The
Child Online Protection Act and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
A
Hypothetical Charter Analysis of the 'Son of the CDA'
By
Corey D. Steinberg
Owen
Bird; Barristers and Solicitors
expectingrain@globalserve.net
April
6, 2000
I. Background
to the Child Online Protection Act
On
October 21, 1998, American Congress passed the
Child Online Protection Act[1]
(COPA). This federal
criminal legislation targets Internet websites that post pornographic
material. The Act makes it a federal
crime to use the World Wide Web to communicate "for commercial purposes"[2]
material considered "harmful to minors,"[3]
with severe pecuniary penalties for each day of violation and up to six months
in prison.
The passage of the Act met with immediate and severe resistance from
civil liberties groups, 'cyber-rights' groups, and web publishers. Various actions were commenced for
temporary and permanent relief based on a constitutional challenge to the
law.
The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was the central Plaintiff in these
suits. The ACLU presented
testimony to the court from
website operators who provide free information for artists, lesbian and gay men,
and the disabled, who all feared that the new federal law would force them to
shut down their websites.
"In an affidavit filed with the court, Mitchell Tepper of Sexual Health Network said that he feared prosecution under the law because his website provides graphic information on sexual pleasure for people with disabilities or illnesses."[4]
The ACLU's main contention is that the law imposes a burden on speech
that is protected for adults.
Essentially, the argument is that, in order for the law to effectively prevent
children's access to material on the World Wide Web that is 'harmful to minors,'
it must necessarily also impede adults' access to such material as
well. Furthermore, the prevention of anyone's access to such
'harmful' material will undoubtedly also result in the restriction of access to
harmless information that is unarguably protected by the American
Constitution.
"COPA threatens protected speech with civil and criminal sanctions, and effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to communicate and receive on the Web."[5]
This
debate is not unfamiliar to the ACLU and the American courts. An analogous battle took place several
years ago when American Congress attempted to pass the Communications Decency Act[6]
in 1996. This legislation was struck
down as contrary to the First
Amendment[7]
of the American Constitution. This
was a result of the landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Reno v. ACLU I.[8]
"COPA's ultimate constitutional flaws are identical to the flaws that led the Supreme Court to strike down CDA in ACLU I. While there are slight differences between the two laws, these differences are insignificant when compared to the fundamental and fatal constitutional defect of both laws: "In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech," COPA -- like CDA -- "effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another." ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 874; see ACLU II, 31 F. Supp.2d at 495. In passing both CDA and COPA, Congress made it a crime for adults to communicate expression that is clearly protected by the Constitution."[9]
The judgment in
Reno I held that this legislation was
an impermissible restriction on the First Amendment[10]
rights of adults. The First
Amendment[11]
is roughly the American equivalent to Section 2(b)[12]
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.[13] It is the provision in the American
constitution, which protects the right to free speech.
Justice John Paul
Stevens wrote the judgment in Reno I
for the majority. The ruling held
that speech on the Internet must be afforded the highest level of constitutional
protection. Further, he likened the
new medium to leaflets and books, which receive similar protection. He compared the relative accessibility
of chat groups, newsgroups, and the like to leaflets, and the relative
inaccessibility of posting on the World Wide Web to
book-publication.
He criticised and
rejected the government's argument that:
"(E)ven though the CDA effectively censors discourse on many of the Internet's modalities--such as chat groups, newsgroups, and mail exploders--it is nonetheless constitutional because it provides a "reasonable opportunity" for speakers to engage in the restricted speech on the World Wide Web."[14]
In order to
exemplify his criticism, he went on to characterise the Government's position in
terms of a reductio ad absurdum
argument:
"The Government's position is equivalent to arguing that a statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as individuals are free to publish books."[15]
In the wake of the demise of the CDA, COPA was an attempt by American
Congress to meet the criticisms of the court in Reno I. COPA has even been pejoratively dubbed
"Son of the CDA"[16]
or "CDA II".[17] Elements of the CDA that attracted
particular judicial commentary in Reno
I were conspicuously not present in COPA; e.g. the CDA was sweeping in its
breadth whereas COPA was restricted to 'commercial speech' only.[18]
Proponents of
COPA extol its virtues as a constitutional law in contrast
with its
unconstitutional predecessor the CDA:
"COPA is carefully limited in scope to deal only with this problem as it exists on the Web and only for commercial sellers of pornography. The technical capability of commercial WWW sites to use credit cards and PIN/codes was recognized by the Supreme Court in last year’s decision in Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). The Act applies only to Web sales sites and excludes other Internet, Usenet, email, BBS, chat, and online services. The Act applies only to commercial sellers of harmful pornography and excludes all non-commercial, non-profit, educational, governmental, and private communications. Finally, this Act adopts the constitutionally valid definition of "harmful to minors" to limit its reach to pornography that is not protected speech for juveniles. COPA’s intentionally narrow focus is a "least restrictive means" to control the availability to minors of harmful pornography on the front pages of the porn syndicate’s Web sites."[19]
Presumably
American Congress, and other proponents of COPA, believed and anticipated that
the courts, even in the face of a constitutional challenge, would uphold this
'modified CDA'. As mentioned above,
such constitutional challenges have been made. In particular, injunctive relief has
been sought and ordered. Plaintiffs
arguing against COPA have argued for a temporary injunction enjoining
enforcement or prosecution under COPA.
The argument maintained that such an injunction would be prudent until
such time that this contentious law could be tested at a trial on the merits to
determine if it would survive First
Amendment[20]
muster.
Reed J. of the United States District Court for the District of East
Pennsylvania heard arguments for an injunction at two separate proceedings. At the first action he awarded a ten-day
injunction. Subsequently, at the
second proceeding on February 1, 1999, Reed J ordered a continuance of this
temporary injunctive relief that continues to the present day. These judgments made it clear that COPA
is far from incontrovertibly constitutional. The court found that the challengers had
delineated a prima facie case that
COPA could not necessarily meet a constitutional
challenge.
Reed J ruled:
"… it is not apparent … that the defendant can meet its burden to prove that COPA is the least restrictive means available to achieve the goal of restricting the access of minors to this material."[21]
Currently, the
matter regarding COPA's constitutionality is still not conclusively settled in
the United States. Moreover, it
would appear that the dispute is not progressing toward any rapid
resolution. A Commission on Online Child Protection
has been appointed to investigate possible alternatives to COPA. The object of this commission is to
investigate alternatives that would provide the least restrictive means of
protecting America's children from harmful material online.
This commission
held its first meeting March 7, 2000.
Reminiscent of a 'comedy of errors,' however, it has been determined that
this commission does not fall under the administrative rubric of any existing
American governing bodies that could fund such an inquiry. For this reason the first issue
discussed by the commission was to address the question of whether or not it
(i.e. the commission itself) could afford to exist in its current economically
tenuous state.
"The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) Commission held its first meeting on March 7. The panel discussed whether it can be effective with no funding and no federal agency to act as its host."[22]
II. Child Online
Protection Act and Canada: Could it happen here?
It would appear
that no definitive answer to this constitutional question should be expected
from the American courts for some time.
At this juncture, however, it is clear that this legislation is of
questionable constitutional validity based on the First Amendment[23]
to the American constitution.
A more interesting question for Canadian constitutional scholars,
however, is whether or not such a law could survive a S.2(b)[24]
Charter challenge if enacted in
Canada. This section of the Charter is analogous to the First Amendment,[25]
but differs in that it extends to "expression" and not merely to "speech".[26] "(T)he word expression is very broad -
broader than "speech"."[27]
Perhaps even more
significant, however, would be a consideration of the Charter provision in S.1[28]
as it would be applied to COPA.
This is the sweeping section that does allow Canadian courts to uphold an
otherwise unconstitutional limitation on fundamental rights and freedoms under
particular circumstances.
It is notable
that Canadian jurisprudence has, traditionally, been much less tolerant toward
the protection of pornography than have the American courts. "In short, freedom of expression
interests have seldom been accorded much weight by Canadian judges in the
context of pornography."[29] It is for this reason that a detailed Charter analysis of COPA is a
particularly worthwhile pursuit.
This paper will attempt to execute just such an
analysis.
III. COPA Held up to a Canadian
Charter Analysis
(1) General
Framework
Any S.2(b)[30]
Charter analysis must begin by
asking the following three questions derived
from Canadian common law:
(i)
What
is the benefit of the right or freedom in question?
(ii)
Are
the interests at issue protected interests?
(iii)
Could
it be said that the governmental action at issue would infringe those
interests?
This
framework for a Charter analysis pertaining to a
limit on freedom of expression is delineated in the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Irwin Toy v. Quebec.[31]
This 1989 decision was not in respect of the censorship of
pornography. Rather, this case
focused on legislation that restricted advertisements to Canadian children. This general framework, however, applies
to any S.2(b)[32]
challenge.
(2)
COPA v.
S.2(b)
In
Irwin Toy, two challenges were made
to the law in question. The first
challenge was made on federalist grounds.
This challenge was unsuccessful, and is, in any case, irrelevant to the
current analysis. The second
challenge (which also failed on the facts) however, was a Charter challenge based on S.7[33]
and S.2(b).[34] It is from this challenge, particularly
in respect of S.2(b),[35]
that a schema has been developed for any Charter analysis of government
action limiting Canadian freedom of expression.
(i)
What
is the benefit of the right or freedom in question?
In
terms of the first question outlined above the courts have responded by
outlining three possible 'rationales' for, or 'benefits' that may be derived
from, an expressive activity:
(a) The activity helps the individual to discover
truth as it contributes to the
general 'marketplace of
ideas''[36][37]
(b) The activity contributes to the advancement of democracy[38]
(c) The activity helps to actualize individual self-realization[39]
These
possible benefits of any particular expressive activity are neatly outlined by
Dickson C.J. writing on behalf of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Keegstra[40]:
"(T)he court has attempted to articulate
more precisely some of the
convictions fueling the freedom of expression, these being summarized in Irwin Toy (at p. 612) as follows: (1)
seeking and attaining truth is an
inherently good activity; (2)
participation in social and political decision-making is to be fostered and encouraged, and (3)
diversity in forms of individual
self-fulfillment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in a tolerant and
welcoming environment for the sake
of both those who convey a meaning and those to whom meaning is conveyed."[41]
The
benefits of freedom of expression, therefore, are characterized broadly. It is important to remain aware of these
benefits for consideration at later stages of our Charter analysis. Having taken account of these, then, the
analysis must move on to the next question articulated in Irwin Toy.
(ii)
Are
the interests at issue protected interests?
This
question is the first analytical stage of our framework. This question is essentially asking: 'Is the act or speech at issue, in fact,
'expression' for the purpose of a Charter analysis?' The interpretation at common law of this
question has focused on the purpose of the expression. The courts have found that if the
purpose of the expression is to bestow any of the benefits (outlined in the
section above) on an individual, then that expression is protected under the Charter. This standard, however, is qualified by
the fact that 'violent' expression does not receive Charter
protection.
Such
a standard is relatively simple to meet.
Any expressive activity is bound to effect the third, if not the first
two of the benefits extolled in the section above. If the expression does not serve the
purpose of furthering the pursuit of 'truth' or the actualization of
'democracy', it is bound to contribute to the 'self-realization' of the
individual engaging in the expression.
Moreover, this standard is at least as likely to encompass the act of
publishing pornography as any expressive activity.
"(I)f a purposive approach is taken to the
definition of "freedom of expression" in S.2(b), pornography should receive the
protection that that provision affords.
In other words, in all cases in which a challenge is brought to
legislation directed at pornography, it is appropriate to conclude that "freedom
of expression" is at issue."[42]
In
order to determine if speech or a particular expressive act qualifies under this
loose standard, a framework consisting of a two-part analysis has been developed
at common law. This framework is
outlined in the majority judgment in Irwin Toy. It amounts to asking two questions of
the act or speech seeking Charter
protection:
(a) Does this speech or act contemplate an attempt
to convey meaning?
(b) Is this speech or act violent in
form?
(a) Does this
speech or act contemplate an attempt to convey
meaning?
The
Majority in Irwin Toy, comprised of
Dickson C.J. and Lamer and Wilson J.J. delineated the first question of this
two-part schema:
"(I)f the activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and prima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee … It might be difficult to characterise certain day-to-day tasks, like parking a car, as having expressive content. To bring such activity within the protected sphere, the plaintiff would have to show that it was performed to convey a meaning."[43]
It is apparent that this is not a difficult standard to meet. Based on the above description of the
standard, it appears that most activities could qualify as "expression". In Irwin Toy the court found that the
activity in question, i.e. advertising to children, clearly represented an
attempt to convey meaning. The
message conveyed was, 'Buy this
product.' As an attempt to
convey meaning, this form of expression cleared the first hurdle of the
analysis.
(b) Is this
speech or act violent in form?
The principle espoused by the second question in this two-part schema is
found concisely articulated in the Supreme Court decision in Dolphin Delivery.[44] This case, like Irwin Toy, was not in respect of
pornography. Rather, the expressive
activity at issue was civil disobedience in the form of
picketing.
McIntyre J. wrote on behalf of the majority of the
court:
"All picketing involves some form of expression and enjoys Charter protection unless some action on the part of the picketers alters its nature and removes it from Charter protection. Charter protection of this freedom does not encompass violence, threats of violence or other unlawful acts."[45]
McIntyre J's statement would logically lead one to believe that
expressive activity is not protected under S.2(b)[46]
if that activity is 'violent' in its form, or 'threatens violence'. This standard, however, was modified in
its later interpretation in Keegstra,
wherein the supremes held that 'threats of violence' are not exempted from Charter protection. Rather, only actual acts of violence are
exempted.[47] This modified interpretation was based
on a distinction between the 'form' and the 'content' of an expressive
act.
Dickson C.J. wrote for the majority in Keegstra:
"While the line between form and content is not always easily drawn, in my opinion threats of violence can only be so classified by reference to the content of their meaning. As such, they do not fall within the exception spoken of in Irwin Toy, and their suppression must be justified under s.1."[48]
This distinction between an expression's 'form' and its 'content' is an
important innovation in Canadian Charter jurisprudence. Dickson C.J. in Keegstra also clarifies this
tenet:
"When an activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, through a non-violent form of expression, it has expressive content and thus falls within the scope of the word "expression" as found in the guarantee. The type of meaning conveyed is irrelevant. Section 2(b) protects all content of expression."[49]
In the same judgment Dickson C.J. also dispels any persisting questions
that might still arise regarding the form-content distinction as it applies to
the violence exemption under
S.2(b).[50] He explains that, "This exception refers
only to expression communicated directly through physical harm."[51] 'Violence', therefore, refers only to
'physical' violence. Any form of
expression falling short of physical violence, thus, necessarily falls short of
this exemption from Charter
protection.
Based on this two-stage
analysis outlined in the cases discussed above, one can conclude that the act of
posting pornography on the World Wide Web for commercial purposes falls under
the protection of S.2(b).[52] The act of posting such material clearly
meets both criteria of such an analysis.
Regarding the first question
of this analysis, such an act certainly attempts to convey meaning. The message conveyed could be, as in Irwin Toy, 'Buy this product' (i.e. 'buy this or other pornographic
material'). Alternatively, the
message could simply be, 'The image
depicted here is sexually arousing'.
In any event, the posting of such material certainly contemplates a
conveyance of meaning.
Regarding the second part of
this schema, the act of posting such material could not be deemed at law a
'violent' act. Although some
feminist legal scholars might argue that this act of publication inherently does
violence to the equality-rights of women or children,[53]
this contention is denied any legal force when compared with the clear statement
of Dickson C.J. in Keegstra. That judgment unequivocally states that
the act itself must be an "expression communicated directly through physical
harm".[54] Regardless of any sociological harm that
such an act may bring to the feminist-legal movement for equality rights, it
certainly falls short of communicating "directly through physical harm".[55]
The judgment in Irwin Toy and
a survey of related case law provides evidence, therefore, that the Supreme
Court of Canada is predisposed toward recognising Charter protection for almost any
activity. The standard implemented
merely requires that the act constitute some attempt at conveying some modicum
of meaning without expressing itself through an act of physical violence. The very fact that the act of "parking a
car" could, theoretically and on particular facts, fall within this rubric
indicates the court's willingness to err in favour of protecting the expressive
activity.[56]
It is reasonable, therefore, to presume that the act of posting
pornographic material to the World Wide Web passes the second stage of our
Charter analysis. It 'conveys
meaning' and is 'non-violent' in its form.
Our analysis must, then, move on to the third question outlined
above.
(iii)
Could
it be said that the governmental action at issue would infringe those
interests?
This third question, is the second analytical stage of our
framework. In order to address this
third question, the Court examines the alleged infringement on free expression
to determine whether it is one of two alternative types. The first possibility is a (a) purpose-based infringement. The second possibility is an (b) effects-based limitation on
expression.[57] The division of infringements into these
two classes is found in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Big M Drug Mart.[58]
(a) Purpose-Based
Infringements
Big M Drug Mart, like Irwin Toy and Keegstra, did not deal with the
publication of pornography. In fact
the case did not even litigate a S.2(b)[59]
infringement. Rather, Big M Drug Mart challenged The
Lords Day Act,[60]
a statute barring stores from opening on Sundays, based on S.2(a).[61] This is the section of the Charter protecting 'freedom of
religion'.
Dickson C.J. wrote on behalf of the majority in Big M Drug Mart:
"The initial test of constitutionality must be whether or not the legislation's purpose is valid; the legislation's effects need only be considered when the law under review has passed the purpose test. The effects test can never be relied on to save legislation with an invalid purpose."[62]
Dickson C.J.'s comment on purpose-based infringements is actually a
restatement of this principle which he initially made in the decision of Hunter v. Southam Inc.[63] That case, as well, did not deal with a
challenge based on 'freedom of expression.' In that case a Charter challenge was made to a
search of an individual's premises.
The challenge alleged an infringement of S.8;[64]
the section of the Charter pertaining to a 'reasonable
search and seizure'.
Dickson J. (as he then was) wrote on behalf of the
majority:
"Since the proper approach to the interpretation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive one, before it is possible to assess the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the impact of a search or of a statute authorising a search, it is first necessary to specify the purpose underlying s. 8: in other words, to delineate the nature of the interests it is meant to protect." [65]
In the context of freedom of expression, a purpose-based infringement
refers to any governmental action that can be said to restrict free expression
in a manner directed at the content of that expression. Essentially, if the governmental action
restricts an individual's right to free expression based on the meaning conveyed
by that expression, then it amounts to a purpose-based
infringement.
(b)
Effects-Based Infringements
An
effects-based infringement focuses on the consequences of the expression. In particular, as outlined in Irwin Toy and Keegstra, consequences that deserve, at
law, such an effects-based limitation are those that manifest themselves in
terms of a message conveyed "directly through physical
harm".[66]
An analysis of an
infringement grounded in the effect of the expression is limited to one
possibility of two possible limits on freedom of expression. This dimension of the limit on free
expression constitutes an infringement of one's freedom to express oneself. This type of infringement refers to an
act of government that prevents an individual from expressing herself in a
non-violent manner as she chooses.
This is in contrast to an infringement of ones freedom from expressing oneself. Such an infringement occurs when an act
of government compels an individual to express herself in a particular way.[67]
In order to prove an effects-based infringement of an individual's
freedom to express herself, the challenger must show that the expression
prohibited furthers one of the three rationales, i.e. 'benefits', listed earlier
in this paper. This means that the
governmental act must interfere with (a) an individual's exploration for
'truth' through an examination of the general 'marketplace of ideas'; or, it
must impede (b) the 'advancement of
democracy'; or, it must interfere with (c) one's pursuit of
'self-realization'.[68]
The majority in Irwin Toy
explained this principle as follows:
"In showing that the effect of the government's action was to restrict her free expression, a plaintiff must demonstrate that her activity promotes at least one of these principles. It is not enough that shouting, for example, has an expressive element. If the plaintiff challenges the effect of government action to control noise, presuming that action to have a purpose neutral as to expression, she must show that her aim was to convey a meaning reflective of the principles underlying freedom of expression. The precise and complete articulation of what kinds of activity promote these principles is, of course, a matter for judicial appreciation to be developed on a case by case basis. But the plaintiff must at least identify the meaning being conveyed and how it relates to the pursuit of truth, participation in the community, or individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing."[69]
We
must now return to the question above:
"Could it be said that the governmental
action at issue would infringe those interests?"
We
must attempt to answer this question as it applies to COPA. In order to do this, as we have learned
from the relevant case law, we must first decide whether COPA is a purpose-based infringement on free
expression or an effects-based
infringement. If this limitation on
expression is purpose-based and that purpose is contrary to the principles of
the Charter, then it will be unnecessary
to determine the effects of the infringement.
This
determination is not always easily discerned. Dickson C.J. makes this point in Big M Drug Mart:
"Purpose and effect respectively, in the sense of the legislation's object and its ultimate impact, are clearly linked, if not indivisible. Intended and actual effects have often been looked to for guidance in assessing the legislation's object and thus, its validity."[70]
COPA
provides an example of just such a situation. It is not obvious whether or not the
infringement in this case is purpose-based or effects-based. In COPA the two are inextricably
intertwined.
American
Congress has always maintained that its object in enacting COPA was the
protection of society's most vulnerable constituents. Congress claimed that COPA was designed
and enacted to prevent harm to children.
This
objective was submitted by affidavit to a Pennsylvania court in defense to a
motion for an injunction enjoining enforcement or prosecution under
COPA:
"Defendant argues that COPA passes constitutional muster because it is narrowly tailored to the government's compelling interest in protecting minors from harmful materials."[71]
The government's contention has always
been that COPA was enacted with the interests of children in mind. It would be prudent, however, to
consider whether there is any other evidence of this objective.
Textually
speaking, the title of this legislation is clearly intended to imply that the
goal in enacting COPA was to meet the object of protecting children. More significantly, the stipulations in
the act also indicate that this was the government's intended purpose. This is apparent in the first subsection
of the act, which describes the breadth of the prohibition
imposed:
"Prohibited Conduct.-Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both."[72]
The
American government's commitment to the protection of children from harm appears
to resound clearly in the above excerpt from COPA. The only prohibition listed explicitly
mentions that the material most both
"(be) available to any minor" and
include "material that is harmful to minors".
Presumably,
material that is unavailable to minors but is harmful to minors would be
permitted. Likewise, material that
is available to minors, but is not harmful to minors also would be permitted.
Thus, it logically follows that the most likely purpose that this legislation
could have been implemented to serve, is the protection of children.
One could argue
that the protection of children was not the intended purpose. One could suggest that the purpose of
enacting the legislation was purely malicious in that it was to decrease the
economic returns to those who post pornography on the World Wide Web as a
business enterprise. This could be
maintained based on the inclusion of the stipulation that the communication must
be for "commercial purposes". This
means that material posted that is "harmful to minors" but that is made
available free of charge would not be prohibited.
Logically, this
could be an intended purpose of the
legislation, but is not likely the main intended purpose. The reason is that the stipulation
included is narrowly focused in that the material prohibited must be "harmful to
minors". For this reason, even if
the legislation does happen to serve the purpose of decreasing the profits that
are returned to commercial pornographers, it only does so through a prohibition
of material that is "harmful to minors" thereby also serving the goal of
protecting children.
The act could
have prohibited material that is 'harmful to women and minors'[73]
or 'harmful to society as a whole'. This would likely decrease the profits of
professional pornographers to an even greater degree. The act, however, is limited to material
that is "harmful to minors".
Giving American
Congress the benefit of the doubt, it is likely that the criterion that the
material be posted for a "commercial purpose" was only included as a pre-emptive
concession to an anticipated constitutional challenge. The government likely expected such a
challenge based on 'overbreadth'[74]
if COPA's application could encompass, for instance, non-profit charitable
organisations. On a balance of probabilities, therefore, one could declare with
some confidence that the act was enacted with the purpose of protecting
children.
It is now more
readily possible to characterise this limitation on free expression as
purpose-based or effects-based. The
fact that the prohibition is aimed at a particular type of content, which is
content that is "harmful to minors", leads one to believe that this is a
purpose-based restriction on free expression. After all, it is the message conveyed by
the content that is being targeted by the legislation. If the message is, 'Buy this or other pornography' or 'This material is sexually arousing' and
that message is deemed "harmful to minors" and must therefore by prohibited,
then it is the content of the message conveyed that is being abridged by this
law.
It must be noted,
however, that COPA is not prohibiting material that is "harmful to minors"
simply as a convenient means of defining the criterion by which one may
determine if the material is prohibited.
This particular characteristic of the material is specifically included
in the act as it represents the effect that this material has on children. The effect that material "harmful to
minors" evokes if made available to minors is, a priori, the effect of harming
children.
One might
conclude, therefore, that it is the effect of the expression that caused
American Congress to enact COPA and not the purpose of such expression. It must, therefore, be an effects-based
limitation. The answer is not so
simple, however. Recall the
criterion outlined in Keegstra:
"When an activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, through a non-violent form of expression, it has expressive content and thus falls within the scope of the word "expression" as found in the guarantee. The type of meaning conveyed is irrelevant. Section 2(b) protects all content of expression."[75]
Is
posting on the World Wide Web a "non-violent form of expression" or is it
violent in form?
One
could argue that posting material on the World Wide Web might do indirect harm
to individuals by creating an unfavourable
societal environment for certain people.
This act might also encourage individuals to go out and commit physical
acts of harm against others.
Some
academics, such as Catharine MacKinnon hold the view that the mere act of
exposing pornography to others is a directly harmful act in and of itself. She derisively makes this statement in
sarcasm:
"Pornography in the marketplace of life where
there are no equality laws - in the world of books, photographs, films, videos,
phone-sex, and cable-television - has fallen into a reality-warp. Harmless Fantasy it is called."[76]
A
prevention of such free expression, however, would not be based on the direct
effect of the expression as it is manifested in physical harm. It would not meet the standard found in
Keegstra that the act itself must be an
"expression communicated directly through physical harm".[77] Such an act of expression is
communicated directly in a
non-violent form and would only cause indirect physical
harm.
Bettina
Quistgaard comments:
"The second view of the harm that results from pornography focuses largely on men and their responses to pornographic messages. This approach moves away from the individualistic conception of harm and considers men as a group who cause harm, and women as a group who are the victims of such harm. It suggests that men "learn" from pornography; they learn that violence and degradation are acceptable and that women desire to be treated in this way. In turn, men are seen to act on what they have learned to be true. Those who take this view are also looking for an identifiable and objectively knowable causal link between pornography and harm to women, but here the causal link is between pornography and men's attitudes which, in turn, are acted on. Attitudinal change becomes the crucial link between the message and the action."[78]
Upon
close and careful analysis, therefore, one must conclude that the goal behind
enacting COPA, that of protecting children, actually constitutes a purpose-based
infringement on free expression.
The act of posting pornography to the World Wide Web is not a directly
physically harmful act and thus falls short of the standard espoused in Keegstra for an effects-based
infringement.
Some,
like Catharine MacKinnon, would hold otherwise. Upon close examination, however, such as
the insight provided by Bettina Quistgaard, it grows obvious that the
publication of pornography could never qualify as anything more than an
'indirect cause of harm'. As such,
a limit on this form of expression could not be targeting the 'directly harmful
effect' of such expression, as the only harm caused could only be indirect. Such a limit on posting material to the
World Wide Web, therefore, must, necessarily be characterised as
purpose-based, i.e. targeting the content of the expression
itself.
As COPA can be
characterised as a purpose-based infringement of S.2(b),[79]
it is thereby unnecessary to examine its effects on free expression. By way of brief comment, however, it is
fairly simple to sum up these effects.
First we must decide if COPA is a limit on one's freedom to express oneself or one's freedom from expressing oneself. This is a trite matter in this
case. COPA prevents one from
expressing oneself freely, and does not compel one to express oneself in any
particular way. It is definitive,
therefore, that this is an infringement on one's freedom to express
oneself.
As a limit on
one's freedom to express oneself, we must consider COPA's implications for the
three rationales for free expression discussed earlier.
Regarding the
first rationale, the 'marketplace of ideas' rationale, this could possibly be
infringed. A child seeking
knowledge of the truth about 'deviant' sexuality, for instance, could be barred
from obtaining this information as a result of COPA.
Regarding the
second rationale, the 'advancement of democracy', it is difficult to see how the
prevention of material 'harmful to minors' from being posted on the World Wide
Web could impede this benefit of free expression. In all likelihood, this benefit would
remain intact in Canada, even if COPA were implemented in this country.
The third
rationale, however, would certainly be infringed. This rationale of free expression is
that it benefits either the expresser or the recipient of the expressed material
by contributing to that individual's self-realisation. The open-ended subjectivity of this
rationale, it would seem, makes it likely that the infringed form of expression
here (and any infringement on free expression) would impede the actualisation of
this benefit. Those who seek to
view such material, children or otherwise, likely perceive the 'enjoyment' of
such material as contributing to full self-realisation. The same can be said of those who make
such material available.
It appears, thus,
that certainly one and likely two of the three rationales for free expression
would be infringed through an enactment of COPA in Canada. It is also clear that, regardless of its
effects, COPA's purpose of limiting non-violent free expression based on the
content of that expression is invalid under S.2(b) of the Charter. It is clear, therefore, that an
enactment of COPA would limit a constitutionally protected right in Canada and
on that basis should be struck down.
Now that this is clear, the next step of our analysis is to determine if
this limitation on a Charter right would be justified and
thereby upheld under S.1.[80]
III. Section 1 Analysis: "Oakes[81]
Framework"
(1)
Rational
Connection Test
As
the purpose of enacting COPA was to target the content of the expression being
limited, it is necessary to decide if this is a valid purpose at law. The purpose of this act, as has been
discussed, is the protection of children.
Canadian common law has indicated that this goal can be a "sufficiently
important" limit on free expression in Canada. The courts have recognized that children
are among the most vulnerable members of society. They are the most susceptible to
external attitudinal influences, as well as vulnerable to acts of adults with
whom they have contact.
This ground for limiting free expression was endorsed in the 1999 British
Columbia Court of Appeals decision in R.
v. Sharpe[82]. In that judgment, McEachern C.J. stated
emphatically:
"The first step is to consider whether the objective to be served by the legislation in question is sufficiently important to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right. I have no doubt that the protection of children in the context of this case is sufficiently important for such a purpose."[83]
The "context" of Sharpe was a
constitutional challenge to the Criminal Code of Canada provision
prohibiting the possession of child pornography. The case did not focus on the harm
caused to children via the production of such material. This fact was examined in the case and
it was accepted that the utilization of minors in the sex industry was already
prohibited in other sections of Canadian criminal law thus this matter was
extraneous to the case.
The
narrow issue with which the court was concerned was the possession of such material. As it was held that the potential harm
brought to bear on children through the possession of a particular type of
pornographic material warranted an abridgement of S.2(b)[84]
as a valid purpose, it is reasonable to presume that the courts would rule
similarly in the context of COPA.
It must be at least as important to prevent the proliferation of certain
types of material based on a concern for the protection of Canadian
children.
(2) Importance
of the Impugned Governmental Action
The
next stage of this S.1[85]
analysis of COPA must examine how to characterise the role of the government in
enacting this legislation. The two possibilities found in Canadian
common law are the state characterised as 'an agent that is merely attempting to
mediate between competing claims' and the state characterised as a 'singular
antagonist of the individual'.
This depiction of the state's role is extremely important. Depending on this characterisation is
the standard by which the Court will or will not choose to defer to the
government's judgment. If the state
is portrayed as a 'mediator' then a reasonable amount of deference is given to
the government's decision, on the facts.
If the state is painted an 'antagonist of the individual', however,
deference is deemed inappropriate.
The court makes this test explicit in Irwin Toy:
"Where the government is best characterized as the singular antagonist of the individual whose right has been infringed, the courts can assess with a high degree of certainty whether the least intrusive means have been chosen to achieve the government's objective. On the other hand, where the government is best characterized as mediating between the claims of competing individuals and groups … This Court will not, in the name of minimal impairment, take a restrictive approach … and require legislatures to choose the least ambitious means to protect vulnerable groups."[86]
In order to characterise the state as a mediator; two factors must be
present. First, there must be a vulnerable group within society whose
interests are being advanced by the impugned governmental legislation. If the court can prove that this
legislation protects a particular vulnerable group then the degree of deference
the court will adopt increases accordingly.
Dickson C.J.
explains this tenet in the context of freedom of religion in Edwards Books v. The Queen:
"(A) legislative attempt to avoid economic coercion of one religious group may result in economic coercion of another religious group. How is a court able to second-guess the Legislature on such issues?" [87]
Second, if the
court is satisfied that the balance to be struck between competing interests
requires the government to rely on some type of social science data then the
degree of deference shown increases still further.
This
is explained in the majority judgment in Irwin Toy:
"(W)here the government is best characterized as mediating between the claims of competing individuals and groups, the choice of means, like the choice of ends, frequently will require an assessment of conflicting scientific evidence and differing justified demands on scarce resources which cannot be evaluated by the courts with the same degree of certainty."[88]
S.1[89] arguments are
often won by this stage of the analysis.
Essentially three criteria have been stipulated thus
far:
(a) The state is characterised as either a mediator or as an
antagonist
(b) Is there a vulnerable group whose interests are being protected
through an infringement of a Charter
right?
(c) Have there been social science data relied upon by the government in
making its decision to limit a Charter right?
If
the government is able to prove that it was:
(a)
acting
as a mediator between competing interests; and
(b)
acting
in a manner that will protect the interests of a vulnerable group within
society; and
(c)
relying
on social science data in deciding to act
then
the government's judgment is shown a fairly high degree of deference by the
court. The degree of deference
shown by the court decreases if there are only two of these criteria met, and
diminishes further if only one criterion is met. Little, if any, deference will be shown
by the court if none of these criteria are met.
If, however, the challenger to the government action is able to prove
that:
(a)
the
state was acting as a singular antagonist to individual rights; and
(b) the
state was not protecting any vulnerable group through its actions; and
(c)
no
social science data have been relied upon
then
the challenger will almost certainly prevail. If all three of these criteria are met,
the odds are nearly certain that the impugned legislation will be struck
down.
How
would COPA stand up to these three criteria?
It is reasonable to presume that the government could convince a court
that it was acting as a mediator between opposing interests. The interests competing would be the
interest of civil liberty versus the interest of protecting children. Even if it could not be proven that COPA
would, in fact, protect children the gravity of this concern would likely
convince the Court to accept that it was prudent and rational for the government
to have attempted to protect this interest in this way.
It is also apparent that the Court would accept that the government
action does protect a vulnerable group in society. Obviously, that group consists of all
children in Canada. Not only does a
vulnerable group exist, therefore, but, the satisfaction of this criterion is
only strengthened by the fact that the group is comprised of a very large number
of very vulnerable individuals.
In order to decide whether or not social science data were relied upon
would be a matter of fact, if this legislation were ever actually enacted in
Canada. We can, however, make an
educated guess on whether or not such evidence would have likely been offered
and accepted. We can base our
educated guess on history.
In the precedent setting obscenity-case, Butler,[90]
the Court was offered large amounts of evidence by concerned parties which
indicated that there is no scientific reason to believe that men will act out in
any physically harmful way based on exposure to pornography. The court was also offered (less
compelling) evidence, based on the socio-philosophical work of Andrea Dworkin
and Catherine MacKinnon, that exposure to such material will, in fact, influence
men to cause harm. Interestingly
enough, the court chose to accept the tenuous submissions based on Dworkin and
MacKinnon's social theory.
David
A. Crerar criticises this judgment:
The first fatal flaw in Butler is the lack of a scientific connection between pornography and the harms Sopinka J. hypothesizes. MacKinnon cites the work of Dr. Edward Donnerstein to support the harm connection, and indeed, the Butler defence team called him as an expert witness at the trial. Yet Donnerstein himself admits that his research is much more tentative than its citors would indicate: "We can show a causal link between exposure to porn and effects on attitudes; but no one can show a causal link between exposure to porn and effects on behaviour." The bulk of studies draw the exact opposite conclusion. Indeed, in countries where government restrictions on pornography are most relaxed, as in Denmark and Sweden, the incidence of violence towards women is lowest. Some studies offer the theory that pornography curbs crime through the draining of otherwise dangerous sexual impulses.[91]
This acceptance by Sopinka J. of relatively tenuous social data evidence
over more sound scientific evidence seems to betray a bias of the court. It would appear that the court is
predisposed toward accepting evidence that will support a limit on free
expression, which could protect
children over evidence to the contrary.
It is apparent that the court would prefer to risk unnecessarily limiting
free expression rather than risk harm befalling children.
The fact that sociological evidence was offered into evidence and
considered by the Court in Butler,
indicates that such data do make an appearance when they are relevant to the
development of Canadian freedom of expression rights. Undoubtedly, submissions would be made
by Dworkin, MacKinnon, and other concerned socio-philosophical theorists to be
considered by the government during its deliberations on the decision to enact
COPA.
Furthermore, the
government would be bound to publicly rely on such data, especially that of the
nature of Dworkin's and MacKinnon's work.
Reliance on such data would be a politically prudent decision, if COPA
actually were enacted. Such data
would give objective justification to the law in the eyes of the public. Even if this data were not actually
decisive, or even influential, in the actual decision to enact COPA, it would be
a foolish government that did not at least use this data to justify its decision
after the fact.
In order to
recap, therefore, this is how the three criteria for a standard of deference
would be satisfied in the event that a Canadian court litigated the
constitutionality of COPA. The
government would maintain that:
(a) it was acting as a mediator
between the interests of free expression and protecting children; and
(b)
a vulnerable group in
society, i.e. children, is protected by COPA; and
(c) sociological data were
relied upon in deciding to enact this law (which, this paper suggests, would be
maintained by the government whether or not it was actually
true)
The challenger to
COPA would be losing significantly at this point in the Charter analysis. It would be nearly impossible to
convince the court that any of the above criteria weighed in the challenger's
favour. The best a challenger could
hope for would be that the government simply concedes that no sociological data
were considered in its decision to enact this law. In this way, the challenger could at
least have one of these criteria in its favour. This, however, as stated above, would be
a very unlikely turn of events and would still only gain a marginal amount of
deference from the Court.
(3) Rational
and Logical Connection Test
The next stage in
our S.1[92]
analysis requires us to determine if the ends pursued by the government action
are proportionate and logically connected to the means of achieving them. This test comes out of the Supreme Court
of Canada decision in R.J.R. MacDonald v. Canada,[93]
as well as a judgment by Dickson C.J. in Keegstra, and Sopinka J. in Butler.
Stevenson J.
wrote in RJR
MacDonald:
The first step in the proportionality analysis requires the government to demonstrate that the legislative means chosen under the Act are rationally connected to the objective.[94]
The test for the proportionality of the means used by the government to
achieve a particular end is that the means and ends must be logically
connected. This is a development
from the original test outlined in Oakes wherein the standard was one of
'tightness of fit'. The modified
standard as outlined in R.J.R.
MacDonald is considerably easier for the government to
meet.
This modified test is particularly conspicuous in Butler. As has already been discussed briefly,
the Court in Butler accepted evidence that the consumption of pornography will
lead the consumers to act out in a physically harmful way. This evidence was
accepted in spite of stronger evidence to the contrary.
The court simply
deduced for itself whether or not it was logical that preventing individuals
from consuming certain types of pornography would be a means toward effecting
the end of protecting women from harm.
The court deduced that it is, at least, rational to believe that the
consumption of pornography could lead men to act out their violent fantasies to
the physical detriment of women. No
hard evidence was necessary for this judicial finding. All that is required by this 'logical
connection standard' is a rational basis for believing in the
finding.
Furthermore, the
government's position is bolstered even more if it can show that the
infringement it has made on one right is actually to protect a different right,
thereby giving the ends a greater sense of importance. In Butler, a law restricting the
consumption of "obscene" material was upheld. It satisfied the logical connection
standard, but it also satisfied the standard of characterising the ends of the
law as of the utmost importance.
The ends were defined in terms of protecting women's right to
equality.
How would COPA fair in regards to this
rational and logical connection test?
It would appear that COPA would likely pass this test as well. It certainly seems logical that the
consumption of material that is "harmful to minors" could lead to children being
harmed. This statement, in fact, is
tautological. Due to the wording of
COPA, which describes the prohibited material as "harmful", no other conclusion
could be reached than that the prohibited material will cause
harm.
This reasoning might seem somewhat suspect, but remember that the logical
connection standard does not require any scientific facts. All that is necessary is a logical
connection between the means, i.e. the prohibition of posting material "harmful
to minors' on the World Wide Web "for commercial purposes", and the ends, i.e.
the protection of children from harm.
It is certainly logical that the prevention of children from being
exposed to harmful material will prevent harm to children.
Could this position be bolstered by
characterising COPA as protecting other rights?
COPA could be characterised
as a reasonable limit on free expression, because it seeks to protect children's
rights recognised both domestically and internationally. This is the child's right to personal
security. This right is recognised
in S.7[95]
of the Charter in terms of "life, liberty,
and security of the person". This
right is also recognised in the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of
the Child[96].
Article 19(1) of that
international-rights instrument holds:
States Parties
shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational
measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence,
injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation,
including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any
other person who has the care of the child. [97]
COPA could, therefore, have a very strong case in terms of the logical
connection and relative importance criteria. The challenger to COPA, however, could
have a reasonable objection to the characterisation of the means of COPA being
logically connected to its ends.
(4)
Technological Limitations and COPA
In order for COPA to have any effect at all, there must be some means of
preventing "harmful material" from reaching children online. COPA does suggest certain means for
doing so, which are valid defences to prosecution under the
act.
S.231(c) lists possible
due diligence defences to a charge under COPA:
DEFENSE.-It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors-
(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number;
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology.[98]
COPA suggests
such solutions as 'credit card verification processes' but this solution seems
superficial at best. Such a system
would require a World Wide Web user to input personal information including a
credit card number, before gaining access to pornographic material. Through this means, the website operator
could cross-reference information and determine the age of the credit-card
holder. The fatal flaw in this
system,[99]
however, is that any child with the ambition to sneak a look at an adult's
credit card would be able to circumvent this type of 'security measure'.
Perhaps the second suggestion will be more effective. This method requires a 'digital
certificate verifying age'. The
only problem is that the World Wide Web touches every jurisdiction on the
planet. Who is to be indemnified with the authority
to issue such digital certificates?
Furthermore, how should they be issued to a computer user? Should they be issued based on
information derived from a 'credit card verification process'? (I refer you
to the paragraph immediately above!)
So, the first two possible means of effecting the goals of COPA do not
seem to be very effective. Perhaps
the third alternative will be more promising. This open-ended defence allows 'any
other means feasible under existing technology'. In order to determine what this could
mean, one must consider what technological means might accomplish such a feat,
and whether they would be effective for the purposes of COPA.
(5)
Limitations of Filtration Software
As it stands at
present, there are two possible technological options for blocking content from
reaching a particular computer or network from the World Wide Web. These are known as 'filtration systems'
and are subdivided into two possible methods. These methods are (a) database
filtration systems and (b) embedded filtration systems. These would either be installed
'upstream' from one's computer, at the level of or before the Internet service
provider, or 'downstream' at the level of the individual user (or user's parents
as the case may be).[100]
(a) Database Filtration Systems
and Their Limitations
Database
systems of filters associate a particular rating with the content comprising a
particular site on the Internet.
When a user requests a particular piece of information, the filtration
software contacts the database. The
database then sends back the corresponding rating. Sites rated at a level deemed
'inappropriate' by the filtration program are blocked and will be unavailable to
the user.
Such a system, however, is limited to the point that one could say it
really does not work, or, at best, that it works 'approximately'. The inherent problem with such software
is that such a system is static.
The Internet, on the other hand, is the most dynamic medium society has
yet developed. The idea of applying
a static system to regulate a dynamic medium is inherently flawed and doomed to
failure over the long term.
The content of the Internet has increased and evolved over the years and
this evolution is bound to continue.
A regulation schema that is not suited to change will eventually fall
short. It is not possible for
producers of database filtration software to anticipate any and all means of
posting 'indecent' material.
Carlin Meyer explains the shortcomings of these
systems:
"(S)ophisticated hackers are able to hide
obscene images and text within other seemingly innocent postings, and decoding
techniques can be rapidly circulated among members of the computer
underground."[101]
Even if it were possible for database filtration programs to decode such
'encrypted'[102]
messages, it would be impossible to implement such a system of watchwords in any
practical way. These filters rely
on dictionaries of words and phrases in order to block particular material. For this reason it would be impossible
to adapt such a system such that it would be neither over-inclusive nor
under-inclusive. (The
over-inclusive aspect of such systems will be discussed below in the section on
"minimal impairment".)
Carlin
Meyer expresses his feelings on the utter impossibility of practically
implementing such a system:
"No matter how inclusive such a
dictionary is, it cannot possibly embrace the enormous variety of words used to
create obscene stories or to describe obscene images."[103]
Database filtration systems would not be likely to block, for instance, a
descriptor such as "Woman! Horse! Hot!"[104]
Such a caption would be an obvious description of a bestiality site, to a human
censor, but would pass entirely undetected by a database filtration
program.
(b) Embedded Filtration Systems
and Their Limitations
Embedded
filtration systems are tags that are 'attached' to websites themselves. These are labels to be used by rating
systems, embedded within Internet content itself that rate a site based on a
number of specified criteria. Such
a system is far less haphazard and vague than a database filtration system as it
necessarily involves the cooperation of the website producer in order to be
implemented pursuant to that site.
Cooperation
is necessary, as it is the creator of the site that must add a line of encoded
information to the HTML coding of the page. This information describes the site in
terms understandable to an external rating system. This information acts as a tag that can
be read by commercially available software. The software program grades the site
based on the tag. According to this
grading, the site is either filtered out, or allowed to pass on to the user's
computer screen.
PICS:
The Most Likely Candidate for an Embedded System
Currently,
the most potentially viable embedded system is called The Platform for Internet Content
Selection (PICS). Paul
Resnik of AT&T Research and James Miller of MIT developed this system as a
means of regulating Internet content according to different standards as imposed
by different communities.
R.
Polk Wagner gives a concise explanation of how PICS works:
"PICS itself specifies little more than
the syntax and protocols used to label content and transmit the labels; it does
not itself specify a ratings system.
The creators of PICS intend to enable other groups (or even individuals)
to develop their own rating schemes, using PICS as the underlying standard to
ensure interoperability. Thus, for
example, any web browser that is PICS-enabled would be able to use any of the
PICS-compatible ratings systems. A
market might then develop for such ratings systems, allowing a diversity of
ratings systems as well as placing the choices regarding rating and viewing
content in the hands of the producers and users, respectively."[105]
Such
a system avoids many of the problems inherent in a database filtration system,
which arise as a result of websites being judged and filtered by third
parties. An embedded system allows
a site producer to rate her own site.
Further, the user may choose a particular rating system that will filter
out particular types of sites with particular types of
ratings.
The
main flaw with this system, however, is that it is open to abuse. Website operators could characterise
their sites as falling within the standards of a particular rating when actually
it should be rated much more harshly.
They would still, however, be able to plead the defence of having
used 'an available technological
means' for preventing children (whose parents use embedded filtration software)
from accessing their sites' material.
(6) The
Implications of These Technological Limitations on
COPA
It
appears, therefore, that none of the means currently available to implement COPA
as a matter of practice are likely to be effective. This seems to detract considerably from
any possible argument pertaining to means and their connection to the ends of
the government action. If the
government action calls for a limitation on free expression that is
technologically impossible, this must be taken into account at this stage of our
Charter analysis.
It
is difficult to anticipate how a court would view this practical impossibility
of COPA. It is possible, however,
that the fact that the only 'means' available to serve COPA's 'ends' are
ineffective would induce a Canadian court to strike down the law for the fact
that the means do not, in fact, logically and rationally connect with the
desired ends.
(7) Minimal
Impairment Test
Leaving aside the practical
problems of implementing COPA, there is one final stage to consider in our S.1[106]
analysis. This is the stage at
which the court must determine whether or not the impugned government action
infringes the right to free expression only to a minimal degree; i.e. only
within the de minimis range. A limit on free expression, if it is to
be upheld, must not be a greater limit than necessary.
Dickson C.J. wrote in Oakes:
"(T)he means, even if rationally connected to the objective ... should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in question"[107]
This question of the range of a limit on free expression is subdivided
into two other questions. These
questions are (a) Is this legislation
overbroad? and (b) are there
potentially alternative means to this legislation? The courts have been far more detailed
regarding the first of these two questions than the second. It appears that the courts are somewhat
expert on overbreadth, but not as confident when they must rule on alternative
means.
(a) Overbreadth
A statute is
deemed 'overbroad' if the court finds that the drafter of the law went too far
in defining the law's scope. This
means that the law ends up prohibiting more than necessary in order to meet its
intended goal. This type of
over-extension, out of the de minimis
range, arises as a result of imperfections in the drafting of the
legislation. It impugns the
language of the statute as being over inclusive.
As overbreadth
occurs as a result of sloppy drafting, the courts have responded by dealing with
such an rights-infringement by narrowly construing the impugned statute. In this way, they manage to uphold the
legislation, while simultaneously rectifying the Charter breach.
Sopinka J. in Butler used such a method.[108]
In order to solve the problem of overbreadth, the Court redefined the
common law understanding of 'obscenity'.
The definition was modified in that case from a test based in the
'standards of one's community' to an argument for promoting 'equal rights
between the sexes.'
It is reasonable
that the Canadian courts could deal with COPA in the same way. Any problems of overbreadth would likely
merely result in a redefinition of the terms "for commercial purposes" and
"harmful to minors". It would be
simple enough for the court to read this law down so that it does not pertain to
any number of activities that might be brought to the court's
attention.
(8) Filtration
Software: A Problem Revisited
A problem for the
court, however, is specific to COPA.
As we have already determined, filtration software is likely the most
viable means of implementing COPA.
We examined two
types of software, database systems and embedded filtration systems. Embedded filtration systems, as we have
noted, are susceptible to human error, either purposely or truly by
accident. These ratings systems are
not a great concern for a discussion of overbreadth as an embedded system is
more likely to be under-inclusive (thereby bringing more traffic to prohibited
websites).
Database systems,
however, are likely to be under-inclusive or overbroad. We have already seen that such systems
could legitimately fail to filter out a website depicting bestiality. These systems are also a concern,
however, because they will tend to filter too much content from reaching the
user.
Rather
than merely filtering content that could arguably be deemed obscene, such
systems also have a tendency to block information relating to matters of genuine
and pressing social concern.
Prof.
Lawrence Lessig expresses his apprehension:
"Horror stories abound - sites opened to
criticize blocking software (are) themselves included in the blocked list, sites
opened to discuss AIDS, or gay rights, excluded because of "mistaken"
associations with indecency, vegetarian pages excluded because of associations
with animal rights movements.
Controversial sites are easily excluded, yet no one says who gets cut."[109]
This
is the central concern for civil libertarians and other proponents of free
expression. There is a great
concern, for instance, that a fourteen year old girl may be prohibited from
viewing material "harmful to minors" and that the filtration software she is
forced to use accidentally prevents her from accessing some time-sensitive and
profoundly important information pertaining to 'breast cancer'. This could cause the purpose of COPA,
which is to 'protect children from harm', to entirely backfire and serve the
opposite effect.
This
concern would have to be weighed by a court should COPA ever be enacted and
challenged in Canada.
(b) Alternative
Means
A statute is out
of the de minimis range if a less
restrictive alternative means could have been used. The challenger in Keegstra made an argument of this
nature. In that case, it was
alleged that criminal legislation was an excessive means for combating the
harmful effects of hate propaganda.
Douglas Christie,
counsel for Mr. Keegstra suggested that 'human rights legislation would be more
appropriate. Alternatively, a
system of mediation, or even simply education could have protected the public
from the evils of hate propaganda.'
The court did not
accept this argument. Dickson C.J.
wrote in Keegstra:
"As for the argument that other modes of combatting hate propaganda eclipse the need for a criminal provision, it is eminently reasonable to utilize more than one type of legislative tool in working to prevent the spread of racist expression and its resultant harm. [110]"
Dickson C.J.
therefore did not reject the idea of using alternative means to the legislation
at issue in Keegstra. Rather, it would appear that the Court
endorsed the idea of using alternative means to combat a particularly despicable
form of expression. Dickson C.J.
did not go so far, however, as to say that only alternative means should be
used.
It is difficult
to say how the Court decides on the relevance of alternative means. It suffices to say that it is unlikely
for a challenger to win under such a heading. Courts traditionally do not relish the
task of determining alternatives.
Courts excel at determining whether or not an alternative chosen exceeds
its due scope.
Alternative means is such a vague and developing area of law that it is
difficult to say with any certainty how it would apply to COPA. The only evidence we have to base a
prediction on, comes in short comments in judgments like the comment in Keegstra. Based on such comments, it is likely
that a court might find that other means could be used in conjunction with COPA in order to
achieve the goal of protecting children.
IV.
Summary
We have learned from the Canadian courts to characterise the purpose for
S.2(b)[111]
of the Canadian Charter in terms of three rationales
or 'benefits' that this right serves to protect and foster. These benefits from free expression are
(i) the pursuit of truth (ii) the advancement of democracy and (iii) the
actualisation of individual self-realisation.
We have also determined that the act of posting material on the World
Wide Web, for commercial purposes, that is harmful to minors does advance at
least one if not two of the above rationales. This act is not 'violent' at law,
and therefore deserves the protection of S.2(b)[112]
It is apparent that if COPA
were enacted in Canada, it would infringe S.2(b).[113]
It infringes this section for one or both of two possible
reasons. This statute is either a
breach of the Charter because its purpose is to limit the content of expression
on the World Wide Web, or it
breaches the Charter because it limits the effects of this right express
oneself. It certainly limits the
enjoyment of the third and likely the first rationale for this
right.
Our analysis then
progressed to the stage of performing a S.1[114]
analysis on COPA. This section
determines whether or not an infringement of a Charter right is justified under the
particular circumstances.
Upon examination,
it is revealed that this infringement of the Charter is for an 'important' and
'valid' purpose at law. As well,
the government could defend its actions in enacting this legislation based on
three criteria: (a) the government was acting as a mediator between competing
interests and (b) the government was
acting to protect a vulnerable group in society; children and (c) the government would almost
certainly rely on sociological data when deciding to enact this law. Based on these three facts, we know that
the Court is likely to pay a fair degree of deference to this governmental
decision to act.
It was also
determined that the enactment of COPA bore a reasonable and logical connection
to the goal being sought; i.e. the protection of children from harm. Furthermore, this action is further
re-enforced in its validity as it can be characterised as a protection of
children's rights to personal security.
This is a right recognised both in Canada and
internationally.
Upon examining the question of whether or not COPA could practically
serve the ends it is logically meant to serve, however, we found reason to
question the likelihood of this. It
seems that the technological means currently at the disposal of those who would
seek to limit online proliferation of materials, are ineffective. Either one must resort to easily
circumnavigated systems such as credit card verification, or one must use an
entirely infeasible system of age verification certificates.
The only other
viable possibilities are filtration software programs. These we have learned are either too
approximate in that they would fail to limit much of the content that COPA seeks
to prohibit, or they are overbroad and would limit the proliferation of some
unarguably constitutionally protected speech. In this way, they would either fail the
test of the means as they further the ends or they would be overbroad in their
scope.
If the court
considered the possibility that alternative means to COPA could be used to
protect children, it is unlikely that the court would have accepted this. More than likely, the court would have
agreed that any various means could be used in conjunction. It is not likely that COPA would be
struck down based on such a contention.
V.
Conclusion: COPA
Stands a Reasonable Chance of Survival if Enacted in
Canada
There is no doubt
that COPA would offend S.2(b)[115]
of the Charter. This is necessarily
so, as it seeks to limit free expression that is non-violent in its form. In order for such legislation to be
upheld in Canada, therefore, it must qualify for a constitutional override based
on S.1.[116]
In order to
qualify for such an override, COPA would have to survive an Oakes analysis. Upon performing this analysis, we arrive
at a mixed result. We find that
COPA is enacted for a valid and important purpose. We also find that the enactment of COPA
is a logical and rational means of meeting this purpose. Furthermore, the goal of COPA helps to
advance the security rights of children.
These facts are in COPA's favour.
These favourable
characteristics lose much of their force, however, when one considers that the
practical means available for meeting these laudable goals of COPA are
essentially implausible at this date.
In order to implement COPA, new technology must be developed.[117]
It seems
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that COPA could be upheld if it were enacted
in Canada. The courts would likely
characterise COPA in such a manner that it would meet the theoretical tests
outlined in Oakes. If, however, the courts considered the
practical obstacles to implementing COPA in a constitutional manner, it would
likely be struck down. This would
occur either on the basis of overbreadth or due to the fact that it could not
serve its intended end.
In conclusion,
therefore, COPA could survive a theoretical challenge under Canadian Charter law. This legislation would be upheld in
Canada in spite of the fact that it infringes our Charter provision protecting free
expression. The only stipulation,
however, is that this law could not pass such Charter muster at this date for practical reasons. Experience with the swift advancement of
computer technology, however, leads this author to expect that such
technicalities will soon be rectified.
If such technological advances are made that could make this law viable
in the real world, it is reasonable to presume that COPA would be upheld if
enacted and faced with a Canadian Charter challenge.
Bibliography
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(1998) 38 Jurimetrics J. 629
MacKinnon, C., "Vindication and Resistance:
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Georgetown L.J. 1959
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Mill, J.S., "Law of Libel and Liberty of the
Press" (1825) in J.M. Robson, ed., Collected Works John Stuart Mill XXI: Essays
on Equality, Law, and Education (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1984)
Quistgaard, B., "Pornography, Harm, and
Censorship: A Feminist (Re)Vision of the Right to Freedom of Expression" 52 U.T.
Fac. L. Rev.132
Resnik, P. & Miller, J., "PICS: Internet Access
Controls Without Censorship" (1996) 10 Comm. ACM 87
R.J.R. MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3
S.C.R. 199; 127 D.L.R. (4th) 1
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Table
of Cases
ACLU
v. Reno
31 F.Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
R.
v. Big M.
Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295
Boucher v. R., [1951] 2 S.C.R. 265
Donald Victor
Butler v. H.M The Queen,
[1992] S.C.C. D.
5840-01
Chernesky v. Armadale Publishers Ltd. (1979), 90
D.L.R. (3d) 321
Edwards Books and Art Ltd. v. The Queen, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713
Ford v. Que. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145
Irwin
Toy v.
Que. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; 26 D.L.R.
(4th) 200
Ref.
Re Alta. Legislation, [1938] S.C.R. 100
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997)
RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573
Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299
R. v. Sharpe (30
June 1999), Vancouver CA025488 (B.C.C.A.)
Smith & Rhuland Ltd. v. R., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 95
R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; 95 D.L.R.
(4th) 202
Legislation
Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 12
December 1989, UNGA Doc A/RES/44/25
Child
Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 231
(1998)
Communications Decency Act 47 U.S.C.A. (1996)
Lord's Day Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13
U.S. Const. amend. I.
[1] Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 231 (1998). [hereinafter COPA]
[2] COPA § I(1).
[3] Id.
[4] Electronic Privacy Information Center, "New Cyber-Censorship Law Would Fracture Internet, Experts and Web Owners Testify" (20 January 1999) http://fed-soc.org/child-telecomv2i3.htm (last visited 31 March, 2000).
[5] ACLU, Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, In the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Case No. 99-1324, On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania http://www.epic.org/free_speech/copa/appellee_brief.html (last visited 1 April, 2000).
[6] Communications Decency Act 47 U.S.C.A. (1996). [hereinafter CDA]
[7] U.S. Const. amend. I.; "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
[8] Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997). [hereinafter Reno I]
[9] ACLU, Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, In the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Case No. 99-1324, On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania http://www.epic.org/free_speech/copa/appellee_brief.html (last visited 1 April 2000).
[10] U.S. Const. amend. I.; "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
[11] Id.
[12] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11, [hereinafter Charter] s. 2(b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[13] Charter.
[14] Reno
I.
[15] Id..
[16] "Child Protection Act Foes File Latest Attack" Newsbytes News Network (1 September 1999) http://www.newsbytes.com/ (last visited 1 April 2000).
[17] Id.
[18] i.e. in Reno I the Court held, "The breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly unprecedented. Unlike the regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the scope of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities. Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all non-profit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own computers in the presence of minors." (Reno I, at 2347)
Notably, COPA explicitly states in § I(1): "Prohibited conduct.--Whoever … by means of the World Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined, … imprisoned, … or both." (COPA, § I(1)).
[19] B.A. Taylor, "The Child Online Protection Act of 1998: A Good Old-Fashioned Harmful To Minors Law" National Law Center for Children and Families (1998) http://fed-soc.org/child-telecomv2i3.htm (last visited 3 March, 2000).
[20] U.S. Const. amend. I.; "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
[21] ACLU v. Reno 31 F.Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999). [hereinafter Reno II]
[22] Internet Free Expression Alliance, "COPA Commission is Strapped for Cash" IFEA News (8 March 2000) http://www.ifea.net/news.html (last visited 2 April 2000).
[23] U.S. Const. amend. I.; "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
[24] Charter, S.2(b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[25] U.S. Const. amend. I.; "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
[26] "The first amendment uses the word "speech". Section 2(b) uses the phrase "thought, belief, opinion and expression". The references to "thought, belief, opinion" will have little impact, since even a totalitarian state cannot suppress unexpressed ideas. It is the reference to "expression" in S.2(b) that is the critical one, and the word expression is very broad - broader than "speech"." (P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 851)
[27] P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 851.
[28] Charter, S.1 "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:1 (U.K.)"
[29] R.M. Elliot, "Freedom of Expression and Pornography: The Need for a Structured Approach to Charter Analysis" in J.M. Weiler & R.M. Elliot, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Vancouver: Carswell, 1986) 309.
[30] Charter, S.2 (b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[31] Irwin Toy v. Que. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. [hereinafter Irwin Toy]
[32] Charter, S.2 (b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[33] Charter, S.7 " Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:7 (U.K.)."
[34] Charter, S.2 (b) "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[35] Id.
[36] This benefit of free expression finds its inception in the work of John Stuart Mill:
"It is evident, at first sight, that, whatever might be the evils of freedom, they could not be worse than the evils of restraint. The worst that could happen, if the people choose for themselves, would be that they would choose wrong opinions. But this evil, as we have seen, is not contingent, but unavoidable, if they allow any other person to choose opinions for them. Nor would it be possible that the opinions, however extravagant, which might become prevalent in a state of freedom, could exceed in mischievousness those which it would be the interest, and therefore the will, of rulers, to dictate: since there cannot be more mischievous opinions than those which tend to perpetuate arbitrary power. There would, however, be one great difference. Under a free system, if error would be promulgated, so would truth: and truth never fails; in the long run, to prevail over error. Under a system of restraint, the errors which would be promulgated from authority would be the most mischievous possible, and would not be suffered to be refuted."
(J.S. Mill, "Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press" (1825) in J.M. Robson, ed., Collected Works John Stuart Mill XXI: Essays on Equality, Law, and Education (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984) at 7-8.)
[37] For examples in Canadian jurisprudence see, e.g., R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; 95 D.L.R. (4th) 202; Smith & Rhuland Ltd. v. R., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 95 at 99, per Rand J.; Boucher v. R., [1951] 2 S.C.R. 265 at 288, per Rand J.; Chernesky v. Armadale Publishers Ltd. (1979), 90 D.L.R. (3d) 321 at 343, per Dickson J. (dissenting).
[38] See, e.g., Ref. Re Alta. Legislation, [1938] S.C.R. 100 at 1145.
In that case Cannon J. stated:
"Freedom of discussion is
essential to enlightened public opinion in a democratic state; it cannot be
curtailed without affecting the right of people to be informed through sources
independent of the government concerning matters of public interest. There must be an untrammelled
publication of the news and political opinions of the political parties
contending for ascendancy. As stated in the preamble of The British North
America Act, our constitution is and will remain, unless radically changed,
"similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom." At the time of
Confederation, the United Kingdom was a democracy. Democracy cannot be maintained without
its foundation: free public opinion and free discussion throughout the nation of
all matters affecting the state within the limits set by the criminal code and
the common law."
[39] See, e.g. Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 at 306-7.
Rand J. wrote:
" Strictly speaking, civil
rights arise from positive law; but freedom of speech, religion and the
inviolability of the person, are original freedoms which are at once the
necessary attributes and modes of self-expression of human beings and the
primary conditions of their community life within a legal
order."
[40] R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; also see Ford v. Que. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
[41] Keegstra, at 727-8.
[42] R.M. Elliot, "Freedom of Expression and Pornography: The Need for a Structured Approach to Charter Analysis" in J.M. Weiler & R.M. Elliot, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Vancouver: Carswell, 1986) 320.
[43] Irwin Toy, at 969.
[44] RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. [hereinafter Dolphin Delivery]
[45] Dolphin Delivery, at 574.
[46] Charter, S.2(b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[47] Note of Criticism:
It is interesting that in no
case does the court give a theoretical explanation of why violent acts are
exempted from Charter protection.
One can arrive at many logically possible reasons. These reasons could range from the legal
jurisprudential (see the work of, e.g. R. Dworkin; J. Raz) to the pragmatic (see
the work of, e.g. J.S. Mill; J. Bentham;
R. Posner) to the moral (see
the work of, e.g. I. Kant; D. Hume).
The Court, however, never does explain its reasoning on this
matter.
[48] Keegstra, at 733.
[49] Id., at 732.
[50] Charter, S.2(b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[51] Keegstra, at 698.
[52] Charter, S.2(b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[53] For an overview of this school of thought, see the work of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin; also see K. Lahey, "The Charter and Pornography" in J.M. Weiler & R.M. Elliot, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation (Vancouver: Carswell, 1986) 265.
[54] Keegstra, at 698.
[55] Id.
[56] "Fortunately, most drivers are unaware of their constitutional right to disregard parking restrictions of which they disapprove" (P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 854, fn. 46).
[57] Note of
criticism:
This approach taken by the Court is somewhat disconcerting. It has clearly been adapted from
American jurisprudence, however it has been adapted incorrectly. In the US, a distinction is drawn
between (a) context based
infringements and (b) 'time place and
manner' infringements. This
distinction, however, is drawn at a later stage in the analysis. In Canada, the distinction between (a)
purpose-based and (b) effects-based infringements is drawn in
order to determine whether or not there has been an infringement. In the US, this distinction is drawn,
more logically, after it has already been determined that such an infringement
has occurred.
The American distinction is
drawn in order to decide which test to use to determine if the infringement is
justified. Context based
infringements are treated with strict scrutiny. The challenger almost always
prevails. 'Time place and manner'
infringements are dealt with less strictly, and it is not as likely that the
challenger will win.
In Canada, however, by the
time we get to this stage we are determining if there is an infringement in
order to go on to a S.1 analysis.
It is no longer relevant what type of infringement it is, for
standard-of-scrutiny purposes. The
test does not change depending on the characterisation of the infringement in
Canada.
[58] R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. [hereinafter Big M Drug Mart]
[59] Charter, S.2(b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[60] Lord's Day Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13.
[61] Charter, S.2(a); "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion."
[62] Big M Drug Mart, at 296.
[63] Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. [hereinafter Hunter]
[64] Charter, S.8; "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:8 (U.K.)."
[65] Hunter, at 157.
[66] Keegstra, at 698.
[67] See, e.g., R.J.R. MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 127 D.L.R. (4th)1.
[68] Note of criticism
(1):
Although the schema being
followed in this analysis is that delineated by the Supreme Court of Canada, one
has to question why it is that the 'three rationales' are not considered until
this point (question (iii) in this
paper) of the framework. At this
stage we are dealing with the second analytical question of whether or not there
has, in fact, been an infringement of the Charter. Intuitively, it seems that it would have
been more appropriate to have examined this in the first analytical stage of the
analysis (question (ii) of this
paper) wherein the question being determined was whether or not the individual's
interests are being protected.
It may not make any
difference in the outcome, however, when one considers the vagueness of the
third rationale, pertaining to 'self-realisation'. It is arguable that any activity that
contemplates a conveyance of meaning probably fits under this
rationale.
Note of criticism (2):
Given that we have waited
until this stage of the framework to consider the 'three rationales', it seems
unusual that they are only considered in terms of effects-based claims. It does not seem logically impossible
that a purpose-based infringement could also prohibit an activity that furthers
one of the three rationales.
Rather, it seems likely that this could occur.
Perhaps the Court will
address the two criticisms above at a later date.
[69] Irwin Toy, at 976-7.
[70] Big M Drug Mart, at 331.
[71] Reno II.
[72] COPA, § I(1).
[73] For a discussion of such theories, see the work of Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon.
[74] It would have been reasonable to anticipate such a challenge, as such a charge was brought against the CDA in Reno I.
[75] Keegstra, at 732.
[76] C. MacKinnon, "Vindication and Resistance: A Response to the Carnegie Mellon Study of Pornography in Cyberspace" (1995) 83 Georgetown L.J. 1959 at 1961.
[77] Id., at 698.
[78] B. Quistgaard, "Pornography, Harm, and Censorship: A Feminist (Re)Vision of the Right to Freedom of Expression" 52 U.T. Fac. L. Rev.132 at 155-6.
[79] Charter, S.2(b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[80] Charter, S.1. "1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:1 (U.K.)"
[81] This framework for a S.1 analysis is originally found in and has since been modified from R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200. [hereinafter Oakes]
[82] R. v. Sharpe (30 June 1999), Vancouver CA025488 (B.C.C.A.). [hereinafter Sharpe]
[83] Sharpe, at ¶ 271.
[84] Charter, S.2(b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[85] Charter, S.1. "1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:1 (U.K.)"
[86] Irwin Toy, at 933-4.
[87] Edwards Books and Art Ltd. v. The Queen, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 797.
[88] Irwin Toy, at 933-4.
[89] Charter, S.1. "1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:1 (U.K.)"
[90] Donald Victor Butler v. H.M The Queen, [1992] S.C.C. D. 5840-01. [hereinafter Butler]
[91] D.A. Crerar, ""The Darker Corners": The incoherence of 2(b) obscenity jurisprudence after Butler" (1996-97) 28 Ottawa L. Rev. 377 at ¶ 17.
[92] Charter, S.1. "1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:1 (U.K.)"
[93] R.J.R. MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; 127 D.L.R. (4th) 1. [hereinafter R.J.R. MacDonald]
[94] R.J.R. MacDonald, at ¶ 82.
[95] Charter, S.7. " Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:7 (U.K.)."
[96] Convention on the Rights of the Child, 12 December 1989, UNGA Doc A/RES/44/25. [hereinafter Child Rights Convention]
[97] Child Rights Convention, art. 19(1).
[98] COPA, S.231(C).
[99] *Not to mention concerns over one's right to privacy; but that will not be discussed here.
[100] The discussion of 'upstream' and 'downstream' filtration raises other issues regarding free expression as well. It is a topic worthy of an entirely separate paper, however, and will not be discussed here. It is reasonable enough for our purposes to assume that 'someone' has installed a filtration system 'somewhere' before World Wide Web content reaches a child.
[101] C. Meyer, "Reclaiming Sex from the Pornographers: Cybersexual Possibilities", (1995) 83 Geo. L.J. 1969 at 1988. [hereinafter Meyer]
[102] For a further discussion of 'encryption' and the legal issues surrounding it see:
C. Kuner, "Legal Aspects of Encryption in the Internet" International Business Lawyer (April, 1996).
[103] Meyer, at 1984.
[104] Id.
[105] P. Resnik & J. Miller, "PICS: Internet Access Controls Without Censorship" (1996) 10 Comm. ACM 87.
[106] Charter, S.1. "1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:1 (U.K.)"
[107] Oakes, at 139.
[108] This method of rectifying overbreadth was also used in Keegstra.
[109] L. Lessig, "What Things Regulate Speech" (1998) 38 Jurimetrics J. 629 at 653.
[110] Keegstra, at 786.
[111] Charter, S.2(b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[112] Id.
[113] Id.
[114] Charter, S.1. "1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:1 (U.K.)"
[115] Charter, S.2(b). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication."
[116] Charter, S.1. "1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 30/31 Eliz. 2-11 Sch. B:1 (U.K.)"
[117] Jurisdictional problems would also abound if it came to a situation of attempting to prosecute a party on foreign soil for violating COPA, but this is a 'conflicts of laws question' worthy of a paper of its own. It is entirely outside the ambit of this discussion.