Drum Corps Economics: Risk and Opportunity in the Coming Decade

Mark V. Herzing


Contents.

1.   Introduction
2.   The individual drum corps as a local economic entity
2.1. Income
2.2. Expenditures
3.   The economics of DCI and the regional associations
3.1. Income and expenditures
3.2. The market for drum corps shows
4.   The coming decade: sources of risk
5.   Understanding drum corps economics: a plan of action
6.   Conclusions and acknowledgements


1.  Introduction.

     During the Drum Corps International (DCI) era (1972 through present), the junior drum
and bugle corps activity in the U.S. and Canada experienced a near catastrophic contraction.  In
1995, many of the corps active in 1972 have folded, and DCI itself has been forced to the brink
of financial collapse.  During this period, drum corps has been transformed from a primarily
urban, neighborhood-based activity focusing on local competition to a suburban, national
activity focused on long-distance touring.  Many are willing to assign DCI the lion's share of the
blame for the negative effects of this transformation.  However, I believe that in doing so these
critics fail to address the role played by the larger socioeconomic factors that have affected
nearly every public institution in the United States and Canada over the last two decades.

     The rapid rise of drum corps following the conclusion of the Second World War
occurred during the greatest peacetime economic expansion in the history of the U.S.(1)  The
DCI era coincided with a period of economic turbulence that included three major episodes of
economic recession (including particularly intense periods of low economic growth and high
unemployment in regions that have been home to many drum corps, such as New England and
Canada)(2), the stagnation of wages (3), the outward migration of middle class families from
urban neighborhoods to suburbs (4), one major and several minor restructurings of the tax code
(5), and the rapid growth in the cost of higher education (6).  Any of these factors (as well as
other not cited here) could credibly be linked to aspects of the changes in the drum corps
activity.

     Others in this Symposium will address whether today's drum corps is "better" than it used
to be.  My purpose it to augment these discussions by providing insights into the realities of the
economically fragile drum corps "enterprise" and the effect of larger socioeconomic factors on
its well-being.  In doing so, I seek answers to the following questions:

A.   What is the current financial condition of the drum corps enterprise?
B.   How does it relate to the larger economy, including local and regional economic
conditions?
C.   Are there "best practices" used by some drum corps that others would benefit from
     implementing?
D.   Can we anticipate future national and regional socioeconomic developments that might
     affect the drum corps enterprise?
E.   Are there lessons from the past that can be used to improve the current and future
     economic condition of the drum corps enterprise?

     In Sections 2 and 3, below, I describe a preliminary model for the structure of the drum
corps enterprise.  Embedded in these sections are a series of questions that I believe need to be
answered analytically to improve our understanding of the current condition of the drum corps
enterprise.  In Section 4, I discuss an example of a developing socioeconomic factor that may
affect the junior drum corps activity.  In preparing this essay, I hoped to present a rigorous
description of the economic structure of individual drum corps, their interrelationships with their
local communities, and the collective behavior of the drum corps enterprise.  To date, I have had
little luck locating quantitative data as the basis for such a description.  Such data are critical if
we are to advance beyond a merely qualitative, anecdotal understanding of the financial
condition of the drum corps enterprise.  I conclude by describing a project I hope to carry out in
the next nine months to develop a more complete descriptive and analytical understanding of the
drum corps enterprise.

1.1.  What do we mean by the "Drum Corps Enterprise"?

     One of the first challenges I encountered preparing this essay was defining the size and
scope of the drum corps enterprise.  In 1989, the most recent year for which I was able to obtain
a statement of income and expenditures, DCI reported that the total operating cost of its 25
member corps was $7.45M (7).  In that year, DCI spent an estimated $3.0M for its operating
expenses, for a combined budget of approximately $10.45M (8).  In that year, an additional 36
Class A and A-60 corps also competed in the DCI World Championships.  As recipients of at
least some portion of the DCI-distributed prize money, they must also be included as part of the
definition of the drum corps enterprise:  their inclusion adds an estimated $1.8M for a total of 
approximately $12.25M (9).

     In addition to competing in the DCI circuit, the DCI member corps also compete in their
regional circuits.  These corps derive at least a portion of their appearance fee income and
devote a portion of their expenditures to competing in these regional shows.  As an important
piece of the economic "puzzle" for individual corps, the regional associations should be included
an overall description of the drum corps enterprise.  Doing so would yield a total size for the
drum corps enterprise of approximately $12.25M plus a "to be determined" sum for the regions
(again, recall that this estimate is for 1989).  Using this set of definitions, the current drum corps
enterprise consists of the following elements:

A.   Drum Corps International
B.   The 19 DCI Open Class Corps (10)
C.   The 50 Division II/III Corps (11)
D.   The DCW, DCM, DCS, and DCW Regional Associations

     I elected not to address the economics of drum corps that compete exclusively in local
circuits (e.g., GSC, E-Mass, ODCA and FAMQ), corps that competed in regional circuits, but
not in DCI (e.g., this year's edition of the SCV Cadets or Pacific Crest), senior and alumni drum
corps, and wholly corporate-sponsored entities (Star of Indiana).  All of these corps present
opportunities for valuable additional insight and data for comparison and contrast.  I hope to
expand the scope of this effort to include their issues and concerns following completion of the
initial phases of this study (discussed in Section 5.0 below).


2.  The individual drum corps as a local economic entity.

     Drum corps are essentially local institutions, drawing the bulk of their income from
community sources.  This income is dictated by local conditions (e.g., conditions of the "market"
within which the corps operates) and the skill of the organization in operating in its
environment.  Decisions regarding expenditures, while made locally, are based primarily on the
competitive interests and aspirations of the organization within the larger framework of
competition as it is currently defined in the drum corps enterprise.

2.1.  Income.

     Corps income comes from four primary sources: membership dues/tour fees,
appearance/contest fees, charitable  contributions/ sponsorship, and corps-sponsored fund-raising
activities.  In the sections below, I discuss aspects of each of these income sources, and pose
questions that could be answered with improved data.

A.  Membership dues:  Income from membership dues and touring fees is presumably dictated
by what the traffic will bear, given each organization's competitive aspirations, its ability to
"sell" itself to prospective marching members, and the alternative summer activities (i.e., work)
available for prospective marching members.  Many corps reportedly use sliding scales for
membership fees, charging higher fees for "rookies" than for multiple year veterans.  Many corps
also reportedly allow individuals to "work off" fees through participation in other corps fund
raising activities.

     Information from a 1992 financial report of a current DCI member corps indicates that
over 21% of their annual income is derived from member fees (12).  Is this representative of the
drum corps enterprise as a whole?  Is the range of variation in membership dues directly
correlated with the size and competitive aspirations of a corps?  Does a "top" corps charge a
premium from its marching members?  How have corps dues changed over time?  To what
extent are corps dues related to the local "market" for alternative activities and educational
opportunities for youth?  Does the local cost of education and the availability/quality of jobs for
young people affect the amount a corps can charge for dues?

B.  Appearance/Contest Fees:  DCI reported that in 1989 it distributed $869K as
appearance/contest fees for DCI sponsored and sanctioned shows (13).  Prizes included $118K
awarded during the Championship week, with a $8,000 award going to the open class champion,
and $1,300 awards each going to the Class A and A-60 winners.  In addition to prizes and fees
awarded by DCI, drum corps also receive appearance fees for shows sponsored by regional
associations, as well as for other events (parades, community appearances).

     Information from a 1992 financial report of a current DCI member corps indicates that
approximately 14% of their income was derived from appearance fees (14).  Is this
representative of the drum corps enterprise as a whole?  What is the range of variation for
appearance/contest fees between corps in each competitive division? How have they changed
over time?  Are any corps particularly successful at obtaining paid appearances from sources
other than DCI and the regions?

C.  Charitable Contributions and Sponsorship:  As non-profit charitable organizations drum,
corps have the opportunity to collect tax-deductible cash and selected in-kind donations from
individuals and corporations.  Many drum corps also seek direct corporate and community
sponsorship, ranging from the complete corporate sponsorship of Star of Indiana by Cook
Industries (not otherwise addressed in this essay), to relatively small scale sponsorship by local
community institutions.

     Information from a 1992 financial report of a current DCI member corps indicates that
approximately 13% of their income was derived from charitable contributions (15).  Is this
representative of the drum corps enterprise as a whole?  What practices are used to maximize
this kind of income?  Has the proportion of funding due to charitable giving changed over time? 
Is there any demographic data available on individuals who contribute to drum corps?  What
percentage of donors are drum corps alumni, and how does this vary from corps to corps?  How
do local economic and demographic conditions affect the charitable donations a corps receives?


D.  Fund-Raising Activities:  Fund raising activities range from relatively large-scale, ongoing
activities, such as bingo, to small-scale activities, such as car washes and fruit sales.  Most corps
sponsor one or more drum corps shows a year, either though DCI or through their regional
association.  In the last few years, several corps have begun "entrepreneurial" initiatives,
including leasing their busses during the off-season, and leasing their facilities for events (e.g.,
wedding receptions, meetings).

     Information extracted from a 1992 financial report of a current DCI member corps
indicates that approximately 52% of their income was derived from "events and programs" (16). 
Is this representative of the drum corps enterprise as a whole?  What proportion of corps income
is generated by bingo/gaming enterprises compared with other sponsored events?  How is
bingo/gaming revenue correlated to local/state gaming laws?  How many corps or sponsoring
associations own property, and how is that property used?  What are some of the best examples
of new entrepreneurial activity being conducted by corps to increasing their funding base?   How
do local economic and demographic conditions affect fund-raising activities?

2.2.  Expenditures.

     DCI has reported annual costs for open class corps (top 12) of between $161K and
$500K (17).  Less reliable sources have cited instances where annual expenditures for some
open class corps approach $1.0M.  Freed from the demands of national touring, many Division II
and III corps operate on a completely different financial basis than their open class counterparts,
with budgets reported to be less than $100K, on average.  Are differences in expenditures strictly
correlated with size, or are there other factors (i.e., region).  Have there been significant changes
in costs over time?  Has cost growth in any specific cost categories exceeded the rate of
inflation, and why?  Corps expenditures fall into four categories: equipment, staff, touring costs
(fuel, food and maintenance), and overhead.  Again, I discuss aspects of each of these
expenditure categories, and pose questions that should be answered.

A.  Equipment:  Drum corps is an equipment-intensive activity, requiring substantial
capitalization.  Transportation (typically three or four coach buses, two tractor/semi-trailers and
auxiliary vehicles) are required for open class touring corps.  Musical instruments, guard
equipment and uniforms make up the remainder of the annual equipment costs.  Of the four cost
categories, equipment costs are the most easily controlled by corps management.  Corps can
(and frequently do) perform with equipment that is "outdated" relative to the state-of-the-art. 
Several corps are notorious for their obsolete rolling stock.  In 1986, DCI reported that the
average drum corps spent over 26% of its budget on equipment costs (18).  How has this figure
changed over time?  What was the effect on equipment budgets from major rule changes (e.g.,
the establishment of the "pit", the introduction of three valve bugles)?  Is there particular
pressure on aspiring corps to keep pace with DCI's "elite" corps in terms of state-of-the-art
equipment?

B.  Staff Costs:  The vast majority of labor in the drum corps enterprise is volunteered. 
However, selected individuals are compensated, including many corps directors, as well as key
creative and teaching staff members.  In 1986, DCI reported that 28% of a typical corps costs
went to cover staff costs (19).  More recent data from a DCI member corps showed fully 49% of
expenditures going to administrative and instructional staff (20).

     How do staff costs vary from corps to corps, and between open class, Division II and
Division III corps?

C.  Touring Costs:  Touring costs are a major component of overall corps expenditures, with
DCI reporting in 1986 that nearly 30% of an average corps' expenses were used for food,
lodging, transportation and vehicle maintenance (21).  More recently, DCI has reported that the
average cost of food for a touring corps is $5.73  for per person/per day, with five meals served
per day (22).  This yields an annual cost of over $55,000 for food (23).   Fuel costs were reported
as $18,200 for 15,000 gallons of fuel, to cover an average touring distance was between 10K and
12K miles (24).  No information has been collected to date on vehicle maintenance costs.

     Do these figures accurately represent the average cost of touring for (respectively) open
class, Division II and Division III corps?  Are there economies-of-scale for a large corps that
smaller corps do not benefit from?  How does tour length and duration vary from corps to corps,
and how does this affect touring costs?  Over time, have tours gotten longer or shorter?

D.  Overhead:  Like business enterprises, drum corps have fixed overhead costs for items such as
insurance, facility rental (office space and rehearsal halls), and interest on outstanding debts.  In
1986, DCI reported costs for these items totaling 16% of the typical corps budget (25).  More
recent data from a current DCI member corps suggested overhead costs of closer to 18% of their
total budget, including 7% for insurance and taxes, 9% for office space, and 2% for debt service
(26).  What are the regional and/or local variations in these costs?  To what extent do state and
local laws affect liability insurance charges?

3.  The economics of DCI and the regional associations.

     Unlike individual drum corps, DCI is a cooperative institution, founded by its original
member corps to maximize their collective impact in the "market" for drum corps shows. 
Started on a shoestring budget in 1972, DCI has grown to a multi-million dollar enterprise. 
However, like the drum corps it represents, DCI is an exceedingly fragile organization, living a
"hand-to-mouth" existence.  In mid-1993, DCI experienced an unusually severe financial crisis,
caused by substantial, sustained shortfalls in income from DCI sponsored shows (27).  The
primary cause of this shortfall was poor attendance at a series of DCI events, including the 1993
Championship in Jackson MS (28), the 1994 editions of Drums Along the Rockies, DCI Mid-America and DCI South, and the last-minute cancellation of DCI North due to poor advanced
ticket sales (29).  By the end of 1994, DCI's debt had grown to a level reported to be as high as
$1.6M.  In response to this crisis, newly arrived DCI Executive Director Sam Mitchell put in
place a severe austerity plan based on conservative estimates of 1995 show income, that
substantially reduced the number of DCI paid staff (30), and (ultimately) led to the cancellation
of the live broadcast of the 1995 DCI Championships.  As a result of these actions, DCI's debt
reportedly stands at approximately $500K, with plans in place for reducing it further.

3.1.  Income and expenditures.

     Since its inception, DCI has been primarily in the business of acting as a "booking agent"
for its members corps.  From 1988 to 1991, DCI reported that an average of 59.5% of its income
was derived from its sponsored and sanctioned shows (31).  Income and expenditure data by
category are presented below:

DCI Income by category (as a percent of total income)

                              1988      1989      1990      1991

Sponsored/Sanctioned Shows:   59.9%     61.0      61.2      55.9
Corporate/Private Giving:     05.6      02.0      07.7      08.7
Services:                     19.1      18.0      13.4      15.2
Products/Franchises:          04.4      15.0      13.6      14.4
Other:                        01.0      04.0      04.1      05.8

DCI Expenditures by category (as a percent of total)

                         1988      1989      1990      1991

Shows:                   40.5      42.0      44.6      42.7
     - Judging           (7.9)     (7.0)     (7.9)     (9.0)
     - DCI Show Production(- -)    (5.0)     (9.1)     (6.8)
     - Stadium Costs     (5.6)     (5.0)     (5.1)     (5.2)
     - Corps fees        (27.0)    (25.0)    (22.5)    (21.7)

Advertising/Promotions:  08.3      09.0      16.0      15.3
Service Projects:        16.4      19.0      12.4      14.4
Overhead:                08.1      11.0      07.8      10.0
Salaries/Benefits:       08.1      08.0      08.6      07.6
Cost of goods:           15.5      08.0      07.2      07.3
Friends of DCI:          (- -)     (- -)     01.3      01.0
Other:                   04.3      03.0      02.1      01.7


     I will defer analysis of trends in DCI's income and expenditures until I obtain more
recent financial data (including dollar amounts for elements in the DCI budget).  Similar
analysis is also required for the regional associations, which are presumably even more
dependent on income from sponsored and sanctioned shows.

3.2.  The market for drum corps shows.

     The establishment of associations of drum corps is based on the premise that corps must
work together to prepare a product (a drum corps show) that can be sold, either to local
sponsors, or directly by DCI or the regional associations, to derive substantial income (32).  In
the absence of more complete data (including data from the regional associations), the total
contribution of staging shows to the drum corps enterprise can only be roughly approximated, on
the order of 20% (33).  Although this figure seems small, it represents the approximate "value"
that the drum corps activity derives from collective action (the remaining 80% of the drum corps
enterprise is financed through the individual actions of corps working within their local markets,
as described in Section 2, or by factors such DCI's sale of franchised goods and services).  In
short, this is the largest single factor that the members of the drum corps enterprise collectively
(rather than individually) control.

     As DCI's recent financial crisis demonstrates, the largest short-term threat to this segment
of the drum corps enterprise is decreasing income from drum corps shows (readers should note
that there are other substantial threats to the remaining 80% of the drum corps enterprise -- an
example of which is described in Section 4, below -- but their effects are distributed across the
individual drum corps).  DCI and the regional associations (perhaps with the exception of DCM)
have struggled to control the variables associated with staging drum corps shows within the
larger market for entertainment.  These variables include show locations, show costs, ticket
prices, and investment in growth (advertising and promotion, clinics, and other developmental
activities).

A.  Location:  DCI and the regionals face the difficult task of determining those locations that
constitute the strongest markets for sponsored and sanctioned shows.  Recent attempts to use
major events (e.g., the Championships) as a way of penetrating previously untapped markets
such as the deep south have met with limited success.  Historical attendance data, as well as
general demographic data, should be used to determine those markets that will generate
sufficient local interest in drum corps to generate the kind of demand necessary to support
higher ticket prices.  These sites should be retained from year-to-year to encourage the growth of
a local constituency for the show (much like the ones that have developed in Allentown, and that
existed for the DCI Mid-America show held in Bloomington from 1989 to 1993).

B.  Costs:  The fixed costs of staging a drum corps show -- corps fees/prizes, judging costs,
stadium costs, insurance and event security -- must be covered regardless of the income from
ticket sales.  Further analysis of quantitative data from DCI and the regional associations may be
useful to determine trends and to see if there are unique opportunities for reducing these fixed
costs.

C.  Ticket Prices:  DCI has historically struggled to achieve a balance between maximizing
income from tickets sales and providing "value" to the drum corps audience.  Since 1988, the
cost of attending the DCI Championships Finals has more than doubled (34).   However, during
this time DCI selected to pursue a "one size fits all" approach to pricing, charging the same price
for high quality seats and those located beyond the goal line.  Further, "premium" seats located
between the 40 yard lines have not been sold to the public at all, but have been sold to Friends of
DCI and to member corps for distribution to parents and donors.

     In a strictly economic sense, DCI has made major strides in its 1996 ticket pricing policy
by recognizing that there is a substantial market for high quality seats that has been historically
untapped.  Although fans may object to substantially higher prices charged for Championship
seats, DCI is practicing a time-honored tradition of "testing the marketplace."  On pragmatic
grounds, this practice should be extended to all DCI-sponsored shows, and sponsors for DCI-sanctioned shows should be given guidelines for optimally pricing "premium" seats.  However,
as ticket prices for drum corps shows rise, DCI must find a way to continue to attract cost
conscious fans (younger people, families).  Just as DCI justifiably seeks to collect a premium for
the best seats in a given stadium, ticket prices should also reflect the fact that the audience's
experience when seated in particularly low seats, or seats located at the far end of the stadium,
may not be optimum.  For these seats, DCI should pursue "bleacher" pricing, as a vehicle for
encouraging casual or novice fans to attend.  Again, analysis of quantitative pricing data is
needed to determine if there is a historical correlation between ticket pricing and show
attendance.

D.  Investment in Growth:  In its first two decades, DCI went to great lengths to increase the
visibility of drum corps in the hope of expanding the overall market for drum corps.  Many
current fans (including the author) received their introduction to drum corps through the annual
live broadcast on PBS.  In the aftermath of DCI's financial crisis, the budget for advertisement
and promotions was substantially reduced, and the 1995 live broadcast was canceled (35).  
These actions, taken out of financial necessity, have potentially profound long-term implications
for growth in the market for drum corps shows.  In the Spring of 1995, DCI successfully
negotiated a two year agreement with the Walt Disney Corporation to host the 1996/1997
Championships at the Citrus Bowl in Orlando (36).  In addition to providing a means to reduce
some of the production costs for the Championship, the Disney deal gives DCI access to
Disney's expertise in public relations and promotion.


4.  The coming decade: sources of risk.

     In the preceding two sections I presented a preliminary model of the corps enterprise and
its possible connections to the wider economy.  Further data collection and analysis is required
to determine the magnitude and significance of each variable as it pertains to the activity as a
whole, as well as the historical trends affecting income and expenditures.  Completion of such
analysis would allow the drum corps community to identify and respond to rising economic
risks.  I offer the following example of a developing issue in the wider economy as the basis for
further discussion of the benefits of such analysis.  Readers should note that there are many other
possible sources of economic risk that must be explored.

     National leaders from both ends of the political spectrum are proposing substantial tax
reform for debate next year, with possible action in the next Congress (seated in January, 1997). 
The "flat tax" proposals developed by House Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-TX) would
completely eliminate the corporate and individual deductions for charitable contributions (37). 
A competing proposal forwarded by Sens. Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Pete Domenici (R-NM) would
retain the deduction for charitable contributions.  Other Congressional leaders are supporting a
complete elimination of the income tax in favor of a national sales (or "consumption") tax.

     Although it is difficult to predict when and if Congress will act (after all, tax reform
could be merely the latest "hot" issue in the 1996 elections, much like health care reform was),
even relatively simple measures reforming the tax deductibility of charitable giving could have a
substantial effect on the finances of the drum corps activity.  Preliminary data suggests that the
drum corps enterprise relies on charitable giving for between 5% and 10% of its income.  The
threatened loss of deductibility on the giving patterns of individual and corporate donors will no
doubt be the subject of much lobbying activity in the community of non-profit organizations.  If
legislative proposals are potentially damaging to drum corps, then the drum corps community
must be prepared to join in a grass-roots lobbying effort to fight these changes.  For now, it is
unclear that the drum corps community has a structured, activity-wide understanding of the
sources of its charitable income.  Such an understanding is critical as the first step in formulating
a strategy for addressing this risk area.


5.  Understanding drum corps economics: a plan of action.

     Those who have gotten this far have doubtless grown weary of reading "further data
collection and analysis is required."  What follows is a brief study plan for extending this
analysis.  I anticipate using the input from the RAMD Symposium regarding my analysis and the
perceived utility of this project as the basis for preparing a proposal to DCI.  I have begun
gathering the names of RAMD community members interested in volunteering their time to
work on this study.

A.  Setting Goals and Priorities:  I intend to tailor this effort to meet the information needs of
those who could ultimately benefit from the study.  The customers for this project -- DCI, its
member corps, and the directors of the Division II and III corps -- must be engaged directly to
establish goals and priorities.   A steering committee made up of representatives from the
various constituencies within the drum corps enterprise would be engaged throughout the study
to review interim products and provide feedback, and to act as "sponsors" within the drum corps
enterprise.

B.  Data Collection:  A comprehensive survey of all DCI member corps, as well as a
representative sampling of Division II/III corps, is needed to develop a complete data set on
income and expenditures.  A relatively large data set extending over substantial time period is
needed to compile reliable statistics, to define historic trends, and to analyze variations between
open class, Division II and Division III corps and between geographic regions.  I would also like
to use such a survey to capture some qualitative data on "best practices" used for cost control
and income enhancement.  Administration could take place through a written survey instrument,
complemented by phone interviews.  Additional financial data and attendance statistics would
have to be collected directly from DCI and the regional associations.

C.  Data Analysis:  Historical data must be "normalized" to account for the effects of inflation
and to correct for any differences in accounting systems (e.g., different fiscal years, cost
categorization).  Analysis of financial data would focus on identifying statistically significant
variances between regions and competitive classes (e.g., open class, Division II/III), as well as
trends in income and expenditures.  Data on finances and show attendance obtained from DCI
and the regional associations would be evaluated for trends.  I would like to prepare several brief
"case studies" to illustrate selected findings.  Case studies might include discussions of the
"lessons learned" from the collapse of recent drum corps, as well as presentation of analogs to
the drum corps enterprise (e.g., NASCAR, which has experienced substantial growth in the last
decade).

E.  Discussion of Findings and Reporting:  I am a firm believer in engaging customer groups in a
wide-ranging discussion of findings and recommendations from any study.  The results of such
discussion (including dissenting views) would be documented in a final report for distribution to
the drum corps community.  Generally, the final report would also include a detailed plan for
implementation, as well as a discussion of follow-on studies.


6.  Conclusions and acknowledgments.

     Like all parts of society, drum corps faces the sobering reality that substantial, and
potentially devastating socioeconomic change will continue for the foreseeable future.  Is drum
corps ready for these changes?  Larry Aldrich has observed:

"Pursuit of those answers is a worthwhile goal...assuming drum corps, and particularly
individual drum corps, have the interest, wherewithal, and management/leadership to affect
necessary change.  Most do not.  They are day-to-day operations run largely by volunteers and
skeleton paid staffs; certainly not the behemoths or paragons of organization that some fans
believe are behind those marvelous, large and impressive formations of talented youngsters we
see on the field.  Most corps, even the impressive ones, are appallingly shallow in terms of
financial and human resources; and their chances of improving the situation are slim."  (38)

     In light of these realities, I believe that it is critical that we pool our resources -- our time,
skills and data -- to develop a clearer understanding of how we arrived at our current position.  I
believe that the resulting insights have the potential of improving the resiliency of the drum
corps enterprise, providing individual units with ideas and best practices that can be used to
maximize their scarce resources, and providing DCI with insights needed to chart the course of
the activity in the coming decade.


Endnotes.

(1)  University of Michigan Economics BBS, gopher://una.hh.lib.umich.edu/11/ebb
(2)  Ibid.
(3)  U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
     http://www.census.gov/pop.html
(4)  Ibid.
(5)  LEGI-SLATE Inc. Congressional data service, gopher://gopher.legislate.com/
(6)  University of Michigan Economics BBS, op. cit.
(7)  1990 DCI Championship Program Book, Executive Director's Report, page 9.  All costs
     cited were for the 1989 season.
(8)  DCI stated that it distributed $869K in fees and prizes to corps:  22.5% of its total budget. 
     The remaining 77.5%, equal to approximately $3.0M, is taken to be additional spending
     over and above that of the DCI member corps in that year.
(9)  I assumed an average budget of $40K for the 24 A-60 corps, and an average budget of
     $70K for the 12 Class A corps that competed at the 1989 DCI World Championships.
(10) Twenty-one Member Corps were selected in 1994.  Freelancers and Marauders were
     inactive in 1995, Spirit of Atlanta competed in 1995 in Open Class and was included in
     the list of "Member Corps", Nite Express competed in Division II at Buffalo and is
     included in that total.
(11) Forty-one Division III Corps competed in Buffalo.  I have excluded Phoenix Regiment
     and Bay Max from Japan, for the purpose of this essay.  Thirteen Division II Corps
     competed  in Buffalo.  Pioneer was a DCI Member Corps for 1995 is included in that
     total.  I have excluded Mayflower from England for the purpose of this essay.
(12) Cadets of Bergen County "The Cadets Insider" Autumn, 1993 Issue, back page.
(13) 1990 DCI Championship Program Book, op. cit.
(14) CBC, op. cit.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Ibid.
(17) 1990 DCI Championship Program Book, op. cit.
(18) 1986 DCI Championship Program Book, page 40.
(19) Ibid.
(20) CBC op. cit.
(21) 1986 DCI Championship Program Book, page 40.
(22) 1995 Preview of Champions Program Book, page 18.  The  figures cited were identical to
     figures presented in the 1991 DCI Championship Program Book.
(23) Total of 48,500 meals served to 128 members and 45 staff at $1.14 per meal.
(24) 1995 Preview of Champions Program Book, op. cit.
(25) 1986 DCI Championship Program Book, op. cit.
(26) CBC, op. cit.
(27) DCI Today, Volume 20, Number 6, Open Letter to Drum Corps Fans from the DCI Board
     of Directors
(28) Ibid.
(29) Lower-than-expected turnout at these regional shows was cited in a series of show
     reports published in Drum Corps World during the summer of 1994.
(30) DCI Today, op. cit.
(31) 1988 DCI Championship Program, page 9; 1989 DCI Championship Program, page 11,
     1990 DCI Championship Program, page 10; 1991 DCI Championship Program, page 12.
(32) Star of Indiana's "Evening of Brass Theater" can be viewed, in part, as a challenge to this
     premise.
(33) This rough estimate is based on the 1989 total value for the drum corps enterprise cited
     above of $12.25M (recall that this figure excluded a "to be determined" sum for regional
     income).  In that year, DCI reported that 61.2% of its income ($2.3M from an estimated
     $3.8M) was from sponsored and sanctioned shows.
(34) In 1989, the price of a championship ticket increased from $15.00 to $2000.  Additional
     $5.00 increases followed in 1992 and 1994.  Ticket prices for attending Championship
     semifinals more than doubled during this time.
(35) DCI Today, op. cit.
(36) Drum Corps World
(37) Washington Post, September 3, 1995, "Flat Tax Proposals Take Center Stage", page 3.
(38) L. Aldrich.

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