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CAFR II | ||||||||||||
The 1989 CAFR showed that New Jersey had liquid investment funds (cash) of $188 billion of which; common stocks worth $70 billion, $10 billion in loans made by the state due from public and private corporations, and $14 billion in insurance company equity participation. The little state of New Jersey, which admitted to less than $25 billion in annual income on its budget, reported $188 billion in cash, stocks, loans and equity participation on its CAFR. According to Mr. Burien, "On that day, I learned the definition of syndicated organized crime." Keep in mind that most of the revenue and investments from the 21 counties, hundreds of cities, municipalities, school districts, state financial authorities, pension funds, and 69 enterprise authorities, all of which put out their own CAFR or Combined Financial Statement are not inclusive with the state's revenue and investments. Totals here when looking at composite New Jersey government figures is well in excess of 1.8 Trillion dollars. Yep, you heard that right, 1.8 trillion. Divide that figure by the population of New Jersey to see the per capita share of the wealth. So why are the taxes in New Jersey some of the highest in the country? The answered is; Power corrupts, absolute Power corrupts absolutely. Mr. Burien keeps emphasizing to the public that they, the public, left the VAULT door open, and those sharp little crackers said thank you very much. The problem is that most (95%) of the public responds with, Vault, what vault . With this well entrenched attitude of naivety by the public in place, those sharp little crackers now have even stopped saying thank you very much as they plunder the wealth in their unabated efforts towards the building of their own empires within the corporate structure of Composite Government. The scam worked something like this: Anything that was a cost or expense for public services (the traditional side of the Annual Service Budget, such as the Department of Transportation, health and welfare, etc.) was reported on the Budget where public taxes primarily paid 100% of the bill for those services. That was $17 billion. However, any governmental agency that was a profit center (the Port Authority for New Jersey, the New Jersey Turnpike, and investment accounts, etc.) that generated no tax revenue was "restricted by statute from being reported in and benefiting the Annual Budget. Why? Because the state legislature passed laws to prevent reporting the income from investment or venture profit centers on the Budget. Instead, income from these profit centers was disclosed only on the CAFR or other financial reports referenced in the notes of the CAFR. But that disclosure was not immediately apparent. For example, when Mr. Burien looked for New Jersey's 1989 "gross cash receipts" in the CAFR, he found the figure buried on page 174, under the "Waste Water Treatment Trust Fund." It showed the amount of the total cash receipts (Cash Additions) for 1989 from all state agencies, departments and sources was $86.799 billion. In other words, New Jersey State Government from all sources was grossing $87 billion to provide $17 billion in public services as seen in the openly represented Annual Service Budget . New Jersey citizens were paying $5 for every $1 in services they received, and the state was pocketing the other $4 as "profit." |
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When breaking down the true revenue income, the most important revelation was that only one third of the states income came from taxes, fines and fees. Two thirds of state governments income came from Other Sources with no direct tie to the publicly known budget. When looking at the openly disclosed Budget , which each year continued to grow at a runaway pace, here ever expanding taxation primarily covered the expenses. The CAFR also reported the state owned $32 billion in common stocks - but this figure was footnoted. The footnote revealed that the stocks were valued according to their original purchase price, not the current market value. In other words, if the state bought a stock in 1968 at $1.25 a share and it's worth $300 a share now, they still report it on the CAFR as worth $1.25 a share. Burien determined that the true market value for the "$32 billion" in stocks reported on the New Jersey CAFR was actually about $70 billion. But Mr. Burien goes further - he claims that the dual system of books is not unique to New Jersey, but also common among the over 54,000 local government corporate entities operating within all fifty states. Moreover, he claims the dual accounting system used ten years ago in New Jersey was created in 1946 through an organization by the name of GFOA (Government Financial Officers Association) and is the primary local government accounting structure being used today. For example, "In 1987 Arizona's annual service budget reported $2.8 billion in revenues but the state's 1987 CAFR reported total cash receipts of $3.1 billion, a mere $300 million difference." "However, in 1997, Arizona reported an Annual Service Budget of $5.5 billion while the States CAFR (printed by the Auditor General's Office) showed total gross cash receipts of $17 billion. That's a difference of over $11 billion. In just ten years, Arizona had caught up to New Jersey in that both states annual budgets reported less than one third of the actual gross income seen in the states CAFRs. "CAFR and Combined Financial Statement reports indicate that the composite totals for all government (Federal, state, county and city) ownership of publicly traded stocks exceeds $32 TRILLION (53% of the total ownership of all listed stocks from ALL exchanges), $8 TRILLION in insurance company equity (should we be surprised by high priced mandatory auto insurance or unaffordable health care?) and $5 TRILLION in Bond Surety Escrow Accounts for future liability of existing or potential debt. Governments use Bond Surety Escrow Accounts to evade that pesky little rule that government should not operate at a "profit." That is, government should not impose more taxes than it actually uses to run the government. By designating tax revenue that exceeds operating costs as "Bond Surety Escrow" for future liability, government avoids calling excess revenue a "profit" and is thereby enabled to continue to enrich itself at public expense. To illustrate the potential for abusing "future liability payments," consider the New Jersey plan in the 1950s to build the New Jersey State Turnpike and Garden State Parkway Authorities. The state asked voters to approve a $7.5 billion bond to construct the turnpikes. The state explained that these turnpikes would be operated as toll roads by the bondholders until the $7.5 billion bond was paid off - but the bondholders could not operate the toll roads at a profit. Once the bonds were repaid, the turnpikes would revert back into the state s Annual Budget as a normal cost/revenue item. The public voted Yes. Cont ... |
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CAFR III | ||||||||||||
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