On 12 Jun 96 the Australian Army experienced a training accident at the High Range Training Area near Townsville involving the collision and destruction of two Black Hawk helicopters, resulting in the deaths of 18 members of the Australian Army and injuries ranging from minor to very serious to a further 12 members.
The accident occurred on the second day of Exercise DAY ROTOR 96, a two week exercise authorised by the Chief of the Defence Force as part of a series of training activities designed to develop and retain high readiness on the part of the Special Air Service Regiment and the 5th Aviation Regiment to undertake operations to recover Australian citizens should they become the victims of a hostage situation such as has occurred in many parts of the World.
The causes of the accident listed below are quoted from the releasable version of the report of the Board of Inquiry.
The primary causes of the accident, listed in approximate sequence rather than in any order of significance, were:
a. inadequate planning for the air mission on 12 Jun 96, in particular:
(1) use of the three aircraft line abreast formation which had not been practised;
(2) failure to plan an overshoot procedure for a live firing mission;
(3) location of the Flight Lead on the left flank of the assault formation, thus compounding difficulties in control and manoeuvre; and
(4) location of the Air Element Commander in a line assault aircraft rather than an aircraft suited to command and control of the mission;
b. the non-availability of adequate information on the objective due to:
(1) the failure of 5 Avn Regt and SASR personnel to conduct a combined reconnaissance of FSB Barbara;
(2) the failure of 5 Avn Regt personnel to conduct a reconnaissance of FSB Barbara at all;
(3) the failure of a reconnaissance conducted by SASR personnel to gather accurate data reasonably required for the conduct of an airmobile mission under its control; and
(4) the failure of planning staffs to acquire air photographs, reasonably knowing of their availability and of their value to the conduct of an airmobile operation;
c. reliance on a single source of data on the objective (being a diagram on a whiteboard) which was wrong in respect of its depiction of gun position revetments which were the key reference for the location of aircraft roping point targets;
d. failure on the part of aircrew to adequately resolve conflicting understandings of the location of specific targets during a post-mission debrief;
e. implementing changes to the mission between the day mission and night NVG mission without benefit of rehearsal, including:
(1) flying lower than during the day mission;
(2) making the 30 Second Call at a point earlier at night than by day (at which point there was little likelihood of being able to see the target) in order to facilitate the early release of fire support aircraft from the formation; and
(3) employing mortar fire support for the night mission when it had not been employed for the day mission;
f. lack of experience of Flight Lead in the leadership of SRO airmobile missions;
g. deficiencies in Flight Lead's leadership of a complicated airmobile live firing assault on Day Two of a combined arms exercise;
h. [Paragraph intentionally blank];
i. [Paragraph intentionally blank];
j. failure to make proper allowance for the known characteristics and limitations of NVG, especially with respect to:
(1) the extraordinary demands on aircrew to maintain aircraft separation in a three aircraft line abreast formation;
(2) the mode of terrain flight (defined as Contour Flight), height and airspeed while using NVG contrary to Army Flying Order 2.7.6; and
(3) the distance from the target of the 30 Second Call (effectively precluding the possibility of seeing the target at that point);
k. flying off track enroute and not adopting a heading to re-intercept track, thereby significantly changing the final approach track to the objective;
l. adopting the line abreast formation (that formation being unsuited to manoeuvre) when off track;
m. probable mis-identification of a target due to an incorrect mental model of the objective on the part of Flight Lead;
n. adoption of a flight path by Flight Lead which caused Black 1 to converge on Black 2;
o. failure on the part of aircrew to detect and prevent aircraft convergence; and
p. inappropriate avoiding action by Flight Lead which brought Black 1 into collision with Black 2.
[The Board also found that there were a substantial number of contributory factors pertinent to the accident which are not listed here.]
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