| One Hundred Forty Years Ago this Month, the 26th OVI... |
| November, 1864 to November, 1865 |
November, 2004 ~ November, 1864 The month began with the 26th OVVI stationed at Pulaski, Tennessee, along with the rest of the 4th Corps. The 26th OVVI was now commanded by Captain William Clark, in the 2nd Brigade under command of Colonel John Q Lane, and was in the 2nd Division commanded by General George D Wagner. The 4th Corps was under immediate command of General David S Stanley. At the beginning of the month, General John Schofield was ordered to combine his 23rd Corps with General Stanley 's 4th Corps at Columbia, Tennessee; under the overall command of Major General John Schofield. The 23rd Corps was now under the command of Major General Jacob S Cox. General Schofield was under orders from General Thomas in Nashville to remain between General Hood's Confederate Army of Tennessee and Nashville, resist General Hood's advance, all the while slowly moving back to help protect Nashville. The Confederate strategy for Hood's Army at this stage of the war was to begin a new offensive by going back into Tennessee in hopes of rallying morale for the homesick troops and the war weary state. Upon success there, to advance northward into Kentucky and move on up to the Ohio River and onto Indiana and Ohio. It was a very risky plan, with little hope of success, but there were no other apparent viable options. If it were not possible to advance past Nashville, the Confederate army could move eastward and hook up with Lee's Army which was currently besiged by General Grant's Army of the Potomac, at Petersburg, Va. The Union strategy was simple: General Thomas was to defend Nashville at all costs, and strike a final severe blow to Hood's Army of Tennessee. General Sherman was to march through Georgia to the Sea, and then onto South Carolina and North Carolina, demonstrating that the Confederacy was wholly unable to defend its territory. General Grant was to continue to dog Lee's Army wherever it went , and slowly drain it of resources; and thus, if all these plans came to fruition, the War might soon come to an end. General Hood did not advance towards Pulaski as had been conjectured, but rather tried to flank past the Union concentration at Pulaski by advancing through Lawrenceburg on the way to Columbia. General Hood hoped to get to Columbia first and thus cut off General Schofield's forces from its supply and escape route to Nashville. On November 21, General Schofield quickly began moving his forces from Pulaski towards Columbia via Lynnville. The 26th OVVI, as part of General George Wagner's 2nd Division of the 4th Corps under command of General David Stanley, was in charge of covering the passage of the supply trains during this movement towards Columbia. On November 23rd, the 26th OVVI crossed the Duck River just below Columbia and formed in line of battle. The Union army had beaten Hood's Army to Columbia, but just barely, and only because of an aggressive all night march. From November 23 until November 27, the 26th OVVI remained at a position on the Franklin Turnpike at Columbia, skirmishing lightly with the Confederate forces. General Hood decided not to attack here, but chose rather to flank again; this time, at fords to the east of Columbia. The Confederate forces began crossing the Duck River at various fords early on November 28. Though the crossing was resisted by Union Calvary, the Confederate forces were soon all across the Duck River and moving rapidly northward, and in effect were about to turn the Union position.. Aware of Hood's movements, early on November 29, General Schofield began leaving Columbia and heading rapidly towards Spring Hill, 11 miles away. Directed to lead the advance and to feel out the Confederates position at Spring Hill was General Stanley with his 1st and 2nd Divisions ( the 26th OVVI being part of the 2nd Division.) General Stanley's orders were simple: engage the enemy if necessary, but hold open the Franklin Turnpike so as to protect the advance of 800 wagons and thousands of troops. General Stanley left Columbia with his two divisions at 8:00 am on November 29. However, just 4 miles into the march, General Stanley decided to redeploy the 1st Division to protect the flank at that point, and directed that only General Wagner's 2nd Division should move onward quickly to Spring Hill. BATTLE OF SPRING HILL - November 29, 1864 The 2nd Division reached Spring Hill at 11:30 am, and immediately was thrust into action to defend against the advancing Confederate forces from the southeast. The 26th OVVI was posted along a dirt road (at that time called Rally Hill Pike and today is called Kidron Road), southeast of the center of town. A fierce battle commenced at this position and at a steep hill nearby. The battle raged on until nightfall. Captain Welden Kelly provides this account of the battle: "...At this place { Rally Hill Pike} we were located near a cotton gin, on which an overlook was posted, who soon reported Confederate troops in sight. We built up a rail barricade, each man got out of cartridge box and bit off ten cartridges and made all the arrangements we could for rapid firing. The gray lines could by seen by Sergeant [ John L ] Hall (the outlook) for a long distance and he kept posting us as to their movements. He held his post too long and was killed in the effort to reach us at the barricade. It was undulating farm land where we were located, with timber showing south of us and also in our rear three-fourths of a mile or one-fourth west of the pike. We could see the gray lines east of us, at some places half a mile away, as they were advancing, but owing to the roll of the land they passed out of our view nearly one-fourth of a mile in front or east of us and did not appear again until less than one hundred yards away. We opened fire and effectively stopped them in our front and temporarily to right and left, but to our left, north of us, they soon pressed forward, passing directly between us and Spring Hill. Wagner, seeing our situation from his position, over a mile away, rushed a battery forward and opened fire, we getting the effect as well as our enemy between us and the guns. We held this position until nearly all had consumed their ten rounds, when Captain Clark gave the order to escape if possible. In doing this we obliqued to the southwest to escape a heavy fire now reaching us from the north and the quicker to get protection from the rolling ground. While the battery held them in check we crossed the pike and made a complete half circle to reach Spring Hill, which we did, losing 77 men from the regiment..." p. 33-34 At night fall, the Union forces had been forced to retreat back towards town, and the Confederate forces were scattered and posted at various points around and along the Franklin Turnpike, but never actually blocking the turnpike. Hood went to bed confident that he had the union army right where he wanted them, and in the morning, they would move in for the kill. The 2nd Division suffered the vast majority of the 350 casualties suffered by the Union forces at Spring Hill. The battered 2nd Division was ordered to stand guard of the pike. That night, one of the strangest and most controversial episodes of the War took place. In the new moon pitch darkness and with absolute quiet, General Schofield advanced his army's 800 wagons, hundreds of cannon, thousands of horses, and thousands of troops past the Confederate forces that encamped within a hundred yards of the turnpike. In many cases, the Union troops could easily see the Confederate soldiers standing alongside their campfires. By the light of dawn, the last Union army train was seen crossing the turnpike bridge at the north end of town. Thus, General Schofield's army had been able to miraculously escape the Confederate forces. This was accomplished due to several factors: 1) immense good luck, 2) poor communication resulting in confusion through the Confederate command on how and where to post their forces; and 3) the heroic stand by the 2nd Division whose stubborn and strategic resistance prevented the Confederate forces from being able to advance any further and to consolidate its position, and contributed to the confusion experienced by the Confederate command.. Once all the trains and other Union troops had safely passed north out of Spring Hill, the battered 2nd Division, swung into position to serve as the rear guard for the army on the turnpike. Thus, the 2nd Division was in continued skirmishing with with the lead Confederate forces all the way on the advance towards Franklin. Three miles due south of Franklin, are heights on both sides of the turnpike known as Winstead Hill ( west of the turnpike) and Breezy Hill ( on the east side of the turnpike).. At this point, the 2nd Division split with the 1st Brigade under Colonel Emerson Opdyke moving on northward and entering the Union works quickly being built near the south bank of the Harpeth River. The Union works were built, on both sides of the turnpike, just south of the Harpeth River near Fountain B Carter's home. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades were ordered to initially defend Winstead Hill against skirmishers who were quickly advancing from the head of the Army of Tennessee. When the skirmishers moved off to the east, General Wagner ordered the 2nd Brigade under Colonel Lane to pull back to Privet Knob ( about a mile immediately due north of Winstead Hill.). The 3rd brigade was moved to the east side of the turnpike in a position in the open and on the plain about a third of a mile in advance of the Union army's main defense works. When the bulk of the Confederate army began appearing on the turnpike at Winstead Hill and on the Lewisburg Pike due west of Breezy Hill, General Wagner ordered Lane's 2nd brigade to take a position in the open and on the plain about a third of a mile in advance of the Union armies defense works on the west side of the turnpike directly opposite the the 3rd bridgade's position. The 26th OVVI was on the extreme right of this exposed position on the plain with the 2nd brigade. Lane and Conrad were ordered to hold this position and to enforce this by the bayonet if necessary. The position was exposed as they were in the open, with no means to even construct a rudimentary breastworks. The purpose of this advanced and exposed position has been and continues to be open to great debate, and was met with severe criticism at the time.. A tenable explanation is that this advanced position could serve to delay the advancing Confederate forces, and thus allow more time for the works to be completed and for the bulk of the army to get across the Harpeth River on its way to Nashville.. Another tenable explanation is that the Union command did not feel the Confederate presence would amount to more than a diversion or demonstration , as it was expected that Hood would again try to flank around the Union position as he had done at Columbia. On the other hand, this alignment left two brigades clearly in an exposed position as "sitting ducks", the defense of which was clearly untenable, and their only option would be to resist as long as they could and then hastily retreat back towards the Union works, which would in effect delay firing from the Union works until the retreating soldiers were safely behind the works. That is exactly what happened. Lane's 2nd brigade held their fire at this advanced position until the Confederate Army ( which clearly outnumbered those in the advanced position) were within 100 yards, and then let loose their volley. The Confederate forces were momentarily slowed, but then they began running, full speed, with bayonets drawn, yelling the rebel yell. As Captain Kelly notes, Wagner's 1st and 2nd brigades in the advanced position, tried to make it back to the main Union works. The result was intense hand to hand combat, and absolute confusion as the Union and Confederate forces were mixed up as they approached the main Union works. Though this delayed the fire from the Union works, it did not prevent it altogether, and both Confederate and Union soldiers found themselves being shot at from both sides. BATTLE OF FRANKLIN - November 30, 1864 Captain Kelly provides a vivid accounting of this great battle: "...We saw the solid lines of Hood's army as it advanced. We held this [advanced] position but a short time. Those to the left of us being more advanced, owing to the lay of the ground, than we, were struck and broken, we fell back to the main line. Company E was less than 200 yards to the right of the Carter House and the main line was not broken at this point. We fought with other troops that occupied the works when we reached them. Here the enemy was repulsed. A short distance to our left, near the Carter House, they had gained part of our line. The 26th, under orders from Captain Clark, moved or closed to the left to aid in repelling them from this place. Our lines, with the other troops in the works, formed in rank four or five deep, the rear men loading and passing the guns to those in the front, and the firing was constant until long after dark, when Hood ceased his efforts to make his lodgment permanent and firing gradually ceased..." p.35 The fighting was indeed very intense and often hand to hand combat. The counter charge led by Colonel Opdyke and the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division, and enjoined by the other brigades of the 2nd Division, halted the Confederate breakthrough, and sent the Confederate forces retreating back to the main Union defense works ( which had become their defense works.). In all, the Confederate forces made 3 separate frontal assaults across a 2 mile plain that afternoon and evening. The losses on both sides were tremendous, but the Confederates could ill afford such heavy losses. The Confederate losses were compounded by the fact that several ranking generals were also killed in these assaults, including perhaps the best one in their army, known as the " Stonewall Jackson of the West " Major General Partrick Cleburne. General Hood attempted to put a positive spin on the debacle indicating since the Union forces had left the battlefield, they had won the battle. Although this might be technically correct, the rank and file in the Confederate army knew the real truth; their army had suffered severe losses from the ill-conceived frontal assaults, resulting in a a tremendous blow that it could not recover from. The Union Army had not been defeated and it was still advancing towards Nashville unimpeded which was its plan. The 2nd Division of the 4th Corps lost more men at Franklin than the other four divisions of infantry that were present that day, and as a testament to the fighting skill of the 2nd Division ( commonly known as Sheridan's Old Division), Captain Kelly notes: "... as a rule, if you follow the trail of blood, you are keeping close to the fighting line.". Webmaster Comment: Pickett's Charge on July 3, 1863 at the Battle of Gettysburg is perhaps, the best known large scale frontal assault made during the War; it was a great and heroic action. However, Pickett's Charge pales in comparision to the charges made at Franklin on November 30, 1864. A simple comparision bears this out: 1) Pickett's Charge was one charge that lasted about an hour; At Franklin, there were three separate charges that afternoon, and the battle went on for four hours. 2) Pickett's Charge covered just over a mile of terrain; At Franklin, the terrain covered by each charge was two miles. 3)Pickett's Charge involved about 10-15,000 men from primarily one division; At Franklin, the charge was made by the entire infantry of the Army of Tennessee, estimated at between 20,000-25,000 soldiers at that time. That night, General Schofield's army moved across the Harpeth River into the town of Franklin and on northward towards Nashville, its final destination. The 26th OVVI were called into the column line just before midnight and continued on the march towards Nashville, arriving in Nashville just before noon on December 1. Finally, for the first time since the morning of November 29, the soldiers of the 26th OVVI could lay down, make their coffee and reflect on what had transpired over the past 48 hours and though totally exhausted, could feel sorrow for those comrades who were no longer with them. December, 2004 ~ December, 1864 The 26th OVI, along with the rest of the 4th Corps took up a defensive position near the center of the Union breastworks, several miles south of Nashville, just west of the Hillsboro Pike. The first couple of days were spent clearing the area in front of their positions of any obstacles, including homes and other buildings, that the Rebel forces might use at the time of battle. With the arrival of Schofield's battered army at Nashville, several significant reorganizations took place. Major General Thomas was now in charge of the entire Union forces. General Schofield was relegated back to resuming command of the 23rd Corps. With General Stanley's wound suffered at Franklin, the command of the 4th Corps was given to Major General Thomas J Wood ( yes, the same General Wood who commanded the the 26th OVI's 1st Division of the 21st Corps at Chickamauga). The 26th OVI was still under command of William Clark ( who was promoted to Lt. Colonel on December 9.) The 26th OVI remained in the 2nd Brigade ( still commanded by Colonel John Q Lane), of the 2nd Division ( now commanded by General Washington L Elliott, as General Wagner was relieved of his command following the controversy over his ill conceived and dangerous advance deployment line at Franklin), in the 4th Corps. When Hood's Army arrived on December 3, the Confederates begtan to build 5 defensive forts, called redoubts. The 26th OVI was positioned facing redoubt # 1. The stage was set for a major battle that would decide the outcome of the war in the west. Hood's strategy was to wait out the Union forces, give battle if possible to an advantage , and try to flank around the impenetrable defensive works ( likely to the east near Murfreesboro.) The Union strategy was to give battle at such time that the weather and reinforcements would play to the Union's distinct advantage. General Thomas' delaying action for two weeks, while awaiting these optimum conditions, nearly cost him his command. The Lincoln Administration and Lt General US Grant, were quite worried that Hood would indeed flank around Nashville and head for the Ohio River, if Thomas did not attack right away. BATTLE OF NASHVILLE DEC 15-16, 1864 Finally, on December 15, the Union forces came out of their defense works and began to charge across the barren, but rolly terrain towards the Confederate positions. The 4th Corps, moved to the right ( or west) and attacked and routed the Rebel forces there. The 26th OVI was left in the main works and deployed in a defensive division front of nearly half a mile. Thus, the first day, the 26th OVI was not meaningfully engaged. On December 16, General Thomas wad determined to capitalize on the great gains of the preceding day, and ordered a full scale assault that he hoped would finally destroy Hood's Army of Tennessee. Before dawn, the 26th OVI moved to a position in front of the 2nd Brigade and headed toward the Brentwood Hills. They were in a line between the Granny White Pike and the Franklin Pike, just to the west of the Overton Hill. They drove back the Rebels from their outposts, and were within several hundred yards of the Rebels new fortified line. The troops withstood heavy artillery and small arms fire throughout the day. Finally, at 3:00 pm, the order was given to prepare 10 rounds of ammunition for rapid firing. Upon, firing the 9th round, the signal would be given to charge with loaded guns the Rebel works. Charge, the 26th OVI and the other Union forces did with earnest. They soon overwhelmed the Rebel position, capturing many prisoners, and sending the routed Army of Tennessee in a confused retreat southward along the Franklin Pike. This was done nearly in concert with other forces attacking, with similar successful results. The 4th Corps led the p?ursuit after the routed Confederate army until dusk. Early the next morning, the 4th Corps continued the pursuit of Hood's fractured army past Franklin and further southward. The swollen rivers and creeks, and the need to rebuild destroyed bridges, hampered the pursuit. The 4th Corps continued the pursuit, with limited rations, until January 1, 1865 when General Thomas called off any further pursuit. Hood's army had escaped into Alabama and were now south of the Tennessee River at Florence. Thus, the month and year ended with Union forces again in complete control of Tennessee, and more importantly, the Confederate Army of Tennessee had suffered a tremendous defeat with a substantial loss of fighting men, and most of their finest generals. It would never recover. Within weeks, General Hood would ask to be relieved of command, and his request was granted. January-February, 2005 ~ January-February, 1865 The 26th OVVI marched to Huntsville, Alabama on January 7 and went into winter camp at that location. the 26th OVVI remained in winter camp until the end of February, enjoying a well earned and needed respite.. March, 2005 ~ March, 1865 On March 15th, the 26th OVVI, along with the rest of the 4th Corps left Huntsville via rail and travelled to Chattanooga and then Knoxville, and onto Bulls Gap in the mountains of eastern Tennessee. (Bulls Gap is located about 50 miles northeast of Knoxville). The purpose of this movement was three fold: Begin to consolidate the Union armies in Virginia, prevent Lee's Army of Northern Virginia from having an escape route westward over the Appalachian Mountains, and prevent remnants of Hood's former army (now under command of General Joe Johnston) from entering North Carolina or Virginia. General Grant had Lee's army under seige at Petersburg, Va., and it was now only a matter of time til Lee would have to make a desperate attempt to escape or vacate Petersburg and Richmond. The movement was slowed by the orders to rebuild the railroad along the way. March ended with the 26th OVVI still in eastern Tennessee, heading towards the town of Greenville. April, 2005 ~ April, 1865 The 26th OVVI was near Greenville when it received news of Lees's surrender to Grant on April 9th.. As Captain Kelly wrote in his company E history, " That night was spent hilariously cheering and singing that old familiar piece, " Go Tell Aunt Rhoda the Old Gray Goose is Dead". The following morning I doubt if there was enough ammunition in the cartridge boxes of the men in our division to have made a respectable skirmish." There is presently no written account of the 26th OVVI soldiers response to hearing the news a few days later of President Lincoln's assassination on April 14th Most likely, the reactions were anger, confusion, sadness, suspicion, and profound grief. My great, great grandfather, Alfred Frost described in a letter home on April 18, 1865, the reaction in his 18th OVI regiment that was likely typical throughout the other Union regiments: " ...Theigh is a great excitement hear in camp about the death of aib linken and eavery man that says eaney thing in favor of it is snatched up and put undear a arrest theigh was one taken out of our camp ney and theigh has ben thirtey taken out of our regment with in one day and night and two of them was shot dead whare theigh stood for saying that theigh was glad oald aib was dead..." Following General Johnston's surrender to General Sherman on April 26th, the 26th OVI , along with rest of the 4th Corps, was ordered to Nashville, Tennessee, where expectations were high the regiment would soon be mustered out. May, 2005 ~ May, 1865 At Nashville, on May 9th, the 26th OVVI passed in review of General George H Thomas and received his thanks and congratulatory order on May 10. The regiment remained at Nashville the rest of the month anxiously awaiting its muster out. June-November, 2005 ~ June-November, 1865 However, the muster out of the 26th OVVI was not quite ready to happen. Much to the chagrine of the soldiers and officers alike, the 26th OVVI was ordered to join an expedition of the 4th Corps to the interior of southeastern Texas. This action was taken to provide a strong military presence there to quell any possible interest that the Mexican government ( really a puppet govemment of France at the time) might have towards attempting to take back any territory in the southwest lost as a result of the Mexican War. In early June, the 26th OVVI, along with the rest of the 4th Corps moved to Johnsonville, Tennessee, and then by steamboats down the Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi Rivers. While being transported on the steamboat, Longworth, on the Mississippi River , they stopped at Island 60 for the night of June 9, 1865. According to two complaint affadavits, some members of the 26th OVI and the 125th OVI departed the steamboat, and allegedly, entered a Freedmen's Camp located on the island. They broke into a sutler store owned by Asa Dean, and stole various items including: shirts, canned fruits, snuff, shoes, hats, cutlery. Mr. Dean, in his complaint, estimated loss of around $1,000. Attempts to halt the pillaging were met with resistance. After two hours, the bugle sounded and the regiment members returned to the steamboat and continued on the journey. There is no information of what, if any action, was taken against the regimental members who allegedly broke into Mr. Dean's store. The only justification offered for this alleged criminal behavior was that "the men were mad because they had to come down the river". ( Affadavits signed by Asa Dean and Charles Sherman, Ohio Historical Society, VFM 2848) The Regiment arrived in New Orleans, LA, on June 16, 1865. Shortly thereafter, the regiment was transported by ocean steamers to the Matagorda Bay, landing at Indianola ( Port Lavaca), Texas. The regiment was then involved in a 120 mile long , hot, and arduous march through insect infested areas from Port Lavaca to San Antonio, Texas. The regiment was stationed in the San Antonio and Victoria area for the rest of the summer and into October, 1865. No combat action occurred, and the day was spent doing guard duty, dress parades, and fatigue duty. The 26th OVVI was finally mustered out of official service on October 21, 1865 at Victoria, Texas. Three days later, the regiment started the journey home. Even the journey home was an ordeal. Due to storms and an unfit vessel, they ran aground in the harbor at Galveston, and had to remain there for four days until a safer ocean vessel could arrive. The regiment then went up the Mississippi River on the steamboat, Ruth, the largest vessel plying the river at the time. They arrived in Cairo, Illinois, and then were transported by freight cars to Indianapolis. For the final leg of the journey to Columbus, Ohio, they were afforded the luxury of being in passenger rail coaches. On November 16, 1865, the soldiers received their pay and discharges at Camp Chase, Columbus in the same barracks they built when they mustered in 54 long months ago. Thus, came to the end the honorable service of the soldiers of the 26th OVVI. |