Marine's Prayer

Almighty Father , whose command is over all and whose love never fails, make me aware of Thy presence and obedient to Thy will. Keep me true to my best self, guarding me against dishonesty in purpose and deed and helping me to live so that I can face my fellow Marines, my loved ones and Thee without shame or fear. Protect my family. Give me the will to do the work of a Marine and to accept my share of responsibilities with vigor and enthusiasm. Grant me the courage to be proficient in my daily performance. Keep me loyal and faithful to my superiors and to the duties my country and the Marine Corps have entrusted to me. Make me considerate of those committed to my leadership. Help me to wear my uniform with dignity, and let it remind me daily of the traditions which I must uphold. If I am inclined to doubt, steady my faith; if I am tempted, make me strong to resist; if I should miss the mark, give me courage to try again. Guide me with the light of truth and grant me wisdom by which I may understand the answer to my prayer.
AMEN.

The Battle of Bougainville

The Solomon Islands campaign began with the taking of Guadalcanal in December 1942. In February 1943 the Russell Islandsfell, and the New Georgia group followed in August 1943. At the end of 1943, the campaign reached its goal when Americantroops gained a solid foothold on the island of Bougainville. The Russells, New Georgia and Bougainville were objectivesbecause of their value as air bases.

Objective: Isolate Rabaul

The objective of the Solomon Islands campaign was to cut off Japan's major forward air and naval base at Rabaul, on the island of New Britain. Rabaul was the hub of Japanese air power in the south Pacific--a stopping point for planes coming from New Guinea in the southwest and Truk, the home of the Japanese Combined Fleet, in the south central Pacific. Bougainvillewas key to neutralizing Rabaul.

Preliminary Attacks

The first attack on Bougainville occurred Aug. 15, 1943. Eight Corsairs from Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (later known as the Black Sheep) flew up from the Russell Islands to strafe the Kahili airfield during American amphibious landings on the island of Vella Lavella. The lightning strike--a surprise so complete the Japanese did not have time to shoot back--damaged aircraft and refueling equipment on the ground and forestalled a night attack on the American amphibious force.

The Solomon Islands air defenses (AirSols), including units from the Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Royal New Zealand Air Force, made many air strikes in October on Bougainville and nearby islands. Although some strikes were designed to keep the enemy guessing as to the Marines' intended landing point, most were planned to reduce air opposition to the Bougainvillelandings when they finally occurred.

Diversions

Two diversionary amphibious landings were made the night of Oct. 27-28: the 2nd Marine Parachute Battalion landed on Choiseul; and New Zealand's 8th Brigade, together with Navy Seabees (U.S. Naval Construction Battalions), made an unopposed landing on the Treasury Islands on Oct. 27. Both operations served their primary purpose of drawing Japanese troops away from Bougainville, but the positions gained in the Treasuries, including valuable Blanche Harbor, were held and strengthened to provide staging for the landings on Bougainville. The Marines left Choiseul by landing craft after a week of harassing Japanese troops and damaging barge and supply bases.

D-Day: Nov. 1, 1943

Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander South Pacific, ordered Task Force 39 (which included four cruisers and the eight destroyers of Captain Arleigh Burke's Destroyer Squadron 23), under Rear Admiral A.S. Merrill, to bombard airfields on Buka and Bonis northwest of Bougainville. He intended the bombardments to keep the enemy off-balance and prevent air harassment of the landing force. The task force then steamed more than 200 miles to strike at the Shortland Islands, while Rear Admiral F.C. Sherman's Task Force 38 took over the bombardment of Buka, eliminating the threat from those airfields.

The actual landing by the 3rd Marine Division at Empress Augusta Bay took place at dawn Nov. 1. The bay, located at some distance from the heavily defended airfields at either end of the island, had what appeared to be the most suitable beaches for a landing. The plan was to establish a beachhead, then bring in supplies and equipment to build a landing strip for fighters.

Invasion forces consisted of 14,321 troops (including the 1st Marine Dog Platoon with their 24 Dobermans and German shepherds) in 12 transports, preceded by a minesweeper group. Destroyer Squadron 45, four minelayers and two salvage tugs provided further support.

The landing met with several obstacles. The Japanese defense of the beaches was stronger than anticipated. The 40,000 troops on the island had been reported stationed mainly around the airfields, and aerial reconnaissance photos did not reveal the extensive system of bunkers in the jungles above the beaches. The Marines who landed west of the mouth of the Koromokina River encountered steep slopes and shoals on which more than 80 of their amphibious craft foundered. Those landing east of the Koromokina were caught in crossfire from machine guns on the offshore islet of Puruata and on Cape Torokina east of the beach. A small contingent of Marines knocked out the gun emplacement on the cape after it had destroyed or damaged 14 landing craft; the 3d Marine Raiders captured Puruata.

The landing force drove away the rest of the Japanese defenders, while the dog platoon, moving ahead of the main body, sniffed out snipers along the trails of the bog-ridden jungle. In spite of the resistance, and two Japanese air assaults launched from Rabaul bases during the day (which were driven off by AirSols fighters), the Marines succeeded. By nightfall, all 14,000 troops, together with 6,200 tons of fuel, rations, and ammunition, were landed along a 200-yard perimeter.

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay

The evening of the landing, Army reconnaissance aircraft reported that a large Japanese surface force was heading for Bougainville. Task Force 39 intercepted it about 2:30 the following morning 45 miles west of Empress Augusta Bay. The American ships, executing maneuvers at breakneck speeds in the darkness to avoid Japanese long-range torpedoes, sank two enemy ships after three hours of heavy fire. With two other ships damaged in collisions while trying to avoid American torpedoes, the scattered Japanese chose to retreat. The American force had only two ships hit, both of which sustainedmoderate damage. The Japanese Response

The initial Japanese reaction to the Bougainville landing was to send a force of 19 ships to strengthen Rabaul. However, a Nov. 5 air attack from Task Force 38 heavily damaged seven cruisers and two destroyers, prompting the withdrawal of the cruisers and eliminating worries about surface attacks on the Bougainville amphibious forces.

Even so, the night of Nov. 6-7, four Japanese destroyers eluded the Americans and landed 475 troops west of the Marine beachhead. The Japanese hoped to catch the Marines between them and the other troops on the island, but the enemy forces never coordinated their actions. The Marines routed out the counter-landing detachment after two days of artillery barrages. Fewer than 100 Japanese escaped into the jungle; the rest were killed. The Marines sustained under 50 casualties.

Another punishing attack from Task Force 38 on Rabaul Nov. 11 cost the Japanese 68 fighters and three ships. Nevertheless, Japanese carrier air groups from Rabaul made repeated attacks on the American landing force and the U.S. Navy ships, which continued to ferry in reinforcements, supplies and munitions. The strikes did little damage to the American forces, but the Japanese lost so many planes--121 out of 173--that the remaining carrier-based squadrons were withdrawn Nov. 13.

By that time, the Americans had landed nearly 34,000 troops and over 23,000 tons of cargo on Bougainville, widened the beachhead 7,000 yards, and moved 5,000 yards inland through dense, difficult mangrove swamps.

Even though two airfields were under construction and the Marines were expanding their perimeter in search of a site to build a bomber strip, the Japanese army commander on Bougainville still believed that the landing was a feint. He continued to think that the primary targets were Buka to the north and the Buin section of the island to the southeast. Thus, no Japanese forceswere withdrawn from either end of the island to root out the American invasion, and the Americans had the opportunity to solidify their positions.

Holidays in the Solomons

On Thanksgiving Day, Nov. 25, Burke's DesRon 23 fought the Battle of Cape St. George, sinking three Japanese vessels out of five sent with troops to reinforce Buka. The American ships suffered no hits at all. The same day, the Marines pushing inland along the Piva River virtually destroyed the 23rd Imperial Infantry in the Battle of Piva Forks. This was the last major Japanese ground resistance on Bougainville.

On Christmas Day, the Army's Americal Division arrived on Bougainville to relieve the 3rd Marine Division. Marine Major General R.J. Mitchell, ComAirSols, moved his headquarters to Bougainville to direct the final air campaign against Rabaul,only 220 miles away. Within a month, the base at Rabaul was of no further use to the Japanese. American troops continued to occupy Bougainville, and contain dwindling Japanese troops, until relieved by Australian II Corps troops in late 1944. The Australians attempted to clear the entire island of Japanese, incurring heavy casualties. The end of the Pacific war brought and end to action on Bougainville.

Campaign Results

The Bougainville campaign remains one of the most resounding successes of the war in the Pacific in terms of the smooth coordination between the Navy and Marine Corps.

The capture of Bougainville successfully isolated Rabaul. In the fight for Bougainville, the Japanese expended more of their air units than they could afford to lose. The Bougainville airstrips constructed at Torokina and Piva by Seabees and engineers made possible fighter-escorted bomber attacks against Rabaul, and other Japanese bases on New Ireland and New Britain.

In December 1943, AirSols began a massive attack on Rabaul. The ensuing two months of constant air strikes, made possible by the possession of Bougainville, caused the Japanese to withdraw.

The capture of Bougainville caused Marine casualties of 423 dead and 1,418 wounded.

Researched and written by JO1 Lorraine Ramsdell

Cpl.Henry Bahe Jr.,Left, and PFC George H. Kirk
operate a portable radio in a clearing.
The two Marines are Navajo code talkers- in the dense jungle on the Pacific Island of Bougainville during World War II.

More About the Navajo Code Talkers

Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Peleliu, Iwo Jima: the Navajo code talkers took part in every assault the U.S. Marines conducted in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945. They served in all six Marine divisions, Marine Raider battalions and Marine parachute units, transmitting messages by telephone and radio in their native language-- a code that the Japanese never broke.

The idea to use Navajo for secure communications came from Philip Johnston, the son of a missionary to the Navajos and one of the few non-Navajos who spoke their language fluently. Johnston, reared on the Navajo reservation, was a World War I veteran who knew of the military's search for a code that would withstand all attempts to decipher it. He also knew that Native American languages--notably Choctaw--had been used in World War I to encode messages.

Johnston believed Navajo answered the military requirement for an undecipherable code because Navajo is an unwritten language of extreme complexity. Its syntax and tonal qualities, not to mention dialects, make it unintelligible to anyone without extensive exposure and training. It has no alphabet or symbols, and is spoken only on the Navajo lands of the American Southwest. One estimate indicates that less than 30 non-Navajos, none of them Japanese, could understand the language at the outbreak of World War II.

Early in 1942, Johnston met with Major General Clayton B. Vogel, the commanding general of Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, and his staff to convince them of the Navajo languages value as a code. Johnston staged tests under simulated combat conditions, demonstrating that Navajos could encode, transmit and decode a three-line message in English in 20 seconds. Machines of the time required 30 minutes to perform the same job. Convinced, Vogel recommended to the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the Marines recruit 200 Navajos. In May 1942, the first 29 Navajo recruits attended boot camp. Then, at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California, this first group created the Navajo code. They developed a dictionary and numerous words for military terms. The dictionary and all code words had to be memorized during training.

Once a Navajo code talker completed his training, he was sent to a Marine unit deployed in the Pacific theater. The code talkers primary job was to talk, transmitting information on tactics and troop movements, orders and other vital battlefield communications over telephones and radios. They also acted as messengers, and performed general Marine duties.

Praise for their skill, speed and accuracy accrued throughout the war. At Iwo Jima, Major Howard Connor, 5th Marine Division signal officer, declared, "Were it not for the Navajos, the Marines would never have taken Iwo Jima." Connor had six Navajo code talkers working around the clock during the first two days of the battle. Those six sent and received over 800 messages, all without error. The Japanese, who were skilled code breakers, remained baffled by the Navajo language. The Japanese chief of intelligence, Lieutenant General Seizo Arisue, said that while they were able to decipher the codes used by the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps, they never cracked the code used by the Marines. The Navajo code talkers even stymied a Navajo soldier taken prisoner at Bataan. (About 20 Navajos served in the U.S. Army in the Philippines.) The Navajo soldier, forced to listen to the jumbled words of talker transmissions, said to a code talker after the war, "I never figured out what you guys who got me into all that trouble were saying."

In 1942, there were about 50,000 Navajo tribe members. As of 1945, about 540 Navajos served as Marines. From 375 to 420 of those trained as code talkers; the rest served in other capacities. Navajo remained potentially valuable as code even after the war. For that reason, the code talkers, whose skill and couragesaved both American lives and military engagements, only recently earned recognition from the government and the public.

Researched by Alexander Molnar Jr.,
U.S. Marine Corps/U.S. Army (Ret.)

Navajo Code Talkers' Dictionary
The Naval Historical Center

Compiled from Times Wires
St. Petersburg Times
St. Petersburg, Florida Published July 27, 2001

Information from the Los Angeles Times, Cox News Service and Scripps Howard News Service was included in this report.

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