MacKenzie, David, and Michael W. Curran. Russia and the USSR in the Twentieth Century. 4th ed. Wadsworth Group. 2002.

Did Stalin Plan to Attack Nazi Germany in July 1941?

Was Hitler or Stalin responsible for the outbreak of the bloody and destructive Nazi-Soviet War? The traditional Western and Soviet view was that Nazi Germany launched a sudden and unprovoked attack—Operation Barbarossa—on an innocent USSR on June 22, 1941. That interpretation views the Nazi- Soviet War as the result of unprovoked but planned Nazi aggression against a Stalin anxious to avoid a conflict. In sharp contrast stands Viktor Suvorov's (pseudonym for Viktor Rezun) article of 1985, and 1988 book Icebreaker, asserting that Stalin was preparing to attack Nazi Germany on July 6, 1941, invade Western Europe and communize it. In his Day-M book of 1994, Suvorov claimed that Stalin had decided in August 1939 on such a Soviet war of conquest as an "icebreaker" to arouse European workers to initiate a socialist revolution.
Suvorov's "icebreaker" thesis was promptly criticized by Western scholars as bad journalism based on inadequate and false documentation. A devastating critique came from the Russian scholar Gabriel Gorodetsky in The Icebreaker Myth (1995), then in Grand Delusion (1999),9 based on exceptional access to Russian archives. Some German scholars, anxious to exonerate Hitler and blacken Stalin and Soviet Russia, accepted much of Suvorov's thesis. They claimed Hitler only turned against the USSR after learning of the planned Soviet invasion of Germany. Some Russian scholars in the post-Soviet era have partially supported Suvorov's claims.
Here we will present the pros and cons of this still hotly disputed controversy for student evaluation. First, comes a summary of the Suvorov thesis followed by critiques of one Russian and one American scholar. Then we will summarize recent German and Russian partial support for Suvorov and a brief conclusion.

The Suvorov Thesis
Viktor Rezun, who defected to the West from Russian Military Intelligence, adopted the pseudonym Suvorov, the name of Catherine the Great's brilliant general. Beginning in 1985 he affirmed that Stalin had been seeking a war between Germany and the West since the rise of Hitler, which he had promoted—viewing a Nazi attack against western European countries as an "icebreaker" that could reopen the possibility of a Communist revolution in Europe. The European working class would acquire a powerful ally in the form of the Red Army, which Stalin would insert after the competing "imperialist powers" had exhausted one another in war. Suvorov asserted that Stalin planned to attack Nazi German forces on July 6, 1941, reach Western Europe and communize it. Suvorov envisioned thousands of Soviet wheeled tanks speeding along Germany's Autobahnen. Stalin's plan was frustrated, noted Suvorov, when the Nazis, discovering Soviet preparations, launched "Operation Barbarossa," a preemptive strike that was amazingly successful because it caught Soviet forces in forward deployment preparing to strike west and thus unprepared for defensive operations. Claimed Suvorov:
I would like to suggest that, from the beginning of the war, the Soviet communists made accusations against every country in the world with the deliberate intention of concealing their own role as instigators (of World War II) (xv).
From the 1920s on ... Stalin revived the strike power of German militarism. Certainly not against himself . . . [but] so that war could be declared on the rest of Europe. Stalin understood that a powerful, aggressive army does not start a war by itself.
A mad, fanatical leader is also needed. Stalin did a great deal to see that just such a leader [Hitler] should appear at the head of the German nation. Once the fascists had come to power, Stalin persistently and doggedly pushed towards war ... In the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939), Stalin guaranteed Hitler freedom of action in Europe and, in effect, opened the floodgates of the Second World War (xvi).
Even before the Nazis came to power, the Soviet leaders had given Hitler the unofficial name of "Icebreaker for the Revolution." . . . The communists understood that Europe would be vulnerable only in the event of war and that the Icebreaker for the Revolution could make it vulnerable. Unaware of this, Adolf Hitler cleared the way for world communism by his actions. . . . The Icebreaker committed the greatest crimes against the world and humanity, and in so doing, placed in Stalin's hands the moral right to declare himself the liberator of Europe at any time he chose. . . . Stalin understood better than Hitler that a war is won by that side which enters it last and not by the one which goes into it first. Stalin granted Hitler the doubtful honor of being the first, while he himself prepared for his unavoidable entry into the war "after all the capitalists (will) have fought amongst themselves." (Stalin, VI, 158) (xvi-xvii).

In a chapter towards the end of Icebreaker entitled "The War Which Never Was," Suvorov affirmed:
Hitler considered that a Soviet invasion was inevitable, but he did not expect it to happen in the very near future. German troops were diverted to activities of secondary importance, and the beginning of Operation Barbarossa was postponed. The operation finally began on 22 June 1941. Hitler himself clearly did not realize what a tremendous stroke of luck he had had. If Operation Barbarossa had been put off again ... to July 22, Hitler would have had to do away with himself considerably earlier than in 1945.
Suvorov was referring to Stalin's alleged plan to attack Nazi Germany on 6 July 1941:
There are quite a few indications that the date for the beginning of the Soviet Operation Groza ("Thunderstorm") was fixed for 6 July 1941. . . . Zhukov and Stalin liked to deliver their surprise strikes on Sunday mornings, and 6 July 1941 was the last Sunday before the concentration of Soviet troops was complete (pp. 344-45).
Then Suvorov described the scenario for "Operation Groza":
At 3:30 A.M. Moscow time on 6 July 1941, tens of thousands of Soviet guns shatter the silence, announcing to the world that the great "liberation" campaign of the Red Army has begun. The Red Army's artillery is superior both in quality and quantity to any in the world. There are vast reserves of ammunition stockpiled on the Soviet frontiers (p. 345).
Suvorov asserted that Stalin had decided on a war of conquest at a meeting of the Politburo of August 19, 1939 (p. 345).

Refutations of the "Icebreaker" Thesis
Gabriel Gorodetsky, a contemporary Russian scholar, had crossed literary swords with Viktor Rezun, better known as Suvorov, ever since the latter had presented his "icebreaker" thesis, stating:
Suvorov depicted Soviet Russia as the aggressor, rather than the victim,in June 1941. He advanced the preposterous and unsubstantiated claim that throughout 1930-41 Stalin had been meticulously preparing a revolutionary war against Germany. Operation "Groza" was planned for 6 July 1941 but was preempted by Hitler's own invasion of Russia. The implication is breathtaking: in executing his foreign policy, Stalin, like Hitler, was pursuing a master plan which sought world domination by transforming the Second World War into a revolutionary war.
The acclaim that Icebreaker of Suvorov received in Russia and Germany, and the failure of Russian military and diplomatic historians to condemn it, induced Gorodetsky, after careful examination of numerous archival materials, to denounce it in his Grand Delusion:
As a former master of disinformation in the GRU (Russian Military Intelligence), Suvorov exploited the fact that the period in question was rife with myth and conspiracy, most of it deliberately propagated. . . . The popularity of Suvorov's flimsy and fraudulent work in Russia and in many quarters in the West proves that the oldest, stalest conspiracies survive longest. His books engender myths and consistently and deliberately obstruct the search for truth by simplifying a complex situation (x).
Suvorov's views, continued Gorodetsky, coincided with a bitter debate in Germany about the nature and course of its history, known as Historikerstreit. Thus some German and Austrian scholars adopted Suvorov's views in order to support their defense of the policies of Nazi Germany. "If Stalin had indeed been intent on 'liberating' Central Europe, then Hitler's decision to fight Russia could no longer be viewed ... as a strategic folly or crude aggressive act" (x).
The American military historian, David B. Glantz,10 who has devoted much writing to the history of the Red Army, rejected Suvorov's conclusions about Stalin's offensive military plans and the Red Army's ability to launch a massive invasion of central Europe in July 1941:
Thus Rezun (Suvorov) resurrected the hitherto muffled and generally discounted argument. . . . that Stalin and his cronies were directly responsible for fostering the outbreak of the war. ... In Icebreaker Rezun documented his contentions with personal recollections and material culled from a host of Soviet open sources with questionable regard to context. While claiming to have had access to classified archival materials while serving as a captain and major in the Soviet Army over twenty years ago, he undercut the possible arguments of those who might use such materials in the future to refute his claims by asserting that the most controversial information in the archives has been suppressed or removed. At the least one can validly question how an officer of his lowly rank could have had access to such material in the first place and, if he had access, how could he recall the minute details of such an extensive collection after so long a period.
In his expose, Rezun wove a complex mass of credible facts taken from Soviet memoirs and postwar studies into a less credible web of intrigue surrounding the circumstances associated with the outbreak of war. . . . He presented considerably less evidence to support his more radical contentions concerning Stalin's war plans for 1941. . . . He contended that Stalin planned offensive action in the summer of 1941 (specifically, on 6 July), that he deliberately mobilized and deployed a massive strategic second echelon to achieve victory . . . consisting of imposing "black-shirted" NKVD formations and crack shock armies . . . , that Stalin deliberately dismantled existing defensive fortifications to facilitate his impending offensive, and that General A.M. Vasilevsky. . . . was the architect and designated implementer of Stalin's cunning plan (pp. 4-5).

Thus Glantz found Suvorov's whole case regarding Soviet intentions in 1941 incredible because of his misuse and distortion of often-questionable source materials. Four years of catastrophic purges, affirmed Glantz, and in the midst of a badly handled force expansion and rearmament program, "the Red Army was clearly not suited to the conduct of large-scale offensive operations in summer 1941" (pp. 6-7).

Recent Russian Evaluation of the "Icebreaker" Thesis
Since the collapse of the USSR, Russian scholars have been free to reach their own conclusions about controversial questions relating to Soviet history. On the back cover of Stalin's Lost Chance, by Mikhail Mel'tiukov,11 contemporary Russian historian, appears:
Political conditions for a blow at Germany on the part of the USSR were sufficiently favorable. Unfortunately, Stalin, fearing an Anglo-German compromise, as a minimum delayed for a month the attack on Germany which was the only chance to defeat a German invasion. Probably, this decision is one of the basic historic miscalculations of Stalin, losing a favorable opportunity to destroy the most powerful European state and by going to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, to eliminate a longstanding Western threat to our country. As a result the German leadership could begin on June 22, 1941 the realization of the plan, "Barbarossa," which under the conditions of unpreparedness of the Red Army for defense, led to the tragedy of the year 1941 (for Russia).
Since 1993, noted Mel'tiukov, the military and political problems of the USSR on the eve of the Great Fatherland War (Nazi-Soviet War) were at the center of a discussion sparked by the publication in Russia of Suvorov's books. "Although written in a genre of historical journalism and representing a type of 'puff-pastry,' in which truth is mixed with half-truths and lies, they rather clearly outlined the circle of problems . . . insufficiently developed in (Soviet) historiography." New materials and investigations, argued Mel'tiukov, showed that the traditional official Soviet version about the exclusively defensive intentions of the USSR was invalid (p. 8).

An Austrian Reinforcement of "Icebreaker"
In 1985, before Suvorov's book on the "icebreaker" theory, the Austrian scholar and former Wehrmacht soldier Ernst Topitsch,12 reached some similar conclusions regarding Stalin's plans to attack Hitler and move westward in 1941 or 1942. In his preface to Stalin's War, Topitsch argues:
Hitler and Nazi Germany forfeit their position at the centre of the stage and make only episodic appearances—chess pieces rather than players— forming part of a long-term strategy already conceived by Lenin which aimed at the subjugation of the "capitalist world." . . .
Topitsch went on to emphasize the key role and outstanding ability of Stalin revealed during World War II and to deprecate Hitler's role and prescience: "It became more and more apparent that Stalin was not only the real victor, but also the key figure in the war; he was, indeed, the only statesman who had at the time a clear, broadly-based idea of his objectives." Topitsch stressed that his purpose in composing "a radical new theory" of the origins of World War II was not to exonerate Adolf Hitler but "rather to reduce the German dictator to his real political and intellectual stature and to correct the widely accepted overestimation of his ability." Stalin, affirmed the Austrian, had utilized and exploited Hitler's weaknesses to spark the outbreak of World War II:
What we know of the development of the Red Army in the spring and early summer of 1941 . . . speaks much more for than against the aggressive intentions of the Kremlin. ... By late summer the preparations for a mass offensive against Germany would have been concluded and such an attack was planned for 1942. The latter date was named by Stalin himself on 5 May 1941 in a private speech to officer cadets. . . . Stalin had excellent information about German plans and preparations for (Operation) Barbarossa, but in spite of this, he did nothing to guard his forces against the tactical surprise of the invasion. . . . There is a red thread woven into the fabric of these events, a thread which represents a well-conceived policy, positioned with astonishing finesse and carried into practice in accordance with clear and logical principles. This proves Stalin to be a statesman of genius . . . , far superior to Hitler and those guiding the destiny of the western powers. ... It was Stalin who emerged the real victor of the Second World War.
After the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, affirmed Topitsch, Hitler became the dupe of Stalin, who utilized him to defeat France in 1940 and drive the British from the European continent. That Nazi victory "would naturally shake the capitalist world to its foundations and open up the possibility of revolutionary subversion in the centres of 'imperialism.'" The German conquest of France, asserted Topitsch, finally created the situation Stalin had hoped for. "The 'imperialist' war had now broken out in all its violence." He continued:
Without knowing it or wanting to, the Germans had performed a surprising and very important service for Moscow: they had eliminated the military capacity of Russia's most important opponent, the Western powers, from the continent. . . . Only the Wehrmacht stood between the Red Army and the Atlantic. If the German army were defeated, the Soviets would be masters of the European continent.
Up to then, affirmed Topitsch, Hitler had unwittingly aided Stalin, but after summer 1940 he became a hindrance "whose removal. . . wouldn't seem to be too great a task." The author then cited clues to suggest Stalin's resolve to exploit a unique opportunity. On June 30, 1940, Foreign Minister Molotov told the Lithuanian foreign minister: "We are more than ever convinced that our brilliant comrade Lenin made no mistake when he asserted that the Second World War would enable us to seize power in Europe. . . ." Thus Hitler was to be utilized as "a battering ram against the allegedly strongest bastion of capitalism, Great Britain." Topitsch intimated that the Kremlin decided to embark on an offensive strategy right after the Nazi victory over France.
Topitsch concluded from a Molotov speech in August 1940 that Stalin aimed to provoke Nazi Germany to attack the USSR "in order then to inflict a defeat by counterattack, and so gain mastery over the continent of Europe. The USSR, asserted the author, "felt itself more and more in the position ... in case of war (in) . . . completely wiping out the enemy aggressor on his own territory." Regarding this as his "new theory," Stalin ordered it tried out in war games and exercises -during the winter of 1940-41. However, his plans were preempted by the Nazi invasion of June 1941. "Yet Operation Barbarossa not only covered up Stalin's plans (for an attack) to perfection, but ensured the complete success of his intention to thrust onto Hitler the odium of the aggressor" (pp. 4, 8-9, 40-41, 54, 66, 69,119).

What, then, is our verdict on the "Icebreaker" theory? Despite its considerable support by some Russian and German scholars, most historians reject it for (1) lack of adequate documentary proof of a Soviet assault plan for July 1941; (2) evident weaknesses and shortcomings in the Red Army in 1941 that would have made its implementation virtually impossible; (3) Stalin's basic caution and reluctance to place the USSR at risk, as shown by his appeasement of Hitler in 1940-41; (4) the absence, as Stalin surely realized, of any significant revolutionary sentiment or agitation among European workers; and (5) most scholars who support "Icebreaker" or a variant thereof appear personally motivated—Russians in order to vilify Stalin and the USSR, Germans to exonerate Hitler of responsibility for provoking World War II. Most scholars thus still accept the view that Hitler was the aggressor in June 1941 against Soviet Russia in Operation Barbarossa. •

8 Viktor Suvorov, Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War? trans. T. R. Beattie (London, 1990).
9 Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT, 1999).
10 David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence, KS, 1998).
11 Mikhail Mel'tiukov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina (Moscow, 2000).
12 Ernst Topitsch. Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War (London, 1987).

Suggested Additional Reading
ANDREYEV, C. Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement ... (Cambridge, 1987).
ARMSTRONG, J. A. Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison, WI, 1964).
ARONSEN, L., and M. KITCHEN. The Origins of the Cold War in Comparative Perspective... 1941-48 (New York, 1988).
BACON, E. The Gulag at War: Stalin's forced Labour System in the Light of the Archives (New York, 1994).
BEEVOR, A. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943 (New York, 1998).
DIALER, S. Stalin and His Generals ... (New York, 1969).
BOTERBLOEM, K. Life and Death under Stalin: Kalinin Province, 1945-1953 (Montreal, 1999).
BREINDEL, E. TheVerona Secrets: The Soviet Union's World War II Espionage Campaign against the United States (Boulder, CO, 2000).
BRZEZINSKI, Z. The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, 2d ed. (Cambridge, MA, 1961).
BUHITE, R. D. Soviet-American Relations in Asia 1945-1954 (Norman, OK, 1981).
CARRELL, P. Scorched Earth: The Russian-German War, 1943-44 (Boston, 1970).
CHUIKOV, V. I. The Battle for Stalingrad (New York, 1964).
CLARK, A. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945 (New York, 1965).
CLEMENS, D. S. Yalta (New York, 1970).
CONQUEST, R. The Nation Killers: Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (New York, 1970).
COOPER, M. The Nazi War Against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944 (New York, 1979).
COUNTS, G. S. The Country of the Blind: The Soviet System of Mind Control (Westport, CT, 1959).
CRAIG, W. Enemy at the Gates:... Stalingrad (New York, 1973).
DALLIN, A. German Rule in Russia, 1941-45 (New York, 1957,1980).
DOUGLAS, R. From War to Cold War 1942-48 (New York, 1981).
DMYTRYSHYN, B. Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918-1953 (New York, 1956).
DUNN, W. S., JR. The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945 (Westport, CT, 1995).
ERICKSON, J. The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany (New Haven, CT, 1999).
---------. The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of
Stalin's War with Germany (Boulder, CO, 1983).
FEIS, H. Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin (Princeton, 1957).
FISCHER, G. Soviet Opposition to Stalin (Cambridge, MA, 1952).
FUGATE, B. Operation Barbarossa (Novato, CA, 1984).
GORODETSKY, G. Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT, 1999).
GLANTZ, D. M. Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence, KS, 2000).
---------. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of
World War (Lawrence, KS, 1998).
GLANTZ, DAVID M., and J. M. HOUSE. The Battle of Kursk (Lawrence, KS, 1999).
HAHN, W. G. Postwar Soviet Politics ... 1946-53 (Ithaca, NY, 1982).
HARBUTT, F. The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York and Oxford, 1986).
HARRISON, M. Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden, 1940-1945 (Cambridge, Eng., 1996).
HAYWARD, J. S. Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East (Lawrence, KS, 1998).
HERRING, G. Aid to Russia, 1941-46 ... (New York, 1973).
HOLLOWAY, D. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, CT, 1994).
KORIAKOV, M. I'll Never Go Back: A Red Army Officer Talks, trans. N. Wreden (New York, 1948).
KUZNETSOV, A. BabiYar, trans. D. Floyd (New York, 1970).
LIDDELL-HART, B. H. The Red Army ... (Gloucester, MA, 1956).
LIGHTBODY, B. The Cold War (New York, NY, 1999).
LOTH, W. Stalin's Unwanted Child: the Soviet Union, the German Question and the Founding of the GDR, trans. Robert Hogg. (New York, 1998).
LUCAS, J. S. War on the Eastern Front 1941-45 (New York, 1982).
LYONS, G., ed. The Russian Version of the Second World War (New York, 1983).
MASTNY, V. Russia's Road to the Cold War ... (New York, 1979).
MCCAGG, W. O. Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978).
NAIMARK, N. and L. GIBIANSKI, eds. The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949 (Boulder, CO, 1998).
NEKRICH, A. M. The Punished Peoples ..., trans. G. Saunders (New York, 1978).
PATERSON, T. G., and R. J. MCMAHON, eds. The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA, 1991).
PETROV, V., comp.June 22,1941 (Columbia, SC, 1968). PURDUE, A. W. The Second World War (New York, 1999).
REDLICH, S. War, Holocaust and Stalinism (Toronto, 1995).
REESE, R. R. The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 (London and New York, 2000).
REINHARDT, K. The Turning Point: The Failure of Hitler's Strategy in the Winter of'1941-42, trans. Karl B. Keenan (Oxford and New York, 1992).
RZHESHEVSKY, O. War and Diplomacy: The Making of a Grand Alliance (Toronto, 1996).
SALISBURY, H. The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (New York, 1969).
SEATON, A. Stalin as Military Commander (New York, 1976).
SHULMAN, M. Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge, MA, 1963).
SIMONOV, K. Days and Nights (New York, 1945). (Novel on Stalingrad.)
SNELL, J., ed. The Meaning of Yalta (Baton Rouge, 1956). STEENBERG, S. Vlasov (New York, 1970).
TARRANT, V. E. Stalingrad: Anatomy of an Agony (New York, 1992).
VITUKHIN, L, ed. Soviet Generals Recall World War E (New York, 1981).
WERTH, A. Russia at War, 1941-45 (New York, 1964, 1984).
WOHLFORTH, W. C. The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, NY, 1993).
ZAWODNY, J. K. Death in the Forest: ...the Katyn Forest Massacre (Notre Dame, 1980).
---------. Nothing But Honour: The Story of the Warsaw
Uprising, 1944 (Stanford, 1978).
ZHUKOV, G. E. Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles (New York, 1969).
ZINNER, P. Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1948 (New York, 1963).
ZUBOK, V., and C. PLESHAKOV. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA, 1996).

"ICEBREAKER" THEORY: BOOKS [RF: discussing the topic in general]

BEEVOR, A. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943 (New York, 1998).
DUNN, W. S. Jr. Hitler's Nemesis: The Red Army, 1930-1945 (New York, 1994).
GLANTZ, D. M. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence, KS, 1998).
GLANTZ, D. M. and J. HOUSE. When Titans Clash: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS, 1995).
GORKOV, I. Kremi, Stavka, Genshtab (Tver, 1995).
GORODETSKY, G. Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT, 1999).
MELTIUKHOV, M. Upushchennyi shuns Stalina (Moscow, 2000).
NEVEZHIN, V. Sindrom nastupatel 'noi voiny (Moscow, 1997).
RAACK, R. Stalin's Drive to the West, 1939-1945 (Stanford, CA, 1995).
SEVOSTYANOV, P. Before the Nazi Invasion: Soviet Diplomacy in September 1939-June 1941 (Moscow, 1984 [a Soviet view]).
STOLFI, R.H.S. Hitler's Panzers East (Norman, OK, 1991).
SUVOROV, V. (Viktor Rezun). Den'M. 6 iuliia 1941 (Moscow, 1994).
---------Posledniai'a respublika (Moscow, 1996).
---------. Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?
trans. T. R. Beattie (London, 1990).
TOPITSCH, E. Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War (London, 1987).
WEINBERG, G. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War E (Cambridge, England, 1994).

DALLIN, A. "Stalin and the German Invasion," Soviet Union, XVIII, nos. 1-3 (1991): pp 19^37.
KIPP, J. W. "Barbarossa, Soviet Covering Forces and the
Initial Period of War___" The Journal of Slavic Military
Studies 1,2 (June 1988): 188-212.
NEVEZHIN, V. A. "The Pact with Germany and the Idea of an 'Offensive War', 1939-1941)," /SMS 8, 4 (December 1995), pp. 809-843.
ULDRICKS, T. "The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?"Slavic Review (Fall 1999).


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