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POLITICA >> Cyprus Peace Plan | ||||
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Last chance for Cyprus?On the 10th of November, the United Nations issued a new peace plan for Cyprus. Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis has greeted the plan as a "new beginning for Cyprus" (Reuters). Headlines all over Europe talk about a "last chance for Cyprus". But the Cypriots themselves are rightly more sceptical. There have been many occasions in the past when a breakthrough seemed possible, and there have been other UN proposals (e.g. the 1992 "Boutros Ghali" (1) plan) . Every time, the Cypriot people's hopes were raised, only to be destroyed later on. The key problem with the "new" plan is that it offers nothing new, and will perpetuate the factors that led to the violent divorce of the Turkish and Greek communities on the island. For example, the UN plan allows Greece and Turkey to retain influence over the small island, influence that was at the root of the original problem. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots bear each other few ill feelings, and could quite easily have lived together if violent confrontation had not been engineered by the two ancient rivals after independence from Britain in 1960. In 1974, the Greek junta of the time organised a failed coup, which provided the Turks with a welcome pretext for an invasion they had been keen on for a long time (Cyprus had been under Ottoman rule until it was ceded to Britain in 1878). Britain, former colonial power, "guarantor" of Cypriot independence, and with important military bases on the island, did nothing to prevent the invasion. Similarly, the USA gave tacit authorisation to its Turkish ally for the attack, in which tens of thousands Cypriots (both Greek and Turkish) became refugees overnight. In fact, the UN plan maintains the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, under which Greece, Turkey (the 1974 aggressor) and Britain (the former colonial power), remain guarantor powers of Cyprus "independence"! This could explain why the British High Commission in Nicosia considers that "the UN has come up with a fair and balanced proposal" (Cyprus Mail). Not surprising, also, is the BBC report that Britain "contributed" to the plan. The plan mentions the return of land to the Greek side, as well as the return of a small proportion of refugees from both sides. But land exchange is not a solution; it merely builds more walls between the Greek and Turkish communities. Moreover, any restriction to individuals' freedom of establishment in the place of their choice will be unacceptable once Cyprus joins the EU. Another clause proposes for compensation to be awarded to the majority of refugees whose houses will not be returned after territorial adjustment. But who will pay the compensation? The bankrupt and failed "state" of Northern Cyprus? The equally bankrupt Turkey, for whom such a move would imply acceptance that the 1974 invasion was illegal? From a political angle, the plan envisages a "Swiss-Style" model, with two component states (Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot) and an overall federal government. However, there are significant differences with Switzerland. Switzerland is composed of many cantons, all of which have political equality, and these cantons are not strictly defined along ethnic lines. It is unlikely Switzerland would survive if it were composed merely of two cantons, one French and the other German. The Cypriot model envisages a perpetuation of the ethnic divide, despite minor territorial adjustments in favour of the Greeks. There are great dangers in a state of continuing division, since if both communities do not live together, the entire politics of the country will be divided along ethnic rather than political lines. This is made worse by two more proposals. First, a 10-month rotating presidency, alternating between Greek and Turkish presidents. This would essentially paralyse the executive, and has already been called a "minefield" by the paper "Ta Nea". Similarly, the 50-50 representation for each community in the Senate can only lead to deadlock and alignment along ethnic lines. Secondly, a section of the plan suggests dual citizenship, both of Cyprus and the citizen's ethnic provenance. There should be only one Cypriot citizenship, with all citizens being considered equal in all respects. Only then can centrifugal tendencies can be avoided. This is far more important that who will get which piece of land. The UN did include a provision against secession, but this would not be necessary if Cypriots were allowed to think of themselves as Cypriots first and above all. This can only lead to further conflict. In this sense, the model envisaged for Cyprus is more akin to Bosnia than Switzerland, and things aren't going too well in Bosnia, which survives only as an international protectorate, essentially ruled by Paddy Ashdown. Indeed, the UN plan does little to rid Cyprus of colonial power games, nor to address the status of the remaining British bases, which serve an unclear purpose (they obviously have no defensive value for the islanders). Similarly, Greece and Turkey will be allowed to retain up to 10,000 troops on the island (whose population in only 750,000). Cyprus will also be forced to consult Ankara and Athens if it wishes to host international military operations. This could give Turkey (and thus the USA) a power of veto over EU defence arrangements, since Ankara must be consulted for the stationing of the EU rapid reaction force in Cyprus. Cyprus will also be required to support Turkish accession to the EU (this would suit America, which has tried to pressure the EU into letting Turkey join). It is hard to see how this foreign interference will allow an independent Cypriot identity to be forged. Of course, the UN plan also contains certain laudable efforts for reconciliation. For example, it tentatively suggests the creation of a South-African-style "reconciliation commission". But there is a difference with South Africa. The Turkish and Greek Cypriots can easily be reconciled, but there is an additional complication: the Turkish Cypriots are now a minority in the North. Over the years, they have been replaced by massive immigration from the mainland, organised by Ankara. Despite many UN resolutions against this policy, the new plan accepts the invasion and the first waves of immigration as a fait accompli. In this sense "the Annan plan is no solution or cure. It merely is a confirmation that in 1974 Turkey won a war against Greece and Cyprus", as written in the Greek paper Kathimerini. 28 years have erased the memories of the international community, and an unjust state of affairs resulting from illegal invasion has become a respectable basis for negotiation. The migrants are also more likely to want unification with Turkey, since they have no real sense of a separate Cypriot identity. However, Turkey may have won the war, but it was an empty victory. While the South, fuelled by the energies of thousands of refugees, grew into a developed country with a modern economy, the Dektash administration of the North underwent a steady decline. Thus, the financial incentive of joining the EU as part of a unified Cyprus may help change the minds of the people in the North…assuming the people have a say at all. Indeed, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Dektash, has a very bad track record where democracy is concerned. On the Greek side, a referendum on the proposals is planned in March. For all its flaws, the UN plan is negotiable, and it has the merit of restarting the failing peace talks. It is a tragedy that such a small island (little more than 9,000 km2) should be divided into two antagonist states. Moreover, the longer this partition lasts, the more likely the Turkish occupation of the North will become an accepted fact, the illegal invasion will be forgotten and the division will become permanent. Cypriots must not be blackmailed into accepting an inadequate document, and they must remember that the accession of the Republic of Cyprus (albeit divided) to the EU is guaranteed. The self-proclaimed "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is recognised only by Turkey, who threatens to annex it if the South were to join the EU alone. However, these threats are unlikely to materialise, since Turkey is also an applicant for EU membership, is unlikely to risk its improving relationship with Greece, and Bulent Ecevit (who ordered the 1974 invasion) is finally out of office. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the winning party in the recent elections, is far more conciliatory. Nobody knows what the outcome of the present debate will be, but one thing is sure, "the last say for the acceptance or rejection of the result of the negotiations belongs to the people of Cyprus" (Alithia). After centuries of foreign interference, let us hope that the Cypriot people will finally regain control of their destiny. Footnotes
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