THE HISTORY OF THE 591st. Engineer BOAT REGIMENT, later

The 1185 Engineer Group, and still later, The 591st Engineer Combat Engineer Group

Foreword

It was my great honor and privilege to have commanded the 591st Engineer Boat Regiment, later the 1185th Engineer Group, and still later the 591st Engineer Combat Group with its three Battalions.They proved to be in all assignments efficient, dedicated soldiers. Their fine support and loyalty under all circumstances, and in most difficult situations, earned them the highest praise and commendations.Some of the missions assigned us, with their short time limits, called forth the greatest of energy and effort. At no time did they fail and thus were able to report within the time limit, "Mission Accomplished."

During the remainder of my days, I will continue to salute the officers and men of the 591st as the finest group of soldiers ever to take up arms in defense of their country. 

Colonel William F. Weiler

Colonel Thomas L Allen, San Antonio, Texas, 1978

INTRODUCTION

It should be emphasized at the ontset that I am not writing a history of the 591st Engineer Boat Regiment. That history has already been written by more than three thousand officers and men who served with the unit in North Africa, Italy, France and Germany. It is my aim to assemble that history in an orderly time sequence and also record the collections of some of the men who participated in the actions of that unique military unit.

The regiment was originally organized as the major unit of the Ist Engineer Amphibian Brigade, with the specific responsibility of oper- ating small craft in ship to shore or shore to shore military operations. After moving overseas, the Navy assumed the responsibility Of Small craft operations and the regiment was assigned other duties. It was my privilege to assist in the organization of the regiment at Camp Edwards, Mass. during the summer of 1942. It was originally commanded by Col. Mark M. Boatner Jr., and I filled the position of Executive Officer. After our move overseas in the late summer, Col. Boatner was transferred to 11 Corps and I was made the Regimental C.O. on September 4th, 1942 and filled that post until March, 1944, when I returned to the United States under the "Rotation Plan".


Most of the really effective work of the regiment was done under the leadership of Col. William F. Weiler, who assumed command in May, 1944. He later wrote, "I found the units spread all over the Mediterranean area and seemingly wasting a fine group of manpower." Through his acquaintance with Gen. Noce, then G3 at Army Headquarters, the scattered units were reassembled in the Naples Area of Italy and formed into an Engineer Combat Group with three Engineer Combat Battalions.

After a period of intense training and re-equipping, the unit moved into France and was attached to the Seventh Army, and moved in support of that unit into Germany. The data for this narrative has come from several sources, which have been properly acknowledged in the text. Some of it has been taken from my personal files and I have asked some of my friends to recall events of which my records are vague or incomplete.

Some of the individual companies have started holding annual reunions since the midsixties. Headquarters Company and Company B have been quite consistent in their reunions and I have attended both groups at different times and have accumulated material which has been used in the narrative. Under the leadership of Everett Mills, a corporate structure has been set up, entitled ENGINEER 591stT REGIMENT REUNION ASSOCIATION, which hopes to carry on the traditions of this unique military unit for many years into the future. It is my hope that this collection of military reports and personal recollections will be read by our grandchildren and great grandchildren which will enable them to say with pride, "My old man was a member of that Group."   T.L.A.

52 -53     OPERATION TORCH  THE 591ST ENGINEER BOAT REGIMENT

WHITE BEACH
REPORT on Amphibian Operations
by
COMPANY "F"
591ST ENGINEER BOAT REGIMENT
IST ENGINEER AMPHIBIAN BRIGADE
Submitted by: Kenneth W. Kennedy

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KENNETH W. KENNEDY
Capt., 591st Engineer Boat Regiment Shore Party Commander

A.P.O. 700, U.S. Army
27 February, 1943

X-RAY OPERATION
1. Purpose

The following report is submitted to record the problems and mistakes of XRay landing, Torch Operation, November 8, 1942, Emphasis is placed on the small shore party and utter lack of shore equipment allowed by the operation plan. It is hoped that this one great failure be remedied in operations to come.

2. Assignment of Tasks

"F" Company, 591.st Engineer Boat Regiment, reduced to 186 men and 9 officers, was attached to Combat Command B, Ist Armored Division, and assigned as shore party for the column to land at XRay Beach. The mission of the shore party is best expressed by the following paragraph from the operation Field Order:

F.O. #1, par. 2b: "Co. F, 591st Engineer Boat Regt., will constitute the Shore Party and will reconnoiter for vehicle assembly areas, unit assembly areas, beach exits, ammunition, gasoline, water, ration and personnel baggage dumps construct beach roadways, arrange for details to unload landing craft, establish an aid station, establish traffic controls in the beach area, furnish guides to vehicle and unit assernbly areas, assist the advance and main signal parties in establishing beach communications, and in general, regulate all movements from our shore inland and assist in beach defense. Operate X-Ray Beach until ordered closed. (See Shore Party Annex, Annex 3.)

This assignment included the landing of 108 officers, 2158 enlisted men, 409 vehicles, 54 trailers and 4291 tons of supplies. Supplies were broken into following classes:

Class I 6 tons Available Landing Craft
Class II 8 " LCA 10
Class III 111 " LCP(R) 14
Class IV 2-1/2 " LCM (1) 4
Class V 132 " LCM (III) 10
Water 65 " LST 1
Misc 104 "
Misc 429 "

To make the assignment more difficult, XRay Beach was divided into Green and White Beaches by a high rock formation. Walking time from one beach to the other was about 15 minutes. This necessitated the breaking down of one shore company into a headquarters section and two complete shore parties, each with its own guides, defense Platoon, unloading details, construction sections etc. The medical detachment of one officer and six men had to work both beaches Unloading and transportation to dumps had to be done almost completely by hand since the Shore Company was allowed only two trucks (2 1/2) and one jeep; one of the two trucks was used constantly in the ammunition shuttle to the front. With the men spread so thin, there was little chance of working in shifts and a 24hour schedule had to be maintained for several days.

3. Organization

Headquarters Platoon Defense Platoon
2 Officers 1 Officer
Shore Party Commander 40 Enlister Men
Assembly Area Commander 1 Second in Command


54 - 55

The 591st Engineer Boat Regiment

30 Enlisted Men 16 Machine Gunners
I Executive 8 8 riflemen
15 Guards
2 Clerks
I Assembly Area Sgt.
6 Recorders
18 Guides
2 Radio Operators

Construction & Unloading Platoon, White Beach

3 Officers
I Assistant Shore Party Commander
I Construction Platoon Commander
I Assistant Construction Platoon Commander
55 Enlisted Men

Construction and Unloading Platoon, Green Beach

Same as White Beach, less Asst. Const Plat. Commander

Medical Detachment
I Officer
6 Aid Men.

4. Plan of Operations

At H-hour, the assistant shore party commanders with their radio operators were scheduled to land on the beaches. They had definite instructions for making reconnaissance as stated in Annex #3, F.O. #1.

At H plus 15 minutes, the Shore Party Commander would land on Green Beach with his radio operators and headquarters platoon. He would contact the assistant shore party commanders either personally or by radio to determine if exits conformed to the prearranged plan. He would contact assembly area officers to see if the initial assembly area was suitable. At H plus 30 minutes, he would contact the Principal Beach Master to decide limits of the beaches, decide landing points and landing point for the LST.

At H plus 15 minutes, the defense platoon would come in carrying four machine guns by hand and setting up at previously designated points; defense plan was coordinated with the Task Force plans.
The assembly area officer would come in at H plus 15 minutes to reconnoiter assembly area for units.

About one half of each construction platoon would cone in at H plus 15 minutes; the remainder to beach at H plus 3 hours. One, bulldozer and two sleds with necessary summerfield track and tools would arrive on each beach by H plus I hour.

It was planned to route all vehicles off the LST right onto the road leading from the village of Bou Sedjor. These vehicles formed the "Flying Column of tanks and half tracks. As soon as waterproofing could be removed, the column would move out the, road. All other vehicles and personnel would be led to the initial assembly area. Here vehicles would be dewaterproofed and then sent to the proper unit assembly area a tentative area had been selected for each unit. The initial assembly area acted as a sump to keep both beaches clear

Wheeled vehicles were to be. guided to the area at night by following it line of green lights held by guides. Tracked vehicles would have a different exit and would be guided to the area by orange lights. Personnel could follow either color.

Each landing craft was to be met by a recorder who would determine either the serial number of the boat, the personnel or the type vehicles and what unit, or the amount of supplies. He would start the vehicles or personnel following the proper lights, and would enter the necessary information oil a prepared form. These reports would be collected at intervals by Shore Party Headquarters and entered on a master sheet one set of sheets for each unit. The master sheets were already filled out except for the time of arrival. Kept uptodate, the master sheet would tell a unit instantly what personnel and vehicles had come ashore and exactly what remained on the ships.

5. Actual Operations

The H hour Wave, landed about H plus 30 minutes on White Beach and about H plus 90 minutes on Green Beach. The Shore Party Commander and his headquarters, scheduled to land at H plus 15 minutes, landed at H plus 25 minutes on Green Beach and were the only troops on the beach for an hour or more. The Shore Party Commander carried out the missing assistant shore party commander's reconnaissance of Green Beach and little time was lost except the Naval Boat Party was not present to erect beach markers. The Shore Party advanced into the interior and made the necessary reconnaissance before the assault troops landed.

Green Beach proved to be very long, about 30 yards wide, then rising into high sand duties and a hill some 500 feet high. The only possible exit was to the east and was very difficult up a steep grade with deep sand. Sand bars necessitated beaching craft about three hundred yards from the exit.

The usable portion of White Beach was 100 feet long and 30 yards wide. There were only two possible oneway exits between houses that lined the beach. Rocks in the water made White Beach dangerous and only a 100foot strip could be used.

The first few waves of craft refused to land between the beach markers, resulting in damaged craft and vehicles stuck all over the area. Early in the operation, an LCP(R) caught on fire and lit up the countryside for miles, giving away all secrecy. The craft was sunk by our 50 cal. machine gun fire, but the oil continued to burn.

The Beach Party insisted on landing the LST on Green Beach, about 300 yards from the exit. It came in at about H plus 3 hours and all of the, 300 feet Of treadway bridging had to be erected. At H plus 4 hours, the LST was almost ready to unload, but the Shore Party had not received any summerfield track or equipment. One bulldozer with one sled of track came in on White Beach and was directed to Green Beach. Surnmerfield track was laid up the steep exit by H plus 5 hours, just as the LST started unloading. Some time was

pg56 The 591st Engineer Boat Regiment Operation Torch pg57

lost due to enemy aircraft, but the LST was unloaded by H plus 6 hours and the flying column moved out soon afterward.

All personnel was landed by H plus 5 hours. By H plus 8 hours, the Shore Party received its other bulldozer and one sled of summerfield track; sleds with the tools did not come in until tile third day.

At 1200 hours, November 8th, the Shore Party Commander closed Green Beach because of landing craft casualties and almost impassable exits. The remainder of the landing operation was made on a beach 100 feet long, 30 yards wide, and with only two narrow defile exits, one of which was 75 yards from beach landing points and could only be used as a tracked vehicle exit.
At 1300 hours, the task force commander had a tactical unit ashore and moved out with his main body.

Not in accordance with plans, the troop ship Batory got orders to leave the anchorage as soon as she was unloaded. Consequently, 1500 barracks bags Were dumped on the narrow White Beach by H plus 6 hours. Little room was left on the beach and additional summerfield track could not be laid. All supplies that came in had to be deposited directly on the beach and carried off on sleds.
By 1420 hours, White Beach was completely blocked by ammunition, gasoline, and barracks bags; the Shore Party work details were completely exhausted. To relieve the situation, the Shore Party Commander hired natives and called in 25 men from units landed for aid in clearing the beach. The ground floors of several houses oil the beach were used to temporarily store ammunition and barracks bags were piled in an alley behind the first row of houses. By 1500, the beach was clear without the operation being slowed up. More track had arrived and was laid so that two trucks could get on the beach at the same time to load supplies. The beach was kept clear thereafter. Two ammunition and two supply dumps were established in a ravine behind the village. By 1900 hours, enough equipment had landed to send an additional combat unit to the Task Force Commander.
The Shore Party called for 30 men from landed units to aid on the night unloading shift. As darkness fell, serials came more slowly and the whole operation lagged. It was noticeable that inexperienced relief crews ,were used on the craft at night, resulting in many boat casualties. Tile fact that the landing operation ran behind schedule was caused by improper use of the craft at night. The Shore Party stayed on the alert to unload only occasional craft.

At 0020 hours, November 9th, the Shore Party Commander received an urgent call from the Task Force Commander for ammunition and re-enforcing equipment. All available tanks, half tracks and trucks were lined up to go forward. All available trucks were loaded with ammunition, including one of the two vehicles belonging to the Shore Party. This convoy moved out at 0100 hours.
Work went smoothly all day November 9th, except for minor difficulties. There were not enough landing craft to enable the operation to continue at maximum speed. One hundred men of an aircorps signal company were called to the beach from the Queen Emma to take over the guard of the village and the dumps.

At 1800 hours, the Shore Party gang that had worked all day was called to Green Beach to aid the ]6th Engineer Platoon in reassembling the engineer treadway bridge. The work had to be done by hand, since no crane was available. The Shore Party, working in high surf, completed the. bridge at 2100 hours.

A plan had been devised to reload the LST from cargo ships and bring her in on White Beach; the plan was necessitated by loss of landing craft, The pontoon bridge was to be floated around the crags from Green to White Beach.

The LST came in very close on White Beach at 0230 hours, November 10th. The surf was very high and in attempting to float the pontoon bridge, two LCP(R's) were completely destroyed. The unloading was postponed.

At 0730 hours, it was decided to try unloading without the bridging. The ramp of the LST was lowered and all the twenty light tanks came off in five feet of water. The first half track to try it was stalled. The pontoon bridge was successfully floated and the remaining vehicles unloaded.

The night of November 9th and 10th was very disastrous to craft. Practically every LCM broached on the beach or tangled lines in the propellers. There was a 70 per cent loss of craft causing the operation on November 10th to be very slow. By 1900 hours all but twelve serials had been unloaded and the beach was closed. For all practical purposes, the landing operation was completed at H plus 66 hours, 23 hours behind schedule.

The Ilth was spent in cleaning up the area and salvaging waterproof material. The Shore Party disassembled the engineer bridge and moved it to the engineer dump. Supplies were transported to the front, prisoners sent to La Senia, and wounded transported to Oran.

On a whole, the operation was a success. One boat company with two trucks and one jeep and with little or no training in shore operations completed a three shore company job. Officers and men were worked almost past the point of human endurance, but in spite of the handling of heavy equipment, not a single Shore Part officer or man was injured. Second Lieutenants Daniel B. Henon and Francis T. Carroll received battlefield promotions upon recommendation of the Task Force Commander. Second Lieutenant Eb W. Smith distinguished himself in making a reconnaissance for assembly areas over obscure and uncertain terrain, one mile in advance of the infantry assault forces.

6. Criticism and Suggestions

The Shore Party for XRay Beach was fortunate in having worked with the British Beach Party in several exercises before leaving England. Organization of the Beach Party was:

Principal Beach MasterCommander Boord
DeputyLt. Wilson
Beach Master, Green BeachLt. Commander Marshall
Asst. B.M.Lt. Carver
Asst. B.M.Sub. Lt. Richards
Beach Master, White BeachLt. Commander Clements
Asst. B.M.Lt. Dixon Smith