Operation Cobra is also growing in scope and sophistication. In December, Brazil opened a regional intelligence center at Tabatinga whose mission is to sort through intelligence on border activities, which it will then share with Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and the United States. Additionally, Brazil has completed work on seven new police installations along the border stretching from Tabatinga to Vila Bittencourt. Brazil has both shed blood and suffered casualties along the Colombian border. In February Brazilian troops attacked a boat with suspected FARC guerrillas, killing six persons near Apoporis. The same month a Brazilian soldier disappeared under unclear circumstances. In March, 197 indigenous persons of the Maku nation sought refuge at Vila Bittencourt charging that the FARC had threatened them. During maneuvers in May, Brazilian soldiers suffered two casualties--one wounding of a soldier outside Tabatinga apparently involved Colombians, while another soldier disappeared along the Rio Negro. Colonel Roberto de Paula Avelino, who manages Calha Norte from a campus-like building in Brasilia, downplays the incidents, claiming the border area is fairly quiet despite the FARC presence on the Colombian side. He also believes that a major incursion by uniformed FARC guerrillas is unlikely, "I don´t think the FARC is interested in making a new enemy." De Paula Avelino's analysis stands in sharp contrast to recent statements about Colombia's illegal armed groups made by Reich, "If these people work to ever gain control over larger parts of Colombian territory, I think there is no doubt that they would take their business, which is narcotics and terrorism, to other countries. I don't think they are only interested in taking control by force of Colombia. I don't think they know any borders. Terrorists sans frontiers, to coin a phrase." Not surprisingly, the FARC disagrees with Reich's analysis. Oliverio Medna, the FARC International Committee representative in Brasilia, said FARC commanders have been ordered to keep their troops out of neighboring countries. "We are hoping for reciprocity from the neighboring governments. Reciprocity in what sense? If we don´t cause problems in the territories of the neighboring countries, that their governments will abstain from intervening and getting mixed up in the internal affairs of Colombia. We are not a problem for any state other than Colombia." Medna claims that talk of FARC border incursions is part of a policy aimed at discrediting the rebel group, "If a tree falls in the Ecuadorian jungle, they says its the FARC's fault. If in Peru a cow shows up dead in the morning, it's the FARC. Our plans do not include intervention in the territory of any country." Alcides Costa Vaz, an international relations professor at the University of Brazil, says Colombia is not a hot political issue in Brazil, "Issues of national security have ranked very low on the domestic political agenda. There is not a very strong position in public opinion. The last few years economic issues have ranked very high." He went on to stress that, "So far Brazil has resisted the idea of having a active role," but if Colombia asks for regional alliances and cooperation, Costa Vaz believes Brazil will probably cooperate. Whatever the semantics, Brazil is involved in the Colombian conflict through the sharing of intelligence and an escalation of military and police activities inside Brazil aimed at stopping drug and arms trafficking and preventing a spillover of the violence. This is likely to continue even if the leftist Workers Party candidate Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva wins the fall elections for the presidency. Workers Party Senator Tião Viana, who represents the Amazon state of Acre, said the party opposes U.S. bases and U.S. troops in Brazil but supports exchange of intelligence, training, and cooperation in operations as long as Brazilians execute them. "In the Brazilian Amazon there's a clandestine infiltration of groups from Bolivia, Peru and Colombia involved in drug trafficking and clandestine wood extraction," Viana said. "The Amazon is very unprotected. There's a need for troops and intelligence operations." The Cobra Program is a natural for U.S. involvement, and cooperation between the two countries began to increase last year when DEA agents toured Brazil's Amazon operations. Brazilian Federal Police and the DEA also cooperated in the arrest in Colombia of Brazilian drug lord Luis Fernando da Costa, know as Fernando Beira-Mar (Seaside Freddy) and the bust a few months later of his top lieutenant Leomar Olviera Barbosa in Paraguay. According to recent congressional testimony by DEA chief Asa Hutchinson, DEA agents in Colombia and Brazil are currently working to capture of Tomas Molina Caracas of the 16th Front of the FARC. The DEA is also fielding special teams of DEA and Brazilian police to investigate money laundering. It has been estimated that as much as 25 percent of Colombian drug money may be hidden in Brazilian accounts. Enticing Brazil into greater cooperation may be the increased availability of funds for equipment, training, operations and development projects, and a decade-long growth in domestic drug use and drug-related violence. The Bush administration's Andean Regional Initiative calls for Brazil to receive $6 million in counterdrug assistance and $12.6 million in social development funds this year, while a 2003 Bush administration request calls for another $12 million in counternarcotics funds. Recently, the presidents of Brazil, Peru and Ecuador joined together to request $1.3 billion from the Inter-American Development Bank for use in border social programs aimed at dealing with the spillover from Plan Colombia. President Cardoso raised the fight against drugs to front burner status in a national speech June 19 when he compared it to the country's earlier struggle against hyperinflation. At the same time the government released a study estimating that there were 1.7 million cocaine addicts in Brazil. Both increased domestic consumption and the creation of cocaine processing centers in Brazil are seen as potentially undermining U.S. drug war efforts. Brazilian traffickers are building a niche for themselves in designer drugs, while the nation's large chemical industry provides an opportunity to obtain drug-processing chemicals. Drug traffickers are active and powerful throughout the country. A 2001 Congressional inquiry into drug trafficking and impunity called for the indictment of 800 persons, among them politicians and police. Fearful that Brazil could rival the U.S. and Europe as a drug market, the United States has been tinkering with Brazil's drug policies. It has jointly designed with Brazil a new series of drug courts and it finances a U.S.-style DARE school drug prevention program. It is also backing a study of Brazilian attitudes toward drug use. Drugs are seen as the fuel for the country's tremendous criminal violence problem and increase in youth murders. In Rio de Janeiro some 10,000 persons are alleged to be active in local drug distribution and street sales. According to a study by the International Labor Organization, many of the persons involved are children. "What you find is that since 1995 more children have taken up drug trafficking. They start as young as eight years old," said Pedro Americo F. Oliveira, head of the ILO Child Labor section in Brazil. "They come from the poorest of the poor. They are one-parent families. The parent works and the child doesn't go to school." What is the average life expectancy for a child drug dealer? One year, says Oliveira. According to a recent Human Rights Watch report the situation is exacerbated by the regular use of torture and murder by the Brazilian police forces. The gruesome killing of Brazilian Investigative Journalist Tim Lopez by a drug trafficking gang has sparked a police crackdown in the Rio de Janeiro favelas that may prove to be a prototype for harsh action to come. A combined task force launched by the federal government includes military intelligence units and the use of combined federal and local police squads. Some people are advocating military occupation of many of Brazil's troubled urban areas. The rapid escalation of the drug war in the last year by the Cardoso administration runs the risk of exacerbating tinder box social conditions. Costa Vaz warns that over-militarization of the drug war, especially in poor neighborhoods, will backfire unless enforcement programs are designed carefully. "We have a very sensitive and dangerous domestic situation. What is going on in Rio right now is generating a situation of social conflict. The door to civil war will open if you bring in the military. We will not solve Colombia's problems, we will probably reproduce them." Ronald J. Morgan is a freelance writer who focuses on Latin America. Back to Top . Comments Copyright © 2002 Information Network of the Americas (INOTA). All rights reserved. |