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SOMALIA'S LETHAL MAGNETISM
Austin Bay
It would be rhetorically elegant ? and a profoundly simpler diplomatic
issue ? if Somalia mimicked Julius Caesar's assessment of Gaul and merely
split into three parts. It doesn't. Anarchic Somalia is arguably the
planet's foremost "failed state," with Afghanistan and the Congo
as basket-case competitors. Find a sub-clan with a savvy leader, or a gang
on a street corner, and you have what passes for governing structure in
much of Mogadishu and its environs. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz noted, Somalia attracts al Qaeda "precisely because the
government is weak or nonexistent." American counterterror
"options" there are limited, Mr. Wolfowitz added, since "by
definition you don't have a government you can work with." Thus, in
the near term, the United States will work with Somali opposition factions
such as the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). The clan
leaders and warlords in the SRRC are, for the moment, lining up against
the self-proclaimed (and al Qaeda-infected) "national government"
in Mogadishu. U.S. intelligence and military coordination with such anti-Islamist
groups offers a potentially effective means for quickly destroying al
Qaeda cells and sympathizers in Somalia. In the long term, however,
America must do better than leave Somalia's "failed state" to
recurrent chaos. We've learned, too painfully, that these hard, wretched
corners can't be neglected. If the locals in these failed states were
truly left to their own devices, that becomes one kind of problem ? the
kind more yielding to checkbooks and compassion. But Osama bin Laden has
demonstrated that terrorists with money and guns don't ignore the hard
corners. Bucks-up zealots spread their own brand of "imperialism,"
imposing their hate-filled "values" upon vulnerable and
frightened people. Which brings us back to Caesar and Gaul. Check the maps.
There are indeed three Somalias. No, don't refer to a current atlas neatly
portraying Somalia as a contiguous political entity enfolding the Horn of
Africa, but examine those maps drawn by Somalis that reflect the fractured
present and indicate possible geopolitical alternatives. Somalilandnet.com
(website of the Somaliland
Republic) carves a separate nation out of northwestern Somalia, with
borders strikingly similar to those of what was once called British Somaliland.
Somaliland held a
plebiscite in May 2001 to "ratify" its independence. The
Web site of the Somali National Educational Trust (snet.click2site.com)
depicts Puntland. Remember the Land of Punt? Egyptian Queen Hapshetsut
sent an expedition to Punt in the 15th century B.C. This 21st century A.D.
"Puntland" is north of Mogadishu on the "elbow" of the
Horn of Africa. Puntland claimed independence from "Mogadishu
control" in 1998. Would that these two fractal-states were free from
threat and strife. They aren't. Trouble hit Puntland last August, and now
two factions struggle for control. Though the Somaliland
Republic depicts itself as a land of "democracy and the rule of law,"
that status is fragile. The two statelets are, however, more stable than
Mogadishu. They also reflect (to some degree) the desire of their
inhabitants to shake the anarchy that has plagued Somalia for a decade. So
"three Somalias" isn't quite as phony a notion as one. These
nascent states may offer long-term possibilities for fostering a more
stable Horn of Africa. The concept is to reinforce the "more
stable" and then use them as a platform to spread stability. Of
course, reinforcing the more stable regions could lead to permanent
separation and new borders. But in Somalia's case, is that so bad? Every
failed state has unique problems, which means no single policy can resolve
them. The issue of bad borders, however ? either as relics of colonialism
or of longstanding antagonisms ? crops up continually. Drawing new
boundaries in Africa has been anathema, where the problem is particularly
acute. As bad as the borders are, most African leaders concluded the
process of drawing new ones might unleash even more violence. Sticking
with the old borders boxed in deadlier possibilities. But the Congo's
collapse and Somalia's terrorist-breeding anarchy demonstrate that the
deadlier "what-ifs" are already among us. Rooting out al Qaeda
is Washington's immediate goal, but the problem of bad borders or phony
states can no longer be ignored. Should Somalia divide into three parts?
Yes, if it means better borders. Perhaps there's a Nobel Prize for the
secretary of state who sees in Somalia an opportunity to demonstrate it is
possible to evolve more responsive and more stable political entities from
the morass of a chronically flawed postcolonial state, and in doing so
eliminate fertile territory for terrorists.

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