UK National Archives, No 1 I(U) Section [another cover name for SIS], Bari, to Lt Col Street, Rear HQ ‘M’ Military Mission, from Major James Millar, 13 October 1944.
‘Following is a summary of Major Reed’s appreciation of present deadlock in relations between the British and the Partisans.
Internal suspicion. Suspicion of the activities of Allied personnel is growing daily stonger, carrying the latent threat that it will assume ugly proportions and become dangerous.
Attitude of Partisan authorities. The Partisan authorities are completely unco-operative, and make no attempt to straighten out difficulties as they arise, claiming that they are powerless to act in the face of instructions from higher up.
This uncooperative attitude is gravely aggravated by the indiscriminate and all too frequently unauthorized infiltration of personnel by various Allied organizations who apparently work independently of each other. In many cases the function of the men thus infiltrated is not clear. In some cases it is not established that they have any function at all. It may happen that a large party composed of members of ISLD, LRDG, American SI and SBS etc. be gathered in one spot, the members of each organization complaining complete ignorance of the activities of the other organizations.
This cannot but cause bewilderment and suspicion to the harassed Partisan officials detailed to look after the party, and liaison is doomed from the start. A typical example of muddle-headed infiltration is the entry of LRDG Italian interpreters in civilian clothes, without written authorization, even without any identity papers.
The only solution is co-ordination of liaison on a high level so that the Partisans may have a simple picture. Infiltration of personnel could be so arranged that every local commander knows the function of every member of Allied parties in his area. Further, all personnel thus infiltrated should be in possession of the necessary documents, authorizing him to work in that particular area. Major Reed states: “Everybody should have with him on his person means of proving to the jealous, bewildered, suspicious, and self-righteous commander what his right is to be here, and what Tito thinks he has to contribute to their victory”.’
Numerous Allied covert organizations were working without proper co-ordination on or near the peninsula, and relations with the Partisans had deteriorated sharply. With the end of the war very obviously approaching, political differences between Tito and the Western Allies were assuming a more prominent role in their association than any common interest in Germany’s defeat...