On 7 December 1941, Imperial Japanese forces turned their war on the Asian mainland
eastward and southward into the Pacific with simultaneous attacks on Pearl Harbor, the
Philippines, Wake, Guam, Hong Kong, and the Malay Peninsula. The rapid southward
advance of Japanese armies and naval task forces in the following months found Western
leaders poorly prepared for war in the Pacific. Nevertheless, they conferred quickly and
agreed that, while maintaining the "German first" course they had set against the Axis,
they also had to blunt Japanese momentum and keep open lines of communication to
Australia and New Zealand. As the enemy closed on those two island democracies, the
Allies scrambled to shore up defenses, first by fortifying the Malay Barrier, and then,
after Japanese smashed through that line, by reinforcing an Australian drive north across
New Guinea. To make this first Allied offensive in the Pacific more effective, the
Americans mounted a separate attack from a different direction to form a giant pincers in
the Southwest Pacific. This decision brought American forces into the Solomon Islands
and U.S. Army troops onto the island of Guadalcanal.
Strategic Setting
During a series of conferences dating from January 1941 the combined ground, sea, and
air chiefs of staff of the United States and the United Kingdom discussed strategies to
defeat the Axis Powers and listed the priorities that should guide their efforts toward that
end. Although they conferred as allies, the two Atlantic partners had to refer to
themselves as Associated Powers while the United States remained neutral. As the major
decision of these conferences, the Associated Powers agreed on a Germany-first
strategy: the anti-Axis coalition would concentrate on the defeat of Nazi Germany and
Italy before turning its collective war-making power against Japan. Until the European
Axis partners surrendered, the Associated Powers would mount only limited offensives in
the Pacific to contain the Japanese. Decisions supportive of the Germany-first priority
included a division of the world into areas of military responsibility reflecting the
respective military potential of the major powers in various geographical areas. The
British would concentrate their efforts in western Europe and the Mediterranean theaters,
while the United States would carry the burden of limited offensives in the Pacific.
On 30 March 1942, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff made a further division of
responsibility for the War and Navy Departments. The U.S. Navy assumed operational
responsibility for the vast Pacific Ocean Areas and gave the new command to Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet since shortly after the attack
on Pearl Harbor. The U.S. Army took operational control of the Southwest Pacific Area,
assigning the command to General Douglas MacArthur, recently ordered from the
Philippines to Australia. MacArthur's new command encompassed the seas and
archipelagos south of Formosa and the Carolines, east of the Malay Peninsula, and west
of New Caledonia, an area including the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies,
Australia, and New Guinea. On 20 April the Joint Chiefs established a subdivision of the
Navy's Pacific Ocean Areas command - the South Pacific Area, under Vice Adm.
Robert L. Ghormley - which included New Zealand, important island bases at the end of
the South Pacific ferry route from Hawaii, and the Solomons, a former British
protectorate only 500 miles east of New Guinea. Ghormley had the mission of blocking
the Japanese before they cut the South Pacific ferry route and severed Australia and
New Zealand from the United States. The line between MacArthur's Southwest Pacific
Area command and Ghormley's South Pacific Area command divided the Solomons at a
point 1,100 miles northeast of Australia. Obviously, any operations in defense of Australia
or New Zealand and the South Pacific ferry route would depend on close Army-Navy
cooperation.
The Allies mounted their first attempt to stop the Japanese at the Malay Barrier, a
3,500-mile-long line from the Malay Peninsula through the Netherlands East Indies and
ending in the British Solomon Islands. The four nations contributing men and arms to the
Malay Barrier defense established the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command
(ABDACOM) to direct their effort. Though unsuccessful - the Japanese punched through
the Malay Barrier in January 1942 - ABDACOM gave the Allies valuable experience in
coalition warfare and combined operations.
As Japanese forces rolled on south and east toward Australia, it became obvious to the
Allies and especially to the United States, the only nation still able to mount meaningful
opposition in the Pacific, that more than token forces would have to be deployed to
accomplish even the modest goal of containing the enemy. A convoy sent to reinforce the
Philippines but diverted to Australia when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor had
brought 4,600 air forces and artillery troops to Australia. Four thousand of these men still
awaited deployment. In January Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall had
dispatched another reinforcement to Australia - this one numbering 16,000 men - and
placed it under command of Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Patch. Combined with American
forces already in Australia, this force would form the nucleus of an infantry division and
air wing.
The collapse of ABDACOM did not stop dispatch of American forces to the South
Pacific. In the early months of 1942 a number of separate Army ground units shipped out
for New Caledonia, and the first complete division - the 37th Infantry Division, a National
Guard unit from Ohio boarded transports for the Fiji Islands. In June the U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff began planning an independent American offensive, and at the same time
deployed Army Air Forces and Marine Corps air squadrons to support the campaign. In
late June and early July the 1st Marine Division arrived at Wellington, New Zealand. The
increase in Army troop strength led the War Department to organize a new command for
the imminent operations: U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, commanded by
Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon.
While the Americans struggled to send enough men and arms to protect Australia, the
Japanese rapidly consolidated their gains in the South Pacific. The Imperial Japanese
Navy exercised theater control in the South Pacific through its Southeastern Fleet,
headquartered at Rabaul. The Imperial Japanese Army organized its troops in the area
into the Seventeenth Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake. Imperial
forces built naval port facilities, leveled land for airfields, and fortified jungled hill masses
to hold the islands they had taken and to support subsequent operations on the march to
Australia. Each island group had at least one strongpoint; some had several. Large bases
were built in the Palaus and the Carolines and at Rabaul in the Bismarcks. Smaller bases
held the Marshalls and the Gilberts, in addition to New Britain and New Ireland in the
Bismarcks and Buka, Bougainville, and Guadalcanal in the Solomons. By the middle of
1942 the American Joint Chiefs faced options of dubious merit: they could find the
Japanese in almost any direction they turned.
Naval action in the spring and summer of 1942 gave American ground forces and opening
into the South Pacific. In the Battles of the Coral Sea in May and Midway in June, the
U.S. Navy seriously damaged the Japanese fleet. In those two engagements the Japanese
lost five carriers and hundreds of aircraft and their pilots, while the American loss of two
aircraft carriers was also significant. Although the Coral Sea and Midway engagements
did not give the Americans undisputed access to the South Pacific, they did bring the
naval balance of forces close enough that the Americans could realistically consider an
amphibious operation.
In this more favorable tactical situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July proposed a
two-pronged assault, one in a northwesterly direction up the Solomon Islands, and the
other from Port Moresby on the south coast of New Guinea north across that island. Of
all enemy strongpoints in the South Pacific, that on Guadalcanal appeared most
threatening because it lay closest to Australia and to the South Pacific ferry route. If the
Americans were going to blunt the Japanese advance into the South Pacific, Guadalcanal
would have to be the place, for no other island stood between the Solomons and Australia.
Operations
Ninety miles long on a northwest-southeast axis and an average of twenty-five miles
wide, Guadalcanal presented forbidding terrain of mountains and dormant volcanoes up to
eight thousand feet high, steep ravines and deep streams, and a generally even coastline
with no natural harbors. With the south shores protected by miles of coral reefs, only the
north central coast presented suitable invasion beaches. There the invading Japanese
forces had landed in July, and there the Americans would have to follow. Once ashore,
invaders found many streams running north out of the mountains to inhibit east-west
movement. A hot, humid climate supported malaria and dengue-carrying mosquitoes and
posed continuous threat of fungal infection and various fevers to the unacclimated. The
Melanesian population of the island was generally loyal to Westerners.
Prior to the American landing in early August, the Japanese had not tried to fortify all
terrain features, but concentrated on the north plain area and prominent peaks. They had
built an airfield at Lunga Point and many artillery positions in nearby hills. At 1,514 feet,
Mount Austen stood as the most important objective to anyone trying to hold or take the
north coast. By August General Hyakutake had a force of some 8,400 men, most in the
2d Division, to hold the island and build airfields. Japanese naval superiority in the theater
assured him of sufficient troop inflow - the 38th Division would land later - to realize his
plans for a two-division corps.
In its early stages, the Guadalcanal Campaign was primarily a Navy and Marine Corps
effort. Directly subordinate to Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Ghormley commanded both Navy
and Army units. On the Navy side of the joint command, Maj. Gen. Alexander A.
Vandegrift (USMC) commanded the 1st Marine Division, the assault landing force. Army
troops committed to Guadalcanal came under command of Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon,
as Commanding General, South Pacific.
On the morning of 7 August 1942, the 1st Marine Division followed heavy naval
preparatory fires and landed across the north beaches east of the Tenaru River. In a
three-month struggle marked by moderate battlefield but high disease casualties and
accompanied by sea battles that first interrupted and finally secured resupply lines, the
marines took the airfield and established a beachhead roughly six miles wide and three
miles deep.
On 13 October the 164th Infantry, the first Army unit on Guadalcanal, came ashore to
reinforce the marines and took a 6,600-yard sector at the east end of the American
perimeter. Commanded by Col. Bryant E. Moore, the 164th had come through the South
Pacific ferry route in January to New Caledonia. There, the 164th joined the 182d
Infantry and 132d Infantry Regiments, in addition to artillery, engineer, and other support
units, to form a new division called the "Americal," a name derived from the words
America and New Caledonia. Until the Americal commander, Maj. Gen. Alexander M.
Patch, and other units of the division arrived, the 164th would fight with the marines.
The newest American unit on Guadalcanal, the 164th moved into the southeast corner of
the perimeter. On the night of 23 October, Moore and his troops heard the Japanese begin
their attempt to retake the Lunga Point airfield, renamed Henderson Field by the marines.
Two nights later the Japanese hit the 164th, running out of the dark jungles yelling
"Banzai," throwing grenades, and firing every weapon they could carry. Despite armor,
artillery, air, and naval support, the Japanese could achieve no more than temporary
breakthroughs at isolated points. The men of the 164th put up a much stiffer defense than
the Japanese expected of a green unit, and with the marines repulsed the enemy with
heavy losses while losing 26 killed, 52 wounded, and 4 missing. Once the enemy attack
failed, Vandegrift had four experienced regiments manning a secure line.
General Vandegrift now moved into the second phase of his operations on Guadalcanal:
pushing out his perimeter far enough so that Japanese artillery could not reach Henderson
Field and overrunning the Seventeenth Army headquarters at Kokumbona, nine miles
west of the airfield. On the morning of 1 November, following naval, air, and field artillery
fire, Marine units began the attack both east and west. On the 4th the Army's 1st
Battalion, 164th Infantry, joined the western attack, while the 2d and 3d Battalions, 164th,
moved to the eastern front. The Army battalions assisted in a major victory during 9-12
November when they trapped against the sea 1,500 enemy troops who had just landed at
Koli Point. Soldiers and marines killed half the enemy force in a twoday fight; the rest
escaped into the jungle toward Mount Austen, six miles southwest of Henderson Field.
Vandegrift suddenly stopped his attacks in mid-November when he learned the Japanese
would soon attempt a major reinforcement via the "Tokyo Express," the almost nightly run
of supply-laden destroyers to the island. As expected, the enemy transports came, bearing
the 38th Division for General Hyakutake. In the four-day naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the
U.S. Navy so seriously damaged the task force that the enemy never again tried a
large-unit reinforcement. Only 4,000 troops, of 10,000, reached land, and the 38th Division
had to function as a large but underequipped regiment.
The attack toward Kokumbona resumed on 18 November with the 164th Infantry, two
battalions of the newly arrived 182d Infantry, and a Marine regiment. After advancing
only one mile against strong opposition, the attack stalled on the 25th. The 164th Infantry
alone lost 117 killed and 625 wounded or sick. Rather than continue the costly push into
the jungle, American commanders decided to await reinforcements.
But rather than receiving reinforcements, the Americans lost effective combat units in
December. Vandegrift's battle-hardened but diseasewracked 1st Marine Division boarded
ships for a much-deserved reconstitution, leaving General Patch in command of all
American units on the island. Despite this temporary reduction, Patch wanted to mount a
limited offensive before the enemy strengthened positions any further. He planned to take
Mount Austen to secure both Henderson Field and his left flank for the next push toward
Kokumbona. Forces available for the Mount Austen operation included the complete
Americal Division, the 147th Infantry, two Marine regiments, and four field artillery
battalions.
Patch gave the mission of taking Mount Austen to the 132d Infantry, which had arrived
on the island on 8 December. With its 3d Battalion in the lead, the 132d kicked off the
assault the morning of the 17th. The battalion had plenty of artillery support on call but
was easily pinned down in the foothills by rifle and machine-gun fire. On the 19th the
battalion commander led a patrol forward in an attempt to locate enemy positions; he
found one machine-gun position which killed him and scattered his patrol. The 132d
thrashed through the jungle for five more days before locating the main enemy
strongpoint, called the Gifu position after a Japanese prefecture. Inside the Gifu, five
hundred troops manned over forty log-reinforced bunkers arranged in a horseshoe on the
west side of Mount Austen. During the last ten days of 1942 the 132d hammered Gifu
repeatedly, making little progress at a cost of 34 killed and 279 other casualties, mostly
sick. Finally, on 1-2 January 1943, the 1st and 3d Battalions attacked from the north while
the 2d Battalion swung around and attacked from the south to overrun most of the Gifu
strongpoint and secure the west slopes of Mount Austen. Now the Americans could
move against Kokumbona without fear of enemy observation or fire from the rear. In the
22-day battle for Mount Austen the 132d Infantry had killed between 400 and 500
Japanese but in the process lost 112 killed and 268 wounded.
During the last weeks of 1942 and the first weeks of 1943 the Americans strengthened
their toehold on Guadalcanal by reorganizing and bringing in fresh troops. On 2 January
General Harmon activated a new headquarters, XIV Corps, and assigned General Patch
to its command. The 25th Infantry Division and the rest of the 2d Marine Division joined
the Americal Division on the island to fill out a three-division corps in preparation for a
January offensive. Patch now planned to destroy the Japanese on Guadalcanal rather
than simply to push them farther away from the Henderson Field perimeter. With the
newly arrived units, he could expect to make more progress than in the previous two
months. Japanese troop strength on the island had peaked at 30,000 in November, but
then fell to about 25,000 in December. With supplies from the Tokyo Express steadily
falling and malaria casualties rising, General Hyakutake had no choice but to scale down
his objectives.
On 10 January XIV Corps began its first offensive of the new year, with Patch pointing
almost all of his units west. Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins' 25th Division took over the
Gifu-Mount Austen area and moved west across the Matanikau River against a hill mass
called Galloping Horse after its appearance from the air. The 2d Marine Division tied in
with Collins' right flank and advanced west along the coast toward Kokumbona. Most of
the Americal Division took over the Henderson Field perimeter, except the 182d Infantry,
one battalion of the 132d Infantry, and division artillery, all of which supported the corps
attack.
Col. William A. McCulloch's 27th Infantry led the assault on Galloping Horse at first light
on 10 January. In support, six field artillery battalions tried an innovation Collins hoped
would deny the enemy the usual warning given when rounds fired from the nearest
battery struck before those of the main concentration, allowing troops in the open to seek
cover and move equipment. Called "time on target," the technique depended on careful
firing sequencing so that all initial projectiles from whatever direction and distance landed
at the same time. Thereafter the batteries would fire into the kill zone continuously but at
irregular intervals through an extended period, thirty minutes in this case. The technique
seemed to be effective, for soldiers later advancing through such zones found little
opposition.
The 1st and 3d Battalions led off the 27th Infantry attack, hitting the Galloping Horse at
the forelegs and tail. In the early hours the battalions had more trouble with the steep
cliffs, deep ravines, and thick jungle of the island. As they moved up the slopes of
objectives they found stiff enemy resistance from hidden bunkers. Expecting fire from
rifles, machine guns, and small mortars, the Americans were somewhat surprised that the
Japanese had managed to muscle the much heavier 37-mm. and 70-mm. pieces atop the
sharp hills. The 1st Battalion made better progress than the 3d, but by the second day both
units experienced another problem: a shortage of water. The Americans had expected
that the many streams on mountainous Guadalcanal would provide water inland and were
surprised to find most stream beds dry. The need to transport water threatened to slow
operations seriously.
At the end of the second day the 3d Battalion slumped into a night position more than 800
meters short of the head of Galloping Horse, exhausted by enemy resistance and water
shortage. Colonel McCulloch pulled the unit back for a rest and moved the 2d Battalion up
to continue the advance along the body of the Horse. Company E soon stalled against a
ridgeline between Hills 52 and 53. For the men involved, the battle now evolved into
intense struggles between fire teams and individuals in the hot jungle and steep ravines.
Capt. Charles W. Davis saw only one way to end the stalemate. Taking four men and all
the grenades they could carry, he led his party in a crawl up to the enemy strongpoint.
The Japanese threw grenades first, but they failed to explode. Davis and his men threw
theirs, then charged before the enemy could recover from the blasts. Firing rifles and
pistols into the position, Davis and his men finished off the stub-born enemy, and
Company E swept up the ridge. For his initiative Davis was awarded the Medal of Honor.
As if in reward, a heavy rain began shortly after Company E took the ridge. Their thirst
relieved, the men of the 27th Infantry prepared to take the rest of the Galloping Horse.
After Colonel McCulloch put the fire of three artillery battalions on Hill 53, the head of
the Horse, company-size assaults from two directions swept forward through the feeble
resistance of starving and sickly Japanese. By the afternoon of 13 January McCulloch's
men held the entire Galloping Horse hill mass.
On the same day the 27th Infantry assaulted Galloping Horse, the 1st and 3d Battalions of
another 25th Division regiment, the 35th, swung around the Gifu strongpoint and moved
west against another hill mass, the Sea Horse. The regimental commander, Col. Robert
B. McClure, opened the attack by sending his 3d Battalion toward Hill 43, the head of the
Sea Horse. For the first seven hours of the attack the troops had more trouble with the
terrain than the enemy, until Company K tried to cross a stream between the head and
body of the Sea Horse. Anxious to continue the advance, the Americans waded into the
water before posting adequate fire cover. With the company split over the two sides of
the stream, Japanese machine gunners began firing on the inviting target below.
Fortunately for the Americans, two men in the company saved the situation. Sgt. William
G. Fournier and T5g. Lewis Hall turned a machine gun on the enemy, now mounting an
infantry rush on the disorganized Americans, and broke up the attack before receiving
mortal wounds. For saving Company K from disaster, Fournier and Hall were awarded
posthumous Medals of Honor.
After Company K regrouped, the 3d Battalion attack picked up momentum. By nightfall
on 10 January the Americans had half the Sea Horse surrounded, and Colonel McClure
began relieving 3d Battalion companies with those from the 1st Battalion. The next day
the attack resumed against weak resistance. When the Japanese massed machine-gun
fire on the 3d Battalion, the 1st Battalion rejoined the attack, and the two units drove the
enemy completely off the Sea Horse by late afternoon on the 11th. In four days of
combat 25th Division troops had taken two important objectives in their January offensive.
To consolidate his gains in the Galloping Horse-Sea Horse area, General Collins brought
forward his last maneuver regiment-the 161st Infantry. During the third week of January
the fresh regiment fought several sharp firefights to clear isolated stream beds and
ravines between the major objectives now in American hands.
While its two companion battalions in the 35th Infantry moved against the Sea Horse, the
2d Battalion had stayed a mile back to complete the difficult job begun by the 132d
Infantry in December: clearing the Gifu area. By 10 January the battalion estimated it
was facing a lone enemy strongpoint held by one hundred troops with ten machine guns.
Two days later, with the Japanese defenders surrounded but offering still more resistance,
the regiment doubled the estimate of enemy strength in the objective. After three attempts
to break into the area, Colonel McClure relieved the 2d Battalion commander on the 16th
and prepared new thrusts at the strongpoint. Besides heavier artillery barrages, the
Americans added psychological operations to their arsenal. For three days from the 15th
the 25th Division intelligence staff beamed Japanese-language surrender appeals into the
Gifu. But the Japanese were determined to fight to the death, and the Americans resumed
the yard-by-yard struggle against their well-prepared enemy. On the 21st three Marine
light tanks joined the assault and tipped the balance of combat power. The next day the
tanks punched through the northeast side of the strongpoint and roared on out the south
side, along the way knocking out eight machinegun positions and opening a 200-yard hole
in the enemy line. Still unwilling to surrender, the Japanese mounted a desperate attack
the night of 22-23 January. The 2d Battalion troops turned back the enemy with heavy
losses and the next morning mopped up the Gifu.
Three days after the 27th Infantry and 35th Infantry assaulted the Galloping Horse and
Sea Horse, the marines kicked off their advance along the coast. In its first operation as a
complete unit, the 2d Marine Division moved west on a two-regiment front on 13 January.
After gaining over 800 yards at a cost of six killed and sixty-one wounded, the marines
stalled on the 14th under heavy enemy machine-gun and mortar fire from ravines to their
left. Adding tanks the next day helped little, but a new weapon - flamethrowers - proved
more effective in driving enemy crews away from weapons. By the 17th the marines had
regained their momentum. In five days of combat they killed 643 Japanese and took 71
machine guns, 3 artillery pieces, and a large quantity of rifles and ammunition. The next
day they stopped a mile west of Point Cruz to await further orders from General Patch.
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