Classics in the History of Psychology -- Freud (1914/1917)Classics in the
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The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement
Sigmund Freud (1914)
Translation by A. A. Brill (1917)
German original first published in the Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse, 4.
Translation first published in the Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series
(No. 25).
New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Pub. Co.
I
If in what follows I bring any contribution to the history of the psychoanalytic
movement nobody must be surprised at the subjective nature of this paper, nor at
the rôle which falls to me therein. For psychoanalysis is my creation; for ten
years I was the only one occupied with it, and all the annoyance which this new
subject caused among my contemporaries has been hurled upon my head in the form
of criticism. Even today, when I am no longer the only psychoanalyst, I feel
myself justified in assuming that none can know better than myself what
psychoanalysis is, wherein it differs from other methods of investigating the
psychic life, what its name should cover, or what might better be designated as
something else.
In the year 1909, when I was first privileged to speak publicly on
psychoanalysis in an American University, fired by this momentous occasion for
my endeavors, I declared that it was not myself who brought psychoanalysis into
existence. I said that it was Josef Breuer, who had merited this honor at a time
when I was a student and busy working for my examinations (1880-1882).[1] Since
then, well-intentioned friends have frequently repeated that I then expressed my
gratitude out of all due proportion. They considered that, as on previous
occasions, I should have dignified Breuer's "cathartic procedure" as merely
preliminary to psychoanalysis, and should have claimed that psychoanalysis
itself only began with my rejection of the hypnotic technique and my
introduction of free association. Now it is really a matter of indifference
whether the history of psychoanalysis be considered to have started with the
cathartic method or only with my modification of [p. 2] the same. I only enter
into this uninteresting question because some opponents of psychoanalysis are
wont to recall, now and then, that the art of psychoanalysis did not originate
with me at all, but with Breuer. Naturally, this only happens to be the case
when their attitude permits them to find in psychoanalysis something that is
noteworthy; ion the other hand when their repudiation of psychoanalysis is
unlimited, then psychoanalysis is always indisputably my creation. I have never
yet heard that Breuer's great part in psychoanalysis has brought him an equal
measure of insult and reproach. As I have recognized long since that it is the
inevitable fate of psychoanalysis to arouse opposition and to embitter people, I
have come to the conclusion that I must surely be the originator of all that
characterizes psychoanalysis. I add, with satisfaction, that none of the
attempts to belittle my share in this much disdained psychoanalysis has ever
come from Breuer himself, or could boast of his support.
The content of Breuer's discovery has been so often presented that a detailed
discussion of it here may be omitted. Its fundamental fact is that the symptoms
of hysterical patients depend upon impressive but forgotten scenes in their
lives (traumata). The therapy founded thereon was to cause the patients to
recall and reproduce these experiences under hypnosis (catharsis), and the
fragmentary theory, deduced from it was that these symptoms corresponded to an
abnormal use of undischarged sums of excitement (conversion). In his theoretical
contribution to the "Studies of Hysteria" Breuer, wherever obliged to mention
conversion, has always added my name in parenthesis, as though this first
attempt at a theoretical formulation was my mental property. I think this
allotment refers only to the nomenclature, whilst the conception itself occurred
to us both at the same time.
It is also well known that Breuer, after his first experience with it, allowed
the cathartic treatment to rest for a number of years and only resumed it after
I caused him to do so, on my return from Charcot. He was then an internist and
taken up with a rather busy medical practice. I had become a physician quite
reluctantly [p. 3] but had, at that time, received a strong motive for desiring
to help nervous patients or, at least, to learn to understand something of their
conditions. I had placed reliance on physical therapy and found myself helpless
in the face of disappointments that came to me with W. Erb's "Electrotherapy,"
so rich in advice and indications. If I did not, at that time, pilot myself
independently to the opinion later announced by Moebius, that the successes of
electrotherapy in nervous disorders are the results of suggestion, it was surely
only the absence of these successes that was to blame. The treatment by
suggestion in deep hypnosis seemed to offer me at that time sufficient
compensation for the lost electrical therapy. I learned this treatment through
the extremely impressive demonstrations of Liébault and Bernheim. But the
investigation under hypnosis with which I became acquainted through Breuer, I
found, owing to its automatic manner of working and the simultaneous
gratification of one's eagerness for knowledge, much more attractive than the
monotonous and violent suggestive command which was devoid of every possibility
of inquiry.
As one of the latest achievements of psychoanalysis, we have lately been
admonished to put the actual conflict and the cause of the illness into the
foreground of analysis. This is exactly what Breuer and I did in the beginning
of our work with the cathartic method. We guided the patient's attention
directly to the traumatic scene during which the symptom had arisen, tried to
find therein the psychic conflict and to free the repressed affect. We thus
discovered the procedure characteristic of the psychic processes of the neuroses
which I later named regression. The associations of the patients went back from
the scene to be explained, to earlier experiences, and this forced the analysis
which was to correct the present to occupy itself with the past. This regression
led even further backwards: At first it went quite regularly to the time of
puberty. Later, however, such failures as gaps in the understanding tempted the
analytic work further back into the years of childhood which ;had, hitherto,
been inaccessible to every sort of investigation. This regressive direction
became an important characteristic of the [p. 4] analysis. It was proved that
psychoanalysis could not clear up anything actual, except by going back to
something in the past. It even proved that every pathological experience
presupposes an earlier one which, though not in itself pathological, lent a
pathological quality to the later occurrence. But the temptation to stop short
at the known actual cause was so great that even in later analyses I yielded to
it. In the case of the patient called "Dora," carried out in 1899, the scene
which caused the outbreak of the actual illness was known to me. I tried
uncounted times to analyse this experience, but all that I could receive to my
direct demands was the same scanty and broken description. Only after a long
detour, which led through the earliest childhood of the patient, a dream
appeared in the analysis of which the hitherto forgotten details of the scene
were remembered, and this made possible the understanding and solution of the
actual conflict. From this one example it may be seen how misleading is the
above mentioned admonition and how much of a scientific regression it is to
follow the advice of neglecting the regression in the analytic technique.
The first difference of opinion between Breuer and myself came to light on a
question of the more intimate psychic mechanism of hysteria. He still favored a
physiological theory, so to speak, and wished to explain the psychic splitting
of consciousness of hysterical subjects by means of the non-communication of
various psychic states (or states of consciousness, as we then called them). He
thus created the theory of the "hypnoid states," the results of which were
supposed to bring the unassimilated foreign body into the "waking
consciousness." I had formulated this to myself less scientifically. I suspected
everywhere tendencies and strivings analogous to those of everyday life and
conceived the psychic splitting itself as a result of a repelling process, which
I then called "defense" and later "regression." I made a short-lived attempt to
reconcile both mechanisms, but as experience showed me always the same and only
one thing, my defense theory, I soon became opposed to Breuer's theory of
hypnoid states. [p. 5]
I am, however, quite certain that this difference of opinion had nothing to do
with the parting of the ways which occurred soon afterward between us. The
latter had a deeper reason, but it happened in such a manner that at first I did
not understand it, and only later did I learn to interpret it, following many
good indexes. It will be recalled that Breuer had stated, concerning his first
famous patient, that the sexual element had been astonishingly undeveloped in
her and had never contributed anything to her very marked morbid picture.[2] I
have always wondered why the critics of my theory of the sexual etiology of the
neuroses have not often opposed it with this assertion of Breuer, and up to this
day I do not know whether in this reticence I am to see a proof of their
discretion, or of their lack of observation. Whoever will reread the history of
Breuer's patient in the light of the experience gained in the last twenty years,
will have no difficulty in understanding the symbolism of the snakes and of the
arm. By taking into account also the situation at the sick-bed of the father, he
will easily guess the actual meaning of that symptom-formation, His opinion as
to the part sexuality played in the psychic life of that girl will then differ
greatly from that of her physician. To cure the patient Breuer utilized the most
intensive suggestive rapport which may serve us as prototype of that which we
call "transference." Now I have strong grounds to suppose that Breuer, after the
disposal of the symptoms, must have discovered the sexual motivity of this
transference by new signs, but that the general nature of this unexpected
phenomenon escaped him, so that here, as though hit by "an untoward event," he
broke off the investigation. I did not obtain from him any direct information of
this, but at different times he has given me sufficient connecting links to
justify me in making this combination. And then, as I stood more and more
decidedly for the significance of sexuality in the causation of the neuroses,
Breuer was the first to show me those reactions of unwilling rejection, with
which it was my lot to become so familiar later on, but which I had then not yet
recognized as my unavoidable destiny. [p. 6]
The fact that a grossly sexual, tender or inimical, transference occurs in every
treatment of a neurosis, although this was neither desired nor induced by either
party, has, for me, always seemed to be the most unshakable proof that the
forces of the neuroses originate in the sexual life. This argument has surely
not been seriously enough considered, for if it were, there would be no question
as to where the investigation would tend. For my own conviction, it has remained
decisive over and above the special results of the work of the analysis.
Some comfort for the bad reception which my theory of the sexual etiology of the
neuroses met with, even in the closer circle of my friends--a negative space was
soon formed about my person -- I found in the thought that I had taken up the
fight for a new and original idea. One day, however, my memories grouped
themselves in such a way that this satisfaction was disturbed, but in return I
obtained an excellent insight into the origin of our activities and into the
nature of our knowledge. The idea for which I was held responsible had not at
all originated with me. It had come to me from three persons, whose opinions
could count upon my deepest respect; from Breuer himself, from Charcot, and from
Chrobak, the gynecologist of our university, probably the most prominent of our
Vienna physicians. All three men had imparted to me an insight which, strictly
speaking, they had not themselves possessed. Two of them denied their
communication to me when later I reminded them of this: the third (Master
Charcot) might also have done so, had it been granted me to see him again. But
these identical communications, received without my grasping them, had lain
dormant within me, until one day they awoke as an apparently original discovery.
One day, while I was a young hospital doctor, I was accompanying Breuer on a
walk through the town when a man came up to him urgently desiring to speak with
him. I fell back and, when Breuer was free again, he told me, in his kindly,
teacher-like manner, that this was the husband of a patient, who had brought him
some news about her. The wife, he added, behaved in so conspicuous a manner [p.
7] when in company, that she had been turned over to him for treatment as a
nervous case. He ended with the remark -- "those are always secrets of the
alcove." Astonished, I asked his meaning and he explained the expression to me
("secrets of the conjugal bed"), without realizing how preposterous the matter
appeared to me.
A few years later, at one of Charcot's evening receptions, I found myself near
the venerated teacher who was just relating to Brouardel a very interesting
history from the day's practice. I did not hear the beginning clearly but
gradually the story obtained my attention. It was the case of a young married
couple from the far East. The wife was a great sufferer and the husband was
impotent, or exceedingly awkward. I heard Charcot repeat: "Tâchez donc, je vous
assure vous y arriverez." Brouardel, who spoke less distinctly, must have
expressed his astonishment that symptoms as those of the young wife should have
appeared as a result of such circumstances, for Charcot said suddenly and with
great vivacity: "Mais, dans des cas pareils c'est toujours la chose génital,
toujours -- toujours -- toujours." And while saying that he crossed his hands in
his lap and jumped up and down several times, with the vivacity peculiar to him.
I know that for a moment I was almost paralyzed with astonishment, and I said to
myself: "Yes, but if he knows this why does he never say so" But the impression
was soon forgotten; brain-anatomy and the experimental production of hysterical
paralysis absorbed all my interests.
A year later when I had begun my medical activities in Vienna as a private
dozent in nervous diseases I was as innocent and ignorant in all that concerned
the etiology of the neuroses as any promising academician could be expected to
be. One day I received a friendly call from Chrobak, who asked me to take a
patient to whom he could not give sufficient time in his new capacity as
lecturer at the university. I reached the patient before he did and learned that
she suffered from senseless attacks of anxiety, which could only be alleviated
by the most exact information as to the whereabouts of her physician at any time
in the day. When Chrobak [p. 8] appeared, he took me aside and disclosed to me
that the patient's anxiety was due to the fact that though she had been married
eighteen years, she was still a virgo intacta, that her husband was utterly
impotent. In such cases the physician can only cover the domestic mishap with
his reputation and must bear it if people shrug their shoulders and say of him:
"He is not a good doctor if in all these years, he has not been able to cure
her." He added: "The only prescription for such troubles is the one well-known
to us, but which we cannot prescribe. It is:
Penis normalis
dosim
Repetatur !
I had never heard of such a prescription and would like to have shaken my head
at my informant's cynicism.
I certainly have not uncovered the illustrious origins of this vicious idea
because I would like to shove the responsibility for it on others. I know well
that it is one thing to express an idea once or several times in the form of a
rapid aperçu, and quite another to take it seriously and literally to lead it
through all opposing details and conquer for it a place among accepted truths.
It is the difference between a light flirtation and a righteous marriage with
all its duties and difficulties. Epouser les idées de -- (to marry so and so's
ideas,) is, at least in French, a quite usual form of speech.
Other doctrines which were contributed to the cathartic method through my
efforts thus transforming it into psychoanalysis, are the following: The
theories of repression and resistance, the addition of the infantile sexuality,
and the usage and interpretation of dreams for the understanding of the
unconscious.
Concerning the theory of repression, I was certain that I worked independently.
I knew of no influence that directed me in any way to it, and I long considered
this idea to be original, till O. Rank showed us the place in Schopenhauer's
"The World as Will and Idea," where the philosopher is struggling for an
explanation for insanity.[3] [p. 9] What is there said concerning the striving
against the acceptance of a painful piece of reality agrees so completely with
the content of my theory of repression that, once again, I must be indebted to
my not being well-read for the possibility of making a discovery. To be sure,
others have read this passage and overlooked it, without making this discovery
and perhaps the same would have happened to me, if, in former years, I had taken
more pleasure in reading philosophical authors. In later years I denied myself
the great pleasure of Nietzsche's works, with the conscious motive of not
wishing to be hindered in the working out of my psychoanalytic impressions by
any preconceived ideas. Therefore, I had to he prepared -- and am so gladly --
to renounce all claim to priority in those many cases in which the laborious
psychoanalytic investigation can only confirm the insights intuitively won by
the philosophers.
The theory of repression is the main pillar upon which rests the edifice of
psychoanalysis. It is really the most essential part of it, and is itself
nothing other than the theoretical expression of an experience which can be
repeated at pleasure whenever one analyzes a neurotic patient without the aid of
hypnosis. One is then confronted with a resistance which opposes the analytic
work by causing a failure of memory in order to block it. This resistance had to
be covered by the use of hypnosis; hence the history of psychoanalysis proper
only starts technically with the rejection of hypnosis. The theoretical value of
the fact that this resistance is connected with an amnesia leads unavoidably to
that conception of the unconscious psychic activities which is peculiar to
psychoanalysis, and distinguishes it markedly from the philosophical
speculations about the unconscious. It may, therefore, be said that the
psychoanalytic theory endeavors to explain two experiences, which result in a
striking and unexpected manner during the attempt to trace back the morbid
symptoms of a neurotic to their source in his life-history; viz., the facts of
transference and of resistance. Every investigation which recognizes these two
facts and makes them the starting points of its work may call itself
psychoanalysis, even if it lead to [p. 10] other results than my own. But
whoever takes up other sides of the problem and deviates from these two
assumptions will hardly escape the charge of interfering with the rights of
ownership through attempted imitation, if he insist upon calling himself a
psychoanalyst.
I would very energetically oppose any attempt to count the principles of
repression and resistance as mere assumptions instead of results of
psychoanalysis. Such assumptions of a general psychological and biological
nature exist, and it would be quite to the point to deal with them in another
place. The principle of repression, however, is an acquisition of the
psychoanalytic work, won by legitimate means, as a theoretical extract from very
numerous experiences. Just such an acquisition, but of much later days, is the
theory of the infantile sexuality, of which no count was taken during the first
years of tentative analytic investigation. At first it was only noticed that the
effect of actual impressions had to be traced back to the past. However, " the
seeker often found more than he bargained for." He was tempted always further
back into this past and finally hoped to be permitted to tarry in the period of
puberty, the epoch of the traditional awakening of the sexual impulses. His
hopes were in vain. The tracks led still further back into childhood and into
its earliest years. In the process of this work it became almost fatal for this
young science. Under the influence of the traumatic theory of hysteria,
following Charcot, one was easily inclined to regard as real and as of
etiological importance the accounts of patients who traced back their symptoms
to passive sexual occurrences in the first years of childhood, that is to say,
speaking plainly, to seductions. When this etiology broke down through its own
unlikelihood, and through the contradiction of well-established circumstances,
there followed a period of absolute helplessness. The analysis had led by the
correct path to such infantile sexual traumas, and yet these were not true. Thus
the basis of reality had been lost. At that time I would gladly have let the
whole thing slide, as did my respected forerunner Breuer, when he made his
unwished-for discovery. Perhaps I persevered only because I had no longer any
choice of beginning something else. Finally I reflected that, after [p. 11] all,
no one has a right to despair if he has been disappointed only in his
expectations. He merely needs to review them. If hysterics refer their symptoms
to imaginary traumas, then this new fact signifies that they create such scenes
in their phantasies, and hence psychic reality deserves to be given a place next
to actual reality. This was soon followed by the conviction that these
phantasies serve to hide the autoerotic activities of the early years of
childhood, to idealize them and place them on a higher level, and now the whole
sexual life of the child made its appearance behind these phantasies.
In this sexual activity of the first years of childhood, the concomitant
constitution could finally attain its rights. Disposition and experience here
became associated into an inseparable etiological unity, in that the disposition
raised certain impressions to inciting and fixed traumas, which otherwise would
have remained altogether banal and ineffectual, whilst the experiences evoked
factors from the disposition which, without them, would have continued to remain
dormant, and, perhaps, undeveloped. The last word in the question of traumatic
etiology was later on said by Abraham, when he drew attention to the fact that
just the peculiar nature of the child's sexual constitution enables it to
provoke sexual experiences of a peculiar kind, that is to say, traumas.
My formulations concerning the sexuality of the child were founded at first
almost exclusively on the results of the analyses of adults, which led back into
the past. I was lacking in opportunity for direct observation of the child. It
was, therefore, an extraordinary triumph when, years later, my discoveries were
successfully confirmed for the greater part by direct observation and analyses
of children of very early years, a triumph that appeared less and less on
reflecting that the discovery was of such a nature that one really ought to be
ashamed of having made it. The deeper one penetrated into the observation of the
child, the more self-evident this fact seemed, and the more strange, too, became
the circumstances that such pains had been taken to overlook it.
To be sure, so certain a conviction of the existence and significance [p. 12] of
the infantile sexuality can be obtained only, if one follows the path of
analysis, if one goes back from the symptoms and peculiarities of neurotics to
their uttermost sources, the discovery of which explains what is explainable in
them, and permits of modifying what can be changed. I understand that one can
arrive at different conclusions if, as was recently done by C. G. Jung, one
first forms for one's self a theoretical conception of the nature of the sexual
impulse and thereby tries to understand the life of the child. Such a conception
can only be chosen arbitrarily or with regard to secondary considerations, and
is in danger of becoming inadequate to the sphere in which it was to be
utilized. Doubtless, the analytic way also leads to certain final difficulties
and obscurities in regard to sexuality and its relation to the whole life of the
individual; but these cannot be set aside by speculations, and must wait till
solutions will be found by means of other observations or of observations in
other spheres.
I shall briefly discuss the history of dream-interpretation. This came to me as
the first-fruits of the technical innovation, after, following a dim
presentiment, I had decided to replace hypnosis with free associations. It was
not the understanding of dreams towards which my curiosity was originally
directed. I do not know of any influences which had guided my interest to this
or inspired me with any helpful expectations. Before the cessation of my
intercourse with Breuer I hardly had time to tell him, in so many words, that I
now knew how to translate dreams. During the development of these discoveries
the symbolism of the language of dreams was about the last thing which became
known to me, since, for the understanding of symbols, the associations of the
dreamer offer but little help. As I have held fast to the habit of first
studying things themselves, before looking them up in books, I was able to
ascertain for myself the symbolism of dreams before I was directed to it by the
work of Sherner. Only later I came to value fully this means of expression of
dreams. This was partly due to the influence of the works of Steckel, who was at
first very meritorious but who later became most perfunctory. The close
connection between the psychoanalytic [p. 13] interpretation of dreams and the
once so highly esteemed art of dream interpretation of the ancients only became
clear to me many years afterwards. The most characteristic and significant
portion of my dream theory, namely, the reduction of the dream distortion to an
inner conflict, to a sort of inner dishonesty, I found later in an author to
whom medicine but not philosophy is unknown. I refer to the engineer J. Popper,
who had published "Phantasies of a Realist" under the name of Lynkeus.
The interpretation of dreams became for me a solace and support in those
difficult first years of analysis, when I had to master at the same time the
technique, the clinic and the therapy of the neuroses, when I stood entirely
alone, and in the confusion of problems and the accumulation of difficulties I
often feared to lose my orientation and my confidence. It often took a long time
before the proof of my assumption, that a neurosis must become comprehensible
through analysis, was seen by the perplexed patient, but the dreams, which might
be regarded as analogous to the symptoms, almost regularly confirmed this
assumption.
Only because of these successes was I in condition to persevere. I have,
therefore, acquired the habit of measuring the grasp of a psychological worker
by his attitude to the problem of dream interpretation, and I have noticed, with
satisfaction, that most of the opponents of psychoanalysis avoided this field
altogether, or if they ventured into it, they behaved most awkwardly. The
analysis of myself, the need of which soon became apparent to me, I carried out
by the aid of a series of my own dreams which led me through all the happenings
of my childhood years. Even today I am of the opinion that in the case of a
prolific dreamer and a person not too abnormal, this sort of analysis may be
sufficient.
By unfurling this developmental history, I believe I have shown what
psychoanalysis is, better than I could have done by a systematic presentation of
the subject. The special nature of my findings I did not then recognize. I
sacrificed, unhesitatingly, my budding popularity as a physician and an
extensive practice among nervous patients, because I searched directly for the
sexual origin of their [p. 14] neuroses. In this way I gained a number of
experiences which definitely confirmed my conviction of the practical
significance of the sexual factor. Without any apprehension, I appeared as
speaker at the Vienna Neurological Society, then under the presidency of
Krafft-Ebing, expecting to be compensated, by the interest and recognition of my
colleagues, for my own voluntary sacrifices. I treated my discoveries as
indifferent contributions to science and hoped that others would treat them in
the same way. Only the silence that followed my lectures, the space that formed
about my person, and the insinuations directed towards me caused me to realize,
gradually, that statements about the part played by sexuality in the etiology of
the neuroses cannot hope to be treated like other communications. I realized
that from then on I would belong to those who, according to Hebbel's expression,
"have disturbed the world's sleep," and that I could not count upon being
treated objectively and with toleration. But as my conviction of the average
correctness of my observations and the conclusions grew greater and greater, and
as my faith in my own judgment was not small, any more than was my moral
courage, there could be no doubt as to the issue of this situation. I decided to
believe that it fell to my lot to discover particularly significant
associations, and felt prepared to bear the fate which sometimes accompanies
such discoveries.
This fate I pictured to myself in the following manner. I would probably succeed
in sustaining myself through the therapeutic successes of the new treatment, but
science would take no notice of me in my lifetime. Some decades later, another
would surely stumble upon the same, now untimely things, compel their
recognition and thus bring me to honor as a necessarily unfortunate forerunner.
Meantime I arrayed myself as comfortably as possible à la Robinson Crusoe upon
my lonely island. When I look back to those lonely years, from the perplexities
and vexatiousness of the present, it seems to me it was a beautiful and heroic
time. The "splendid isolation" did not lack its privileges and charms. I did not
need to read any literature nor to listen to badly informed opponents. I was
subject to no influences, and no pressure was brought to bear [p. 15] on me. I
learned to restrain speculative tendencies and, following the unforgotten advice
of my master, Charcot, I looked at the same things again and often until they
began of themselves to tell me something. My publications, for which I found
shelter despite some difficulty, could safely remain far behind my state of
knowledge. They could be delayed as long as I pleased, as there was no doubtful
"priority" to be defended. "The Interpretation of Dreams," for example, was
completed in all essentials in the beginning of 1896, but was written down only
in 1899. The treatment of "Dora" was finished at the end of 1899. The history of
her illness was completed in the next two weeks, but was only published in 1905.
Meantime my writings were not in the reviewed professional literature of the
day. If an exception was made they were always treated with scornful or pitying
condescension. Sometimes a colleague would refer to me in one of his
publications in very short and unflattering terms, such as "unbalanced,"
"extreme," or "very odd." It happened once that an assistant at the clinic in
Vienna asked me for permission to attend one of my lecture courses. He listened
devoutly and said nothing, but after the last lecture he offered to accompany
me. During this walk he disclosed to me that, with the knowledge of his chief,
he had written a book against my teachings, but he expressed much regret that he
had only come to know these teachings better through my lectures. Had he known
these before, he would have written very differently. Indeed, he had inquired at
the clinic if he had not better first read "The Interpretation of Dreams," but
had been advised against doing so, as it was not worth the trouble. As he now
understood it, he compared my system of instruction with the Catholic Church. In
the interests of his soul's salvation I will assume that this remark contained a
bit of sincere recognition. But he ended by saying that it was too late to alter
anything in his book as it was already printed. This particular colleague did
not consider it necessary later on to tell the world something of the change in
his opinions concerning my psychoanalysis. On the contrary, as permanent
reviewer of a medical journal, he showed a preference to follow its development
with his hardly serious comments. [p. 16]
Whatever I possessed of personal sensitiveness was blunted those years, to my
advantage. But I was saved from becoming embittered by a circumstance that does
not come to the assistance of all lonely discoverers. Such a one usually frets
himself to find out the cause of the lack of sympathy or of the rejection he
receives from his contemporaries, and perceives them as a painful contradiction
against the certainty of his own conviction. That did not trouble me, for the
psychoanalytic fundamental principles enabled me to understand this attitude of
my environment as a necessary sequence. If it was true that the associations
discovered by me were kept from the knowledge of the patient by inner affective
resistances, then this resistance must manifest itself also in normal persons as
soon as the repressed material is conveyed to them from the outside. It was not
strange that these latter knew how to give intellectual reasons for their
affective rejections of my ideas. This happened just as often with the patients,
and the arguments advanced -- arguments are as common as blackberries, to borrow
from Falstaff's speech -- were the same and not exactly brilliant. The only
difference was that in the case of patients one had the means of bringing
pressure to bear, in order to help them recognize and overcome their
resistances, but in the case of those seemingly normal, such help had to be
omitted. To force these normal people to a cool and scientifically objective
examination of the subject was an unsolved problem, the solution of which was
best left to time. In the history of science it has often been possible to
verify that the very assertion which, at first, called forth only opposition,
received recognition a little later without necessity of bringing forward any
new proofs.
That I have not developed any particular respect for the opinion of the world or
any desire for intellectual deference during those years, when I alone
represented psychoanalysis, will surprise no one. [p. 17]
II
Beginning with the year 1902 a number of young doctors crowded about me with the
expressed intention to learn psychoanalysis, to practice it and to spread it.
The impetus for this came from a colleague who had himself experienced the
beneficial effects of the analytic therapy. We met on certain evenings at my
residence, and discussed subjects according to certain rules. The visitors
endeavored to orient themselves in this strange and new realm of investigation,
and to interest others in the matter. One day a young graduate I of the
technical school found admission to our circle by means of a manuscript which
showed extraordinary sense. We induced him to go through college and enter the
university, and then devote himself to the non-medical application of
psychoanalysis. Thus the little society gained a zealous and reliable secretary,
and I acquired in Otto Rank a most faithful helper and collaborator.
Soon the little circle expanded, and in the course of the next few years changed
a good deal in its composition. On the whole, I could flatter myself that in the
wealth and variety of talent our circle was hardly inferior to the staff of any
clinical teacher. From the very beginning it included those men who later were
to play a considerable, if not always a delectable, part in the history of the
psychoanalytic movement. But these developments could not have been guessed at
that time. I was satisfied, and I believe I did all I could, to convey to the
others what I knew and had experienced. There were only two inauspicious
circumstances which at least mentally estranged me from this circle. I could not
succeed in establishing among the members that friendly relation which should
obtain among men doing the same difficult work, nor could I crush out the
quarrels about the priority of discoveries, for which there were ample
opportunities in those conditions of working together. The difficulties of
teaching the practise of psychoanalysis, which are particularly great, and are
often to blame for the present rejection of psychoanalysis, [p. 18] already made
themselves felt in this Viennese private psychoanalytic society. I myself did
not dare to present an as yet incomplete technique, and a theory still in the
making, with that authority which might have spared the others many a blind
alley and many a final tripping up. The self-dependence of mental workers, their
early independence of the teacher, is always gratifying psychologically, but it
can only result in a scientific gain when during these labors certain, not too
fre9uently occurring, personal relations are also fulfilled. Psychoanalysis
particularly should have required a long and severe discipline and training of
self-control. On account of the courage displayed in devotion to so ridiculed
and fruitless a subject, I was inclined to tolerate among the members much to
which otherwise I would have objected. Besides, the circle included not only
physicians, but other cultured men who had recognized something significant in
psychoanalysis. There were authors, artists, and so forth. The "Interpretation
Of Dreams," the book on " Wit," and other writings, had already shown that the
principles of psychoanalysis cannot remain limited to the medical field, but are
capable of application to various other mental sciences.
In 1907 the situation suddenly altered and quite contrary to all expectations;
it became evident that psychoanalysis had unobtrusively awakened some interest
and gained some friends, that there were even some scientific workers who were
prepared to admit their allegiance. A communication from Bleuler had already
acquainted me with the fact that my works were studied and applied in
Burghölzli.[4] In January,1907, the first man attached to the Zürich Clinic, Dr.
Eitingon, visited me at Vienna. Other visitors soon followed, thus causing a
lively exchange of ideas. Finally, by invitation of C. G. Jung, then still an
assistant physician at Burghölzli, the first meeting took place at Salzburg, in
the spring of 1908, where the friends of psychoanalysis from Vienna, Zürich, and
other places met together. The result of this first psychoanalytic congress, was
the founding of a periodical, which began to appear in 1909, under the name of
"Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische und Psychopathologische [p. 19] Forschungen,"
published by Bleuler and Freud, and edited by Jung. An intimate comradeship in
the work done at Vienna and Zürich found its expression in this publication.
I have repeatedly and gratefully acknowledged the efforts of the Zürich
Psychiatric School in the spreading of psychoanalysis, especially those of
Bleuler and Jung, and I do not hesitate to do the same today, even under such
changed circumstances. It was certainly not the partisanship of the Zürich
School which at that time first directed the attention of the scientific world
to the subject of psychoanalysis. This latency period had just come to an end,
and psychoanalysis everywhere became the object of constantly increasing
interest. But whilst in all the other places this manifestation of interest
resulted first in nothing but a violent and emphatic repudiation of the subject,
in Zürich, on the contrary, the main feeling of the situation was that of
agreement. In no other place was so compact a little gathering of adherents to
be found, nowhere also was it possible to place a public clinic at the service
of psychoanalytic investigation, or to find a clinical teacher who regarded the
principles of psychoanalysis as an integral part of the teaching of psychiatry.
The Zürich doctors became, as it were, the nucleus of the little band which was
fighting for the recognition of psychoanalysis. Only in Zürich was there a
possible opportunity to learn the new art and to apply it in practice. Most of
my present-day followers and co-workers came to me via Zürich, even those who
might have found, geographically speaking, a shorter road to Vienna than to
Switzerland. Vienna lies in an eccentric position from western Europe, which
houses the great centers of our culture. For many years it has been much
affected by weighty prejudices. The representatives of the most prominent
nations stream into Switzerland, which is so mentally active, and an infective
lesion in this place was sure to become very important for the dissemination of
the "psychic epidemic," as Hoche of Freiburg called it.
According to the testimony of a colleague who was an eyewitness of the
developments at Burghölzli, it may be asserted that psychoanalysis awakened an
interest there very early. Already in Jung's [p. 20] work on occult phenomena,
published in 1902, there was an allusion to dream-interpretation. Ever since
1903 or 1904 according to my informer, psychoanalysis came into prominence.
After the establishment of personal relations between Vienna and Zürich, a
society was also founded in Burghölzli in 1907 which discussed the problems of
psychoanalysis at regular meetings. In the bond that united the Vienna and
Zürich schools, the Swiss were by no means the merely recipient part. They had
themselves already performed respectable scientific work, the results of which
were of much use to psychoanalysis. The association-experiment, started by the
Wundt School, had been interpreted by them in the psychoanalytic sense and had
proved itself of unexpected usefulness. Thus it had become possible to get rapid
experimental confirmation of psychoanalytic facts, and to demonstrate
experimentally to beginners certain relationships which the analyst could only
have talked about otherwise. The first bridge leading from experimental
psychology to psychoanalysis had thus been constructed.
In psychoanalytic treatment, however, the association-experiment enables one to
make only a preliminary, qualitative analysis of the case, it offers no
essential contribution to the technique, and is really not indispensable in the
work of analysis. Of more importance, however, was another discovery of the
Zürich School, or rather, of its two leaders, Bleuler and Jung. The former
pointed out that a great many purely psychiatric cases can be explained by the
same psychoanalytic process as those used in dreams and in the neuroses
(Freudsche Mechanismen). Jung employed with success the analytic method of
interpretation in the strangest and most obscure phenomena of dementia præcox,
the origin of which appeared quite clear when correlated with the life and
interests of the patient. From that time on it became impossible for the
psychiatrists to ignore psychoanalysis. Bleuler's great work on Schizophrenie
[sic] (1911), in which the psychoanalytic points of view are placed on an equal
footing with the clinical-systematic ones, brought this success to completion.
I must not omit to point out a divergence which was then already [p. 21]
distinctly noticeable in the working tendencies of the two schools. Already in
1897 I had published the analysis of a case of schizophrenia, which showed,
however, paranoid trends, so that its solution could not have anticipated the
impression of Jung's analyses. But to me the important element had not been the
interpretation of the symptoms, but rather the psychic mechanisms of the
disease, and above all, the agreement of this mechanism with the one already
known in hysteria. No light had been thrown at that time on the difference
between these two maladies. I was then already working toward a theory of the
libido in the neuroses which was to explain all neurotic as well as psychotic
appearances on the basis of abnormal drifts of the libido. The Swiss
investigators lacked this point of view. So far as I know Bleuler, even today,
adheres to an organic causation for the forms of Dementia Præcox, and Jung,
whose book on this malady appeared in 1907, upheld the toxic theory of the same
at the Congress at Salzburg in 1908, which though not excluding it, goes far
beyond the libido theory. On this same point he came to grief later (1912), in
that he now used too much of the stuff which previously he refused to employ at
all.
A third contribution from the Swiss School, which is to be ascribed probably
entirely to Jung, I do not value as highly as do others who are not in as close
contact with it. I speak of the theory of the complexes, which grew out of the
"Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien" (1906-1910). It itself has neither resulted
in a psychological theory nor has it added an unconstrained insertion to the
context of the psychoanalytic principles. On the other hand, the word "complex"
has gained for itself the right of citizenship in psychoanalysis, as being a
convenient and often an indispensable term for descriptive summaries of
psychologic facts. None other among the names and designations, newly coined as
a result of psychoanalytic needs, has attained such widespread popularity; but
no other term has been so misapplied to the detriment of clear thinking. In
psychoanalytic diction one often spoke of the "return of the complex" when "the
return of the repression" was intended to be conveyed, or one became accustomed
to say "I have a complex [p. 22] against him" when more correctly he should have
said "a resistance."
In the years after 1907, which followed the union of the schools of Vienna and
Zürich, psychoanalysis received that extraordinary impetus in which it still
finds itself today. This is positively attested by the spread of psychoanalytic
literature and the increase in the number of doctors who desire to practice or
learn it, also by the mass of attacks upon it by congresses and learned
societies. It has wandered into the most distant countries, it everywhere
shocked psychiatrists, and has gained the attention of the cultured laity and
workers in other scientific fields. Havelock Ellis, who has followed its
development with sympathy without ever calling himself its adherent, wrote, in
1911, in a paper for the Australasian Medical Congress: "Freud's psychoanalysis
is now championed and carried out not only in Austria and in Switzerland, but in
the United States, in England, India, Canada, and, I doubt not, in
Australasia."[5] A doctor from Chile (probably a German) appeared at the
International Congress in Buenos Ayres[sic], in 1910, and spoke on behalf of the
existence of infantile sexuality and praised the results of psychoanalytic
therapy in obsessions."[6] An English neurologist in Central India informed me
through a distinguished colleague who came to Europe, that the cases of
Mohammedan Indians on whom he had practiced analysis showed no other etiology of
their neuroses than our European patients.
The introduction of psychoanalysis into North America took place under
particularly glorious auspices. In the autumn of 1909, Jung and myself were
invited by President Stanley Hall, of Clark University, to take part in the
celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the opening of Clark University, by
giving some lectures in German. We found, to our great astonishment, that the
unprejudiced men of that small but respected pedagogic-philosophical university
knew all the psychoanalytic writings and had honored them [p. 23] in their
lectures to their students. Thus even in prudish America one could, at least in
academic circles, discuss freely and treat scientifically all those things that
are regarded as offensive in life. The five lectures that I improvised at
Worcester then appeared in English in the American Journal of Psychology; later
on they were printed in German under the title, "Über Psychoanalyse." Jung
lectured on diagnostic association studies and on "conflicts in the psychic life
of the child." We were rewarded for it with the honorary degree of LL.D. During
this week of celebration at Worcester, psychoanalysis was represented by five
persons. Besides Jung and myself there were Ferenczi, who had joined me as
travelling-companion, Ernest Jones, then of Toronto University (Canada), now in
London, and A. A. Brill, who was already practising psychoanalysis in New York.
The most noteworthy personal relationship which resulted at Worcester, was that
established with James J. Putnam, teacher of neuropathology at Harvard
University. For years he had expressed a disparaging opinion of psychoanalysis,
but now he befriended it and recommended it to his countrymen and his colleagues
in numerous lectures, rich in content and fine of form. The respect which he
enjoys in America, owing to his character, his high moral standard and his keen
love for truth, was very helpful to the cause of psychoanalysis and protected it
against the denunciations to which it might otherwise have early succumbed.
Yielding too much to the great ethical and philosophic bent of his nature Putnam
later required of psychoanalysis what, to me, seems an impossible demand. He
wished that it should be pressed into the service of a certain moral
philosophical conception of the universe; but Putnam has remained the chief prop
of the psychoanalytic movement in his native land.
For the diffusion of this movement Brill and Jones deserve the greatest credit.
With a self-denying industry they constantly brought under the notice of their
countrymen, through their works, the easily observable fundamental principles of
psychoanalysis of everyday life, of the dream and of the neuroses. Brill has
strengthened these influences by his medical activities and his translations of
[p. 24] my writings: Jones, by illuminating lectures and clever discussions at
the American Congresses.[7] The lack of a rooted scientific tradition and the
lesser rigidity of official authority have been of decided advantage to the
impetus given to psychoanalysis in America by Stanley Hall. It was
characteristic there from the beginning that professors, heads of insane
asylums, as well as independent practitioners, all showed themselves equally
interested in psychoanalysis. But just for this very reason it is clear that the
fight for psychoanalysis must be fought to a decisive end, where the greater
resistance has been met with, namely, in the countries of the old cultural
centers.
Of the European countries, France has so far shown herself the least receptive
towards psychoanalysis, although creditable writings by the Zürich physician, A.
Maeder, have opened up for the French reader an easy path to its principles. The
first indications of interest came from provincial France. Moricheau-Beauchant
(Poitiers) was the first Frenchman who openly accepted psychoanalysis. Régis and
Hesnard (Bordeaux) have lately tried (1913) to overcome the prejudices of their
countrymen by an exhaustive and senseful presentation of the subject, which
takes exception only to symbolism. In Paris itself there still appears to reign
the conviction (given such oratorical expression at London Congress 1913 by
Janet) that every thing good in psychoanalysis only repeats, with slight
modifications, the views of Janet -- everything else in psychoanalysis being
bad. Janet himself had to stand at this Congress a number of corrections from
Ernest Jones, who was able to reproach him for his lack of knowledge of the
subject. We cannot, however, forget the credit due Janet for his works on the
psychology of the neuroses, although we must repudiate his claims.
Italy, after many promising starts, ceased to take further interest. Owing to
personal connections psychoanalysis gained an early hearing in Holland: Van
Emden, Van Ophuijsen, Van Renterghem [p. 25] ("Freud en zijn school") and the
two doctors Stärke are busy in Holland particularly on the theoretical side.[8]
The interest in psychoanalysis in scientific circles in England developed very
slowly, but the indications are that just here, favored by the English liking
for the practical and their passionate championship of justice, a flourishing
future awaits psychoanalysis.
In Sweden, P. Bjerre, successor to Wetterstand, has, at least temporarily, given
up hypnotic suggestion in favor of analytic treatment. A. Vogt (Christiania)
honored psychoanalysis already in 1907 in his "Psykiatriens gruntraek," so that
the first text-book on psychiatry that took any notice of psychoanalysis was
written in Norwegian. In Russia, psychoanalysis is very generally known and
widespread; almost all my writings as well as those of other advocates of
analysis are translated into Russian. But a deeper grasp of the analytic
teaching has not yet shown itself in Russia. The contributions written by
Russian physicians and psychiatrists are not at present noteworthy. Only Odessa
possesses a trained psychoanalyst in the person of M. Wulff. The introduction of
psychoanalysis into the science and literature of Poland is due chiefly to the
endeavors of L. Jekels. Hungary, geographically so near to Austria,
scientifically so foreign to it, has given to psychoanalysis only one co-worker,
S. Ferenczi, but such an one as is worth a whole society.
The standing of psychoanalysis in Germany can be described in no other way than
to state that it is the cynosure of all scientific discussion, and evokes from
physicians as well as from the laity, opinions of decided rejection, which, so
far, have not come to an end, but which, on the contrary, are constantly renewed
and strengthened. No official seat of learning has, so far, admitted
psychoanalysis. Successful practitioners who apply it are few. Only a few
institutions, such as that of Binswanger's in Kreuzlingen (on Swiss soil) and
Marcinowski's in Holstein, have opened their doors to [p. 26] psychoanalysis. In
the critical city of Berlin, we have K. Abraham, one of the most prominent
representatives of psychoanalysis. He was formerly an assistant of Bleuler. One
might wonder that this state of things has thus continued for a number of years
without any change, if it was not known that the above account merely describes
the superficial appearances. One must not overestimate the significance of the
rejection of psychoanalysis by the official representatives of science, the
heads of institutions, as well as their young following. It is easy to
understand why the opponents loudly raise their voices whilst the followers,
being intimidated, keep silent. Many of the latter, whose first contributions to
analysis raised high expectations, later withdrew from the movement under the
pressure of circumstances. But the movement itself strides ahead quietly. It is
always gaining new supporters among psychiatrists and the laity. It constantly
increases the number of readers of psychoanalytic literature and thus forces the
opponents to a more violent attempt at defense. In the course of these years I
have read, perhaps a dozen times, in the reports of the transactions of certain
congresses and of meetings of scientific societies, or in reviews of certain
publications, that psychoanalysis was now dead, that it was finally overcome and
settled. The answer to all this would have to read like the telegram from Mark
Twain to the newspaper that falsely announced his death: "The report of my death
is grossly exaggerated." After each of these death-notices, psychoanalysis has
gained new followers and co-workers and has created for itself new organs.
Surely to be reported dead is an advance over being treated with dead silence!
Hand in hand with its territorial expansion just described psychoanalysis became
enlarged with regard to its contents through its encroaching upon fields of
knowledge outside of the study of the neuroses and psychiatry. I will not treat
in detail the development of this part of our branch of science since this was
excellently done by Rank and Sachs (in Löwenfeld's "Grenzfragen")[9] which
presents [p. 27] exhaustively just these achievements in the work of analysis.
Besides, here everything is in inchoate form, hardly worked out, mostly only
preliminary and sometimes only in the stage of an intention. Every honest
thinker will find herein no grounds for reproach. There is a tremendous amount
of problems for a small number of workers whose chief activity lies elsewhere,
who are obliged to attack the special problems of the new science with only
amateurish preparation. These workers hailing from the psychoanalytic field make
no secret of their dilettantism, they only desire to be guides and temporary
occupants of the places of those specialists to whom they recommend the analytic
technique and principles until the latter are ready to take up this work
themselves. That the results aimed at are, even now, not at all insignificant,
is due partly to the fruitfulness of the psychoanalytic method, and partly to
the circumstance that already there are a few investigators, who, without being
physicians, have made the application of psychoanalysis to the mental sciences
their lifework.
Most of these psychoanalytic applications can be traced, as is easily
understood, to the impetus given by my early analytic works. The analytic
examinations of nervous patients and neurotic manifestations of normal persons
drove me to the assumption of psychological relationships which, most certainly,
could not be limited only to that field. Thus analysis presented us not only
with the explanation of pathological occurrences, but also showed us their
connection with normal psychic life and uncovered undreamed-of relations between
psychiatry and a variety of other sciences dealing with activities of mind. Thus
certain typical dreams furnished the understanding of many myths and fairy
tales. Riklin and Abraham followed this hint and began those investigations
about myths which have found their completion in the works of Rank on Mythology,
works which do full justice to all the requirements of the specialist. The
prosecution of dream-symbology led to the very heart of the problems of
mythology, folk-lore (Jones, Storfer) and of religious abstraction. At one of
the psychoanalytic congresses the audience was deeply impressed when a student
of Jung pointed out the similarity [p. 28] of the phantasy-formation of
schizophrenics with the cosmogonies of primitive times and peoples. In a later
elaboration, no longer free from objection yet very interesting, Jung made use
of mythological material in an attempt to harmonize the neurotic with religious
and mythological phantasies.
Another path led from the investigation of dreams to the analysis of poetic
creations, and finally to the analysis of authors and artists themselves. Very
soon it was discovered that the dreams invented by writers stand in the same
relation to analysis as do genuine dreams.[10] The conception of the unconscious
psychic activity enabled us to get the first glimpse into the nature of the
poetic creativeness. The valuation of the emotional feelings which we were
forced to recognize while studying the neuroses enabled us to recognize the
sources of artistic productions and brought up the problem as to how the artist
reacts to those stimuli and with what means he disguises his reactions.[11] Most
psychoanalysts with wide interests have furnished contributions from their works
for the treatment of these problems, which are among the most attractive in the
application of psychoanalysis. Naturally here also opposition was not lacking
from those who are not acquainted with analysis, and expressed itself with the
same lack of understanding and passionate rejection as on the native soil of
psychoanalysis. For it was to be expected as a matter of course, that everywhere
psychoanalysis penetrates, it would have to go through the same struggle with
the natives. However, these attempted invasions have not yet stirred up interest
in all fields which will, in the future, be open to them. Among the strictly
scientific applications of analysis to literature the deep work of Rank on the
theme of incest easily ranks first. Its content is certain to evoke the greatest
unpopularity.
Philological and historical works on the basis of psychoanalysis are few, at
present. I myself dared to venture to make the first attempt [p. 29] into the
problems of the psychology of religion in 1910, when I compared religious
ceremonials with neurotic ceremonials. In his work on the "piety of the Count of
Zinzendorf," as well as in other contributions, the Rev. Dr. Pfister, of Zürich,
has succeeded in tracing back religious zealotism to perverse eroticism. In the
recent works of the Zürich School one is more likely to find that religion
becomes injected into the analysis rather than rationally explained by it.
In my four essays on "Totem and Taboo"[12] I made the attempt to discuss the
problems of race psychology by means of analysis. This should lead us directly
to the origins of the most important institutions of our civilization, such as
state regulations, morality, religion, as well as to the origins of the
interdiction of incest and of conscience. To what extent the relations thus
obtained will be proof to criticism cannot be determined today.
My book on Wit[l3] furnished the first examples of the application of analytic
thinking to esthetic themes. Everything else is still waiting for workers, who
can expect a rich harvest in this very field. We are lacking here in workers
from these respective specialties and in order to attract such, Hans Sachs
founded in 1912, the journal Imago, edited by himself and Rank. Hitschmann and
v. Winterstein made a beginning with the psychoanalytic elucidation of
philosophical systems and personalities. The continuation and deeper treatment
of the same is much to be desired.
The revolutionary findings of psychoanalysis concerning the psychic life of the
child, the part played therein by sexual impulses (v. Hug-Helmuth) and the fate
of such participation of sexuality which becomes useless for the purpose of
propagation, naturally drew attention to pedagogics, and instigated the effort
to push the analytical viewpoint into the foreground of this sphere. Recognition
is due to the Rev. Pfister for having begun this application of analysis with
honest enthusiasm, and for having brought it to the [p. 30] notice of ministers
and educators.[14] He succeeded in winning over a number of Swiss pedagogues as
sympathizers in this work. It is said that some preferred to remain
circumspectly in the background. A portion of the Vienna analysts seem to have
landed in their retreat from psychoanalysis on a sort of medical pedagogy.
(Adler and Furtmüller, "Heilen and Bilden," 1913·)
I have attempted in these incomplete suggestions to indicate the, as yet, hardly
visible wealth of associations which have sprung up between medical
psychoanalysis and other fields of science. There is material for the work of a
whole generation of investigators and I doubt not that this work will be done
when once the resistance to psychoanalysis as such has been overcome.[15]
To write the history of the resistances, I consider, at present, both fruitless
and inopportune. It would not be very glorious for the scientific men of our
day. But I will add at once that it has never occurred to me to rail against the
opponents of psychoanalysis merely because they were opponents, not counting a
few unworthy individuals, fortune hunters and plunderers such as in time of war
are always found on both sides. For I knew how to account for the behavior of
these opponents and had besides discovered that psychoanalysis brings to light
the worst in every man. But I decided not to answer my opponents and, so far as
I had influence, to keep others from polemics. The value of public or literary
discussions seemed to me very doubtful under the particular conditions in which
the fight over psychoanalysis took place. The value of majorities at congresses
or society meetings was certainly doubtful, and my confidence in the honesty and
distinction of my opponents was always slight. Observation shows that only very
few persons are capable of remaining polite, not to speak of objective, in any
scientific dispute, and the impression gained from a scientific quarrel was
always a horror to me. Perhaps this attitude of mine has been misunderstood, [p.
31] perhaps I have been considered as good-natured or so intimidated that it was
supposed no further consideration need be shown me.
This is a mistake. I can revile and rave as well as any other, but I am not able
to render into literary form the expressions of the underlying affects and
therefore I prefer to abstain entirely. Perhaps in many respects it might have
been better had I permitted free vent to my own passions and to those about me.
We have all heard the interesting attempt at an explanation of the origin of
psychoanalysis from its Viennese milieu. Janet did not scorn to make use of it
as late as 1913, although, no doubt, he is proud of being a Parisian. This
apereçu says that psychoanalysis, especially the assertion that the neuroses can
be traced back to disturbances in the sexual life, could only have originated in
a city like Vienna, in an atmosphere of sensuality and immorality not to be
found in other cities, and that it thus represents only a reflection, the
theoretical projection as it were, of these particular Viennese conditions.
Well, I certainly am no local patriot, but this theory has always seemed to be
especially nonsensical, so nonsensical that sometimes I was inclined to assume
that the reproaching of the Vienna spirit was only a euphemistic substitution
for another one which one did not care to bring up publicly. If the assumptions
had been of the opposite kind, we might be inclined to listen. But even if we
assume that there might be a city whose inhabitants have imposed upon themselves
special sexual restrictions and at the same time show a peculiar tendency to
severe neurotic maladies, then such a town might well furnish the soil on which
some observer might get the idea of connecting these two facts and of deducting
the one from the other. But neither assumption fits Vienna. The Viennese are
neither more abstemious nor yet more nervous than dwellers in any other
metropolis. Sex matters are a little freer, prudishness is less than in the
cities of western and northern Europe that are so proud of their chastity. Our
supposed observer would, more likely, be led astray by the particular conditions
prevailing in Vienna than be enlightened as to the cause of the neuroses. [p.
32]
But Vienna has done everything possible to deny her share in the origin of
psychoanalysis. Nowhere else is the inimical indifference of the learned and
cultured circles so clearly evident to the psychoanalyst.
Perhaps I am somewhat to blame for this by my policy of avoiding widespread
publicity. If I had caused psychoanalysis to occupy the medical societies of
Vienna with noisy sessions, with an unloading of all passions, wherein all
reproaches and invectives carried on the tongue or in the mind would have been
expressed, then perhaps the ban against psychoanalysis might, by now, have been
removed and its standing no longer might have been that of a stranger in its
native city. As it is, the poet may be right when he makes Wallenstein say:
"Yet this the Viennese will not forgive me,
That I did them out of a spectacle."
The task to which I am unequal, namely, that of reproaching the opponents
"suaviter in modo" for their injustice and arbitrariness, was taken up by
Bleuler in 1911 and carried out in most honorable fashion in his work, "Freud's
Psychoanalysis: a Defense and a Criticism." It would be so entirely natural for
me to praise this work, critical in two directions, that I hasten to tell what
there is in it I object to. This work appears to me to be still very partisan,
too lenient to the mistakes of our opponents, and altogether too severe to the
shortcomings of our followers. This characterization of it may explain why the
opinion of a psychiatrist of such high standing, of such indubitable ability and
independence, has not had greater influence on his colleagues. The author of
"Affectivity" (1906) must not be surprised if the influence of a work is not
determined by the value of its argument but by the tone of its affect. Another
part of this influence -- the one on the followers of psychoanalysis -- Bleuler
himself destroyed later on by bringing into prominence in 1913, in his
"Criticism of the Freudian School," the obverse side of his attitude to
psychoanalysis. Therein he takes away so much from the structure of the
psychoanalytic principles that our opponents may well be satisfied with the
assistance of this defender. [p. 33] It was not new arguments or better
observations that served Bleuler as a guidance for these verdicts, but only the
reference to own knowledge, the inadequacy of which the author no longer admits
as in his earlier writings. Here an almost irreparable loss seemed to threaten
psychoanalysis. However, in his last utterance ("Die Kritiken der
Schizophrenie," 1914) on the occasion of the attacks made upon him owing to his
introduction of psychoanalysis into his book on "Schizophrenie," Bleuler rises
to what he himself terms a "haughty presumption:" " But now I will assume a
haughty presumption, I consider that the many psychologies to date have
contributed mighty little to the explanation of the connection between
psychogenetic symptoms and diseases, but that the deeper psychology (tiefen
psychologie) furnishes us a part of the psychology still to be created, which
the physician needs in order to understand his patients and to heal them
rationally; and I even believe that in my 'Schizophrenie' I have taken a very
small step towards this." The first two assertions are surely correct, the
latter may be an error.
Since by the "deeper psychology" psychoanalysis alone is to be understood, we
may, for the present, remain satisfied with this admission. [p. 34]
III
"Cut it short,
On doomsday 'twon't be worth a farthing!"
Goethe.
Two years after the first congress the second private congress of psychoanalysts
took place at Nuremberg, March, 1910.· During the interval, whilst I was still
under the impression of the favorable reception in America, the growing
hostility in Germany and the unexpected support through the acquisition of the
Zürich School, I had conceived a project which I was able to carry out, at this
second congress, with the help of my friend S. Ferenczi. I had in mind to
organize the psychoanalytic movement, to transfer its center to Zürich, and
place it under a head who would take care of its future. As this found much
opposition among the adherents of psychoanalysis, I will explain my motives more
fully. Thus I hope to justify myself, even if it turns out that my action was
not a very wise one.
I judged that the association with Vienna was no recommendation, but rather an
obstacle for the new movement. A place like Zürich, in the heart of Europe,
where an academic teacher had opened his institution to psychoanalysis, seemed
to me much more promising. Moreover, I assumed that my own person was a second
obstacle. The estimate put upon my personality was utterly confused by the favor
or dislike from different factions. I was either compared to Darwin and Kepler
or reviled as a paralytic. I, therefore, desired to push into the background not
only the city whence psychoanalysis emanated, but also my own personality.
Furthermore, I was no longer young, I saw a long road before me and I felt
oppressed by the idea that it had fallen to my lot to become a leader in my
advanced age. Yet I felt that there must be a leader. I knew only too well what
mistakes lay in wait for him who would undertake the practice of psychoanalysis,
and hoped that many of these might be avoided if we had an authority who was
prepared to [p. 35] guide and admonish. Such authority naturally devolved upon
me in view of the indisputable advantage of fifteen years' experience. It was
now my desire to transfer this authority to a younger man who would, quite
naturally, take my place on my death. I felt that this person could be only C.
G. Jung, for Bleuler was of my own age. In favor of Jung was his conspicuous
talents, the contributions he had already made to analysis, his independent
position, and the impression of energy which his personality always made. He
also seemed prepared to enter into friendly relations with me, and to give up,
for my sake, certain race-prejudices which he had so far permitted himself to
indulge. I had no notion then that in spite of the advantages enumerated, this
was a very unfortunate choice; that it concerned a person who, incapable of
tolerating the authority of another, was still less fitted to be himself an
authority, one whose energy was devoted to the unscrupulous pursuit of his own
interests.
The formation of an official organization I considered necessary because I
feared the abuses to which psychoanalysis would be subjected, once it should
achieve popularity. I felt that there should be a place that could give the
dictum: "With all this nonsense, analysis has nothing to do; this is not
psychoanalysis." It was decided that at the meeting of the local groups which
together formed the international organization, instruction should be given how
psychoanalysis should be practised, that physicians should be trained there and
that the local society should, in a way, stand sponsor for them. It also
appeared to me desirable that the adherents of psychoanalysis should meet for
friendly intercourse and mutual support, inasmuch as official science had
pronounced its great ban and boycott against physicians and institutions
practising psychoanalysis. This and nothing else I wished to attain by the
founding of the "International Psychoanalytic Association." Perhaps it was more
than could possibly be attained. Just as my opponents learned that it was not
possible to stem the new movement, so I had to learn, by experience, that it
would not permit itself to be led along the particular path which I had laid out
for it. The motion made by [p. 36] Ferenczi at Nuremberg was seconded. Jung was
elected president, and Riklin was chosen as secretary. It was also decided to
publish a corresponding journal through which the central association was "to
foster and further the science of psychoanalysis as founded by Freud both as
pure psychology, as well as in its application to medicine and the mental
sciences, and to promote assistance among the members in all their efforts to
acquire and to spread psychoanalytic knowledge." The members of the Vienna group
alone firmly opposed the projects with a passionate excitement. Adler expressed
his fear that "a censorship and limitation of scientific freedom" was intended.
The Viennese finally gave in, after having gained their point that Zürich should
not be raised to the center of the association, but that the center should be
the home city of the president, who was to be elected for two years.
At this congress three local groups were constituted: one in Berlin under the
chairmanship of Abraham, one in Zürich, whose chairman became the president of
the central association, and one in Vienna, the chairmanship of which I
relinquished to Adler. A fourth group, in Budapest, could not be formed until
later. On account of illness Bleuler had been absent from the congress. Later be
evinced considerable hesitation about entering the association and although he
let himself be persuaded to do so by my personal representations, he resigned a
short time afterwards owing to disagreements at Zürich. This severed the
connection between the Zürich group and the Burghölzli institution.
Another result of the Nuremberg Congress was the founding of the Zentralblatt
für Psychoanalyse, which caused a reconciliation between Adler and Stekel. It
had originally been intended as an opposing tendency and was to win back for
Vienna the hegemony threatened by the election of Jung. But when the two
founders of the journal, under pressure of the difficulty of finding a
publisher, assured me of their friendly intentions and as guarantee of their
attitude gave me the right to veto, I accepted the editorship and worked
vigorously for this new organ, the first number of which appeared in September,
1910. [p. 37]
I will not continue the history of the Psychoanalytic Congress. The third one
took place at Weimar, September, 1911, and even surpassed the previous ones in
spirit and scientific interest. J. J. Putnam, who was present at this meeting,
later expressed in America his satisfaction and his respect for the "mental
attitude" of those present and quoted words which I was supposed to have used in
reference to the latter: "They have learned to endure a bit of truth." As a
matter of fact any one who has attended scientific congresses must have received
a lasting impression in favor of the Psychoanalytic Association. I myself had
presided over two former congresses. I thought it best to give every lecturer
ample time for his paper and left the discussions of these lectures to take
place later as a sort of private exchange of ideas. Jung, who presided over the
Weimar meeting, reëstablished the discussions after each lecture, which had not,
however, proved disturbing at that time.
Two years later, in September, 1913, quite another picture was presented by the
congress at Munich which is still vividly recalled by those who were present. It
was presided over by Jung in an unamiable and incorrect fashion: the lecturers
were limited as to time, and the discussion dwarfed the lectures. Through a
malicious mood of chance the evil genius of Hoche had taken up his residence in
the same house in which the analysts held their meetings. Hoche could easily
have convinced himself that his characterization of these psychoanalysts, as a
sect, blindly and meekly following their leader, was true ad absurdum. The
fatiguing and unedifying proceedings ended in the reëlection of Jung as
president of the International Psychoanalytic Association, which fact Jung
accepted, although two fifths of those present refused him their support. We
took leave from one another without feeling the need to meet again!
About the time of this third Congress the condition of the International
Psychoanalytic Association was as follows: The local groups at Vienna, Berlin,
and Zurich had constituted themselves already at the congress at Nuremberg in
1910. In May, 1911, a group, under the chairmanship of Dr. L. Seif, was added at
Munich. In the same year the first American local group was formed under the
chairmanship [p. 38] of A. A. Brill under the name of "The New York
Psychoanalytic Society." At the Weimar Congress, the founding of a second
American group was authorized. This came into existence during the next year as
"The American Psychoanalytic Association." It included members from Canada and
all America; Putnam was elected president, and Ernest Jones was made secretary.
Just before the congress at Münich in 1913, a local group was founded at
Budapest under the leadership of S. Ferenczi. Soon afterwards Jones, who settled
in London, founded the first English group. The number of members of the eight
groups then in existence could not, of course, furnish any standard for the
computation of the non-organized students and adherents of psychoanalysis.
The development of the periodical literature of psychoanalysis is also worthy of
a brief mention. The first periodical publications serving the interests of
analysis were the Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunden which have appeared
irregularly since 1907 and have reached the fifteenth volume.[15a] They
published writings by Freud, Riklin, Jung, Abraham, Rank, Sadger, Pfister, M.
Graf, Jones, Storfer and Hug-Hellmuth. The founding of the Imago, to be
mentioned later, has somewhat lowered the value of this form of publication.
After the meeting at Salzburg, 1908 the Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und
psychopathologische Forschungen was founded, which appeared under Jung's
editorship for five years, and it has now reappeared under new editorship and
under the slightly changed title of Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse. It no longer
wishes to be as in former years, merely an archive for collecting works of
psychoanalytic merit, but it wishes to justify its editorial task by taking due
notice of all occurrences and all endeavors in the field of psychoanalysis. As
mentioned before Das Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse started by Adler and Stekel
after the founding of the "International Association" (Nuremberg, 1910) went
through in a short time a very varied career. Already in the tenth issue of the
first volume there was an announcement that in view of scientific difference of
opinion with [p. 39]the editors, Dr. Adler had decided voluntarily to withdraw
his collaboration. This placed the entire editorship in the hands of Dr. Stekel
(summer of 1911). At the Weimar congress the Zentralblatt was raised to the
official organ of the "International Association" and by raising the annual dues
it was made accessible to all members. Beginning with the third number of the
second year (winter 1912) Stekel alone became responsible for the contents of
the journal. His behavior, which is difficult to explain in public, forced me to
sever all my connections with this journal and to give psychoanalysis in all
haste a new organ, the International Journal for Medical Psychoanalysis
(Internationale Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse). With the help of
almost all my collaborators and the new publisher, H. Heller, the first number
of this new journal was able to appear in January, 19q3, to take the place of
the Zentralblatt as the official organ of the "International Psychoanalytic
Association."
Meanwhile Dr. Hanns Sachs and Dr. Otto Rank founded early in 1912 a new journal,
Imago (published by Heller), whose only aim is the application of psychoanalysis
to mental sciences. Imago has now reached the middle of its third year, and
enjoys the increasing interest of readers who are not medically interested in
psychoanalysis.
Apart from these four periodical publications (Schriften z. Angew. Seelenkunde,
Jahrbuch, Intern. Zeitschrift, and Imago) other German and foreign journals have
contributed works that can claim a place in psychoanalytic literature. The
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, published by Morton Prince, as a rule, contains
many good analytical contributions. In the winter of 1913 Dr. White and Dr.
Jelliffe started a journal exclusively devoted to psychoanalysis, THE
PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW, which takes into account the fact that most physicians in
America interested in psychoanalysis do not master the German language.
I am now obliged to speak of two secessions which have taken place among the
followers of psychoanalysis. The first of these took place in the interval
between the founding of the association [p. 40] in 1910 and the congress at
Weimar, 1911, the second took place after this, and came to light in Münich in
1913· The disappointment which they caused me might have been avoided if more
attention had been paid to the mechanisms of those who undergo analytical
treatment. I was well aware that any one might take flight on first approach to
the unlovely truths of analysis; I myself had always asserted that any one's
understanding may be suspended by one's own repressions (through the resistances
which sustain them) so that in his relation to psychoanalysis he cannot get
beyond a certain point. But I had not expected that any one who had mastered
analysis to a certain depth could renounce this understanding and lose it. And
yet daily experience with patients had shown that the total rejection of all
knowledge gained through analysis may be brought about by any deeper stratum of
particularly strong resistance. Even if we succeed through laborious work in
causing such a patient to grasp parts of analytic knowledge and handle these as
his own possessions, it may well happen that under the domination of the next
resistance he will throw to the winds all he has learned and will defend himself
as in his first days of treatment. I had to learn that this can happen among
psychoanalysts just as among patients during treatment.
It is no enviable task to write the history of these two secessions, partly
because I am not impelled to it by strong personal motives -- I had not expected
gratitude nor am I to any active degree revengeful -- and partly because I know
that I hereby lay myself open to the invectives of opponents manifesting but
little consideration, and at the same time I regale the enemies of
psychoanalysis with the long wished-for spectacle of seeing the psychoanalysts
tearing each other to pieces. I had to exercise much control to keep myself from
fighting with the opponents of psychoanalysis, and now I feel constrained to
take up the fight with former followers or such as still wish to be called so. I
have no choice; to keep silent would be comfortable or cowardly, but it would
hurt the subject more than the frank uncovering of the existing evils. Any one
who has followed the growth of scientific movements will know that quite similar
disturbances [p. 41] and dissensions took place in all of them. It may be that
elsewhere they are more carefully concealed. However, psychoanalysis, which
denies many conventional ideals, is also more honest in these things.
Another very palpable inconvenience lies in the fact that I cannot altogether
avoid going into an analytic elucidation. Analysis is not, however, suitable for
polemical use; it always presupposes the consent of the one analyzed and the
situation of a superior and subordinate. Therefore he who wishes to use analysis
with polemic intent must offer no objection if the person so analyzed will, in
his turn, use analysis against him, and if the discussion merges into a state in
which the awakening of a conviction in an impartial third party is entirely
excluded. I shall, therefore, make here the smallest possible use of analysis,
thereby limiting my indiscretion and aggression against my opponents, and I will
also add that I base no scientific criticism on this means. I have nothing to do
with the possible substance of truths in the theories to be rejected nor am I
seeking to refute the same. This task may be left to other able workers in the
field of psychoanalysis, and some of it has already been done. I only desire to
show that these theories deny the basic principles of analysis -- I will show in
what points -- and for this reason should not be known under this name. I shall,
therefore, use analysis only to make clear how these deviations from analysis
could take place among analysts. At the parting places I am, of course, obliged
to defend the just rights of psychoanalysis with purely critical remarks.
Psychoanalysis has found as its first task the explanation of the neuroses; it
has taken the two facts of resistance and transference as starting points, and
by bearing in mind the third fact of amnesia in the theories of repression, it
has given justification to the sexual motive forces of the neuroses and of the
unconscious. Psychoanalysis has never claimed to give a perfect theory of the
human psychic life, but has only demanded that its discoveries should be used
for the completion and correction of knowledge we have gained elsewhere. But
Alfred Adler's theory goes far beyond this goal. It pretends to explain with one
stroke the behavior and character [p. 42] of men as well as their neurotic and
psychotic maladies. As a matter of fact, Adler's theory is more adequate to any
other field than to that of the neuroses, which he still puts in the first place
because of the history of its origin. I had the opportunity of studying Dr.
Adler many years and have never denied him the testimonial of having a superior
mind, especially endowed speculatively. As proof of the "persecution" which he
claims to have suffered at my hands, I can only say that after the formation of
the Association I handed over to him the leadership of the Vienna group. It was
only after urgent requests from all the members of the society that I could be
prevailed upon to resume the presidency at the scientific proceedings. When I
had recognized Dr. Adler's slight talent for the estimation of the unconscious
material, I expected that he would know how to discover the connections between
psychoanalysis and psychology and the biological bases of the impulses, a
discovery to which he was entitled, in a certain sense, through his valuable
studies about the inferiority of organs. He really did bring out some thing, but
his work makes the impression as if -- to speak in his own jargon -- it were
intended to prove that psychoanalysis was wrong in everything and that the
significance of the sexual impelling forces could only be due to gullibility
about the assertions of neurotics. Of the personal motive of his work I may also
speak publicly, since he himself revealed it in the presence of a small circle
of members of the Vienna group. "Do you believe," he remarked, "that it is such
a great pleasure for me to stand in your shadow my whole life?" To be sure I see
nothing objectionable in the fact that a younger man should frankly admit an
ambition which one might, in any case, suspect as one of the incentives of his
work. But even under the domination of such a motive a man should know how to
avoid being "unfair" as designated by the English with their fine social tact.
We Germans have only a much coarser word at our disposal to convey this idea.
How little Adler has succeeded in not being unfair is shown by the great number
of mean outbursts of anger which distort his writings, and by the feeling of an
ungovernable mania for priority which pervades [p. 43] his work. At the Vienna
Psychoanalytic Society we once heard him claim for himself the priority for the
viewpoints of the "unity of the neuroses" and the "dynamic conception" of the
same. This was a great surprise for me as I had always believed that I had
represented these two principles before I had ever known Adler.[15b]
This striving of Adler for a place in the sun has brought about, however, one
result, which must be considered beneficial to psychoanalysis. When I was
obliged to bring about Adler's resignation from the editorial staff of the
Zentralblatt, after the appearance of his irreconcilable scientific antagonisms,
Adler also left the Vienna group and founded a new society to which he first
gave the tasteful name "Society for Free Psychoanalysis." But the outside
public, unacquainted with analysis, is evidently as little skilled in
recognizing the difference between the views of two psychoanalysts, as are
Europeans in recognizing the tints between two Chinese faces. The "free"
psychoanalysis remained in the shadow of the "official" and "orthodox" one, and
was treated only as an appendage of the latter. Then Adler took the step for
which we are thankful. He severed all connection with psychoanalysis and named
his teachings "The Individual Psychology." There is much space on God's earth,
and any one who can is surely justified in tumbling about upon it uninhibited;
but it is not desirable to continue living under one roof when people no longer
understand one another and no longer get on together. Adler's "Individual
Psychology " is now one of the many psychological movements opposed to
psychoanalysis, and its further development lies outside our interests.
Adler's theory was, from the very beginning, a "system," which psychoanalysis
was careful not to become. It is also an excellent example of a "secondary
elaboration" as seen, for example, in the process which the waking thought
produces in dream material.[16]
In this case instead of dream material there is the material newly [p. 44]
acquired from the viewpoint of the ego and brought under the familiar categories
of the same. It is then translated, changed, and as thoroughly misunderstood as
happens in the case of dream-formation. Adler's theory is thus characterized
less by what it asserts than by what it denies. It consequently consists of
three elements of quite dissimilar value; first, good contributions to the
psychology of the ego, which are superfluous but admissible; secondly,
translations of analytical facts into the new jargon, and, thirdly, distortions
and perversions of these facts when they do not fit into the ego
presuppositions. The elements of the first kind have never been ignored by
psychoanalysis, although it owed no special attention to them. Psychoanalysis
had a greater interest in showing that all ego strivings are mixed with
libidinous components. Adler's theory emphasizes the counterpart to it; namely,
that all libidinous feeling contains an admixture of egotism. This would have
been a palpable gain if Adler had not made use of this assertion to deny, every
time, the libidinous feelings in favor of the impelling ego components. His
theory thus does exactly what all patients do, and what our conscious thinking
always does, it rationalizes, as Jones would say, in order to conceal the
unconscious motives. Adler is so consistent in this, that he considers the
object of evincing domination over the woman, to be on the top, as the
mainspring of the sexual act. I do not know if he has upheld this monstrous idea
in his writings.
Psychoanalysis early recognized that every neurotic symptom owes the possibility
of its existence to some compromise. It must, therefore, also put to some good
account the demands of the ego which manages the repression, it must offer it
some advantages by finding for it some useful employment, otherwise it would
suffer the same fate as the originally defended impulses. The term "morbid gain"
expresses this state of affairs. One might even have been justified in
differentiating the primary gain for the ego which must have been active at the
origin, from a "secondary" gain which appears in connection with other
intentions of the ego, when the symptom is about to assert itself. It has also
long been known to analysis that the withdrawal of this morbid gain, or the
cessation of the same [p. 45] in consequence of some real change, is one of the
mechanisms in the cure of the symptom. On these relationships which can be
verified and understood without difficulty, Adler's theory puts the greatest
emphasis. It entirely overlooks the fact that innumerable times the ego makes a
virtue out of necessity in submitting to the most undesired symptom forced upon
it, because of the use it can make of it, e.g., when the ego accepts anxiety as
a means of security. Here the ego plays the absurd part of the Pierot in the
circus, who, through his gestures, wishes to convey to the spectators the
impression that all changes in the menage are taking place at his command. But
only the youngest among the spectators believe him.
For the second part of Adler's theory psychoanalysis must stand security as for
its own possessions. For it is nothing but psychoanalytic knowledge which the
author had from all the sources opened to him during ten years of our joint
work, but which he later marked as his own after changing the nomenclature. For
instance, I myself consider "security" a better word than "protective measure,"
which I used; but cannot find in it any new meaning. Similarly one will find in
Adler's statements a great many long-known features if one will replace the
expressions "feigned" (fingiert) fictive and fiction, by the original words "to
fancy" and "phantasy." This identity would be emphasized by psychoanalysis, even
if the author had not for many years participated in our common work.
The third part of Adler's theory, which consists in giving new interpretations
to, and in distorting the disagreeable facts of psychoanalysis, contains that
which definitely severs the actual "Individual Psychology" from psychoanalysis.
As is known the principle of Adler's system states that it is the object of the
self-assertion of the individual, his "will to power" in the form of the
"masculine protest," to manifest itself domineeringly in the conduct of life, in
character formation and in the neurosis. This "masculine protest," the Adlerism
motor, is nothing else, however, than the repression set free from its
psychological mechanism, and what is more, it is sexualized and thus hardly in
keeping with the vaunted expulsion of sexuality [p 46] from its place in the
psychic life. The "masculine protest" certainly exists, but in constituting it
as the motor of the psychic life, observation has only played the part of the
springboard which one leaves in order to uplift one's self. Let us consider one
of the most fundamental situations of the infantile desire; namely, the
observation of the sexual act between adults by the child. When the life-history
of such persons is later subjected to analysis by a physician, it is found that
at this moment the minor spectator was seized by two feelings; one, in the case
of a boy, to put himself in the place of the active man, and the other, the
opposing feeling, to identify himself with the suffering woman. Both strivings
conjointly exhaust the pleasure that might have resulted from this situation.
Only the first feeling can come under the head of the "masculine protest" if
this idea is to retain any meaning at all. The second feeling, whose fate Adler
either ignores or does not know, is really the one which assumes greater
significance in the later neurosis. Adler has placed himself so entirely into
the jealous confinement of the ego, that he only accounts for such emotional
feelings as are agreeable to the ego and furthered by it; but the case of the
neurosis, which opposes these strivings, lies beyond his horizon.
Adler's most serious deviations from the reality of observation and his deepest
confusion of ideas have arisen in his attempt to correlate the basic principle
of his theory with the psychic life of the child, an attempt which has become
inevitable in psychoanalysis. The biological, social, and physiological meaning
of "masculine" and " feminine" have here become mixed into a hopeless
composition. It is quite impossible, and it can easily be disproved by
observation, that the masculine or feminine child builds its plan of life on any
original undervaluation of the feminine sex; nor is it conceivable that a child
can take as the guiding line the wish: "I will be a real man." In the beginning
no child has even an inkling of the significance of the difference in sex, more
likely it starts with the assumption that both sexes possess the same (male)
genital. It does not begin its sexual investigation with the problem of sex
differentiation and is far from entertaining the social undervaluation [p. 47]
of the woman. There are women in whose neurosis the wish to be a man never
played any part. So far as the "masculine protest" is concerned, it can easily
be traced back to a disturbance of the original narcissism caused by the threat
of castration; that is, to the first hindrance of sexual activity. All dispute
as to the psychogenesis of the neuroses must ultimately be decided in the sphere
of the childhood neuroses. The careful analysis of a neurosis of the early years
of childhood puts an end to all mistakes in regard to the etiology of the
neuroses, and all doubts as to the part played by the sexual impulses. That is
why Adler in his criticism of Jung's "Conflicts of the Child's Mind" was obliged
to resort to the imputation that the material of the case surely must have
followed a uniform new tendency " from the father."[17]
I will not linger any longer over the biological side of Adler's theory, and
will not examine whether the palpable inferiority of organs or the subjective
feeling of the same (one often cannot tell which) can possibly be the basis of
Adler's system. Only permit me to remark that this would make the neurosis a
by-product of the general stunting, while observation teaches that an
excessively large number of hideous, misshapen, crippled, and wretched creatures
have failed to react to their deficiencies by developing a neurosis. Nor will I
consider the interesting information that the sense of inferiority goes back to
infantile feelings. It shows us in what disguise the doctrine of infantilism, so
much emphasized in psychoanalysis, returns in Adler's Individual Psychology. On
the other hand, I am obliged to emphasize how all psychological acquisitions of
psychoanalysis have been disregarded by Adler. In his book "The Nervous
Character," the unconscious still appears as a psychological peculiarity, but
without any relation to his system. Later, he declared, quite logically, that it
was a matter of indifference to him whether any conception be conscious or
unconscious. For the principle of repressions, Adler never evinced any
understanding. While reviewing a lecture before the Vienna Society in 1911, he
[p. 48] said: "On the strength of a case I wish to point out that the patient
had never repressed his libido, against which he continually tried to secure
himself."[18] Soon thereafter at a discussion in Vienna Adler said: "If you ask
whence comes the repression, you are told: from culture. But if you ask whence
comes culture, the reply is: from the repression. So you see it is only a
question of a play on words." A small fragment of the sagacity used by Adler to
defend his "nervous character" might have sufficed to show him the way out of
this pettifogging argument. There is nothing mysterious about it, except that
culture depends upon the acts of repression of former generations, and that each
new generation is required to retain this culture by carrying out the same
repressions. I have heard of a child that considered itself fooled and began to
cry, because to the question: "Where do eggs come from?" it received the answer,
"Eggs come from hens," and to the further question: "Where do the hens come
from?" the information was "From the eggs," and yet this was not a play upon
words. The child had been told what was true.
Just as deplorable and devoid of substance is all that Adler has said about the
dream -- that shibboleth of psychoanalysis. At first he considered the dream as
a turning from the masculine to the feminine line, which simply means
translating the theory of wish-fulfillment in dreams into the language of the
"masculine protest." Later he found that the essence of the dream lies in the
fact that it enables man to realize unconsciously what is denied him
consciously. Adler should also be credited with the priority of confounding the
dream with the latent dream-thoughts, on the cognition of which rests his idea
of "prospective tendency." Maeder followed him in this, later on. In doing so he
readily overlooks the fact that every interpretation of the dream which really
tells nothing comprehensible in its manifest appearance rests upon the same
dream-interpretation, whose assumptions and conclusions he is disputing.
Concerning resistance Adler asserts that it serves to strengthen the patient
against the physician. This is certainly correct. It means as much [p. 49] as
saying that it serves the resistance. But whence this resistance originates, and
how it happens that its phenomena serve the patient's interest, these questions,
as if of no interest for the ego, are not further discussed by Adler. The
detailed mechanisms of symptoms and phenomena, the motivation of the variety of
diseases and morbid manifestations, find no consideration at all with Adler,
since everything is equally subservient to the "masculine protest," to the
self-assertion, and to the exaltation of the personality. The system is
finished, at the expense of an extraordinary labor of new interpretation, yet it
has not contributed a single new observation. I believe that I have succeeded in
showing that his system has nothing whatever in common with psychoanalysis.
The picture which one derives from Adler's system is founded entirely upon the
impulse of aggression. It has no place at all for love. One might wonder that
such a cheerless aspect of life should have received any notice whatever; but we
must not forget that humanity, oppressed by its sexual needs, is prepared to
accept anything, if only the "overcoming of sexuality" is held out as bait.
The secession of Adler's faction was finished before the Congress at Weimar
which took place in 1911, while the one of the Swiss School began after this
date. Strangely enough, the first indications of it were found in some remarks
by Riklin in popular articles printed in Swiss literature, from which the
general public learned, even before Riklin's closest colleagues, that
psychoanalysis had succeeded in overcoming some regretable mistakes which
discredited it. In 1912 Jung boasted, in a letter to me from America, that his
modifications of psychoanalysis had overcome the resistances to it in many
persons, who hitherto wanted to know nothing about it. I replied that this was
nothing to boast about, that the more he sacrificed of the hard-won truths of
psychoanalysis, the less resistances he would encounter. This modification for
the introduction of which the Swiss are so proud, again was nothing more or less
than the theoretical suppression of the sexual factor. I admit that from the
very beginning I have regarded this "progress " as a too-far-reaching adaptation
to the demands of actuality. [p. 50]
These two retrogressive movements, tending away from psychoanalysis, which I
will now compare, also resemble each other in the fact that they are seeking to
obtain a favorable opinion by means of certain lofty points of view, as sub
specie æternitatis. In the case of Adler, this rôle is played by the relativity
of all knowledge, and by the rights of the personality to construe artificially
any piece of knowledge to suit the individual; while Jung insists on the
cultural historical rights of youth to throw off any fetters that tyrannical old
age with ossified views would forge for it. These arguments require some
repudiation. The relativity of all our knowledge is a consideration which maybe
used as an argument against any other science besides psychoanalysis. This idea
originates from well-known reactionary streams of the present day inimical to
science, and wishes to give the appearance of a superiority to which we are not
entitled. Not one of us can guess what may be the ultimate judgment of mankind
about our theoretical efforts. There are examples to show that what was rejected
by the next three generations was corrected by the fourth and its recognition
thus brought about. There is nothing else for the individual to do than to
defend, with all his strength, his conviction based on experience after he has
carefully listened to his own criticisms and has given some attention to the
criticisms of his opponents. Let him be content to conduct his affair honestly
and not assume the office of judge, which is reserved for a remote future. To
accentuate personal arbitrariness in scientific matters is bad; it evidently
wishes to deny to psychoanalysis the value of a science, which, to be sure,
Adler has already depreciated by the aforementioned remark. Any one who highly
regards scientific thinking will rather seek for means and methods by which to
restrict, if possible, the factor of personal and artificial arbitrariness
wherever it still plays too large a part. Besides one must remember that all
agitation in defending is out of place. Adler does not take these arguments
seriously. They are only for use against his opponents, but they respect his own
theories. They have not prevented Adler's adherents from celebrating him as the
Messiah, for whose appearance waiting humanity had been prepared [p. 51] by so
many forerunners. The Messiah is surely no longer anything relative.
Jung's argument ad captandam benevolentiam rests on the all-too-optimistic
assumption that the progress of humanity, of civilization, and of knowledge has
always continued in an unbroken line, as if there had never been any epigones,
reactions, and restorations after every revolution, as if there had never been
races who, because of a retrogression, had to renounce the gain of former
generations. The approach to the standpoint of the masses, the giving up of an
innovation that has proved unpopular, all these make it altogether unlikely that
Jung's correction of psychoanalysis could lay claim to being a liberating act of
youth. Finally it is no: the years of the doer that decide it, but the character
of the deed.
Of the two movements we have here considered, that headed by Adler is
undoubtedly the more important. Though radically false, it is, nevertheless,
characterized by consistency and coherence and it is still founded on the theory
of the impulse. On the other hand, Jung's modification has lessened the
connection between the phenomena and the impulses: besides, as its critics
(Abraham, Ferenczi, Jones) have already pointed out, it is so unintelligible,
muddled, and confused, that it is not easy to take any attitude towards it.
Wherever one touches it, one must be prepared to be told that one has
misunderstood it, and it is impossible to know how one can arrive at a correct
understanding of it. It represents itself in a peculiarly vacillating manner,
since at one time it calls itself "a quite tame deviation, not worthy of the row
which has arisen about it" (Jung), yet, at another time, it calls itself a new
salvation with which a new epoch shall begin for psychoanalysis, in fact, a new
aspect of the universe for everything else.
When one thinks of the disagreements between the individual private and public
expressions of Jung's utterances one is obliged to ask to what extent this is
due to his own lack of clearness and lack of sincerity. Yet, it must be admitted
that the representatives of the new theory find themselves in a difficult
position. They are now disputing things which they themselves formerly defended
and what [p. 52] is more, this dispute is not based on new observations which
might have taught them something fresh, but rather on a different interpretation
which causes them to see things in a different light from that in which they saw
them before. It is for this reason that they will not give up their connection
with psychoanalysis as the representatives of which they first became known in
the world. They prefer to proclaim that psychoanalysis has changed. At the
Congress of Münich I was obliged to clear up this confusion and did so by
declaring that I could not recognize the innovation of the Swiss School as a
legitimate continuation and further development of the Psychoanalysis which had
originated with me. Outside critics (like Furtmüller) had already recognized
this state of affairs and Abraham says, quite rightly, that Jung is in full
retreat away from psychoanalysis. I am naturally entirely willing to admit that
any one has the right to think and to write what he wishes, but he has not the
right to make it out to be something different from what it really is.
Just as Adler's researches brought something new into psychoanalysis, a piece of
the ego-psychology, and paid only too dearly for this gift by repudiating all
the fundamental analytic principles, in the same way Jung and his adherents have
based their fight against psychoanalysis upon a new contribution to the same.
They have traced in detail (what Pfister did before them) how the material of
the sexual ideas originating in the family complex and in the incestuous object
selection can be used to represent the highest ethical and religious interests
of mankind, that is, they have explained a remarkable case of sublimation of the
erotic impelling forces and the transformation of the same into strivings that
can no longer be called erotic. All this harmonized very well with the
assumptions of psychoanalysis, and would have agreed very well with the
conception that in the dream and in the neurosis one sees the regressive
elucidations of these and all other sublimations. But the world would have
exclaimed that ethics and religion had been sexualized. I cannot help assuming
"finally" that the investigators found themselves quite unequal to the storm
they had to face. [p. 53] Perhaps the storm began to rage in their own bosoms.
The previous theological history of so many of the Swiss workers is as important
in their attitude to psychoanalysis as is the socialistic record of Adler for
the development of his "psychology." One is reminded of Mark Twain's famous
story about the fate of his watch and to the speculative remark with which he
closed it: "And he used to wonder what became of all the unsuccessful tinkers,
and gunsmiths, and shoemakers, and blacksmiths; but nobody could ever tell him."
I will encroach upon the realm of parables and will assume that in a certain
society there lived a parvenu who boasted of descent from a very noble family
not locally known. But it so happened that it was proved to him that his parents
were living somewhere in the neighborhood and were very simple people, indeed.
Only one way out remained to him and he seized upon it. He could no longer deny
his parents, but he asserted that they were very aristocratic by origin but much
come down in the world, and secured for them at some obliging office a document
showing their descent. It seems to me that the Swiss workers had been obliged to
act in a similar manner. If ethics and religion could not be sexualized, but
must be regarded as something "higher" from the very beginning, and as their
origin from the family and Oedipus complexes seemed undeniable, then there was
only one way out; namely, that these complexes themselves, from the beginning,
could not have the significance which they appeared to express, but must have
that higher "anagogic" sense (to use Silberer's nomenclature) with which they
adapt themselves for proper use in the abstract streams of thought of ethics and
religious mysticism.
I am quite prepared to be told once more that I have misunderstood the contents
and object of the theory of the New-Zürich School, but here wish to protest
against being held responsible for those contradictions to my theories that have
arisen as a result of the publications of this school The burden of
responsibility rests on them, not on me. In no other way can I make
comprehensible to myself the ensemble of Jung's innovations or grasp them in
their associations. All the changes which Jung has perpetrated upon [p. 54]
psychoanalysis originated in the intention of setting aside all that is
objectionable in the family complexes, in order that these objectionable
features may not be found again in religion and ethics. The sexual libido was
replaced by an abstract idea, of which it may be said that it remained equally
mysterious and incomprehensible alike to fools and to the wise. The
Oedipus-complex, we are told, has only a "symbolical" sense, the mother therein
representing the unattainable which must be renounced in the interests of
cultural development. The father who is killed in the Oedipus myth represents
the "inner" father from w hose influence we must free ourselves in order to
become independent. No doubt other portions of the material of sexual
conceptions will, in time, receive similarly new interpretations. In place of
the conflict between erotic strivings adverse to the ego and the self-assertion,
we are given the conflict between the "life-task" and the "psychic-laziness.''
The neurotic guilty conscience corresponds with the reproach of not having put
to good account one's life-task. Thus a new religio-ethical system was founded
which, exactly like Adler's, was obliged to give new interpretations, to distort
or set aside the actual results of analysis. As a matter of fact they have
caught a few cultural higher notes from the symphony of the world's by-gones,
but once again have failed to hear the powerful melody of the impulses.
In order to hold this system together it was necessary to draw away entirely
from the observations and technique of psychoanalysis. Now and then the
enthusiasm for the higher cause even permits a total disregard for scientific
logic, as for instance, when Jung maintains that the Oedipus complex is not
"specific" enough for the etiology of the neuroses, and ascribed this
specificity to laziness, that is, to the most universal quality of animate and
inanimate bodies! Moreover, it is to be remarked that the "Oedipus complex" only
represents a capacity on which the psychic forces of the individual measure
themselves, and is not in itself a force, like the "psychic laziness." The study
of the individual man has shown and always will show that the sexual complexes
are alive in him in their original sense. That is why the study of the
individual was [p. 55] pushed back by Jung and replaced by the judgment of the
essential facts from the study of the races. As the study of the early childhood
of every man exposed one to the danger of striking against the original and
undisguised meaning of these misinterpreted complexes, it was, therefore,
thought best to make it a rule to tarry as little as possible at this past and
to place the greatest emphasis on the return to the conflict. Here, moreover,
the essential things are not at all the incidental and personal, but rather the
general, that is to say, the "non-fulfilment of the life-task." Nevertheless, we
know that the actual conflict of the neurotic becomes comprehensible and
solvable only if it can be traced back into the patient's past history, only by
following along the way that his libido took when his malady began.
How the New Zürich therapy has shaped itself under such tendencies I can convey
by means of reports of a patient who was himself obliged to experience it.
"Not the slightest effort was made to consider the past or the transferences.
Whenever I thought that the latter were touched, they were explained as a mere
symbol of the libido. The moral instructions were very beautiful and I followed
them faithfully, but I did not advance one step. This was more distressing to me
than to the physician, but how could I help it? -- Instead of freeing me
analytically, each session made new and tremendous demands on me, on the
fulfilment of which the overcoming of the neurosis was supposed to depend. Some
of these demands were: inner concentration by means of introversion, religious
meditation, living together with my wife in loving devotion, etc. It was almost
beyond my power, since it really amounted to a radical transformation of the
whole spiritual man. I left the analysis as a poor sinner with the strongest
feelings of contrition and the very best resolutions, but at the same time with
the deepest discouragement. All that this physician recommended any pastor would
have advised, but where was I to get the strength?"
It is true that the patient had also heard that an analysis of the past and of
the transference should precede the process. He, however, was told that he had
enough of it. But as it had not helped [p. 56] him, it seems to me that it is
just to conclude that the patient had not had enough of this first sort of
analysis. Not in any case has the superimposed treatment which no longer has the
slightest claim to call itself psychoanalysis, helped. It is a matter of wonder
that the men of Zürich had need to make the long detour via Vienna to reach
Bern, so close to them, where Dubois cures neuroses by ethical encouragement in
the most indulgent fashion.[19]
The utter disagreement of this new movement with psychoanalysis naturally shows
itself also in its attitude towards repression, which is hardly mentioned any
more in the writings of Jung; in the utter misconstruction of the dream which
Adler, ignoring the dream-psychology, confuses with the latent dream-thoughts,
and also in the lack of understanding of the unconscious. In fact this
disagreement can be seen in all the essential points of psychoanalysis. When
Jung tells us that the incest-complex is only "symbolic," that it has "no real
existence," that the savage feels no desire towards the old hag but prefers a
young and pretty woman, then one is tempted to assume in order to dispose of
apparent contradiction that "symbolic" and "no real existence" only signify what
is designated as "existing unconsciously."
If one maintains that the dream is something different from the latent
dream-thoughts, which it elaborates, one will not wonder that the patients dream
of those things with which their mind has been filled during the treatment,
whether it be the "life-task" or being "above" or "below." Certainly the dreams
of those analyzed are guidable in a similar manner as dreams can be influenced
by the application of experimental stimuli. One may determine a part of the
material that occurs in the dream, but this changes nothing in the nature and
mechanism of the dream. Nor do I believe that the so-called "biographical" dream
occurs outside of the analysis. On [p. 57] the other hand, if we analyze dreams
that occurred before the treatment began, or if attention is paid to what the
dreamer adds to the stimuli supplied to him during the treatment, or if we avoid
giving him any such task, then we can convince ourselves how far the dream is
from offering tentative solutions of the life-task. For the dream is only
another form of thinking; the understanding of this form can never be gained
from the content of its thoughts, only the consideration of the dream-work will
lead to it.
The effective refutation of Jung's misconceptions of psychoanalysis and his
deviations from it is not difficult. Any analysis carried out in accordance with
the rules, especially any analysis of a child, strengthens the convictions on
which the theory of psychoanalysis rests, and repudiates the new interpretations
of Adler's and Jung's systems. Jung himself, before he became enlightened,
carried out such an analysis of a child and published it.[20] It remains to be
seen if he will undertake a new interpretation of this case with the help of
another "uniform new tendency of the facts," to give Adler's expression used in
this connection.
The opinion that the sexual representation of "higher" ideas in the dream and in
the neurosis is nothing but an archaic manner of expression, is naturally
irreconcilable with the fact that these sexual complexes prove to be in the
neurosis the carriers of those quantities of libido which have been withdrawn
from the real life. If it were only a question of sexual jargon, nothing could
thereby be altered in the economy of the libido itself. Jung himself admits this
in his "Darstellung der psychoanalytischen Theorie," and formulates, as a
therapeutic task, that the libido investing the complexes should be withdrawn
from them. But this can never be accomplished by rejecting the complexes and
forcing them towards sublimation, but only by the most exhaustive occupation
with them, and by making them fully conscious. The first bit of reality with
which the patient has to deal is his malady itself. Any effort to spare him this
task points to an incapacity of the physician to help [p. 58] him in overcoming
his resistances, or to a fear on the part of the physician as to the results of
this work.
I would like to say in conclusion that Jung, by his "modifications" has
furnished psychoanalysis with a counterpart to the famous knife of Lichtenberg
He has changed the hilt, has inserted into it a new blade, and because the same
trademark is engraved on it he requires of us that we regard the instrument as
the former one.
On the contrary, I believe I have shown that the new theory which desires to
substitute psychoanalysis signifies an abandonment of analysis and a secession
from it. Some may be inclined to fear that this defection may be more
unfortunate for the fate of psychoanalysis than any other because it emanates
from persons who once played so great a part in the psychoanalytic movement and
did so much to further it. I do not share this apprehension.
Men are strong so long as they represent a strong idea. They become powerless
when they oppose it. Psychoanalysis will be able to bear this loss and will gain
new adherents for those lost.
I can only conclude with the wish that the fates may prepare easy ascension for
those who found their sojourn in the underworld of psychoanalysis uncomfortable.
May it be vouchsafed to the others to bring to a happy conclusion their works in
the deep.
Footnotes
[1] "On Psychoanalysis." Five lectures given on the occasion of the twentieth
anniversary of Clark University, Worcester, Mass., dedicated to Stanley Hall.
Second edition, 1912. Published simultaneously in English in the American
Journal of Psychology, March, 1910; translated into Dutch, Hungarian, Polish and
Russian.
[2] Breuer and Freud, " Studien über Hysterie," p. 15, Deuticke, 1895.
[3] Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, 1911, Vol. I, p. 69.
[4] The Clinic of Psychiatry, Zürich.
[5] Havelock Ellis, " The Doctrines of the Freudian School."
[6] G. Greve, " Sobre Psicologia y Psicoterapia de ciertos Estados angustiosos."
See Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, Vol. I, p. 594·
[7] The collected publications of these two authors have appeared in book form:
Brill, "Psychoanalysis, its Theories and Practical Applications," 1912, 2d
edition, 1914, Saunders, Philadelphia, and E. Jones's "Papers on
Psychoanalysis," 1913, Wood and Company, New York.
[8] The first official recognition that psychoanalysis and dream interpretation
received was extended to them by the Psychiatrist Jelgersma, rector of the
University of Leyden, in his rectorship address February 1, 1914.
[9]An English translation has just appeared in the Nervous and Mental Disease
Monograph Series, No. 23.
[10] Cf. "Der Wahn und die Träume" in W. Jensen's "Gradiva."
[11] Rank, "Der Künstler," analyses of poets by Sadger, Reik, and others, my
little monograph on a Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci; also Abraham's
"Analyses von Segantini."
[12] A translation is in preparation.
[13] Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, translated by A. A. Brill, Moffat,
Yard & Co., New York.
[14] "Die Psychoanalytische Methode," 1913, Vol. I of the Pedagogium, Meumann
and Messner. English Translation by Dr. C. R. Payne. Moffat, Yard & Co., N. Y.
[15] Cf. my two essays in Scientia, Vol. XIV, 1913, " Das Interesse an der
Psychoanalyse."
[15a] Dreams and Myths, Wish-fulfillment and Fairy Tales, Myth of the Birth of
the Hero, in this series are translated in the Monograph Series.
[15b] Adler's Inferiority of Organs, translated by Jelliffe, appears as
Monograph 24. His, "Nervous Character," translated by Glueck and Lind, published
by Moffat, Yard & Co., N.Y.
[16] Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 389, translated by A. A. Brill, The
Macmillan Co., New York, and Alien, London.
[17] Zentalbl., Vol. I, p. 122. See "Analytical Psychology," Moffat, Yard & Co.,
N. Y.
[18] Korrespondenzbl., No. 5, Zurich, April, 1911.
[19] I know the objections which stand in the way of using a patient's
statements, and I, therefore, expressly state that my informant is as worthy of
credence as he is capable of judging this matter. He gave me this information
without my request, and I make use of his communication without asking his
consent, because I cannot admit that any psychoanalytical technique should lay
claim to the protection of discretion.
[20] Experiences Concerning the Psychic Life of the Child, translated by A. A.
Brill, American Journal of Psychology, April, 1910.