Copyright © The Malta Historical Society, 2005.

Source: Melita Historica : Journal of the Maltese Historical Society. 13(2002)3(239-252)

[p. 239] Reassessing the September 1775 Rebellion: a Case of Lay Participation or a 'Rising of the Priests'?

David Borg Muscat

In early modern Europe the concept of the modern state which, broadly defined, is one which brooks no interference between government and governed, was definitely an alien entity. The complicated ramifications of ancien régime privileges were so deeply entrenched in the fabric of European society that for most monarchs the claim to absolutism exceeded by far the realities of their domestic fiscal and political situations. Privilege made a mockery of sovereignty and absolutism. [1] Historical inquiry, in focusing attention on privilege, has generally done so in order to study the manner in which this circumscribed fiscal and legislative power. But sovereign prerogatives of social control - that is, the ability to control the populace and ensure respect for authority - could also be severely restricted by the existence of privilege. The latter enabled malefactors to evade sovereign power and retribution. Central to this argument is the study of the privilege of sanctuary, and in this late eighteenth-century Malta provides a case-study through which can be examined the irreconcilable differences between social control and privilege. All generalisation stops there; factors specific to the Maltese archipelago, principally the September 1775 rebellion, provide only a partial solution to the problem.

    Sanctuary, also referred to as ecclesiastical immunity, was defined as that element ‘by which sacred persons, places and things are exempted or freed from secular obligations and services, or rather from secular jurisdiction in civil matters’. [2] This embraced a spatial dimension, the human element and a spiritual dimension. The three factors were analogous to each other. The spatial dimension of immunity was certainly the most contentious to ancien régime sovereign power. A Christian entering a sacred place immediately partook of its immunity. This was known as Ius Asyli. Since sanctuary could not be violated by officers of the law in pursuit of their prey a criminal, once in asylum, was immune to arrest, corporal punishment or imprisonment. Asylum was possible through a whole range of buildings having [p. 240] religious associations. The person who had successfully sought sanctuary had thereby slipped through the hands of secular justice. [3]

    Ius Asyli was justified by the Catholic Church authorities on two grounds. Sanctuary was the respect due to a sacred place, as well as a charitable act by which the Church provided refuge to those fleeing injustices committed against them by the indiscriminate and harsh application of the law, either by government or by private persons exacting their feudal dues. But the Church was consistently accused of abusing its privilege of Ius Asyli. Sovereign authority claimed that Ius Asyli was taken advantage of principally by criminals on the run. Furthermore, the Church was far too rigorous in inflicting canonical censures on representatives of the law who, in the exercise of their office, infringed sanctuary. Such accusations engendered a deeply-rooted conviction that the Catholic Church was actually encouraging crime and harming public order by deliberately impeding the administration of secular justice. [4] In the long run sanctuary earned the Church more criticism than benefit. In Dei delitti e delle pene Cesare Beccaria referred explicitly to the crux of the social and political problems posed by sanctuary, pointing out that secular justice, in sanctioning immunity, undermined its own power and ability to exercise social control. [5]

    The problem of ecclesiastical immunity was endemic to all Catholic governments of ancien régime Europe. But in the Maltese archipelago historical vicissitudes in the development of ecclesiastical and political structures ensured that the Holy See assumed an overwhelming preponderance in domestic affairs. As a religious institution the Order of St John - the Hospitaller government - recognised the Papacy as its head. This ensured that in many respects government in Malta could not be effected without Rome having its say. [6] Dependence on Rome often contributed to a conflict of interest. Sovereign power exercised by the Prince Grand Master had to model itself on the papal interpretation of absolutism, with its concomitant emphasis on spirituality and charity, while simultaneously aspiring to the more secular-oriented role model rigorously being pursued by other Catholic monarchs. [7] Within the Papal States the Vatican’s commitment to uphold ecclesiastical immunity resulted in a [p. 241] significant difference between papal absolutism and its secular version. The papal definition of absolutism incorporated within it a paradox. It recognised the privilege of sanctuary despite the fact that social control and sanctuary could never be conterminous. This situation had changed somewhat by the late eighteenth century. Three papal bulls - Cum alias, Ex quo divina and In Supremo iustitiae solio - defined the crimina excepta that were barred from the privilege of sanctuary. [8] Nonetheless, what remained of sanctuary was still an obstacle to effective law enforcement. [9] This was intolerable to Malta’s Prince Grand Masters since the privilege of refuge undermined their control of deviants and subordinate social groups. The Hospitaller government made its position perfectly clear on the issue of sanctuary.

When one is concerned with public security, and tranquillity, Sovereigns cannot, and should not pay heed to any Privilege, or [even] to Human Law … [these are] absolutely not to be tolerated because observing them can produce an even greater evil. [10]

    At the very least, the Hospitaller government could avail itself of the crimina excepta clause within the above-mentioned papal bulls, enabling it to prevent criminals found guilty of having shed blood from using sanctuary as a loophole to escape justice. But the crimina excepta qualification was by definition applicable only to certain types of miscreants and conspicuously omitted other types of social groups that resorted to sanctuary to evade control. The latter comprised sailors, soldiers, buonavoglie deserting their terms of service, and slaves on the run. The ability to control subordinate social groups serving the government was an integral aspect of sovereign power and understandably came to preoccupy the Magistracy. In 1777, Grand Master de Rohan attempted to obtain from Rome ‘the faculty to extract from churches, and other immune places, all slaves, forzati, buonavoglie, and soldiers’. [11] Rome however refused to infringe the principle of sanctuary and judged that

soldiers who abandon their service would not be punished, and having sought sanctuary would not be handed over [to the secular arm] by the Curia without the agreement, that the [p. 242] Punishment of such a misdemeanour will be reduced to a few days in prison. [12]

    Even when the Church decided that delinquents falling within the crimina excepta clause were not to enjoy immunity, the right of immediate power over the body of the criminal removed from sanctuary was still retained by the Church and was only waived aside - and the criminal passed on to the State - after careful deliberation by the Episcopal curia. [13]

    In conflict with Magistral powers of jurisdiction were the Episcopal Curia and the Tribunal of the Holy Inquisition, ensuring that the Maltese archipelago was indeed close ‘to being a theocracy’. [14] Through their courts of law the Bishop and the Inquisitor had absolute jurisdiction over all litigation in which their own subjects were involved. A person acknowledged as an ‘ecclesiastic’ was, strictly speaking, exempt from the Grand Master’s jurisdiction. This was legally referred to as privilegium fori, by which ecclesiastics claimed exemption from the coercive power of secular judges as well as from civil obligations and duties. [15] Privilegium fori meant that a person ‘could not be tried, punished or molested in any way by civil authorities’. [16] Personal immunity contributed even further to undermining the principle of sovereign power. The tonsure became a mark of distinction conferring upon the person privilegium fori and was highly sought after in eighteenth-century Malta. Privilegium fori was as of right enjoyed by all the Bishop’s menservants - his alarii and cursores - and the Inquisitor’s patentati and familiari. [17] The tonsure thereby conferred upon the alario (et al.) the aura of immunity, marking him out from common folk. It could be for this reason that alarii were barred from approaching the Order’s galleys, which were in effect mobile prisons housing slaves, forzati and buonavoglie. In one notorious incident the Chevaliere de Rosieres had an alario beaten up by his henchmen for approaching the Order’s galleys. [18] This possibly occurred because the demarcation line between the physically violable [p. 243] (the Order’s slaves and prisoners) and the physically inviolable (the ecclesiastic bearing the possibility of immunity) had been infringed by this alario. [19]

    With such a large social group of exempt persons to contend with, the Magistracy perceived the Bishop’s and Inquisitor’s jurisdictional rights as ‘excessive and exorbitant’, and became ever more jealous of such rights. Attempts to curb the growth in number of those enjoying privilegium fori met with limited success. [20] The Bishop and Inquisitor, anxious not to suffer any reduction of their ability to court patronage, vigorously defended privilegium fori.

    Throughout the eighteenth century, these extensive networks of ecclesiastical patronage were subjected to sustained attack by the Magistracy. [21] This was motivated by the need for a more efficient degree of justice. But underlying this was the problem of absolutism and the concomitant exercise of social control and punishment. Privilege in the form of sanctuary and personal immunity compromised the application of sovereign power. Therefore, it is not enough to merely imply that this ‘attack’ reflects a pan-European trend brought on by the Enlightenment. [22]

    The insidious result of this rivalry between ecclesiastical patronage and secular-absolutist social control was an ongoing political tension which always seethed below the surface and which sometimes exploded into open violence whenever Magistral power threatened to jeopardise the cherished privileges of personal immunity and sanctuary. Political tension was particularly acute between 1773 and 1775. Contemporary accounts variously refer to a ‘ferment of revolution’, to several uprisings, and to a generally tense political situation. [23] These comments were prompted by the perception that the Magistracy was becoming increasingly tyrannical and power-hungry. The political situation in the mid-1770s was exacerbated by fiscal levies which, to the collective psyche, seemed to indicate that the Magistracy was rapaciously consuming rights belonging to ‘autonomous’ local institutions. [24] This popular belief has filtered into modern historiography and has [p. 244] resulted in a slanted impression of the September 1775 rebellion which clearly needs to be reassessed to take into consideration the aspect of absolutism vis-à-vis social control. [25]   Furthermore, with some of the Magna Curia Castellania prison registers having come to light in the Santo Spirito archives (Banca Giuratale annex), a re-evaluation of the Magistracy’s position regarding the rebellion can now be undertaken. [26]

    As with all uprisings, timing was of the essence to the success and meaning of the September 1775 rebellion. [27] From a military point of view, the rebels had chosen their moment well. In September 1775, Valletta was practically undefended. The Order’s troops and ships of the line were out at sea with the Spanish navy. Several years of prevarication on the part of the would-be rebels finally paid off with the surprisingly successful seizure of the two extremities of Valletta.  Access to St James Cavalier was gained by using a spare key while Fort St Elmo was taken over with the help of a corporal in the Magistral Regiment and a disgruntled soldier who had been dismissed from service. [28] The rebels then lowered the Order’s flag and hoisted the Maltese colours. [29] The Hospitaller government chose to ignore the national symbolism of the flag and when the rebellion had been stamped out the insurgents were charged with ‘introducing themselves into the Tower of the Cavalier, and taking possession of this, and having raised a flag different to that of the Sacred Religion’, while ‘their companions by means of cunning introduced themselves and took possession of St Elmo Castle, where they raised a similar flag; in this manner rebelling against the Sacred Religion’. [30]

    The government was able to reverse the disastrous situation in which it found itself - the Order was in fact being held prisoner in its own city - by putting to good use Valletta’s grid-pattern street system. Further acts of rebellion were prevented by imposing house arrest on all of Valletta’s inhabitants. [31] Official claims that all was tranquil and that calm reigned both in the city and in the rural casals were belied by this immediate imposition of what amounted to martial law, with the Magistracy threatening the use of arbitrary punishment for those who did not fall in [p. 245] line with its edicts. [32] Then, in a supreme test of loyalty, which perhaps was also calculated to rattle the nerves of the rebels and disprove their possible claims to unanimous support, a make-shift urban militia, a Corpo di Guardia, was immediately raised. [33] The offer of ‘un buon soldo giornalmente’ was proof that in its own city the Magistracy had remained the fount of patronage with which it could command the loyalty of its subjects.

    The government’s report on the principal events of the rebellion - Relazione di Quanto e Occorso nell’Isola di Malta in Congiuntura della Ribellione di una Truppa di Sacerdoti e Chierici - was commissioned after the event to present Pope Pius VI with irrefutable proof that ecclesiastics could and did do their utmost to stir up trouble in Malta to the detriment of Magistral power. [34] The title clearly indicates that the blame for the tumult was to fall entirely on the shoulders of ecclesiastics tout court. But the prison records of the Magna Curia Castellania show that out of a total of sixty-four prisoners whose names appear in connection with the rebellion, only one-third were given the appellation of Sacerdote or Chierico. Thus, in the eyes of the Castellania judges, two-thirds of those involved were laymen and not ecclesiastics or clerics. The Relazione conspicuously ignored this and, as will be shown further on, the rebellion was not quite a ‘rising of the priests’.

    The rebellion placed the Magistracy in a critical situation demanding extreme solutions. Rather than being in a position to dictate terms the government resorted to plea-bargaining and, at the height of the crisis, announced an ‘amnesty’ which would allow the rebels to enjoy their privilege of personal immunity. Despite this the government went back on its word and prized two rebels from sanctuary. [35] Furthermore, three of the four rebels captured in St James Cavalier were summarily strangled and decapitated. One historian has claimed that the judges of the Curia Castellania declined to sign the decree of execution of the three men taken from the Cavalier. [36] Elsewhere, another historian has claimed that one of the rebels from the Cavalier, Pasquale Balzan, was a tonsured cleric and that Grand Master Ximenes [p. 244] refused to hand Balzan over to the Episcopal curia. [37] If so, the Magna Curia Castellania prison records for September 1775 ignored this and listed all four as laymen, giving their occupations. [38] The four rebels captured in the St James Cavalier were Pasquale Balzan, pharmacist; Michele Tonna, caretaker of fountains; Claudio Chircop, violinist; and the fourth, Francesco Bonnici, was merely described as ‘bastaso’. [39] Bonnici was given a life sentence on the galleys, commuted to exile in perpetuum from Malta. As for the rest, ‘Pasquale Balzan, Michele Tonna and Claudio Chircop, were on the order of H[is] E[minent] H[ighness] … sentenced to be strangled in the secret prisons of this court and their heads to be placed on pikes on the [St James] Cavalier tower’, which had been the scene of their crime. [40]

    In addition to the above four criminals, the names of sixty other persons associated with the rebellion appear in the Castellania prison records.  These can be divided into five groups according to the prisons in which they were held. [41] The first and second groups were imprisoned in the Castellania dungeons. The third group of seven men, all ecclesiastics, were held in the Episcopal prisons. The fourth and fifth groups were confined in the St Elmo dungeons, and all but the last group, passed through the Castellania prisons on their way to execution or exile. The sentences with which these were served were the following:

Table 1

Groups of prisoners associated with the September 1775 rebellion, and the differing modes of punishment accorded to each group. [42]

The names of the last group of prisoners come from a list drawn up in August 1784. The assumption that this refers to prisoners who were confined at the Grand Master’s pleasure in the St Elmo dungeons rests upon the appearance on the list of the most prominent name associated with the rebellion, that of Don Gaetano Mannarino, the so-called leader of the rebellion who, we know, was only released in 1798. The list also includes Don Mannarino’s brother, Don Antonio, as well as Marquis Depiro; Marquis Testaferrata of Vittoriosa; Advocate Antonio Moneta; Onorato Paie medico della Floriana; and even the Segretario della Rota, Giuseppe Schembri, as well as more humble folk, such as Giuseppe Mizzi violinista and a certain Angelo, falegname.

    It would be worth assessing the Hospitaller government’s attitude towards these prisoners, using the criterion of social status based on the tonsure. As pointed out above, only one-third of the prisoners were described in definite terms as being priests or clerics. The rest were laymen who, possibly, claimed the privilege of personal immunity even before the guarantee issued by the government. Yet the government chose to distinguish markedly between the two groups, using different terminology to charge and to describe the prisoners on the basis of whether these were laymen or ecclesiastics. The exclusive use of the terms sacerdote and chierico in the title of its report has already been mentioned. It remains to be considered how the prisoners were charged in the Magna Curia Castellania. The second group - which included only laymen - were

conducted to these [Castellania] prisons from those of St Elmo, where they had been arrested for having been found together with the rebels, after which these persons were overcome, and submitted. [43]

[p. 248]    Within this group was to be found Antonio Antonurso, the Magistral Regiment corporal who had treacherously given the rebels access to St Elmo. He was conducted to these [Castellania] prisons from those of St Elmo because during the night he clandestinely opened the gates of the said Castle to the rebels, and these gained possession of it. [44]

    In no instance was Antonurso, or any layman in the second group, described as a rebel. In his sentence he ‘was on the order of S.A.E. Pad.ne exiled from all the dominion’. [45] The third group - three priests and four clerics - was described as ‘guilty of rebellion, and sedition which took place on 9 September past [1775] ... for which crime they were held in the Episcopal Prison’. [46] The fourth group - three priests and three clerics - was described as ‘those who were held as rebels in the prisons of Fort St Elmo’. [47] As far as the government was concerned it had marshalled enough evidence to claim that only priests and clerics were to blame for the September 1775 rebellion. Having achieved this objective the Magistracy then proceeded to announce an all-embracing amnesty. [48]

    While the Relazione served to implicate ‘sacerdoti’ and ‘chierici’ it also attempted to deflect attention from possible countercharges that the Hospitaller government had overstepped the bounds of legitimate government by infringing upon the ‘Privileges of the Nation’. [49] These privileges were of course sanctuary and personal immunity. Instead, the Relazione claimed that the rebels had engaged in an ‘extravagant and audacious enterprise’ despite which the Grand Master and the Sacred Council had munificently exercised ‘acts of innate clemency’. [50] The Relazione went on to assure Pius VI that ‘the Privileges of the Nation, have never been infringed, nor have there been any laments on the lack of observance of the said privileges’. [51] By implication the rebels could only be dangerous maniacs who, headed by the ‘notorious priest Gaetano Mannarino’, had espoused unjustifiable claims and had attempted to lead astray the loyal populace. Indeed, the Relazione emphasised that those social groups who counted for anything firmly supported [p. 249]the Grand Master. [52] At the height of the crisis the rebels had wrested from the Hospitaller government a pact allowing them to retain their privileges and not suffer ‘any sort of corporal punishment’. [53] Yet, following this, they had proceeded on to the most heinous act possible, that of threatening to ‘set fire to the Arsenal of the said Castle’. [54] They could thus not but be found guilty of lèse-majesté. If a good proportion of the rebels were ‘sacerdoti’ and ‘chierici’ then, by implication this could only mean that their fanatical adherence to their privileges had induced them to defy Magistral authority.

    The rebellion and subsequent Relazione produced unforeseeable consequences in Rome. To begin with, the rebellion brought about immeasurable support from the Bourbons of France and Spain for the Hospitaller government in its cause against ecclesiastical immunity. Pressure was brought to bear on the Holy See and this resulted in the issuing of a document - Ea Semper Fuit - which imposed a legal limitation on the ecclesiastical privileges of sanctuary and personal immunity. Although Pope Pius VI objected to the Relazione’s derogatory title, he could not argue with the fact that the September 1775 rebellion had indeed jeopardised Magistral authority in the Maltese archipelago. With the overwhelming evidence before him proving that ecclesiastics had fomented the rebellion, Pius VI was constrained to write, in the opening paragraph of Ea Semper Fuit, that

We are most grievously displeased to understand that Chierici were the instigators of the mutiny … the multiple increase in the number of Chierici, has rendered personal immunity intolerable to the Grand Master, and has similarly raised within [him] a detestation of the Immunity of the Church, and of other sacred places. [55]

    Pius VI could not have known that, of the prisoners taken in connection with the rebellion, the majority were laymen, not ecclesiastics. Nor could the Pope have had any knowledge of the biased terminology used in the Castellania prison registers. The Magistracy had taken a stand: ecclesiastics were rebels.

.

[p. 250] Appendix
 List of Names of  Prisoners taken
 in conjunction with the
September 1775 Rebellion
taken from the Libro di Carcerati Della Magna Curia Castellania: 1773-1781