Bedford and Bridgeport/Huntingdon and Broad Top Mountain- Southern Connection with Allegany County Maryland Coal Fields- Photos Fall of 2001
Huntingdon and Broad Top Mountain (HBTM) Railroad, Bedford and Bridgeport RR, Pennsylvania Railroad in Maryland and the Georges Creek and Cumberland RR were roads to tap coal from the Broad Top region of Pennsylvania and the Georges Creek field of Maryland. A Cumberland Maryland connection with the West Virginia Central and Pittsburg was made for even more West Virginia coal potential. All of southern end of this system was designed to break the B&O monopoly on coal-by-rail transportation, apparently a very sore point with the likes of Henry Gassaway Davis and the Georges Creeks coal operators in competition with the Consolidation Coal Company of Maryland. The city of Cumberland even got into the act of railroad financing by providing $65,000 in funding for the Pennsylvania in Maryland RR, which at the time was 15% of all of its funded debt. The photos below are of the bridges on the Bedford and Bridgeport Railroad section,Bridgeport was an earlier name for Hyndman, PA. The Bedford and Bridgeport was built by the PRR as a "commutation line", the PRR could avoid or "commute" certain taxes by building railroads that politicians wanted, even if not connected to the PRR. This link to Maryland and West Virginia Coal fields was used by the HBTM RR, creating probably more bridge traffic than the HBTM's own Broad Top Mountain coal sources. This coal was headed for the New York City market at PRR's South Amboy New Jersey docks.The PRR involvement is certainly confusing to this writer, as Scharf's contemporary history refers to the system of lines as the Pennsylvania Railroad, yet the HBTM was a separately chartered and independent railroad. According to Patrick Stakem (see link below) when the HBTM would not sell out to the PRR, the Pennsylvania retaliated by building a branch from Hollidaysburg to Bedford and somehow wrestled all of the Cumberland Coal haul from the HBTM. The HBTM went out of business in 1954 with the remaining rails around Everett, PA reforming as the Everett Railroad, connecting with the Pennsylvania Railroad at Bedford.
By the way, the Broad Top Coal field seems to be somewhat of a geologic curiosity, being far to the east of other bituminous fields in the area. There is mention of a similar isolated coal field in the Sleepy Creek region of West Virgina, but apparently it was not big enough to mine commercially.
From Hyndman to Manns Choice PA
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SUMMARY
Railroad: Huntingdon and Broad Top Mountain Railroad and Coal Company
Date: May 5, 1942
Location: Hummel, Pa.
Kind of accident: Head-end collision
Trains involved: Freight : Passenger
Train numbers: Extra 33 North : Passenger Extra M-39 South
Engine numbers: 33 :M-39
Consist: 40 cars, caboose :Gas-electric motor car
Speed: 10-25 m.p.h. : 35-40 m.p.h
Operation: Timetable and train orders
Track: Single; tangent; 0.31 percent ascending grade northward
Weather: Clear
Time: About 6:50 p.m.
Casualties: 1 killed; 6 injured
Cause: Accident caused by failure to obey meet order
INVESTIGATION NO. 2585
IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.
THE HUNTINGDON AND BROAD TOP MOUNTAIN RAILROAD AND COAL COMPANY
June 19, 1942.
Accident near Hummel, Pa., on My 5,1942, caused by failure to obey meet order.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 1
PATTERSON, Commissioner:
On May 5, 1942, there was a head-end collision between a freight train and a passenger train on the line of the Huntingdon and Broad Top Mountain Railroad and Coal Company near Hummel, Pa., which resulted in the death of one employee, and the injury of two passengers and four employees. This accident was investigated in conjunction with a representative of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.
Diagram
Inv-2585 Huntingdon and Broad Top Mountain Railroad and Coal Company Hummel, Pa. May 5, 1942.
Location of Accident and Method of Operation
This accident occurred on that part of the railroad which extends between Mt. Dallas and Huntingdon, Pa., a distance of 44 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable and train orders. There is no block system in use. At Hummel a spur track about 500 feet in length parallels the main track on the west. Entry to this track is made at a point 750 feet north of the station through a facing-point switch for south-bound movements. The accident occurred at a point 4,706 feet north of this switch. As the point of accident is approached from the south there are in succession, a tangent 3,200 feet in length, a 1 degree 20' curve to the left 400 feet, and a tangent 2,790 feet to the point of accident and 110 foot beyond. As the point of accident is approached from the north there is a 2 degree curve to the loft 900 feet in length, which is followed by the tangent on which thc accident occurred. At the point of accident the grids ii 0.31 percent ascending northward.
The southern end of the curve immediately north of the point of accident is laid in a out. The walls or this cut rise to a maximum height of 13 feet and there are trees on top of each well.
Operating rules road in part as follows:
14. ENGINE WHISTLE SIGNALS.
NOTE.-The signals prescribed are illustrated by "o" for short sounds; "-----" for longer sound.
*** (n) ---- ---- o Approaching meeting or waiting points. See Rule 90.
*** 88. *** At meeting points between extra trains, the train in the inferior time-table direction must take the siding unless otherwise provided.
*** 90. *** Train must stop clear of the switch used by the train to be met in going on the siding. *** The engineman of each train will give signal 14 (n) at least one mile before reaching a meeting or waiting point. Should the engineman fail to give signal 14 (n) as herein proscribed, the conductor must take immediate action to stop the train.
210. When a "31" train order has been transmitted, *** Those to whom the order is addressed, except enginemen, must read it to the operator and then sign it, ***. The copy for each engineman must be delivered to him personally by the conductor; the engineman will then read the order to the conductor before proceeding. Enginemen must show train orders to firemen and when practicable to forward trainmen. Conductors must show train orders when practicable to trainmen. Time-table instructions read in part as follows: Northward Trains are superior by direction to Trains of the same class in opposite Direction, unless otherwise specified. *** The maximum authorized speed for passenger extras is 45 miles per hour, and for local freight extras, 35 miles per hour. Description of Accident Extra 33 North, a north-bound local freight train, consisted at the time of the accident of engine 33, 32 loaded and 8 empty cars and a caboose. At Saxton, 6.4 miles south of Hummel, the crew received copies of train order No. 19, Form 31, which read as follows:
Extra 33 North Meet Pasgr Extra M 39 South at Hummel
Extra 33 North departed from Saxton at 6:05 p.m., according to the dispatcher's record of movement of trains. At Fisher's Summit Siding, 2.7 miles south of Hummel, cars were added to the train, and a running air-brake test was made as the train departed. This train passed the fouling point of the spur track at Hummel, where it was required to wait unless Passenger Extra M-39 South was into clear, and while moving at an estimated speed of 10 to 25 miles per hour it collided with Passenger Extra M-39 South at a point 4,706 feet north of the switch of the spur track.
Passenger Extra M-39 South, a south-bound passenger train, consisted of gas-electric motor car M-39. The gas-electric motor car was of steel construction. It was 75 feet 1/2 inch in length, and was divided into an engine compartment, a baggage compartment, a smoking compartment and a passenger comportment. At Huntingdon, 17.7 miles north of Hummel, the crew received copies of train order No. 19, Form 31, previously quoted. This train departed from Huntingdon at 6:30 p.m., according to the dispatcher's record of movement of trains, and while moving at a speed estimated as 35 to 40 miles per hour collided with Extra 33 North. The air brakes functioned properly en route.
Because of the cut and the track curvature north of the point of accident the view from the control compartment of a south-bound motor ear is considerably restricted.
The force of the impact moved the gas-electric motor car backward 235 feet. The front end bras crushed inward a distance of 5 feet, and the car was otherwise badly damaged. Engine 33 and its tender were derailed, but remained upright arid stopped, badly damaged, with the front end of the engine telescoping gas-electric motor car M-39. The tender was somewhat damaged. The first four cars wore derailed to the right and were slightly damaged.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 6:50 p.m.
The employee killed was the conductor of Passenger Extra M-39, and the employees injured were the engineer of Passenger Extra M-39 and the engineer, the fireman and the front brakeman of Extra
33. Data
During the 30-day period preceding the day of the accident, the average daily movement in the vicinity of the point of accident was 5.6 trains.
Discussion
The rules governing operation on the line involved provide that at a meeting point between two extra trains, the train in the superior time-table direction must stop clear of the switch to be used by the train going into clear. The engineer of each train must sound the meeting-point whistle signal at least 1 mile in advance of the meeting point. If an engineer fails to sound the proper signal, thc conductor must the action to stop the train. When practicable, all members of a crew must read train orders. All surviving members of both crews understood these requirements.
The crews of both trains held copies of train order No. 19, which established Hummel as a meeting point between Extra 33 North, a freight train, and Passenger Extra M-39 South. Sine Passenger Extra M-39 was moving in the inferior time-table direction, it was required to enter the spur track at Hummel to clear for Extra 33, and Extra 33 was required to stop on the main track short of the spur-track switch unless Passenger Extra H-39 was into clear.
The crew of Passenger Extra M-39 consisted of two employees. As tale train was approaching Hummel, the speed was about 40 miles per hour and the engineer was stationed in the control compartment maintaining a lookout ahead. The engineer was not aware of anything being wrong until his motor car reached a point in the cut about 900 feet north of the point where the accident occurred, and then he observed smoke north of the switch at Hummel. Immediately afterward he saw Extra 33 and applied the brakes in emergency, but the distance was not sufficient for the accident to be averted. The brake on the motor car had functioned properly en route.
After the conductor of Extra 33 North signed train order No. 19, Form 31, in the dispatcher's office at Saxton, ha received two copies of the order, and then delivered one cop/ to the engineer and the other copy to the fireman. He did not retain a copy for the flagman and himself. The conductor said that before his train departed from Saxton, because of performing switching service, he failed to inform either the front brakeman or the flagman concerning the meeting point with Passenger Extra M-39 at Hummel. According to the statement of the engineer of Extra 33, he read train order No. 19 before his train departed from Saxton but afterward he forgot the meeting point. A his train, was approaching the point where the accident occurred, the speed was about 25 miles per hour, and the front brakeman and he were maintaining a lookout ahead. The fireman was tending the fire. The first that the engineer was aware of anything being wrong was when he observed Passenger Extra M-39 approaching at a distance of about 1/4 mile. He immediately moved the brake valve to emergency position but the distance was not sufficient for stopping short of the approaching train. The engineer estimated that the speed of his train was about 10 miles per hour at the time of the collision. According to the statement of the conductor, when his train passed Hummel he was in the caboose engaged in clerical duties and failed to observe if passenger Extra M-39 was into clear at Hummel, or if his train was being operated prepared to stop short of the fouling point of the switch. When his train had passed a considerable distance beyond Hummel, he became aware that his train had not complied with the provisions of train order No. 19, but before he could take action to stop the train the collision occurred. The rules require that the meeting-point whistle signal be sounded not less than 1 mile in advance of a meeting point. In this instance the engineer of Extra 33 did not sound the whistle signal. If the conductor had observed the failure to sound the meeting-point signal he could have taken action to stop the train. Although the fireman had a copy of the train order in his possession, be forgot the meeting point.
The investigation of this accident disclosed that the handling of train orders did not comply with the requirements of the rules. The dispatcher read train order No. 19 to the conductor, who signed the order but did not read it to the dispatcher. The conductor than read the order to the engineer and delivered a copy to him, but the engineer did not read it to the conductor. The conductor delivered the second copy of the order to the fireman, but neither one discussed it or read it to the other. The conductor did not inform the flagman of the provision of the meet order and neither of the enginemen informed the front brakeman that Extra 33 and Passenger Extra M-39 were to meet at Hummel. The conductor said that it is customary for him to deliver both copies of a train order to the engine crew and that he depends upon them to fulfill the requirements of the order. No member of the crew had been on duty more than 1 hour 5 minutes when the accident occurred. If the flagman and the front brakeman had read the order involved, it is probable they would have remembered about the meeting point, as they were not occupied with any duties when their train passed Hummel.
The carrier's rules for the testing of train air-brake equipment provide that terminal tests of the air-brake system must be made at originating terminals. In addition, when cars, added to a train subsequent to a terminal test, are in the position in which they are to be hauled in the train, an air brake test must be made and each brake must be examined to determine if it applies and releases properly. Three members of the crew of Extra 33 said that a proper test was made at Saxton, the initial terminal, but two members were not certain if a proper test was made at that point. At Fisher's Summit Siding 25 cars were added to the train. The engineer said the only test at that point was made by the use of the automatic brake valve to control the train moving from the siding. There was no evidence that the brakes did not function properly between Fisher's Summit Siding and the point of accident nevertheless, Extra 33 left this station without the crew. knowing the actual condition of the brakes, of their train.
The trainmaster said that employees had been instructed to comply with the rules, but, since he also fulfilled the duties of dispatcher, he was no able to observe if employees complied with the rules. The manner in which the employees of Extra 33 performed their duties indicates a lack of proper supervision. The investigation of disclosed the need for additional protection for the movement of trains on this line. If an adequate block system had been in use, this accident would have been averted.
Cause
It is found that this accident was caused by failure to obey a meet order.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this nineteenth day of June, 1942.
By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.
W. P. BARTEL, (SEAL) Secretary.
FOOTNOTE:
1. Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition. Director.