The Hungarians outside Hungary
by Sigurd Marstein and Sven Gunnar Simonsen

Next to Albania, Hungary is the country in Europe which has the greatest proportion of its predominant ethnic group residing outside its national borders. Since the collapse of the Iron Curtain, it has been an important aim of Hungary’s foreign policy to safeguard the welfare of these people. However, the immediate short-term interests of the minority groups stand in the way of a more long-term and constructive policy.

Background

During the reign of King Mattias Corvinus (1458–90), Hungary grew to be the foremost power in Central Europe. The kingdom stretched from the Adriatic coast in the west, across a large part of former Yugoslavia and well into present-day Romania. To the north, the realm encompassed present-day Slovakia. Furthermore, in order to strengthen resistance to the Turkish threat, Mattias Corvinus conquered the adjoining areas of Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia.

All the same, the Turks conquered Hungary in 1526 and divided the country into three regions. The northern and southern areas were assigned to the Habsburg Empire, while central Hungary and the Principality of Transylvania came under Turkish supremacy.

It was in Transylvania that the idea of an independent and free Hungary lay in hibernation. Powerful princes gained political and military assertion through the constant wars between the Austrian emperor and the Turkish sultan in Istanbul. Gradually Turkey became weakened, and in 1699 almost all of the old Hungary was surrendered to Austria.

Peoples from throughout the Hapsburg realm now flooded into Hungary, making the original inhabitants of the country, the Magyars, a minority in their own land. Nevertheless, Hungary consolidated its position within the Habsburg realm, and in 1867 the empire was converted into the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy. This monarchy pursued an aggressive foreign policy which included entering the so-called Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy. The alliance drew Austria-Hungary into World War I, which in turn led to the final dissolution of the dual monarchy.

The present borders of Hungary were laid down by the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. The country was forced to relinquish two-thirds of its territory to the neighbouring states of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In addition, smaller areas of Hungary were taken over by Austria, Italy and Poland. The population of Hungary was thereby reduced from 20.8 to 7.6 million. The number of Magyars within the reduced Hungarian state sank from 10 to 6.8 million. Approximately 3.2 million ethnic Hungarians became minorities outside their own state.

Until the mid-1980s, the problem of the minorities was ignored by the socialist regime led by Janos Kadar. Then, under the government of the late Jozsef Antalls, the question became a central issue of foreign policy.

Suspicion

It is traditionally difficult for a state to make demands on host nations on behalf of resident minorities. Such demands are frequently perceived as pretexts for subsequent territorial or political demands on the host country. This is particularly characteristic of Hungary’s relations with its neighbouring states. For one thing, the Hungarian minorities in these countries constitute large numbers, and host nations fear that even the slightest concession may encourage even greater demands. Second, Hungary has historically been a great power within the region. Requests or demands on behalf of Hungarian minorities are therefore looked upon with deep suspicion by neighbouring states. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that Hungary is one of the states which most frequently demand recognition of the principle of collective minority rights – scarcely surprising, since every fourth Hungarian lives outside Hungary. However, in the light of their past experience with Hungary, neighbouring states frequently interpret such demands as elements of a manoeuvre towards regaining control of adjoining areas. There is a latent fear of Hungarian revenge in the region because of the awareness of the harsh treatment suffered by Hungary under the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. This fear has been nurtured by demands from the extreme right in Hungarian politics for the renegotiation of the treaty, with the result that whenever minority questions are discussed with neighbouring states, Hungary has to reaffirm its humiliating acceptance of the 1920 treaty.

Slovakia

In southern Slovakia, there are approximately 600,000 residents of Magyar origin (11.5% of Slovakia’s total population). Hungary appreciates Slovakia’s acknowledgement of the principle of collective minority rights. The Slovakian nationality law of 1968 is among the most liberal in Eastern Europe. This law secures proportional representation for minority groups in elections, and the right to express themselves in their own language, both in writing and orally. However, not all the Hungarian demands have been met by the Slovakian authorities: for one thing, Hungary has contended that the November 1990 legislation does not give sufficient status to minority languages. Slovakia has also been blamed for not giving full compensation to those Hungarians who were persecuted during the Communist regime.

Representatives of the Council of Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE) visited Slovakia in January 1994 and expressed general approval of the Slovakian policy on minority groups. However, in both January and June, the parliament rejected a motion for bilingual sign-posting in areas with large ethnic minorities. For their part, the Slovakian authorities frequently accuse Hungary of ‘misrepresenting’ information relating to the conditions of Hungarians in the country. The climate has not been the most favourable for finding pragmatic solutions to the minority question: Hungary was relentlessly opposed to the division of Czechoslovakia, arguing that the maintenance of a united federal state was the best defence against aggressive Slovak nationalism. Since Slovakia became independent, there have been disputes between the two nations over the use of the water resources of the Danube.

Nonetheless, in the autumn of 1991, the Slovakian authorities established a Hungarian cultural centre in Bratislava. The two countries also agreed to appoint a committee of historians to work out a joint Hungarian–Slovakian analysis of the relations between the two states up to the present time. A student-exchange programme will be expanded, and instruction in the language of the other country will be strengthened. The most successful specific agreement so far has been a set of confidence-building initiatives in the military sphere which have been agreed upon by Hungary and former Yugoslavia. Slovakia subsequently joined this agreement.

On 19 March 1995, Slovakian Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and his Hungarian counterpart, Gyula Horn, signed a historic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty has four main points: 1) the rights of minorities are designated as fundamental human rights; 2) such minorities are regarded as forming ‘integral parts of the society and state’; 3) both states recognize the ‘responsibility to protect and foster the national or ethnic, religious and language identity of minorities’ within their borders; and 4) the existing Hungarian–Slovak border is declared ‘inviolable’, and a mutual commitment is made ‘not to raise territorial claims in the future’.

Relations between Slovakia and Hungary have not improved to any great extent since the signing of the treaty. Slovakia has continued to issue legislation which Hungary considers to have negative consequences for the Hungarian minority. In November 1995, a law was passed which reaffirmed Slovak as the country’s only official language and restricted the use of other languages in public life. The law, which went into effect 1 January 1996, effectively repealed the 1990 law that allowed use of minority languages in districts where a minority constituted more than 20% of the population. The Hungarian Coalition has protested the law, which it claims violates both the Constitution and the Slovak–Hungarian agreement entered into in March 1995.

In March 1996, the Slovak parliament approved the Law on the Protection of the Republic, which provided for, among other things, two years’ imprisonment for ‘disseminating false information abroad damaging to the interests of the republic’.

In September, the Slovak government passed a law altering the boundaries of the country’s administrative entities in a way that diluted the influence of the Hungarian minority. In the autumn of 1996, the government was working on a change in the country’s electoral system which seemed to greatly benefit Vladimir Meciar’s party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.

In early July, a summit was held in Budapest with participation of the Hungarian government, all parliamentary parties and 11 ethnic Hungarian organizations from neighbouring countries. The participants called for establishing local governments and autonomy in line with Western European practices. Slovak and Romanian leaders strongly criticized the communiqué from the summit. In particular, tensions rose between Hungary and Slovakia; the Slovak cabinet accused Hungary of violating the bilateral treaty between the two countries, and a planned meeting between Meciar and Horn was postponed indefinitely by the Slovakian side.

Romania

The largest group of Magyars outside Hungary – approximately 2 million – live in what is now Romania. Most of these people have settled in the Transylvania region in the western part of the country. Relations between Hungary and Romania are influenced by the concern of the Hungarian authorities for the situation of the minorities. Even so, the topic was not brought up for formal discussion before the spring of 1993, when the first Hungarian–Romanian summit meetings after the fall of the Soviet regime took place. Before this, it had not even been possible for the two states to agree on an agenda for any meeting.

The Hungarian delegation to the CSCE asserted in July 1991 that the Hungarians in Romania were the victims of persecution and vindictive treatment. The Magyars alleged that they were systematically underrepresented in local bodies. Recent Romanian legislation gives room for cultural activities to be regarded as separatism and thus prohibited as criminal offences. Furthermore, the Hungarian CSCE delegation accused Romania of restricting the use of Hungarian as an official language in areas with a predominantly Hungarian population. In February 1994, the Romanian Senate passed a law making the publishing of ‘false information and contempt of the Romanian nation’ a punishable offence. The opposition considers this law a tool which may be used to reduce the freedom of expression of the minorities.

Throughout the entire postwar period, the Magyars’ opportunities for education on their own terms have been reduced. Hungarian and Romanian schools have been amalgamated to prevent the use of Hungarian in class. Opportunities for cultural development have been similarly reduced. Romanian has become the language of the theatre, and even the meetings of the Hungarian authors’ association are to be conducted in the Romanian language.

Violent street fighting took place in March 1990 between Hungarians and Romanians in the Transylvanian town of Tirgu Mures. The riots were triggered by a Hungarian–Romanian agreement on increased autonomy for the Hungarians in the area. The Romanian nationalists retaliated with attacks on Hungarians and their property. During the subsequent legal settlement, local Hungarian groups protested that they had been unfairly blamed for the riots.

The most successful measures taken by Hungary and Romania so far have been a series of agreements on the coordination of defence policies and a set of regulations aimed at generating trust and preventing tension in the border zones. The latter correspond to the agreement between Hungary and Slovakia on the same issues. During the spring of 1993, there were also talks at the foreign-ministerial level, at which the minority question and other topics were discussed.

In May 1994, Romania’s treatment of ethnic minorities was criticized by a commission appointed by the European Council. This question has been standing in the way of the conclusion of the planned Romanian–Hungarian friendship treaty.

During 1995 and 1996, Hungary and Romania worked together towards agreement on a bilateral cooperation agreement. Opposition to the agreement, however, was significant. In September 1995, Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs said it was an ‘illusion’ to expect historic reconciliation without first settling contentious issues. Kovacs specifically pointed to Romania’s education law, promulgated two months earlier, which declared that Romanian was to be the language for instruction and examination in all universities and colleges, and the Romanian parliament’s approval that same month of a law banning the use of foreign flags and the singing of foreign national anthems.

In mid-August 1996, it was finally announced that Hungary and Romania were close to sign their basic treaty. Hungarian Prime Minister Horn said his country was not ready to accept the Romanian interpretation of the Council of Europe recommendation on ethnic minority rights, which implied that national minorities would not be granted ‘collective rights’ or territorial autonomy on the basis of ethnicity. Opposition circles in both countries reacted strongly to the news of the treaty. In Hungary, the vice-president of the Smallholders’ Party charged that ‘the holocaust’ of Hungarians in some parts of Romania would not be prevented by the treaty. Gheorghe Funar, leader of the Party of Romanian National Unity, described the treaty as ‘an act of national treason’.

In early September, a second round of the Hungarian minority summit was held in the Hungarian city of Papa. The summit criticized the basic treaty between Hungary and Romania, and objected to the choice of the Romanian town of Timisoara as the site for its signing. A demonstration in Budapest gathered 10,000–20,000 people who were against the treaty. Still, on 16 September, the basic treaty was signed by the Romanian and Hungarian prime ministers, Nicolae Vacaroiu and Gyula Horn, in Timisoara.

Serbia

There are over 300,000 Magyars residing in the north-eastern part of Serbia (about 340,000, according to the census of 1991). This district is called Vojvodina and borders on Hungary. Under Tito’s regime, ethnically diverse Vojvodina had the status of an autonomous province, with a degree of self-government for its Hungarian minority and other minorities. In 1987, however, these rights were withdrawn simultaneously from Vojvodina and Kosovo province, and in 1990 they were stripped of all special privileges in relation to the rest of Serbia. Conditions deteriorated further when it became known that Hungary was selling weapons to Croatia. This unleashed a wave of anti-Hungarian nationalistic feeling in Serbia. Hungarian schools were closed, and the use of Hungarian as an official language was no longer permitted in Vojvodina. The Hungarians in Vojvodina appealed to the Hungarian authorities to halt any measures which could exacerbate conditions for Hungarians in Serbia. The war in former Yugoslavia worsened the situation for Hungarians in Vojvodina. They maintained that they were conscripted for military service to an extent out of all proportion to their numbers; Hungarian losses in the battles of the federal army in Croatia were correspondingly high. Hungarian civilians have also been directly affected by the war, in that their lands in Croatian Slavonia were turned into a battlefield. This state of affairs has resulted in a stream of Hungarian refugees into Hungary, in addition to the Bosnian and Kosovo-Albanian refugees. In all, Hungary has taken in 100,000 refugees from former Yugoslavia, of which some 30,000 are Magyars.

Ukraine

North-eastern Hungary borders on Ukraine. Approximately 160,000 Magyars live in the Transcarpathia region, where they make up about 10% of the population. Relations between Hungary and Ukraine are good, owing to the sympathetic attitude of the Ukrainian government towards the Hungarian minority. Ukraine accepts the principle of minorities as the holders of collective rights. There are two reasons why it is easier for Ukraine to accept this controversial principle. First, the Magyars do not constitute a large group in relation to the total population of the country. Second, Ukraine looks upon Hungary as the road to Western Europe, both politically and geographically, and the authorities hope that a clean record on the treatment of minorities may help to smooth the path. In this situation the Magyars benefit from a relatively well-developed educational system which includes subjects such as Hungarian language and history.

In December 1991, Ukraine decided to seek independence from the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Hungarians of Transcarpathia were pressing for local self-government within an independent Ukraine. So far, the Ukrainian national assembly has not legalized such independence; but even so, Ukraine stands out as the host country with the best and least-complex relations with the government in Budapest. In May 1993, the two nations signed a treaty of friendship in which Hungary agreed to abstain from any future territorial demands on Ukraine.

International Initiatives

Hungary has attempted to deal with the problem of minorities both through bilateral negotiations with neighbouring states and by taking up the question in the Council of Europe and the OSCE, as well as in the European Union. The OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities has become particularly involved in relations between Hungary and Slovakia. The two countries have accepted a proposal from the High Commissioner to form an advisory group of impartial experts to take a position on various minority problems over a two-year period.

The main line of the Hungarian government over the question of minorities has been to promote good relations with neighbouring states, including those with whom they are not altogether satisfied, in hopes of ensuring a stable situation for the Hungarian minorities. This friendly policy, however, conflicts with the deep distrust of Hungary among its neighbours, and is under pressure from Hungarian right-wing groups which do not accept the Treaty of Trianon. Recently it has become possible to establish relations with neighbouring states so that minority problems can be discussed objectively. However, this is not the case in Serbia, where in the summer of 1993 CSCE human rights observers were not allowed to renew their residence permits in Vojvodina.

On the institutional level, Hungary is working for a general extension of minority rights to include collective rights. It is natural that Hungary should take the lead in this field, given the large number of Hungarians living outside the national boundaries. Hungary sees collective minority rights as a constructive alternative to traditional nationalistic demands for amending the Treaty of Trianon. The idea of a group as the subject of rights is controversial, even from a strictly theoretical point of view. In the tense reality of Central Europe, such ideas become even less attractive when they are put forward by a mistrusted Hungary to sceptical neighbouring states.



by Sigurd Marstein and Sven Gunnar Simonsen
source://PRIO - International Peace Research Institute, Oslo