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A Determined Paper:

A Discussion on Materialism and the Ramifications for the Free-Will Debate

 

The mind-body problem is a concept that philosophers have contemplated and debated about for hundreds of years.  Although significant in and of itself, it also has far reaching implications for other areas of philosophy, one of which is the debate between free-will and determinism.  This paper will discuss the different attitudes towards the mind-body problem and how they effect the debate on free-will and determinism.  In the end, this paper will argue that even if one subscribes to the materialistic theory of the mind-body problem, free-will is still entirely possible.

There are two main camps by which the mind-body problem can be considered: dualism and materialism.  Each has their strengths and their weaknesses.  Let us first consider the former.  Dualism, loosely stated, is:

the theory that the universe is explicable only as a whole composed of two distinct and mutually irreducible elements. In Platonic philosophy the ultimate dualism is between “being” and “nonbeing”—that is, between ideas and matter (“Dualism”).

The idea of the mind existing as an intangible form apart from the physical body is attractive because it eliminates the need reconcile volition with physical and natural laws.  Dualism, however, trades one critical problem for another; how does something intangible interact with the physical?

Unable to find a reasonable answer to this question, many philosophers abandon dualism for a materialistic point of view.  Materialism, loosely stated, is “the doctrine that all existence is resolvable into matter or into an attribute or effect of matter” (“Materialism”).  In materialism, the human being is reduced to its purely physical form, and the mind-body problem is nullified because now the “mind” is something physical.  This, however, has problems that become very apparent when we begin to consider the question of free-will.

If we accept that all we are (when it comes to our brains/minds) is an intricate network of neurons, then we must consider the possibility that free-will is “a complete illusion, because our behavior is entirely fixed by the neurobiology that determines the muscle contractions” (Searle, “Free” 505).  In his paper “Neural Holism and Free Will”, Levy discusses the idea that all of our “decisions” and actions are simply the consequents of deeply rooted antecedents.  The idea that all of our actions are classically conditioned[1] responses to empirical stimuli precipitates that there is no room for free-will because we will respond in a deterministic and predictable fashion; we will simply do what we have been trained to do by our environment.

            This denunciation of free-will seems to be entirely possible.  Neurobiologists have shown that single neurons and groups of interconnected neurons can learn.  Two neurons sharing a single synapse can learn through graded potentials known as EPSP & IPSP.  Researchers demonstrated that by exposing a single neuron to electrical stimulation they could increase or decrease the likelihood the neuron would fire.  This concept has ramifications for groups of neurons too.  By shocking a Aplysia californica researchers can produce an enduring response.  The organism becomes sensitized to the stimulus and thus changes its behavior (Kolb & Whishaw 176-180).  Following this discovery, researchers were able to show that the same concept is at work in mammalian brains.  In a 1973 study, Bliss and Lomo demonstrated long-term enhancement (LTE), an experiment by which they could effect the amplitude of EPSP in groups of hippocampus cells and render those cells more likely to fire (Kolb and Whishaw 181).  It would not be surprising if researchers one day discovered that human behavior is really just EPSP and LTE, just on a grand scale; the result of interplay between millions and millions of neurons.

To expand on this idea, some materialists explain conscious thought and the illusion of free-will as a form of epiphenomenalism, where thoughts and volition are simply the byproducts of neural activity.  This seems prima facie valid, but there is one major problem the materialist (and/or compatiblist) purist encounters.  As Nagel puts it:

We aspire in some of our actions to a kind of autonomy that is not a mere subjective appearance-not merely ignorance of their sources-…the sense that we are the authors of our own actions is not just a feeling but a belief…it presents itself initially as the belief that antecedent circumstances, including the condition of the agent, leave some of the things we will do undetermined: they are determined only by our choices, which are motivationally explicable but not themselves causally determined (qtd. in Morgan 114).

Agency and autonomy is not something people are willing to part with easily, we hold these things as a priori invaluable because “our conception of ourselves as free agents is fundamental to our overall self-conception” (Searle, “Minds” 86).

Additionally, there seems to be intuitive problems with the notion that causally sufficient antecedents cause our behavior.  John Searle comments on this:

if I am standing in a park looking at a tree, there is a sense in which it is not up to me what I experience. It is up to how the world is and how my perceptual apparatus is. But if I decide to walk away or raise my arm … then I find a feature of my experiences of free, voluntary actions that was not present in my perceptions. The feature is that I do not sense the antecedent causes of my action in the form of reasons … as setting causally sufficient conditions for the action.  You see this strikingly if you consider cases of rational decision making. … when I chose to vote … and later when I actually cast a vote … I did not sense the antecedent causes of my action as setting causally sufficient conditions. I did not sense the reasons for making the decision as causally sufficient to force the decision, and I did not sense the decision itself as causally sufficient to force the action (Searle, “Free” 493).

So the philosopher finds herself in paradox of sorts.  On the one hand, dualism allows for free will but is inconsistent with natural and physical laws, and on the other, we can account for our behavior but are required to deny our volition; something that is intuitively very troubling.  For the purpose of this paper, however, I will lean to the materialistic side of this argument, and deny dualism.  The reason I do this is because given all we know about the world it seems there is more validity to the claim that, at the end of the day we are simply matter.  To quote Patricia Chrchland:

…abstract skills…can also be specified in terms of dynamical-system properties, dependent as they are on neural networks and neurochemical concentrations.  My hunch is that human skills in planning, preparing, and cooperating can likewise be specified, not now … but in the fullness of time as neuroscience and experimental psychology develop and flourish (Churchland).

The reasonable person must agree that neuroscience has not developed very far, although we know a lot more about how the brain works then we did 150 years ago, we still know very little.  It is reasonable to assume that as neurological research progresses, we will have a better understanding of how the brain works and will be better able to explain the natural/material mechanisms which allow for conscious thought and free will, even in the most metaphysical sense of the terms.  To sum up, it is difficult to say whether or not there is a neurological basis for free-will because there has not been enough progress in neurological research.

                        There are, however, theories about how free-will can be reconciled with materialism.  In his paper “Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology”, John Searle discusses the ideas of “gaps” between different parts of decision making within the conscious state.  He divides the psyche[2] into two broad categories.  There are quasi-deterministic parts of the psyche such as perceiving an object, over which we have very limited (if any) control, and the so-called “gaps” where we exercise volition.  Searle does not give an account of the physical mechanisms by which these “gaps” operate, citing a lack of scientific evidence, but he does offer up a theory for how they could exist.  Searle’s idea is that we perceive things about the world through our sensory apparatuses and that information is then processed throughout a series of “stages”.  In some of these stages the information is processed according to the architecture of our brains over which we have little or no control, and in other “stages” we are able exercise volition because “at each stage, the conscious states are not experienced as sufficient to compel the next conscious state” (Searle, “Free” 494).  It is in between these stages that we consciously experience a process of “deliberating, deciding and acting, and the subsequent stages” (Searle, “Free” 494).  Because casual antecedents are not sufficient to cause the next stage, people are able to exercise volition insofar that they can consciously control the process of deliberation, which leads to decision about how to behave.  Searle also recognizes that there is a definite intuition about consciousness and free-will:

when it comes to explaining a certain class of human behavior, it seems that we typically have the experience of acting ‘freely’ or ‘voluntarily’ in a sense of these words that makes it impossible to have deterministic explanations (Searle, “Free” 492).

By coupling intuition with a plausible theory, Searle offers up a very convincing account that reconciles free-will with materialism.

            Speaking from the Humian perspective that behavior is caused by desires, intentions and beliefs, Patricia Churchland discusses the idea that we have varying levels of free-will, and that intuition is not a good method to quantitatively define the level of free-will.  As evidence, Churchland paints a spectrum.  On the deterministic side we cannot help but jump at the site of a mouse leaping unexpectedly from a compost heap, and more to the free will side one decides to tie their shoe.  Somewhere in the middle is our predisposition, which may be stronger or weaker, to behave in a certain way.  For example, a smoker who has just given up their habit may choose not to smoke, but she has great difficulty in preventing herself from lighting up.  As we all know, people who have made a choice to quit smoking often stumble or fail because their seemingly innate need to smoke over powers their free-will.

So we find ourselves in a muddle of different theories and perspectives when it comes to the implications materialism has on free-will.  I have to agree with Searle and Churchland that there simply is not enough scientific evidence to neither confirm nor dispel the notion of free-will from a materialistic standpoint, but let us take stock of the evidence.

            In the beginning of scientific thought, theories about how the brain/mind worked were crude and completely implausible by today’s standards.  For example, Aristotle believed the psyche was completely immaterial and that the purpose of the brain was to cool the blood (Kolb and Whishaw 8). As natural science and philosophy progressed, Descartes believed the brain had behavioral implications plagiarized from the net but that the mind was immaterial.  It is safe to say that Descartes would have not known just how big a role the brain plays in analyzing empirical data and producing behavior (Kolb and Whishaw 8,9).  These highly respected philosophers could not have had any idea of what we know today, and yet they still formed theories as how the brain related to the mind and body.  As a result their theories are widely thought to be implausible accounts of how the brain works by today’s standards.[3] It seems as though contemporary philosophers who try to establish hard and fast theories about the brain/mind and free-will are committing the same fallacy; trying to conclusively define i stole this something we still know very little about. As we move into the 21st century it is reasonable to assume that many great discoveries will be made that will further our understanding of how the brain relates to conscious thought and free-will.  Before that time, however, it is difficult to speculate as to whether or not free-will, or a variation of free-will, is plausible.

            Before setting out to write this paper I had my own ideas about the mind-body problem and the ramifications it has on free-will, and after much research my stance has changed very little.  Although I could not conclusively say, it seems as though every time theorists try to account for something by citing immaterial influences, some discovery is made and they are proven wrong or the plausibility of their position is greatly reduced.  As previously stated, science has made major progress in understanding the internal mechanisms of the brain and how they affect human behavior.  Given that we have come such along way from Aristotle’s blood-cooling hypothesis to a comprehensive (though in no way complete) understanding of cognition, it is reasonable to assume that one day scientists will be able to conclusively demonstrate how we deliberate, come to decisions and then carry out actions based on those decisions.  This sort of hard materialist standpoint intuitively precipitates that humans would have very limited choice over their thoughts and behavior, but it is exactly that intuition that points to the negation of that hypothesis.  It seems we are very much on the fence about whether that intuition is real or simply an illusion.  The fact that I can raise my arm right now for no reason whatsoever, work through this paper rationally, or lay back and take a five minute vacation to Hawaii in my mind spontaneously, supports the thesis that I am an agent, capable of exercising volition and making decisions based on my opinions, values, and beliefs.  These opinions, values, and beliefs are not static, they change as I learn more about the world and the opinions of others surrounding it, yet they are always rationally formed[4] based on the evidence I have been presented with. 

Neural holists and materialistic determinists alike, however, would argue that lifting my arm or taking a mental vacation are simply the result of subtle (or not so subtle) changes in my environment and neurology, and that my thinking I was exercising volition was simply an epiphenomenal byproduct of my brain.  They would argue I exercised no agency and the experience of volition was simply an illusion.

This is a very difficult argument to counter because without hard scientific proof that there is a neurological basis for volition, any argument from empirical knowledge begs the question.  The determinist’s argument at this point trumps the free-will theorist; after all I can’t conclusively prove that my experience of volition is not simply an illusion.  As Searle puts it:

In the old problem of skeptical epistemology, it seems, on the one hand, according to common sense, that we do have certain knowledge of many things in the world, and yet, on the other hand, if we really have such knowledge, we ought to be able to give a decisive answer to the skeptical arguments, such as ‘How do we know we are not dreaming? (Searle, “Free” 491)

Until neuroscience can conclusively prove or dispel the neurological basis of volition, the theorist will have to take their position by weighing the arguments and considering which are most appealing.  But that, like so many things, is entirely subjective.

Works Cited

 

 

Churchland, Patricia Smith. “Feeling Reasons.” Flashfactor SubStrata. 10 Mar. 2004

 http://www.aec.at/fleshfactor/subs/reasons.html.

 

"Dualism" Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia. 2004 http://encarta.msn.com.

 

Kolb, Bryan and Ian Q. Whishaw. An Introduction to Brain and Behavior. New York: Worth

Publishers, 2001.

 

Lefton, Lester A., Michael C. Boyes, Nancy A. Ogden. Psychology. Canadian ed. Toronto,

Canada: Allyn and Bacon Canada, 2000.

 

Levy, Daniel A. “Neural Holism and Free Will” Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003): 205-208.

 

“Materialism” Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia. 2004 http://encarta.msn.com.

 

Morgan, Vance G. “The Metaphysics of Naturalism.” American Catholic Philosophical

Quarterly 75 (2001): 409-431.

 

Searle, John. “Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology.” Philosophy 76 (2001): 491-514.

 

Searle, John. Minds, Brains and Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univeristy Press,

1984.

 


[1] A psychological concept from Pavlov in which an unconditioned stimulus is paired with an unconditioned response to produce a conditioned response from a neutral (after conditioning it becomes the conditioned) stimulus (Lester, Boyes and Ogden 154).

[2] I use this as abroad term to refer to all parts of the human conscious and unconscious.

[3] As a note of integrity, I in no way mean any disrespect towards Descartes and Aristotle.

[4] This is not to say that some people have some beliefs that are irrational.  The point I am trying to make here is that an individual’s opinions and beliefs change as the parameters used to form them change.