I have gathered different views from diverse sources, below, some pertaining to revealed and natural

theology, some addressing faith and reason, others speaking to the reality of contemplation, all integrally

and holistically conceived. What these authors say about one dyad, in my view, can justifiably be said

about the others. I have gathered these materials in support of a notion I may choose to defend one day,

which is that contemplation, broadly conceived, is the highest form of epistemic virtue and, as such, is the

illuminative beacon that might best guide both mystic and scientist in their encounter with reality,

proximate and ultimate. As for any distinctions between natural and theological virtue, acquired/active and

passive contemplation, that is not treated here.

1) Natural religion and positive religion, we have argued, do not exist except in a relationship of mutual

dependence. Consequently, both are legitimately alleged in the service of mutual critique, lest both cease

to be religion and lest both end up distorting true humanity.

Do natural religion and positive religion have equal standing in the relationship? In other words, is the

relationship between the two symmetrical? Or are they related asymmetrically--- that is to say, by way of a

hierarchical relationship?

... any hierarchy occurs, not between two separable elements, but between two distinguishable moments

that are related to each other by way of mutual interpenetration. The attribution of hierarchical superiority

to one, therefore, does not entail the attribution of a separate existence to it.

F.J. van Beeck, __God Encountered__ pp 108-09

2) ... even though theology, as instanced by Aquinas and Rahner, has traditionally opened the systematic

exposition of the Christian faith by an analysis of natural religious knowledge, this has never served to

deny that the Christian faith is epistemologically prior.

F.J. van Beeck, __God Encountered__ pp 139

3) Augustine examines numerous vestigia trinitatis, or, structures in the human mind that parallel the divine

Trinity. Viewed in this way, the treatise's epistemological claim is that because we are like God, we can

come to knowledge of God by looking at ourselves. There are numerous objections counting against this

reading, however.

One immediate reason to reject this interpretation of the vestigia's function is that Augustine explicitly

denies one can extrapolate from the natural world to God. ... ... Second, he is aware of the difficulties

inherent in extrapolation from creation to God, because of the profound difference between the Uncreated

and the created.

A.N. Williams, "Contemplation," __Knowing the Triune God__ edited by Buckley & Yeago, pg. 122

The vestigia, then, are a tool for penetrating belief and grasping it yet more fully, not a means for

establishing the contents of faith independently of, or prior to, Scripture. pg 123

Here we see the distinctiveness of Augustine's epistemology: to know God certainly entails mastery of

information, but it also entails personal contact. pg. 130

The inseparability of knowledge and love in the De Trinitate testifies to Augustine's holistic anthropology:

there is no possibility of the true engagement of one human faculty with God in the absence of the

engagement of the whole person. pg. 130

His point is not so much that human beings resemble God --- as we have seen, he is as acutely aware of the

ontological divide as any other Christian thinker --- but that what is inseparable in God must also be

inseparable in us. The vestigia provide not a lesson in anthropology or natural theology, but in

epistemology. Specifically, they make the claim that the knowledge and love of God are as inseparable as

the persons of the Trinity. ... A second way of asserting the unity of knowledge and love is to point to the

unity of human nature itself ... pp. 134-5

... the status of contemplation in Augustine's thought is ambiguous, seeming to belong exclusively neither

to activity nor to product. ... No more does contemplation belong exclusively either to the intellect or to the

will. pg. 138

... implicitly, it also states a relation between spheres of Christian life that have in our time been sundered

from one another. Because personal apprehension of God must include both knowledge and love,

Augustine's epistemology indicates that we cannot separate theology from spirituality as we have done

increasingly since the Enlightenment. pg. 143

Contemplation is neither the statement of a set of postulates discovered by the assiduous effort of the

human mind, nor some sort of doctrinally denuded reverie. pg. 144

The contemplative character of theology points to not only a disciplinary, but an existential unity. Just as

the contemplation that is theology cannot be separated from the contemplation that is prayer, so an

authentically Christian existence consists in a unity, in virtue of which this life is inseparably wedded to the

next. pg. 147

4) At this point I touch upon complex issues in metaphysics and epistemology about the relationship

between the lives we lead and the beliefs we hold. As Bruce Marshall suggests, our thinking about the

relations between "teaching" and "practice" is interwoven in complex ways with our convictions about

the triune God who creates us and saves us in Word and Spirit. That is, "[o]nly the Spirit whom Jesus sends

from the Father can teach us to recognize in the narratively identified Jesus the Father's own icon, and to

interpret and assess all of our beliefs accordingly." And the "school in which the Spirit teaches us these

hard won skills" is the Church. But the schooling is not just schooling in such teachings or beliefs (e.g.,

from catechism classes at home and in local congregations to college, university and seminary seminars). It

is such schooling only as we learn to engage "in a rich and distinctive array of practices and attitudes,

including worship and prayer in the name of the triune God, and love of neighbor after the pattern of

Christ."

James J. Buckley, "The Wounded Body," __Knowing the Triune God__ edited by Buckley & Yeago, pg.

221

5) And because the intellectualism that James deplored has done at least as much damage in theology and

in philosophy, we can wholeheartedly welcome his insistence that reality is richer than reflection; that it

is not by pure reason alone that we can take our bearings and find our way (quite apart from the fact that

reason is never as pure, as devoid of passion and particular interest, as its advocates suppose it to be); that

quality of feeling is no less important to our well- being than quality of argument ...

Nicholas Lash, _Easter in Ordinary__, pg 86

It is these disjunctive contrasts and, with their aid, the confining of the territory of the personal to the realm

of the individual, private feeling and emotion, which renders the Jamesian account at once so seductive and

so dangerous. The situation is not lacking in tragic irony. By calling us back from the death-dealing rigidity

of institutional order, and from the divisiveness of intellectual debate, to some primordial realm of pure

experience in which the individual may "apprehend" himself to "stand in relation" to that "continuum of

consciousness" of which we each form part, James sought to secure firm foundations for religious truth,

prospects for progress, and a basis for social harmony. And yet, the foundations turn out to be nothing

firmer than the fragile optimism of an excited ego entertaining dubious hypotheses concerning the

paranormal. pg. 88

... a context in which the account given of what it is to be in relation to God was not locked into feeling at

the expense of thought, or into private individual states of mind at the expense of public behavior and

intersubjective patterns of thought and inquiry. It would, finally, be a context in which --- if the

distortions of intellectualism (in James' sense) are to be avoided --- the heart is known to be no less

important for the attainment of truth than the head, and in which the test bed of truth is acknowledged

to be experience. pg. 105

... it is when such distinctions are hardened into dichotomies that the trouble starts: for when did you last

find yourself simply "feeling," without the slightest play or engagement of the mind, or simply

"thinking," without the slightest interest, excitement or distaste? pg. 134

If, for von Hugel, the essence of the scientific method is to be found ( as we shall see) in the submission of

all claims whatsoever to empirical testing, then the "essence of Christianity" is, for him, to be found in the

revelation of "personality" and in the fostering and production of "persons." ... ... Christian experience, on

this account, is experience of participation in what we might call a school for the production of persons.

pg. 148

Reacting rather sharply to what he calls my "unremitting attack on positive analogy," Brown appeals to

Wittgenstein's remark that, logically "positive and negative descriptions are on the same level" with

negative propositions presupposing positive ones and vice versa. ... ... I accept the warning that the way of

negation is misused if it serves, in practice, to furnish us with just the kind of information about God the

possibility of which it in principle denies. This is not, however, the moral that he himself draws from this

warning. "Precisely because negatives are so often simply disguised positives," he says, " the only really

'disciplined way of unknowing' is to admit that one can say nothing at all." pg. 233

It follows that we have, as Christians, no ultimate explanations; that there are, for us, no final solutions. The

Christian, says Rahner, "has less 'ultimate' answers which he could throw off with a 'now the matter's clear'

than anyone else." And when he say that "all human knowing ... is enfolded in an incomprehensibility

which forms an image of the divine incomprehensibility where God reveals himself as the one

without a name," he means, I think, that it is in living in "holy insecurity," in openness to each other and

all truth, not as possessors or centers of the world, that we become, in some measure, the "image of the

imageless one." pg. 240

God is not, of course, an object in space and time nor is he, for that matter, an object "outside" of space and

time (whatever that would mean). Nevertheless, if God is not a figment of our imagination, if it is truly "in

relation" to his incomprehensible mystery that we, and all things, exist and have their being, then, in our

worship of God, our address to God, we may (and do) make mention of him. Except, therefore, on a purely

expressivist account of our use of the term, such mention as we make of God in worship has cognitive

implications: it entails the conviction that there is something that we can truly say "about" God. In

other words, even if the "nature" of God is unknown to us, because we cannot understand God, cannot

grasp him in concept or image, cannot render his mystery comprehensible, we may perhaps, nevertheless,

in relation to him, living in his presence and responding to his address, successfully refer to God, make

true mention of him. ... It therefore follows, from this distinction between reference and description, that

not all questions concerning the possibility of true speech about God are questions concerning the

possibility of offering true descriptions of God. pg. 257

And although such a view is very ancient, for the "notion of regulae fidei goes back to the earliest Christian

centuries," the novel element in Lindbeck's proposal is that on his view the regulative function "becomes

the only job that doctrines do in their role as church teachings." ... Lonergan's work in this area has been

criticized for handling the historical evidence to woodenly and schematically, and, according to Avery

Dulles, Lindbeck's theory of doctrines "unduly minimizes [their] cognitive and expressive import." The

legitimacy of these criticisms can be accepted without (as it seems to me) undermining the central

contention that the primary function of Christian doctrine is regulative rather than descriptive. pg. 260

It is time to go back to the beginning and to consider, once again, how we might move beyond or

"transcend" autonomy without taking flight into either feeling or thought. The suggestion is that we can

do so through conversion, through the awakening of basic trust, the actualization of "relation," the

occurrence of community. ... ... In all relationship, all friendship, all community, there is an element of

risk, because the grammar of relationship is trust rather than control, vulnerability rather than

domination. ... .... the second difference does not lie between fact and feeling, or between word and idea,

but rather between "address" and "presence," clarification and community. pg. 281

Autodidact and polymath, von Hugel, for all his erudition, was not a specialist in any one particular

academic discipline. Everything that came his way was grist to his mill, and it seems likely that his

tendency to lumber, like some unchained beast, across the neatly cordoned gardens of academic

specialization, partly accounts for the neglect from which he has suffered ..." pg. 143 [talking about

johnboy here? ouch!]

6) There is no reason in principle ... to think that nonfoundationalist philosophy could not prove helpful in

illuminating Catholic commitments on any number of issues, especially the proper relationship between

faith and reason.

John E. Thiel, _Senses of Tradition_, pg. 121

7) Janet Soskice makes the point well: "To be a realist about the referent is to be a fallibilist about

knowledge of the referent ... So the theist may be mistaken in his beliefs about the source and cause of all

... for fixing a referent does not on this account guarantee that the referent meets a particular description."

Christopher Mooney, _Theology and Scientific Knowledge_, pg. 17

"Rational argument in theology," says Ian Barbour, "is not a single sequence of ideas, like a chain that is as

weak as its weakest link. Instead, it is woven of many strands, like a cable many times stronger than its

strongest strand." pg. 17

Here we have a source of knowledge that readily acknowledges the theological implications of both a weak

and strong anthropic principle, whatever its value for science. What we must be clear about is that these

theological implications have not one but two epistemological lines --- lines that are distinct in principle,

with radically different sources, subject matter and modes of inquiry. Hence there is no question of casting

disparate data into a single mode, either deducing a divine creative and salvific action in Jesus Christ from

the anthropic arguments of science or finding in Christian revelation information about the physical

structure and specific history of the world. ... ... There is an apt analogy here: these data are like two

meridians on the sphere of the Christian mind. Because Christians believe God to be the source of

each, the two can be examined critically at the equator for signs of both their present consonance and

their possible future convergence at some pole of common vision. pg 63

... whatever science can tell us about the structure and behavior of matter in the universe is of immense

importance for theology, insofar as it provides insight into how God has actually been acting creatively in

the realms of mater and energy. Christian revelation by itself says nothing about these specific realms, yet

whatever science discovers about them, provisional though it may be, belongs to the totality of human

knowledge within which Christian faith must be lived. This is why the full anthropic principle in its two

versions can have such illuminative power as a methodological tool for Christian scientists and theologians.

On the meridian of science, the principle says not only that the emergence of intelligent life on earth

depended on all the fine- tuning extending back to the Big Bang; it also suggests that the fact of intelligence

in the universe actually requires that all of these delicately balanced laws of nature be exactly as they are.

The principle as a scientific principle thus provides data otherwise lacking on the meridian of theology,

where Christians believe they already know about God's design of the cosmos for human life, but have no

idea how God has actually gone about this designing process. While neither meridian's data depend upon

those of the other, the thoughtful Christian can obviously draw insight into reality from both. ... ... The

thoughtful scientist, on the other hand, might possibly as a scientist do the same. For if there was in fact a

Big Bang, as is generally accepted in science today, then this looks a lot like the act of a creator such as the

one Christians (and others) have always believed in; or, minimally, it is not incompatible with this belief.

pg 64

8) It is not just a matter of observation, but of realization. It is not something abstract and general, but

concrete and particular. It is a personal grasp of the existential meaning and value of reality. Thomas

Merton, __The Inner Experience__, pg 60

Contemplation does not back away from reality or evade it. It sees through superficial being and goes

beyond it. This implies a full acceptance of things as they are and a sane evaluation of them. The

"darkness" of the contemplative night is not a rejection of created things. On the contrary, the

contemplative in some way finds and discovers things as they really are, and enjoys them in a higher way

when he rises above contacts with them that are merely sensual and superficial. ... The neurotic, on the

other hand, cannot accept reality as it is. He withdraws into himself and, if he sees things at all, sees only

that aspect of them which he can bear to see, and no other. Or at least he tries to. pg 111

9) This is why Merton tells us over and over again that contemplation is a state of heightened

consciousness. "Contemplation," he writes, "is the highest expression of man's intellectual and spiritual

life. It is life itself, fully awake, fully awake, fully active, full aware that it is alive." One is reminded of

Evelyn Underhill's words: "Only the mystic can be called a whole man, since in others half the powers of

the self always sleep."

William Shannon, __Something of a Rebel__, pg. 78

10) According to John Cassian, liturgical prayer bursts forth in a wordless and ineffable elevation of the

mind and heart which he calls "fiery prayer"--- oratio ignita. Here the "mind is illumined by the infusion of

heavenly light, not making use of any human forms of speech but with all the powers gathered together in

unity it pours itself forth copiously and cries out to God in a manner beyond expression, saying so much in

a brief moment that the mind cannot relate it afterward with ease or even go over it again after returning to

itself.

Thomas Merton, __Contemplative Prayer__, pg. 47

11) I accepted the Cogito ergo sum with less reserve than I should have, although I might have had enough

sense to realize that any proof of what is self-evident must necessarily be illusory. If there are no selfevident

first principles, as a foundation for reasoning to conclusions that are not immediately apparent, how

can you construct any kind of philosophy? If you have to prove even the basic axioms of your metaphysics,

you will never have a metaphysics, because you will never have any strict proof of anything, for your first

proof will involve you in an infinite regress, proving that you are proving what you are proving and so on,

into the exterior darkness where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth. [johnboy notes that Merton exhibits

a little cartesian anxiety here, which does not impress nonfoundationalists.]

Thomas Merton, __The Seven StoreyMountain__, pg.84

12) First of all, the contemplative life demands detachment from the senses, but it is not a complete

rejection of sense experience. It rises above the level of reasoning; yet reasoning plays an essential

part in the interior ascesis without which we cannot safely travel the path of mysticism. Mystical

prayer rises above the natural operation of the intelligence, yet it is always essentially intelligent.

Ultimately, the highest function of the human spirit is the work of the supernaturally transformed

intelligence, in the beatific vision of God. Nevertheless, the will plays an integral part in al contemplation

since there is, in fact, no contemplation without love. Love is both the starting point of contemplation and

its fruition. ... ... Furthermore, contemplation presupposes ascetic action. By this interrelation of the work

of intelligence, will, and the rest of our being, contemplation immolates our entire self to God.

Thomas Merton, __The Ascent to Truth__, pg. 13

Therefore, it must be made quite clear that traditional Christian mysticism, although it is certainly not

intellectualistic in the same sense as the mystical philosophy of Plato and his followers, is nevertheless

neither antirational nor anti-intellectualistic. ... ... The Church does not seek to sanctify men by

destroying their humanity, but by elevating it, with all its faculties and gifts, to the supreme perfection

which the Greek Fathers called "deification." pg. 16

Fearing that domestic peace is no longer possible, faith barricades itself in the attic, and leaves the rest of

the house to reason. Actually, faith and reason are meant to get along happily together. pg.33

... secular philosophers seem unable to make up their minds whether or not there are such things as law of

contradiction or of causality, although they live in the midst of scientific developments that bear witness to

both these fundamental principles of thought. ... ... Not that they don't have brilliant or well-trained minds,

but in their approach to ultimate metaphysical problems their minds are all but paralyzed by a philosophical

equipment that is worse than ineffectual: it leaves them in doubt as to the nature of being, of truth, and even

sometimes of their own existence. ... ... On that level, we are not dealing with faith, but with the rational

preambles to faith. pg. 37

... ... faith has, for its material object, truths which are so profound and which so far exceed our intelligence

that they are called --- and in the highest sense--- mysteries. It is quite obvious that these truths are not easy

to understand and that they present tremendous intellectual difficulty. However, it is not at all true to say

that the mysteries of faith are unintelligible or that their intelligibility does not matter. pg. 42

We receive enlightenment only in proportion as we give ourselves more and more completely to God by

humble submission and love. We do not first see, then act; we act, then see. ... ... And that is why the

man who waits to see clearly, before he will believe, never starts on the journey. pg. 48

... ... St. John of the Cross regarded the First Commandment as a summary of the entire ascetical and

mystical life, up to and including Transforming Union. He tells us in fact that his works are simply an

explanation of what is contained in the commandment to "love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with

all thy soul and with all thy strength." He writes: "For herein man is commanded to employ all his faculties

and desires and operations and affections of his soul in God so the ability and strength of his soul may

serve for no more than this." pg. 55

To sum up: our abstract considerations of false mysticism have shown us that all false mysticism

misconceives the proper roles of knowledge and love in contemplation, as well as the essence of

contemplation itself. pg. 72

It is not so much the presence of concepts in the mind that interferes with the "obscure" mystical

illumination of the soul, as the desire to reach God through concepts. There is therefore no question of

rejecting all conceptual knowledge of God but of ceasing to rely only on concepts as a proximate

means of union with Him. pg. 89

According to this false view the phenomenal world, the body with its senses, language, concepts, logic,

the reasoning mind, the will that is moved by love --- all must be silenced and rejected. ..... ... The kind

of asceticism that literally seeks to destroy what is human in man in order to reduce the spirit to an innate

element that is purely divine is founded on a grave metaphysical error. The gravity of that error ought to be

immediately apparent from the very fact that man's spiritual and psychological health depends on the

right order and balance of his whole being --- body and soul. pg. 109

The passage from philosophical understanding to faith is marked by a gift of ourselves to God. The

moment of transition is the moment of sacrifice. The passage from faith to that spiritual understanding

which is called contemplation is also a moment of immolation. It is the direct consequence of a more

complete and radical gift of ourselves to God. pg. 116

In other words, grace does not destroy nature, but elevates it and consecrates it to God. Men do not

becomes saints by ceasing to be men. ... ... Reason must serve us in our struggle for perfection. But it does

not fight under its own standard. Reason alone is not our captain. It is enlisted in the service of faith. ... ...

The great paradox of St. John of the Cross is that his asceticism of night cannot possibly be practiced

without the light of reason. It is by the light of reason that we keep on traveling through the night of

faith. pg. 155

St. John of the Cross aims at nothing more or less, in his asceticism, than the right ordering of man's

whole being ... ... "The soul that is perfect is wholly love ... all its actions are love, and it employs all its

faculties and possessions in loving." pg. 157

Let me explain in a way that ought to be acceptable even to those who secretly lament the fact that they do

not have infinite stomachs, in order to devour all the fried chicken in the universe. You cannot gain the

possession of all the being and all the goodness contained in all the food in the world by grimly sitting

down to the task of eating everything in sight. Despite the ambitions of Gargantua, our bodies are not

equipped for this feat. ... ... Nevertheless, all the reality that exists, and all the goodness of everything that

exists and is good, can be spiritually tasted and enjoyed in a single metaphysical intuition of being and

goodness as such. The clean, intellectual delight of such an experience makes all of the inebriation

procured by wine look like a hangover. pg. 197

The true fulfillment of reason as a faculty is found when it can embrace the truth simply and without

labor in the light of a single intuition. pg. 204

We have seen that in the natural order our knowledge proceeds from the intuitive grasp of a few selfevident

first principles, through a process of discursive reasoning on the evidence of sense experience, to

conclusions in which the mind rests, once again, in intuition. It is the same in the order of faith. When we

begin, the first principles of our belief are apt to be vague and cold to us, because we cannot see below their

surface. ... ... Now, as Aristotle somewhere says, when a man is learning to play a harp he has to think of

every movement he makes. He is conscious of the distinct effort to find each proper note and to strike the

right string. But when he is a proficient player, he no longer is aware of what he is doing with his fingers.

His mind is not concerned with each separate movement to be made. His hands move easily over the strings

as though by instinct, and the mind of the musician is no longer concentrated on technical details but loses

itself in the enjoyment of the music he is drawing from the instrument. In the same way, when we have

learned how to meditate, the truths of God present themselves spontaneously to our minds.We do

not always have to work them out by discourse; we need only to enjoy them in the deep and satisfying

gaze of intuition. pg. 208

The function of discretion in the beginnings of mystical prayer is to discover the true way that lies

between extremes. Reason guided by faith must be on the alert and give the will sufficient light to reject

either impulses to overactivity or tendencies to sloth. pg. 229

Saint John is chiefly talking about what is to be done at the time of prayer. The activity he requires of the

soul must be elicited by the understanding and will together. It is very simple. It has three stages or

"moments." pg. 237

The function of the intelligence is to guarantee the purity of faith, hope and charity, not by much

reasoning and subtlety but by the constant ascetical discernment between the illusions of subjectivism and

the true light which comes from God. pg. 246

St. Thomas himself is there to prove that there is no reason why God should not pour out His purest

graces of mystical prayer even upon a professor, just as St. Teresa remains a monument to the truth

that God can raise you to ecstasy while you are trying to fry eggs. pg. 285

John of St. Thomas is one of those speculative theologians who cannot reach the average educated man

except through a mediator who is willing to translate his thought into ordinary terms. The issues which

concern such theologians are generally matters of such minute detail that this work of mediation is scarcely

ever worth while. pg. 334 [another statement re: johnboy? ouch!]

The good order of the soul with which we are concerned here is not simply an ethical or moral

perfection. St. John of the Cross is not considering merely the level of perfection on which men

refrain from cheating each other in business, go to Mass on Sundays, give alms now and then to the

poor, and lend their lawnmower to the people next door without even cursing under their breath. pg.

163

But the very fact that all conversions do not have this experiential element and that, indeed, many

conversions are hardheaded and "cold," lends weight to the thomistic argument which distinguishes bare

faith from faith illumined by the Gifts. And I may add, parenthetically, that the convert whose faith is

emotionally "cold" and is not inflamed with an element of quasi-mystical experience is not therefore less

virtuous or less pleasing in the sight of God. It may, in fact, require great charity to allow oneself to be

led, in spite of temperamental or hereditary disinclination, by force of rational demonstration alone,

to an unemotional acceptance of the faith. pg. 212

13) If we do not try to be perfect in what we write, perhaps it is because we are not writing for God after

all. In any case it is depressing that those who serve God and love him sometimes write so badly, when

those who do not believe in Him take pains to write so well. I am not talking about grammar and syntax,

but about having something to say and saying it in sentences that are not half dead. St. Paul and St. Ignatius

Martyr did not bother about grammar but they certainly knew how to write. Imperfection is the penalty of

rushing into print. And people who rush into print do so not because they really have anything to say, but

because they think it is important for something by them to be in print. The fact that your subject may be

very important in itself does not necessarily mean that what you have written about it is important. A bad

book about the love of God remains a bad book ... [another statement re: johnboy? ouch!]

Thomas Merton, __The Sign of Jonas__, pg. 59

14) In the last book to come to us from the hand of Raissa Maritain, her commentary on the Lord's Prayer,

we read the following passage, concerning those who barely obtain their daily bread, and are deprived of

most of the advantages of a decent life on earth by the injustice and thoughtlessness of the privileged: "If

there were fewer wars, less thirst to dominate and exploit others, less national egoism, less egoism of class

and caste, if man were more concerned for his brother, and really wanted to collect together, for the good of

the human race, all the resources which science places at his disposal especially today, there would be on

earth fewer populations deprived of their necessary sustenance, there would be fewer children who die or

are incurably weakened by undernourishment." ... ... She goes on to ask what obstacles man has placed in

the way of the Gospel that this should be so. It is unfortunately true that those who have complacently

imagined themselves blessed by God have in fact done more than others to frustrate his will.

Thomas Merton, __Contemplative Prayer, pg. 113

Want a person to laugh? Cannot order them to laugh. Must tell them a joke.

Want a person to love? Cannot order them to love you. Must give them a hug

(or chocolates or roses or time and space).

Want to lead a person to Ultimate Reality? Must tell them a story and tell

them a joke and give them a hug.

What you write implies, properly, that the hermeneutical is unconditional.

One’s commitment to the virtues of faith, hope and love are not derived from

and do not depend on any findings in the practical, empirical or rational

realms. That is why they are called faith, hope and love and not, rather,

science, logic and pragmatics. And, yes, a TOE must include the

hermeneutical. A TOE must include the rational, empirical and practical as

well as the smell of apple pie. So, the Big TOE will have data, charts,

graphs, diagrams ... and, necessarily will include .... stories. It is not

fully constructed in a manner that lends itself solely to logical proof,

empirical demonstration or practical experience ... but it would partially

include those things ... along with a story ... that included jokes and

tear-jerkers. That’s why it is called a metanarrative and not just a

metaphysics. So, it will include some elements that can be proven, some that

can be demonstrated, some that can be experienced ... ... all of which can

be, more or less, KNOWN with varying degrees of confidence ... a confident

assurance in things hoped for and a conviction of things not seen. Along with a fundamental trust in

uncertain reality.

So, let me tell you this story ... from this book that addresses all of

these levels --- empirical, rational, practical and hermenutical, although

we call it literal-historical, allegorical-creedal, moral and anagogical: In

the beginning was the Word ... Here is a man who was born in an obscure

village, the child of a peasant woman. He grew up in another village. He

worked in a carpenter shop until He was thirty. Then for three years He was

an itinerant preacher.

He never owned a home. He never wrote a book. He never held an office. He

never had a family. He never went to college. He never put His foot inside a

big city. He never traveled two hundred miles from the place He was born. He

never did one of the things that usually accompany greatness. He had no

credentials but Himself...

While still a young man, the tide of popular opinion turned against him. His

friends ran away. One of them denied Him. He was turned over to His enemies.

He went through the mockery of a trial. He was nailed upon a cross between

two thieves. While He was dying His executioners gambled for the only piece

of property He had on earth - His coat. When He was dead, He was laid in a

borrowed grave through the pity of a friend.

Nineteen, make that twenty, long centuries have come and gone, and today He

is a centerpiece of the human race and leader of the column of progress.

I am far within the mark when I say that all the armies that ever marched,

all the navies that were ever built; all the parliaments that ever sat and

all the kings that ever reigned, put together, have not affected the life of

man upon this earth as powerfully as has that one solitary life.