What is the alleged problem about mind-body interaction?
Is it really a problem?
The problem about mind-body interaction is one of undeterminable causation.
Dualist philosophy propounds a physical body and a non-physical mind as constituting ‘the person’. The problem arises simply as to how such different things as the physical and non-physical, polar opposites, could interact.
‘If the body and soul are two
distinct things, then the one could in pinrciple
exist without the other’ pp3
The ‘ ‘two-component’
picture of the person goes clean against the contemporary scientific view of
man as part of the natural world’ à non-physical part of NW (!?)p4
‘It seems gratuitous to
suppose that humans are marked off from the rest of nature by possessing an
extra non-physical component, which somehow underlies and explains their
actions’ p4…don’t suppose that then; all living (and non-living?) things
have this non-physical component…and this NPC may not
even explain actions…after all, every step allows another…
‘The working presumption
of the sciences is that human behaviour can in principle be explained without
any reference to non-bodily entities’ p4…’this presumption seems very well
supported by the continuing developments of progressively more detailed
accounts of the biological bases of behaviour’ p4…but it’s not…despite all
our advances in neurophysiology, psychochemistry and
psychoanalysis, we’re no closer to any proper understanding of human
behaviour…we just find that the deeper we go, the more there is…
(If science-stance right,
‘reject all talk of the mind as a non-physical entity’p4??
Naturalism problem—if mind
physical, to physical and biological laws, is this not determinism, ruining
free will?...well, like all things that be, cannot
the non-physical also be bound by its laws and limits? We suppose that
deterministic potential ends at the physical…this need not be the case!)
Concerning mind-body
interaction, there is not so much a problem with the issue, but with our
approach to it…philosophically, we tend to address MBIP
through the rationalist, materialist, scientific view…which we presumptuously
take to be accurate. We are denying a non-materialist view, and shooting
ourselves in the foot…
‘The problem of the relation
between mind and body arises because some familiar ways of thinking of
ourselves as contrasted with our bodies seem to conflict with what we are
inclined to say in our more scientific moments’ p5
It is apparent that mental events can cause physical events: we recall a happy memory and smile; we feel pain and wince. Conversely, physical events can cause mental events: light passing through our eyes creates visual images in our mind; our stomach, being empty, creates the feeling of hunger. Mind-body causation is, seemingly, assured and two-way. Indeed, our lives consist of the reaction of body to mind, and of mind to body.
However, mind-body causality, though instinctively undeniable, is vaguely described. In the physical world we can explore and define causation. A mosquito bites a man, and he develops malaria, and fever: we identify a causal mechanism between the bite and the fever. We can track causation in the observable and experimental physical world. Even if we cannot determine causation, we can identify it. A previously-happy girlfriend runs home sobbing after speaking with her boyfriend; we identify causation as the boyfriend, even if we know nothing of the conversation between them.
The problem of perceived causation is expanded with the mind and body, for the central issue remains: how can two so very different substances (physical and non-physical) interact?
Consider that Alf wants to vote for Bill: the Mind of Alf says that Bill is the best candidate, and that he should vote for him, and that raising his hand would count as a vote; and, for Alf’s body, neural impulses will be fired, travel along his nerves, trigger muscle contractions, and raise his hand. We can, through Science and reason, identify these chains of causality. Yet we cannot specify the point at which Alf’s Mind interacts with his body. The issue of how the Mind and Body interact is unknown; whilst we can detail evermore complex causes, the simple problem of how Mind interacts with Body is unknown.
As Smith and Jones identify, the dualist can ‘only mention further happenings that fall squarely on one side or the other of the great divide between physical events and events in immaterial Minds’ (S&J, pp54) We can identify physical causations and mental causations, but not the one physical-mental causation. Descartes failed to provide solution to this; as Leibniz observed, ‘Descartes gave up the struggle’ (S&J, pp55).
It seems impressively argued and intuitively correct that mind and body interact. However, the argument becomes a frustrating without any suggestion as to the nature of mind-body interaction. We could continue this fruitless mind-body interaction problem from the causation view, but there are other theories we can consider. As demonstrated, the problem is either one of causality or of difference of state. I offer two alternatives to resolve this problem.
Firstly, that mind and body are not causal and do not interact, which leads us to ideas of [phenomenalism], pre-established harmony and parallelism. Here, I shall discuss causality, and:
Secondly, that mind and
body are simply differing forms of the same underlying substance, where we
shall explore monism, and in particular, neutral monism, exploring difference
of state.
Non-Causality
Recall the example of the mosquito bite and the fever. Smith and Jones remark that, ‘the observed correlation between mosquito bites and fever may make us very confident that there is some underlying causal mechanism at work’ (Smith and Jones, 53). Instead of causation (and interaction therein) we could pursue Leibniz’ doctrine of pre-established harmony: simply, mental and physical events are non-interactive, but simply synchronised, creating the appearance of causation.
Consider two persons playing chess. Neither player has any knowledge of the game. Each has simply memorised which piece to move and when. When the game begins, each move according to plan. To an observer, the two are causally interacting and playing great chess; when in fact, they are merely synchronised.
If our mental events are thus synchronised exactly with physical events, then mind-body interaction is illusory, and we are accurate in being unable to find causal interaction between body and mind.
This idea of mental and physical events being non-causal can be expanded with parallelism. This states that mind and body are non-causal, but that for every mental event, there is a corresponding physical event; every time we recall an embarrassing event, we blush, in parallel. We can liken to this to two clock faces, which show the same time, without interaction.
Pre-established harmony and parallelism both offer acceptable resolutions to mind-body interaction. They resolve the problem of causality, by removing the central problem of causality. However, if we consider the vast complexity required to synchronise all mental events with physical ones, we find ourselves exchanging one simple problem (mind-body interaction) with a greater problem (predestination and design in the universe)- a deus ex machina on epic scale (Cottingham, p89). Malebrance added to this with occasionalism, stating that all mind-body interaction is due to continual intervention by God, forcing change in one in occasion to the other.
The problem of mind-body interaction is causality. If we ascribe causality to the synchronisation of mental and physical events, then the problem is resolved. There is, as it were, ‘perfect timing’ in the stubbing of a toe and the feeling of pain. The interactive point we strove to find would not exist, and the problem resolved. However, if we are true to Ockham’s Razer, we must dismiss these otherwise appealing arguments. Pre-established harmony and parallelism requires vast teleological design in the universe: the necessary synchronisation of the mental and the physical would require absolute determinism. Furthermore, occasionalism requires the constant intervention, deus ex machina, of God. Whilst we can resolve the problem of mind-body interaction, we create even greater problems. On these grounds, we must reject pre-established harmony, parallelism and, especially, occasionalism.
Thus we cannot explain mind-body interaction by engaging causality. It appears that mind and body must interact, pending divine intervention. The prob
Difference of State
The second solution to the mind-body problem is that mind and body are merely different forms of the same underlying substance. This doctrine is monism, which is broad in scope, but generally states that ‘all things, no matter how many or of what variety, can be reduced to one unified thing in time, space, or quality’ (IEP).
Our problem was that mind and body are, simply, too different to interact. However, if the mental and the physical are, ultimately, of one substance, then their interaction poses no problem. Removing the distinction between mental and physical removes the problem of their interaction. We can maintain causality even over the difference between
Repeating myself…!!
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/