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Giuseppe Tornielli-Brusati di Vergano.

Notes regarding his Diplomatic Mission in Romania

1879-1887

 

Rudolf Dinu,

University of Bucharest

Romanian Institute of Humanistic

Culture and Research, Venice

 

      During the period between 1879 and 1914, Italy was represented in Bucharest by four plenipotentiary ministers, with considerably different temperaments, abilities, conceptions and strategies. The personality selected to inaugurate in December 1879 the diplomatic relationship with the independent Romania at the level of Legation was the Count Giuseppe Tornielli Brusati di Vergano, una delle figure più corpose della diplomazia italiana[1]. Carried on during more than 46 years, his diplomatic career and activity is less known and studied even nowadays[2]. The present investigation especially refers to the eight years spent by Tornielli-Brusati in Bucharest, as plenipotentiary minister of Italy.

        Born at Novara on 1836, February 12, the first extraordinary envoy of Italy to Bucharest originated in a traditional noble family, one of the most ancient and powerful in Novara, since a certain Guglielmo di Tornielli, Bishop of Novara was attested in the 12th century. The family has included an important number of local magistrates, prefects, intendents, mayors, as well as three bishops. His grandfather, that is Giuseppe Maria, had gone through a brilliant career in the Piedmont Kingdom, being successively prefect, General Intendent at Chambéry (1816), Director of the Administration of the Public Debit (1820), Viceroy of Sardinia (1824), Minister of State (1836), being named as Grande di Corona (1831) and distinguished with the superior order of Santa Annunziata. The diplomat’s father, that is Eugenio was mayor of Novara, deputy and

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Gentiluomo di camera of the King Victor Emmanuel II. Eugenio Tornielli would add the family name of his mother, Camilla Brusati, who was the last descendent of another famous noble house in Novara[3]. Through the agency of his mother, Tornielli was related to the family of the dukes of Guerrieri-Gonzaga[4]. Consequently, he belonged to the Savoyard-Piedmontese high nobility, where some other representative characters of the Italian diplomacy, such as Carlo Nicolis di Robilant, Edoardo De Launay, Carlo Alberto Maffei di Boglio, Carlo Gerbaix De Sonnaz, and so on came from.

        Graduate in law studies at the Turin University in 1858, Tornielli begins his diplomatic career as volunteer in the Kingdom of Sardinia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 1859, November 15[5]. On 1862, May 16 he is promoted as Second Class Secretary of Legation, and on September 27 the same year he is attaché at the particular cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Between 1863 and 1867 he functions as Secretary of Legation at St. Petersburg and Athens. After this period spent abroad, on 1867, October 8 he is named as head of minister’s cabinet, and on 1868, January 2 has the task of regent of the ministry’s political department by March 1876. In this position, he has the merit to determine the constitution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ archive, which ordination he supervised personally[6]. On 1876, March 16 he is promoted as Second Class Plenipotentiary Minister. In the periods 1976, April 2-1878, June 3 and 1878, December 19-1879, July 6 he has the function of Minister of Foreign Affairs’ General Secretary. Thus, there is a relatively gradual evolution, but permanently ascending. In 1882, in a letter to the President of Ministers’ Council, Agostino Depretis, Tornielli regarded his own evolution in the Ministry’s Direction as “13 anni consecutivi di larga, effettiva, quotidiana cooperazione nella direzione della politica estera italiana[7]. Affirming the important part played by him inside the decision making group during all these years, and especially between 1876 and 1879 when he functions as Consulta’s General Secretary, becomes a common feature in the historiography[8]. Federico Chabod names him as “la ninfa Egeria di Depretis per i problemi internazionali[9], thus defining

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his part as intimate counsellor of the Left leader[10], and indicates him together with Maffei di Boglio as “the real promoter” of the Italian international policy during the difficult times of the Oriental crisis[11]. A similar and more recent opinion is to be found out in Enrico Decleva: “Anche in considerazione delle malcerte condizioni di salute del nuovo titolare della Consulta, Luigi Amedeo Melegari [March 1876-December 1877, n.n.], sin lì rappresentante italiano a Berna, funzioni importanti vennero assunte dal nuovo segretario generale, Giuseppe Tornielli Brusati, legato a Depretis, ma già alla guida della Divisione politica del Ministero. […]”[12]. The same considerations are to be detected also at the contemporary opinions, meaning from statesmen and diplomats. For instance, Maffei di Boglio makes reference to the influence upon Depretis in the foreign policy matters, in a letter on 1878, August 13 to Alberto Pansa. Tornielli is regarded as “l’anima dannata di Crispi e Depretis]”[13]. The British plenipotentiary at the conference in Constantinople, the Marquis of Salisbury, during a visit to Rome, had the impression that it was Tornielli to be “the real Minister of Foreign Affairs”[14]. The new regent of the Romanian diplomatic agency in Rome, Mihail Obedenaru, after his first contacts with Consulta, reported on 1877, May 11 that “[…] domnul conte Tornielli este cel care pare a se ocupa mai mult cu relaþiunile între Minister ºi Agenþii Statelor strãine. Domnul Melegari se þine mai mult în rezervã […] / [...] the Count Tornielli is the one that seems to deal more with the relationship between

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the Ministry and the foreign states’ agencies. Mister Melegari is more reserved [...]”[15]. The great influence of the expert Tornielli on the Italian foreign policy in a moment when the lack of eperience (Unerfachrenheit) dominated on the government – including Melegari – was signaled also by the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary, Haymerle, in a report on 1877, May 12 to the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrassy[16]. In the

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summer of 1878, because of the conflict with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luigi Corti is forced to retire from the function of General Secretary, despite his efforts to assure the permanency[17]. Quite probable, this is the period when Tornielli’s decision to

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achieve the nomination in a representation abroad, preferably an important one, is dated. At least in a first stage, his intention was to be nominated as Plenipotentiary Minister at Constantinople, the only post considered as being on his own ability’s size. Nevertheless, he would be forced to renounce because of the same Luigi Corti’s opposition[18]. On December 19, 1878, once with the third Depretis government’s installment, Tornielli is once again General Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Since the government did not seem to be longlasting, Tornielli would decide to ‘reserve’ the post at Bucharest, although the decision to recognize Romania as an independent state was still suspended sine die[19].

        We could ask ourselves: why Bucharest? In a letter on March 1883 to Agostino Depretis, Tornielli affirms that: “[...] During my departure from the Ministry [1879, July 6 – n.n.] I accepted Bucharest, refused by the others, because it was to only vacant. [...]”[20]. In truth, it was also vacant the lately created Italian Legation in Belgrade, where Tornielli would be temporarily nominated on September, 1879, in the expectation of the decision to recognize the Romanian independence. There were different reasons that

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determined him to chose Bucharest. Among others, it was because it was more attractive financially, due also to his own efforts. The budget of representation in the ministry’s balance sheet for the Legation in Bucharest was clearly bigger than the one allocated to Belgrade: 50,000 Italian pounds, respectively 36,000 Italian pounds[21]. Although it was far of being a residence to offer influence to the titular there, because of its settlement between the two rival empires, that is Austria-Hungary and Russia, Bucharest represented an observing point more important than Belgrade[22]. This choice is to be connected also to the idea that Tornielli had on the place that Italy was to play in the Balkans and on the Romania’s future in this area[23] (cf. infra). Finally, it is to be noticed that Tornielly considered the mission to Bucharest as a shortlasting one, as a temporary stage before his nomination in a residence to correspond to his potential and ability[24]. On December 7, 1879, the Secretary of the Romanian Legation in Constantinople, Obedenaru, warned I. C. Brãtianu, the President of the Council of Ministers: “Însã foarte probabilmente, Tornielli ne va lãsa dupã câteva luni, poate chiar dupã puþine luni de tot. Deja ºtiam de la dânsul chiar cã el doreºte mult sã ajungã la Constantinopol. Aflasem de la Maffei, actualul Secretar General, cã [Tornielli –n.n.] ceruse postul de la Constantinopol încã din timpul Congresului, cãci se spera attunci cã Corti ar trece la Petersburg. Corti însã s-a reîntors la Stambul. Acum, din nou a rãmas vacant postul de Ambasador italian de la Paris; din nou e posibil sã treacã Nigra la Paris ºi Corti la Petersburg. În cazul acela, Tornielli s-ar repezi aci in Turcia. Astãzi

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am vorbit cu Corti. El chiar mi-a confirmat acestea zicându-mi cã probabilitatea aceasta existã […] / It is still probable that Tornielli is to leave us in a few months, maybe even after very few months. I already knew from him that he has to go to Constantinople in intention. Maffei, the present-day General Secretary, has let me know that [Tornielli – n.n.] had asked for the post in Constantinople since the times of the congress, since it was then hoped that Corti was to be removed to St. Petersburg. But Corti came back to Constantinople. Now the post of the Italian Ambassador to Paris is again vacant. It is again possible that Nigra to come to Paris and Corti to St. Petersburg. In this case, Tornielli would come quickly here, in Turkey. Today I talked to Corti. He even confirmed this to me, saying that this probability exists [...]”[25]. One of his letters to Alberto Pansa referring to the circumstances of his installment to Bucharest illustrates also that he has no intention to spend in the Romanian capital more than one year[26]. Finally, he would remain as the head of the Italian Legation in Bucharest no less than eight years!

        In connection to Tornielli-Brusati’s activity as General Secretary of Consulta, there is to be noticed that his position – together with Agostino Depretis’, was favorable to the recognition of the Romanian independence as soon as possible[27]. According to the Treaty of Berlin, this recognition was conditioned by the cession of the Southern Bessarabia from Romania to Russia and by the modification of the Article 7 in the Romanian Constitution regarding the circumstances of the attribution of the civic and political rights. Actually, in the spring of 1879, during the third Depretis governments, Italy made its second attempt to abandon the position of “solidarity” with the governments in Berlin, London and Paris and to recognize unilaterally the Romanian Principality’s independence. This intention was announced to the German government by a note sent by the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, De Launay, to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Bülow, at the beginning of April 1879[28]. According to the

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warrant of the Romanian diplomatic Agency in Rome, Obedenaru, the respective application was to be due to the Count Tornielli’s endeavours[29]. Anyhow, as a consequence of the German government’s hostile attitude and of the British and French refusals to leave their reserves, the idea would be finally abandoned.

        On July 6, 1879[30], once with the fall of the third Depretis government, Tornielli would abandon for the second time the post of General Secretary. Still, it did not occurred without the signing on the same day of the Royal decree that nominated him as Italian Extraordinary Envoyee and Plenipotentiary Minister in Bucharest. In the period between 1879, September 7 and December 5 he would be temporarily nominated

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in Belgrade. Finally, after other five months of hesitations, Consulta would decide to break “the line” strictly respected previously and to recognize Romania as independent state (1879, December 5). Arrived in Bucharest in the evening of December 18, 1879[31], the first titular of the Italian Legation in Romania, Giuseppe Tornielli-Brusati, Count of Vergano, would present the accreditation letters to the Prince Charles I in a solemn audience, on December 18, 1879[32]. In the honour of the Italian Plenipotentiary Minister, the Romanian ruler organized on December 18/30, 1879 an extraordinary lunch, with the participation of the all first rank dignitaries of the Romanian state: the President of the Council, the ministers of Internal Affairs and of Foreign Affairs, the presidents of the two legislative chambers, the Primate Metropolitan, the First-President, the presidents and the General Attorney of the High Court, the mayor of Bucharest, the rector of the University, the Prefect of the Police, etc., meaning more than 50 persons[33].

        At the beginning of his mission in Bucharest, Tornielli came to his 44th year of life. Since 1864, he was married with Olga Rostpkin, the daughter of the famous Russian General Rostpokin, who had set fire to Moscow during the entrance there of the Napoleonian troops[34]. Together with his wife, he would be accompanied in Bucharest by his foster daughter, the Countess Virginia Lazzari-Tornielli[35]. As they were preserved, the opinions of the contemporary witnesses as regards to his character were somehow intrigued. For instance, Salvago Raggi had known him at Madrid in 1889. According to his depiction, Tornielli, immediately after his transfer to Bucharest, was “un vechio signore con una lunga barba quasi bianca […], con cortese ma lenta parolaSe non un uomo gentile, certo era una persona intelligente, forse un po’ troppo burocratico, ma molto capace; non uomo ‘di mondo’, ma ‘un signore’; non elegante, ma distinto; […] con Tornielli la vita di cancelleria era un poco monotona, forse non interessante, un pocco accaparrante perché non amava accordare lunghe

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licenze…”[36]. Among those who did not admire him, Alessandro Guiccioli presentes him as “proud” and thus difficult[37], Domenico Farini as “able, but puzling”[38], while the Austrian-Hungarian Ambassador to Rome, Ludolf, as “a determined character”, “ambitious” and “... dangerous”[39]. The Italian Ambassador to Berlin, De Launay, describes him with negative terms in 1884, in a moment when the name of Tornielli was on the list of the possible ministers of Foreign Affairs: “Il ne manque certainement pas de très bonnes qualités comme chef de mission, mais je doute qu’il ait déjà acquis le calme nécessaire pour des fonctions aussi importantes que celles d’un ministre des affaires étrangères. Il est d’un caractère irascible et rancuneux qui se modifiera avec l’âge, mais qui, pour quelques années encore m’inspirerait quelque appréhension s’il était appelé à diriger notre politique extérieure. […]”[40]. Nevertheless, he was generally appreciated as a “gifted” and conscientious civil servant, with a special working capacity, “accustomed to promote, for him and for the others, the rigid respect of the discipline”[41]. Cool[42] and rational temperament, but possessing a faith almost boundless in the diplomatic art, he supplied the lack of imagination by tenacity and method[43]. According to his own considerations, he was a diplomat “che sente altamente del decoro della carica che ha l’onore di occupare[44]. His profession was what Serra called as “the courage of truth, even of that that could hurt; he used a language which clarity was sometimes excessive”[45]. Anyway, his honesty and also his scrupulous and sometimes inflexible respect regarding the diplomatic usages were often enough the

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origin of some dissensions with his superiors or with the authorities that he was accredited to[46]. For instance, it was on May 1880 when the unexpected presence of an Austrian-Hungarian extraordinary mission to the celebrations on the occasion of the Romanian Kingdom’s proclamation and especially the priority given to this mission during the ceremonies to the prejudice of the diplomatic corp determined him to make a protest ’virulently’ in a ... special manner. During the reception at the Royal Palace, he would abandon the proper place in order to settle down at the tail end of the diplomatic corp, specifying that “it is at the Romanian Royal Court where there is no hierarchy of the ranks”[47].

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        Tornielli came to Bucharest accompanied not only by the image of an extremely experienced diplomat, but also by the “renown” of philo-Russian[48]. This etiquette would bring him many troubles during his entire career. The origins and the sense of it are not quite clear[49]. This characterization is not yet also clearly argumented. According to Enrico Serra, he was to achieve such a fame after the so called “Busch incident” (on June 1887), meaning after a conversation with the German Minister at Bucharest, Klemens Busch, when Tornielli had brutally criticized the Italian agreements with Germany and Austria-Hungary[50]. In truth, he had been regarded as philo-Russian a long time before this event. For instance, it had been in 1878 when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luigi Corti, had definitely named him as “Russian agent”[51]. There is also the British General Consul in Bucharest, White that also regards him as philo-Russian in a confidential report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Salisbury in December 18, 1879[52]. Still, according to his own opinion – expressed in a letter on October 1894 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Blanc as an argument contrary to the idea of his transfer to St. Petersburg –, his activity as General Secretary and

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subsequently as Italian Minister to Bucharest had been on the contrary, often unfavorable to Russia:

 

In Italia non vi è forse più nessuno che ricordi la parte direttiva da me avuta nella politica la quale, durante l’ultima guerra turco-russa, preparò la situazione che condusse, nel momento critico, l’Inghilterra ad offrirci l’intesa di cui non profitammo per malaugurati incidenti di politica interna e parlamentare. Ma a Pietroburgo ciò non sarà stato di certo dimenticato; come non sarà stato messo in oblio che, durante nove anni a Bucarest, la mia azione ebbe a spiegarsi sovente in senso non favorevole alla influenza russa [emphasis mine]. La stessa mia intimità personale con il defunto Sir W. White e col successore di lui, Sir F. Lascelles, ora Ambasciatore inglese in Russia, sarà stata debitamente annotata. […]”![53]

 

        The real meaning of such a prejudice seems to be better understood by the former Romanian diplomatic agent to Rome, Mihail Obedenaru. In a report dated on November 25/December 7, 1879 and addressed to the Prime Minister, Ion C. Brãtianu, one could read about Tornielli: “Venerabile Cetãþene, permite-mi sã-þi dau unele informaþiuni asupra noului Ministru plenipotenþiar ce Italia ne trimite. Cum ai aflat altã datã ºi de la Domnul Rosetti, Comitele Tornielli este prea mult propuls spre Russia. El are o lubiã, o idee fixã, dupã cum zicea de el un competitor al lui [Corti – n.n.]; are temere de Austria; în toate vede mâna ascunsã a Austriei. De temerea Austriei, el cautã sã fie totdeauna cu Russia de câte ori Russia e în opposiþiune cu Austria [emphasis mine] / Venerable citizen, please allow me to give you some information about the new Plenipotentiary Minister  that Italy sends to us. As you found out a time ago from Mr. Rosetti, the Count Tornielli is too much directed to Russia. He has a lover, a fixed idea, as one of his competitiors [Corti – n.n.] said; he is afraid of Austria; he sees the hidden hand of Austria in everything. Because of this fierce from Austria, he always looks for Russia any time Russia is against Austria [emphasis mine]”[54]. In other words, it was the necessity to counteract the Austrian policy, considered as hostile to the Italian interests, that determined him to preview also the cooperation with Russia as one of the possible strategies. There is no evidence to demonstrate that he indeed acted in the sense of its materialization.

        The Austrian-Hungariam monarchy seemed to be indeed “l’incubo” of Tornielli! However, his diplomatic activity proves this, being “constantly hostile” to the Austrian interests and carried on in Belgrade and then in Bucharest. According to the observations presented on December 1879 by the Austrian-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Haymerle, to the Italian Ambassador to Vienna, Di Robilant,

 

“[…] il Conte Tornielli durante il suo soggiorno a Belgrado avvrebbe costantemente spiegato la sua azione in senso ostile all’Austria, ponendo sotto gli occhi del Governo Serbo i pericoli di cui il Principato è minacciato dall’occupazione

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Austriaca nella Bosnia e nell’Erzegovina, e caldeggiando inoltre l’ideea della Lega Balkanica. Il Barone Haymerle soggiungeva che il Conte Tornielli dovendosi ora recare a Bucharest sarebbe sommamente desiderabile non spiegasse colà del pari la sua azione in modo ugualmente ostile all'Austria-Ungheria, creando così imbarazzi al Governo Imperiale[55].

 

        However, it happened that Tornielli had precise ideas as regards the place taken by the Balkan states, and particularly by Romania, in the new order constituted by the Congress of Berlin. These ideas were contrary to the Austrian [policy in the area, respectively contrary to his own government’s intention to develop relationship of “cordial friendship” with the cabinet in Vienna. This is the reason why his diplomatic action in Bucharest at least before 1883-1884 continued to take shape in the same hostile sense against Austria-Hungary, despite the warnings expressed by his superiors[56].

        The terms that he images that Italy’s Balkan strategy would promote, somehow idealistic, indicate him as a real “herald of the nationalities’ principle”[57]. Actually, Tornielli had served his political-diplomatic apprenticeship with one of the apostles of the Italian Unity, Massimo d’Azeglio, during the latter’s mission in Romagna (July 1859) in the times of the second Independence War[58]. He had been witness and also participant to the birth of the modern Italian nation between 1859 and 1870, so that he, just like the greatest part of the generation that he belonged to, that is the generation of the Unity, felt the external policy matters under the light of the principles that had inspired the constitution process of the state, especially those of freedom and nationalities. At the beginnings of his mission to Bucharest, Tornielli was not yet one of those willing to abandon the ideals of Mazzini and Cattaneo regarding a completely new Europe[59], relying upon the nationalities’ principle. For a while, he would remain hostile to “the middle way” of the moderates, which supposed the mixing of the nationalities’ principle with the one of the European balance.

 

“Le traité de Berlin – Tornielli confessed in the summer of 1878 to the Romanian diplomatic agent in Rome – est un pas en arrière fait par le parti libéral de l’Europe. Nous devons l’existence de notre État à l’application du principe de la liberté et de l’indépendance des nationalités. Vous savez, vous Roumains, de quelle façon notre principe a été violé [emphasis mine]. Mais c’est le traité qui sera le plus tôt neutralisé et annihilé dans ses effets. L’an dernier, en parlant de votre indépendance, je vous ai dit que l’on ne peut guère faire remonter les rivières dans les montagnes. Je ne peut que vous répéter la même chose en parlant des droits sacrés que le Congrès de

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Berlin a cherché à supprimer. Il faut que dans la Peninsule balcanique le principe des nationalités triomphe. Et pour nous, c’est un besoin, c’est une nécessité de venir au secours de ces nationalités [emphasis mine]. Un beau rôle vous attend, vous Roumains. […] Vous avez montré de la force et de la sagesse. Soyez tranquilles, nous saurons ensemble venir à bout de tous les obstacles que le congrès a mis à notre développement, à notre évolution normale [emphasis mine]. La Russie a un terrible adversaire en Asie. Elle aura du fil à retordre. De manière que l’empire russe vous laissera plutôt tranquilles. Vous n’aurez rien à craindre de ce côté-là. Vous ne risquez pas de vous voir prendre la Dobrodja. […] Je connais le dessous de la société russe. On ne se figure pas jusqu’où va le nihilisme. […] Une société pourrie à ce point est incapable d’organiser un pays primitif. C’est une chose jugée: Les Bulgares ne seront pas assimilés par les Russes, la Dobrodja ne vous sera pas reprise, parce que les Russes verront toute leur activité absorbée par l’Asie. Vous avez donc devant vous un bel avenir. Vous serez nos principaux auxilliaires. Car nous allons travailler. La France est tenue de se concentrer chez elle, et ne pourra pas lever le drapeau des nationalités. C’est à nous qu’il incombe donc de soutenir ce grand principe. La France ne se mettra pas en avant, mais elle contribuera néanmoins à la réussite de notre cause [emphasis mine]. Le parti libéral en Europe ne tardera pas à l’emporter sur les efforts de la Sainte-Alliance remise à neuf. Le monde marche. La résultante des forces fera fatalement manquer l’entreprise de la réaction. […] Il faudra que l’on ait dorénavant une politique plus accentuée dans le sens que je viens d’indiquer [emphasis mine]”[60].

 

Ciò che è necessario – Tornielli wrote in November 1879 from Belgrade to Agostino Depretis – è poter esercitare sopra questi governi un’influenza che accresca le loro simpatie per l’Italia. Non dobbiamo, noi Italiani, perdere di vista la tendenza del trattato di Berlino, come si rivelo negli ultimi atti della diplomazia Austro-Allemanna. Ma ritengo che questi paesi non sono disposti ad accettare la preminenza austriaca quando pure a Vienna ed a Berlino si fosse fitti in capo di voler rinuovare per l’Austria, nella penisola balcanica, la posizione che il Congresso di Vienna le avea fatta in Italia. Sarebbe un anacronismo che potrebbe costar caro alla antica Monarchia degli Augsburgo. Quel che è certo è che per l’Italia sarebbe tempo di smettere dalla monotona ripetizione che ho letto ancora ieri in un articolone del Diritto sulla nostra fedeltà al Trattato di Berlino nel quale, dal dire del giornale stesso, risulterebbe che fummo parte principalissima. Non saprei proprio che specie di vanto sia questo. Esso in ogni costo dimostra che non si capisce ancora da noi la tendenza che l’opera del Congresso del 1878 ha voluto imprimere alla politica dell’Europa, tendenza affatto opposta al trionfo del principio [the nationalities’ principle – n.n.] sul quale l’Italia nuova riposa[61].

 

        Since the first moments of his mission to Bucharest, Tornielli would make detailed referrals about the tendencies of the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy in the Southeastern Europe and in Romania. In a report on March 25, 1880, insisting upon the realities discovered in Romania, he concluded: “[…] cã ar fi oportun ºi convenabil

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pentru Italia sã sprijine dezvoltarea sentimentului naþional în România, atât prin acte care sã ateste simpatiile noastre pentru aceastã þarã, cât ºi prin acele acþiuni diplomatice ce pot ajuta la menþinerea în echilibru a influenþelor contrare ale Austriei ºi Rusiei / that it would be opportune and convenient for Italy to sustain the development of the national feeling in Romania, both through acts to attest our sympathies for this country and through those diplomatic actions that could aid the preservation of the balance between the contrary influences of Austria and Russia”[62]. On the opposite, according to Tornielli, the progressive installment of the Austrian preponderance in Romania and in the entire Balkan space, favored by the Russian inertia, would led to

 

“[…] a la perte compléte de l’avenir de tous les pays de l’Orient qui, par le développement graduel des germes autonomes et nationaux, semblent être appelés à former le système des états secondaires du midi de l’Europe et à rétablir ainsi l’équilibre que les grandes agglomérations ont rompu. L’intérêt qu’il y aurait pour la Roumanie et pour les autres petits états des Balkans à constituer dans un avenir peut-être peu éloigné une chaîne non interrompue depuis les Carpathes et le Pruth jusqu’à l’Adriatique, est trop naturel, trop évident pour qu’ici on ne s’en rende pas compte. [emphasis mine] […]. Je me suis formé la convinction qu’il n’y a encore rien de fait pour lier ce pays-ci à la politique orientale de l’Autriche et de l’Allemagne; mais que le cabinet de Vienne cherche surtout à endormir la Roumanie et à l’isoler des autres pays de la péninsule balkanique. L’union de ce pays serait en effet un obstacle à la réalisation de certains plans auxquells on se donne l’air de ne pas même songer, car le moment approche où leur exécution ne pourra plus être différée à la faveur de circonstances habilement préparées[63].

 

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        It is not quite clear whether Tornielli’s conception previewed that this “system of secondary states” was to be necessarily constituted in Balkan political-military league with a function both anti-Russian and anti-Austrian. In exchange, Tornielli believed “cã prietenia micilor puteri ar compensa în parte ceea ce este mai puþin perfect în poziþia noastrã de mare putere / that the friendship among the small powers would compensate partially what is less perfect in our position of great power”[64]. Realistic or not, Count Tornielli’s vision about what the Italian policy in the Balkans had to do would not be shared by the leading milieu in Rome. On the contrary, under the circumstances that the Italian external policy would developed to an approach to the Central Powers especially after 1881, Tornielli’s conceptions would come to an end by being disapproved and even condemned[65]. Affirmed in the period immediately subsequent to the Tunisian crisis, the Italian government’s firm intention to follow the Austrian policy in the East became rapidly the political line adopted in Italy’s relationship with the Southeast European states, respectively in the relationship with Romania[66]. Despite the radical transformations occurred in the Italian external strategy, Tornielli still continued to “navigate against the wave” in the Romanian capital. Despite his subordinated function in Bucharest, he

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would not hesitate to criticize and to reject the alliance project concluded with Berlin and Vienna and also its immediate consequences[67]:

 

Nella politica estera è chiaro che non si possono mutare le linee generali direttive. Ma non bisogna farsi l’illusione di credere che siamo cresciuti in importanza. È il contrario che è vero. Siamo ritornati precissamente nell’identica situazione in cui vivevamo prima del 1870, con questa differenza che allora si diceva che l’Italia voleva ciò che la Francia e l’Inghilterra decidevano, ed ora si dice che per conoscere la nostra opinione, bisogna andare a Berlino ed a Vienna. Siccome mi piace dire schietto il mio pensiero, così aggiungerò che allora ci si attribuiva almeno certe ispirazioni nelle risoluzioni di Napoleone 3° e che ora nessuno suppore che siamo noi ad inspirare [sic!] Bismarck. Allora avevamo Roma da acquistare, ed ora nessuno capisce che cosa vogliamo. Quando si vuole solamente avere il diritto di stare tranquilli, non si sente il bisogno d’impegnarsi per rendere più libere le mani altrui. Forse ci si sospetta meno a Vienna. Ma in compenso siamo poi sospettati dappertutto altrove[68].

 

        It was also the Romanian government to complain indirectly against its anti-Austrian attitude. On October 2, 1883, in a moment when the negotiations for the Austrian-Romanian alliances were in progress, the Italian chargé d’affaires in Vienna, Galvagna, reported to his superior, the Ambassador Di Robilant that:

 

Sono stato oggi dal conte Kalnoky. […] Avendo saputo da me ch’ella deve recarsi da un giorno all’altro a Roma, mi ha pregato di farle conoscere quanto segue: ‘Le comte Torn s’agite beaucoup trop; il fait son possible pour empêcher le rapprochement de la Roumanie à l’Autriche; il ne cache pas à cet égard sa manière de penser, il est en confabulations continuelles avec Urussov [the Russian Minister to Bucharest – n.n.], qui est bien heureux d’avoir dans ces agissements anti-autrichiens un allié tel que Torn. Bratianu même, à son passage à Vienne, s’est plaint avec moi de l'attitude du ministre d’Italie qui ne facilite pas l’evolution qu’on est en train d’opérer dans l’opinion publique en Roumanie’ [emphasis mine]. Gli ho risposto che la cosa mi stupiva assai, giacché conoscevo a fondo Torn, e lo consideravo come incapace di agire contrariamente alle istruzioni del ministero e potevo assicurare nel modo più formale che le istruzioni costanti e ripetute di Mancini gli prescrivevano l'assoluta astensione tanto negli atti che nei consigli. ‘Je ne doute nullement que les instructions de M. Mancini soient telles, mais je vous affirme qu’il ne s’y conforme pas. Je sais que Torn est rongé par le désir d'une ambassade, et on me dit que c’est par un aimable égard à Berlin et à Vienne qu’on ne veut pas le nommer à Pétersbourg. S’il en est ainsi, je

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serais plus tranquille de le voir en Russie qu’en Roumanie. A Pétersbourg il ne pourra pas nous faire grand mal, tandis qu’il nous nuit beaucoup à Bucharest. La Roumanie n’est pas un grand Etat mais elle occupe une position qui rendrait très utile son concours en cas de complications avec la Russie, et il est de tout notre intéret qu’elle soit avec nous; et c’est ce que Torn veut empêcher [emphasis mine]. Veuillez je vous prie écrire tout cela confidentielement, au comte Robilant.’ […]”[69].

 

        It seems that similar observations were presented at the suggestion of King Charles I and of the Italian representative to the German government[70]. However, a year later, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dimitrie Sturdza would express in extremely eulogistic terms as regards Tornielli, in a discussion with the Italian Ambassador to Berlin, De Launay: “En terminant ce rapport – De Launay wrote – je ne veux pas oublier de mentionner que le ministre des affaires étrangères de Roumanie m’a parle dans les termes les plus flatteurs de M. le comte Tornielli, avec lequel S. E. entreténait les meilleures relations[71]. That demonstrates that Tornielli’s relationship with the Romanian officials came into normality. In exchange, the resentments of the Austrian-German diplomacy were long-lasting. According to the Austrian documents published in the ’30 by Augusto Sandonà, it was that any time Tornielli’s name appeared on the list of the possible ministers of Foreign Affairs, in 1882, 1885, 1887 and even in the moments when his transfers to St. Petersburg (1883/1887) or to Constantinople (1885) were in discussion, the governments in Vienna and Berlin opposed a determined veto[72].

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        As a whole, in spite of his previous diplomatic experience, of his profound knowledge regarding the Romania realities, of the multitude of contacts with the local establishment, of his human and also material energy[73], the Italian first plenipotentiary in Bucharest did exert only to a insignificant extent a well determined function in Italy’s policy in the Danube area, from Cairoli (1879) to Francesco Crispi (1887). His interference in the decision making process was visible especially in the period when Benedetto Cairoli was prime minister, meaning the first years of his mission in Romania (December 1879-May 1881). “The mental map” that he created and sent to Cairoli, regarding some evolutions in the Romanian policy, was decisive in the elaboration of the Consulta’s strategy in the area. The possibility to determine a particular strategy and also the manner of its implementation were favored in this case by a series of ideological affinities[74], by the “weakness of character”[75] of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cairoli, and also by the obvious incapacity of his close fellow-worker, the General Secretary of the minister, Maffei di Boglio[76]. His recommendations were the basis on which the Italian position took shape to a significant extent in the case of some developments in the international policy that directly came into connection to the Romanian interests, such as: Arab-Tabia – the delimitation of the Romanian-Bulgarian border (1879-1890)[77], the matter of the Holy Places in the Orient, the international recognition of the Kingdom of Romania (1881), or the first stage of the Danube Question (1880-1881)[78]. Due to his persuasions, it was in the spring of 1881 when Italy was the first Great Power to recognize officially and without conditions the entrance of the small Danubian state in “the family of the European kingdoms”[79]. On this occasion,

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together with the Ambassador in Vienna, Di Robilant, Tornielli was a fervent supporter of the Romanian cause, recommending insistently to his Government to ignore the existing international stipulations in the matter. In this sense, he referred to the dispositions of the third paragraph of the protocol at Aix-la-Chapelle (signed on October 11, 1818 by the representatives of Austria, Great Britain, France, Russia and Prussia), according to which the recognition of one monarch’s changing of title was to be conditioned by the previous agreement of the powers signing this act.

 

L’iniziativa parlamentare – he wrote to the President Cairoli, during the proclamation of the Kingdom of Romania – e l’unanimità del voto al quale presero parte tutti i capi dell’opposizione, danno all’atto testé compiuto una solennità che, nelle condizioni attuali del paese sarebbe certamente mancata se dal governo avesse dovuto prendersi l’iniziativa dell’atto medesimo. Si potrà da qualche Gabinetto, tenace conservatore di tradizioni diplomatiche, oppore all’atto della volontà popolare della Romania, i protocolli del convegno di Aquisgrana? In simili pastoie della vecchia diplomazia l’Italia nulla avrebbe a vedere. Quando la legge che ha proclamato il Regno d’Italia fu comunicata al Governo inglese dal Regio Ministro a Londra, il Gabinetto britannico rispondeva immediatamente che, conformemente ai suoi principi, egli riconosceva il nuovo titolo. Questi principi sono i nostri. Le tradizioni della nostra politica sono stabilite in questo senso. Per questi motivi io mi sono permesso di pregare Vostra Eccellenza di non volere indugiare a permettrmi di annunziare al Governo rumeno che l’Italia ha riconosciuto il nuovo titolo e che nuove lettere credenziali mi sono spedite [emphasis mine]”[80].

 

        Tornielli has also them merit to inspire the attitude in favor of Romania adopted by the Italian government in the first moments of the Austrian-Romanian dispute regarding the navigation on the Danube[81]. At least before December 1881, there was not any constant attitude of the Italian government as regards the Danube matter, meaning the European Commission of the Danube – ECD and the dispute around its composition, respectively the stipulations in the matter of navigation on the territory of Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania that were to be confer to. Both Cairoli and Mancini during the latter’s first months as Minister of Foreign Affairs clearly oscillated between the aversion to deteriorate the relationship with the Southeastern European states and the necessities resulted from the more and more obvious orientation towards the Central Powers. For instance, it was in August 1880 when the Romanian Legation in Rome reported that the Consulta’s position referring to the Danube matter had developed during no more than 15 days from the approval and unconditioned sustain of the Austrian-Hungarian viewpoint to the embrace of the freedom of action[82]. In his

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commentary, the Romanian chargé d’affaires, Mihail Obedenaru considered that the motion was due either to the intervention of the Italian minister in Bucharest, Tornielli, or to the Italian cabinet’s desire to achieve a compensation from Vienna as an exchange for the assistance. Actually, the Count Tornielli, faithful to the convictions that Italy is to have a special part in the application and sustaining of the Balkan nationalities’ independence and also faithful to his extremely anti-Austrian feelings, had such a direct intervention in the autumn of the same year to the President of the Council of Ministers, Cairoli, that his action imposed a temporary modification in the Italian government’s conduct. Consequently to a meeting on November 1880 with Benedetto Cairoli at Belgirate, when he struggled against the pro-German attitude of his colleague in Berlin, the Count De Launay, Tornielli succeeded to achieve the promise that during the next ECD’s debates Italy would be “favorable” to Romania. This promise would be also enunciate to the Romanian minister in Rome, Kreþulescu[83]. According to the testimony

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of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vasile Boerescu, the pledge was to be honored at least during the session in winter 1880-1881 of the ECD session. “În chestiunea Dunãrii – Boerescu wrote to Nicolae Kreþulescu in January 1881 – suntem mulþumiþi cum au mers lucrurile la comisiunea de la Galaþi ºi ne-a plãcut atitudinea comisarului italian [emphasis mine] / In the Danube matter, we are content with the direction in which the things went to during the Commission of Galaþi and we liked the Italian commissary’s attitude [emphasis mine]”[84].

        However, the Count Tornielli’s ability to influence the Italian external policy diminshed considerably, almost to cancelation, at the beginning of the summer of 1881, when the portfolio of the Foreign Affairs was received by Pasquale Stanislao Mancini (May 29, 1881). The presence of the excellent jurist at Consulta provoked remarkable transformations in the Italian external strategy, due to the “possiblist” conception and

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attitude adopted in the international relations field. Preoccupied with the taking off of Italy from the isolation consequently to the Tunisian crisis, Mancini had to abandon the ’independent’ policy in the favor of the approach to the Central Powers. Such a choice was to affect inavitably the attitude towards Romania. Sometimes early after his installment, he would summarize his conception with regard to the Italian mission in the Southeastern Europe in these terms: “[…] atitudinea amicalã reciprocã a Italiei ºi a Austro-Ungariei, în timp ce ne va garanta o bazã sigurã de acþiune în concertul european, ne va permite sã exercitãm, asupra aceleiaºi politici austro-ungare în regiunile danubiene, o influenþã beneficã, nu doar din punctul de vedere al principiilor, ci ºi din punctul de vedere al intereselor materiale ºi directe ale acelor populaþii… / [...] while the mutual friendly attitude of Italy and Austria-Hungary would guarantee a solid basis of action in the European concerto, it would allow us to exert a profitable influence on the same Austrian-Hungarian policy in the Danubian region, not only from the principle viewpoint, but also from the viewpoint of the material and direct interests of those peoples...”[85]! It is useless to ask ourselves which was the point where such a strategy could come into contact with viewpoints of the Italian Minister in Romania.

        Briefly, there is to be said that the dissatisfaction promptly manifested by Tornielli vis-à-vis the new concepts of the Italian external policy and also the tendency to permanently “adjust” this option, to give a personal interpretation to the instruction, often conducted him during the immediately subsequent period to a conflictual state with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. On his turn, Mancini was not ready to accept suggestions from the civil servants, who had the execution of the orders as their essential mission. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was many times put in the situation to remind to the Ambassador in Bucharest that it was only the ministry to have the task and the right to estimate the information sent by the diplomatic agents, respectively the right to give solutions. The inherent difficulties that appeared made Tornielli at the end of 1882 to extent his regular vacation with three months. Thus, his absence from the post totalized approximately a half a year, between October 8, 1882 and April 1, 1883[86]. Motivated by the expectation for a transfer to St. Petersburg, his extended staying in Italy coincided thus and involuntarily with the Consulta’s undeclared intention to temporarily remove him from Bucharest. This was to be in connection with the fact that during the temporary period of the First Secretary of Legation, the moderate Alberto Pansa, the consequences of Tornielli’s anti-Austrian attitude – increased on the background of the Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian dispute concerning the navigation on the Danube (1881-1882) – would be somehow alleviated.

        He returned to Bucharest on May 1883. This time, because of some firm instructions from the ministry, he was constraint to renounce to his anti-Austrian speeches, previously spoken ardently to the Romanian officials. Because of the same instructions, during the immediately subsequent months, he was not able to do anything but to assist helplessly and revolted to the approaching between Romania and Vienna and Berlin. This approaching would take the shape of a secret treaty of defensive alliance on October 30[87].

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On this occasion, it is to be remarked the complete devotion to the general liberal values and also to the belief in the “constitutionality” of the Romanian political life. These tendencies made him to consider wrongly the meaning and the finalities of the Austrian-German-Romanian negotiations in the summer and autumn of 1883, his reports often denying the rumours regarding the conclusion of a formal alliance[88]. Erare humanum est! It is not less true that the same Tornielli, proving not necessarily intuition but a high level of knowledge with regard to the Romanian realities, would predict to the Austrian-Hungarian representative to Bucharest that in a possible “war in the East”, Romania would choose the alliance with Russia, since the Romanian soldier feels himself closer to the Russian one because of the same virtues and especially of the same vices![89] It occurred in January 1887, a quarter of century previous to the Romanian involvement in the First World War against the Central Powers.

        After 1883, having the general rebound of the Italian policy vis-à-vis the Southeastern Europe as background, the Count Tornielli’s activity in Bucharest ceased to be a noisy one. The Italian envoyee gradually renounced to the idea to ‘inspire’ the policy of his own government. To a significant extent, he restraint to carry out the order given from Rome. Quoting the Italian Ambassador to Berlin, De Launay, “Tornielli était en train de se refaire une virginité [emphasis mine] […] et pour peu qu’il eût

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patience, un brillant avenir s’ouvrait devant lui[90]! However, there were to be other four years spent in the Romanian capital before the well expected nomination to an important embassy to occur. His patience was seriously put to the test during this period. After the failure of his transfer to St. Petersburg in the spring of 1883, it occurred on November 1885 the refusal of the Count Di Robilant against Tornielli’s request to be nominated as Italian Ambassador to Constantinople for political reasons, as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs considered. Still, it was the King Humbert I who firmly promised to Tornielli to be promoted for merit in the first class of Plenipotentiary ministers. Nevertheless, the promotion delayed and in addition, the vacant post in Constantinople was offered on January 1887 to the Baron Alberto Blanc[91]. Occurred in June 1887, “the Busch incident” put Tornielli in a delicate position in his relationship with his own ministry and thus, the matter of promotion seemed to be delayed sine die. However, it would happen six months later, through the agency of the new President of the Council, Francesco Crispi.

        Despite the diversity of opinions, the often polemics with the ministry, the Count Tornielli’s activity in Romania was a fruitful one. Through his endeavor, the juridical background for the development of the political-diplomatic relationship between the two states was created immediately after the establishment of relationship at the Legation level. It occurred in the summer of 1880, through the conclusion in Bucharest of the Consular Convention and of the Convention for Extradition (August 5/17, 1880). The exchange of the ratification instruments took place on March 1/13, 1881[92]. Thus, Italy preceded all the other Great Powers in this matter. The two conventions had the principle of the complete equality of treatment as basis and, according to the Românul newspaper, they had been conceived in such a manner that the reserves in the Article 49 of the Treaty of Berlin had no value from that moment on in the Romanian-Italian relationship. “În toate materiile, atât comerciale, cât ºi civile ºi penale, dreptul comun al naþiunilor libere era stabilit între ambele State în toatã întinderea ºi întregimea lui / In all domains, both commercial and civic and criminal, the common right of the free nations was established between the two states wholly and completely”[93].

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        Tornielli was the one that had the idea to endow the Italian Legation in Bucharest with a proper palace and that also put it into practice in 1883-1884, in a period when there were only the Russian Representation and the Greek General Consulate owed buildings in their own propriety[94]. It was and older ambition from his side, which had been exposed to the Romanian agent in Rome, Obedenaru since the summer of 1878, when Tornielli had the function of General Secretary:

 

“[…] il nous faudra avoir à Bucarest une Légation digne de notre position en Europe, et digne de votre pays. L’importance du rôle que nous allons avoir, les uns comme les autres, exige que nous soyons représentés dignement, et je dirai même, avec une certaine splendeur. Sans être un État des plus riches, nous ne sommes pas dans la situation de l’Espagne. Nous aurons à Bucarest une Légation bien montée. […]”[95].

 

        After laborious works of consolidation and restoration, the Legation’s new residence would be officially inaugurated on March 14, 1885 through a great ball, in the presence of the King Charles I of Romania and of more than 300 guests[96]. He was the one who also had the idea[97] to nominate an Italian military attaché to Bucharest, since 1882. The proposal was advanced for the same considerations regarding the Italian prestige and the influence that it was supposed to have in Romania and implicit in the Balkans.

        Tornielli was a tireless informer of Consulta about the Romanian realities that he explored in all the details. He is the author a 532 pages synthesis entitled “Relazione del R. Ministro d’Italia in Romania per il biennnio 1882-83[98], a real treaty about the constitution of the Romanian independent state. Structured in four chapter, dedicated to Romania’s international relationship, the law activity, the country’s economic structure, the foresights on the development, etc., the work was published on 1885 at the order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mancini, “pentru valoarea sa

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intrinsecã ºi pentru a fi oferitã ca model / for its intrinsic value and to be offered as model” to the other diplomats[99]. Tornielli also noticed attentively the evolution of the Italian-Romanian economic relationship, offering a great number of reports in the economic field, almost all of them being published in Bolletino Consolare. Generally, he gave a special attention to the economic matters, meaning to the development of this kind of relationship between Italy and Romania. For example, he promoted the first contacts with Società Veneta per Imprese e Costruzioni Pubbliche (Padua) and he facilitated this society’s subsequent presence on the Romanian market in the field[100]. He also negotiated in 1887 the constitution of a regular service of commercial and passenger traffic between Romania and Italy through the agency of Compagnia di Navigazione Generale Italiana[101]. As a recognition of his interest in the economic field and as a reward for the work of documentation, he was decorated in 1886 with the silver medal with honorable diploma by the Royal Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce[102].

        As we said previously, his mission to Bucharest came to an end on December 25, 1887. After the ‘exile’ spent in Romania, he finally received an embassy, being sent to represent the Italian interests in Spain.

 

 

Vidi Tornielli a Madrid.

Soddisfatto ma vedendo

sempre le cose di questo mondo

coll’occhio del fegato[103]!

 

See Appendix

 

 

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[1] At least, this is the portrait illustrated by Enrico Serra, “I fondi archivistici sulla Romania esistenti presso il Ministero degli Esteri”, Storia Contemporanea 11 (1980), 2: 312.

[2] For a concise analysis regarding his diplomatic activity and emphasizing the period between 1894 and 1908, see Serra, “Giuseppe Tornielli Brusati di Vergano”, Storia e Politica 2 (1963): 336-363; idem, La questione tunisina da Crispi a Rudini ed il “colpo di timone” alla politica estera dell’Italia, Milan: Giuffrè, 1967: 104-114, for the period when he functioned as Italian Ambassador to London (1889-1894).

[3] Vittorio Spretti, Enciclopedia storico-nobiliare italiana, VI, Milan, 1929: 658 sqq.

[4] La formazione della diplomazia nazionale (1861-1915). Repertorio bio-bibliografico dei funzionari del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (a cura di Fabio Grassi), Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1987: 721.

[5] Cf. ibidem: 719-721.

[6] Cf. Le scritture del Ministero degli Affari Esteri del Regno d’Italia dal 1861 al 1887 (ed. by Ruggero Moscati), Rome: Tipografia riservata del MAE, 1953: 14-15.

[7] Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Roma [hereafter, ACS], Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81, Tornielli to Depretis, Bucharest, July 18, 1882; Rudolf Dinu, “Note e documenti riguardanti la storia della Legazione italiana a Bucarest, 1879-1914”, in Annuario. Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica 3 (2001): 284-286.

[8] Cf. Federico Chabod, Storia della politica estera italiana, II, Bari: Laterza, 1965: 594, 723-24; Le scritture del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, cit.: 15; Rosaria Quartararo, “L’Ambasciata di Londra: alcuni interpreti della politica estera italiana (1861-1915)”, in La formazione della diplomazia italiana, 1861-1915 (ed. by Laura Pilotti), Milan, Franco Angeli, 1987: 586-623; Serra, La questione tunisina…: 107; idem, Giuseppe Tornielli…: 339.

[9] Chabod, op. cit., II: 723-724: “Il Depretis,[] forse anche preoccupato dell’insufficenza del Melegari, ministro degli Esteri, e perciò deciso ad assumere nelle sue mani la direzione effettiva della politica estera, si era risolto nell’estate, probabilmente sollecitato dalla sua ninfa Egeria per i problemi internazionali, e vale a dire il Tornielli segretario generale agli Esteri […] [emphasis mine]”.

[10] Cf. Stuart J. Woolf, “English Public Opinion and Agostino Depretis”, The Journal of Italian History, 2 (1979), 2: 218-231.

[11] Chabod, op. cit.: II, 594. Uno stato di cose [il fatto che la politica estera restava nelle mani della diplomazia piemonteze – n.n.], […] ch’era destinato a durare ancora assai a lungo, anche dopo la caduta della Destra, con il Tornielli e il Maffei di Boglio – piemontesi entrambi – veri ispiratori, dietro le spalle rispettivamente del Depretis e del Cairoli, della politica internazionale dell’Italia dal ’76 all’81 [emphasis mine], sino a quando l’avvento del Mancini alla Consulta non portò, per la prima volta, mentalità, preoccupazioni e stile non piemontesi nella trattazione degli affari. […]”.

[12] Enrico Decleva, “Il compimento dell’Unità e la politica estera”, in Storia d’Italia, vol. II: Il nuovo stato e la società civile, 1861-1887 (ed. by G. Sabbatucci and V. Vidotto), Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1999: 169-170.L’eventualità di un ingrandimento dell’Austria nei Balcani, e in particolare in Bosnia-Erzegovina, aveva continuato nel frattempo a tenere in allarme i governanti italiani, e in maniera più specifica Depretis che nella sua seconda formazione ministeriale, costituita alla fine di dicembre [1878 – emphasis mine] […] aveva assunto direttamente gli Affari Esteri, continuando ad avvalersi della colaborazione determinante di Tornielli [emphasis mine]. […]”. Cf. ibidem: 176.

[13] Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome [hereafter, ASDMAE], Carte Pansa, busta 5, Maffei to Pansa, Rome, August 13, 1878.

[14] Cf. C. J. Lowe, F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940, London-Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985: 16.

[15] R. V. Bossy, Politica externã a României între anii 1873-1880 privitã de la Agenþia Diplomaticã din Roma, Bucharest, 1928: 150, no. XXXIX, Obedenaru to Kogãlniceanu, May 11, 1877.

[16] Cf. Chabod, op. cit.: II, 794, n. 441, Haymerle to Andrassy, Rome, May 12, 1877; Bossy, op. cit.: 182, no. LXV, Obedenaru to Kogãlniceanu, Rome, December 26, 1878: “Le Secrétariat Général a été confié au comte Tornielli, qui a rempli les mêmes fonctions dans le précédent Cabinet Depretis. Comme j’ai eu l’occasion de le dire déjà dans mes précédents rapports, M. Tornielli est un homme d’état jeune, mais très-estimé, très autorisé. C’est lui, on peut dire, qui a mené les affaires du temps que M. Melegari était ministre […]”; Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914 [hereafter, DDF], series 1, II, Paris, 1930: 442, no. 387, Noailles, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Waddington, Rome, February 28, 1879: “Cependant le comte Tornielli, qui paraît avoir des vues particulières sur la direction de la politique italienne et qui siège plus souvent au ministère des Affaires étrangères que M. Depretis, retenu par les discussions de la Chambre et par les soins du ministère de l’Intérieur, […]”. The manner in which Tornielli understood to “inspire” the Italian foreign policy during the Oriental crisis is clearly expressed by Maffei di Boglio in his presentation of the conflict between Tornielli and Luigi Corti, in a letter to Alberto Pansa, on 1878, June 1: “Un altro motivo per cui Corti vuol assolutamente allontanare Tornielli dalla Consulta prima della riunione del Congresso [di Berlino – n.n.], è perché pretende che Tornielli sotto il Ministrero di Melegari e di Depretis ci aveva posto a due dita di una guerra coll’Austria, spingendo il Regio Governo a impedire l’annessione della Bosnia ed Erzegovina all’Austria, o almeno protestare, per stabilire il principio che a noi dovrebbe essere accordato un compenso [emphasis mine]. Corti invece è fieramente opposto a questa politica, sia perché ha la convinzione che tutta l’Europa, compresa la Germania, spinge l’Austria a ciò, sia perché trova che una protesta da parte nostra, oltre al non aver alcun valore, ci isolerebbe, porrebbe in rilievo la nostra debolezza e last not least ci metterebbe in una posizione falsissima rispetto all’Austria. […]”. Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 5: Maffei to Pansa, Rome, June 1, 1878. Although somehow abrupt and subjective, the presentation offered by the Marquis di Boglio emphasizes the essential of the external strategy of the Depretis-Tornielli ‘tandem’ in 1877-1878. It means an ‘active’ policy of the compensations, opposed to the passive one, “of the clean hands”, preferred by the bynomous Cairoli-Corti. Some years later, Tornielli would assume the responsability for the orientation given to the Italian external policy during the Balkan crisis, considering it as the one that best represented the Italian national interests: Riflettiamo che tutto ciò avvenne quando si aprì la quistione orientale. Si poteva fare due politiche. Accettare tutto in pazienza, fare il morto, dire di sì a qualunque cosa. Oppure procurare di mettere qualche freno al precipitare degli avvenimenti orientali. Abbiamo preferito questa seconda politica e se fosse da ricominciare, salvo, ben inteso, alcuni punti speciali, io credo che chiunque seguirebbe le linee generali che furono da noi adottate. Una maggiore arrendevolezza non avrebbe giovato. Ci avrebbero lasciati indietro e forse il compimento dei disegni prestabiliti per compensare l’Austria, sarebbe già avvenuto. Quale Ministero avrebbe d’altronde potuto battere una via nella quale il paese avrebbe veduto avvenimenti di grande gravità per la posizione relativa dell’Italia verso l’Austria, senza che da noi si facesse pur cenno di resistenza? […]”. Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6; Dinu, loc. cit.: 280-283, Tornielli to Pansa, Bucharest, June 23, 1881. Under the same circumstances, there are also to be remarked the critics that Tornielli formulated on the policy of neutrality and balance promoted by the Italian governments after the Union and that had the Italy’s isolation on the international stage as result: “Se vogliamo essere giusti però, caro Pansa, dobbiamo riconoscere che ciò che ci avvenne nel 1878 e ciò che accade attualmente non è che la conseguenza della nostra politica di neutralità protratta oltre il limite del necessario. Ella ha potuto seguire passo a passo il periodo nel quale avremmo potuto mettere le basi di amicizie durature, di intimità che ci avrebbero assicurato l’avvenire. Creda a me dopo il viaggio di Berlino non siamo più stati in tempo. Abbiamo preso troppo alla lettera la promessa cavouriana di voler essere elemento di pace e di concordia. Non abbiamo riflettuto che per prendere la parte dell’amico di tutti bisogna essere in grado di non avere bisogno di nessuno. Il posto che la natura delle cose, che le circostanze stesse della Francia ci assegnavano, l’abbiamo lasciato occupare da un altra potenza [Austria–Ungheria – n.n.] e per essa la Germania, d’allora in poi, ha messo in non cale qualunque nostro interesse. […]”. Cf. ibidem. However, in the period there was a part of his contemporary to consider him as responsible for such a finality. Cf. Alessandro Guiccioli, “Diario”, in Nuova Antologia, fasc. 1542, June 16, 1946: 433/439 – 7 ottobre 1880: “Gita a Novara… Arrivo a Novara alle 5,30. Mi trovo all’albergo “Roma” con Sella, Ricotti, Perazzi, Tornielli ecc… Lunga conversazione con Tornielli sulla politica estera, che giudichiamo sotto punti di vista molto diversi. Io sono convinto che la politica di isolamento e di sedicente libertà d’azione sia fatale all’Italia. Egli al contrario crede alla così detta politica di equilibrio e alla onnipotenza dell’azione diplomatica anche priva di sanzioni materiali. Insomma egli segue la politica tradizionale del nostro Ministro degli esteri. – 30 ottobre 1880: […] [Milano] Alla stazione incontro l’ambasciatore germanico von Keudell, che mi parla della scarsa fiducia che l’Italia gode all’estero; egli l’attribuisce alla politica indecisa e di vedute ristrette, che è inspirata da Tornielli. Su questo punto devo, in cuor mio, dargli ragione”. For the England’s fears concerning a possible motion in the Italian external policy with regard to the Oriental question and particularly to the relationship with Austria-Hungary once with the constitution of the Depretis government, and with regard to the Tornielli’s position, see Maria Garbari, “Un documento inglese sulla stipulazione della Triplice Alleanza”, in Universitã di Pavia, Studi in onore di Federico Curato, I, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1990: 345-349. Il Tornielli continuava a parlare di reali danni per l’Italia [nel caso in quale l’Austria-Ungheria occupava la Bosnia –.n.n.], colpita nei suoi interessi adriatici, di reazioni popolari nel Regno, di turbamento dell’ordine europeo …” [Paget to Derby, February 13 1877, FO 45 310]. “Più intransigente appariva il Tornielli, deciso a prendere delle contromisure nel caso l’Austria avesse messo in atto delle precauzioni militari sulla frontiera italiana e ad evidenziare il ruolo assunto nel Regno dalla questione trentina” [Paget to Derby, July 30, 1877, FO 45 314]; “Il Paget notava che l’Austria pendeva sul segretario generale della Consulta [Tornielli – n.n.] come un incubo!” [Paget to Derby, October 8, 1877, FO 45 315].

[17] Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 5: The General Secretary of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Maffei to Pansa, Rome, June 1, 1878. “Frattanto Tornielli fa sforzi sovraumani per rimanere. È andato dal Re, ha sedotto Cairoli, il quale, come Ella sa, tiene ufficio alla Consulta, e da cui egli è continuamente, a fierissimo dispetto di Corti. Infatti la lotta tra i due è tremenda, e, davvero, mi reca meraviglia come un gentlman al par di Tornielli si metta in tale posizione. Corti gli disse in, as many words, che o l’uno o l’altro deve uscir dalla Consulta, e andò a rivangare le mille amarezze di cui il cessato Ministero lo abbeverò [?] a Costantinopoli e che tutte eran frutto delle insinuazioni di Tornielli [emphasis mine]. […] Del resto egli non teme opposizione da Cairoli, il quale piegherebbe alle sollecitazioni di Tornielli piuttosto per debolezza di carattere, che per qualunque altra ragione. […] Ora siccome le idee di Tornielli sull’Italia irredenta concordano pur troppo con quelle sempre propugnate da Cairoli e dal suo partito, Corti teme che, se non vi pone riparo, vista massima la debolezza di carattere del Presidente del Consiglio [Cairoli-n.n.], potrebbe succedere qualche grosso pasticcio [emphasis mine]. La morale di tutto questo è che i due contendenti quasi non si rivolgono più la parola. È Malvano [the Head of the Political Affairs Department – n.n.], che fa tutto, con grande ira di Tornielli il quale bestemmia contro tale manomessione dei suoi diritti, ma non si decide ad … andarsene. […]”, ibidem: Maffei to Pansa, Rome, June 25, 1878: “Inoltre v’è la questione di Tornielli. Io me lo sento alle costole con una tenacità che nulla stancherà. Se dipendesse da me lo farei subito ambasciatore, senatore, insomma tutto ciò che vorrebbe. Ma la cosa non dipende da me. Capirà dunque, lasciando in disparte che il che ne risentirei, quanto la mia posizione sarebbe ridicola se a novembre, tutti i posti essendo occupati, colla caduta del Ministero dovessi cedere l’attuale mio ufficio di nuovo a Tornielli o ad altrui. […]”.

[18] Ibidem.

[19] Bossy, op. cit.: 182, no. LXV, Obedenaru to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rome, December 26, 1878, R. 779: “Il y a quelques jours, M. Maffei, Ministre d’Italie à Athènes, Secrétaire Général des affaires étrangères dans le Cabinet Cairoli, et qui m’avait dit en confidence, qu’il désirait la place de Bucarest, - M. Maffei m’a fait savoir que, vers le mois d’août, M. Tornielli avait demandé la place de Ministre plénipotentiaire à Bucarest. M. Maffei est convaincu que si le Cabinet Depretis dure quelques mois seulement, M. Tornielli sera envoyé chez nous à sa sortie du ministère; si au contraire le Cabinet dure longtemps, M. Tornielli aura acquis les titres suffisants pour ambitioner un poste encore plus élevé, comme le serait celui de Constantinople, par exemple. Mais rien ne fait présager une longue durée du Cabinet actuel. […]”. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta nr. 5: Maffei to Pansa, Rome, February 4, 1879: “Se la Rumenia fosse sul punto di essere riconosciuta, mi darebbero, credo, senza troppe difficoltà la legazione di Bucarest. Ma essa potrebbe eventualmente anche servire di comodino a Tornielli […]”.

[20] ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81; Museo Centrale del Risorgimento-Roma [MCR-Roma], Archivio Mancini, b. 698, fasc. 11, 2; Dinu, loc. cit.: 287-288, Tornielli to Depretis, Rome, March 23, 1883.

[21] MAE, Ministero, Ambasciate, Legazioni e Consolati. Agenti diplomatici e consolari degli Stati esteri in Italia, 15 aprile 1882, Rome: Tipografia del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1882: 79.

[22] ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81: Rome, March 23, 1883: “L’importanza di quella residenza è determinata dalle nostre relazioni con i Grandi Stati limitrofi della Rumania. […]”

[23] Bossy, op. cit.: 182, no. LXV: December 26, 1878: “L’été dernier, j’ai eu plusieurs conversations avec le comte [Tornielli – n.n]. Il m’a parlé du beau rôle que l’Italie va avoir en Europe, maintenant que par le traité de Berlin, le parti rétrograde a eu le dessus en Europe. Puisque la France se tient à l’écart, pense le comte, c’est à l’Italie à prendre en main la cause du parti libéral européen et, pour l’avenir, la Roumanie est destinée à devenir l’associée de l’Italie, en Orient. Le comte s’est longuement étendu sur le beau rôle qu’aura notre pays et sur l’importance de la future légation italienne à Bucarest. Il m’a pour ainsi dire exposé une profession de foi du futur Ministre d’Italie chez nous. […]”.

[24] In November 1879, when he was already in Belgrade, he required for Agostino Depretis’ assistance in order to be nominated, even temporarily, in a residence correspondent to his ‘fame’ and to the services that he was able to accomplish.: “Le assicuro che quando mi domando se proprio sono diventato buono a null’altro che a firmare qualche passaporto e qualche richiesta di ospedale in questa piccola cancelleria, mi sento perdere di animo. Non potrebbe il Ministero utilizzare meglio la mia buona volontà e quella poca notorietà che pure si accorda al mio nome all’estero? Non potrei, per esempio, se non si nomina subito l’Ambasciatore a Parigi, essere mandato a reggere quel posto? Mi pare di essere capace di qualche miglior servizio di quelli che rendo nella posizione alla quale mi ha condanato la politica del Gabinetto Cairoli no. 2. […]”. Cf. ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81: Tornielli to Depretis, Belgrade, November 27, 1879.

[25] Biblioteca Naþionalã [hereafter, BN], Bucharest, mss., Fond Brãtianu, file 526: 1-4, Obedenaru to Ion C. Brãtianu, Constantinople, November 25/December 7, 1879.

[26] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6: Tornielli to Pansa, Bucharest, December 30, 1879.

[27] In connection to this argument, there is a consistent number of ancient and new studies, which clarify the discussion to a significant extent. One of the most pertinent analyses belongs to Domenico Caccamo, “L’Italia, la questione d’Oriente e l’indipendenza romena nel carteggio del consolato italiano a Bucarest (1870-1879)”, Storia e Politica 18 (1979), 1: 65-124. See also Dinu, loc. cit.: 225-236.

[28] Cf. DDF, 1, II: 466-68, n. 403, Saint-Vallier to Wadington, Berlin, April 4, 1879. “Quant à l’Italie, a ajouté M. de Bülow, sa conduite nous est fort indifférente et nous n’avons aucune intention d’agir pour tenter de la lui faire modifier; elle nous avait abandonnés une première fois [novembre 1878 – n.n]; nos observations l’ont fait venir à résipiscence; elle se disposé à déserter de nouveau la cause du Droit et de l’exécution du Traité; grand bien lui fasse et qu’elle agisse comme elle le voudra; nous attachons un prix considérable à mantenir notre communauté de vues avec la France et l’Angleterre, mais nous n’avons pas grand souci de ce que fera le Gouvernement actuel de l’Italie, ne pouvant plus avoir confiance dans une politique sans cesse flottante, agitée et prête à obéir à tous les courants où l’entraînent des ambitions peu avouables, des rêves d’influence exagérée, des défiances et des jalousies passionnées contre l’Autriche, et, pour tout résumer d’un mot, un désir singulièrement vif de jouer un rôle retentissant sans l’énergie ni moyens de le remplir. Je vous dirai même confidentiellement à ce sujet que j’ai dû relever vivement, il y a quelques jours, une note dont M. le comte de Launay avait pour instruction de me donner lecture et de me laisser copie; cette note, relative à la question qui nous occupe, avait pour objet de m’annoncer l’intention du Cabinet de Rome de nous fausser compagnie et de reconnaître l’indépendance roumaine; rien à dire jusque-là, mais, pour justifier sa résolution, M. Depretis n’avait-il jugé à propos de qualifier de conduite injuste notre attitude dans l’affaire roumaine; j’ai trouvé que ce n’était pas là un terme acceptable et je l’ai nettement déclaré à M. de Launay en refusant la copie qu’il voulait me laisser; […]”.

[29] BOSSY, op. cit.: 189-90, no. LXXII, Obedenaru to Câmpineanu, Rome, April 16, 1879. “Le comte Tornielli m’a envoyé avant hier deux de ses cartes de visites, bien qu’il n’eût pas de visite récente à me rendre. Le Secrétaire général donnait à entendre qu’il désirait me parler. […] J’ai donc été le voir au ministère. Il me dit en substance: ‘…Nous avons fait des démarches comme vous le savez, mais les autres Cabinets se refusent à nous suivre; on allègue que, pendant que la Serbie s’est prononcée d’une manière franche et nette, le gouvernement roumain a hesité, a tergiversé’. […] Pour pouvoir, continua le comte, revenir à la charge, comme nous le désirons, auprès des autres cabinets, il faut que nous ayons un document, une déclaration, quelque chose sur quoi nous baser, par quoi justifier nos nuovelles démarches”. According to the same Obedenaru, Tornielli, on the opposite to the other decision making factors from Consulta, seems to be not receptive to the Israelite Alliance’s interventions for the civic and political emancipation of their religious fellowes in Romania: “J’ai parlé au Secrétaire Général du scandale causé par les juifs à Jassy. Le comte m’a dit que si l’Alliance israélite envoie une lettre au Cabinet italien, la pièce ira rejoindre les nombreuses autres lettres qui dorment dans les cartons. […]”. ibidem: 189, no. LXXI, Obedenaru to Câmpineanu, Rome, April 6 1879.

[30] Even subsequently to this date, both in the private correspondence to Pansa and Depretis and in the official one to Cairoli, Tornielli would continue to be in favor of what he considered as “un atto di giustizia e di buona politica”, that is the immediate recognition of the Romanian independence. Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6; Dinu, loc. cit.: 267, 269-270, Tornielli to Pansa, Novara, August 5, 1879; Tornielli to Pansa, Belgrade, October 3, 1879; ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81; Dinu, loc. cit.: 270-274:  Tornielli to Depretis, Belgrade, November 4, 1879: “L’interesse che noi abbiamo a rinvigorire la nostra influenza in questi paesi è tale che io non comprendo come a Roma non si sia ancora pensato a riconoscere la Rumania. […]”; Tornielli to Depretis, Belgrade, November 27, 1879: “Alla Consulta si persiste nel non mandarmi a Bukarest, ho creduto dunque mio dovere di esporre in termini molto chiari tutto il danno che può risultare agl’interessi del nostro paese dalla politica seguita verso la Rumania. […] Anche il poco di bene che può aver prodotto la mia presenza in questo paese [Serbia – n.n.] svanisce poiché qui si osserva come l’Italia trascura le simpatie dei Rumeni e le pospone ad un’interesse rispetabilissimo, ma che non è di vero ordine politico, bensì di ordine morale e sociale. […]”.

[31] Cf. ibidem, Archivio dell’Ufficio del Personale, serie VII, T 1: Fava to Cairoli, Bucharest, December 16, 1879, 4,30 p.m. The diplomatic agent in Roma, Esarcu had recommended that the gratitude of Romania for “the beauty of the friendly gesture of Italy” to be manifested through a warmy receiving organized for the Italian Extraordinary Envoyee, cfr. Bossy, op. cit.: 93, Esarcu to Boerescu, Rome, December 15, 1879. However, due to an inexact interpretation given to a Consulta’s telegramm on December 11, 1879 that recommended the avoiding of the noisy manifestations, the arrival of the Italian minister to Bucharest in the evening of December 15, 1879 would be completely ignored by the Romanian authorities! Cfr. ASDMAE, DP [hereafter, DP], Rapporti in arrivo, Romania, busta 1396: R. nr. 1, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, December 19, 1879; ibidem, Copialettere in partenza, Romania, registro nr. 1202: D. nr. 4, the General Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maffei, to Tornielli, Rome, January 4, 1880.

[32] Ibidem, Divisione Politica, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania, busta 1396: Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, December 19, 1879. He would present the retiring letters to His Majesty King Charles I on Thursday, January 7/19, 1888, in an official audience, cf. Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe [hereafter, AMAE], Bucharest, Fond 11 – Reprezentanþi strãini, Tornielli Brusati Giuseppe, T1.

[33] Cf. Monitorul Oficial al României, December 21, 1879/January 2, 1880: 8063.

[34] Cf. Serra, “Giuseppe Tornielli”: 344; La formazione…Repertorio: 719.

[35] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6: Tornielli to Pansa, Novara, August 5, 1879.

[36] Cf. Glauco Licata, Notabili della terza Italia. In appendice, carte di Savago Raggi e altri inediti, Rome: Cinque Lune, no year: 255/264.

[37] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 5: Guiccioli to Pansa, Rome, December 19, 1879. “Ti scrivo a Belgrado perché leggo nei giornali che il fiero Brusati è già arrivato in Rumania. Mi felicito coi Rumeni! […]”.

[38] Domenico Farini, Diario di fine secolo, II, Rome, 1962: 1318/1523.

[39] A. Sandonà, L’Irredentismo nelle lotte politiche e nelle contese diplomatiche italo-austriache, III, Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1938: 116-117, Ludolf to Kalnoky, Rome, May 30, 1883.

[40] Cf. I documenti diplomatici italiani [hereafter, DDI], 2, XVII-XVIII: 520, no. 542, De Launay to Di Robilant, Berlin, November 28, 1884.

[41] At least, this was the opinion of Cairole in December 1879. Cf. ibidem, 2, XII: 391, n. 499, Cairoli to Di Robilant, Rome, December 21, 1879.

[42] Eliza Brãtianu, “Aºa i-am cunoscut”, Magazin istoric 26 (1992), 11: 54. “Contele Tornielli […] era un om rece ºi tãcut, foarte apreciat de tatãl meu [Alexandru ªtirbey – n.n.]. Contesa, soþia sa, era rusoaicã, vorbãreaþã, amabilã, iubea dansul ºi nu se plicitisea la Bucharest, unde bunii dansatori erau numeroºi ºi balurile se þineau lanþ. […] /  The Count Tornielli [...] was a cool and silent person, very appreciated by my father [Alexandru ªtirbey – n.n.]. His wife, the Countess, was Russian, talkative, kind, she loved dancing and was not bored in Bucharest, where the great dancers were numerous and the balls were ceaseless. [...]”.

[43] Cf. Serra, La questione tunisina…: 107.

[44] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania, busta 1396 and Rudolf Dinu, Ion Bulei, 35 anni di relazioni italo-romene, 1879-1914. Documenti diplomatici italiani, [35 anni] Bucharest, Univers Enciclopedic, 2001: 59-60, no. 10, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, December 19, 1879.

[45] Serra, Giuseppe Tornielli…: 340-341.

[46] On April 1880, the energetic manner that he used to make a protest to the Romanian authorities – as a consequence of an aggression against one of his servants – was considered by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vasile Boerescu, as “dangerous” and unfit for a diplomat: Un domestique du comte Tornielli s’est battu hier soir à la sortie du théatre avec un cocher. A propos de cet incident le comte prend une attitude, il tient un langage qui ne s’accordent pas trop avec le caractère d’un diplomat. Il fait presque des menaces dans une note qu’il m’envoie. […] Veuillez attirer officieusement l’attention du ministre sur cet incident et faire conseiller au comte un peu plus de calme et de sang froid; car il ne se trouve pas ici dans un pays d’orient habitue à de pareilles vices nerveuses”. AMAE, Italia, 1880-1884, vol. 263: 13, Boerescu to the Romanian Minister in Rome, Kretzulescu, T. cifr. nr. 5048, Bucharest, March 26/April 7, 1880. In truth, the Italian diplomat’s attitude had been to a significant extent dictated precisely by the ’Levantine’ attitude of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, which was to hush up the incident in intention, without any explanation. ASDMAE, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania, busta 1396: Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, April 10, 1880; Boerescu to Tornielli, Bucharest, April 12, 1880; Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, April 13, 1880.

[47] Arhiva Naþionalã Istoricã Centralã, Bucharest [hereafter, ANIC], Casa Regalã, dosar 12/1881 [Austrian Diplomatic Correspondence – CDA]: 91-93, Bericht n° 61 A-F, Hoyos to Haymerle, Bucharest, May 25, 1881: “Nach den seither eingezogenen Erkundigungen war eine Anfrage ob ein Special-Gesandter genehm wäre eigentlich nur von der serbischen Regierung anher gerichtet worden. Mein italienischer Collega hatte allerdings vor einigen Wochen, wie er mir sagte, aus seiner eigenen Initiative, angefragt, ob man die Entsendung von Krönungs-Botschaftern oder Gesandten erwarte und die verneinende Antwort an seine Regierung berichtet. […] Der Abgesandte Seiner K. und K. Apostolischen Majestät wurde während der Krönungsfeierlichkeit auf der für das diplomatische Corps errichteten Tribüne placirt und ihm bei dieser Gelegenheit der Vorgang vor den ständigen Vertretern eingeräumt. War Graf Tornielli schon über diese vermeintlische Zurücksetzung sehr verstimmt so erreichte seine Erregtheit den höchsten Grad als er sobald wir uns im Palais versammelt hatten sah dass Feldmarschall-Lieutenant Bauer von Ihren Majestäten in einem abgesonderten Gemache und vor dem diplomat. Corps empfangen werden sollte. Er protestirte beim Hofmarschall und auch bei mir als dem doyen des diplomatischen Körpers gegen diese Anordnung und da natürlich seiner Einsprache nicht Rechnung getragen werden konnte indem der König selbst diesen modus festgesetzt hatte, so verliess der italienische Gesandte seinen Platz und stellte sich am andern Ende des Saales nach dem jüngsten Geschäftsträger auf, mit dem Bemerken dass an dem königl. Rumänischen hofe keine Rangordnung mehr existire. Graf Tornielli kam noch im Laufe desselben Tages zu mir um mir sein Bedauern zu geben dass der Incidenzfall sich gerade wegen des Abgesandten Seiner K. und K. Apostolischen Majestät ergeben habe und die Versicherung beizufügen dass er dem Vertreter einer jaden anderen Macht unter denselben Verhältnissen ebenfalls das Recht des Vortrittes abgesprochen hätte. …Die meisten meiner Collegen, selbst diejenigen welche dem Grafen Tornielli im fond nicht unrecht geben, sind der Ansicht, dass er in der Form gefehlt habe, da er durch das Verlassen seines Platzes und durch die mit grosser Heftigkeit vorgebrachte Protestation sich einer Unhöflichkeit gegen der König schuldig gemacht hat”. Cf. also ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania, busta 1397, 35 anni…: 105, no. 55, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, May 26, 1881.

[48] In the period, this characterization was often completed by another one, of philo-French: “sviscerato francofilo”, according to Domenico Farini, or “lustra scarpe della Francia”, as Quintino Sella names him! Cf. Farini, op. cit.: II, 1523; ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6; Dinu, loc. cit.: 280-83, Tornielli to Pansa, Bucharest, June 23, 1881.

[49] A great part of the historiography regards him as Philo-Russian, namely a supporter of the policy of friendship/alliance with Russia since the period of the Oriental crisis, when he functioned as General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cf. G. Salvemini, La politica estera dell’Italia, 1871-1915, Florence, 1950: 39-42; W. Langer, “The European Powers and the French occupation of Tunis”, American Historical Review 21 (1925-1926): 62; Carlo Giglio, “Il secondo gabinetto Depretis e la crisi balcanica”, Rivista Storica Italiana 67 (1955), 1: 185-186; Chabod, op. cit., I: 532. All’altra estremità dell’Europa, la Russia. Era lontana, geograficamente; perciò, le due nazioni non potevano farsi ‘né molto bene, né molto male’, annotava il Nigra, ambasciatore a Pietroburgo. C’era stato sì, fra il ’76 e l’80, in un periodo di asprezze italo-austriache, come un serrarsi di rapporti, tanto da far spesso favoreggiare, nella stampa italiana e straniera, di segreti accordi e addirittura di alleanza italo-russa, di cui sarebbe stato propugnatore il Tornielli [emphasis mine]. [...]

[50] Cf. Serra, La questione tunisina…: 107-108.

[51] Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 5: Maffei to Pansa, Rome, June 1, 1878, cit.

[52] ANIC, Microfilme, England, R. 124, Public Record Office, Foreign Office [PRO.FO], 104/8: 304-306, White to Salisbury, Bucharest, December 18, 1879. “Count Tornielli presented this morning his Credentials as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Prince Charles I. […] His well know anti-Germanian proclivities and the pro Russian party including Baron Fava, the last Italian Representative here, are making capital out of the Railway Question to increase the existing animosity against Austria leads people here to suppose that Russian influence has brought about the separation of Italy from the other three Powers on the question of recognition. […]”.

[53] ASDMAE, Carte Blanc, busta 1, cartella 29: Tornielli to Blanc, London, October 2, 1894.

[54] BN, mss., Fond Brãtianu, dosar 526: 1-4, Obedenaru to Ion C. Brãtianu, Constantinople, November 25/December 7, 1879.

[55] DDI, 2, XII: 371, nr. 479, Di Robilant to Cairoli, Vienna, December 15, 1879.

[56] Ibidem: 391, nr. 499, Cairoli to Di Robilant, Rome, December 21, 1879.

[57] The expression belongs to Federico Chabod, who uses it when defines a great Italian diplomat, that is, Costantino Nigra. Cf. Chabod, op. cit.: II, 674-675.

[58] Annuario Diplomatico del Regno d’Italia per l’anno 1886, Rome: Ippolito Sciolla, 1886: 173.

[59] For this argument, see G. O. Griffith, Mazzini profeta di una nuova Europa, Bari, 1935: passim; Chabod, op. cit.: I, 525-526.

[60] BN, mss., Fond Brãtianu, file 526: 1-4, Constantinople, November 25/December 7, 1879, cit.

[61] ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81: Tornielli to Depretis, Belgrad, November 4, 1879.

[62] DDI, 2, XII: 636, nr. 783, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, March 25, 1880.

[63] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania, busta 1396: ciphered report [attached to political R. no. 65], Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, July 30, 1880. Also, according to the ciphered appendix of the same political R. no. 65, ibidem: “Je prie V. E. de vouloir bien se faire soumettre mon dernier rapport ciffré. Je l’ai écrit après avoir eu une longue audience du prince régnant qui dignait s’exprimer de façon à ne point me laisser de doute au sujet de ce que j’avance à l'égard des agissements autrichiens en Roumanie. […] En parlant de l'influence que les intérêts réunis des États Balcaniques pourraient avoir à un moment donné, S. A. Royale m'a dit que, toute modestie à part, la Roumanie étant le seul des trois États qui puissent se vanter de posséder une vraie armée, s'est à elle que devrait appartenir la direction des intérêts de la ligue [emphasis mine]. Ceci m’a surtout démontré que l’on ne s’est pas encore engagé ici avec l’Autriche et l’Allemagne aussi loin que bien de monde le pense. Faisons nous de notre côté quelque chose pour détourner le danger de l’occupation autrichienne dans d’autres provinces ottomanes. En est-il encore temps [emphasis mine]”. It is also to be mentioned that he would make a proposal to the Ministry, in order to assure a clearer coherence of the Italian policy in the Southeastern Europe, meaning his simultaneous activity as Plenipotentiary Minister both to Belgrade and Bucharest: “Nel mio rapporto sopra i due posti, Bukarest-Belgrado, credo che persisterò nella mia idea che convenga, in certe circostanze, tener riunite le due legazioni sotto un solo titolare, che però abbia obbligo effettivo di avere due residenze. Mi pare che la presenza a Belgrado di un Ministro, fruit sec de la carrière, per tutto l’anno serva a nulla e che valga assai meglio che il Ministro soggiorni tre mesi dell’anno a Belgrado ed a Bukarest il rimanente. Un buon Segretario che lo surroghi, alternandosi nei due posti, un Segretario di seconda classe o un’Addetto che lo segua e il personale di cancelleria stabile nelle due residenze basterebbero al buon andamento che avrebbe allora una certa unità d’indirizzo ed anche maggiore significazione politica. […]”. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6; Dinu, loc. cit.: 276, Tornielli to Pansa, Bucharest, December 30, 1879.

          [64] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6: Tornielli to Pansa, Belgrad, October 3, 1879. This idea seemed to be one of his diplomatic strategy’s coordinate. He would go back on it later, exposing it in 1886, in the context of the Rumelian crisis, in a particular letter to the General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Capelli, condemning at the same time the policy of indifference promoted by Consulta in the relationship with the Balkan states: “È curiosa l’idea del riserbo adottato da noi verso i piccoli Stati balcanici. L’Italia, che non è ancora un’aquila ma un aquilotto, dovrebbe, secondo Tornielli, circondarsi, a sua difesa, di paseri. […]”. Cf. DDI, 2, XX: 147, no. 144, Capelli to Di Robilant, Rome, September 30, 1886. Some years later, in 1891, after a meeting with the Romanian King, Charles I, at Pallanza, he would go even farther, suggesting the conclusion of an alliance with Romania to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Di Rudini: “Mi permetto […] d’indicarle che, nelle conversazioni che ho avuto col Re […], mi sono formato l’idea che per noi vi sarebbe forse l’occasione di conseguire dalla Rumania un impegno per l’eventuale sua azione, comune alla nostra in certe eventualità. Tale impegno accrescerebbe il peso della nostra cooperazione in Oriente, perché ormai la Rumania, dal punto di vista militare, non è quantità trascurabile. Nutro opinione che il Re Carlo s’indurrebbe a fare qualche cosa con noi piuttosto che con l’Austria o l’Inghilterra. La nostra posizione in questo gruppo sarebbe molto più forte se con noi conducessimo i rumeni”; ibidem, 2, XXIV: 369, no. 449, Tornielli to Di Rudini, Novara, September 22, 1891. Obviously, it demonstrates that he had no idea about the Italian-Romanian alliance treaty concluded on May 9, 1888.

[65] Cf. DDI, 2, XIV: 67-68, no. 71, Di Robilant to the General Secretary of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Blanc, Vienna, June 30, 1881; ibidem: 109, no. 119, Mancini to Tornielli, Rome, July 28, 1881. Actually, his anti-Austrian attitude was considered as one of the main obstacles against an Italian-Austrian approach by the Italian Ambassador to Vienna, Di Robilant: “[…] a cosa serve ch’io mi adoperi qui a riavvicinare i due paesi, mentre… a Bucarest chi rappresenta il governo italiano [Tornielli] si direbbe non si fa altro studio se non di metterci male coll’Austria”, cf. Chabod, op. cit.: II, 769, note 286, Di Robilant to Nigra, Vienna, July 2, 1881.

[66] Cf. DDI, 2, XVII-XVIII: 171, no. 170, Mancini to Di Robilant, Rome, April 15, 1884.

[67] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 1, Diario, II: “Domenica, 31 dicembre: Lettera contessa Tornielli. Sera White. Finito il 1882, di cui non me lagno. D’accordo con Tornielli per disapprovare la Triplice Alleanza: 1° Perché giunta troppo tardi. Se a suo tempo poteva prevenire il disastro di Tunisi, essa non serve ora che nominalmente a proteggerci dal pericolo che non esiste di una supposta aggressione francese; 2° perché ci espone così inutilmente ai danni di un guasto colla Francia colla quale l’Italia non può mantenersi in ostilità permanente [emphasis mine]; 3° perché il giorno in cui fossimo invitati a marciare in nome del casus foederis, non si marcierà [sic!]; e ciò con danno della nostra reputazione.

[68] ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81: Tornielli to Depretis, Bucharest, May 23, 1883.

[69] DDI, 2, XV-XVI: 679-80, nr. 703, Galvagna to Di Robilant, Vienna, October 2, 1883 (appendix to the letter the Count Robilant to Mancini, Turin, October 6, 1883).

[70]Des préjugés existaient contre lui. Dans les premiers temps de son séjour à Bucharest, il les avait en quelque sorte justifiés, à tel point qu’un jour le Ministre de Roumanie vint chez moi, au nom de son Souverain, pour me signaler les allures de notre représentant qui favorisait la politique russe, et se montrait anti-autrichien. Je gardais ces détails par devers moi, car il me répugne de faire tort même à ceux qui n’usent pas envers moi de bons procédés, et à plus fort raison pour ceux qui comme Tornielli m’ont témoigné du bon vouloir. Je répondais à Mr. Liteano que mieux valait fermer les yeux, que mon collègue quand il se serait mieux orienté, prendrait une autre attitude. En effet depuis lors le Gouvernement Roumain non seulement n’a pas élevé des plaintes, mais rendait de justes éloges. […]”. Cf. ACS, Carte Crispi, busta 72, fasc. 107: De Launay to Barilari, Berlin, June 15, 1887.

[71] DDI, 2, XVII-XVIII: 244, no. 251, De Launay to Mancini, Berlin, June 13, 1884.

[72] Cf. Sandonà, op. cit., III: 116-118. ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81: Tornielli to Di Robilant, Rome, March 22, 1883; Di Robilant to Tornielli, Vienna, March 23, 1883. DDI, 2, XIX: 4, no. 2, De Launay to Di Robilant, Berlin, June 29, 1885. A propos de Tornielli dont le nom était mis en avant pour recueillir la succession Mancini, ici les journaux la Post et le Kreuzzeitung lui donnent déjà une boule noire. Le Morning Post de Londres, un des organes prétendus de lord Salisbury, émit l’espoir qu’il n’en sera rien de cette candidature. Je m’abstiens d’écrire là-dessus à Rome. On n’a pas demandé mon avis, et d’ailleurs je ne voudrais pas nuire à Tornielli dont je reconnais volontiers certaines bonnes qualités. Je pense que c’est un fonctionnaire qu’il faut tenir en réserve pour l’avenir après qu’il aura occupé quelques postes plus en évidence que celui de Bucarest”; ibidem, 2, XX: 618, no. 647, T. f.n., De Launay to Di Robilant, Berlin, April 5, 1887.

[73] Cf. Dinu, loc. cit.: 243-244 and note 67.

[74] Cf. supra, note 17.

[75] For some considerations about “la debolezza di carattere” of the President of the Council, Benedetto Cairoli, see the correspondence of his fellow-worker, Maffei di Boglio. Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta no. 5: Maffei to Pansa, Rome, June 1 1878, cit.

[76] For some extremely negative considerations about the Marquis Alberto Maffei di Boglio, see the “Memoirs” of the diplomat Salvago Raggi, who was in his subordination at Madrid in 1890. Cf. Licata, Notabili della terza Italia. In appendice, carte di Savago Raggi e altri inediti, Rome: Cinque Lune, f.a.: 264 sqq.: “Maffei era un ‘vieux beau’; intelligenza, zero. […] Esitava nel paralre, e un breve mugolio rivelava lo sforzo per trovare la parola desiderata anche nei discorsi più banali… Il concetto che Maffei aveva della importanza della sua posizione era grande e non meno grande era la coscienza della sua incapacità, perciò ogni suo atto richiedeva tutta la sua attenzione… […]”!

[77] For this matter, see cf. Antonello Biagini, “L’Italia e la delimitazione del confine in Dobrugia”, in Risorgimento. Italia e Romania, 1859-1879. Esperienze a confronto (Atti del Convegno Internazionale 'Italia e Romania dal 1859 al 1878. Unità nazionale e politca europea', Milano, 2-3 luglio 1979) (ed. by Giulia Lami), Bucharest: Anima, 1992: 85-114.

[78] Cf. ªerban Rãdulescu-Zoner, “La souveraineté de la Roumanie et le problème du Danube après le Congrès du Berlin”, Revue des études sud-est européennes 9 (1971), 1: 152 sqq; G. N. Cãzan, “La question du Danube et les relations roumano-austro-hongroises dans les années 1878-1883”, Revue roumaine d’histoire 18 (1979), 1: 43-61.

[79] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, România, busta 1397, 35 anni: 99-100, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, April 4, 1881.

[80] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, România, busta 1397: Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, March 26, 1881.

[81] ANIC, Fond Kreþulescu, file 122: 22-23, R. 221, Obedenaru to Boerescu, Rome, August 19/31, 1880; ibidem, file 125: 6-7, [Kreþulescu] to Boerescu, Rome, [November 24/December 6], 1880.

[82] ANIC, Fond Kreþulescu, file 122: 22-23, R. 221, minutes, Obedenaru to Boerescu, Rome, August 19/31 1880. “Dans le numéro du 15 Août, le Diritto publiait un entrefilet, provenant de Mr. Malvano, où on lisait: ‘L’Italie ayant autorisé son délégué qui siège dans le Comité d’études, non seulement à accepter le projet de réglement, mais même les amendements proposés par le Commissaire austro-hongrois, se trouve déjà tenue liée (vincolata) d’accepter l’intervention et la présidencede l’Autriche au sein de la Comission exécutive. L’Italie n’a jamais pensé à attenuer l’efficacité de son approbation (consenso) qu’elle a du reste elle même prêtée (promise) par anticipation’. […] Dans le numéro d’hier soir du Diritto, le souffleur officiel dit: ‘1° Il n’est pas encore démontré que les questions préliminaires et les questions de forme – dont il a apparu tout un nuage autour des affaires danubiennes – soient écartées et résolues en temps utile de façon à ce que la Commission puisse affronter les questions de premier ordre dans sa prochaine session d’automne. 2° Il ne nous semble pas convenable de manifester l’opinion du Gouvernement (à supposer que cette opinion nous soit connue) relativement à l’affaire qui probablement sera l’objet ultérieurement d’une échange d’idées. Dans cette affaire il y a une chose à laquelle nous devons tenir surtout, c’est que, pour Italie, la liberté du vote ne soit pas diminuée par des manifestations intempestives’. Ainsi, Monsieur le Ministre, le 15 Août on fait dire à l’organe officieux que l’Italie a déjà promis … de soutenir les prétentions de l’Autriche. Le 31 Août, on fait dire que l’Italie garde sa liberté d’action, qu’elle ne doit pas engager son vote par des manifestations anticipées et intempestives. Dans les quinze jours il a dû se passer quelque chose. Ou bien Mr. le Comte Tornielli, qui craint l’Autriche pardessus tout, aura réussi à faire dévier le Cabinet de Rome du chemin qu’il avait pris; ou bien le Cabinet italien, après mûre réflexion, s’est convaincu qu’il était intempestif d’appuyer les désirs de l’Autriche avec empressement, lorsque peut-être les intérêts italiens exigeraient par la suite une autre attitude [emphasis mine]. Ou bien encore, l’Italie, avant de donner son vote à l’Autriche, voudra-t-elle obtenir de cette dernière un avantage quelconque en échange”.

[83] Ibidem, file 125: 6-7, R. (minutes), [Kreþulescu] to Boerescu, Roma, [November 24/December 6] 1880. “Je viens vous rendre compte des conversations que je viens d’avoir avec M. le Comte Tornielli et avec M. Cairoli, Ministre des affaires étrangères. M. Tornielli est venu me voir. Il m’a dit s’être rencontré à Belgirate (Haute-Italie) avec M. Cairoli, où se trouvait aussi le Comte de Launay, Ambassadeur d’Italie à Berlin. ‘Nous étions là le pour et le contre [ss. orig], dit le Comte Tornielli; car M. de Launay avait été influencé par les idées du Cabinet de Berlin en cette affaire. Nous avons longuement parlé en présence de M. Cairoli. J’ai vu que M. de Launay a été presque convaincu que la Roumanie a le droit de son côté. J’ai surtout insisté sur ce point: le traité de Berlin reconnaît une commission européenne générale, celle qui date du traité de Paris, et une commission riveraine à réunir en temps opportun… Si les Puissances veulent d’une commission mixte, cela ne peut être arrêté que par un congrès et un traité à venir. Sur ce point, M. Cairoli comme M. de Launay ont dû se déclarer de mon avis. Et je pense que la Roumanie doit tenir fermement à ce que la question préalable soit posée de cette façon, dans le cas où l’Autriche venait à insister et à saisir la Commission Europèenne de cette affaire. On ne peut rien désirer de mieux que de voir cette affaire assoupie. On devrait la laisser dormir pour que nous gagnons du temps’. Pour arriver, dis-je, jusqu’en 1883 ou jusqu’à l’époque où l’on devra s’occuper de prolonger la durée des pouvoirs de la Commission Européenne. ‘Précisement, reprit le Comte. Ainsi, continua-t-il, l’affaire peut tomber jusqu’à nouvel ordre; mais si l’Autriche la reprend, ce n’est pas à nous à combattre l’avant-projet. Nous pouvons vous aider, nous devons le faire; j’ai beaucoup insisté dans ce sens auprès de notre gouvernement, mais ce n’est pas à nous à poser la question prèalable; c’est à vous. Je ne manquai pas de dire au Comte combien nous apprécions l’attitude ferme qu’il a prise dans cette affaire, et combien nous lui savons gré pour la manière dont il soutient notre cause auprès de son gouvernement, lequel avait pris dans le commencement une voie qui n’était pas la bonne. […] J’ai ensuite été voir M. Cairoli. Il fut le premier à me parler de cette affaire. Je lui dis sans aucun détour que nous ne pouvions nullement accéder aux propositions de l’Autriche. […] On a mis en avant les intérêts considerables de la Grande Puissance voisine; nous nous aussi nous y avons des intérêts, et toutes les Puissances européennes, et l’Italie elle-même plus que bien d’autres. Et c’est au nom de vos propres intérêts que nous vous demandons à nous prêter tout votre appui. M. Cairoli m’exprima aussi l’avis que selon toute probabilité on ne traitera pas cette affaire dans la prochaine session; que l’avant-projet sera laissé dans l’oubli; mais que si toutefois on remet l’affaire sur le tapis, l’Italie ne manquera pas de nous être favorable [emphasis mine]. It was undoubtedly unofficial the Tornielli’s option that essentially relied upon the inflexible resistence against the Austrian-Hungarian pretentions: “[…] e indispensabil – he would declare to N. Kreþulescu – sã vã arãtaþi ferm deciºi a susþine drepturile D-trã., ºi aºa vã vor ajuta ºi unele Puteri. Alminterea, dacã de exemplu Puterile vãd cã vã arãtaþi dispuºi a face concesiuni ºi transacþiuni, dacã lãsaþi a se crede cã veþi ceda, nimeni nu va avea curajul sã va susþie ºi sã-ºi atragã la colére de Bismarck. […] / [...] there is indispensable to prove yourselves firmly resolute to sustain Your rights, and thus there would be some Powers to sustain you. Otherwise, if for instance the Powers notice that you are ready to make concessions and transactions, if you would let them to believe that you would retreat, then there would be no one to have the courage to sustain you and the provoke la colère de Bismarck. [...]”. Cfr. ibidem, file 334: 71, personal letter, minutes, Kreþulescu to Boerescu, Rome, November 24 /December 6, 1880.

[84] Ibidem, file 333: 1-2, 5-6, personal letter, Vasile Boerescu to Nicolae Kreþulescu, Bucureºti, January 7/19, 1881.

[85] DDI, 2, XIV: 109, nr. 119, D. 98, Mancini to Tornielli, Rome, July 28, 1881.

[86] ASDMAE, Archivio dell’Ufficio del Personale, serie VII, Tornielli-Brusati, T1.

[87] Cf. Dinu, “Romanian-Italian Relationship inside of the Triple Alliance. The 1888 Agreement”, Annuario. Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica di Venezia 2 (2000): 181-188.

[88] Cf. 35 anni: 165-66, nr. 107, Tornielli to Mancini, Bucharest, October 5, 1883: “Dans l’entretien que je me suis procuré avec M. Bratiano et dont j’ai rendu compte hier à V. E., je me suis abstenu, comme de raison, de l’interroger on sujet des prétendus accords pris par le Roi Charles et signés ensuite par son premier Ministre avec les Cabinets de Berlin, Vienne. Je ne sais pas si ma réserve a été remarquie [sic!] par Bratiano qui ce matin est venu me voir et presque aussitôt m’a dit: ‘J’ai été souvent obsédé par les diplomates russes au sujet des traités et des alliances qu’on nous attribue, je leurs ai constamment répondu que les Représentants de la Russie étaient moins encore que tout autre autorité à me prêter de pareilles imprudences car ils devraient bien se rappeler que je n’ai consenti à signer une convention que le coûteau à la gorge lorsque les armées russes avaient déjà entamé notre frontière. Je ne comprends vraiment pas que l’on puisse m’attribuer l’idée d’engager ainsi à la légère mon pays. On ne comprend évidemment pas que pour un petit état les chances de la guerre esposent l’existence; une grande puissance subit l’umiliation d’un échec sans disparaître, mais un petit pays peut être rassé de la carte géographique. Notre enjeu à nous serait beaucoup plus grand que celui de tous nos alliés possibles; où ils n’y a pas de parrité il ne peut y avoir des engagements a longue échéance’. Bratiano avait amené lui-même le discours de manière à avoir l’occasion de me faire cette déclaration, dont je pense devoir prendre note dans ma correspondance officielle; elle n'ajoute pas grande chose a ce que j’ai eu l’honneur de faire connaître à V. E., mais elle confirme mes impressions sur les derniers incidents de la politique de la Roumanie; ibidem: 166-167, no. 108, Tornielli to Mancini, Bucharest, November 21, 1883.

[89] BAR, Corespondenþã diplomaticã austriacã, Mapa XLIII/Acte 1-444, 1887: Bericht 6C, Heidler to Kalnoky, Bucharest, January 30, 1887: “Meine bescheidene Zwischenfrage, was speziell Rumänien Russland verdanke, schien den blinden Eifer meines italienischen Collegen nur zu steigern, denn er fuhr fort: ´wenn je [?] Rumänien in einem zukünftigen Orientkrieg eine Polle zu spielen hätte, so würde sich die Kraft diesser elementaren Geneigtheit für Russland im rumänischen Soldaten und im Volke zeigen. Der rumänische Soldat fühle sich dem russischen durch gleiche Tugenden und noch mehr durch gleiche Fehler verwandt. Diessem Gefühl würde es entsprechen mit den Russen und nicht gegen dieselben zu kämpfen´. […]”.

[90] ACS, Carte Crispi, busta 72, fasc. 107: Berlin, June 15, 1887, cit.

[91] Dinu, “Note e documenti…”, cit.: 292, Tornielli to Depretis, Bucharest, January 9, 1887.

[92] Cf. Trattati e Convenzioni tra il Regno d'Italia ed i Governi esteri, VIII, Rome, 1883: 78-116.

[93] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, România, busta 1396: R. 74, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, August 26, 1880. “Presa periodicã din aceastã þarã a primit cu semne de deschisã simpatie pentru Italia încheierea convenþiilor noastre cu România. Mai multe ziare au vorbit în termenii celei mai sincere satisfacþii. Va vedea Excelenþa Voastrã dacã convine ca asemenea manifestãri ale presei române sã aibã un ecou în cea italianã. […] / The periodicals in this country received the conclusion of our conventions with Romania with signs of sincere sympathy towards Italy. Many newspapers spoke in the terms of the most honest satisfaction. Your Excellence will see if it is conveneint that such a manifestations of the Romanian press have echo in the Italian one. [...]”; Românul (Bucharest) on August 7/19, 1880.

[94] Cfr. Dinu, “Documents regarding the history of the Italian Legation in Bucharest, 1879-1914”, Annuario. Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica, 4 (2002): 366-367.

[95] BN,, mss., Fond Brãtianu, file 526: 1-4, Constantinople, November 25/December 7, 1879, cit.

[96] Dinu, Note e documenti…, cit.: 291, Tornielli to Pansa, Bucharest, March 17, 1885.

[97] 35 anni: 73, nr. 22, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, March 12, 1880: “[…] oserei sottomettere al prudente apprezzamento di Vostra Eccellenza l’importanza che potrebbe avere la designazione di un distinto nostro ufficiale per compiere, almeno durante qualche mese, le stesse funzioni tanto in Serbia che in Rumania”. ibidem: ciphered appendix: “La présence de l’uniforme Italienne ferait ici le meilleur effet, car il y a encore beaucoup des officiers roumains qui ont fait les études à Turin et les attachés militaires servent quand ils sont bien choisis non seulement pour reconnaître la force d’un Etat mais aussi pour entretenir un contact sympathique entre les armées. Pour la Serbie le choix devrait être fait d’une manière très prudente pour ne pas éveiller l’idée que nous y envoyons un conseiller vu un instructeur. Un seul officier suffirait pour le moment pour Belgrade et pour ici; mais il devrait être d’un caractère docile pour se laisser diriger par le chef de la Légation.

[98] Giuseppe Tornielli-Brusati, Relazione del Regio Ministro d’Italia in Rumania, 1882-1883, Rome, Ippolito Sciolla, 1885.

[99] ASDMAE, DP, Registri Copialettere in partenza, R. 1203, Rumania: 35, Mancini to Tornielli, Rome, June 24, 1885.

[100] BAR, mss., Fond G. C. Cantacuzino, S 59(1)/MLXXII: Tornielli to G. C. Cantacuzino, Novara, November 27, 1887.

[101] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania, busta 1398: R 847, Tornielli to Depretis, Bucharest, July 18, 1887.

[102] Annuario diplomatico del Regno d’Italia per l’anno 1886, Rome: Ippolito Sciolla, 1886: 173.

[103] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 3: Collobiano to Pansa, Lisbon, June 26, 1888.

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