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## Zionism and European Nationalisms; Comparative Aspects\*

FOR A LONG TIME, studies of Zionism were focused on the development of Zionism, its history, its ideas, its internal struggles, and debates as part of Jewish history. It was only recently that the question was raised whether Zionism was like or unlike other national movements. At first, this question prompted more descriptive or propagandist writing, but in time, it became possible for students of Zionism to approach their subject from a comparative vantage point.<sup>1</sup> Although this kind of work is just beginning, today it is considered legitimate and instructive to try and place Zionism among the national movements and, as in general studies of nationalism, to seek to find both unique characteristics and recurring patterns in the various movements.<sup>2</sup>

The comparison of Zionism with European nationalism does not yield ready results, since there is no one model for nationalism by which Zionism can be tested. Nor has there been one concept of Zionism accepted by all in the course of its history. For some it was primarily political, for others cultural, social, or religious. Nevertheless, the questions raised and considered through the comparative approach can be useful. A common form of comparison resembles a stock-taking operation. Is the Zionist claim based on common territory, language, and descent, like the movements of the Czechs or Hungarians, for example? Answers vary. Some say there is a myth of common descent from the ancient Hebrews, there is a homeland, Palestine (generally known to be the land where Jewish national identity was formed), and there is a common language, Hebrew, the language of the bible, which has been preserved as the language of religion and prayer. It is further claimed that these three elements fulfill the same role as in other national movements. Against such claims, some find it easy to emphasize the fact of the dispersion of Jews all over the world, the variety of languages and cultures in which Jews live and function, and the visible ethnic differences between the various dispersions. All these would lead

to the conclusion that Zionism differed profoundly from the “normal” national movements characterized by a recurring pattern: an ethnic group, recognized as such and bound to a place and to a local language or dialect, at some point demands for itself the political right of national self rule. The debate on whether Zionism fits the pattern is not resolved.<sup>3</sup>

Another example of commonly asked questions is whether the ideology of Zionism revealed the recurring combination of a wish for modernization with a romantic yearning for reviving the past. This combination of conservative and revolutionary aims was indeed typical of many national movements, though it appeared in a variety of manifestations; for example, the idealization of village life and mentality as an authentic remnant of the ancient and original nation, untainted by outside influences, was a motif prevalent in European national movements, notably in the German and the Czech.<sup>4</sup> Is it comparable to the Zionist idealization of agricultural work as the outstanding feature of the return to the land? There were those who thought so and tried even in their life style to imitate Tolstoyan peasants or, more logically, Arab *fellahin*.<sup>5</sup> But mainstream Zionist ideology regarded agricultural work as embodying and symbolizing not only the return to the homeland, but also, and mainly, the economic and psychological recuperation of the Jewish people. Moreover, the image of the new Jew, cleansed of Diaspora dust, was not meant to sink into rustic ignorance, but to develop as a technologically advanced, modern, self conscious, educated laborer.<sup>6</sup>

One can continue endlessly with comparisons of this kind. One of the most interesting is that of the role of religion in national movements. It shows, for example, that, as a rule, religious establishments were opposed to popular national movements because of their rebellious and revolutionary character, because they threatened the undivided loyalty of the people to the churches, and because they posed new and non-religious ideals of self-sacrifice. The Irish Catholic church, for instance, opposed the violent national movements, their terrorist activities, and the risings. It condemned the martyred rebels of 1916, whom the people hailed as national heroes. On the other hand, in most national movements, including those of the Irish and Jews, the religious feelings of the masses usually merged with national feelings to strengthen the national cause. It was only when nationalism won the hearts of the people, however, that the religious establishments themselves tended to adapt their political view to that of their flocks and to patronize the national movements, while also attempting to inspire them with religious symbols and feelings. In Zionism, too, most rabbis opposed Zionism on doctrinal grounds, but some came over to work for a vision that combined religious and political revival and redemption.<sup>7</sup>

Comparisons of this kind certainly enrich historical research, but, in the end, the basic comparison of Zionism with other movements rests on a deeper and wider basis—the belief (or disbelief) in the uniqueness and chosenness of the Jewish people and the divine purpose for which it exists. The tension between two opposite interpretations of Jewish history is the root of the extreme diversity among Jewish thinkers and the existence of so many streams in the Jewish national movement. At one end, there is the claim for uniqueness, which leads to the conclusion that the existence of Judaism is more important than the existence of the Jews. At the other extreme, there is the equally strong aspiration to be like other nations, existing for their own sake. Both views are genuine expressions of Jewish nationalism. The teleological claim has inspired not only Anti-Zionist streams, but also certain groups within Zionism, such as religious Zionism and spiritual (or cultural) Zionism. Spiritual Zionists believed that Zionism was the instrument by which the Jewish people would fulfill its universal mission of radiating justice and peace to the whole world. The claim for the uniqueness and purposefulness of Jewish existence therefore inspired not only orthodox anti-Zionists, but also important streams within Zionism—the religious Zionists, the spiritual Zionists, as well as the Socialists, who believed Zionism to be part of the social revolution of the world.

### THE CLUSTER OF STREAMS

What has been claimed so far is that Zionism has remained an entangled web of divergent schools that draw different conclusions from the dogmas of Jewish religion and the realities of Jewish history. The sharpest antagonism is between the two extreme standpoints, one of which stresses the overwhelming primacy of the existence of Judaism over the existence or well being of the Jews, and the other looking forward to the normalization of the life of the Jewish people as a nation like other nations. Such profound ideological chasms do not appear to have ever existed in any of the European national movements.

The doctrine of nationalism arose in Europe as part of the drive for freedom and self-rule propelled by the French Revolution. Once the principle of the sovereignty of the people was accepted, it was necessary to lodge sovereignty in a group that would act as the source of authority. It was natural that groups clearly distinguished by centralized rule, location, language, culture, and history were selected, by themselves, for that purpose. In this way human collectivities, previously defined as subjects of

a ruler,<sup>8</sup> or as ethnic groups, now declared themselves to be nations with political rights of self-government. This is the simple historical basis for the rise of European nationalism about two hundred years ago.

It did happen that there were disagreements within national movements between those who aspired for full independence and those who believed they could only get some form of autonomy, but even the latter often turned to the demand for independence when conditions seemed ripe. The classic example is that of the Czechs led by Masaryk, who had hoped to become autonomous within the Habsburg Empire until World War I seemed to offer the chance of independence. There were also socialists and Marxists in other places who opposed the doctrine of nationalism on principle. Some of them, for example in England, refrained from participating in what they called “national” wars, such as the Boer War and World War I, preferring jail to the betrayal of conscience.<sup>9</sup> Others, like the Irish Marxist Connolly, dramatically joined the national rising of 1916 at the last moment, after years of mockery at the expense of nationalist rhetoric.<sup>10</sup> All this shows that in other nations, too, there existed marginal groups of people who were convinced anti-nationalists. The phenomenon, however, of large and influential groups within a people declaring that their people did not form a nation and should not have an independent state is uniquely Jewish and has proven to be excessively divisive. Basic dissention on the interpretation of Jewish existence, coupled with the historical reality of the multi-cultured dispersions, have made the deep rifts dividing the Jewish people a prominent characteristic of Jewish nationalism. In recent history, there have been times when, by force of colossal events like the *Shoah* [Holocaust] or the establishment of Israel, an appearance of unity and solidarity seemed to emerge; but in fact the underlying ideological diversity is as strong today as it ever was.

The fathers of Zionism—and certainly Herzl among them—believed that the Jewish people could follow the example of the European nations and arrive at the territorial concentration and political independence of a progressive society guided by the principles of the European Enlightenment.<sup>11</sup> Even before that, the precursors of Zionism mentioned inspiring examples of Greece, Belgium, Serbia, Italy, and others.<sup>12</sup> Herzl always emphasized the like-other-nations motif. And indeed, considering the prominence of the principle of nationalism in late nineteenth-century Europe, the attempt of political Zionism to fit the Jews into the general picture was natural and logical at the time.

What foiled the acceptance of this concept in the European environment were not just the survival of Christian theological beliefs that the Jews

survived in order to bear witness to divine justice through their suffering, but also legitimate prevailing views that Jewish efforts had long been laboring to confirm. Zionism demanded a conceptual revision from both Jews and gentiles. For decades in the course of the nineteenth century, Jews had tried to integrate into the surrounding societies on equal terms, renouncing separate national loyalties. At the same time, liberal and progressive forces in Europe pressured their governments and societies to accept the Jews living amongst them as English, French, German, etc. And now, toward the end of the century, before the peoples of Europe had internalized this innovation, they were required, by Jewish spokesmen, to adopt another and opposite conceptual innovation—that the Jews were after all a separate nation with a right to their own state. When we look at the idea of Zionism as it must have been seen at the time, it is easier to understand the opposition to Zionism from within and from without.

There were also similarities between anti-Zionist arguments of Jews and non-Jews. Just as Zionism partly emulated environmental concepts, so the opposition to Zionism also formed itself in shapes familiar to the outside world. For instance, the claim that Judaism was a religion and not a nation—and accordingly the expression of a preference for the goal of equality in a multi-cultural society over Jewish particularism—was shared by both Jews and non-Jews. There was also a parallel Jewish claim that the fate of the Jews to be eternally dispersed among the nations was the result of divine punishment, or, alternatively, that Jews were the divine instrument for the redemption of the world.<sup>13</sup> There were also Jews who agreed with the Jewish settlement of Palestine for humanitarian reasons, adopting the claim that this would improve the lot and the character of the Jews and, at the same time, divert the pressure of Jewish immigration from western countries. The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that both Zionism and anti-Zionism were mostly based on European ideas and inclinations. This is eminently true for Jewish socialists, who either combined socialism and Zionism as twin goals or else adopted the socialist opposition to the doctrine of nationalism in general and to Zionism in particular.

### INCONSISTENT NATIONAL RHETORIC

Another comparative approach focusses on types of nationalism. In the study of nationalism, it used to be common to classify types of nationalism. On the whole, present day research has overcome this tendency and has learned to recognize the culturally individual character of each national

movement. Some, however, still use terms that imply the existence of two prototypes: civil nationalism, such as that of France, motivated by principles of equal citizenship and freedom; and, ethnic nationalism as exemplified by Germany—a nationalism that arose as a result of the French conquest and attempts to enforce French culture. German nationalism, so the theory goes, therefore emphasized the ethnic nation, the autochthonic culture, the historical continuity, the pure language, and tradition. One often hears this juxtaposition made between civil and ethnic nationalism,<sup>14</sup> but the terms do not represent two mutually exclusive types. They should serve only for analytical purposes, and do not reflect the immanent nature of any national movement. When investigated, most movements show that both elements, the civil and the ethnic, coexist within them in different and changing proportions.<sup>15</sup> Sometimes laws, such as those of naturalization, reflect the prevalent tendencies with regard to the definition of national identity, whether by birth, language, or descent.<sup>16</sup> The emphasis on a civil or ethnic ingredient depends on the historical circumstances and on the prevailing views at different times. To suggest otherwise is to imply that cultures emerge from unchanging racial characteristics—an argument easily disproved by history.

The source on which theories of national types of nationalism are based are mostly literary. Writers, poets, speakers, who have invented popular texts in the service of their nation, apparently create fixed ideological patterns for their nations. The German Herder is connected with cultural, ethnic, and organic nationalism. Fichte is associated with an exclusive and militant nationalism. The French writer and historian Michelet has become a symbol for a poetic nationalism that is both romantic and democratic, while Mazzini, the father of Italian nationalism, became known for a theory that combines individual and national freedom with the construction of an internationally harmonious world society. Dostoevsky appropriated the idea of God's chosen people exclusively for Russia,<sup>17</sup> and Mickiewicz went further when he identified the Polish nation as an incarnation of Christ's agonized body and predicted that, like Christ, Poland would rise from the dead and save the world.<sup>18</sup> Themes of national martyrdom and self sacrifice are also abundant in the nationalist Hebrew poetry of Uri Zvi Greenberg. Nationalist poetry and rhetoric is rich in color and passion because it is a cultural product drawing on tradition as well as on mimesis and individual creativity. It has been tempting to use the rhetoric for the characterization of nations and movements. This is why it is so important to stress that nationalist literature, though highly important for the history of specific national movements, as well as for tracing recurring motifs, is not a reliable

documentary source for the analysis and categorization of types of nationalism, and for classifying particular countries as reflecting this or that type. Literary creativity is free to choose its images, is not subject to logic, and does not necessarily embody sound historical generalizations. The history of Zionism is rich with examples of logical inconsistencies.

Paradoxically, it was Achad Ha'am, the father of spiritual Zionism, the advocate of a minimalist political program and of accommodation with the Arabs, who gave Jewish nationalism an organic, ethnic, and culturally exclusive definition.<sup>19</sup> In this he followed the teachings of the German thinkers, Herder, Fichte, and Hegel, and their historicist disciples, who saw the national spirit as an historical entity forming the nation and its culture from within by means of ethnic and organic continuity. In the language of our time, we might say that they ascribed to every nation a cultural D.N.A. that acted in a deterministic manner, and they saw national belonging as the highest and most meaningful part of a person's life. Was Achad Ha'am then a minimalist Zionist or an ultra-nationalist? The answer is that he was a creative and eclectic thinker and not a systematic theorist of nationalism.

Another example of the paradoxes with which nationalist rhetoric abounds is that of Brit Shalom,<sup>20</sup> a group inspired by Achad Ha'am. They were extreme in their demand for equality and justice among nations and particularly between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Yet it was they who openly and demonstratively based their world view on an absolute certainty in the moral superiority of Judaism over all other religions and the imperative duty of the Jewish people, because of this superiority stamped on them, to save the entire world with love and compassion—a concept not unlike that of Kipling when he coined the famous phrase “the white man's burden,” hailing the duty of the superior white race to serve the rest of the world for its own good. Buber and others sometimes went so far as to invoke Christian associations when they said that the Jewish people, through its suffering, would save the world. The paradox here is the combination of a sense of innate superiority with the use of an apparently selfless discourse of equality.

Another example is in some ways the opposite case of political Zionism and particularly that of Herzl himself. It seems illogical that the Herzlian stream in Zionism, whose starting point is the revolutionary demand that the Jews be recognized as a political nation with a right to a sovereign state in Palestine, did not give too much thought to the specific national content of that state, culturally or religiously. On the contrary, for Herzl anti-Semitism had more to do with the formation of this new national identity than any historical or mystical national spirit. The nationalism which Herzl

envisioned and in whose name he spoke was almost formal nationalism, a matter of rights and laws and recognition. He accepted the nation as produced by history, multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-attitudinal toward religion, and expected this state of affairs to continue.

The logical paradox here is that the very stream of Zionism, which was extreme in its political demand for international recognition of the Jewish people's right to a sovereign state in Palestine, was almost indifferent to the cultural content of the state and, in fact, planned a modern civil society that would be progressive and pluralistic.<sup>21</sup> There is no trace of an organic society permeated by a revived and uniform Jewish culture of which the politically moderate cultural Zionists spoke. From a theoretic point of view of nationalism, it would be hard to say which of these opposite streams belongs to the supposedly moderate civil type of nationalism and which to the self-centered ethnic and exclusive type. It is phenomena of this kind that weaken the case for classifying historical cases of nationalism as fitting certain ideal types, and this should convince us to limit our use of terms denoting ideal types to abstract discussion.

### THE CASE OF JEWISH NATIONALISM

What conclusions may be drawn from such observations of Jewish and European nationalisms? One is that movements differ from one another; the common denominator, however, is generally reduced to the aspiration of a collectivity, conscious of its particular identity, to govern itself and nurture its culture. Beyond this minimal commonality, national movements reveal an enormous variety of historical features, each resulting from a separate culture, history, and set of circumstances. This is particularly true of the Jewish case because of the great variety of diasporas. If we examine the tests for national belonging, for example, we find that, because the Jews were distinguished by religion and their fear of submersion into other cultures, they were particularly careful to guard the borders of Jewish identity. Although there was constant mobility in and out of Jewish communities, the process was strictly controlled. This is why Jewish nationalism always appeared as an eminently particularist nationalism with a strong emphasis on ethnicity in both meanings of the term—culture, and descent. This caused many observers to regard Jewish nationalism as an extreme example of a nationalism that closes in on itself, keeps itself apart, and rejects outsiders. This view survived the desperate attempts of generations of European Jews to assimilate into the European nations. Thus the image of Jewish national



identity remained that of a closed society; the view was often expressed that it was similar to German nationalism, which stressed the importance of kinship above all other tests of identity. Comparisons with Germany were made long before it became common to ascribe militarism and power politics to Zionism.

This point is related to a tendency—not new, but newly emphasized—to trace a close connection between the Jewish people and the very appearance of the principle of nationalism. Even before nationalism became a central feature of European history, the Jewish people was singled out, for example by Rousseau, as an extraordinary case of a people that had survived through dedicated preservation of its culture and laws, even in times of adversity. After their country was partitioned and wiped out, Rousseau advised the Poles that they should follow the Jewish example in order to survive.<sup>22</sup> About 60 years ago, Hans Kohn,<sup>23</sup> a student of nationalism, and, only a few years ago, Adrian Hastings, a professor of Christian Theology, developed the idea that the example of the biblical Israelites was the first historical example of a nation proper and of nationalism.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, what we find in the bible is not just a king and subjects (of those there were many in the ancient world), but a national culture, a system of community laws, a consciousness of moral and social obligations, a sense of mission, etc. Because Europe was Christian and the bible was its first textbook, entities resembling nations with self-conscious identities that followed the model of biblical Israel developed early—some say in the Middle Ages.

If we apply this interpretation of European nationalism to the beginning of Zionism, we could say that, when Herzl received the principle of modern nationalism from Europe and sought to apply it to the Jewish people, he adopted a modern, secular, and foreign principle, as the rabbis rightly said. It was, however, a principle whose remote roots sprang from within the ancient Jewish people before being transmitted to Christian Europe. It was also a principle that did not long remain secular and foreign. In order to survive, it had to have a cultural content, and this meant that it was quickly “converted,” taking on central and symbolic Jewish traits.<sup>25</sup> In our time, when the concept of nationalism has gained a bad reputation in some circles, this connection between the Jews and nationalism serves the purposes of anti-Zionists on the academic level. The place of the theological accusation against the Jews as those who caused the death of Jesus and rejected Christianity has now been overcome by a new accusation against Zionism—that it was an extreme embodiment of a particularist and xenophobic tradition of the Jewish people, an anachronistic expression of chauvinism that the rest of the world is trying to shake off. Historically and

chronologically, the new and intensified hatred for nationalism serves as the third stage—after the theological and the racist stages—in the theoretic justification of anti-Semitism.

As already mentioned, unlike all other nationalists, who dedicated their efforts to the relatively simple goal of self-rule and cultural regeneration, Zionists were endlessly grappling with the abstract problems involved in defining their goals. The need of Jewish thinkers to harmonize their world view with their attitudes toward Zionism is very striking. It is as if an aspiration for national independence resulting from a feeling of belonging may be enough for other national movements, but not for Jews. The different streams of Zionism loaded their ideological agendas with religious, social, or universalist aims. During the Mandatory period, a group that excelled in these heart searchings was partly made up of Hebrew University professors, who emphasized the duty to act according to the moral laws of Judaism, which they interpreted as being universal moral laws objectively applied. They were also keen to apply intellectual conclusions derived from historical or philosophical research to the problems that Zionism raised. Descent, origin, belonging, collective interests were to them irrelevant as motives. It is as if they held that to act instinctively in line with natural feelings of solidarity was primitive, almost animal-like—as though they were listening to the call of blood, to the wailing of wolves. Jewish wisdom and morality dictated to them cooperation with the Arabs, the setting up of a bi-national pacifist and disarmed state, a model society based on the Jewish heritage of justice and equality.<sup>26</sup>

To a certain extent, these people continued to strive to hold up the concepts of a universal mission of Judaism that had been formulated in the Jewish reform movements in Europe and in the United States. Contrary to the European and American reform movements, they did not shake off Jewish nationalism, but gave it their own definition. They believed in setting up a Jewish community in Palestine, imbued with Jewish culture, as part of a bi-national Palestinian state. The university was to be the place where the revival of Jewish culture and its enrichment through the study of the humanities and the sciences was to be accomplished. The plan for a bi-national state resulted from a conviction that morally and realistically it was the only option. The aspiration for a Jewish state was bound to lead to endless war. More than any other Zionist group these people were troubled by questions concerning the essence of nationalism and its good and bad ways of expressing itself. They felt a moral obligation to choose the kind of nationalism that would fulfill the prophetic aspirations of Judaism. Judaism dictated to them a spiritual kind of nationalism—moral, just, pacifist—whose horizons would cover the whole of humanity.

## IS THERE ANYTHING LIKE IT AMONG THE NATIONS?

This was an extreme expression of an attitude that is found in different shades to this day—a sort of selfless national consciousness, a sensitivity to the rights of others, a readiness to minimize or forego national demands for the sake of a vision of universalism. It is sometimes said that a “type” of nationalism, “western nationalism,” dictates such goals. It is said that the nationalism prevailing in France, Britain, and the United States is focused on universal civil rights rather than on the particular rights of the nation. History does not support such a claim. French nationalism had indeed started at the time of the Revolution with the most noble declarations for the liberation of all of humanity; but while the universal concept spread, French nationalism very quickly became the movement of the historical French nation, whose culture was, from then on, enriched by democratic messages as part of its heritage. This did not make French nationalism universalist, or in any way selfless in the international arena. As A.D. Smith recently wrote, foreigners fare equally badly on both sides of the French-German border.

As for British nationalism, it was endowed with the title of civil nationalism mainly because there had not been much nationalist rhetoric emanating from Britain in the course of history except toward the end of the nineteenth century, when imperial rivalry raised voices expressing national pride and fervor. At that time, the rhetoric of British Imperialism in fact expressed an extreme form of nationalism based on absolute certainty in the superiority of what was then called the British race; an innate political superiority which, it was claimed, created the right to rule others (for their own good, of course). Another reason that seemed to entitle Britain to be a model of civil nationalism was the fact that its regime preceded others in developing certain representative institutions, liberal practices, and equality before the law. As in the French case, the national heritage included liberal messages as a source of national pride. But again, this does not make British nationalism universalist.

Things are different with regard to the United States. At the root of that country’s nationalism, as shown, for example, in the monumental book by Yehoshua Arieli,<sup>27</sup> there was a conscious choice to adopt the universal values of the Enlightenment as the foundation and content of American nationalism. Of course it is also true that Americans developed a sense of traditional belonging first to the English origin of their political concepts, then to European culture as a whole. It is also true that there developed in America a strong sense of patriotism very similar in its intensity to the

nationalism of other countries. The phrase “My country right or wrong,” was after all coined in America. Nevertheless, the further America moved from specific ethnic roots through multi-colored immigration, the closer it moved toward the interpretation of American nationalism as expressing loyalty to universal values of freedom and equality. The idea embedded in the national lore had, in fact, a chance to grow stronger. In the United States alone a model was developed for a universally inspired nationalism that could be imitated.

In Israel, universalism was adopted by some of the peace movements. The movement of Brit Shalom in mandatory Palestine was partly influenced by the American model, but its outstanding feature was its claim that the inspiration and authority for a morally universalist and internationally peace-oriented nationalism was to be found in Judaism and in the teachings of the biblical prophets. So there was, apart from the American influence, a strong Jewish element in the early peace movements derived partly from the European Jewish scholars who interpreted Judaism for themselves and for the outside world as an eminently moral, pacifist, and universalist religion. Most of those who continue the tradition of peace movements nowadays no longer turn to Jewish sources of inspiration, but construct their arguments primarily on present day political criticism.

My general conclusion from these thoughts about the comparative aspects of Zionism is that, in Israel today, half a century after the establishment of the state, the transformation that was supposed to turn the Jewish people into a normal nation whose identity would be taken for granted, and therefore ignored as an issue, has not taken place. The tendency to grapple endlessly with questions of identity and goals has not diminished, but has grown more intense. The aim of Zionism was to solve the homelessness of the Jews in order to create a convenient political base for processes of regeneration on the spiritual as well as the economic level. This did not happen. In spite of the large number of Israelis who apparently embody the process of normalization through phrases such as “We do not have another country,” normality does not dominate the scene, and the whirlwind of heart-searching has not subsided.

Two thousand years of deeply diverse developments cannot apparently be ironed out easily. The same points of debate that accompanied Zionism from its inception, between saving the individual or saving the collective existence—between particularism and universalism; between Jewish identity or citizenship of the world; between ordinary nationalism or a Zionism imbued with aspirations of saving the world; between “like other nations” and the idea of a model nation; between Judaism as a product of

the national culture or the notion that Judaism is the purpose for which the Jewish people exist—all of these debates continue to this day and influence the practical choices individuals and groups make. The old debates are now conducted in new vocabularies that fit the historical experiences and intellectual discourses of the present generation; but the need for them springs from the persistence of old predicaments that have resulted from the tortuous paths of Jewish history. It is these deep ideological rifts, which have accompanied Zionism since before and after the fulfillment of its political objective, that distinguish Jewish nationalism from all others.

## NOTES

\*An earlier version of this essay was published in Hebrew in *Mifne*, No. 38 (September 2002) 8–12.

1. See Gideon Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology* (Hanover, CT and London, 1995) Ch. I.

2. See, e.g., Shmuel Almog, *Nationalism and Anti-Semitism in Modern Europe 1815–1945* (Jerusalem, 1988) [Hebrew]; Anthony .D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations* (Oxford, 1986); Hedva Ben-Israel, “Reflections on Zionist History,” in Anita Shapira, Jehuda Reinharz and Jay Harris (eds), *The Age of Zionism* (Jerusalem, 2000) 19–36 [Hebrew]. See also, “Herzl’s Leadership in a Comparative Perspective” in Gideon Shimoni and Robert Wistrich, *Theodor Herzl* (Jerusalem, 1999) 147–64. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London, 1960) 81, 100.

3. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, UK, 1990).

4. Johann Gottfried von Herder, *On Social and Political Culture*, edited by Frederick Mechner Barnard (Cambridge UK, 1969).

5. On Aharon David Gordon, see Avraham (Arthur) Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea* (Jerusalem 1970) 285–98 [Hebrew].

6. A famous Ben-Gurion wish is often quoted, that, in Israel, every worker would have a university degree.

7. Yosef Salmon, *Religion and Zionism* (Jerusalem, 2002).

8. Denis Diderot, Jean le Rond d’Alembert, *Encyclopaedie ou Dictionnaire Raisonnee des Sciences des Arts et des Metiers*, v22, “Nation” (Lausanne, 1781) [French].

9. Alan John Percivale Taylor, *English History 1914–1945* (Oxford, 1965) 51–2.

10. On James Connolly, see Francis Stewart Leland Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine* (Glasgow, 1971) 342–8, 353–5, 366–70.

11. Shimoni and Wistrich, *Theodor Herzl*.

12. Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea*, 86, 92; Yehuda Alkalay, *Works*, (ed.), Yitzhak

Raphael (Jerusalem, 1944) [Hebrew]; Zvi Kalischer, *Derishat Zion* (1862) [Hebrew]; Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 51, 66.

13. Haim Avni and Gideon Shimoni, *Zionism and Its Jewish Opponents* (Jerusalem, 1990) [Hebrew].

14. Hans Kohn spoke of liberal and organic nationalism. See Hagit Lavsky, "Nationalism in Theory and Praxis: Hans Kohn and Zionism," *Zion*, LXVII(2) (2002) 189–212.

15. Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation in History* (Jerusalem, 2002) 25–36 [Hebrew].

16. Roger Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge MA, 1992).

17. Hans Kohn, *Prophets and Peoples* (New York, 1946).

18. Norman Davis, *God's Playground*, v2 (Oxford, 1982) 8–9.

19. On Achad Ha'am, see Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 80, 96.

20. On Brit Shalom, see Hagit Lavsky, *Before Catastrophe* (Jerusalem, 1992) 185–204 [Hebrew].

21. Rachel Elboim-Dror, "Herzl as a Proto 'Post Zionist'," in Shimoni and Wistrich, *Theodor Herzl*, 240–64.

22. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Considerations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne," *Oeuvres Completes*, v3 (Paris, 1969) 951–1041.

23. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York, 1944).

24. Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge, UK, 1997).

25. David Vital, *The Origins of Zionism* (Oxford, 1980) 339–45.

26. For example, Magnes, Buber, Simon, and Bergmann.

27. Yehoshua Arieli, *Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology* (Cambridge, MA, 1964).