THE WAR THE FEDERALISTS REFUSED TO FIGHT

by

Roger Thomas

William Vans Murray knew exactly what was happening when Louis-Andre Pichon called on him in June 1798. Pichon was part of the French Bureau, and Murray was President Adams' emissary to The Hague. They had met in 1794 when Pichon was part of the France's Philadelphia legation.

Revolutionary France had been treating the United States like a puppet.

In 1797 the French had kept the new American emissary in his hotel room, subject to arrest. President John Adams was so angry over the incident that he told Congress, on May 15, 1797;

"The refusal (of France to receive our minister) until we have acceded to their demands without discussion and without investigation, is to treat us neither as allies, nor as friends, nor as a sovereign state."

The President wanted peace, but demanded honor. He added two more men to make the Paris delegation more impressive, but this second effort failed too. The delegation's report was disappointing. They were never even received by the Directory. They had met with three men, named Hottinguer, Bellamy, and Hauteval, who told them that the Directory had been insulted by Adams' May 15 speech. The Directory expected a $250,000 gift to sooth its offenses. The Americans had recently made such a present to the Barbary nations, and were well aware that the shuffle of cash and skirts was part of 18th Century diplomacy, at least in Paris.

The three men also insisted on a $10,000,000 loan. They pointed out that Holland had offered $10,000,000 in bonds which were pledged to aid France. Holland had since reduced the bonds to half price. Even French financiers refused to buy the bonds because Holland was nearly bankrupt. The men suggested that the United States meet the full amount of the loan they were demanding by buying the bonds for the full $10,000,000. If the Dutch decided to pay the bonds after the wars, the United States would lose nothing. The French feared that if the Americans did not agree to this proposal there would be war. The Directory had already determined that all nations would either help France or be considered her enemies. There would be no neutrals. "Gentlemen" the French said, "I will not disguise from you...il faut de l'argent--it faut beaucoup d'argent; you must pay money, you must pay a great deal of money." The Americans replied just as strongly, "The answer is no! No! Not a sixpence!", and left Paris.

The President received the delegation's report, but took the precaution of changing Hottinguer, Bellamy, and Hauteval's names to XY&Z. Then he sent the entire report to congress. Congress published the XYZ report in the press.

XYZ was disastrous. The Fleur de Lief came down all over the country. French friends became nationalists. "Hail Columbia" became a popular new song. "Millions for defense but not one cent for tribute," was the toast of the nation.

Congress authorized the capture of French ships as prizes. It passed a non-intercourse bill. It allowed merchant ships to carry weapons. It revoked the previous treaties with France. It also increased the army from 80 to 1,300 men.

President Adams called George Washington out of retirement to command the new army, and created a gunnery school at the west point of the Hudson River. Washington requested Alexander Hamilton as second in command.

Hamilton immediately began to brag that he would deliver Florida to the nation. He freely talked about marching from Florida, through New Orleans and Mexico City, to link up with Miranda's Venezuelan revolutionaries. He openly discussed reconciliation with Britain because of the impending war with France. Hamilton even proposed that Britain and the United States should divide all French and Spanish territories in the Americas.

Murray knew that both Britain and France wanted America in their war. America's size and location made it the key to each one's New World ambitions and possessions. The United States was also the largest neutral shipping fleet in the world. It could help the French break the British blockade just as easily as it could help the British secure the West Indies and clear the French from the seas.

France was having problems everywhere it looked. The German Rastadt Congress had refused to meet French demands in the Rhineland. The neutral, north European nations were restless under international shipping regulations that France had created. Italy was unstable because of Bonaparte's personal absence. Austria had allied with Prussia. Britain had embarrassed France more than once on the sea, and now was close to peace with Spain. Even Switzerland which had quickly imitated the French Republican model was no longer submitting to the French will. Murray commented on the scene in his diary:

"Rastadt looks black--Swissed. black--all Germany in a tremor of rage agt. her. England invulnerable--Holl'd not friendly--a combination ahead--Buonaparte's fleet running before Nelson's. ... I believe France is alarmed."

Pichon indicated that the tensions from XYZ could be resolved by a spontaneous act of justice. France, for example, could release all the American ships it was holding. Murray knew that the issue was neither money nor peace. The issue was sovereignty. Peace would have no meaning if France continued to look down on the United States the way she did on Poland or Turkey. Again, Murray commented into his diary:

"(He) tried to soften everything, and with a degree of persevering industry that leads me to believe he has been sent on purpose.--entering as he does into various details--lamenting this, & softening that.

How I rejoice to hear a Frenchman--& one of the Bureau too--obliged to tackle to & placed on the defensive towards a country which 6 months--nay 35 days since they considered as feeble & a poor opponent."

Murray believed that France sincerely wanted peace, so he wrote a detailed account of his conversations to President Adams personally. The President also believed that France wanted peace. The President was not willing to set aside the policy of neutrality which President Washington had made in 1793. Adams took his stand on June 21, 1798. He insisted that he would

"never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation."

The President's words gave Murray the specific guidance he needed. Murray's conversations with Pichon had a clear direction.

All the talk came to a head on September 22, 1798 when Pichon asked Murray to write down exactly what assurances would be required to proceed with settlement of their differences. Murray wrote down what he had been hammering at for three months. The United States was a free and independent nation. It was not a protégé. The emissaries who had been sent to Paris had been treated disgracefully. The pledge of assurances must be those made in President Adams' speech.

Tallyrand's answer came five days later:

"...you were right to assert to (Murray) that whatever plenipotentiary the government of the United States might send to France in order to terminate the existing differences between the two countries, he would undoubtedly be received with the respect due to a representative of a free, independent, and powerful nation."

Tallyrand's assurance was close enough to President Adams' words to make it a great diplomatic victory for the Federalist Party. Tallyrand had recognized American sovereignty and neutrality. All the Europeans now respected the policies which President Washington had initiated in 1793.

Adams discussed America's next move with his cabinet from October to February. Alexander Hamilton had been boasting about war and conquest, so he coached the cabinet to oppose any act that would lead toward peace. The President disagreed. He chose peace. On February 18, 1799 he nominated William Vans Murray to be the new emissary to France.

The nomination hit like a bombshell. Every Federalist who had been bragging about conquest and victory now stood red faced at the prospect of peace.

One group of Federalists stood loyal to the President and his offer of peace. Hamilton's friends formed the "High Federalists" faction, and began to lash out against Murray, the Adamses, the administration, and particularly against France and her Jacobin revolutionaries.

The Republicans in turn gathered to the pro-French members of their party, and were delighted to watch the split develop in their opposition.

The Senate finally approved Murray, but only as the third man in a delegation with Oliver Ellsworth and William Davie. Murray had great respect for Ellsworth. They had worked together in the Senate for Jay's Treaty. Ellsworth had been appointed Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court at about the time Murray had been appointed to The Hague. He had been the author of the Connecticut Compromise and the Judiciary Act of 1789, and he would check every detail of a new treaty. William Davie caused Murray more difficulty. The former governor of North Carolina had no diplomatic or worldly experience. His sole qualification was his friendship with Hamilton. Murray was reminded that what would pass in the Senate was more important to diplomacy than what would sell in Paris.

The delegation was received and seated, with an agreed agenda, within four days of their arrival in Paris. Joseph Bonaparte was the head of the French delegation and the key to France's pacification policies. He had a natural talent for diplomacy. Pierre Roederer was the workhorse of the delegation, and Charles Fleurieu was the necessary third person.

At first the American pecking order reflected the Senate's instructions. Murray's hope for a cordial working relationship was lost the moment the other delegates avoided The Hague and landed in Lisbon. His frustration was reflected early in the negotiations:

"It is true my two colleagues I believe even disliked me--they were men of sense--but exceedingly rude and raw--with whom I was but on terms of decent civility--not one liked the other:--They came I believe under prejudice against me--I had originated the whole--in June July Augt. Sept. 1798--with Pichon--they thought lightly of me clearly--& I had too much pride to please them: as I had cause to believe that they had not a good nor respectful opinion of me! They were ignorant of the world and its manners & were too conceited, particularly Davie, to borrow any idea with complacency from me, the third named & youngest of the mission. --As to Mr. E--he thought little about anything but the logic of the points--as if Logic had much to do with the courts of Europe! good man!--excellent & another Judge!"

The negotiations got nowhere until Ellsworth and Davie understood that negotiating a treaty with France was not the same as settling an American lawsuit. Endless alternatives and millions of words were exchanged, but there was no real progress. In 1778 the United States and France had made treaties that only French warships and their prizes could use American ports, and that the two nations would each guaranty the security of the other's new world possessions. France wanted these treaties restored, and they wanted privileges equal to those which Britain had won in Jay's Treaty in 1794. The Americans were there to block these former treaties, and obtain a new one which didn't compromise American sovereignty.

Both sides understood that they would pay indemnities according to how much they won in the treaties. The French, for example, were willing to pay $20,000,000 in American shipping losses if they won the old treaties back. If the Americans won a new treaty, France would pay no indemnity.

There were some threats. The little American navy had done very well against the French ships in the area. Britain's Admiral Nelson had also sent a handsome part of the French fleet to the bottom in the Battle of Aboukir Bay on August 1, 1798. Much of the rest of their fleet was bottled up inside the British blockade. The Americans also pointed out how exposed the French West Indies were. Bonaparte, in turn, pointed out that the little American army or navy would be hopeless in the face of a concerted French effort. The Americans could only defend themselves through a very complicated alliance with Britain.

Negotiations began in earnest after these threats were set aside. Functional leadership in the delegations began to settle on Murray and Roederer, the workhorses of the delegations. Pichon was secretary. Murray proposed that France waive their claim to the old treaties, and that America waive her claim to indemnities. He proposed a broad agreement, called a "General Convention", rather than a specific treaty.

The advantage of a General Convention was that there could be an end to hostilities, a return of captured ships and goods, and a restoration of maritime practices. The sore points were the treaties and the indemnities. These could be indefinitely postponed. Murray's purpose was to avoid a collapse of the negotiations. Collapse would mean war. It would also mean a defeat for President Adams in an election year. A general Convention could be a victory for everyone. The French would appear to be the protector of the neutrals, and the Americans would gain respect as a free and independent nation. Murray also believed that an end to the fighting was better than any French promise to pay indemnities. Roederer knew that Spain was about to restore Louisiana to France. Once this happened the Americans would not be willing to enter into any agreement.

Napoleon personally signed the Convention at an elaborate reception at Joseph Bonaparte's country estate, Mortefontaine. The signing took place at one o'clock in the morning of October 1, 1800. He expected that President Adams would do the same when he received the document at his new capitol in Washington. This was not to be.

Adams had lost the election of 1800 before the Convention reached the Senate. The Republicans rejected it out right. Hamilton and the High Federalists rejected the Convention because it had been made at Adams' direction. The Senate defeated it on January 23, 1801.

Hamilton had second thoughts when he realized that a new treaty would be directed by the new President Jefferson. A Jefferson treaty would be much more favorable to France. First Hamilton decided to take out the provision that tied indemnities to the revival of the old treaties. Then he added a language, like that in Jay's Treaty, which ended the Convention after eight years. The Senate passed the modified agreement on February 3.

President Jefferson sent Murray to explain the new terms to France. Murray was amazed. He had been a loyal supporter to President Adams. He had assumed that he would be sent home the minute Jefferson took office. Jefferson left him totally without instructions except that he was to negotiate the new terms with France.

The French were confused too. France had moved quickly from the authority of the Bourbons to the authority of the Bonapartes. They were accustomed to negotiating with European nations on the spot. They thought they had settled with the Americans at the Convention. Napoleon had personally signed the Convention. They had assumed that Adams would countersign it as a matter of routine. The entire controversy would go away. Now they learned that the agreement had been submitted to the Senate, and that the Senate had changed what Napoleon had signed.

In September the French had thought they were negotiating with three men who had been confirmed by the Senate to speak for the President. Now they had one man, with no instructions, who probably did not speak for the new President. They could not understand the American system of checks and balances with regular elections among political parties. Their persistent question was: who makes American foreign policy? Who is in charge?

French were further confused when John Dawson appeared in Paris with the language the Senate had approved. Dawson appeared to be the new minister to France, but he had not presented the letters of introduction which President Jefferson had given him. Napoleon confronted Murray directly: "Monsieur, avez-vous le pouvoir de discuter et signer?" Murray answered just as directly: "Conformement a mes instructions".

Pichon had already been assigned to Washington, so Murray met with Roederer alone. He urged France to sign the agreement as amended, then add a separate statement of intent which abandoned both the old treaties and the claims for indemnities. This was the exact proposal he had made in negotiations a year earlier. Napoleon signed the new treaty, on July 31, 1800 and the Senate agreed to it on December 18.

Murray and Roederer arranged the release of the last American ships and goods in 1801. The long tale of negotiations between the United States and the last of the warring Europeans was finally closed.

France had offered to pay $20,000,000 for American shipping losses in 1798. The Convention which was signed in 1801 did not allow for any of these indemnities. The United States Court of Claims finally awarded $7,149,306.10 in compensation for the shipping losses in 1915. 114 years had passed since the Convention. Congress appropriated $3,910,860.61 to pay off that award. Much of that appropriation was ultimately paid to the shippers.

The steady hand of Federalist foreign policy made the Europeans recognize the United States as "a great, free, powerful and independent nation". America was no one's puppet. America did not have to choose between a British alliance or French executive authority. Europeans were given a basic understanding of the strange, new American system of government. Murray opened doors which would later lead to full discussions on the Louisiana Purchase, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Ostend Manifesto. Each of these ideas required that the parties respect each other as "great, free, powerful and independent nations". This respect was also required for the creation of an undefended boundary between the United States and Canada. It was the basis on which the Union was able to prevent European intervention in the Civil War.

There is a remarkable similarity between the potential for war which faced the Federalists in 1798 and those which faced Presidents Madison in 1812, Wilson in 1917, and Franklin Roosevelt in 1941. This was the only general European conflict in which the United States did not become involved.

The domestic price was dear. Alexander Hamilton's boasts of victory and conquest, followed by his embarrassment at the prospect of peace, almost exhausted his personal power. His fight with Adams, and his formation of the High Federalists became a permanent split in the party, and was the beginning of the end of the Federalists. It also seriously damaged Hamilton's own political future.

President Adams' inability to reconcile with Hamilton before nominating Murray as emissary to France probably cost him the election of 1800.

Oliver Ellsworth continued to serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. William Davie passed privately from the scene after assisting with the Tuscarora Treaty in 1802.

William Vans Murray died at his Maryland estate in 1803. He was 43. Only John Quincy Adams remarked on his passing. Had he lived nine more days he would have seen France transfer the Louisiana Purchase to the United States. Had he lived nine more years he would have seen the United States become involved in the 1812 war between Britain and France.

It is a measure of Adams' greatness, and Murray's talent, that peace was snatched from the jaws of war in 1800.John Adams wrote the epitaph on the whole affair:

"I will defend my missions to France as long as I have an eye to direct my hand or a finger to hold my pen. They were the most disinterested and meritorious actions of my life. I reflect upon them with so much satisfaction, that I desire no other inscription over my gravestone than: `Here lies John Adams, who took upon himself the responsibility of the peace with France in the year 1800.'"

The reader is referred to Peter Hill, William Vans Murray: A Federalist Diplomat, for further, and abundantly footnoted, reading on the subject.