this is Jutta. I am sorry that we have been so busy in the last couple of weeks that we could hardly keep up our regular thought exchange. I really would have liked to make further comments on the "artifical man" -debate that arose from our last chat almost two weeks ago, but didn’t even have the time and leisure to read the "half man, half machine" article you sent some time ago. I hope to be able to do so, soon.

Anyhow, within our multifacettical debate, lately and among many other things, we have been discussing the guidelines and probable hypothesis for a seminar paper that Iris has to elaborate within the next few weeks for the Faculty of Social Sciences of the German University of Freiburg. It is about the concept of "sympathy" in Adam Smith’s "Theory of Moral Sentiments". It seems that the seminar she attended somehow set up the hypothesis, that the "feeling of sympathy" as explained in Smith’s moral philosophy, is (or can be) the basis for the "coordination of society" in the global era.

Unfortunatley, I cannot give you more details about what exactly has been debated within the seminar and how they would have backed their hypothesis, as I myself did not assist the seminar. However, Iris has asked me to elaborate a short overview on the moral philosophy of Adam Smith and post in on our marx.com "debate space", so we could get further stimuli from probable comments and suggestions from others to our posting.

Here is the overwiev and also some questions following it. Please post this on marx.com, Carl, and if you have any observations, we highly appreciate your comments and suggestions. Thank you.

                                                        Kindest regards from Jutta and Iris.
 
 
 

The Notion of "Sympathy" in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments - Basis for the Coordination of Global Society?

Adam Smith has mainly been known for his writings on political economy as exposed by him in "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations", which would become a milestone in the development of liberal economy in the 19th Century. Not only did he provide an analytical basis for David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, but for Karl Marx himself, concerning insights on the problems of exchange value, the function of money and the division of labour, leading Marx, via Ricardo, towards the determination of the theory of the value of labour.

The significance of Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, however, vanished precisely in favour of his reputation as an economist. Smith’s teacher at Glasgow College, Francis Hutcheson, motivated his interest in moral philosophy, determining to a considerable degree the well known Smithean optimism concerning his general philosophic world outlook, which later would express itself in the field of economics, especifically in his belief in the "good nature" of capitalism. In 1759, Smith elaborated his first mayor opus, "The Theory of Moral Sentiments", which brought fame to him beyond the borders of Scotland.

Having the Scottish philosopher David Hume, with his "Treatise of Human Nature", a decisive influence on Smith’s effort to develop a philosophy of morality based on "human nature", we will have to take a quick glance at Hume’s central reflections.

David Hume

In his reflections on the philosophical process of recognition, Hume departs from empirical experience, which, according to Hume, is the natural basis and conditio sine qua non for the human recognition ability. Thus, imaginations, ideas, reflections and thinking can never be separated from their empirical basis, the actual-natural impressions, that is, sensorial perceptions.

Contrary to conceptions that determine "god" or "reason" as the source of morality, Hume sustains, that there must be empirical elements to be found in the nature of the human being, that can form the source and basis of morality. For Hume, these primary elements, from which every moral theory and philosophy has to depart, are the sentiments and emotions as given by empirical experience.

According to Hume, it is a fact of experience, that along with egoistic sentiments of self-interest, human nature bears sentiments of sympathy and humanity. Both, egoistic and sympathetic sentiments, complement each other in a way, that individual acts and actions stemming from egoistic sentiments can lead to positive, humanitarian results on a whole. This basically anticipates Jeremy Bentham’s utilitaranism, as well as Adam Smith’s criteria of judgement, according to which universal validity (the common good) can be induced via the particular, individual circumstances (selfishness).
Finally, Hume determines the liberal State order, based on private property and freedom of personal development, as the one that best matches and combines the above mentioned elements of human nature, egoistic as well as sympathetic and human sentiments.
 

Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy

Smith, like Hume, founded his moral philosophy on "human nature",  constituting the following questions his criteria for morality:

  1. According to which principle do we judge about acts as moral or
      immoral ones?
  2. Which acts deserve to be called "moral acts"?

The decisive element in human nature, which is of utmost significance for morality, is, according to Smith, the sentiment of sympathy, which we have seen above in Hume’s "Treatise of Human Nature". Smith’s conception of sympathy, however, has little to do with a constantly sympathetic attitude towards all other human beings (Christian "thy neighbour"-attitude), but a determined, particular, emotional reaction on the emotions of others.

Smith does not determine the sympathetic sentiment itself as an intuition, but as a result of the ability of human imagination. According to Smith, this is why everybody can relate sympathetic feelings to human beings in general, independently if he/she knows them personally or not.

Sympathy feelings form sort of a "guideline" for moral judgements, but do not constitute the whole of criteria for proper moral judgement, which, according to Smith, depends on the correspondence of the sympathetic emotions of a given person with those of a supposed "neutral observer", which Smith calls the "inner man". This "inner man" manifests himself as a "voice" that cannot be ignored, which approves or condemns the person’s own as well as other people’s acts. [- In Julian Jaynes’ termini we would be dealing with the classical "bicameral mind" here.] According to Smith, this supposed "neutral position" is the condition for moral judgements to claim universal validity and commitment.

Still, there is another element in human nature, which Smith identifies as "self-love", being this human longing for one’s own happiness and personal advantage, however, a praiseworthy maxim of acting for Smith. He supposes the existence of "natural harmony" and a balance of individual self-interests, so that the "common good" of the general community would not be threatened at no point. This is, what also reflects itself in Smith’s "invisible hand" principle, in his affirmation of the principles of the exchange-based society and the division of labour, which together lead to the production beyond a particular need and  thus to a further differentiation of human capacities and human interaction via exchange relations, as exposed in the "Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations".
 

Questions
 

1. Is Adam Smith’s work "The Theory of Moral Sentiments"
    complementary or contradictory to "An Inquiry into the Nature and
    Causes of the Wealth of Nations"? If both, in which way can it be
    considered complementary, in which way contradictory?

2. Is Smith’s famous statement, as expressed in his "Theory of Moral
    Sentiments", and as later repeated in the "Wealth of Nations",
    according to which selfish men are often guided by an "invisible
    hand", and "without knowing it, without intending it" promoting the
    interests of the society as a whole, an expression of the still
    prevailing bicameral mind tendencies (J. Jaynes) of bourgeois
    society in liberal capitalism?

3. Is the assertion of utilitarianism, that individual acts and actions
    stemming from egoistic sentiments can lead to positive,
    humanitarian results on a whole, verifyable, depending on what is
    understood by "positive, humanitarian results"?

4. Adam Smith, in his last years, revised and completed his "Theory of
    Moral Sentiments". In which sense did he do so? Did he modify his
    optimistic approach concerning the essentially "good" nature of the
    human being and the capitalist system?

5.  Is the "feeling of sympathy", as explained in Smith’s moral
     philosophy, the basis for the "coordination of society" in the global
     era ?

                            We welcome your comments.