Subject:
Words
and Writing (Part
III)
( continuation )
2.2. Materialist Conceptions of History
Departing from a single postulate, Matter (nature), the mechanical materialist conceptions of history suggest, that "spirit" or "human consciousness", is a "reflection" of matter, a variant of mechanical motion itself. Thus, at first sight, it seems that matter (nature) makes history, mechanical deterministic history. Yet, what moves matter, what moves this mechanical deterministic history, are the "laws" of mechanical motion, which are being cut off from matter itself. Consequently, another, hidden, non-material, id est, spiritual entity, is being re-introduced through the back-door, being these very "laws" of mechanical motion the "subject of history", and matter the object, the stage of history.
This also is, in the final analysis, the case in the historical dialectical materialist conception of history, where "spirit" or "human consciousness" is the "highest blossom of matter". Spirit or human consciousness, as a product of matter, makes history, as it starts "acting back" on matter through the labour process, changing it according to human "needs". So, once again, the "subjective factor", that is, the human being itself, plays the decisive role, becoming "historic" as it starts to produce and reproduce itself by converting nature into its doublefold means of live: means of consumption and means of production. Once again, we end up with the contradiction (non-relation): History versus Nature.
Historical Dialectical Materialist Conception of History
The role of nature in the Marx a n d Engels, historical dialectical materialist conception of history is controversial, if we dare to make a clear distinction between Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in this respect. Marx’ historical materialist conception of history, in the final analysis, excludes nature from history, whereas Engels' consistent dialectical materialistic conception of history necessarily includes nature as an intrinsic part of history.
Historical Materialist Conception of History
Karl Marx in his Economic Philosophic Manuscripts from
1844, denotes, that nature only gains historical importance as far as it
becomes "human", as far as it enters the labour process as "humanized nature",
that is, being converted into object and tool of human life activity.
Only through human labour is nature upgraded from merely being the "inorganic
body" of mankind to being at the same time object and tool of human life
activity. For Marx, in prehistory, nature and society are the two parts
of nature itself : Nature as the inorganic body of the human
being, and the human being as an intrinsic part of Nature itself, basically
not differing from the animal. According to Marx, history begins as mankind
"transcends" this relation and converts nature into the doublefold
means of life mentioned above: Nature, from the very beginning,
is nothing else but a means of life, pure medium, not purpose. The human
being converts itself and nature into history, as far as it converts nature
from an immediate, unconsciously consumed into a mediate, consciously produced
"medium of life". Thus, it is the "human being", in other words society,
that makes history, and "progress" in history is equivalent to the progressive
labour process, that makes society "independent" from nature, that makes
society "historic" by freeing itself from the "yoke of nature", cutting
itself off from nature to a degree, where even the "immediate means of
life" and the "natural" products tend to be no longer the products of physical
production and nature itself, but of exclusive intellectual labour, as
is the case from post-industrial capitalism on.
(Note, concerning the Marx Debate: In this sense, Marx does
have a brilliant future)
Dialectical Materialist Conception of History
As far as Friedrich Engels is concerned, although he and Marx worked close together and although it is perfectly justified to state, that Engels coincides with Marx about the role of nature in history as briefly described above, there is an aspect of nature revealed in his "Dialectics of Nature", that necessarily leads to a different conclusion with regard to nature’s role in history. The methodological background of the controversy that arose on Engels' "Dialectics of Nature" is, that if Dialectics was to be applied not only to society, but to nature, too, like Engels did in his "Dialectics of Nature", then nature will become an intrinsic part of history, which "contradicts" all the conceptions we have seen above, that only society makes history. Engels, in the final analysis, comes to the conclusion of the "eternal circle of matter-in-motion", which creates and destroys worlds without regard of their "historical achievements" whatsoever, thus elevating nature to a "mayor player" in history, with and in spite of the labour process.
[Note here, that the German historical dialectical materialist philosopher Ernst Bloch, who (ironically) has placed his entire "open-system"- philosophy within the formal-logical good-bad parameter, does not at all approve Engels' conception of nature as an intrinsic part and "player" of history. According to Bloch, Engels' "eternal circle" of coming-into-being and vanishing of worlds is a threat to the good, human processes and achievements in history, and obstructs a possible, final, eternal "human home of humanity", that would not live to last in Engels' conception. "Cosmic Entropy" as pictured by Engels in the philosophical sense, is the "bad force" and Bloch’s nightmare, that has to be fought against on all fronts.]
Preliminary Conclusion
Except Friedrich Engels' conception of the eternal circle of matter-in-motion, we have seen, that there is no qualitative difference between the idealist and the materialist conceptions of history, just a quantitative one, as they both postulate only one, single "primordial" principle. It is "contradictory" in the formal-logical sense, if we state here, that in the final, materialist analysis, the ultimate postulate is still "spirit", is still society, never mind it’s material costume. Ironically, Shakespeare's "Call a rose by any other name, it will still smell as sweet", applies to the case of the apparent philosophical arch-enemies "idealism" and "materialism": Call the postulate "spirit", call it "matter" - it still is the same thing.