CMP(A1) Some plain speaking from Sir Khizr Hayat Khan, Mr. Abell and Viceroy Wavell on various occasions, April, May and October 1946

Documents included
  • Note of Meeting between Cabinet Delegation, Viceroy Wavell and Sir Khizr Hyat Khan, Premier of Punjab,  5 April 1946. From The Transfer of Power, Vol VII, Mansergh and Moon,  (excerpts)
  • Note by Mr Abell on Breakdown Plan discussed by Cabinet Mission and Viceroy Wavell on 16 May 1946. From The Transfer of Power, Vol VII, Mansergh and Moon (excerpt)
  • Viceroy Wavell to Jinnah on futility of a communal vote in a coalition Cabinet,  4 October 1946. From Transfer of Power,  Volume VIII, Mansergh and Moon (excerpt)
  • Jinnah's post-independence interview to Robert Stimson, Correspondent of BBC, Karachi, Dec 19 1947. From 'Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid e Azam', ed Khurshid Yusufi(excerpt)

Note of Meeting between Cabinet Delegation, Viceroy Wavell and Sir Khizr Hyat Khan, Premier of Punjab on Friday, 5 April 1946,  59 page 147, (excerpts)

Lord Pethick-Lawrence congratulated Sir Khizr on the fine contribution which he and his Government had made towards winning the war.

Sir Stafford Cripps inquired what would be the effect on the Punjab if it were agreed, or decided in default of agreement, to establish Pakistan.

Sir Khizr replied that this depended on what basis the new State were to be set up. If it included the whole of the Province as it now existed, the Muslims would be very pleased. If, however, the two and a half divisions with nonMuslim majorities were to be excluded from Pakistan, when the Muslims in this area came to realise their fate and when the Muslims of the Province as a whole came to realise what benefits in the way of military pensions, etc., they had lost, a reaction would probably set in.

If Mr. Jinnah had been required at an earlier stage to define Pakistan, and if its financial and other implications had been worked out, perhaps the demand for it would not have been so strong.

The Sikhs would be quite happy to continue as at present in a united Punjab where they had a share in the Government. If, however, they were to be included in Pakistan their relations with the Government of the new State would be very difficult; he did not think that in this event they could be dealt with peacefully.

Nor would the relations between the Muslims in the various parts of Pakistan be free from difficulty. Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis all had one religion, but they spoke different languages and were otherwise very different.

If there were to any all-India central Government at all, it should be a weak one.

His own conception of Pakistan was any regime where Muslim interests were fully protected. It was in this sense that he had declared during the recent elections that he believed in Pakistan. The Muslim League had liked to keep the idea vague, so that every Muslim might interpret it as a sort of Utopia where his own ambitions would be satisfied. At the elections they had identified it with Islam, the Koran and the Holy Prophet. At the same time it must be admitted that the Pakistan idea, in which Mr. Jinnah himself had not believed seven years ago, had now taken root among the educated class.

He had thought for some time that right at the beginning of the Pakistan agitation Mr. Jinnah should have been officially asked to define what he wanted. Even now it was not too late to do this. If he refuses, the Government should themselves define how far they considered it right to go towards satisfying the Muslim demand. Their award should preferably be based on the existing provincial demarcation, because if once the process of realigning boundaries were started no one would know where it would end.

(end excerpts)

From Note by Mr Abell discussed by Cabinet Mission and Viceroy Wavell on 16 May 1946, 295 page 568(excerpt)
Breakdown plans

8. If the British are not to stay for any length of time in Pakistan a new constitution must be set up. With the hiving off of the Hindu provinces the communal problem would be transferred to Pakistan, and it would be exceedingly acute in both zones. If it was immoral to surrender 80 million Muslims to the Hindus in the whole of India, would it be right to put 48 million nonMuslims at the mercy of the Muslims in Pakistan? Leaving justice aside, if we did this the communal tension might wreck Pakistan.

On the other hand if we left out the non-Muslim territories we would be left with what the League at any rate regards as a non-viable Pakistan.
(end excerpt)

Viceroy Wavell to Mr. Jinnah 4 October 1946,  404 page 654(excerpt)
"4. In a Coalition Government it is impossible to decide major matters of policy when one of the main parties to the coalition is strongly against a course of action proposed. My present colleagues and I are agreed that it would be fatal to allow major communal issues to be decided by vote in the Cabinet.

The efficiency and prestige of the Interim Government will depend on ensuring that differences are resolved in advance of Cabinet meetings by friendly discussions. A Coalition Government either works by a process of mutual adjustments or does not work at all."


Post-independence, with Muslims in majority, nonMuslims still out in the cold.

Jinnah's Interview to Robert Stimson, Correspondent of BBC, Karachi, Dec 19 1947 (excerpt)

Pakistan League

Asked whether the Muslim League of Pakistan would eventually transform itself into a national organization open to members of all religious communities, the Quaid-i-Azam said the time had not yet come for a national organization of that kind. Public opinion among Muslims of Pakistan is not yet ready for it. We must not be dazzled by democratic slogans that have no foundation in reality.

The Muslims have only just won their own Muslim homeland, and they still have to build a structure that will suit conditions and developments that will take place. But the decision to form a purely Muslim organization in Pakistan is not irrevocable. It may be altered as and when necessary to suit changing conditions. Nothing is static in politics. It all depends upon what progress we make and further developments that may take place..

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Page 2

Secondary sources on Page 3

CMP(1) - From Ayesha Jalal's 'The Sole Spokesman'<

CMP(2) - The Congress League positions on 12 May 11946

CMP(3) - The Cabinet Mission Plan 16 May 1946<

CMP(4) - Jinnah's and Muslim League's responses too the Cabinet Mission Plan 22 May  and June 6 1946

CMP(5) - Jinnah's meeting with Mission Delegation on 4 April 1946

CMP(6) -  Jinnah's meeting with Mission Deleggation on 16 April 1946

CMP(7A) -  Maulana Azad's meeting with Missionn Delegation on 17 April 1946

CMP(7) - The Congress unease with parity- it's excchanges with the Mission  8-9 May 1946

CMP(7B) Jinnah and Azad's responses to the Cabinet Mission's preliminary proposals 8-9 May 1946

CMP(8A) Simla Conference meetings on 5 May 1946 on the powers of the Union

CMP(8) - More exchanges on parity during Simla Connference meeting  11 May 1946

CMP(9)- Jinnah's Conversations with Major Wyatt(1) on Pakistan and the Cabinet Mission Plan , 8 January and 25 May 1946

CMP(10) - Jinnah's Conversations with Major Wyatt(22) on the interim government, 11 June 1946

CMP(12)- Congress Working Committe resolutions, May-June 1946

CMP(12A) Congress and the Cabinet Mission's arguments over inclusion of a Congress Muslim in the Interim Government June 12 and June 23 1946

CMP(13)- Jawaharlal Nehru's press conference on the Plan, 10 July 1946

CMP(14) - League withdrew from Plan, called Direct Action, Viceroy Wavell talked to Nehru, July-August 1946

CMP(15) - The Viceroy tried to strong-arm Nehru andd Gandhi on compulsory grouping, Pethick Lawrence to Attlee, August-September 1946

CMP(16)- Intelligence assessment on Jinnah's options and threat of civil war, September 1946

CMP(17)- The League's boycott of the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah and Wavell, Mission insisting on compulsory grouping, etc October 1946-January 1947
CMP(17A) Congress "climbdown" on grouping and Jinnah's rejection, January 1947

CMP (A1) - Additional material - Some Plain speaking from Sir Khizr Hayat, Abell on the Breakdown plan, Viceroy to Jinnah

CMP(A2) North West Frontier Province, October-November 1946 and February-March 1947

CMP(A3) Bengal and Bihar, August - November 1946

CMP(A4) Punjab, February - March 1947

CMP (18) - My take

CMP (19) - What did parity and communal veto mean in numbers?

CMP(20) Another summary /take on the Cabinet Mission Plan-with links to the above reference material

CMP(21) Mountbatten discusses the Cabinet Mission Plan with Sardar Patel and M. A. Jinnah, 24-26 April 1947

CMP(22) A reply on the Cabinet Mission Plan

Extra(1) - Speech by Jinnah in March 1941 outlining the case for an independent sovereign Pakistan 

Extra(1A) Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1941-1942

Extra(1B) Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1938-1940

Extra(1C) Jinnah's speeches and Statements from 1943-45

Extra(2) -  Jinnah's letter to Gandhi during Gaandhi-Jinnah talks in 1944 on defining Pakistan

Extra(3)- B.R. Ambedkar quoted from his book 'Pakistan or the Partition of India'  

Extra(4) Congress and Muslim parties' positions on the Communal question 1927-1931

Extra(4A) Excerpts of Motilal Nehru Committee Report 1928

Extra(4B) Nehru, Bose, Jinnah Correspondence 1937-38

Extra(6) Gandhiji's scheme of offering the Prime Ministership to Jinnah in 1947

Extra(6A) Jinnah on Congress's offers of Prime Ministership 1940-43 and Gandhi's 1943 letter to Jinnah from jail

Extra (6B) April-July 1947  Negotiations on Pakistan between Mountbatten and Jinnah

Extra(7) M.A.Jinnah and Maulana Azad on two nation theory

Extra(8) Comments on Separate electorates, Joint electorates and Reserved constituencies

Extra(9) Links to a selection of cartoons on Indian constitutional parleys published in the Daily Mail, UK, in 1942 and 1946-1947, by L.G. Illingworth, from National Library of Wales' online Illingworth exhibition