דברי הגמרא באותיות כאלה: 12 ROD; הפירוש – רש"י -
באותיות מרים 10; פסוקים – בגופן נרקיסים; הערות העורך בגופן courier
new 10, בסוגריים []; מקראה מלאה בסוף הדף.
כתובות
דף ג
מתוך "גמרא נוֹחָה"
על שם הורי נפתלי וחנה הולנדר
הכ"מ
(כתובות ב,ב)
אלא רבא סברא דנפשיה קאמר: משום צנועות ומשום פרוצות:
משום צנועות: דאי אמרת לא להוי גט
(כתובות ג,א)
זימנין דלא אניסה (והוי גיטא), וסברה דאניס (דלמא אניס ואינו גט ותדאג להינשא), ומיעגנא ויתבה; ומשום פרוצות: דאי
אמרת לא ליהוי גיטא, זימנין דאניס ואמרה: לא אניס, ואזלא ומינסבא (וכשיבא ויאמר נאנסתי נמצא גט בטל ובניה מן
האחרון ממזרים לפיכך אמרו יהא גט) ונמצא גט בטל ובניה ממזרים.
ומי איכא מידי דמדאורייתא לא להוי גט (שמצינו טענת אונס מן התורה שנאמר (דברים כב,כו) 'ולנערה לא תעשה דבר'),
ומשום 'צנועות' ומשום 'פרוצות' שרינן אשת איש לעלמא?
אִין! כל דמקדש (כל המקדש אשה) - אדעתא דרבנן מקדש (על דעת שהנהיגו חכמי ישראל בישראל הוא מקדשה,
שיהיו קיימין קידושין לפי דברי חכמים - ויהיו בטילים לפי דברי חכמים, על ידי גיטין
שהכשירו חכמים), ואפקעינהו רבנן לקידושי מיניה (כשיבא גט כזה אחריהם).
אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי: תינח (למימר אפקעתא) קדיש בכספא (דנימא: גט זה עוקר הקידושין ועושה מעות
מתנה מעיקרן); קדיש בביאה מאי איכא למימר (מאי אפקעתא מעיקרא איכא? בשלמא על ידי גט כשר - אף
על פי שהקידושין קיימים עד עכשיו, גזירת הכתוב היא שהגט כורתו ומתיר איסורו מכאן
ולהבא; אבל זה, שאינו גט מן התורה ואתה מכשירו מפני דעתו של זה שקידשה על דעת
חכמים ושביטלו על פי חכמים - צריך אתה לומר שמעיקרן לא יהו קידושין! ואי קדיש
בביאה ואתה עוקר קידושין למפרע - מה תהא על ביאתו)?
שויוה רבנן (למפרע על ידי גט שהוא מדבריהם) לבעילתו בעילת זנות (ויש בהן כח לעשות כן, שהרי הוא תלה בהן.
שמעתי
כל רבותי מפרשים 'דקדיש בכספא' - דקידושי דרבנן נינהו, ואי אפשר לומר כן: חדא:
דגזירה שוה היא 'קיחה' 'קיחה' משדה עפרון (קידושין ב,א), וכל הלמד מגזירה שוה - כמו שכתוב מפורש הוא לכל
דבר! ועוד: אי דרבנן נינהו - היאך סוקלין על ידו? ומביאין חולין לעזרה על שגגתן?
וסוף סוף כי קא משנינן 'שויוה רבנן לבעילתו בעילת זנות' - על כרחך צריך אתה לפרש
כמו שפירשתי: שהקידושין נעקרין מעיקרן, ולא מכאן ולהבא. והמפרש לומר 'שויוה רבנן
לכל מקדשי בביאה בעילת זנות' - טעות גמור הוא, ובא להתיר אשת איש המתקדשת בביאה
בלא גט מן הטעם הזה! ולא מצינו זאת בהתלמוד)[1].
איכא דאמרי: אמר רבא: 'וכן לענין גיטין' (א'לפיכך' קאי, דטענינן טענת אונס בתנאי
הגט להפקיעו)!
אלמא קסבר רבא יש אונס בגיטין!
מיתיבי [גיטין פ"ז מ"ג]: '"הרי
זה גיטיך אם לא באתי מכאן ועד שנים עשר חדש", ומת בתוך שנים עשר חדש - אינו
גט'; 'מת' - הוא דאינו גט, הא חלה הרי זה גט!
לעולם אימא לך: חלה נמי אינו גט, והיא גופה קא משמע לן:
דאין גט לאחר מיתה.
אין גט לאחר מיתה? הא תנא ליה רישא!
דלמא לאפוקי מדרבותינו.
תא שמע [גיטין פ"ז מ"ח]: '"מעכשיו
אם לא באתי מכאן ועד שנים עשר חדש", ומת בתוך שנים עשר חדש - הרי זה גט'
מאי לאו - הוא הדין לחלה?
לא, מת דוקא; דלא ניחא ליה דתפול קמי יבם.
תא שמע מההוא דאמר להו "אי לא אתינא מכאן ועד שלשים
יום ליהוי גיטא" אתא בסוף תלתין יומין ופסקיה מברא ואמר להו "חזו דאתאי!
חזו דאתאי!" ואמר שמואל: לא שמיה מתיא!
אונסא דשכיח שאני: דכיון דאיבעי ליה לאתנויי ולא אתני -
איהו הוא דאפסיד אנפשיה.
אמר רב שמואל בר יצחק: לא שנו אלא מתקנת עזרא ואילך שאין
בתי דינין קבועין אלא בשני ובחמישי, אבל קודם תקנת עזרא שבתי דינין קבועין בכל יום
(כלומר שקביעות כל הימים שוה) -
אשה נשאת בכל יום.
קודם תקנת עזרא מאי דהוה הוה?
הכי קאמר: אי איכא בתי דינין דקבועין - האידנא - כקודם
תקנת עזרא: אשה נשאת בכל יום.
הא בעינן 'שקדו' (שיהא טורח בסעודה שלשה ימים)?
דטריח ליה (אם טרח לפני השבת, ותיקן צורכי סעודה - כונסה באחד בשבת או בשני בשבת).
(כתובות ג,ב)
מאי 'שקדו' (היכן שנינו 'שקדו' דמקשינן לה הכא? אי משום דאמר שמואל לעיל - לית לן
לאותביה מינה לאמוראה אחרינא)?
דתניא [תוספתא כתובות פ"א מ"א
[ליברמן]]: 'מפני מה אמרו "בתולה נשאת ליום הרביעי"? שאם היה
לו טענת בתולים היה משכים לבית דין;
ותנשא באחד בשבת, ואם היה לו טענת בתולים היה משכים לבית
דין [ביום שני]?
'שקדו חכמים על תקנת בנות ישראל שיהא אדם טורח בסעודה
שלשה ימים: אחד בשבת ושני בשבת ושלישי בשבת, וברביעי כונסה;
ומסכנה ואילך (לקמן מפרש לה) נהגו העם לכנוס בשלישי ולא מיחו בידם
חכמים;
ובשני לא יכנוס (בשביל אותה סכנה, ואין צריך לעקור בשבילה תקנת
חכמים אלא יום אחד, ויהיה טורח מיהת שני ימים בצורכי סעודה);
ואם מחמת האונס (לקמן מפרש) – מותר;
ומפרישין את החתן מן הכלה לילי שבת תחלה (אם ביאה ראשונה היא מפרישין אותה ממנו
לילי שבת)
מפני שהוא עושה חבורה'.
מאי 'סכנה'? אילימא דאמרי בתולה הנשאת ליום הרביעי
תיהרג – 'נהגו' (בתמיה:
סכנת נפשות היא ואת אמרת 'נהגו... לכנוס ביום שלישי' אבל מיעקר רביעי לגמרי
לא עקרו)?
לגמרי ניעקריה (ויתקנו להם
ימים אחרים)!
אמר רבה: דאמרי 'בתולה הנשאת ביום הרביעי תיבעל להגמון
תחלה'[2].
האי 'סכנה'? 'אונס' הוא!
משום דאיכא צנועות דמסרן נפשייהו לקטלא ואתיין לידי סכנה[3].
ולידרוש להו דאונס שרי? (דנבעלת באונס אינה נאסרת על בעלה, דילפינן לקמן
בפרק רביעי (נא,ב) מ'והיא לא נתפשה' [במדבר ה,יג], ולא לימסרו נפשייהו למיתה!)
איכא פרוצות (דאי מקילינן להו - עבדי ברצון, ונאסרות על בעליהן)! ואיכא נמי
כהנות (שנאסרות על בעליהן אף באונס; ואינהו מסרן
נפשייהו למיתה: דאשת כהן שנאנסה אסורה לבעלה, ולקמן בפרק רביעי (שם) ילפינן לה).
וליעקריה (הואיל וזמנין דאיכא סכנה)?
גזירה (של הגויים, או: שמדא)
עבידא דבטלא, ותקנתא דרבנן מקמי גזירה (של הגויים, או: שמדא) לא
עקרינן.
אי הכי בשלישי נמי אתי ובעיל (כיון דידע שהתחילו לנהוג בשלישי)?
מספיקא לא עקר נפשיה (כיון דלאו קביעות גמור הוא על ידי תקנת בית דין -
ספיקא היא לו אם יש נישואין היום בעיר, ולא עקר נפשיה לבא בעיר).[4]
'ובשני לא יכנוס, ואם מחמת האונס מותר':
מאי 'אונס'?: אילימא הא דאמרן - התם קרי ליה
'סכנה' והכא קא קרי ליה 'אונס'? ותו: התם 'נהגו' (משמע רובם נהגו) הכא 'מותר'
(לא גרסינן 'לכתחילה'; והכי קא מתמה: הכא
'מותר' קתני, דמשמע: אם ימלך איש יחידי בבית דין - יתירו לו, אבל 'נהגו' לא קתני)?
אמר רבא: דאמרי שר צבא בא לעיר (ויחטפו צורכי סעודה מאשר ימצאו).
היכי דמי?: אי דאתי וחליף [ויסע מכאן] (לאחר רביעי) - ליעכב (עד יום רביעי של שבת הבא)!
לא, צריכא דאתי וקבע [ואינו
מתכוין לעזוב].
בשלישי מיהא לכנוס (למה נתיר לו לקדום כל כך [ליום
שני], שלא יטריח
בסעודה אלא יום אחד, ומיעקרא תקנתא ד'שקדו')?
אספרווא דידיה (חיל משרתיו המכינים לו צורכי סעודה; בלשון לעז הירניי"ש [חיל אספקה]) - בשלישי
קאתו.
ואיבעית אימא: מאי 'מחמת האונס'? - כדתניא: '(חתן שמת אביו בשני ואין יכול להמתין עד
למחר שצריך להשהות את המת עד שיכנסו לחופה) הרי שהיה פתו אפוי וטבחו טבוח ויינו
מזוג (במים, שיהא
ראוי לשתיה, ושוב אינו מתקיים) ומת אביו של חתן או אמה של כלה (דוקא נקט 'אביו של חתן' שהוא הטורח
בצורכי סעודה ו'אמה של כלה' היא המכינה לה תכשיטין; לפיכך אם יעבור המועד
שוב אין מכין להם) - מכניסין את המת לחדר ואת החתן ואת
הכלה לחופה (והתירו
להם להכניס את המת לחדר שלא יקברוהו: דאם כן חלה אבילות על האבל בסתימת הגולל,
כדלקמן, ושוב לא יוכל לכנוס עד שיעבור האבילות).
(כתובות ד,א)
ובועל בעילת מצוה ופורש (ויקברו את המת מיד דכיון דחלה עליו חתונה הויא
לגביה כרגל ולא אתיא אבילות וחיילא), ונוהג שבעת ימי המשתה, ואחר כך נוהג
שבעת ימי אבילות; וכל אותן הימים (של ימי המשתה ושל אבילות) הוא ישן בין האנשים והיא ישנה בין
הנשים (ואין
מתיחדין זה עם זה שמא יבעול, ואָבל אסור בתשמיש המטה, כדילפינן ב'אלו מגלחין' (מועד קטן טו,ב); ואף בשבעת ימי המשתה שהן כרגל - נוהג
הוא אבילות של דברי צינעא, דהיינו איסור תשמיש, כדלקמן); ואין
מונעין תכשיטין (בשביל
האבילות) מן
הכלה (אין אוסרין
עליה תכשיטיה, שלא תתגנה על בעלה) כל שלשים יום (ואף על פי שהן ימי אבילות לשאר בני אדם;
וכל שכן משלשים ואילך)';
ודוקא אביו של חתן או אמה של כלה, דליכא איניש דטרח להו (אם יפסידו מה שהכינו), אבל איפכא
- לא.
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
כל המוצא
שגיאה – נא להודיע לי בכתובת שנמצאת באתר www.oocities.org/yeshol
דברי הגמרא באותיות כאלה: 12 ROD; רש"י בתוך הגמרא בסוגריים () ובתוך הסוגריים - אותיות 10 MIRIAM; מראי מקומות - 8 MIRIAM
מובאות בגופן NARKISIM; השלמת פסוקי המקרא בסוגריים [] ובאותיות 10 NARKISIM; בתוך דברי רש"י – נרקיסים בגודל 9
הערות: בסוגריים [] באותיות CourierNew, בגוף הגמרא בגודל 10, בתוך
דברי רש"י – בגודל 8; ההערות עם קידומת ## אינם פשט הגמרא אלא הערת העורך
הטעונה בדיקת הלומד.
הגירסא: לפי דפוס וילנא עם אחדים
מההגהות שעל הדף – לפי הנראה לי כנחוץ לצורך הפשט הפשוט.
הערות בשולי הדף – בתצוגת דף אינטרנט אפשר – באקספלורר –
להניח עליהם את הסמן ואז מופיעה ההערה בחלון. אפשר גם לראות כאשר עוברים לתצוגה של
דף הדפסה.
In Explorer, Footnotes become visible when
the cursor rests on the number of the footnote.
Alternatively: in the File menu, there is an
Edit option to edit the page with your word processor.
הערות
וטבלאות באנגלית – ע"י כולל עיון הדף, ראש הכולל הרב מרדכי קורנפלד –
Producers of the Dafyomi Advancement Forum,
mailto:daf@dafyomi.co.il, http://www.dafyomi.co.il/
This material is ©2007 by Julius
Hollander 27 Bialik St., Petah Tikva, Israel 49351
Permission to distribute this material,
with this notice, is granted - with request to notify of use at the email
address on www.oocities.org/yeshol
[1] THE
RABANAN'S AUTHORITY TO UPROOT A MARRIAGE
QUESTIONS: The Gemara states that in certain situations, the Rabanan – in order
to end a marriage -- uproot the Kidushin so that the marriage will no longer
exist. The situation discussed in our Gemara is when a person gives a Get to
his wife on condition that he does not return, and then circumstances beyond
his control prevent him from returning. Even though the Get is not a valid Get
mid'Oraisa (since a fulfillment of a condition against one's will is not
considered as though one fulfilled the condition), the Rabanan instituted that
the Get does take effect (for the reasons that the Gemara describes). How can
the Rabanan make the Get valid when, mid'Oraisa, it is not valid? The Gemara
explains that the Rabanan make the Get effective by implementing their
authority to uproot the Kidushin (retroactively), "Afke'inhu Rabanan
l'Kidushei Minei."
Another example of a situation in which the Rabanan remove the Kidushin is when
a man sends a Get to his wife and then annuls the Get after the Shali'ach has
departed, without informing the Shali'ach of the annulment.
Although the Get is not valid when the Shali'ach gives it to the woman, the
Rabanan make it take effect by uprooting the Kidushin.
How does this mechanism of uprooting the Get work? When the Rabanan uproot the
Kidushin, is it considered as though the couple were never married? If so, it
should be possible to remove the status of a Mamzer in a situation
where a married woman committed adultery or was raped and had a child from the
union; although the child is a Mamzer, it should be possible to make the child
legitimate by having the Kidushin uprooted retroactively (such as by sending
her a Get with a Shali'ach and then annulling the Get)! Similarly, a man could
save his wife from being punished with Misah, where she committed adultery, in
this manner as well!
In addition, the PNEI YEHOSHUA points out that if the Rabanan uproot the
Kidushin retroactively, then if the brother of the husband later marries the
woman (who is Asur to him as "Eshes Achiv"), the Kidushin should take
effect mid'Oraisa (and she should require a Get if she wants to leave him)
since she is not his "Eshes Ach!" Is that indeed the Halachah?
Another question is that if the Rabanan are able to remove Kidushin in such a
manner, then why do they not use it in a broader context -- such as to permit
Agunos to remarry? For example, in a case where a husband drowns in
the sea ("Mayim sh'Ein Lahem Sof") and there is no positive testimony
that he is dead, the Halachah is that his wife may never remarry. The Rabanan
should permit her to remarry by exercising their authority to uproot the
Kidushin!
ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS in Gitin (33a) says that it is true that where the Rabanan
uproot the Kidushin, a child who is a Mamzer due to the Kidushin becomes
legitimate, and the woman becomes exempt from punishment for committing
adultery (and, presumably, if she marries the brother of her husband, the
Kidushin with him will take effect). However, a person cannot take advantage of
this right of the Rabanan in order to intentionally correct the status of a
Mamzer. In such a case -- where a man intentionally sends a Get to his wife
with a Shali'ach and then annuls the Get in order to save his wife from
punishment or to make his wife's illegitimate children legitimate – the Rabanan
do *not* uproot the Kidushin. They only uproot the Kidushin when a man annuls
the Get innocently, with no ulterior motives.
As for why the Rabanan do not exercise their authority to uproot Kidushin in
order to permit Agunos to remarry, the RAMBAN and RASHBA explain that the
Rabanan exercise this power only where there was some form of Get that was
already given. Even though the Get itself is not valid, the Rabanan uproot the
Kidushin based on the giving of the Get.
This also seems to be the intention of RASHI here who repeatedly writes that
the Rabanan uproot the Kidushin "when a Get is given." (Rashi in
Shabbos (155b) writes that the reason the Rabanan permitted a woman to remarry
based on the testimony of a single witness is because of the principle of
"Afke'inhu." Here, Rashi explains why the Rabanan do not apply
"Afke'inhu" to permit Agunos in other situations. Rashi is explaining
that in the case of a single witness who testifies that the husband died, there
is at least some sort of testimony that he died, and thus there is a foothold
for the Rabanan to uproot the Kidushin. According to Rashi, wherever there is
some form of Get or some form of testimony of death, the Rabanan can apply
"Afke'inhu.")
(b) The RAMBAN and RE'AH write that although the Rabanan uprooted the Kidushin
d'Oraisa, they nevertheless established in its place a Kidushin d'Rabanan.
Therefore, the child born to the woman from another man will
still be a Mamzer d'Rabanan, and the relatives of the husband will be
prohibited to the woman mid'Rabanan. Similarly, she will be prohibited
mid'Rabanan to marry a Kohen.
(c) The Rishonim here (RAMBAN, RASHBA) and in Gitin quote the RASHBAM (see also
PNEI YEHOSHUA here) who suggests that when a condition of the Get is fulfilled
against the husband's will, and when a husband annlus a Get after having sent
it with a Shali'ach, the Kidushin is not uprooted retroactively,
but rather it is uprooted from now on, "mi'Kan ul'Haba." (See also
SHITAH MEKUBETZES who quotes the Rashbam as found in a marginal note in a
manuscript of Rashi's commentary.)
The Rashbam explains that the Gemara means that the Rabanan have the right to
uproot the Kidushin retroactively, and if they do so, all of the Be'ilos
retroactively become Be'ilos of Z'nus. Since nobody wants his Be'ilos to become
Be'ilos Z'nus, when he gives a Get with a condition, he has in mind that even
if the condition is fulfilled later against his will, he still wants the Get to
be valid. Similarly, when a man annuls a Get, since he
knows that the Rabanan will make his Be'ilos into Be'ilos Z'nus if the Get is
annulled, he does not really want to annul the Get.
The Ramban asks that according to this, in a case where a woman is only
betrothed (with Erusin), and her husband gives her a Get on condition or annuls
a Get that he sent with a Shali'ach, the Kidushin *should* be
uprooted retroactively, since the man has not had relations with his wife and
thus has no fear that his Be'ilos will be made into Be'ilos Z'nus! The Ramban
answers that even though there was no Be'ilah, the husband has in
mind that the Get should take effect even if the condition is fulfilled b'Ones,
because he knows that if he does not want it to work, it will not gain anything
for him (since the Kidushin will still be uprooted against his will).
Therefore, he intends for the Get to take effect no matter what.
(d) RASHI cites a fourth explanation in the name of "all of my
teachers."
This explanation is actually found in PERUSH RABEINU GERSHOM in Bava Basra
(48b). He explains that all Kidushin nowadays is only mid'Rabanan in any case,
and that is why the Rabanan are able to uproot it from now on. Rabeinu Gershom
asserts that Kidushei Kesef (and Kidushei Shtar) are mid'Rabanan, while
Kidushei Bi'ah -- which is mid'Oraisa -- cannot make a Kidushin d'Oraisa
nowadays since the Rabanan prohibited being Mekadesh a woman with Bi'ah
(Kidushin 12b). The Rabanan went further and said that since everyone is
"Mekadesh Al Da'as d'Rabanan," all Kidushei Bi'ah does not work
mid'Oraisa nowadays (and it only makes a Kidushin d'Rabanan).
(Once the Rabanan instituted that one can be Mekadesh a woman with Kidushei
Kesef, it became a an act of effrontery to be Mekadesh a woman with Bi'ah.
Therefore, when the Rabanan instituted Kidushei Kesef, they also instituted
that a person may not be Mekadesh with Bi'ah and they annulled that form of
Kidushin, based on the premise that when a person gets married, he does so
according to the will of the Rabanan.)
Rashi and the other Rishonim ask strong questions on the explanation of Rabeinu
Gershom.
1. First, how can he say that Kidushei Kesef (and Kidushei Shtar) are
mid'Rabanan, when Kidushei Kesef is derived from a Gezeirah Shavah (Kidushin
2a) and is thus clearly d'Oraisa?
Apparently, Rabeinu Gershom learns that this Gezeirah Shavah is not an actual
Gezeirah Shavah mid'Oraisa, but is only an Asmachta. (The same applies to
Kidushei Shtar, which is learned by comparing it to a Get (Kidushin 9b).
Rabeinu Gershom understands that comparison to be only an Asmachta.)
2. Second, Rashi asks that we know that a Ne'arah Me'urasah is defined as a
woman who was assumed to be a Besulah at the time of the Nesu'in, but was found
to have had relations with another man while she was an Arusah. The Torah
punishes such a woman with Sekilah. How can the Torah consider her to be a
Besulah at the time of Nesu'in if, mid'Oraisa, there is no such thing as
Kidushei Kesef or Kidushei Shtar? The only way she could have become an Arusah,
mid'Oraisa, is through Kidushei Bi'ah, and thus it is not possible for there to
be a case of Ne'arah Me'urasah!
Rabeinu Gershom apparently was not bothered by this question, because we could
say that the Kidushin was done with a Bi'ah *she'Lo k'Darkah*. Such a Bi'ah
serves to make the woman an Arusah, but it does not make her a Be'ulah and she
remains a Besulah. (See in full the Gemara in Kidushin 9b. Even though the
Gemara there rejects this possibility, perhaps Rabeinu Gershom understands that
the Sugyos are arguing.)
3. Third, Rashi asks that according to Rabeinu Gershom, a woman who gets
married with Kidushei Bi'ah should be permitted to leave her husband without a
Get. Rabeinu Gershom apparently learned that although the Rabanan removed the
Kidushin d'Oraisa, they did substitute in its place a Kidushin d'Rabanan which
does requires a Get.
Kesuvos 003: Retroactive release אפקיעו רבנן קידושין
Rabbi David Willig <rabbidw@cs.com>
asked:
Rava says ein ones b'gittin. this i
understand to mean that the get is
valid as a get despite the oness. rava
is saying that in the absence of
any evidence of a d'oraisa positon
one way or the other, the rabbanan,
in the interest of judicial certainty
(tznuos u'prutzos) will rule the get
valid at the time the t'nai expires.
kol mekadesh al d'aatah d'rabbanan mekadesh
means the parties accept this position
and afkinon rabbanan l'kidushei minei
refers to now, not retroactively. what
does b'eilas znus have to do with
anything?
no one is changing the
status l'mafreia?
David Willig, Perth Amboy NJ, USA
-----------------------------------------------
The Kollel replies:
As I understand it, you are asking why the Gemara assumes that the only
way for the Rabanan to remove
Kidushin is retroactive. Why can "Kol d'Mekadesh" not be applied to
remove it from here on? An exellent question.
I see only two ways for "Kol d'Mekadesh..." to possibly remove
Kidushin from here on (and not retroactively):
(1) By having every person make their Kidushin, from the start, in such a way
that it should "expire" as soon as the Rabbanan want it to.
I don't think this can be done. Kidushin doesn't just expire; it needs a Get to
end it (Nedarim 29a).
(2) The other, more serious, suggestion is that just as Kidushin is enacted
according to the wishes of the Rabanan, so too Gerushin. (This is not only
logically sound, it is actually the truth, according to Teshuvos Rashba cited
by the Gilyon ha'Shas and a few other Rishonim.) If so, when a person gives a
Get, let us assume he wants it to take effect as the Rabanan wish. Therefore,
even if the Get does not work mid'Oraisa (because the Tenai was fulfilled
b'Ones), the Rabanan can make it work, and end the Kidushin from here on
through "Kol d'Megaresh..." Why doesn't the Gemara accept this
possibility?
The answer is that the Gemara never applies Kol d'Mekadesh (or d'Megaresh) to
*effect* a Kinyan. The clause only allows the Rabanan to *annul* a Kidushin or
Gerushin that was made. They cannot effect Gerushin with that principle, they
can only retroactively annul the Kidushin through that application of that
principle in order to release the wife from her husband. (Kol d'Mekadesh is
just a *clause* in a Kinyan, not a Kinyan in its own right.)
Be well, Mordecai Kornfeld
[2] HALACHAH: THE "BI'AH" OF A
NOCHRI ביאת נכרי
OPINIONS: During a era when the wicked regime instituted
that every Jewish Besulah was to be defiled by the local governor before her
wedding, people started getting married on Tuesday to avoid the decree (since
the officials knew that the Chachamim had instituted that a Besulah get married
only on Wednesday). The Gemara says that those who are defiled by the governor
are nevertheless permitted to live with their husbands afterwards (because the
act was one of Ones), except for the wives of Kohanim, who become Asur to their
husbands even when raped.
It is clear from the Gemara that if a woman lived with the Nochri governor
willfully, she will would *not* be permitted to her husband. What is the
Halachah if a married, Jewish woman is Mezanah with a Nochri? Does she
become prohibited to her husband, and to the one with whom she was Mezaneh (if,
for instance, he later converts to Judaism)? The Rishonim discuss this question
at length.
(a) RABEINU TAM (cited by TOSFOS DH v'Lidrosh) writes that the Bi'ah of a
Nochri is like that of a Behemah. Therefore, a woman is not Chayav Misah if she
willingly lives with a Nochri while she is an Eshes Ish. This is also the
opinion of the BA'AL HA'ME'OR and the MILCHAMOS in Sanhedrin (74b).
However, the reason they give for exempting her from Misah is that the Torah
says that only a man who commits adultery with "Eshes Re'ehu"
("the wife of one's *fellow* man") is Chayav Misah, and when a Nochri
commits adultery with a Jewish man's wife, she is not called "Eshes
Re'ehu."
Rabeinu Tam adds that for the same reason, if the Nochri later converts, he is
permitted to marry the woman with whom he lived, even though normally a woman
who commits adultery is prohibited both to her husband and to the adulterer. In
this case, the Nochri, after converting, may marry her, because his Bi'ah with
her was like the Bi'ah of a Behemah which is not the type of Bi'ah that can
make him Asur to her, and thus when he converts he
may marry her.
The RIVAM (cited in Tosfos, ibid.) understands that Rabeinu Tam means to permit
not only the Nochri to the wife, but even the husband is permitted to his wife
after she was Mezanah with a Nochri. However, he strongly opposes this ruling
based on our Gemara that implies that if the woman lived with the Nochri
willingly, she becomes Asur to her husband.
(We might also ask that if Rabeinu Tam mean to say that Z'nus with a Nochri
does not prohibit the woman to her husband or to the adulterer, the woman
should also be permitted to her husband if he is a Kohen. Yet our Gemara
says that she is prohibited to her husband if he is a Kohen! However, we could
answer this question by saying that the prohibition to a Kohen is not because
of Tum'ah, that she was defiled, which is the reason for her
prohibition to her husband and to the adulterer. Rather it is because of the
Isur of "Zonah." This Sugya holds that even Bi'ah b'Ones makes a
woman a Zonah (see Yevamos 56b and 59b).)
It is possible, though, that Rabeinu Tam had a different intention. Rabeinu Tam
means only that the woman is permitted to the adulterer, but *not* to her
husband nor to a Kohen, as the SHITAH MEKUBETZES (DH v'Ivra) writes. The logic
behind this distinction is that since the Nochri's Bi'ah is not the same as
that of a Jew because of the element of "Zirmas Susim Zirmasam," the
woman is not Chayav Misah for such a Bi'ah. For the same reason, the adulterer
is not prohibited to the woman, because his Bi'ah was not the type of Bi'ah
which the Torah punishes with Misah, and we do not find that such a Bi'ah could
make her Asur to the adulterer.
She *is* Asur to her husband, though, because she was not faithful to him, and
the Torah says that if a woman is unfaithful to her husband she becomes Asur to
him; it makes no difference whether she was unfaithful to him with a Nochri or
with a Jew. In short, the Isur to her husband depends on her being unfaithful,
while the Isur to the adulterer depends on the Bi'ah being considered a normal
Bi'ah. (See MISHNEH L'MELECH, Hilchos Yibum 6:19, who discusses the extent to
which we compare the woman's status to her husband with her status to the
adulterer.)
In fact, this is exactly the opinion of RABEINU YECHIEL (cited by the RITVA
here and by the MORDECHAI in Sanhedrin #720). Rabeinu Yechiel says that if a
Nochri lives with a Jewish Eshes Ish, he is permitted to marry her after he
converts, since he was permitted to her at the time he had relations with her
(since he was a Nochri), and when he converted he became like a "Katan
sh'Nolad." This implies that if he had been Asur to her while he was a
Nochri, the Isur would *not* have been revoked because of "Ger sh'Nisgayer
k'Katan sh'Nolad Dami."
Accordingly, Rabeinu Tam is giving the reason why the Isur does not apply to
the Nochri while he is a Nochri, and Rabeinu Yechiel is adding why the Isur
does not apply to him when he converts. Indeed, the CHASAM SOFER and TOSFOS YOM
HA'KIPURIM (Yoma 82b) explain that Rabeinu Tam means to say the same as
Rabeinu Yechiel.
(b) The ROSH (1:4, and in TOFOS HA'ROSH) also rules that when a woman is
Mezanah with a Nochri and then he converts, she is permitted to marry him, like
Rabeinu Tam says, but for a different reason than that of Rabeinu Tam. He asserts that we only prohibit a
woman to her adulterer if she was permitted to him before the Z'nus. Since she
is prohibited to marry a Nochri even before the Z'nus, the Torah does not
prohibit her to him when she was Mezanah with him, and even when he converts
she is permitted to him.
The TERUMAS HA'DESHEN (#29) discusses what the Rosh would hold if a woman was
Mezanah with the husband of her sister, and then her sister later died.
Following the logic of the Rosh, she should be permitted to the adulterer,
because at the time of the Z'nus, she was prohibited to him (because of
"Achos Ishto").
The Terumas ha'Deshen concludes that even the Rosh permits her only to a
Nochri, because a Nochri is *always* Asur to the woman. If he converts, he is
not the same person anymore because he is like a "Katan sh'Nolad."
Therefore the Isur to the adulterer will not apply when the Nochri converts. In
contrast, the husband of her sister is only prohibited to her as long as her
sister is alive. Therefore, when she commits adultery with him, the Isur
to marry her adulterer will apply.
(c) The RIVAM rejects Rabeinu Tam's argument entirely. He rules that the woman
*is* prohibited to the Nochri with whom she committed adultery.
HALACHAH: The SHULCHAN ARUCH (EH 178:19) rules like Rabeinu Yechiel and the
Terumas ha'Deshen, that the woman is permitted to the Nochri when he converts,
but she is not permitted to the husband of her sister after her sister dies.
[3] UPROOTING A
"TAKANAH D'RABANAN" IN THE FACE OF DANGER
QUESTION: The Gemara says that if a wicked regime were to institute that anyone
who marries a Besulah on Wednesday is to be killed, the Rabanan would uproot
the Takanah d'Rabanan and would not require a Besulah to get married on
Wednesday.
However, later the Gemara says that if the wicked regime decrees that any
Besulah who gets married on Wednesday must live with the governor first, then
even though there is a concern that some women, the Tzenu'os, might give up
their lives, the Rabanan do not uproot the Takanah of getting married on
Wednesday, because "evil decrees are wont to be retracted, and we do not
uproot a Takanah d'Rabanan because of an evil decree which will
eventually be retracted."
If so, why are the Rabanan prepared to uproot their Takanah if the regime
decrees that whoever gets married on Wednesday will be killed? That, too, is an
evil decree that will eventually pass!
ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS (DH Takanah) explains that if the governor makes a decree to kill
anyone who gets married on Wednesday, then the Rabanan would not have to uproot
their Takanah, because they could institute a different day for getting married
instead of Wednesday. Such a change would satisfy the governor, since he would
be content with the knowledge that he was able to cause a change in the
Halachah of the Jews. Since his intention in making such a decree was clearly
to prevent the Jews from observing the Halachah, it will not bother him if he
finds that everyone is getting married on another day.
However, when the governor wants to live with every Besulah who gets
married on Wednesday, he is obviously interested in personal pleasure and not
in abolishing the Jews' Halachah. (This also explains why there is no
requirement "to be killed and not to transgress," in this case, even
though the Halachah is that when a Nochri tries to make us change any religious
practice with the express intention to abolish the Jewish faith, there is a
requirement "to be killed and not to transgress.") If the Rabanan
were to institute that Besulos should get married on Tuesday, the governor
would just change his evil decree to take all the woman who get married on
Tuesday. Therefore, the Rabanan would have to avoid instituting a new day for
getting married and abolish the Takanah of getting married on a specific day.
Since they do not abolish any Takanah because of an evil decree, the Takanah
remains.
This appears to be the intention of Rashi as well (DH v'Ne'akrei).
(b) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES explains that if the evil decree was to *kill* people
who get married on Wednesday, then the Rabanan would certainly have annulled
their enactment in order to save lives. But if the decree was only that the
Besulos must be defiled by the governor -- and there was no definite danger to
lives but only a *possible* danger that a modest woman might give up her life
in order to avoid living with the governor – the Rabanan would not have
annulled their enactment, since there is a possibility that *no* lives will be
lost by the time that the evil decree is revoked. (See also PNEI YEHOSHUA.)
(c) The RITVA answers that in the case where the decree was that each Besulah
must be defiled by the governor, the Rabanan did not uproot the decree, because
the only concern is that some women will give up their lives
Lifnim mi'Shuras ha'Din, beyond the letter of the law. For such a concern, the
Rabanan do not abolish an enactment. If, however, there would be a concern that
a person would have to give up his life according to the letter of the law,
then the Rabanan would certainly abolish their enactment.
As the SHITAH MEKUBETZES here points out, it seems that the Ritva is following
his opinion elsewhere (19a), where he writes that for any Mitzvah for which a
person is not required to give up his life, it is *prohibited* for him to give
up his life. (This is also the ruling of the RAMBAM in Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah
5:4.) Accordingly, , the Rabanan did not find it necessary to abolish the
Takanah because of women who are acting improperly by giving up their lives
when they are not supposed to do so (and it is prohibited to do so). This is
the "Lifnim mi'Shuras ha'Din" to which the Ritva is referring -- an
erring act, not a laudable one.
[4] Kesuvos 003:
Marriage of a Besulah b'She'as ha'Sakanah
Aaron Kaplan <fubar17@aol.com>
asked:
On 3b we ask why we dont teach the "tzneuot" that "ones" is
ok so it wont be a "sacana", and then AFTER we answer that
possibilty(because of "prutzot"...) we say why not just get rid of
the "takana".
This seems to imply that it would be better to have her
have "biah" with the "hegmon" then get rid of the
"takana"?!
(I think she’d be a lot happier with a smaller wedding and no
"hegmon" involved)
Aaron Kaplan, Chicago, Il
Reuven Miller <millerr@mail.biu.ac.il>
asked:
Chazal did not want to uproot their takana because of the hegmon. Instead the
gemarra tells us that the custom (nahagu ha-am) became not observe the
takana and Chazal did not "protest".
My question : What would beis din say to a couple that came to ask:
Should we
observe the takanna ansd marry Wed night even though the hagmon would
take the kallah or should we go against the takana and marry Monday night
thereby avoiding the hamon?
Reuven Miller Jerusalem, Israel
--------------------------------
The fact that Chazal did not repeal the Takanah and even ruled for those who
asked that the Takanah was still operational, is not to say that they preferred
a Bi'ah to the Hegmon over a Nisuin on a day other than Wednesday.
However, the Takanah is in effect until repealed and there must be a Halachic
reason to repeal the Takanah. Since, in actuality, even if the unfortunate
happened, and the bride was taken to the Hegmon involuntarily she remains Mutar
to her husband, Chazal did not find it neccessary to repeal a pre-existing
Takanah due to a temporary unfortunate state. It is safe to assume that had
the Sakanah existed prior to the Takanah, Chazal would never had made the
Takanah.
The important thing to note is that the Takanos of Chazal were not mere
suggestions, but rather Halachah Pesukah, and were not easily repealed. Just as
there were binding rules on how to enact a Takanah there were strict rules how
and when to repeal them, and as long as they were in force Chazal were bound to
them. However, unlike a Din Torah, Chazal was able to overlook them on an
individual basis, in certain cases such as here where it was unlikely that the
people could abide. Dov Zupnik
---
Just to add a short note to Rav Zupnick's excellent answer, Rashi (DH Hasem
Nahagu and DH Hacha) and Tosfos (DH v'Su) discuss what Beis Din would tell her
if she asked l'Chatchilah what to do. Rashi clearly rules that they would tell
her to marry on a different day.
Even though Tosfos says that Beis Din will not tell her to marry a different
day, he only means that *as a Beis Din* they would not tell her that, since
they could not present such a ruling. However, the Dayan can certainly take her
aside, out of court, and give her some "practical advice", that
"nowadays, people are marrying on days other than Wednesday -- maybe you
should follow their lead." (That is what Chazal call "Nahagu,"
an action that
is condoned by the Rabanan and they do not try to stop it, although they cannot
rule that way as a court for the reasons Rav Zupnick gave.)