impossible. Instead, I want to use the collection of
articles in Walker Connor's book Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding as a
launching pad for some reflections relevant to the three questions above. Moreover, to
make these reflection as interesting as possible, I have chosen to focus on topics which I
feel I know something about, such as rational choice theory and methodology.
Is it important?
The second question - that of importance - is seemingly the easiest question to answer.
Nationalism has been used to explain earth-shattering events such as the break-up of the
Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and most recently the Soviet Union - just to mention a
few examples. Moreover, it is not just a force of the past; the Kurds, the Basques, the
Palestinians, and many other groups and conflicts testify to the continued importance of
nationalism. In sum, nationalism has behavioural consequences which makes it well worth
closer examination.
Still, it is possible to argue that factors other than nationalism was, and is, the
driving force behind the events ascribed to nationalism in the paragraph above. Maybe
economic variables best explain the collapse of the Soviet Union? Maybe religious factors
were more important than nationalism in the break-up of the Ottoman empire? Maybe the
Palestinian movement is best understood in term of the personal interests of an elite?
Connor disagrees:
Explanation of behaviour in terms of pressure groups, elite ambitions, and rational
choice theory hint not at all the passions that motivate Kurdish, Tamil, and Tigre
guerrillas or Basque, Corsican, Irish, and Palestinian terrorists. Nor at the passions
leading to the massacre of Bengalis by Assamesc or Punjabis by Sikhs. In short, these
explanations are a poor guide to ethnonationally inspired behaviour (p. 74)
Thus, Connor argument is that explanations in terms of relative economic deprivation,
elite theory, and rational choice are falsified by historical experience. History shows
that nations demand independence regardless of their economic situation compared to the
rest of the state. The Basque are better off than the rest of Spain; the Irish were worse
off than the rest of the United Kingdom. History, Connor claims, also shows that religious
and class bonds are weaker than ethnic ties. Witness, for instance, the failure of Lenin's
call to the working class not to participate in World War I, and the failure of religious
leaders to prevent Christians from fighting Christians in the same war (p. 156). Finally,
focusing on the elite cannot explain why the masses so readily accept the message of
nationalism. True, the elite may exploit, and manipulate nationalist feelings, but surely
there must be something to be exploited in the first place. In short, alternative factors
are not powerful enough - we need to examine nationalism in order to explain important
historic events.
If the importance of nationalism is beyond doubt, its precise nature, its relationship
to other concepts (such as the state), its causes, its consequences, and its future are
more debated. Moreover, in order to say that nationalism was, and is, an important facto
in shaping history we must at the very least have a rough idea about what nationalism is.
This is the topic to which I now turn.
What is nationalism?
According to Connor, a "nation consists of a group of people who believe they are
ancestrally related" (preface, xiv). Nationalism, in turn, is defined as
"loyalty to the ethnic group" (p. 40). Loyalty in this context implies
willingness to sacrifice, for instance being willing to give your life to defend the group
in a war. This definition of nationalism should be sharply distinguished from patriotism
(loyalty to the state). In relatively homogeneous societies - like Germany, Japan and
Norway - the two are easily confused, but in multi-ethnic societies there are many
examples of conflicts between loyalty to your ethnic group and loyalty to the state.
Having defined a nation and nationalism, Connor goes on to examine the causes and the
nature of these concepts. Why, for instance, do we believe that we are ancesterally
related to the members of our nation. The cause of this belief cannot be rational
evaluation of evidence, since the factual basis for arguing that, say, all Germans descend
from a common German Eve is clearly empirically false (p. 217). How, then, do we explain
why people believe in the myth of the nation and are nationalists?
One possible explanation is evolution. To explain this allow me to recall an
observation from Richard Dawkins' book The Selfish Gene (I here rely on my fallible
memory). Lengthy observation of a bird colony established the following facts: A
bird-mother would almost always risk her life defending her children against an intruder.
A uncle, however, was less frequently willing to risk his life to protect a single child,
although he was more inclined to do so when the lives of two or three children were at
stake. Finally, even more distant relatives would only defend the children if more than
four lives were threatened. In short, the closer the DNA resemblance, the more the bird
were willing to sacrifice. Why should this be so? The obvious answer is evolution. A
species with a DNA code that told it to sacrifice its life defending everybody - even
other species - would become extinct. In the same way, one might speculate whether human
willingness to make sacrifices for your relatives (real or imagined) can be explained by
evolution.
Connor does not speculate on the evolutionary causes of nationalism. He simply notes
that "its well-spring remain shadowy and elusive" (p. 92). Moreover, the precise
nature of the bond is also elusive, although in general Connor argues that "the
national bond is subconscious and emotional rather than conscious and rational in its
inspiration" (preface, xiii).
I have so far presented Connor's definition of nationalism and his discussion of its
nature and its causes. This leaves maybe the most important topic: The link between
nationalism and the events claimed to be caused by nationalism (like the collapse of
Empires). Exactly how did the ethnic bonds between people lead to, for example, the
collapse of Austria-Hungary?
Being a strong believer in methodological individualism, I want to explain events by
reference to the individuals who were involved. The key question is thus what forces make
an individual behave as he does. The most parsimonious answer to this question - that
employed by economists - is rational selfishness. In short, people do what they think is
best for themselves. In this perspective, only two main variables explain behaviour: aims
and beliefs. Of course, one might go further - as sociologists often do - to try to
explain the aims and beliefs we have. For instance, there are hot and cold mechanisms that
shape our beliefs, and our preferences are also shaped by various mechanisms.
Wishful-thinking is an example of hot belief-formation (beliefs influenced by what we want
to be true); Incorrect beliefs about the distance to an object when the weather is good is
an examples of cold belief-formation (beliefs influenced by systematic cognitive
mistakes); and sour-grapes is an example of preference formation (that we do not want what
we cannot get). Regardless of whether we try to explain preferences and beliefs, the key
to the economist approach is the prediction that of all the possible actions an individual
faces, he will choose the one that he believes is best at satisfying his aims. Using this
frame, rational choice theorists have lately invaded political science. My question is
then: Where nationalism fit into this picture (if at all).
Being loyal to your ethnic group, Connor's definition of nationalism, is not a belief -
nor is it an aim. Instead, it seems to be an action inspired by emotions (the bond we feel
to those we believe are our relatives). And emotions are not the only factor causing
problem for the narrow economic view of man. Another factor is norms which influence
behaviour without being an aim or a belief. For instance, rational-choice theory cannot
explain why people vote (the effort is simply not worth the small amount of influence from
one vote), while norms of duty ("it is my duty to vote") may explain voting. In
sum, to the question of what drives human beings we can give three main forces: Interests,
passions and reason. [For more on this distinction see Jon Elster (1996): Doing our level
best, The Times Literary Supplement, 29. March, pp. 12-13. Also available from The
Jon Elster Page at URL: www.oocities.org/hmelberg/elster.htm]
Interests are our selfish desires, and it is relatively obvious that our behaviour is
motivated by this factor - for instance, consumer behaviour. That we are motivated by
passions, should also be relatively obvious. For example, revenge and hate are rarely
rational, although often a powerful motivator for behaviour. Lastly, reason can be
associated with impartial rules: We want to have good reasons for our actions and we feel
that these reasons should go beyond pure self-interests. The reason we vote is neither
interests, nor passions, but that we think it is the right think to do.
What is the proper role of nationalism in this extended frame? As mentioned, Connor
believes nationalism is an action associated with an emotion. Emotions, in general, have
what one might call 'action tendencies'. As Jon Elster writes: " The first urge of
the envious person is to destroy the object of his envy or, if that is impossible, to
destroy its owner. The action tendency of shame is to hide or disappear; that of guilt, to
make atonements and repairs; that of anger, to strike: that of fear, to run; that of joy,
to dance." [Elster (1996), Rationality and the emotions, Economic Journal
(September 1996), vol. 106 (438), pp.1386-1397. Also available from the Jon Elster Page.]
The 'action tendency' of feeling related to a person, then, must be to protect and advance
that person; or more generally, to advance and protect the group.
Let me now return to the original question: What is the link - the causal connections -
between nationalism and the events ascribed to nationalism? Building a new state can, in
part, be viewed as facing a series of prisoner dilemma's problems. As an example of this
problem, consider the defence of a community. Could the community be defended without a
central authority with the power to coerce people? Without a central authority, each
individual would have to face the following question when a potential danger loomed on the
horizon: Should I leave my family and defend the community? (Or, should I leave my family
to fight for a new state?) Assume the payoffs can be visualised in the following figure:
Pal
Fight Not fight
Fight 7, 7 1, 10
Igor
Not fight 10, 1 3, 3
The motivation behind these payoffs is that if none of us fight, we will end up in a
relatively bad situation (occupied, but alive; everybody gets 3). If only Igor fights
there is a high probability that he will die, but he will also defend the country so Pal
can live in freedom (so, Igor's expected payoff is 1, while Pal gets 10: freedom and no
fighting). If both fight, they greatly reduce the probability of dying, and the expected
payoff to each is 7 (fighting is costly, but liberty is good).
What will Pal and Igor choose? A rational and selfish person, say Igor, would reason as
follows: If Pal fights, it is best for me not to fight (I get 10 instead of 7). Now, if
Pal chooses not to fight, it is also best for me not to fight (I get 3 instead of 1). So,
whatever Pal chooses it is best for Igor not to fight, and this is what he will choose.
But the same reasoning applies to Pal, whatever Igor does, it is most profitable for him
not to fight, so this is what he will do. The end result is that both choose not to fight
and they both get 3 in payoff. The paradox, of course, is that they could have done much
better if they both had fought (get 7 each). But this solution is not available, if one
person chooses to fight the other has an incentive to cheat - to avoid fighting, to make
the other person carry the burden while you free ride. This shows how individual
rationality can create collectively disastrous results.
What is the solution to this problem? If a state is created with the power to punish
those who cheat, this will change the payoffs so as to make it profitable to fight. In
this way the state can solve the problem of the prisoner's dilemma (as it is called).
Moreover, defence is not the only example of a how individual rationality may create
collectively disastrous results. To mention a few examples: Individually fishermen have an
incentive to fish too much; factories an incentive to over-pollute; and people an
incentive to under-invest in prevention of epidemics. Faced with these problems most
countries have opted for some kind of state intervention.
In what way does nationalism affect the story above? Recall that Connor defines
nationalism in terms of willingness to make sacrifices for the group. Within my frame,
there are at least two ways of visualising this. First, to say that people will choose to
fight even when it is not in their material interests. Second, to argue that being a
nationalist changes that payoffs, so that it makes fighting more profitable - for instance
by including psychic gains from fighting on behalf of your group. In any case, the point
is that ethnic bonds between people can make the co-operative solution more likely since
it makes individuals more willing to make sacrifices on behalf of the group. This shows a
more detailed picture of how nationalism can explain the collapse of empires: As
nationalism grows in new nations, more and more people become willing to make the
sacrifices necessary to fight for nationhood - scarifies that are individually not
profitable but because of nationalism people are no longer propelled solely by selfish and
material cost-benefit considerations.
Can nationalism be studied scientifically?
A person can accept that nationalism is both important and roughly definable, but still
doubt the utility from studying nationalism. This, of course, depends on the aim of our
study. Three such aims are: to explain (historical events), to predict (future events) and
to recommend (finding policies to deal with nationalism).
One reason why focusing on nationalism may run into problems on all three accounts, is
that explanations based on emotions are very hard to quantify. Consider the following
competing arguments:
1. "Person X did Y since his aim was to become rich and action Y was believed to earn
him $1000"
2 "Person X did Y because his emotions made this the most profitable actions"
(Or, "because his emotions made him do Y")
The first argument can be tested, since it is possible to examine what the person would
do if he received less than $1000 to do Y (e.g. give less blood the less you are paid).
The second argument has a circular quality (everything can be explained by saying that
"he felt like doing it"), and it is much more difficult to test. The monetary
payoffs are observable, the emotional payoffs are not. This is one reason why explanations
based on emotions may be less reliable than rational choice explanations.
Lack of quantifiability, and lack of a formal mathematical model, also makes
predictions difficult. Rational choice supporters, on the other hand, have the advantage
that they can make predictions based on the "as-if" assumption. That is, when
they make predictions they need not assume that people actually are rational, only that
they behave "as-if" they were rational. For instance, if we were to predict the
shot and angle of a pool-player, we might find that a quite complicated mathematical model
accurately predicts the strength and angle of his shot, but we need not claim that the
pool player actually goes through these calculations in his head before he makes the shot.
There is, I think, no similar argument available to make predictions based on emotional
behaviour.
Finally, policy recommendations may also be best when we use a framework based on the
belief that people respond to material incentives. For example, assume that you want to
reduce the crime rates in a country. Two alternative proposals are then put forth:
1. To try to change people's norms and attitudes
2. To increase the sanctions (e.g. increase tickets for speeding)
The effect of these measures do not only depend on whether people are motivated by
norms or rational cost/benefit calculations when they commit crimes, but also on the ease,
predictability and relative efficiency of changing norms vs. incentives. One may even
admit that emotions are very important in certain kinds of crime, but as long as there is
some element of cost-benefit considerations the net payoff from focusing on changing the
incentives may be much larger than the net payoff from trying to change attitudes. The
simple reason is that it is hard to change attitudes (since the causal mechanisms are
relatively uncertain, and - moreover - it may take a long time and be very costly), while
it is easy to change the sanctions.
Return now to the original question: To what extent can nationalism be studied
scientifically? I have so far made general arguments to the effect that the lack of
quantifiability and precise models makes this study difficult - whether your aim is to
explain, to predict or to recommend. In the following I want to make this argument a bit
more precise, as well as discussing Connor's arguments on the possibility of scientific
study of nationalism.
On several occasions Connor seems very sympathetic to the argument that nationalism
cannot be studied scientifically. For instance, he discusses an article by Ladis Kristof
to the effect that: "Dissection and logic, even in concert, may prove not only
inadequate but misleading when applied to the study of sensory loyalties" (p. 112).
Similarly, he quoted Freud who writes about "many obscure and emotional forces, which
were the more powerful the less they could be expressed in words" (p. 203). Finally,
Connor himself writes that "... nations, national identity, and nationalism are 'the
stuff that dreams are made of,' and this helps to account both for their emotional appeal
and for their resistance to rational inquiry" (p. 210).
This does not imply that the study of nationalism is worthless. As Connor argues,
nationalism "can be analysed but not explained rationally" (p. 204, my
emphasis). By analysed, he means that it is possible to examine "the type of
catalysists to which it responds ..." (p. 204). In short, what factors make
nationalism grow or decline, and what factors shape its form. This kind of examination is
possible within a "normal" scientific frame, using historical examples, surveys
and statistics.
I am not too convinced by the argument that emotions are resistant to rational
investigation. Too see why we must distinguish between rational (or scientific)
investigation and explanations based on rational choice. Given a set of evidence, I may
rationally conclude that a person was motivated by love (or hate) when he did X.
Rationality or scientific investigation, is then simply a way of evaluating evidence.
There is nothing inherently impossible in "rationally" concluding that people
sometimes are "irrational" - in fact there is a great deal of evidence which
points in this direction (see, for instance, experiments by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky).
Conclusion
I started with the question of why I should be interested in nationalism. While I think
nationalism both has important consequences, and that it is possible to gain a rough
understanding of what it is, I am less certain whether a focus on nationalism is
"useful" if the aim is to find reliable scientific theories that can be used to
shape policy. Assume, for the sake of argument, that we after much work have a
"scientifically" good argument that the situation in Kazakhstan would improve if
they started to follow the civic model of national integration. The problem, of course, is
that the elite need not be motivated by the "scientifically" best policy, but
simply by more brute considerations of what is best for the elite and how they can
maintain their power. In sum, I am not yet convinced that the study of nationalism is
useful from a policy perspective, but I am more convinced that it is important from a
historian's standpoint - to explain historical events. However, even there doubts remain
about its reliability. But, then again, no explanation is certain!
A note on some possible references
A. Rorty has edited a book called Explaining Emotions which is recommended by Jon
Elster (I have not read it yet). R. Hardin and M. Hechter have both written on the
relationship between rational choice and nationalim.
[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1997), Nationalism: Is it definable,
important and worthy of attention?, www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/971210.htm]