The movement for strengthening the German fleet forms a link in the chain of our destinies, and that the initiation of this movement coincides with a great turning-point in the history of sea-trade and sea-control...May the Germans lay hold of this histori

The movement for strengthening the German fleet forms a link in the chain of our destinies, and that the initiation of this movement coincides with a great turning-point in the history of sea-trade and sea-control...May the Germans lay hold of this historic moment.
-Professor Friedrich Ratzel^[1]

The construction of a powerful German navy represented the fruition of the young Empire’s industrial capacity and an emblem of its success and ambitions. With the emergence of a unified German Empire in 1870, an economic and military juggernaut disrupted the delicately calibrated balance of power in Europe. The growth of German industry and technology blossomed into dominance in many economic niches; however, it was the application of this industrial might for military purposes that created the greatest concern amongst the European powers. The most prominent symbol of the intertwining of industry with the military was the gargantuan Krupp firm, the primary builder of Germany’s fleet. While the Prussian dominated army had already proved itself in the Franco-Prussian War, the German navy was only beginning to take shape as Europe moved toward the twentieth century. The creation of a Mahanian fleet of capital ships and the development of the German U-boat caused growing concern for the world’s greatest maritime power, Britain. These same developments had a profound effect on the national consciousness as evidenced by the predominantly positive public opinion concerning the navy.
Since the formation of the Empire, Germany had constantly expanded in several different areas. This is summarized in Michael Hughes’ work, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945 (1988), “What differentiated Germany from most of its neighbors was the size of its population and resources, ...its military and economic power and the advanced standards of its scientific and technical education.”^[2] Krupp and German industry grew at an astounding rate, soon surpassing the other Continental powers and Britain in output and quality. The Franco-Prussian war, German weaponry and the development of the renowned General Staff secured the German army’s dominant position in Europe. The army’s constant research of new arms, reevaluation of its practices and numerous reforms insured its position as the preeminent fighting force in the world. These same methods were later employed in the building and maintenance of the German navy to address one of the most underdeveloped areas of the nation’s power, the acquisition of colonies. While the Germans possessed some colonies, the prevailing popular sentiment clamored for the addition of new territories. Influenced by the work of American author Alfred Thayer Mahan, Kaiser Wilhelm II believed that the most effective tool to attain and protect new colonies was a powerful navy.
In this paper I will argue that the building of the German navy by Krupp served to divert the German public’s attention from allegations of profiteering and created a surge of nationalism while allowing the firm to continue its unscrupulous former practices. The industrial giant was able to harness these popular sentiments and used them to craft an image of the corporation carrying the banner of Teutonic culture and forging a new and glorious position for Germany. The development of the German navy and its impact on the growth of nationalism in the Empire provides insight into the relationship between and acceptance of new military technology into German society. Throughout the concluding years of the nineteenth century, Krupp came under increasing public scrutiny due to its alleged war profiteering and other questionable business practices. The public’s suspicion lay dormant following the beginning of the construction of the German fleet, but was reawakened by the Kornwalzer scandal, which placed Krupp under investigation by the Reichstag. However, due to the intervention of the Kaiser and Krupp’s significance in the foundation of German nationalism, the scandal disappeared. Kornwalzer represented the realization for Krupp that its assumption of the mantle of a national icon had effectively silenced the voices that had formerly tainted its image. Krupp used the German navy as the vehicle to enable this transition, not only building the fleet, but also currying favor with the German public by funding organizations such as the Navy League. Though the Kornwalzer affair threatened to unravel the protective cloak that Krupp had wrapped around itself, its abatement signaled the completion of Krupp’s transformation. The building of the German navy satisfied the dual purpose of providing Germany with a means to challenge those who would refuse it its “place in the sun” and offering Krupp an instrument to cleanse its image.
Krupp’s position as the preeminent representation of German industry is clearly illustrated in the observation, “The Ruhr is Essen. Essen is Krupp.”^[3] Germany’s industrial center in the Ruhr valley offered the technical expertise and immense resources of the nation’s industrial behemoth, without which the German navy would have remained merely a dream. Through an analysis of the organization and operation of Krupp I will explore its changing place in public opinion from an infamous “Merchant of Death” to the builder of Germany’s salvation. The completion of this metamorphosis represents the significance of the Kornwalzer affair as evidence of the company’s purified image. Continuing with a comparison of German and British industry and testaments of the superiority of Krupp products, I will show the firm’s dominance in armor and gun manufacture that bolstered hopes of challenging other naval powers and facilitated the change in public opinion. These various elements of Krupp’s practices and position in the world and German economy combine to show the transition in public opinion prior to World War I. An investigation of the application and performance of the naval technology in preparation for and during the global conflagration introduces the strategy and ambitions of the navy itself and will further cement the intimate union of Krupp and the navy. I will accomplish this by analyzing the integration of Krupp goods into a fleet built on the Mahanian archetype, and offer a view of their reception by the navy. The construction of the navy by Krupp allowed the firm to take nearly sole responsibility for the creation of Germany’s deliverance through sea power. It is this close connection between builder and product that elevated Krupp’s place in public thought. In order to form the link between Krupp’s changing image and the navy, I will construct the nationalistic views of the Kaiser, a vocal advocate of naval expansion and Krupp. The Kaiser’s influence helped to insure the preservation of the company’s popularity, keeping both German nationalism and Wilhelm’s dream of world dominance alive. Wilhelm II’s involvement with the firm signifies a molding force on the public consciousness from a throne that relied on Krupp militarily and as a rising icon of morale. Furthermore, I will delve into the intricacies of Krupp’s funding of the Navy League and use of other outlets of popular opinion to form a picture of the impact the navy had on German nationalism. Through its manipulation of the myriad facets of Germany’s industry, military, and society and essential position in the plans of the Kaiser and other German officials, Krupp washed away its transgressions with seawater.
When investigating the relationship between the German navy and nationalism, it is important to define key elements of Mahanian theory in order to better understand the underlying doctrine that made the navy an enticing and effective instrument for Krupp and captured the public’s imagination. Mahan’s book changed the manner in which nation’s viewed their navies, placing the means to control the sea as the strategic advantage of the future. Robert Massie’s book, Dreadnought (1991) provides a succinct description of Mahan’s famous work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1890), “Mahan traced the rise and fall of maritime powers in the past and demonstrated that the state which controlled the seas controlled its own fate.”^[4] As a recently emerged and restless power, Germany felt that it could not afford to be without a powerful navy. Bereft of such an instrument, the Empire would be relegated to a subordinate position despite the effectiveness of its army. An important component of the doctrine and one which Mahan placed considerable emphasis upon was the control of “sea-lanes of communication.” The tactical importance of the sea-lanes is illustrated by his statement that:
“The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others.”^[5]
By creating a strong navy, Germany could exert its influence upon the sea-lanes allowing it to pursue its colonial interests unhindered by the naval power of other nations. Mahan also specified the necessary composition of a navy that could undertake the task of controlling the sea-lanes. The Mahanian “fleet-in-being” consisted primarily of capital ships, which could fulfill the ideal espoused by Clausewitz of the “decisive battle.”^[6]
The most common form of naval engagement before the publishing of Mahan’s work was guerre de course, which involved the raiding of an enemy’s commercial fleet. Mahan dismissed these actions since, “such ships, having little power to defend themselves, need a refuge or point of support near at hand.”^[7] Before World War I, the architect of the German fleet, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, largely neglected the U-boat in favor of the capital ships called for by Mahan. However, despite the adherence of the builders of Germany’s navy to almost all of Mahanian theory, the fleet’s involvement in World War I was based around guerre de course. The pursuit of this type of action was prompted by the success of the German U-boats against British shipping. However, The guidance of Mahanian doctrine is evident in the desire and basis for building a navy and in the composition of the German fleet prior to World War I. German industry was geared toward producing thickly armored and heavily armed vessels that could challenge those of any other navy. Krupp’s dominance in armor production and its continual innovation in naval technology were instrumental in the rapid rise of the German navy. The appeal of the navy to both government figures and the German public was built on the promises of Mahan and fueled by the meteoric progress of the navy and the early successes of the First World War. The public’s enthusiasm for the navy and its potential ensured that Krupp would remain perched on the altar of nationalism. This is shown in Roland Usher’s assertion in Pan-Germanism (1913) that, “Germany’s greatest strength, however, lies as her rulers think, in the hearty cooperation of the German people in the great scheme. They seem all to be willing to sacrifice and suffer whatever may be necessary for the realization of the great vision.”^[8] The advancement of German maritime power by Krupp and the application of naval technology established a national emblem that had a profound effect on German nationalism.

Amboß des Reich^[9]

Since the late sixteenth century, the Krupp family of Essen had provided first the Prussian and later the German army with their tools of war. The coming of the German Empire and the unification of the formerly disjointed resources within its newly established boundaries signaled the Empire’s vault into the upper echelons of industrial powers. In the years between 1873 and 1878, the production of steel by Krupp alone more than doubled, illustrating the potency of the galvanized German industry (see Appendix).^[10] Alfred Krupp primarily engineered the careful management behind this rapid growth; however, it was his son Friedrich Alfred Krupp who would guide the firm through the latter part of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. In his work, The Arms of Krupp (1968), William Manchester recounts the instructions Alfred gave his young son, “Fritz must cultivate distrust of people so that ‘Nobody will be able to fool you,’ and he should learn to think out ‘every possibility in advance, generally ten years in advance’...Victory, for a sole proprietor, meant absolute rule of his domain.”^[11] The emphasis placed on planning several years into the future and attaining complete dominance of one’s industry are evident in the business practices of the Krupp firm under Friedrich. These principles resulted in the sometimes ruthless quest for profit and unscrupulous methods of making an extra mark. Krupp’s adeptness and willingness to employ procedures in the spirit of his father’s instructions are the basis for the rise of accusations of profiteering.
The public’s suspicions of unfair business practices were not without evidence. Perhaps one of the most grievous acts of profiteering made by Krupp was revealed during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Bernhard Menne describes the public outcry stemming from Krupp’s actions in Blood and Steel (1938), “Shortly after the conclusion of the Boxer Rebellion, which had cost Germany so many lives, the Chinese Minister in Berlin went to Essen, where the firm of Krupp accepted a large contract for the rearmament of China regardless of popular indignation recently aroused by the shelling of the gunboat ‘Iltis’ by Chinese guns of Krupp make.”^[12] Krupp’s involvement in the Boxer Rebellion was damaging for two reasons. The first is that the contract to rearm the Chinese was an affront to national security, offering advanced weaponry to a country with known hostile elements. The second is tied to the attack on the Iltis by Boxers armed with Krupp artillery. Not only did this incident compound the potentially serious implications of the contract that was established, it also uncovered the unsettling truth that Krupp was profiting through the deaths of German soldiers. The entire situation tainted the image of Krupp whose intimate connection with the condition of the German army had fixed the firm in a position of national respect.
Krupp’s disregard for national security in favor of turning a profit is illustrated in other actions by the firm and caused further alienation of the public. During the early stages of construction of the German fleet at the turn of the century, Krupp conducted negotiations with several foreign governments regarding its methods of armor manufacture. Menne reveals that, “The leading armour-plate works in England, the United States, France, Russia, Austria, and Italy acquired licences [sic] under Krupp patents covering the production of armour.”^[13] While the list of foreign governments, many of whom bordered Germany, is long, most surprising among them is the inclusion of the “hereditary enemy,” France. Not only was France included, “Paris even got preference, as a French licence [sic] was sold and French engineers were undergoing special instruction at the Essen works before any other country, Germany included, took out a licence [sic].”^[14] Krupp’s actions represented an affront to several facets of German national security. The firm’s agreement with other companies in foreign nations that bordered on the Empire exacerbated the dangers of encirclement that were so greatly feared by the German government. Furthermore, providing access to military technology utilized by the Empire’s armed forces to other nations and training those nations’ engineers in the techniques of production placed Germany at a severe disadvantage in terms of arms superiority. In return for its information and materials, Krupp merely expected loyal customers. The firm’s world superiority in armor and advanced ordnance and artillery products established a system where money was the only item offered by foreign buyers. These elements combined to form a significant chink in Germany’s empire and demonstrate Krupp’s continued practice of placing business before its country.
Friedrich Krupp’s disregard for the security of the German Empire furthered the degradation of the Krupp name and hardened the association drawn between the company and profiteering. In addition to the licensing of armor production information, Krupp concluded another agreement with a foreign firm in 1902. Friedrich entered negotiations with the English firm Albert Vickers, chairman of the Harvey United Steel Company, to form a munitions trust. The two companies would exchange information about the production of munitions and new armor technology. The latter part of the agreement had the profound implication that England would have the necessary knowledge to create ordnance capable of penetrating the newest German armor. William Manchester describes another component of the Krupp-Vickers agreement, “Fritz’s engineers had perfected the finest time fuses in the world, and Albert Vickers liked them so much that he wanted his customers to have them...Vickers would stamp each shell KPz (Krupp patent fuse), and pay Essen one shilling-threepence for each one fired.”^[15] Similar to the consequences of the attack on the Iltis by the Chinese with Krupp guns, the royalty to be paid by Vickers would be largely built on German deaths in the First World War.
The endangerment of national security and profit from the deaths of fellow citizens did not represent the full extent of the results of Krupp’s business tactics. The firm’s reputation was further sullied when it was revealed that it was cheating the German government to increase its profit. In Blood and Steel, Menne recounts that in 1900, “The Catholic newspaper, Kölnische Volkszeitung, began to reckon out Krupp’s profits. In nickel steel alone these worked out at the net amount of 99 million marks in sixteen years, equivalent to a net annual profit of six millions...out of a total contract expenditure of 279 millions...no less than 176 millions constituted net profit.”^[16] The figures presented by the newspaper demonstrated that Krupp was selling armor to the German government at a greatly inflated price. Though an attempt was made to force Krupp to sell their product at a sum closer to its value, “The fact that even these reduced prices included a big margin of profit was sufficiently demonstrated in the case of the armour plate, where a price reduction from 2320 to 1920 marks paled into insignificance beside the fact that the cost of production was only 900 marks.”^[17] The marketing of Krupp goods at over twice their value to the German government aroused suspicions of disloyalty to the Empire, adding another stain to the crumbling edifice of the firm.
The various actions that soiled the reputation of Krupp were slowly erased by the growth of the German navy and shall be dealt with in more detail below. The transition of Krupp from a merchant of death to a harbinger of good tidings and builder of Germany’s future paralleled the development of the German fleet. However, the process was not a completely smooth one. In 1912, the firm, now under the leadership of Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach^[18], was suddenly embroiled in another scandal, the Kornwalzer affair in which, “Irrefutable evidence appeared proving that Essen agents had stolen over a thousand documents from War Office files.”^[19] Krupp was again in the position of threatening national security to further its business success. Despite the overwhelming evidence and the testimony of several key members of the company, including Krupp’s Berlin sales manager Maximilian Brandt, “No further serious enquiries [sic] were made into [the affair].”^[20] How could the German government allow Krupp to slip away when it finally had the company firmly in its grasp? This can be explained by Menne’s statement that, “The powerful friends of the threatened firm had come into action to quash the whole affair.”^[21] Among these friends was the Kaiser himself who placed the Krupp family behind his “Shield of Honor” to protect them and their company from their enemies in the Reichstag.
The Kaiser’s motivation in protecting the company consisted of two main purposes. The first was that “on February 3^rd, 1908, William II instructed the Deutsche Bank to purchase Krupp shares to the value of 50,000 marks.”^[22] As an investor in the company, the Kaiser had an interest in preventing it from coming to any harm that he could prevent. Furthermore, the damage that the Krupp name would be subjected to could disrupt the framework of nationalism that had been carefully constructed. Manchester quotes the leader of the Social Democrats, Karl Liebknecht, “Obviously it is impossible without alluding to Krupp, to sing all those patriotic hymns lauding Germany which are customary in veterans’ associations, Young German clubs, and other such military societies. The collapse of the good name of Krupp would unquestionably deal a staggering blow to the brand of patriotism we Germans have patented.”^[23] This statement illustrates the degree to which Krupp had been infused into German society and nationalism. The Kaiser and Germany could not allow Krupp to falter or the nation would as well. In order to prevent such a disaster, the Kaiser exerted his influence so that the press was never informed of the scandal, which quietly died away. The conclusion of the Kornwalzer affair demonstrates the near invulnerability enjoyed by Krupp and signaled to the firm that the banner of nationalism it now carried was as protective as the company’s armor plate.
Having established the scandals provoked by Krupp’s business tactics and their implications, it is now possible to explore the resources that the firm provided its vehicle of absolution, the German navy. Despite the selling of technology to other nations and the greatly inflated prices that the German government was subjected to, Krupp materials were widely recognized as the superior brand in the world. In addition to the quality of Krupp goods, all of German industry participated in a surge of productivity that challenged the insular industrial power, Great Britain. Robert Massie observes that:
“In 1871, British coal dominated world markets with production of 112 million tons a year; Germany, the world’s second-largest producer of coal, mined 34 million tons. By 1890, German coal production was half of Britain’s; by 1913 it was equal...In 1890, Britain produced 3.6 million tons of steel a year, Germany about two thirds of that...In 1914, Germany (14 million tons) produced more than twice as much steel as Britain (6.5 million tons).”^[24]

The flexing of German industrial might threatened Britain both industrially and militarily as coal and steel were essential to conducting the operations of both pursuits. In the midst of the swirl of activity in Germany, Krupp exploited the increase of materials to produce high-quality products in large quantity. The level of advancement of Krupp products when compared with those of the rest of the world is illustrated by The Scientific American’s article on the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893, “Germany takes the lead, in extent, variety, cost, and superiority in almost every characteristic. Of the private exhibitions, Krupp, the great metal manufacturer of Germany, stands at the head...its greatness almost dwarfs all other exhibits in the same line.”^[25] Krupp focused this superiority of materials and products into the construction of the German fleet.
Krupp’s unquestioned reign as king of German industry rested on the complete dominance its goods enjoyed in the market. The armor plating and guns that emerged from the works at Essen were transformed into the powerful warships of the German navy. The underlying reasons of Krupp’s control of weapons production are revealed by Gary Weir, “Besides its monopoly of armor and gun supply, the technicians of the Krupp firm were the only ones in Germany who could properly assemble and install heavy guns on naval vessels.”^[26]Krupp’s stranglehold on the means of production made it the only choice for building the ships of the German navy. Germany recognized that it could not be without the services of the firm if it wished to build a powerful fleet. A key component in the construction of the ships was their armor plating. Krupp had moved from nickel steel, a very resilient armor, to even stronger steel that was produced with a high carbon content. The latter form was subjected to test firings at the Chicago World’s Fair where, “The firm demonstrated this ostensibly prefect armour plate and offered it to the world as “Krupp-Armour” with a thirty per cent. superiority over Harvey steel.”^[27] In addition to the dominance of Krupp armor, the firm’s guns were also highly reputed. Though prior to the building of the fleet, the company had focused on land-based artillery, manufacture was easily translated to service maritime needs. The architect of the German navy, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz praised the Krupp guns, “Whole volumes might be written to indicate in detail how we have made full use of the vast superiority of our Krupp guns.”^[28] The combination of resources and technical knowledge enabled Krupp to construct a modern fleet that stood poised to challenge Britain, the mistress of the seas.

On and Below the Sea

Having examined the scandals that threatened Krupp and exploring the material resources that Krupp offered the German navy, it is important to have an understanding of how the latter were employed in the construction of Krupp’s instrument to repair its image. In addition to the building of the fleet, it is also necessary to focus on the governing German strategy and the actual use of the warships before discussing their impact on nationalism. German sentiment concerning the navy is captured in a letter from Admiral von Tirpitz to Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, “The Fleet was created as a fighting force, for only by a naval battle can Germany achieve any result.”^[29] This reflects the enthusiasm for the navy epitomized by the Kaiser'’ assertion that Germany’s future was on the water. The Kaiser relied on Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz to use the power of Krupp to create a force capable of challenging any other navy.
Before investigating the development of the German navy, an outline of the German’s strategy and the international reception of the fleet provides the framework for the application of Krupp technology. The most important of the guiding principles is the development of the “risk theory” by Admiral von Tirpitz. Tirpitz first put forth the idea in 1894 in “Service Memo IX,” stating that, “It is not absolutely necessary that the German battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power because a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against us.”^[30] Tirpitz crafted the risk theory around the premise that another nation’s forces would be spread out amongst its territorial possessions, a weakness of Mahanian theory. Therefore, Germany need not attempt to out-build its competitors, a significant force of naval vessels would be sufficient to protect the Empire’s interests. However, Tirpitz also cautioned against the pursuit of commerce raiding, citing the shortage of available bases for German cruisers. In accordance with Mahan, Tirpitz strongly advocated the building of capital ships, asserting that, “The military situation against England demands battleships in as great a number as possible.”^[31] The construction of battleships was also useful for Krupp’s purposes. Not only would the large ships need to be armored with Krupp steel, they also required a large amounts of guns that only Krupp could manufacture and install. In addition to this, following the launching of the first modern battleship, the English Dreadnought, capital ships gained a heightened sense of majesty and modernity. These feelings allowed Krupp to ensnare the public’s attention with the products of its shipyards while continuing to reap a large profit.
The enchantment of the German people and government by the battleship facilitated the continuation of forming naval strategy around a fleet composed of the steel giants. Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener exemplified the belief in the power of the battleship, remarking that, “A strategic offensive serves to change the strategic position; a strategic defensive serves to adhere to and stagnate in the strategic position.”^[32] The statement reveals the urge to continue to advance and change one’s position, an ideal that was a cornerstone of the German army. Tirpitz and the Reichsmarineamt (Imperial Naval Office) reasoned that the realization of this principle on the seas would best be accomplished through their fleet of battleships. The ease with which Krupp was able to answer Tirpitz’s call for capital ships is explained by the “floating battery” described by Alfred Krupp shortly before his death. Though originally scoffed at, the dying man’s image was comparable to the modern battleship, “The ship must be of such a size that she has a sufficient number of cells to keep her above water...[a] gun on the hollow island.”^[33] Though crude, Alfred Krupp’s idea gave a template that would be manifested in the Dreadnought. The cells that are referred to continue to be used in modern warships, preventing the rapid flooding of compartments and thus limiting the effects of an enemy attack. With Alfred’s vision in hand, Krupp was able to fulfill the German government’s call for dreadnoughts of its own.
Germany’s concentration on battleships represented an expression of German nationalism as the construction of the fleet sparked an arms race between the Empire and Britain. The Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 provided Tirpitz with the authority to construct a fleet of capital ships, a task that he and Krupp began with great speed. The German Navy Laws of 1907, 1908, and 1909 supplemented the first two, calling for the completion of eight battleships and four battle cruisers that rivaled those possessed by the English. The swift pace with which the German warships were completed caused growing concern for Great Britain. Massie describes the Navy Scare of 1909 in Dreadnought, “If the British and German programs for 1909 each included four new ships, then in 1912, when all these ships were completed, Germany would possess thirteen dreadnoughts and Britain sixteen.”^[34] Since the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had committed itself to having enough ships to match those of its two closest rivals combined. The expansion of the German navy crushed the possibility of continuing the policy and threw the island nation into panic. The situation was further darkened by the observation of Reginald MacKenna, who wrote the Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey, “If by any spurt Germany can once catch us up, we have no longer any such superior building capacity as would ensure our supremacy.”^[35] The English panic was cause for pride on the Continent and respect for German industry, symbolized by Krupp’s titanic presence.

It is possible to discuss the application of Krupp technology in World War I and its effects with this understanding of the foundation of German naval strategy and examination of the British reaction to the construction of the German navy. The role of the German navy in the First World War reveals a nearly complete reversal from the intentions of Admiral von Tirpitz and the architects of the pre-war navy. The battleships of the German High Seas Fleet remained moored at their piers for a large part of the war. Tirpitz claimed that the mere presence of the Mahanian modeled “fleet-in-being” demonstrated the “high opinion held of its capacities by the enemy...[as] the English avoided a meeting.” ^[36] The Admiral also noted that the English placed half a million more men in their shipyards during the war “a figure involving a very great relief to our Western Front.”^[37] These assertions bear witness to the firm hold that Mahan’s emphasis on capital ships and their effectiveness had on the minds of the German high command. Though these results may have been prompted by the existence of the German fleet, Tirpitz neglects to mention the absence of a decisive battle. The Battle of Jutland (1916) was the closest the German navy came to realizing the meeting of Mahanian and Clausewitzian doctrine, but the confrontation proved a draw with both sides claiming victory. The Kaiser and Tirpitz brilliantly crafted the results of the battle into nationalistic propaganda. The Kaiser cabled Krupp that, “I wish to place on record that our success was due to our excellent guns and armour and more especially to the destructive effect of our shells. The battle is, therefore, also a triumph for the Krupp works.”^[38] Tirpitz also commented on the superiority of the materials that had been forged in the Essen works. Despite the indecisive engagement at Jutland, Krupp was tied through its ships to what was being hailed as a great German victory. The performance of Krupp’s battleships and the immediate connection made to the company itself illustrates the degree of intimacy to which the firm was associated with the navy.
Turning from the largely unused battleships of the High Seas Fleet to another component of the German navy, the U-boat affords another link between Krupp and nationalism. While the presence of the battle fleet and the trumpeting of success following the Battle of Jutland continued to stoke the patriotic furnaces of Germany, the submarine was nearly the only means of maritime confrontation used by the Empire. The successes enjoyed by the submarines were beneficial to Krupp as the company was able to expand its factories to accommodate all the processes of producing the craft, only having to subcontract the manufacture of the electrical propulsion systems.^[39] Prior to the First World War, Krupp had developed a diesel engine suitable for the constricted spaces of the U-boats and composed of newly developed stainless steel. Even in the development of the submarine, Krupp continued to practice its ruthless business tactics, “Krupp must become the world’s greatest producer of diesel engines, and it was done. ‘Rustless’ (stainless) steel was the coming thing, [Gustav] insisted that he have a patent for that, too, and in 1912 he got it.”^[40] Despite the firm’s severe procedures, the results quieted any potential questions from the public who became as enraptured with the almost magical submersible as they had with the mighty battleships. Though Tirpitz had vehemently argued against investing in the U-boat program as late as September 1914, he quickly changed his viewpoint after the early successes of the weapon and its positive reception by the German public.
To gain a fuller perspective of the U-boats and their use, it is helpful to probe the perspective of those who served on them. In How Germany Makes War (1914), Friedrich von Bernhardi establishes the duty of a German service-member, “Acting with self-reliance in the sense and spirit of General Headquarters, and of the uniform plan of battle known to us, is the decisive factor in modern battle.”^[41] The German reputation for self-reliance within a framework of obedience to the state and Kaiser is aptly captured in the role of the submarine commander. In The Journal of Submarine Commander Von Forstner (1917), Von Forstner observes, “[The commander] becomes responsible for every action which is taken, and for many weeks no orders reach him from his superiors. He is unable to ask any one’s advice...he stands alone.”^[42] The nature of submarine warfare necessitated the utmost trust in the men that commanded the U-boats and the vessels themselves. By designating Krupp to produce Germany’s U-boat fleet, the German government, whether consciously or unconsciously, demonstrated its firm belief in the company.

The close relationship between Krupp and the navy and the powerful effect of the latter on nationalism pulled the image of the firm from scandal to almost unquestioned purity. Even the potential of the Kornwalzer affair slicing the tether that bound Krupp to the soaring German nationalism was deflected, leaving the company unscathed. The analysis of nationalism and Krupp can be separated into that espoused by the Kaiser and his court, and that which was carried aloft by the German people. In addition to this Krupp directly tied itself to German nationalism by naming the shipyards it built at Kiel in 1897, Germaniawerft. The incorporation of the mythological figure of Germania into the Krupp works had several implications. It is significant that Krupp chose to call the sites where it constructed the German navy by a name that would instantly be associated with German pride. Furthermore, the name evokes the similar national icon of Britain, Britannia. This parallel mirrors the confrontation between the navies of the two nations and placed Krupp, the creator of both the maritime and land-based components of Germany’s power, in the position of defending Germania from foreign powers. This image provided the foundation for the cleansing of Krupp’s reputation through the navy.
One of the biggest advocates of the construction of a German fleet was the “sailor prince,” Kaiser Wilhelm II. In addition to his support of the navy, the Kaiser recognized the importance of Krupp to both the land and naval forces of the Reich and was willing to defend the company as evidenced by the Kornwalzer affair. Wilhelm attributed his fascination with the navy to a holiday in Portsmouth, England as a child, “I gazed speechlessly...the tour of the ship...revealed to me an entirely new world...massive rigging, the long tier of fund with their heavy polished muzzles.”^[45] The young prince would carry these impressions to the throne, where they would later be awoken and set ablaze by the treatise published by Mahan in 1890. The Kaiser’s attachment to the navy is illustrated in his proclamation to the German people that, “Germany’s future lies on the water.”^[46] This statement realized the potential embodied in the promise Mahan’s theory made, that the nation, which controlled the seas would rise above its rivals. The realization of this vision was continued by Friedrich’s successor, Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach. Following the transfer of power to Gustav through his marriage to Friedrich’s daughter Bertha in 1906, the Kaiser held a banquet and toasted the heiress, “May you be successful, my dear daughter, in maintaining the works at the high standard of efficiency which they have attained and in continuing to supply our German Fatherland with offensive and defensive weapons of a quality and performance unapproached by those of any other nation!”^[47] The Kaiser’s reference to Bertha by the familial “daughter” attests to the strength of the bond that Wilhelm felt with the “anvil of the Reich.” Kaiser Wilhelm recognized the importance not only of Krupp’s material value, but also its potential for nationalistic propaganda as the armory of the navy, and sought to tie himself to the company to the benefit of both. The enthusiasm of the “sailor-prince” for the navy and the advanced fleet supplied by Krupp infused German nationalism with new vigor, proving beneficial to the company both financially and in its public relations.
In addition to the Kaiser’s personal feelings, it is useful to analyze how he expressed these nationalistic sentiments to his subjects. In 1911, Wilhelm ordered the German gunboat Panther to enter the harbor of Agadir in Morocco, a French protectorate. The Kaiser asserted that he had sailed to the port to protect European interests; however, his voyage really represented Germany’s insistence on inclusion in colonial affairs. Wilhelm transmitted this to the public, associating his claim with the growing German navy and asserting that Germany needed “to strengthen our fleet still further in the future, so that we may rest assured that no one will dispute with us that place in the sun which is rightly our due.”^[48] The Kaiser’s call for the further expansion of the German fleet urged the German people to devote themselves to its construction in order to reap the benefits of their “place in the sun.” Previous to this confrontation, the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George repeatedly called for an end to the production of German warships following the Panic of 1909. Twisting Lloyd George’s suggestions to garner public support, the Kaiser responded, “If England only intends graciously to hold out her hand to us with the indication that we should curtail our fleet, then this is an excessive impudence, which contains a great insult for the German people and its Kaiser.”^[49] Wilhelm II’s provocative words during the Moroccan Crisis and the naval arms race demonstrate his belief in the power of the German fleet and the fostering of nationalism around the navy.
The nationalism created by the building of the navy and fanned by the advocacy of the Kaiser revealed itself through several outlets in German society. Krupp’s position as the builder of the navy earned it a fair portion of the nationalistic fervor, “Krupp is the matador of the international armament industry, pre-eminent in every department.”^[50] This statement made by the leader of the Social Democrats, Karl Lieberknecht, in 1914, proves the replacement of the public’s conception of Krupp as a war monger and profiteer by the image of a powerful industrial leader and asset to the nation. The positive position held by Krupp was largely furnished through its connection with the navy as demonstrated by another facet of German nationalism, the Navy League. The League was created during the debate in the Reichstag over the passage of the Navy Bill of 1898. The German fleet’s ability to capture the public is shown by the following Navy Bill of 1900, “In its drive for the passage of this law, the Navy League alone increased its private membership by more than 155,000...and the circulation of its periodical, Die Flotte, grew by 175,000 copies.”^[51] To place the exposure the Navy League gained in perspective, MacLaren writes in Germanism From Within (1916), “[Die Flotte’s] circulation is equal to that of Germany’s four leading daily papers combined.”^[52] The relationship between Krupp and the Navy League is similar to that between the company and the navy itself. As with Germany’s warships, the firm provided the resources for and created the Navy League. Krupp now controlled not only a vehicle to stimulate nationalism and reverse attacks on its image, but also the means to actively promote the navy through a popular movement. While Krupp was as Massie describes it, “a major contributor” to the League, “[The Navy League] represented part of a wider, independently mobilized populist movement of which the other patriotic societies, the Pan-German League and the Army League, in particular, were manifestations.”^[53] However, the Navy League was not the only organ of propaganda employed by Krupp to further its purposes. Krupp’s newspaper Berliner Neueste Nachrichten used tactics such as referring to the English as Seeräuber (pirates) to stimulate more support for the navy.^[54] Krupp’s funding of the popular movement embodied by the Navy League and the publication of its own jingoistic paper facilitated the successful rebuilding of its image through the nationalism generated by the construction of the German navy.
The building of the German navy in the years preceding World War I created a massive rise of German nationalism. The fleet represented the potential to realize the promises of Mahan and the means to assert Germany’s place amongst the colonial powers. The driving force behind the construction of the navy was the almost limitless resources and advanced technology of the industrial giant Krupp. Without the technical capabilities of the Germaniawerft shipyards, the navy would have remained an intangible dream. The German public recognized the instrumental contribution made by Krupp, causing the fortunes of the company to become inextricably bound to those of the navy. The continuation of popular support for the German fleet throughout the pre-war years and the First World War laundered the firm’s soiled image, removing the stains of war profiteering that had clung to it. However, underneath the veil of nationalism created by the navy, Krupp continued to conduct its ruthless business tactics, reveling in both the financial and public relations gains it made. Despite this, the company’s association with the German fleet, and the Kaiser’s recognition of the Krupp’s importance to the stability of nationalism rendered the firm’s purified image nearly impregnable to attack as shown by the Kornwalzer affair.
Krupp’s financial, technological, and promotional investment in the German navy strongly supports the firm’s intentional use of the navy as a means to reconstruct its damaged image. The disparate public conceptions of Krupp before and after the start of Germany’s shipbuilding program illustrate the effectiveness of the company’s strategy. By firmly binding itself to a revered object of German aspirations and pride, Krupp was able to transform itself in the eye of the populace while continuing to benefit from the same practices it had earlier been condemned for. The anvil of the Reich answered Mahan’s call and placed its steel in the water on which the German Empire’s hopes floated.