Barry L. Ritholtz
Terror Analysis


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Terror Analysis


The following analysis of the terror attacks in New York and Washington D.C. was written by a correspondent (who wishes to remain anonymous) of Don Hays, former Market Strategist of Wheat First Union. Don thought it significant enough to post to his subscribers.

I found this report to be uniquely insightful in its appraisal of the post-9/11 political and military situation. It is written from an (obviously) Western perspective, by someone who is familiar with the byzantine ways of the Middle Eastern Geopolitics.

The author's capabilities include analyzing Military Intel, and reaching conclusions re: political and strategic repercussions of the attack and US responses. More importantly, he cogently has examined these issues and concludes what can possibly happen, and what will most likely happen.

I hope you find it as informative (and fascinating) as I did.



First, let me summarize the strategic aims of the two major players: bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, and the U.S.

Make no mistake—bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization are rational operators. Whatever else they may be, they are not stupid and they are not functionally delusional. Their goals are apparently nothing less than a complete Western withdrawal from contact with the Mideast and Islamic Asia. To accomplish this, they have settled on a tactic of apparently random, destabilizing attacks on America and other Western countries. This is probably coupled with direct attempts to destabilize secular governments in Islamic nations such as Egypt and Indonesia, or in Islamic regions of non-Islamic countries, such as the Moro separatists in the Philippines. By staging these attacks, al Qaeda seemingly hopes to provoke U.S. attacks against Muslim countries that will prove that America is quite simply out to destroy Islam, and so Western cultural forms must be shunned and Western power held at bay. Thus, their essential aim is to convince a critical mass of Muslims that they must reject globalization and accept the life wished on them by the radical imams. This war, like most is rooted in problems of the political economy.

The U.S. has three overriding aims: The first is the most immediate, to prevent any future attacks that have already been set up and damage the al-Qaeda organization enough that it is incapable of executing more. The second is more psychological: to be seen to extensively punish any states which offered significant support to al-Qaeda, in such a way as to present a deterrent to future state-sponsored terrorism. The third is the most elusive.

In the long term, the U.S. must ensure trade with, and responsive government in, the Middle East. In the short and medium term, it is a vital national interest to preserve access to mideast oil reserves. In the longer term, it might be technologically possible to do without oil, but that could still leave the middle east region with a repressive system of government which is almost certain to be an economic failure, and will continue to cause tensions between Islam and the West. The U.S. must, therefore, prevent the radical Islamization of any more nations, and seek to improve the economic and political performance of all Islamic nations. Note that this does not necessarily mean democratic forms of government—it means responsive, transparent government, however that may be achieved.

First things first, however. The U.S. has to seriously destabilize al-Qaeda. It has to neutralize its agents in the field by killing them, imprisoning them, or breaking their will to fight, has to prevent recruitment and training of new personnel, destroy whatever assets exist, impede financial operations, and disrupt planning of new operations; This has already been happening.

There have been several arrests of known terrorist cells in the last few weeks, some of them unconnected to the Sept. 11 attacks. In addition, the U.S. seems to have made bin Laden himself, his military cadre, and his bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan targets for the initial coalition counterattack. It is my belief that this initial phase will be mostly successful, and will succeed quickly.

I base this analysis on several reports that seem to indicate that the Taliban is weak, and that there seem to exist several alternatives to the Taliban government that the Afghan people could rally around to provide much of the fighting force. The U.S. must not be seen as an outside invader, or we will never be able to successfully complete the mission. If we are instead seen as assisting the Afghan people in helping themselves, the U.S. goals have a high likelihood of being accomplished.

There are several reports, with none offering contrary information, that the Taliban suffers a high rate of desertion among its military, who are largely unwilling conscripts. The Taliban was initially seen as better than the alternatives, at least providing some stability to the country. Its repressive policies, however, have made it unpopular even among its own Pushtun tribe. The core of the Taliban fighting force is now provided by the Arab-Afghanis, men who came to Afghanistan from other countries to fight with the mujahideen against the Soviets, and who are loyal to bin Laden. One report even indicates a belief that the Taliban is no longer in charge—bin Laden is running the country. Whatever the truth of this report, it is clear that the two are fast allies, and that the Taliban would have much trouble surviving without bin Laden’s support.

The Northern Alliance, the only currently organized opposition in the country, could provide the focal point of a new guerilla army to defeat the Taliban. If given arms and allowed to train new recruits over the winter, when military operations become difficult, the NA could be at minimum a diversionary force, and perhaps could conquer the country with air support from U.S. forces in the spring when the weather clears.

However, the U.S. may not wait that long. If U.S. ground units were used to occupy and destroy several al-Qaeda bases, that might divert enough Arabs from fighting the NA that the NA could take Kabul before winter really sets in. Or an assassination campaign could destabilize the Taliban enough that no real U.S. military action is necessary. It is really impossible to call the U.S. tactical intentions at this moment, which I’m sure is intentional. The U.S. has much to gain from being inscrutable at this point, while preparing its response.

Actually, during this time, several psychological warfare tactics are to be expected. Over the last two days, there have been so many reports about the weakness of the Taliban that I am having to be more careful about what I believe. I’m wary of a propaganda campaign. I’d discount the burning dogs reports to some degree.

The key with propaganda, like mythology, is that it is usually based on some kernel of truth. Even propaganda can reveal solid information if enough of it fits together to create a pattern that allows the exclusion of the untruthful bits.

The Taliban can be replaced by a new government chosen by the traditional assembly of tribal elders, the Loyah Jirgha. This body has drawn up constitutional plans of government previously in Afghanistan's history. This constitutional conventionmay or may not involve the old king of Afghanistan, who is currently making an excellent (and not-so-subtle) media campaign for his own return to power.

If the Taliban is successfully destroyed and (more importantly) successfully replaced, the U.S. will have achieved moral ascendancy, the appearance of being a winner on the battlefield, which will help U.S. forces (military and otherwise) to fight and work like winners and will cause the terrorists to think like losers. It will have demonstrated its seriousness, which is currently in doubt given the past U.S. tendency to achieve (or fail to achieve) short-term goals and then withdraw from engagement.

This is currently causing problems in assembling and holding the coalition together. It will also have disrupted al-Qaeda’s physical plant to a degree which which will cause problems with their ability to gather and train new recruits. It will, however, only be the turning point, the Midway in the Pacific War. There will almost certainly be battles left ahead.

In the end, though, I am optimistic. We will win. We have already won. This has awakened America to the effect that our power has on other countries in the world. We will finally mature to our place as the leader of the world. And it will be a better world when we do.




Want to know how you can help? Donate cash, blood, help the relief efforts, whatever you can. For more information, see: Emergency and Relief Information in Wake of Terrorist Attack On U.S.