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Confrontng Current Challenges
on the
Peace Front: Constraints &
Opportunities
By Atty. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR.
(Paper prepared for a conference on "Waging Peace in the Philippines
Looking Back, Moving Forward," Ateneo de Manila University, 10-12
December 2002)
Greetings of Peace. Kapayapaan. Katoninongan, Paghi-daet. Kalinaw.
Wassalam.
A specter is haunting Asia, the specter of terrorism and with that the
"global war against terrorism." This is the main current challenge on
the peace front, or more precisely the various peace fronts, in the
Philippines. The post-September 11 "global war against terrorism" has
set back or constrained the work for peace in much the same way as it
has set back the work for human rights, whose day we of course celebrate
today. The U.S.-led campaign against terrorism reflects a drift toward
the militarization of the response to terrorism, and predominance of the
military and military solutions in addressing not only terrorism but
also rebellion and internal armed conflict, which this conference has
been convened to discuss both in its 1988 and 2002 versions. The
militarization of the response to terrorism and rebellion is not just a
"dangerous tendency" but already a "clear and present danger" to peace
processes, to the ways of peace, dialogue, persuasion, inclusion and
participation. In particular, in the Philippines, it is a threat to the
viability of peace negotiations with the various rebel groups.
This is, of course, most clearly demonstrated in the current state of
the Philippine government's peace process with the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP)-New People's Army (NPA)-National Democratic Front
(NDF). With the U.S. designation of the CPP-NPA as a "foreign terrorist
organization" and the Philippine President's welcoming of this in her
Nine-Point Guidelines on the CPP, the "prejudicial question" has been
raised by the hawks in high circles: "why are we negotiating with the
CPP-NPA when we have declared them a terrorist organization?" The
simplistic logic is this: The policy is we do not negotiate with
terrorists; the CPP-NPA has been declared a terrorist organization;
ergo, we do not negotiate with the CPP-NPA. It is not as simple as that
in reality but this logic appears to have won the policy battle, at
least on the level of the executive branch of government.
The logic of that policy, which naturally leads to the downgrading or
even scrapping of peace negotiations in favor of military offensives or
"all-out war," must be challenged, if no longer in the Cabinet then in
Congress. Even the premise that "we do not negotiate with terrorists"
must be challenged. I am talking not so much about whether the CPP-NPA
is really terrorist. I am talking against the absolutist position of no
negotiations with terrorists. Perhaps the best current counter-example
is the new, ongoing Sri Lanka peace process with the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE has long been designated by the U.S. as
a "foreign terrorist organization." Yet, without lifting this
designation, the U.S. itself has expressed support for the Sri Lanka
peace process. In Sri Lanka, as with the Philippines, there is a
history, including a history of peace negotiations, that cannot just be
disregarded. In the case of the Philippine government and the NDF, there
has been already a decade of on-and-off peace negotiations, maybe more
off than on, but which have at least produced a Comprehensive Agreement
on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL).
In the light of this recent history and rich resource of experience in
peace negotiations not only with the NDF but also the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA),
Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (RAM), Alyansang Tapat sa
Sambayanan (ALTAS), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and
Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa (RPM) all of which, incidentally,
have been called "terrorist" at one time or another, a question like
"why are we negotiating with the CPP-NPA?" should no longer even be
asked.
There are doves in the Cabinet like the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process (PAPP) who, to his credit, has tried to maneuver within
the constraints of the President's Nine-Point Guidelines by nuancing the
matter: "On the issue of terrorist groups, government has adopted a
policy of not dealing or negotiating with such criminal groups whose
main motivation is neither political, ideological or religious.
Therefore, such groups as the Abu Sayyaf, the Pentagon and other
kidnap-for ransom bands are dealt with through military and police
operations. Recently however, the government has had to review this
policy in the light of the U.S. State Department's recent designation of
the CPP-NPA as a foreign terrorist organization… The U.S.' action must
be seen in the context of the U.S. role in spearheading the global
campaign against terrorism and of the CPP-NPA issue as an internal
matter which must be addressed through our own internal policy. In a
9-point policy guide on dealing with this issue, the government stated
that while it condemns the acts of the CPP-NPA which constitute
terrorist acts and demands that these acts cease immediately, open
communication lines however shall continue to be maintained in pursuance
of the peace efforts with the said organization." There is a small
window of opportunity here for those who would advocate the primacy of
peace negotiations over military action in dealing with the major rebel
groups, not just the CPP-NPA-NDF but also the MILF.
But, as we said earlier, the hawks appear to have won the policy battle
against the doves at the Cabinet level and, most importantly, with the
President who has already laid down the hard line, which has not been
softened even for Christmas. The lead hawk, namely the Secretary of
National Defense, who justifiably prides himself as a thinking general,
to his credit, has sharpened the policy and public debate on this matter
by articulating some sophistication in his arguments, for example, that
"sometimes we have to wage war to have peace" (incidentally, a line
shared by the NDF), that the peace negotiations are useless "for the
past 10 years, and nothing is happening," that "we are for peace, but we
are not in favor of negotiations that are interminable," and so on. Have
these really become the superior arguments or ideas in the policy and
public debate? One current challenge on the peace front is to engage and
win the argumentation on the merits of the issue, and this requires some
counter-sophistication. The struggle for peace is also a struggle of
ideas. Martin Ennals, in his major paper on "International Conflict
Resolution" delivered at the 1988 International Conference on Conflict
Resolution in the Philippines, saw fit to quote these words from the
UNESCO Charter: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the
minds of men that the defenses of peace must be created."
At another, more comprehensive or encompassing level, the "global war
against terrorism" has reinforced an already dominant or hegemonic
ideology of national security, particularly its thrust of
counter-insurgency as the framework to address insurgency or rebellion.
The peace process has become subsumed under a national or internal
security framework. The peace negotiations in particular, through the
PAPP, have been subject to the Cabinet Oversight Committee (COC) on
Internal Security created by Executive Order No. 12 with a
counter-insurgency "Strategy of Holistic Approach." A truly holistic
approach called the "Six Paths to Peace," currently institutionalized in
Executive Order No. 3 defining policy for government's comprehensive
peace efforts, has in effect been undermined. This includes the third
"path to peace" which is "peaceful, negotiated settlement with the
different rebel groups."
At one level, the national security framework must be challenged and
debunked once and for all as a framework of governance. The basic
concept of national security as "the state or condition wherein the
people's way of life and institutions, their territorial integrity and
sovereignty including their well-being are protected and enhanced," on
its face, would tend to exclude other ways of life and institutions such
as those of the Bangsamoro (Moro nation) as well as alternative social
systems like socialism. The concept lacks a sense of history and tends
to focus in its operationalization on preserving the status quo from
various perceived threats or threat groups. There is a need for a
counter-hegemonic framework for governance and development that would
better address rebellion and its root causes. Off-hand, human rights,
human security, peace and development, conflict resolution and
peace-building, conflict transformation any of these would be a better
framework for addressing internal armed conflict.
A little more must be said about human rights as a possible policy
framework because it is, after all, Human Rights Day, and because Martin
Ennals highlighted human rights with quotes from the UN instruments all
throughout his 1988 major paper on "International Conflict Resolution."
His very starting quote from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
"Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression,
that human rights should be protected by the rule of law." uncannily and
succinctly shows both the roots of rebellion and the best legal regime
to address it. Human rights can be a framework not only for governance
and development but also for conflict resolution and peace-building.
After all, peace is a human right, going by the bold declaration of
global civil society in its Hague Appeal for Peace 1999.
At another level, the "Six Paths" framework for a comprehensive peace
process must be defended from the inroads of the national security
framework. The "Six Paths" framework formulated in 1993 is still the
best framework for the peace process so far not only because of its
comprehensiveness but also because it was the product of a process of
nation-wide consultation and consensus-building under the auspices of
the National Unification Commission, thereby enjoying a broad spectrum
of support both inside and outside of government. This is supposed to be
government's peace policy but it has been embodied only in executive
orders, which lapse with each new President or which may be revoked by
any President anytime. Government policy on such matters of life and
death to the nation like war and peace surely must be embodied in laws,
which all Presidents have the sworn duty to faithfully execute. It is
about time that peace be declared a national policy through a national
peace policy act of Congress, the highest regular national policy-making
authority under the Constitution. One current effort along this line is
Senate Bill No. 1451 of the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on
Peace, National Unification, and Reconciliation which would create a
Commission on Peace (or we can call it a Commission on the Peace Process
or CPP for short).
The policy battle on dealing with the CPP-NPA-NDF may be over in the
Cabinet but the battle should be brought to the Congressional arena
where it should be carried out as part of deliberations on a national
peace policy act, including whatever necessary Congressional
investigations and public hearings in aid of legislation. So much the
better if the Congressional debate becomes a national debate where there
is people's participation in peace policy-making. Peace needs its
allies, whether strategic or tactical, and there is one in no less than
the Speaker of the House of Representatives who does have a track record
in the peace negotiations with the NDF. He and a good number of
representatives have supported a House resolution calling for the
immediate resumption of formal peace talks with the NDF and the MILF.
But it is no longer enough now to call for the immediate resumption of
peace talks. The on-and-off, up-and-down talks will just keep repeating
themselves if there are no paradigm shifts on both sides. I am not
talking about junking framework agreements like the Hague Joint
Declaration with the NDF and the Tripoli Peace Agreement with the MILF.
By all means, honor all such agreements. I am talking about, on one
hand, the government casting aside a counter-insurgency orientation
which seeks to impose a peace settlement, and on the other hand, the
rebel side casting aside a framework of engaging in peace talks for mere
tactical or organizational gains. There is an urgent need here for a
decisive break with old bad habits something which is, of course, always
a challenge.
It is also no longer enough now to call for a Christmas ceasefire which,
incidentally, was pioneered as a People's Christmas Ceasefire at the
1988 version of this conference as breaking new ground for peace. This
is now old ground in the GRP-NDF peace process. Breaking truly new
ground here calls for nothing less than breaking the decade-old "talk
and fight" mode of no ceasefire during peace talks which mode both sides
have affirmed and reaffirmed to this day. It is no longer enough to just
call for the implementation of the CARHRIHL which would presumably
guarantee "a considerable reduction of violence" but the fighting goes
on. The continued fighting itself goes against the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Hague Joint Declaration which stipulates "specific
measures of goodwill and confidence-building to create a favorable
climate for peace negotiations." The "end of hostilities" is supposed to
come at the end of the process but this does not necessarily preclude an
interim ceasefire. After trying the "talk and fight" mode for more than
a decade, both sides must be challenged to give an interim ceasefire a
chance, to give it at least one decade also, for the sake of the people
and of the process itself, with the best possible safeguards. This could
create its own positive dynamic, including foreseeable peace dividends
bringing concrete benefits to the people which in turn generates support
for the peace negotiations. The challenge to peace advocates is to make
a good case for an interim ceasefire, considering that both sides have
their respective established positions against this.
Thus far, we have been dealing mainly with questions of war and peace
policy which is partly a struggle of ideas. It is also partly, in fact
mainly, a struggle of motive forces, of political support. The President
drives home this point everytime she challenges peace advocates by
asking where is the peace constituency, claiming a war constituency of
95% against the resumption of peace negotiations with the CPP-NPA-NDF.
Peace advocates should take this challenge more seriously. One idea is
to consciously and systematically work towards a peace vote at the next
general elections, whatever year this is held and for whatever form of
government. The idea, first and last tried in the 1992 general
elections, is to elect leaders whose track record and program are good
for the peace process. We all know this is easier said than done. Where
will the peace votes and the peace campaigners come from? Where have all
the peace advocates gone? The Philippine peace movement has admittedly
lost some ground in peace-constituency building because of past and
current failures or loss of momentum in peace negotiations, agreements
and implementation. As we indicated at the start, the "global war
against terrorism" with its militarization of the response has further
eroded or weakened the work for peace as well as its constituency.
Ironically, this crisis is also an opportunity for the peace movement to
regain lost ground because war also gives occasion to its own
anti-thesis, peace. The intensification and internationalization of
internal armed conflicts has given rise to some new peace alliances
(another kind of NPA) for example, "Gathering for Peace" to oppose
U.S.-led wars of aggression and military intervention, and "All-Out
Peace Groups" to support peace negotiations over "all-out war" with the
main rebel groups. And remember it was the Vice President as then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs who linked those two concerns when he was
able to get the U.S. to agree that the R.P.-U.S. "Balikatan" joint
military exercises shall not affect the progress of ongoing peace
negotiations with the NDF and MILF.
Below the relatively quiet surface of the peace constituency are the
increasingly active efforts at peace advocacy, peace education, peace
research, peace zone-building and other community-based peace
initiatives, especially in Mindanao. One interesting NPA (i.e. new peace
alliance) there is the Mindanao Peoples' Peace Movement (MPPM) which is
advocating a U.N.-supervised referendum as a peaceful and democratic
process of determining political options in Muslim Mindanao. Martin
Ennals was prophetic in his "Summary Review: Closing Statement" at the
1988 conference: "Perhaps the people's revolution of 1986 can be
decentralized. With the confidence of the past, the Filipino people can
reject violence as a means of achieving peace and assert themselves and
their authority over the life and death of their citizens, and the
future of their children." Peace workers have indeed acted locally, and
usually more effective at that than when acting nationally. Their
separate but interrelated and collective efforts at various levels, in
various peace fronts, are a source of hope that eventually a critical
mass consolidated into a strengthened peace movement will turn the tide
in favor of peace (Atty. Soliman M. Santos, Jr., Kaiba News and
Features).
__________
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Abangan ang December print issue ng KNF. Libre lang itong
ipinamimigay.
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