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| An Anti-introductionistic Philosophy |
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| Author: Ove Møbjerg Kristensen |
| E-mail: ovemk@post.tele.dk |
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| Anti-introductionism. This is a presentation of my philosophical anti-realism concerning physical entities, so-called not-observable entities or unobservable entities, and time. It has been inspired by George Berkeley's philosophy and Michael Dummett's philosophy. The result is a hic-et-nunc anti-realism. It focuses on what we have to assume and what we do not have to assume. Thus we can consistently assert that only our depening situation and its content exist. Moreover, it is fundamentally impossible to introduce literal existence of new types of entities. The question is what entities can be claimed to be in the world, and not least, in what way these entities are in the world, that is, what at most can be put into different propositions about existence. It is argued that to a number of propositions about existence we cannot attribute as much as the realists do. This is why this philosophy is called "anti-introductionism". The mentioned propositions about existence are about time (the past, the future, and especially the present time), physical entities, other people's consciousness, the concept of cause, and not-observable objects (e.g. electrons and subconsciousness). The argumentation for these idaes involves a clarification of the meaning of propositions about these entities, e.g. the character of the now. |
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| Part V. Summary. This text argues that a number of supposed words are semantically empty as no semantic meaning can be attributed to them. Because of this, their occurrence in a sentence makes the sentence in question semantically meaningless. For that reason, the semantic emptiness of words is a stronger concept than proof transcendence. Inter alia, this applies to the religious’ putative concept of a so-called good and the realists’ extraordinary concept of an external world. As it is a fundamental subject, the critique of the concept of useful assumption in scientific realism is deepened. Instances of literal interpretations of scientific theories are discussed. Moreover, examples of literal ideas of existence and absence in grammar are criticized. These are related to the concept of not-observable entities in natural science. After that, occurrences of semantically meaningless statements about existence and non-existence are examined A lexical account of phenomenalism, the problem of reality, and solipsism is criticized, which makes a starting point of a discussion of the problems in their own right. This criticism occasions a substantiation of the idea that philosophy can be practised in a scientific way in the sense that specific demands can be made on philosophical arguments. Considerations concerning the absurdity of the concept of velocity of time, which has lead to the anti-introductionistic philosophy of time, are presented. As Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science touches the realism debate as regards the realistically influenced idea of a finite truth about the world, and the question whether Newton’s physics is a special case of that of Einstein’s at small velocities, these ideas are discussed. Kuhn’s literally worded assertion that scientists relate to a new world after a paradigm change is also discussed. This occasions a thoroughgoing clarification of the relation between science and the world. Finally, it is argued that religious statements only borrow an appearance of semantic meaning from sentences they resemble, and that in fact they are semantically empty. This result is a by-product of anti-introductionism. In Part V the following subjects are discussed. 1. Introduction. The philosophical basis of our thought. 2. The concept of useful assumption in the realism debate. 3. Literal interpretations of scientific theories. Wrong use of terms of so-called not-observable entities. Why pointillism rests on a misunderstanding. Documentation of not-observable entities. 4. So-called null-elements in grammar. Null-elements in morphology. A computer-scientific and morphologic example. The absurdity of the concept of null-morph. Lacking literal meaning versus contra-intuitivity. Null-elements in syntax. Related problems. Analogous examples. The relationship to natural science. 5. Wrong use of the concept of ellipsis in grammar. Examples. 6. Semantic senselessness – semantic emptiness. The external world. The religious’ putative entities. Not-observable entities in science. Gravitational fields. Elementary particles. Material objects. 7. Critique of an account of phenomenalism, the problem of reality, and solipsism. Phenomenalism. The problem of the external world. A critique of the concepts and the problem description. A critique of the approach. Objects. Solipsism. The realist’s conception of anti-realism. 8.Philosophy as science. 9. The velocity of time. 10. Science and reality. The idea of a final scientific truth about the world. The concept of a final grammar. Conclusion about grammar and natural science. Is Newton’s physic a special case of Einstein’s theory of relativity at small velocities? Kuhn’s answer. Do scientists relate to different worlds before and after a paradigm change? 11. The relation between science and the world, especially the past. Theories and matter. Theories and the past. Theories and the world. 12. Semantic critique of religious sequences of signs. Sociological versus semantic critique of religion. Exactness and prolixity. The sign sequence “god” versus statements about realities. Consequences of the semantic critique. Treatise Part V. |
| The main task of philosophy.
According to my understanding it is the main task of philosophy to clarify 1) what it means to be a human being, 2) what the world is, 3) what it means to be a human being in the world, and 4) whether this is possibly one and the same question. The answer to thesequestions is the source of the answer to fundamental ethical and political questions. |
| My articles about these questions make up a treatise in five parts: Treatise Part I. Treatise Part II. Treatise Part III. Treatise Part IV. Treatise Part V. |
| Part I. Summary. The mentioned hic-et-nunc anti-realism is accounted for. This philosophy is based on considerations concerning what we can restrict ourselves to assuming. According to these, we can consistently assert that the only thing that exists is our deepening situation and its content. Taking this as our point of departure, we can structure and clarify our situation in the world. Among other things, this will be illustrated with an account of what we at most have to put into the concept of body. It also involves the consideration of an ethical argument against this hic-et-nunc philosophy and its consequences for an anti-realist conception of the reality of other people's consciousness. In Part I the following subjects are discussed: The aim of the treatise. Our existence in the world. The idea of minimal suppositions. A metaphysical world picture. Our here and now situation. Three different views of the notion physical object The idea of proceeding to the very matter. Our ordinary language. Our cognitive situation. Our deepening existence. The external world. The physical world. Theories and theoretical entities. Our body. The philosophy of time. The past. The future. Present time. Fictions and other people's consciousness. Fictions and time. Extracts from Part I: Time. We may consistently assert that only the here-situation exists. We do not need to assume that what we call past situations is former present time, but only that these past situations are recollected situations or useful fictions. Moreover, the fact that they are recollected only means that they are memory impressions, that is, a certain sort of impressions that have been named in this misleading way. The fact that they are moments or situations just means that they have the same structure as the here-situation. The following counterargument may be adduced: "You are able to do something now, which you allow to be real, for instance to put a fresh point to your pencil, and in a moment you may be able to recollect that you pointed your pencil. In consequence, your recollection has to refer to something real." However, this may be refuted. Certainly, we are able to perform different kinds of actions now, such as the pointing of a pencil, but this does not imply any existence of a future memory of the pointing of the pencil now. For a proposition about this would be both the claim that the future exists now or will exist in the future and (with that) the claim that the concept about future is valid. Thus, it would presume what has to be proved, namely the existence and validity of the future, because this is just what I assert that we do not need to assume. Another counterargument is, "You have just asserted some of your arguments in the discussion which we are carrying on now. Is this adducing of arguments only recollections (yours and mine)?" However, this argument is only appealing. Against that, I am only able to remark that it may seem difficult to understand, but it does not force us to assert that the past is deceased present time. Neither is it necessary to assert that something exists besides the here-situation containing our sensations, memories, and thoughts. Treatise Part I. |
| Part II. Summary. Part II contains an account of our cognitive situation. It is argued that in principle it is impossible to assert the existence of fundamentally new types of entities. For that reason, we have to understand the world by means of a top down model, which steadily interprets the phenomena, as opposed to a bottom up model, which starts from an assumed not-observable basis. A given structure from which the phenomena emerge does not exist. Therefore, scientific values are qualities of the object and the experimental arrangement The difference between realism and anti-realism is not primarily a question of existence, but of our organizing the world - and of the direction of the explanation structure. Thus, the difference is a question of what sort of world we live in. In Part II the following subjects are discussed: The chief aims of philosophy. Three different views of the idea of physical object: A. Common sense. B. Phenomenalism. C. Cognitive antirealism. Top down and bottom up explanations. An example. The facticity of cognitive anti-realism. The concept of energy. Solipsism / other minds. Different views of the problem. My experience and that of the other person. Further clarification of the problem of solipsism. Time. Differences between past and future. The basis of scientific explanations. Cause and effect. Extracts from Part II: Top down and bottom up explanations: We may distinguish between two conflicting ideas of what it means to explain. In regard to structure, our explanations may be structurally described as being in accordance with either a top down model of our knowledge, in which our experiences are placed in the top as the primary part, or a bottom up model of our knowledge, in which the basis or the matter is at the bottom as the primary part. These two models may be said to be interpretations of anti-realism and realism respectively: According to the top down model of knowledge the phenomena - plus our memories, thoughts and feelings - are the fundamentally real entities. The phenomena, among which are both sense impressions and their behaviour, form the basis of our whole understanding of reality, as we describe observed connections on a superior level by application of concepts of objects and their qualities and behaviour, such as "table", "green" and " tilting". Based upon the regularities of our sense impressions (as the same systematism is retrieved at more sensations) science forms further helping concepts, such as "atom" and "magnetic field", as these concepts can be used to describe of the regularities. By this, we extend our knowledge to a still broader and deeper tree structure - of which some branches may be grown together. According to the bottom up model of knowledge our sense impressions (understood as something that is created in us and conditioned by our sense faculty) is something that we aim to explain. This explanation takes as its point of departure a foundation, viz. a physical matter, as it is asserted that our sense impressions are both caused and passed on by means of that kind of thing. However, a foundation must have qualities based upon which other qualities may be explained, but it also has to be explained itself (eventually). So this realist foundation is deliberately based upon a foundation that constantly may be exchanged. Whether a last foundation exists, is naturally an essential question to this model. What are only usable help concepts in the top down model are elevated to an existing foundation in the bottom up model. To reach this foundation, the proponents of the bottom up model apply the same principles of observation as the those of the top down model, but stop when they have got down to a level where they consider their most lately established helping concepts to be a foundation; and after this outwards going tour as regards explanation they make a backwards going tour from this foundation to reach their aim with regard to explanation. Thus, it is first at this stage that they work bottom up though this approach is their stated basic principle. --- Solipsism / other minds: My being able to understand another human being's utterances and having impressions of the existence of its consciousness is identical to my knowledge that in this way it is an existence who relates to the same world as the one which I relate to. This fundamental knowledge is sufficient to make it meaningful for me to say "you" and with that to express myself by means of more than first person singular. I am not justified in asserting that another human being is like me, that it has a consciousness with a content just like my consciousness. This lack of my understanding is simply a fundamental fact, but as substantiated above, it does not mean that I am only a human being who only pretends to communicate with some sense impressions. The question is whether it is correct to talk about "a lack" at all. Knowledge of another person's consciousness is not knowledge of something veiled or not-observable that manifests itself: it is knowledge of the fact that the other human being and I are in the same world. The question is whether what I have described as my impression of existence of consciousness can be explained on the basis of my being able to communicate with another human being about my experiences in a way that works, and based on the fact that I sense a certain community - or whether it simply is an impression of truth. It is my view that in this situation I have an impression, which I am able to deepen by involving the two first mentioned aspects, viz. the communication and the community. --- The basis of scientific explanations: The idea of the existence of definite lengths presupposes too much. This is said independently of theories of relativity and theories about uncertainty, just as it does not concern the idea of "exact measurement" either. We simply cannot attribute meaning to the concept of a definite length that an object possesses in itself. For that reason we have to reject the concept of the true result of a measurement, understood as something that corresponds to or describes an underlying reality. We are only able to attribute meaning to the process of measurements and their results as such, i.e. as mere values at which the scientists have arrived in a specific way. However, understood in this way, these measurement results can enter into meaningful statements and theories. Treatise Part II. |
| Part III. Summary. By means of a counter-example is argued that our usage does not commit us to particular ontological assumptions. The question of other people's consciousness is elaborated and compared to a deepening of the concept of our own consciousness while the rejection of the idea of a definite value as an object of our measurements constitutes a model of the discussion. Arguments for the existence of not-observable entities substantiated by the idea of other kinds of sense perceptions are discussed. Two of Grover Maxwell's arguments for the existence of not-observable entities are gone through and criticized. The connection between the traditional concept of time and realism is described and discussed. In Part III the following subjects are discussed: Usage end existence. Meaning and expression of meaning: Other people's statements and meaning. Our own statements and their meaning. Other ways of perceiving: People with defective sense organs. Creatures with other kinds of sense organs. The problem of induction in the light of a hic-et-nunc viewpoint. Not observable entities. Grover Maxwell's argument for the existence of not-observable entities. Time and existence. Maxwell's continuous arrangement of kinds of observations. Elementary particles. Extracts from Part III: Usage end existence: We talk of the pictures or figures that we move about on computer screens as if they behave in the same manner as what they look like, e.g. a heap of diagrams or photographs. About these removals, our usage is the same as the one we use when we talk of "taking out a picture" from a heap of photographs. In both cases, we can have an idea of a new picture appearing. However, how are we to interpret our statements about the existence of such hidden pictures? ... Thus, I will conclude that we talk about existence of entities in situations where nobody, even the realist, wants to assert that these entities actually exist - unless one is an adherent of the above mentioned, far-fetched, refutable idea. For this reason, the anti-realist cannot be attacked for his use of the word "existence", although it resembles the realist's use of that word. It does not imply realism. --- Not observable entities: Maxwell's continuous arrangement of kinds of observations: Though for the sake of convenience we talk of microbes by means of the terms of our everyday language, this does not mean that we have the same relations to microbe figures as to our visual impressions of tables. We relate ourselves to our visual impressions without glasses (or with adjusted glasses) in a way that is determined by the size we perceive and we also ascribe them this size, since we talk of the fact that the seen object has this size. It can here be tempting to say that we relate ourselves to the things as what they are, but regarded as a philosophical statement, this formulation has a realist character. Instead, we can assert the opposite, namely that the things and their properties are what we experience - this is what we relate to. However, the latter does not apply to microbes, because when we look at microbe figures we also relate to them in the size we see (if they filled up a screen, we would have to move our head), but the size we attribute to the microbes is the result of a calculation based on the size of the figures and the magnification factor of the microscope. In this way, we do not deal with something known but with a construction. (The result of this kind of extrapolations does not have more reality than the result of the extrapolations that lead to the concept of Big Bang.) For this reason, we cannot say that microbes exist in the same way as the things that we see with our naked eyes or with glasses. With other words, as regards microbes there is nothing we relate to in the same way as we relate to things and that we can call "microbes" just as we call a table a "table". This is the answer of the two questions above concerning the reality of microbes versus that of physical object. Treatise Part III. |
| Part IV. Summary. Here I discuss those parts of Michael Dummett's philosophy of language and those of Bas van Fraassen's philosophy of science that are referred to in my treatises Part I-III. Thus, I will explain 1) what I am able to endorse and for what reasons, 2) what I want to criticize, and 3) what I can instead substantiate. First, however, the importance of the semantic elements in the debate between realists and anti-realists is explained. The top down-principle is looked upon as an argument for anti-realism. The correspondence principle of truth is criticized, which will clarify my view upon anti-realism. Thus, I conclude that the correspondence of a statement with its truth is identical to its correspondence with our justification of the statement. This means that truth is verification. In addition, the contention that realism is a good explanation of the progress of science and thus must be assumed is criticized. In Part IV the following subjects are discussed: The semantic approach to the realism debate. Dummett's anti-realism. Entities versus statements about entities. Dummett's definitions of realism and anti-realism. Berkeley's phenomenalism. A clarification of the concept of object. Examples. Fictions and meaning. The past. The correspondence principle of truth. Examples. The importance of the top down line of thought. Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. A critique of realism as a good explanation. Extracts from Part IV: The semantic approach in the realism debate. The semantic approach in the realism debate is not to be understood as a direction. It is simply a necessity. For the central question in the realism debate is to find out what justified meaning we can at most put into a number of different statements. Realism concerning physical entities is sometimes defined as the view that the existence of objects is "independent of our consciousness". Here, it is natural to ask what it means that objects exist "independently of our consciousness". However, this question cannot be answered directly as it presupposes that the formulation has a meaning altogether, which is not given and therefore first has to be procured in order that the formulation can be used. In addition, this construction is based on a mistaken or inadequate way of expounding the realism debate, as it presupposes that also the realist's opponent can accept the in-terpretation. This becomes especially obvious, if anti-realism is simply defined as the opposite of the above definition of realism, i.e. as the view that "the existence of objects is dependent of our consciousness"; for the anti-realist will often define his position in another way and argue for it on other premises. As an example, the author of this text has by no means described anti-realism as the latter position, i.e. the view "that objects only exist in a way that is dependent on our consciousness". --- Realism: Immanuel Kant's concept of Das Ding an Sich is a marked example of realism. The concept of the thing-in-itself is introduced by Kant in Kritik der reinen Vernunft ([Kant 90], B XX), but without further discussion, as far as I can see. Thus, Kant takes the meaning of this concept for granted, as he neither defines the concept nor discusses what underlies it. This omission is of course a principal philosophical failure, because discussing fundamental assumptions is an important part of philosophy. However, we do not need such an idea at all, which must appear from my considerations concerning the concept of the regularity of objects and thus of the concept of time, cf. the bathroom example in "The philosophy of time" in Part I. As far as I have conceived it, Kant's concept of Das Ding an Sich has not only to be understood as: 1) something that exists without our ever being able to perceive it, but also as 2) something that is uncognizable in the sense that it cannot be characterized by the concepts we have at our disposal. This makes Kant's realism into an extraordinary realism, an intensified realism. According to anti-introductionism, however, it is the other way round: We can talk consistently by means of statements that contain terms of things and deal with our sensation and handling things. This is why we have a talk about things that exist, and why the concept of thing has sense. Thus, we cannot justify the opposite statement, viz. that our talk's being consistent is due to the existence of things in themselves, or put in a different way, a literal existence of things. We can talk consistently about our experiences, simply because our experiences are consistent. In addition to that, just the possession of mental faculties is needed, but nothing extra in our external world. --- A clarification of the concept of object: The so-called principle of inference to the best explanation can be used to show the presence of observable properties and entities, as our talk about these already has meaning. However, it cannot be applied to proving that our statements about constructions or invented types of entities refer to real physical objects, for this presupposes that our talk about them possesses literal meaning, which is just the matter at issue in this dispute between scientific realism and anti-realism. This is not a criticism of the very use of terms of so-called not-observable entities, only of the understanding of this use as if it is on equal terms with the use of terms of known physical objects. --- The correspondence principle of truth: The correspondence principle of truth can be described like this: "Statements are true just if they agree with reality". However, it is problematic what it means that a statement agrees with reality: We cannot meaningfully talk about the truth of a statement, purely and simply, as we have to talk more specifically of our reasons for a statement being truth, which involves our clarifying its truth conditions and how they can be satisfied. For that reason, it is immaterial whether we talk about the justification of the truth of a statement or just about the justification of a statement: we cannot put more into the former concept than into the latter. Thus, the concept of truth is not a fundamental concept, but at most the opposite of falseness. Instead, the concepts justified and unjustified are more fundamental than that of truth. ... The conclusion is: We cannot attribute meaning to the concept of some "reality in itself" which a statement agrees with. What we can at most put in our talk about the idea that a statement "agrees with reality" is that the statement can be justified by means of our experiences. Thus, the only reality that exists is the experiences we are dealing with. Besides that, we can only talk about our constructions. --- The importance of the top down line of thought: The realist can assert that he is able to explain a crash from the room next door by referring to a big painting hanging in there in an old string, which is possibly worn over just now. However, the anti-realist can also assert this as his usage is not ontologically committing; for concerning this sort of verifiable statements, the realist does not have a monopoly of language: we talk in that way. Perhaps the realist will put more in his explanation, but ultimately both parts are able explain their statements by references to the regularity of nature. It is this extra the realists will put in his explanations that the discussion is about. For as regards the painting that is just seen in the room next door, according to the realist as well as the anti-realist it will indeed be true to say "The painting is in the room next door". However the realist will, in a philosophical context, add "But the painting is there also in the same way as a painting in this room is here" - whatever the expression "in the same way" means. The anti-realist can assert that what exist are our present sense impressions, memories, thoughts and knowledge about e.g. the regularity of nature. We do not need more to expound our experiences. - The realist's extra statements do not concern anything of this, but express an assumption that does not refer to a difference. It is obvious that anti-introductionism expresses or implies a different understanding of the world and of what it means to be in the world than realism does. This view implies - to a higher extent than realism - that clarification and knowledge are important as to what statements about existence we can assert. Treatise Part IV. |
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