Up untill mid-1960's, State Department and Pentagon officials argued that Israel didn't need Americans arms because it was strong enough to defend itself and had access to arms elsewhere. Official also worried that Arabs would be alienated and provoked to ask the Soviets and Chineses for weapons that would stimulate Middle East arm race.
U.S policy first shifted with John Kenndy's 1962's sale of Hawk antiaircraft missiles to Israel, which was made over the objection of the State Department, but only after Egypt obtained long range bombers from the Soviets. Lyndon Johnson subsequently provided Israel with tanks and aircraft, but these sales were balanced by transfers to Arab countires. U.S policy was to avoid providing one state in the area of military advantage over the other. This changed in 1968 when Johnson announced the sale of Phantom jets to Israel. That sales established the beginning of the U.S policy to give Israel a QUALITATIVE military edge over its neighbors.
Johnson decision was based on Israel's perceived need, rather than its potential contribution to U.S security interests. Up to this point, Israel wasn't viewed as having any role to play in Western defense, largely because it didn't have the military might contribute to the policy of containment. This perception began to change in 1970 when U.S asked Israel for help in bolstering King Hussein's regime, By early 1970's, it became clear that no Arab state could or would contribute to Western defense in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact had long before expired and the regimes friendly to the United States were weak reeds in the region compared to the Anti Western forces in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, even after Egypt reorientation, following the signing of the peace treaty with Israel, the United States couln't count on any Arab government for military assistance.
The Carter's Administration began to implement a form of strategic cooperation by making Israel eligible to sell ,ilitary equipment to the U.S and engaging in limited joint exercises. The relationship could have stagnated at this point, especially after the blow up between Ronald Reagan and Mencahem Begin (Israeli Prime Minister) over the 1981 sale of AWACS to Saudi Arbia, but Reagan was the first president to see Israel as a potential contributor to the Cold War.
Prior to his election, Reagan had written :" Only by full appreciation of the critical role of the State of Israel plays in our strategic calculus can we build the foundation for thwartingn Moscow's designs on territories and resources vital to our security and our national well-being".
The Israeli wisely played up their capability to deter the Soviet Union, while the Arab states refuesed to join the "Strategic Consensus" that Alexander Haig tried to create to opposes Soviet expansionism in the region. The Arabs insisted the greatest threat to them was not Communism, but Zionism. The Israeli never considered the Soviet their principal threat either, but were preparedd to say otherwise to win Reagan's favor.
They began to reap the benefits of this approach on Novmeber 31, 1981, when the two countires signed a Memorandum of Understanding terned " strategic cooperation". The agreement was diluted by oppoistion from the Pentagon and the State Department and didn't provide for joint exercises or a regular means of cooperation. Worse, it was used as a stick to beat Israel with a mounth later when the Memorandum of Understanding was suspended because of American dissatisfaction with Israel's decision to annex the Golan Heights. Still Israel for the frist time was formally recognized as a strategic ally.
Two years later, a new MOU was signed that created the joint political - Military Group (JPMG) and a group to oversee secuirty assistance, the joint secuirty Assistance Planning Group (JSAP). The JPMG was originally designed to discuss means of countering Soviet threat, but it almost immediately focused on bilateral concerns. The JSAP was formed in response to Israeli economic crisis in the mid 1980's and focused primarily on Israel's military procurement needs.
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