"..Shia Muslims in Southern Iraq launch a revolution.." - CNN'S Bernard Shaw reports on the Shia rebellion in southern Iraq. Real Video:

At the end of the Gulf War it seemed unlikely that Saddam would survive. The army appeared to be fragmented and demoralised, the infrastructure of the country had been massively damaged, there were still tens of thousands of US troops in southern Iraq, and the country remained under tight economic blockade. Uprisings against Saddam Hussein continued throughout Iraq, with the rebels, having been exhorted by the allies to overthrow the regime, repeatedly asking for military assistance. On 3 March resistance leaders met US forces at Safwan, the site of the cease fire talks, and asked the allies for bomber support to fight off the Republican Guards moving from the north to crush the rebellion. Refugees - many of them expatriate workers released from prisons in Basra - told of widespread civil turmoil in southern Iraq. It was said that some 1400 prisoners had been freed from Basra's main prison after police had been shot dead by rebels, and that disturbances were taking place in many other towns and cities of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, including al-Kut, al-Nasiriyah, al-Amarah, Suqash Shuyukh and Ali al-Gharbi. A farmer and rebel leader, Mamad Ibrahim Wali, declared: 'There are many dead - maybe hundreds. The opposition control the city [Basra]. All offices of the Saddam party, police stations, security areas, are all hit by the opposition.' There were also signs that Iran was intervening in the situation to aid the southern Shia rebels. On 7 March President Rafsanjani, in an address to Saddam Hussein, urged him not to stain further 'your bloodied hands by killing more innocent Iraqis. Yield to the people's will and step down'. This declaration was accompanied by reports that 'tens of thousands' of armed men had moved from Iran into Iraq, raising the prospect of another Iran-Iraq war and an intensified Iraqi civil conflict formented by outside interests. It was significant that the Basra rebels were loyal to the Shi'ite cleric Ayatollah Baqr al-Hakim, whose father, Mahdi Hakim, had been executed by the Ba'athist regime. Now there was speculation that a provisional government of 'Free Iraq' might be formed in the territory occupied by the US forces.

"Rebellion breaks out in nouthern Iraq" - CNN'S Bernard Shaw reports on the Kurdish attempt to oust Saddam Hussein. Real Video:

Kurdish rebels were said to have seized control of the northern town of Sulaimaniya, while the Basra rebels were fighting off an attack by Republican Guards and clashes continued in the area of Baghdad. Ayatollah Hakim, referring to the uprisings as a jihad (holy war), urged Saddam Hussein to quit power and called on Iraqi army units to join the revolt and to ignore orders issued 'to the detriment of the nation'. A Sairi official in Beirut reported that units of guerillas were now in Baghdad, 'working to assassinate Saddam Hussein'. At the same time it was becoming increasingly clear that Washington was reluctant to become involved in the uprisings throughout Iraq. Thus a US military source commented on the American refusal to give arms to Iraqis struggling to overthrow the regime: 'We're sticking out of this. They're doing real fine all by themselves right now.

On 11 March 1991, following meetings in Damascus, representatives of nineteen political parties and movements - all opposed to Saddam Hussein - met for a two-day conference in Beirut, in optimistic preparations for assuming power in Baghdad. This was, however, a fragile union, split by religious and political differences and incapable of producing a coherent plan for the exploitation of the nationwide turmoil in Iraq. The Iraqi opposition failed to name any permanent leadership, failed to identify a useful strategy, and failed to channel the energies of the disparate groups. Said one of the Syrians, in manifest frustration, at the Beirut conference: 'You have to do something concrete when there is an uprising. If you don't show any practical reaction, it will be seen as a failure to help them.' Where the delegates did agree was on the evident lack of US commitment to the opposition cause. Said one delegate: 'What are the Americans up to? The American army allowed the Republican Guard to pass down the road to Basra to attack our fighters there. Why did they do that? I thought the cease fire agreement said there should be no movement of forces. Do the Americans want Saddam to stay in power?' On 12 March a senior US diplomat revealed at least one strand in American thinking: 'Better the Saddam Hussein we know than an unwieldy coalition, or a new strong man who is an unknown quantity.' Now the rebels - in Basra and elsewhere -were being crushed: some, according to witnesses, being hanged from tank gun barrels, others being burnt alive. The rebels in Basra were doomed but the Kurds, with their long history of revolt, continued to fight - despite the US refusal to help for fear of offending Turkish sensitivities. A report on Tehran Radio claimed that loyal Iraqi troops had killed 16,000 people in the Shia towns of Najaf and Karbala.

By the end of March Iraqi opposition leaders were claiming a number of significant successes. In a final offensive the Kurds had taken control of Kirkuk, Iraq's main northern oil city, and the surrounding oil fields, including the main complex of the Iraqi Oil Company. Iraqi helicopter gunships had been shot down and the rebels were holding 9000 prisoners-of-war. Kurdish Radio was instructing rebels to bring Iraqi prisoners to Arbil, where 'we will judge them'. The Kurds were now claiming to hold about one-tenth of the land area of Iraq, including the region of Kirkuk, Sulaimaniya, Arbil, Dahuk and parts of Mosul. In Baghdad the regime was re-establishing control and in the south the Shia rebels were coming under increasing pressure. The United States gave every sign of political uncertainty. The Bush administration had refused to talk to the opposition groups, a policy that was coming under increasing criticism. Thus Laurie Millroy, from the Washington Institute on Near East Policy, commented that the US government was 'paying the price for an inexplicable failure to talk to the Iraqi opposition... With tens of thousands of people dying within Iraq, we should be giving close air support to the rebels.' But it was not difficult to find evidence for US strategic confusion. A Congressional official went on the record: 'The question we are asking is "Do we want either the Kurds or the Shias to succeed? Is it in our interest to mm Iraq into Lebanon?" Quite honestly, I don't believe we know what to do.'63 It did seem clear the American forces were content to allow Iraqi helicopter gunships to attack Kurdish and Shia positions. One report suggested that Saddam Hussein's forces had used Scud missiles - supposedly all destroyed in the Gulf War - and fixed-wing aircraft - supposedly banned under the ceasefire terms - in the mounting counter-offensive to regain Kirkuk.

This is the story of a Kurdish family's desperate flight to the mountains as the Iraqi army advanced. This Audio clip is part of a special four-part BBC Radio series to mark the fifth anniversary of the Gulf War, these programs are drawn from the research and reporting done for "THE GULF WAR" BBC/FRONTLINE television series. Each fifteen minute program focuses on an eye-witness account of some of the dramatic events in Desert Storm--the January 1991 military campaign to liberate Kuwait. 'Voices in the Storm' is a Fine Art Production for BBC Radio 5 Live. Real Audio: listen

"The rebellious Kurds and Shia's are on their own." - CNN'S Bernard Shaw reports on the American betrayal of the Iraqi rebellion. Real Video:

The extent of the US betrayal of the Iraqi rebels was now manifest to all. The word 'betrayal' ran through the headlines of Western newspapers; the Kurds, it was recorded, had not asked for much but the world 'gave them nothing'; efforts to help the rebels had been 'thwarted'; the US 'stands by'; 'Read my lips: no action'; 'George casts morals away'; and, declared journalist Andrew Stephen, 'the President is turning a blind eye to genocide ..because he really is a wimp' . The Iraqi people had struggled to rid themselves of Saddam Hussein, as exhorted to by the West, but now Washingwn was 'looking the other way' . In one area the US did act: it cut off aid to an impoverished Jordan to punish that country for King Hussein's support for Saddam during the Gulf War (before this measure was enacted the Jordanian economy was in crisis with unemployment running at nearly 30 per cent). Eventually the US, under mounting pressure, agreed to establish Kurdish enclaves in northern Iraq, to protect the refugees and to safeguard the UN relief efforts. Some observers suggested that this was only a token gesture - since a much greater area was already under the control of the rebel Kurdish forces. And in any case the Western forces were planning to leave the area, at which time the Kurdish people would again be at the mercy of Saddam.

The turmoil in Iraq continued through June, though it was clear that Saddam had reasserted his authority in Baghdad and most of the country outside the Shia south and the Kurdish north. The US, shamed into some response to the plight of the Iraqi people, had delayed its withdrawal from the Kurdish zone, though UN efforts to supply protection and relief were near to collapse through lack of funds (the US remained a massive debtor state in the United Nations). Competing victory parades were held in Washington and New York, with President Bush declaring 'there's a new and wonderful feeling in America'. A week later Saddam Hussein - using tanks, armoured vehicles and helicopter gunships - was launching a fresh onslaught on the southern Shias.

Reconstruction

Saddam began his efforts at post-war reconstruction with a cabinet reshuffle. Tariq Aziz, the foreign minister who had shuttled round the world in a vain attempt to prevent the war, was made deputy prime minister - to observers a meaningless post. Saddoun Hammadi, a Shia, was promoted to the position of prime minister; and Taha Yasin Ramadan, a Kurd, elevated to the new post of vice-president. Some exiled opposition claimed that Latif Jasim, the former information minister, had disappeared without a trace. Soon - as part of his 'carrot' theme - Saddam encouraging Iraqi journalists to write freely: 'Write what you like. If you get it right, take the credit. If you get it wrong, I'll take the blame.' There were in fact signs of a partial liberalisation, with Iraqi newspapers carrying measured criticism of shortages and high prices. Saddam also tried to bolster Iraqi morale by pretending that Iraq had won the war. Thus on the eve of the first anniversary of the invasion of Kuwait he declared: 'We look at victory in its perspective as an historical duel, not as a fight between one army and several others. You are victorious because you have refused humiliation and repression . . . and clung to a state that will strengthen the people and the [Arab] nation forever. We don't have the feeling that we were not victorious in the historical duel.' Then there were more ministerial changes.

Saddam now felt strong enough to pressure the British government into releasing some Iraqi assets in exchange for freeing a British businessman. On 23 November 1991 Ian Richter, jailed by the Iraqis for five years on bribery charges, was celebrating his release after Britain had allowed Iraq access to £70 million-worth of assets. There were signs of factional squabbles in the Iraqi leadership - with at least one account of a gun-battle involving Saddam's bodyguards - but it seemed clear that now Saddam was 'in complete control of the country outside Kurdistan'. Syria was now moving closer to Iraq, opposing UN Security Council threats of fresh military action against Baghdad and growing increasingly suspicious of American intentions to turn the Middle East into a US 'security zone'. In March 1992 Damascus resumed its mail and parcel services to Baghdad, and Syrian newspapers and television were instructed to end their verbal attacks on Saddam Hussein. It was significant that Syria also declined to celebrate the February anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait. American efforts to intercept the North Korean ship carrying Scud missiles to Syria had enraged the Ba'athist leadership in Damascus. In an address to the Syrian parliament President Assad denied that the ship had been carrying missiles but commented: 'We have missiles and will bring missiles according to our needs.' Then he attacked US hypocrisy. Israel was being allowed to produce 'all types of weapons, especially missiles' while Washington was trying to prevent Arab states from doing the same: 'That is not international legitimacy. That is the law of the jungle. The law of wild animals.'

A clip of Saddam Hussein touring the Doura Refinery in Baghdad soon after its reconstruction in May 1991, taken from the 1991 Iraqi Ministry of Housing and Construction film "Sign of Miracle." Real Video:

Much of the problem, from the Washington perspective, was that Saddam was succeeding in escaping the intended sanctions stranglehold. In July CIA chief Robert Gates flew to Jordan to urge King Hussein to allow on-the-spot inspection of lorries carrying the bulk of Iraq's trade with the rest world. US intelligence sources were blaming Jordan for allowing middlemen to supply Iraq with howitzers, steel cables and rods, tyres, cement, and other equipment that could be used for military purposes. The Jordanian response was to insist that the Iraqi borders with Syria, Turkey and Iran were equally permeable. In one substantial account a detailed description was provided of how Barzan Tikriti, Saddam's half-brother, was running a world-wide sanctions-busting operation from Switzerland, and it was increasingly being recognised that Iraq was now selling millions of gallons of oil in violation of UN sanctions and with the apparent compliance of Turkey.

A 2,000-lb. laser-guided bomb obliterated the top floor of the 13 story Ministry of Industry building, gutting the next two floors below and causing lesser damage farther down. Reconstruction began in the summer of 1991.

On 18 September 1992 it was announced that Iraqi engineers and builders, working round the clock, had succeeded in rebuilding Saddam's main palace, the massive 'Home of the People' on the southern bank of the Tigris River. The army newspaper al-Qadissiyah declared that the speedy reconstruction of the bombed palace was 'a loud reply to rancorous and malevolent enemies'. Saddam was also spending vast sums on the construction of a modern Babylon. Huge artificial mounds carry terraced trees and flowers, in imitation of ancient Babylon's Hanging Gardens, with palaces and recreation centres overshadowing the remains of the monuments to Nebuchadnezzar's greatness. Placards decorating the entrances to the ancient city proclaim: 'From Nebuchadnezzar to Saddam Hussein, Babylon rises again'. Of Saddam's plans to revive an international cultural festival in the ruins of ancient Babylon, Hamed Youssef Hammadi, the Iraqi minister of culture and information, has declared: 'The Babylon festival will underline that the torch of life will not be extinguished no matter how hard the enemies like Zionists and [their] agents try to stop the march. This festival... is a defiance... of the forces of evil and conspiracy against our country.'

There were now fresh UN moves to help the Kurds, Shias and other Iraqi groups again facing a harsh winter, with Washington urging the use of frozen Iraqi assets to pay for weapons inspections and humanitarian aid. Iraq in turn threatened that it would not co-operate with the 'winter survival program' if the Security Council decided to go ahead with plans to seize Iraqi assets. It also announced that it was seeking UN agreement to export $4 billion-worth of oil to pay for humanitarian aid and to fund the implementation of UN resolutions against Iraq. Any attempt to seize the frozen assets would be 'bank robbery, Texas-style' and 'an act of illegal confiscation'. On 2 October 1992 the UN Security Council passed the planned resolution (14-0 with China abstaining) for the confiscation of frozen Iraqi oil assets, an unprecedented UN initiative. Iraq had been able to use some foreign funds to purchase humanitarian supplies exempt under the UN sanctions. Now such a facility was blocked, with all the relevant funds having to go through the US-controlled UN agencies. Washington had succeeded in performing its Texas-style 'bank robbery'.

Construction of the Jumhuriya bridge over the Tirgris. Engineers worked for 16 months to repair Jumhuriyah bridge damage and install new steel spans at an estimated cost of $3 million

The Iraqis continued - in the teeth of sanctions, with their assets frozen and with oil sales limited - to rebuild their country, to repair the massive damage caused by forty-three consecutive days and nights of bombing. By October 1992 Iraqi engineers had succeeded in repairing all but one of the bridges in Baghdad, the 14-storey telephone exchange - bombed to a concrete shell - had been restored, and the many gutted ministries had been rebuilt. The main Baghdad power plant was working at 90 per cent of its pre-war capacity and oil production was back to around 800,000 barrels a day (though overseas sales were still prohibited). The six-lane highway from Baghdad to the Jordanian border - once littered with bomb craters - was now again a smooth super-highway. Developments were continuing on the 'Third River' project, a 350-mile canal that will tap the Tigris-Euphrates basin to reclaim land. It was obvious that Saddam Hussein was a key motivating factor in the reconstruction of Iraq. Those around him have said: 'Saddam never, ever, gives up ...' - a mentality which, according to the journalist Marie Colvin, has proved 'crucial to the rebuilding of Iraq. He went from the Mother of all Battles to the Mother of all Reconstructions without missing a beat'.

Ordinary Iraqis continued to face massive problems, not least the repression visited on dissident groups, but it would be wrong to doubt the pride felt by many Iraqis in the speedy rebuilding of their country - in the face of sanctions and continued Western hostility. (In some cases the Western policy on Iraq worked to damage Western firms: for example, by 1993 the freezing of Iraqi assets was driving some thirty British companies close to ruin.) On 18 October 1992 the head of UNICEF reached agreement with senior officials in Baghdad on reviving aid to Iraq. Said the UN official, James Grant: 'It is a programme for all of Iraq, including the three northern governorates [areas controlled by the Kurds].' Two days later, to the outrage of UN officials, the United States moved to block the humanitarian agreement, saying that it made too many concessions to Baghdad. As the desperate Kurds in the mountains faced yet another cold winter, Washington had again demonstrated the character of its political priorities.

Outside the destroyed baby milk factory in the Abu Ghraib suburb of Baghdad. Milk cans and other debris from the attack are scattered in front, verifying Baghdad's claim that the facility was little more than an infant formula plant.

At the end of October the strengthened opposition Iraqi National Congress (INC) completed its conference in Salahuddin in northern Iraq. Now it was conceded that the INC had little organised support within most of Iraq, though there was still hope of fresh Western support that might make the difference. Saddam Hussein gave no sign that he was troubled by the INC efforts in the north. He had survived - despite everything - and it looked as if he would remain in power for the foreseeable future. The rebuilding of Baghdad, while much of the rest of Iraq remained desolate, was increasingly advertised as a propaganda success. For example, on 21 January 1993 there were celebrations in Baghdad to mark the reopening of the Bilady baby milk factory, destroyed two years ago by US bombs and missiles. The prime minister Mohammad Hamza al-Zubeidi presided over the inauguration of the plant, while an anti-aircraft crew swivelled their gun on a US-supplied Jeep and children from the Saddam Kindergarten chanted: 'With our spirits and our blood we will sacrifice ourselves to you, O Saddam!' At the same time there were frequent reports of the rising tide of crime in Baghdad and elsewhere, of Basra still awash with untreated sewage (a UNICEF water and sanitation officer, Kazim Hallal, declaring that 'the people here are drinking sewage'), and the hospitals still having to contend - in the teeth of a de facto UN embargo on medical supplies - with epidemics of cholera, hepatitis and malaria. Dr Aladin al-Fadhli, a hospital director, was quoted: 'It is a catastrophe for me as a doctor to watch people die unnecessarily. It is not humanity for anyone to do this. We feel that the war did not end with the bombing and shelling. It is not finished.'

The US-inspired sanctions - in late-1993 running into a fourth year-ensured that Saddam, well cushioned in Baghdad, would continue to preside over a demoralised and suffering country racked by crime, destitution and disease. It was becoming increasingly clear that there was little reason for continued sanctions. There was broad Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions and no suggestion that Iraq was about to embark upon further aggression. UN inspectors had commented, for example, that Saddam's nuclear intentions were no longer a threat, that the destruction of mustard gas stockpiles was progressing well and that nerve gas stocks had been destroyed (The Independent, 20 March 1993). On 19 March 1993 UN experts arrived in Baghdad to remove Iraq's stockpiles of irradiated uranium. In such circumstances of broad Iraqi co-operation with UN inspectors it was hard to see why the Iraqi population should continue to be punished with sanctions. Any independent observer might have thought that the Iraqi people had suffered enough, but there was more to come. A frustrated George Bush, smarting under the fact that Saddam had outlived his term in office, could not resist the temptation of launching a final punitive attack on Iraq. A fresh military onslaught - some observers noted - would have the additional consequence of locking president-elect Clinton into a violently anti-Saddam posture.

• Simons, Geoff. Iraq From Sumer to Saddam St. Martin Press, NY 1994