| 140 Years Ago, the 26th OVVI... |
| October, 1863 to April, 1864 |
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| April, 1861 to December, 1862 |
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| January, 1863 to September, 1863 |
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October, 2003 ~ October, 1863 - The month began with the 26th OVI, along with the remainder of the Army of the Cumberland, besieged in Chattanooga, entering the second week of the seige. General Rosecrans ill-advised decision to withdraw from Lookout Mountain, left the army essentially surrounded and with its back to the Tennessee River. The only possible escape would be over very poor mountainous roads after crossing the vast Tennessee River. Thus, though the Army of the Cumberland was protected from attack in a very fortified position, it was also very trapped! To make matters worse, the tenuous supply line from Bridgeport was cut off effectively by numerous raids by the Confederate cavalry under General Wheeler. Thus, the only remaining supply line was a long, 60 mile, circuitous route over very mountainous terrain from the closest railroad at Bridgeport, Ala. This route became even more difficult by incessant rains that made the poor roads literal mud pits. Supplies, especially food, initially plentiful, became increasingly more scarce, leading to the reduction of rations to half and then to 1/4 rations. The beef that was available was of such poor quality, that the soldiers termed it " beef dried on the hoof." The fouder for the horses was also in very short supply, and many of the horses literally starved to death. Captain Kelly reports that over 10,000 horses and mules died during the seige, and that those who survived were of little use for service. The 26th OVI, as part of the new Fourth Corps commanded by General Gordon Granger, 2nd Division under General Philip Sheridan, 2nd Brigade, under General George Wagner, was generally stationed at Fort Wood on the eastern edge of the fortifications. (The new army organization was finalized by October 9th. ) The reorganizing ,or as some would put it, dissolving of the 20th and 21st Corps and taking away the corps command of General Crittenden was a controversial matter at the time. So much so, that Major General John M Palmer, who commanded the 2nd Division of the 21st Corps, tended his resignation in protest, citing: "...the late order of the war department, which abolishes the 21st Corps, and orders its late commander, Major-General Crittenden , before a court of inquiry, implies, and will be understood by the country as implying, the severest censure upon the conduct of the officers and men lately composing the corps..." ( Baumgartner, p. 139) His resignation was not accepted by General Rosecrans, who indicated in response that the consolidation of the two corps did not imply any censure and that he was noting in his report the " magnificant fighting in the battle of Chickamauga." ( Baumgartner, p.139). Well, the reorganization was finalized. General Palmer went on to command the 14th Corps shortly thereafter upon General Thomas assuming command of the Army of the Cumberland. By the way, General Crittenden was found innocent of any wrongdoing by the Court of Inquiry. Detachments from the regiment were used to help guard the tenuous supply line. According to Captain Kelly, the 26th OVI thought that it would be detached from the 2nd Brigade to fulfill garrison duty in Chattanooga. Since the 26th OVI had been the first to enter Chattanooga the month before, and had done initial patrol duty, many of the regiment were desirous of this and thought it due them. ?Division Commander General Sheridan had other ideas. He was not about to spare a veteran regiment from the front lines, no matter how decimated its ranks were after Chickamauga. Meanwhile, on the national front, efforts were underway to come to the assistance and rescue of the Army of the Cumberland. General Joe Hooker's 11th and 12th Corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac, and in a logistical accomplishment reminicent of the Longstreet's movement the previous month, Hooker's Corps was moved over 1,000 miles in a matter of days. It arrived in Bridgeport, Ala. in early October and awaited further orders. Also, General Burnside's Army of the Ohio was ordered to advance from its positions around Knoxville, Tennessee, but for various reasons, this assistance never materialized. President Lincoln became more concerned about General Rosecrans ability to still lead the Army of the Cumberland. Though initially supportive of him, telegraphs received in early October, made the President remark that General Rosecrans was sounding like a " duck hit on the head." On October 15th, President Lincoln made several key decisions that would impact greatly on the ultimate outcome of the war. He elevated General US Grant to Commander of a newly created Division of the Mississippi, supreme commander over the three large armies: Army of the Cumberland, Army of the Mississippi ( under General Tecumseh Sherman), and the Army of the Ohio ( under General Ambrose Burnside). This put General Grant in charge of nearly all forces west of the Allegheny Mountains. He ordered General Grant to go to Chattanooga immediately to see what could be done to break the seige. He also gave General Grant two descretionary orders: 1) he could keep General Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland or 2) he could replace him with someone of his choosing. General Grant chose the latter, and on October 18th, General George H Thomas assumed command of the Army of the Cumberland. General Grant ordered General Thomas to hold Chattanooga at all hazards, to which General Thomas made his famous reply: " We will hold the town till we starve." October 23rd, General Grant finally arrived at Chattanooga. After conferring with General Thomas and General William F ( Baldy ) Smith, the decision was made that the first priority was to open again a supply line, or Cracker line as it became known. In the early hours on October 27th, in a daring night manuever led by General Hazen and developed by Generals Thomas and Smith, a beachhead was established at Brown's Ferry about 9 miles down river from Chattanooga. This manuever was done in concert with General Hooker's advance of his 11th Corps from Bridgeport, Ala towards Lookout Mountain down the Wauhatchie Valley. The daring move worked and after initial stout resistance by Longstreet's forces, by October 28th, the Cracker line was reopened and protected so that desperately needed rations could again be sent to Chattanooga. By the end of October, the 5 week long seige had severely weakened the overall strength of the Army of the Cumberland. Though the Cracker line was now open, it would still be weeks before sufficient supplies were regularly entering Chattanooga. The forces remained trapped, the effects of the seige continued. The month ended with plans underway to break out of the trap and finally end the seige.. November, 2003 ~ November, 1863 The month began with the Army of the Cumberland still beseiged at Chattanooga. Significant developments were under way that would change that situation drastically. In addition to General Hooker's two corps having arrived at Bridgeport from the Army of the Potomac, General US Grant also ordered General William Tecumseh Sherman's Army of the Tennessee eastward from Mississippi to Chattanooga. In addition, the newly reopened Cracker line was finally starting to move desperately needed food and other supplies into Chattanooga. The key to success would be these developments all falling into place as envisioned, and then to put together a breakout assault plan to end the seige and allow the Union forces to once again take the offensive. On November 7, General Grant ordered the Army of the Cumberland to assault the north terminus of Missionary Ridge. However, Generals Thomas and Smith argued that the Army, especially the horses and mules necessary for the artillery, were not yet ready for such an assault, and the order of countermanded. General Sherman's Army of the Mississippi finally reached Bridgeport, Ala on November 15. At that time, the senior commanders ( Grant, Thomas, Smith, Hooker, and Sherman) met and came up with the break out plan. In short the plan involved several coordinated actions: 1) General Hooker's troops would assault Lookout mountain, and after securing that important position moved eastward and assault Missionary Ridge from its mouth southern area. 2) General Sherman's troops would cross over the Tennessee River north of ?Chattanooga around the mouth of the South Chickamauga Creek. After securing a beach head there, then proceed to assault the confederate forces on the northern terminus of Missionary Ridge. 3) General Thomas' troops would initially assault and take command of Orchard Knob. Thereafter move forward to threaten the center area of Missionary Ridge by taking the rifle pits at the base and assaulting the center area of the steep ridge. November 21st was the initial date set for the assault, if all preparations were ready by that time. However, incessant rains delayed the start of the initiative. During the delay, a fortuitous development occurred within the Confederate ranks. General Bragg ordered General Longstreet to take his troops and proceed northeastward to Knoxville to attack General Burnside's forces there. On November 23rd at 2 pm, the first phase of the break out operation began. General Wood's and Sheridan's Divisions [ 26th OVI was part of 2nd Brigade commanded by General George Wagner, as part of Sheridan's 2nd Division of the 4th army corps] of the Army of the Cumberland were ordered out of Fort Wood and to assault the confederate advance forces on and about Orchard Knob. With much pageantry that caught the eye of both forces, Wood's and Sheridan's Divisions formed as if on dress parade on the plains between Orchard Knob and Chattanooga, and then suddenly began a spirited assault towards Orchard Knob. Wood's Division towards Orchard Knob directly, and Sheridan's Division towards a series of small hills just south of Orchard Knob.; The factors of surprise and concentrated effort overwhelmed the confederate advance forces and in two hours, Orchard Knob and the immediate area south were now in Union control. The first phase of the plan had come off in spectacular fashion. The Union forces had now extended their line and were just a mile or so from Missionary Ridge; and in excellent position to form a base of operations for the next phase of the plan. General Hooker's troops began their famous "battle above the clouds" the following day, and after routing the confederate forces off of Lookout mountain, the stage was set for the assaults of the concentrated confederate forces on top the steep, nearly impregnable Missionary Ridge. General Sherman's troops crossed the Tennessee River, established a beach head, and then proceeded to take a position on what they believed was the northern part of Missionary Ridge. However, due to the night movement and poor maps, the troops actually occupied a hill separated by a steep valley from Missionary Ridge. November 25, 1863, a day that will live in the annals of military history, was the date set for the assault on Missionary Ridge. The battle began at the north with General Sherman's forces moving down the hill they occupied and finally up the steep hill toward the confederate forces occupying the northern part of the ridge. These forces, commanded by General Patrick Cleburne, put up a very stiff resistance, and Sherman's troops suffered many casualties while failing to a gain the summit. At the same time, General Hooker's troops were delayed in making their assault on the southern end of the Missionary Ridge, as they found several bridges had been burned by the confederates slowing the movement from Lookout mountain through the valley towards Rossville. All the while, Thomas' Army of the Cumberland, lay in waiting orders around Orchard Knob, facing directly towards the center of Missionary Ridge. By mid afternoon, most of the day was gone, and the Union forces had accomplished little, and there was the danger that the sun would soon set with the confederate forces still in command of Missionary Ridge. General Grant ordered General Thomas to advance towards the rifle pits. at 3 p.m., six successive cannon shots from Orchard Knob signaled the start of this advance. The 26th OVI, as part of Sheridan's Division was in line a few hundred yards south of Orchard Knob. The forces moved forward against a literal hailstorm of shells from the confederate batteries on top of Missionary Ridge. The orderly advance soon changed to a double quick, and then a mad dash toward the rifle pits. The confederate advance forces in the rifle pits shot off one volley and then attempted to scramble up the steep slope in retreat. The Union forces soon occupied the rifle pits at the base of the ridge. However, it soon became quite clear that this position was not tenable, as they were under constant and direct artillery and small arms fire from the confederate forces on the summit. How what happened next if often debated by historians, but there is no debate as to what happened next. The Union forces began climbing the steep ridge against a constant assault of artillery and infantry shelling and shots. The 26th OVI, led by Col. William Young, climbed halfway up the ridge, and then through confusion of orders from General Sheridan, were ordered to fall back off the ridge, and then ordered to assault the ridge again. This movement back and forth contributed to additional casualties. Captain Kelley recounts in his Company E history, " About 2 p.m. each man was notified that when six shots were fired in regular succession from the artillery on Orchard Knob we were to move forward in order, keeping well our alignment, and take the Confederate works at the foot of the ridge. A tiresome wait of one or two hours followed. The men's faces became pale, but firm pressure of the lips showed the determination. The time passed slowly, for the mental strain was great. Finally, the signal came... all stepped over our temporary works and moved forward. The enemy's artillery promptly opened in full force from the top of the ridge, the shells exploding all around us. A file or two of men fell near the colors. The men began quickening the step- no pale faces now- the excitement of battle was on. You could constantly hear the officer's command- 'Steady nen! go slow!' Time flew by like a dream. The enemy's line in the lower works at the foot of the ridge became demoralized and they left before we reached them. The reverse side of their works offered us no protection from the artillery and infantry fire from the top, and by a common impulse, without orders, we continued the charge up the side of the ridge. We had the usual double line formation, the 26th Ohio in the front line, the 15th Indiana supporting 150 to 200 paces in the rear. We were to a great extent winded, having made the last three or four hundred yards double quick; We moved up the hills slowly, loading and firing, taking advantage of such protection as was available. The enemy was at this time largely overshooting us and the 15th Indiana, in our rear, was suffering heavily.... We reached the enemy's works and captured them, taking a few prisoners, most of the enemy escaping down the eastern slope of the ridge, which was not so precipitous as the western which we had come up..." ( p.21 -23) Finally, the 26th OVI reached the summit, about three hundred yards north of where General Bragg's headquarters were located. The other union forces also reached the summit in the general area, and the rout was on. The confederate forces dropped everything they had, and fled in wild retreat down the east slope of the ridge. General Sheridan, had his dander up, and smelling total victory ordered his troops to go after the retreating forces. The 26th OVI, as part of this division continued eastward down the slope in pursuit of the retreating forces, capturing ten artillery guns. Captain Kelley picks up his narrative: "...General Sheridan, quick to seize and hold the advantage, came to the left of his division and ordered Colonel Young, with his 26th Ohio and the 15th Indiana, to hasten northeast down the slope and capture all we could reach ...This we did for nearly a mile, gaining two brass guns at one place, four brass and two Parrott guns, several caissons and limbers at another...A quarter mile or more of gap now existed between our right and the brigade, which was advancing in line along the road...and became heavily engaged. Sheridan sent orders for us to oblique to the right. It was now dark and under Colonel Young's directions we moved carefully and slowly over ravines, through brush, guided by the sound of battle, striking the enemy's lines on an abrupt knob, which we, without hesitation or any delay, charged, and captured two more pieces of artillery and many wagons. General Sheridan, in his official report of the battle, in speaking of this part of the engagement states: ' But a few moments elapsed ere the 26th Ohio and 15th Indiana carried the crest. When the head of the column reached the summit of the hill the moon rose from behind and a medallion view of the column was disclosed as it crossed the moon's disk and attacked the enemy.'...Our part in the battle was over". ( p.23-24) Regarding the cost for this great victory, Captain Kelley states: "That the reader may more fully understand the important part taken by us I will give a few statistics taken from official records: Loss of Sheridan's 2nd Divisionh, 4th Army Corps, 1346, the heaviest in any division of the army...Our 2nd brigade, 2nd Division, 4th army corps, lost 730...That magnificant 15th Indiana regiment that was in the second line supporting us, that came so gallantly to our aid and so nobly stayed with us...went into the battle with 334 officers and men, and of this number its loss was 199 killed and wounded, the heaviest regimental loss in the battle. The three regiments sustaining the greatest loss were all in our brigade. The 26th Ohio numbered present about 150 and lost 36...James H Smith was shot, a minnie { 1 oz.} ball passing through his leg while we were going up the ridge. He examined the wound and remained with the company [E], the blood spurting from the top of his shoes at each step until he was orderd to the hospital by Colonel Young after the battle was over. No organizations in the battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga carried their banner higher on the roll of fame than did the 26th Ohio..." ( p.24-25) Indeed, so important was the follow up action by the 26th Ohio and the 15th Indiana under General Sheridan's orders and under Colonel William H Young's command, that Commanding General U.S. Grant ( actually former President U.S. Grant by that time ) made special mention of it in his acclaimed Personal Memoirs: " Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge...It was now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished.: ( p.359) ?The sun set on November 25th with the Union forces in complete control of Missionary Ridge. For the first time ever in the Civil War, Confederate forces had been routed from an established,strong defensive position; all the more amazing considering the almost impregnable position on top of Missionary Ridge. . The break out plan had worked; not necessarily exactly as planned, but nonetheless, it had worked, and the 26th OVI could take great pride in its contribution to its success. Exactly 67 days from September 20th, the date of the major defeat at Chickamauga, and just 5 miles from the Chickamauga battlefield, the 26th OVI and the Army of the Cumberland had arguably its greatest success of the war at Missionary Ridge. A bronze plaque sits in a front yard of a private residence atop Missionary Ridge on S. Crest Road, in honor of the 26th OVI, and details its contribution in the success. Two days later, November 27th, the 26th OVI, as part of Sheridan's division was ordered along with Wood's division of the 4th corps, to Knoxville to relieve General Burnside's troops who were beseiged by General Longstreet. The forces had limited provisions and were to forage off the countryside. The horses and mules were unfit for active service. Nevertheless, the forces trugged northeastward towards Knoxville. December, 2003 ~ December, 1863- December, 1863 was an unusually cold month in the hills and mountains of eastern Tennessee. The 26th OVI, as part of General Granger's 4th Corps, and under supreme command of General Sherman, trekked towards Knoxville to rescue the besieged troops there under General Ambrose Burnside. However, by the time, the rescuing troops arrived on December 6th, General Longstreet had unsuccessfully attempted to break through Burnside's fortifications with an assault on Fort Sanders, and having failed, called off the siege and retreated into the mountains of extreme eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina. The union troops, without proper seasonal clothing, and with limited rations, tried to bear up against the harsh conditions. A most descriptive account in Sgt Elias Cole's journal describes how the soldiers would build a large fire, sit around the fire as long as the wood would hold up, and after the flames died down, they would lay down in the warm ashes to sleep. The 26th OVI moved northeast on past Knoxville to a place called Blain's Crossroads. Here they stood guard with Burnside's Army of the Ohio against any aggressive move by Longstreet. They also had an important decision to make: Should they reenlist as their three year enlistment was due to expire in six months? The Army needed to know well in advance in order to make proper plans for the upcoming 1864 offensive campaign. As an inducement, anyone who reenlisted would get a months furlough home, and also, if a large portion of a regiment renlisted, the regiment could continue to stay intact, and would be given the recognition as a Veteran regiment. Against the backdrop of extreme cold, without proper shelter and limited provisions, the soldiers of the 26th OVI, faced this important decision, individually and collectively. Together, they had fought and suffered great casualties. Many of their comrades were no longer around. What would they do? January, 2004- February, 2004 ~ January, 1864- February, 1864 The reenlistment question was answered quickly and decidedly with a nearly unanimous decision to reenlist. On one of the coldest New Years on record, January 1, 1864, of the 26th OVI soldiers present to decide at Blain's Crossroads Tennessee, all but 22 decided to renlist. With that settled, the soldiers looked forward to their promised furloughs home. With Longstreet no longer an active threat in eastern Tennesseee, the army decided now would be a good time to grant the furloughs. The soldiers left Blain's Crossroads for Chattanooga via Knoxville on January 18th, and were officially mustered at Chattanooga on January 21. Thereupon, they loaded into freight cars for the cold, but welcome trip northward to home. The now 26th OVVI ( Ohio Veteran Volunteer Infantry) remained home on furloughs for the balance of January and all of February, 1864. However, many of the regiment did not get the chance to go home on furlough; of those who had not been killed, many were now suffering in hospitals in Chattanooga or Nashville, or languishing in prisons at Richmond or Danville. March, 2004 - April, 2004 ~ March, 1864 - April, 1864 The " veteran" 26th OVVI volunteers returned to Chattanooga from their furloughs home on Monday, March 14, 1864. While they were absent, plans were being finalized by Generals Grant and Sherman for the Atlanta Campaign. The primary objectives of the Atlanta Campaign were twofold: 1) Advance into northwestern Georgia and keep offensive pressure on General Johnston's Army of Tennessee. This would make it difficult for the Confederate forces to take advantage of their stronger and shorter interior lines and transport troops to assist General Lee in Virginia where the Army of the Potomac was to initate action against Lee's Army of Northern Virginia; 2) Capture the key southern city of Atlanta. Atlanta and environs had grown considerably and become the major railroad, industrial and munitions center in the South. It was now the jewel city of the Deep South. The advance into Georgia would be a difficult one, as the Confederate forces had built numerous strong fortifications during the past several months. In addition, the advance would continually stretch the Union's supply line from Chattanooga and Nashville. The 26th OVI remained with the Army of the Cumberland commanded by General George H Thomas. Major General Oliver O Howard was the new 4th Corps Commander. Major General Granger was now the 2nd Division commander ( as General Sheridan had been recalled and promoted to Washington to serve as the chief cavalry commander), and Colonel John Q Lane the new 2nd Brigade commander. On March 17th, the 26th OVVI moved out to join its brigade at Charleston, Tennessee. The regiment remained in Charleston, Tennessee until April 25th while the rest of the division's forces were concentrating there. Clearly, preparations were being made to commence the Atlanta campaign. On April 25th, the 2nd Division marched out and camped just south of Cleveland, Tennessee. The month ended with the 26th OVVI encamped south of Cleveland, Tennessee awaiting orders to advance. The Army of Tennessee was well fortified at Dalton, Georgia ( only about 15 miles due south). General Sherman knew a frontal assault would be bloody and useless. Thus, he divined to have the army move in three separate columns in an effort to divert and flank the Army of Tennessee out of its Dalton positions. The Army of the Cumberland would have the role of feinting the more frontal assault towards Dalton while the Army of the Mississippi under General James McPherson and the Army of the Ohio under General Schofield flanked southeastward. |
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