Metaethics and Atheism

• Doesn't atheism necessarily leads to moral relativism?

• If there is no God and no absolute moral standard, why should we be moral?

Atheism and the Moral Yardstick

Does this mean that morality and ethics are subjective and not objective? There are atheist philosophers who take positions on one or the other side of the subjective/objective divide. Michael Martin has written a book, Atheism, Morality and Meaning (2002), arguing the case for an objective morality without God, while J.L. Mackie argued for subjective morality (or "moral skepticism") in his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977). However I think that the disagreement between these two are purely semantics. [a]

It is first important to understand the meaning of the terms objective and subjective and how they are being used here.

The adjective objective is normally used in one of the two senses below: [b]

• O1: referring to a thing or a being that exists outside the mind; has a real ontological existence.

• O2: referring to a decision or evaluation made without bias or prejudice - verifiable by others.

• S1: referring to a thing or a being that exists only in mind(s) of person(s); has no real ontological existence.

• S2: referring to a decision or evaluation made that is based on feelings or temperament of one particular person - not verifiable by others.

As an example we can find things which are "subjective" in the sense of having no ontological existence, yet is "objective" in the sense of being verifiable by others. Take any field of mathematics - say calculus. The concepts of calculus have no real existence outside of the logical system developed by humans. However calculus is objective in the sense that calculations performed can be checked and verified by others as either being "correct" or "wrong". Thus calculus is subjective in the sense of "S1" and objective in the sense of "O2".

Let me bring in another example which is a little closer to what we want to discuss; since it will involve an epigenetic rule: color perception. We have already discussed color perception in some detail elsewhere, but here we will use it again as an example.

When we look at a daisy, we perceive the color of its petals as "yellow". This perception is the result of the interaction of electromagnetic waves of a certain wavelength reflected from the surface of the petals with the cones cells in the retina of our eyes and its representation in our brain. Now color perception is objective in the "O2" sense that any other human being who does not have color impaired vision will be able to verify that the color is yellow. [c]

Yet we know that this color perception is subjective in the "S1" sense. Entomologists have long discovered that flowers, such as daisies have evolved petal pigmentation which leads insects towards their nectar - at the center of the flower. Thus a petal that would look like it has a single uniform color yellow to us actually has an inner portion that absorbs ultraviolet light. When photographed with an ultraviolet sensitive film, it can be seen that the inner portion of the flower petals are "dark", compared to the "light" outer side. We know that insects are able to perceive these color differences (which we cannot) because in experiments where the petals where reversed by scientists, the bee pollinator move towards the outside of the flower rather than towards the center where the nectar are. This shows that the bees are able to perceive differences in the colors of the petals that we could not. Thus when the same insect look at the same "yellow" daisy as we do, it will see the petals not as consisting of a single color, yellow, but as distinct two-color toned petals [with an inner portion which absorbs ultraviolet light and an outer portion that does not]. Thus the insect will "see" two different colors on the flowers when we only see one. [3]

Thus the color yellow has no objective existence ("O2") outside the interaction of reflecting surfaces, electromagnetic waves and percepting neurological systems.

Since we have shown elsewhere that our moral senses are based on epigenetic rules, the color perception is more than an unrelated analogy; it shows the biological implications very clearly.

That "yellow" has no ontological existence does not make it impossible for human beings to agree with each other what things have this color. Similarly, although our sense of morality does not transcend the human species it does transcend individual humans. Thus morality is objective in the sense that different human beings from different cultures, given all the facts and free from all dogmatic bias can normally come to an agreement as to what is "right" and what is "wrong". The fact that there are moral universals that extends through all human cultures is proof of the objective ("O2") nature of morality.

Of course no one is denying that there are some differences between various cultures as to what is moral and what is not. The strong Muslim revulsion for pork and the devout Hindu avoidance of beef showing some relative differences between cultures. And certainly moral values change over time within the same culture. However this does not lead us to "moral relativism" - the ideas that all moral values - across different cultures and across different times - are merely personal preferences with which no outsider has a right to criticize. As Michael Ruse noted, these differences are "secondary modified consequences of a shared primary moral imperative." In other words the specific conditions of the external and internal environment requires such a modification to the moral system. I quote an example from Ruse:

In the 1950's nice girls said "No!" and ... this was a moral issue. Pregnancy spelled much unhappiness to the mother-to-be, to her family and, quite probably, to the child. Now efficient contraception has removed the threat of pregnancy, and with it has gone much of the moral hand-wringing. Nice girls no longer have to say "No!"...But none of these represents a change in primary moral attitude. Wantonly causing unhappiness is still wrong. [4] [Emphasis added]

Thus when it comes to basic ethical principles - loving your family, not cheating on friends, not causing unhappiness unnecessarily etc - humans have a shared moral sense. We have this shared moral sense because we share the same (more or less) genes and the same evolutionary history. In what culture do we find it acceptable to neglect a friend for no reason? In what society do we find gratuitous torture of children as a moral norm? In what stage of our history do we find lying and cheating being the over-riding call to virtue? In which normal human being do we not find guilt or shame as the accompanying emotion for having done a wrong? Do we know of any non mentally disturbed people who do not feel a sense of pride or righteousness in doing what is right? [5]

Thus the charge that an ethical system that is not objective (in the "O1" sense) leads to moral relativism is pure nonsense.

Back to the top

Why Should We Be Moral?

Morality is part of human nature and...an effective adaptation. Why should we forego morality any more than we should put out our eyes? [7]

Back to the top

Notes

Back to the top

References

Back to the top