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Maxim Sladky`s News Agency
2003 A.D.
GOVERNOR RECOMMENDS NEW FEDERAL INSPECTOR IN KURSK
(14 November 2003)
FEDERAL AUTHORITIES FILE CHARGES AGAINST FORMER KURSK GOVERNOR
(14 October 2003)
WAVE OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS CROSSING RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER
(12 September 2003)
PROCURATOR GENERAL ENDS SCANDAL IN KURSK OFFICE
(14 August 2003)
MOSCOW PURGES KURSK'S YEDINAYA ROSSIYA
(22 July 2003)
CENTRAL OKRUG, RTR, PRO-KREMLIN PARTY PREPARE UNIFIED MEDIA COVERAGE FOR DUMA CAMPAIGN
(3 May 2003)
KURSK HOPES TO COPY BELGOROD SUCCESS WITH UKRAINIAN NEIGHBORS
(2 February 2003)
GOVERNOR RECOMMENDS NEW FEDERAL INSPECTOR IN KURSK
On 27 October, the federal authorities named as their representative in Kursk a new chief federal inspector hand-picked for the job by the region's Communist governor Aleksandr Mikhailov. In theory, the chief federal inspector is supposed to be independent of the regional authorities so that he can give the federal government an objective assessment of what is going on in the region. In Kursk, however, this does not seem to be the case.
The new chief federal inspector is Aleksandr Kichigin, who previously was the mayor of Zheleznogorsk and a member of the Kursk Oblast Duma. He replaces Viktor Surzhikov, who was elected mayor of Kursk at the end of September. In contrast to the former Kursk mayor, Kichigin has never come into conflict with Governor Mikhailov, though he did have difficult relations with former Governor Aleksandr Rutskoi. In October 2000 Kichigin unexpectedly tendered his resignation in a conflict with the Mikhailovskii Mining and Processing Combine about tax payments to the city budget. Three days later, when the city council refused to accept his resignation, Kichigin withdrew it. After that, he did not engage in any more extravagant measures. During the summer, there were many press reports that Governor Mikhailov was pressing Kichigin to run for the mayor's office in Kursk (Region-46, 20 August 2003). Kichigin denied these reports, but the governor publicly described him as a "strong manager and a leader with a constructive approach."
Now political observers speculate that Surzhikov will use his post as Kursk mayor to launch a gubernatorial campaign in two years. Surzhikov lost the governor's race to Mikhailov in 2000 after the court removed Rutskoi from the race (see Russian Regional Report, 23 October 2000). Surzhikov is the former head of the Federal Security Service in the region.
Beyond the governor's desires, another reason for appointing Kichigin as chief federal inspector is his close ties to the giant holding company Metalloinvest, which owns the Mikhailovskii plant, the largest enterprise in Zheleznogorsk and the region. Its gradual transformation into a metallurgical production plant, in which Metalloinvest is planning to invest $500,000 by 2007, requires the support of both the regional and federal authorities.
In presenting Kichigin to the heads of the federal agencies working in Kursk, First Deputy Presidential Envoy to the Central Federal Okrug Aleksandr Gromov expressed the hope that in the future there were would be no conflict between the local and regional authorities and that Kursk would be able to establish close and stable contacts with the federal government. In this way the federal authorities seem to be seeking a cooperative, rather than confrontational, relationship with the regional elite.
14 November 2003
FEDERAL AUTHORITIES FILE CHARGES AGAINST FORMER KURSK GOVERNOR
Last week the investigative arm of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Central Federal Okrug office charged former Kursk Governor Aleksandr Rutskoi with abusing his office. The charges focus on the 1999 "combine affair." As the media pointed out, the charges coincided with the 10th anniversary of the October 1993 events in which Rutskoi led a rebellion against Yeltsin's government. When the charges were filed, Rutskoi himself was receiving treatment at a Moscow cardiology center.
The law enforcement authorities have apparently decided to shine a light on Rutskoi's management of the oblast in 1997 and 1998. Most of the current accusations are connected with the quick rise and collapse of the Kursk Guberniya Bank, the Latvian, Pareks-Bank, and several foreign firms.
According to the charges, as governor Rutskoi illegally received a 35 million ruble credit in Pareks-Bank. In 1997 and 1998, oblast officials used this money to purchase Don combines and Czech milling equipment, costing the oblast budget a significant sum in the process.
The court has already prosecuted some players in the combine affair. Two of Rutskoi's deputies were indicted and the former governor was called as a witness. On that occaision, First Deputy Governor Yurii Kononchuk was able to avoid trial for health reasons, but Deputy Governor Vladimir Bunchuk was convicted. The court found that Rutskoi's people paid 14 million rubles more than they should have for the equipment. Rutskoi called that investigation a political provocation, a claim that he has continued to make in responding to the current accusations (Drug dlya
druga, 7 October).
In the present case, Rutskoi asserts that the charges are connected with his decision to participate in the 7 December State Duma elections. He identified Presidential Envoy Georgii Poltavchenko, Governor Aleksandr Mikhailov, and oblast police chief Aleksei Volkov as behind the accusations.
The "combine affair" is only one of numerous well-known financial scandals that took place in Kursk Oblast while Rutskoi was in power. In August 1993, the Moscow procurator investigated then Vice President Rutskoi's participation in the illegal transfer of $3 million to a company headed by a Swiss citizen. In 1998, a variety of criminal cases were filed against Rutskoi's son and two brothers. At the end of 2000, Rutskoi had to answer charges about the privatization of the apartment he received as governor and the court disqualified him from the governor's race in which he sought a second term.
During Rutskoi's four years in office, there were 26 criminal cases filed against oblast or local officials, with 19 of them leading to convictions. The most prominent targets were the two deputy governors mentioned above (Kononchuk and Bunchuk), oblast prime minister Boris Khokhlov, and raion administration chiefs Yurii Goncharov and Vasilii Filchakov.
14 October 2003
WAVE OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS CROSSING RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER
Illegal immigration on the Russian-Ukrainian border became a problem quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thanks to the porous state of the border, exacerbated by a decade of delimitation and demarcation, illegal immigration grew continuously, reaching a new peak in 2003. Its current scale makes it one of the key threats to Russia's national
security. In fact, the flow of migrants has "overwhelmed the border," according to Lt. Gen. Sergei Minakov, the head of the Border Service's western regional administration (Belgorodskie izvestiya, 3 September).
Generally, the illegal migrants come from Central and South-East Asia (India, China, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh, and other countries). Usually, they enter Russia legally and seek to transit through Ukraine to the European Union. They often claim that they want to come to Russia because they are interested in education, medical treatment, or seeking work.
Transporters meet them at Moscow and St. Petersburg airports and take them to unguarded parts of the border, sending them by secret paths to the Ukrainian side. The border guards note the largest flows of illegal migrants in Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai (up to two-thirds of the total flow), but Kursk, Belgorod, and Voronezh oblasts also see large numbers of migrants (Vestnik granitsy Rossii, no. 8, 2003).
The MVD's regional units and the border guards consider illegal migration a well-developed and extremely profitable business. The authorities in the border regions believe that addressing the problem requires developing and implementing a migration policy. They recommend changes in Russia's administrative and criminal codes, toughening sanctions against people illegally crossing the border and those working to help them. They also argue for clarifying the procedure of inviting foreigners to Russia and the conditions of their stay. Ministry of Internal Affairs officials believe that if they have sufficient powers, their institution could become the main force in combating illegal migration. Currently only the border guards investigate criminal groups involved in illegal migration and arrest illegal migrants and their
helpers.
Organized crime groups working on the Russian-Ukrainian border are also involved in transporting drugs and other illegal goods. Generally, illegal migrants move from Russia to Ukraine, while contraband goods and drugs flow in the other direction. The result is an extremely complicated criminal situation on the border.
12 September 2003
PROCURATOR GENERAL ENDS SCANDAL IN KURSK OFFICE
At the end of July, a commission set up by the Procurator General's office brought to a conclusion a nine-month scandal involving a conflict between Oblast Procurator Aleksandr Babichev and his first deputy Vasilii Izotov. The commission determined that Izotov's accusations of corruption and abuse of office by his boss were baseless and instead accused him of corruption.
On numerous occasions, the local press wrote about Izotov's magnificent mansion, something he could not possibly buy with his procurator's salary, and about a series of scandals, which he had been involved in (see for example, Kurskaya Pravda, 22 July). Babichev's predecessor, now working as a deputy governor, had also attempted to
fire Izotov. In November 2002, relations between Babichev and Izotov deteriorated to the point where they could no longer work together and Izotov sent his accusations to the procurator general.
In his report, Izotov claimed that Babichev had attempted to illegally bankrupt the Mikhailov Mining and Processing Combine, the largest enterprise in the region, hoping to make a personal profit. He also charged that the procurator had illegally received housing in Kursk and that he had used budget funds improperly. Additionally, Izotov charged that the prosecutor had not conducted public tenders in remodeling the procurator's raion offices and had purchased cars without seeking competitive bids (Izvestiya, 25 July).
In April 2003 the procurator general abolished Izotov's job and the commission launched its investigation. Indicating their unhappiness with Izotov, the Moscow officials offered him an opportunity to take a new position in Siberia. Izotov turned down these opportunities and instead went on sick leave. Russian law prohibits firing someone on sick
leave.
The commission cleared Babichev of all charges and then filed numerous accusations against Izotov. The commission claimed that he had refused to pay workers the 35,000 rubles he owed them for working on his house, used a stolen car for official business, and put pressure on the court and investigators in exchange for construction materials (provided
by the latter). The Muscovites also accused Izotov of filing an illegal case against Kursk Mayor Sergei Maltsev for buying an expensive car for the mayor's office.
Despite the extensive evidence of wrongdoing, Izotov's only punishment will be that he will be forced to go on pension as soon as he returns from sick leave. The procurator general made this decision and it naturally casts doubt on the sincerity of his efforts to fight corruption.
14 August 2003
MOSCOW PURGES KURSK'S YEDINAYA ROSSIYA
On 10 July, the Yedinaya Rossiya General Council voted to expel four well-known Kursk politicians from
the party: Kursk Mayor and oblast legislature member Sergei Maltsev, oblast legislature members Vladimir Kartamyshev and Sergei Vasilev, and businessman Vladimir Losev. Why did the party leadership make a move that drops the party's representation in the regional legislature to 25 percent (the Communists control 65 percent of the seats) and strengthen
the division within party ranks?
Regional Political Council Chairman Aleksandr Chukhraev provided the official explanation, claiming that the expelled members "violated the party charter and took actions discrediting the party (Kursk Television, 11 July)." At the beginning of 2003, Kursk Mayor Maltsev ordered his subordinates and those dependent on the city budget to sign
up 3,500 party members as quickly as possible. According to the Seim television station (14 July), the director of the city's education department assigned each school director a quota of how many teachers should enlist in the party. Similar events occurred in municipal heating stations and other enterprises. Maltsev met his targets within six
months, signing up those who actually supported the party and those who didn't. In the process, many complained to the oblast procurator, saying that they were forced to join the party under threat of not receiving bonuses at work or reductions in their salary. There had not been attempts to force people to join political parties since the communist
era and the revival of these practices struck a sensitive public chord.
According to the four members of the party who lost their positions, the expulsions were the result of their efforts to put
together an extraordinary regional party conference, which criticized the work of the regional political council. The former council was disbanded and a new one elected in its place. In response, Moscow supposedly decided to expel the rebellious members of the party. Moscow has little to lose in such a move since Yedinaya Rossiya has little
authority in Kursk.
In defending the expulsions, Chukhraev claimed that the party deals harshly with members of the regional elite who join the party simply to cover up the fact that they do nothing in their official positions to help their regions. Chairman of the Central Executive Committee Yurii Volkov recently announced that the party would purge its ranks of ineffective bureaucrats and inactive members.
The recent removal of Ivanovo Mayor Aleksandr Groshev from the party provides another example of the implementation of this new policy. In that case, the party charged that the mayor was trying to split the
party's ranks, had failed to win the support of the majority of the population, and could not adequately prepare Ivanovo for the upcoming winter (Izvestiya, 17 July).
22 July 2003
CENTRAL OKRUG, RTR, PRO-KREMLIN PARTY PREPARE UNIFIED MEDIA COVERAGE FOR DUMA CAMPAIGN
With President Putin's suggestion on 16 May that Russia should have a government that relies on a parliamentary majority, the stakes for the country's December 2003 parliamentary elections are high.
On 29 April the 18 chief federal inspectors from the Central Federal Okrug met in Kursk with regional representatives of the Russian Television network (VGTRK), the country's second most important network, to pursue Putin's long cherished objective of creating a "unified
information space." First Deputy Presidential Envoy Anton Fedorov said coordinating information flows was one of the most important tasks in strengthening authority (vertikal' vlasti) in the country and cooperation between regions. Fedorov said that the meeting marked the end of negotiations between the Central Okrug leadership and VGTRK about using the stations to carry out a unified information policy. The first concrete step as
part of the new agreement will be the broadcast of a new, weekly, half-hour show in all 18 regions of the okrug. Fedorov said that this
outcome was better than he expected.
VGTRK First Deputy Chairman Petr Zemtsov said that the purpose of the new show would be to positively present life in the 18 regions of the Central Okrug. In his appeal to the heads of the regional television stations, Zemtsov stressed that the new show should not simply detail the lives of the governors. Rather the purpose of the shows will seek to provide more positive information, including about the presidential envoy. VGTRK's Moscow television center will take the information from the regional stations, and in coordination with the Central Okrug leadership, prepare the content of the program.
The creation of the new show is one of the first steps in creating a unified information space in the okrug and establishing control over it in the runup to the December 2003 Duma and 2004 presidential elections. Attempts to create similar shows in other okrugs, such as in Siberia, ran into difficulty because the content was not interesting enough to attract a wide viewership.
On the same day, at the same Kursk hotel (Solovinaya roshcha) there was another conference with a similar theme: representatives of the pro-Kremlin party Yedinaya Rossiya met to discuss their relations with the Central Okrug media. Regional party leaders participated in the session. Clearly the conduct of the two conferences was not a coincidence. The state-controlled media will back the efforts of this party, regardless of how many times the chief federal inspectors assert that they will not engage in political activity.
3 May 2003
KURSK HOPES TO COPY BELGOROD SUCCESS WITH UKRAINIAN NEIGHBORS
Kursk Oblast is trying to increase its trade with neighboring Sumsk Oblast in Ukraine, matching similar success between Belgorod and Kharkov oblasts. During a 15 January visit, Sumsk Oblast leader Vladimir Shcherban and Kursk Oblast Governor Aleksandr Mikhailov signed a joint declaration to their national governments calling for simplifying customs and border regimes in the interest of helping people living in the border regions.
In 2001, Russia and Ukraine signed a treaty simplifying customs and border regimes for residents of the border regions in Belgorod and Kharkov oblasts as an experiment. Kursk and Sumsk now want to extend the treaty to their own regions since they believe that it significantly increased the foreign trade activity of enterprises in Belgorod, making
a powerful positive impact on local markets.
Kursk and Sumsk signed a trade agreement in November 2001 and it is quickly becoming an important factor in Kursk's economic development.
During the course of 2002, Kursk enterprises sent 1.32 million rubles worth of goods to its neighbor. While the amount of trade is still small, it was five times more than in 2001. For the first time, the two regions traded agricultural products and Sumsk enterprises sold light industrial goods to the Russians. The two sides agreed to finalize plans for establishing trading houses in their respective regions by 1 May 2003.
3 February 2003
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