

Preface and Acknowledgements

This book illustrates a certain change in emphasis that has recently been occurring in my long-lasting interest in pragmatics and discourse analysis. Having started out from merely critical analysis of natural text, I got gradually involved in methodological issues concerning the format and strategies of pragmatic research in general. A result of this was my 2002 book publication which I refer to more extensively in the Introduction. Later, affected primarily by the stimulating cognitive environment at my home university, the University of Lodz, I developed some extra interest in trying to reconcile my formal pragmatics background and its methodological orientation with the many illuminating models offered by cognitive linguistics. It is this last shift that is best seen from the present book; it consists in not only how the argument starts and ends, but mainly, how it *unfolds*.

It is a truism to stress the mounting difficulties that a linguist encounters while trying to re-evaluate and restructure one's attitude to methods of research, let alone the concept of linguistic science as such. But it is also the best way to voice one's debt of gratitude to those who have been helpful in surmounting these difficulties. First and foremost, I owe such debt to Professor Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk who, having been my boss at the Department of English Language, University of Lodz, for nine years now, always kept inspiring me to deal originally with solutions that seemed to myself, quite fallaciously, nothing but straightforward and ultimate. In turn, Professor Piotr Stalmaszczyk and Professor Kamila Turewicz, of the University of Lodz and Lodz Academy of Humanities and Economics respectively, have been invaluable in bringing up issues related to construction of scientific argument as such, thus contributing to my growth as professional linguist. And last but not least, many words of thanks should go to Professor Henryk Kardela of the University of Maria Skłodowska-Curie in Lublin, who not only reviewed the present text before its going to print, but was also kind enough to talk to me beforehand about the all the hazards and difficulties that my project was inevitably going to entail.

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January 2003

Introduction

1. Contexts and inspirations: from discourse analysis to research in analyzing discourse

The idea for writing the present book came from the many methodological questions I left unanswered in my earlier publication *Explorations in Political Discourse* (cf. Cap 2002); the present work attempts to clarify and systematize some of the issues I consider particularly problematic to a discourse analyst undertaking a natural (i.e. real-life) text investigation.

In *Explorations...*, I elected two distinct discourse ‘genres’ to illustrate two complementary models of analysis. I chose the post-1933 inaugural addresses by the US presidents to work with a “bottom-up” or “inductive” model (cf. Beaugrande 1991), and the recent NATO texts¹ to provide exemplification of a “top-down” or “deductive” model (cf. Beaugrande 1991). A reverse correlation, though certainly possible, was never attempted nor even hypothesized.

Why wasn’t it? One could probably say that the goal was merely to illustrate two methodological approaches with a common ‘denominator’, a text invariably involving persuasion, enactment of credibility, political propaganda, etc. In that sense, the goal was reached as both analyses yielded plausible conclusions with respect to all these factors. But ever since the question has remained whether the elected correlation was just a matter of chance or perhaps something deeper. This question has gradually led me to believe that the presidential discourse could just *inherently* invite the “bottom-up” approach, while the NATO discourse could just be *inherently* more “top-down”-friendly’, so to say. Such conviction has in turn given rise to a consequential generalization:

A discourse type could in itself be an analytic determinant

Discussion of this claim and its derivatives, in various contexts and perspectives, is going to constitute the core of the present book. But it should still be started with one of the many critical observations I made in the NATO part of the *Explorations...*:

Compared to the issue of the Kosovo intervention, NATO’s presentation of its eastward expansion policy seems to be determined by, occasionally, somewhat

¹ These texts were predominantly press releases and statements produced by NATO authorities in connection with the military conflict in Kosovo in 1999, and an ongoing political expansion of the Alliance to the East.

different premises and conditions. One might say that the Kosovo case lends itself to a complex but consistent situational definition. This means that the conflict raises (at the time of its happening) relatively clear-cut (though usually polarized) attitudes, that its ultimate resolution is mostly predictable (in the sense that the NATO forces are virtually bound to prevail), and finally that there are largely distinct addressee groups at which messages [...] are directed (NATO member states, non-NATO states, the Yugoslav government, the people of Yugoslavia, etc.). These groups can be expected to hold well-defined attitudes towards the intervention (since the very political context is well-defined) and hence the language used to influence them can be for the most part clear-cut [...] But the Alliance's expansion process is much less defined, both politically and militarily. In fact, one cannot anticipate the prospective size of the expansion nor its ultimate outcome. Therefore, one cannot expect the addressee groups to have stable, consistent, or highly polarized attitudes because they are all subject to momentary changes. The implications for the rhetoric of the Alliance is thus that it has to be even more flexible, manipulative, and vague. And indeed, technically, we will again spot the strategy of *attitude unification in dialogic discourse*, but this time applied in a much more elaborate manner; we will also see examples of [...] *two-sided argument* (: 155).

Although this comment was dedicated originally to a *critical* effect - that there be different rhetorical strategies within a seemingly homogeneous discourse type - its *methodological* implications have gone a long way. The words involved a hypothesis of the presence of certain linguistic constructs as following from audience expectations as understood and inferred by an analyst being himself part of the audience. The analyst (that is, myself) also made a hypothetical distinction between the distribution of these constructs whereby he tacitly admitted some necessary limitations on accuracy of their measurement. In both cases distinguished, the hypothesis followed from extralinguistic knowledge available; the amount of knowledge either strengthened or weakened it. The argument itself was as much prescriptive of the discourse type as anticipatory of substantial data support.

What seems to motivate such research procedures as the quoted one is that certain discourse types which 'include' an analyst or are more 'familiar' to him/her do generate observations on their function and structure at a relatively early stage of their componential analysis, or, in foreseeable cases, even before it takes place. The global function established, the analysis proceeds "top-down", i.e. toward all micro-data chunks supportive of the initial hypothesis. This naturally involves a number of methodological hazards which I shall comment on later in the chapter.

Elsewhere in the *Explorations...* I set myself to determine the macro function of President John F. Kennedy's inaugural. This turned out possible only after substantial amount of data had accumulated, i.e. after all major discourse features had been

identified and relations between them described and systematized.² In fact, most of my expectations about the macro function of the text failed this ‘data-test’. The analysis proceeded necessarily “bottom-up”, with larger functional units being derived from common properties of the smaller chunks.

Discourse analyses pursued in a “bottom-up” manner seem partly to result from an analyst having insufficient extralinguistic knowledge to postulate *a priori* claims about text and its function; this constraint primarily concerns analysts *not* being part of the reality investigated or, more often than not, undertaking a diachronic study.

Furthermore, methodological determinism of discourse manifests itself relative to the structural and functional homogeneity of a genre supplying text for analysis. It will naturally be greater in the case of entirely different genres, having their own sentence structure and connectedness canons or other idiosyncratic properties. These canons will also attract an analyst to the preferred research mode.

The objective of the present book is to conclude, on the basis of investigation into a couple of different discourse types (as well as the ways in which they have been studied in literature), about the degree of analytic determinism pertaining to a given kind of text. The goal is also to indicate which discourse types invite which of the analytic approaches (i.e. “top-down” and “bottom-up”) mentioned above. Finally, it is to tackle the question whether and when a most ‘integrated’ approach is possible, what it means for an analyst to adopt it (purposefully or unconsciously) and what is the methodological model under which the analysis of discourse determination as a whole seems maximally elucidated.

2. Strategies of discourse comprehension as strategies of discourse research

It seems fair to say that if a ‘discourse analyst’ can be defined as a goal-oriented, professional and ‘conscious’ receiver of a discourse form, much of knowledge about discourse research is in fact a specialized form of knowledge about discourse comprehension in general. A great many works on discourse comprehension by such linguists and psychologists as Beaugrande, Kintsch, Van Dijk, Schiffrin, and others (cf. Beaugrande 1986; Beaugrande 1988; Beaugrande 1990; Beaugrande 1991; Georgakopoulou and Goutsos 1997; Kintsch 1988; Kintsch 1989; Kintsch and Van Dijk 1983; McKoon and Ratcliff 1992; Schiffrin 1987; Schiffrin 1994; Short *et al.* 1996; Yates 1986; Whitney *et al.* 1995) invite application of observations on text understanding and processing in a study of text analysis. Among most important of these observations are ones that stress the role of *cultural information in discourse processing*. ‘Cultural strategies’ of comprehension have a very wide scope, involving knowledge about geographical areas and locations, social structures, institutions, and events, speech acts, symbolic or ritual values, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, ideologies, and norms - plus a whole conceptual ordering of the world and society. The culture decides

² In the analysis of President Kennedy’s speech, I classed otherwise heterogeneous discourse features such as speech acts, relational propositions and cohesion/coherence markers for common illocutionary characteristics expressed in “speech events” (cf. Van Dijk 1977, and later publications) indicating macro-functional properties of the text.

what discourse receivers believe to be important, relevant, interesting or prominent in discourse - for example whether telling a story is intended to amuse, reproach, give advice, reaffirm norms or teach history. Hence, it can be pre-established what speech acts should be performed in the discourse of a government, a judge in a courtroom, an advertisement character or a student in a class. The strategies applied here limit the interpretation of many aspects of the discourse to rather restricted sets and help decide how a discourse is understood as aggressive, helping, cooperative, obstructive, etc., and how it is meant to affect further verbal or non-verbal actions or knowledge, beliefs, opinions, or motivations of the receiver. That the intention of the speech act performed in a familiar culture may be inferred *before it is heard* is a crucial observation for the understanding (whether task-oriented or not) of the “top-down” mode of language processing. This observation breeds another important one; namely that an unfamiliar culture will motivate the occurrence of the opposite, “bottom-up” mode.

Also, discourse comprehension studies have had a lot to say about the particular *cues* (not necessarily culture-determined) for inferring macropropositions (i.e. global text functions), whether in a “top-down” or “bottom-up” mode. The ability to recognize the presence and distribution of discourse cues may be a major advantage for any discourse receiver; yet which of the cues get interpreted and in which order is also an indicator of the research track elected by an ‘analyst’. Basic cues for macropropositions range from purely grammatical features and individual key words to sequences of sentences. Syntactic signalling can indicate local importance and focus with a passive or cleft sentence structure, and can foreground information by means of super- versus subordinate or first versus final clauses. Final positioning can be used for newness and focus, and deviations from this can mark contrasts or breaches of expectations. All these cues get analyzed for a global text function.

And most significantly for considerations of discourse analyst’s activity, there have amassed numerous findings about an apparent lack of clarity in defining the very process of comprehension as **either** exclusively “top-down” **or** “bottom-up” phenomenon. This limitation results from the highly dynamic character of the interaction of continual data input with an idealized conception or theory of the macroproposition. In the process of comprehension, they get simultaneously under- and over-determined by each other (cf. Beaugrande 1991). For example, the theory of the macroproposition is *underdetermined* by actual data in that not only several theories are usually possible for the same data, but the data sample itself can never be complete. A discourse receiver must therefore rely on his or her intuition about when a data set is attained such that the data sample can be judged sufficient and representative for a theoretical account of global text function. The process of data collection is inherently a “bottom-up” phenomenon, but the ultimate judgement, for its necessary tentativeness involved, marks a switch to subsequent “top-down” reasoning. Furthermore, the theory of the macroproposition is *overdetermined* at least in that it invites criteria and categories with standards for rigor and formality to which some data do not conform. Reciprocally, data are *overdetermined* in that external factors, such as speaker’s personality or emotional state, control the data besides the relation to an underlying language system. As degree of this control cannot be adequately measured, any “top-down” postulate as to the essence of the macroproposition involved remains an approximation. Simultaneously, a “bottom-up” strategy gets discouraged by the very fact of occurrence of such immediate indicators. And finally, data are *underdetermined* in the sense that collected data are finite (which

motivates “bottom-up” comprehension), but the data that could belong to language are infinite (which de-motivates it), and also, specific choices of the speaker are often significant only in respect to others that were not made, but could have been, according to varying degrees of probability dictated by situation (which motivates “top-down” comprehension, based on expectations from a given discourse type).

3. Methodological limitations of the inspired modes of discourse analysis

We have seen from the discussion in 2. that discourse comprehension studies have, though for the most part unintentionally, paved the way for organized research in formal strategies of text analysis. The research in the operation of “top-down” and “bottom-up” modes of analysis can thus be focused on how these modes fit in the methodological preferences of a discourse analyst investigating a particular text type. This question presupposes certain inherent inadequacies characterizing both the “top-down” and the “bottom-up” mode. Such inadequacies indeed exist and need to be reckoned with by an analyst. Following the “bottom-up” approach, an analyst may have a rough vision of the macroproposition of the text, yet in the process of research he or she will rely on individual and random pieces of information, so as to combine them into increasingly larger units, such as speech events and macro speech acts (cf. Van Dijk 1977, and later publications). This is because the “bottom-up” mode will involve more of the necessary interplay between the selection of individual information and its description on the one hand, and the anticipated idea of the general function of the text. In fact, the stronger such anticipation, the greater the risk of misrepresentation. An analyst whose research is progressing in the direction of clearly predefined goals is tempted to manipulate with the selection of examples, leaving out the ones that might potentially endanger the global conclusion or simply clash with other examples at the same level of analysis. This gets us in turn to the major inadequacy of most “top-down” studies, where the macroproposition is presupposed prior to actual analysis. Naturally, an analyst who embarks on the project without any assumptions whatsoever as to the general function of the text will inevitably face problems with pursuit of analysis as such, since he or she will fail to construct the schema for derivation of the macroproposition in the first place. Therefore, a ‘successful’ analysis calls for anticipation of the globality of function which is neither specific enough to allow selective research into the random data, nor as general as to make it impossible to delineate the particular levels of analysis. The former reservation follows from the recognition of the apparent inefficiency of an independently “bottom-up” analysis, while the latter from an inadequacy of any unequivocally opposite mode.

4. Organization of the book

As I indicated in 1., the argument undertaken in the present book draws upon the assumption that text types are, by virtue of their structure and pre-expected function, analytic determinants which motivate an analyst to follow a specific mode of investigation. In the first four chapters I make an attempt to assess the degree of such determination across the four different (though all characteristically ‘persuasive’) text domains, i.e. politics and the media (Chapter One), advertising (Chapter Two), scientific argument (Chapter Three), and law (Chapter Four). I analyze the selected texts for their

“bottom-up” and “top-down” determinism, and try to find out which types encourage commitment to which mode of research. In so doing, I address issues involving analytic awareness described in 2. as well as methodological hazards indicated in 3. to see how they apply to the particular, basic-level investigations. The examples given throughout the chapters are not only of real-life data selected by myself, but also of mini-analyses, claims and comments on various (also real-life) texts, available from general literature on text research. The closing Chapter Five is an attempt to enrich the analysis of persuasive discourse determination by verifying selected findings from previous chapters against the methodological background of Langacker’s (1987, 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1995, 1996, 2001) Cognitive Grammar apparatus. This part of the book can thus be treated as an attempt to reconcile the application of instruments offered by the mainstream models of discourse analysis and linguistic pragmatics (as exemplified by works of Beaugrande, Kintsch or Van Dijk) with an illuminating model of discourse analysis available from the potential of cognitive linguistics.

In closing to this introductory chapter, I should make it clear that the idea of having Langacker’s CG model further elaborate on the questions traditionally associated with the mainstream models of discourse (analysis) does not imply a necessary absence of a linguistic theory or theories that would indiscriminately address and possibly even encompass all the issues discussed in chapters 1-4 on the one hand, and 5 on the other. Furthermore, I don’t mean to pretend that all the unfolding considerations in chapters 1-4 are confined to a single linguistic model or, worst of all, that Langacker’s CG has evolved in little contact with the preceding models. I argue against such simplistic approach more fully in the opening part of Chapter Five. Consequently, I try to be careful to use terms which, although defined a long time ago, have retained a relatively stable meaning in linguistics, to eventually become a not negligible part of apparatus of cognitive or, at least, ‘pre-cognitive’ trends, as manifested in works by Chafe (cf. Chafe 1970, 1979, 1994) or Givon (cf. Givon 1989). This refers to, for instance, terms such as “chunk” (of text), “hypothesizing”, or “data-theory interplay” (and synonymous ones). Though they are used in different contexts and for different purposes by, say, Beaugrande and Chafe, their reference has always been to methodologically similar areas (for instance, observing and theorizing, as in the very last case).

Chapter One

Political Talk: Inductive and Deductive Methods of Analysis

1. Introduction

As I already mentioned, the analytic commitment to a specific mode of inquiry can be (partly) determined by the extent to which an analyst shares expectations of the actual text receivers. Determination of the analytic mode is usually further strengthened by other factors, such as the structure and length of text, the kinds and number of ‘cues’ occurring in it, or the density of text’s figuration. All these factors come under investigation in the present chapter, which discusses analytic determinism of texts representing the domain of politics and political rhetoric. In the first part of the chapter I look at Wilson’s (1991) accounts of two texts which, to my mind, inherently invite disparate research modes, i.e. the “bottom-up” and “top-down” mode. I try to establish how this natural determinism has affected Wilson’s analysis, and which points could have been overlooked or misinterpreted as a result. In the second part, I support these observations with this time a first-hand inquiry, into two texts which situate themselves methodologically somewhere in between the preceding ones, and therefore call for a twofold investigation.

2. Reagan’s metaphor

In *Politically Speaking*, Wilson pays close attention to the pragmatic status of metaphorization. His discussion is illustrated with numerous examples taken from political language. In his observations, Wilson (1991: 115-21) devotes much space to a statement by Ronald Reagan:

(1) *The Lady standing in the harbor has never betrayed us once.*¹

Wilson starts the analysis of (1) with noting that President Reagan made this statement as part of a speech delivered in the area of New York, against the backdrop of New York City, and in particular the prominent figure of the Statue of Liberty. The date of the speech (29 May, 1988) is, quite intriguingly, *not* given. Wilson admits that the statement does not stand a traditional test for truth validity and therefore applies the theory of relevance (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986) to interpret it. What is important for correct interpretation, he claims, is the awareness of distinction between “attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions” (cf. Katz 1987). This in turn involves looking at Reagan’s words in two parts: the subject part and the predicate part, where specification of the former will affect meaning of the latter. If, Wilson says, the hearer follows the referential track, he or she will simply pick out the subject suggested (i.e. the Statue of Liberty) and match it against all referents accessible, that is all individual Americans. As a result, the metaphor will imply that it is America and individual Americans who have not betrayed their values, of which ‘Liberty’ is an example. If, however, the hearer attempts a focused, selective and better ‘worked-out’ *attribution* of these values (which is the case when he or she is more involved with the symbolism of the words rather than their automatic projection), then it is probably Ronald Reagan himself who only gets referred to. The first interpretation, Wilson claims, is more plausible because the hearer will probably treat the first part of the statement in terms of a “dead” metaphor since this understanding means less processing effort as confronted with basically the same level of comprehension (expressed by the second interpretation) achieved through complicated steps of comparison involving animate and inanimate objects. The likely function of the metaphor, Wilson concludes, is hence that of glorification of the American people.

The problem with Wilson’s account, however, is his utter disregard for temporal setting of the speech, while it is the time when the speech was given that is a cornerstone of its interpretation. In fact, President Reagan made his statement, along with many others, in support of the incoming Republican nominee George Bush, whose 1988 campaign was characteristically centered around expressing commitment to the continuum of Reagan’s liberal policies. Therefore, as Norris and Whitehouse (1988) note, Reagan’s words were most probably meant to justify this commitment by stressing that over the 80s liberalism had passed the test of time with success. This conclusion could have been reached in the quoted analysis by posing a question about audience’s pre-expectations of the speech. The fact is that since Reagan’s popularity was relatively high at the end of the term, *no* declaration of change in policies was ever desired or expected. In his analysis, however, Wilson does not pose such questions. Hence, instead of testing a *global* assumption about the function of Reagan’s statement against text data, he generates a fallacious conclusion from data micro-chunks which, in his approach, dominate, rather than complement each other. Still, there are a few factors which seem to explain why Wilson

¹ US spelling modification, numbering and italics mine.

undertakes such characteristically componential or “decompositional” (cf. Katz 1987) analysis. The nature of Wilson’s research is strongly determined by the actual text properties which attract him to the “bottom-up” mode of investigation.

First and foremost, it is the metaphoric status of the statement that encourages the “bottom-up” approach. Metaphors, not only in political language, impose step-by-step speculation about their meaning. They enforce perplexity, bewilderment and natural desire to decipher meaning through mental processing which involves intrinsically inductive computation (cf. Lakoff 1997). In his analysis, Wilson sets upon the very first ‘cue’ to compute the meaning; he starts with finding referent for the word *Lady* and builds the entire interpretation of the statement around the postulated correlation. This seems to be a fallacious move, since the comprehension of the metaphor does not really depend on finding a ‘correct’ reference for the word *Lady*. Nor in fact does it depend on the second part of the statement being ‘correctly’ inferred from the first part, as Wilson claims. All we need to interpret Reagan’s statement is a thorough *check of the words against a global, culture-dependent supposition*, a verification continual and unbiased in the sense of no word prescribing the meaning of another prior to it. But, without doubt, the quoted metaphor offers enough peculiarities (status of the word *Lady*; a semantic falsity of the phrase *standing in the harbor*; an intriguing concept of betrayal, etc.) to discourage an analyst from taking such track.

Secondly, the analysis is motivated by the length of the text sample. Since in Wilson’s case the sample consists of merely a single sentence, consecutive investigation of the subject part and the predicate part seems nothing but natural. Furthermore, since interaction between the subject and the predicate usually involves some sort of semantic dominance, the analyst is encouraged to collect data on the basis of left-to-right investigation of the sentence because it is the left-most part (subject) that enacts such dominance. If the subject, as is the case with Reagan’s statement, is ‘attractive’ enough to provoke independent speculation, further inductive research is likely to follow (cf. Beaugrande 1991). The conclusion, however, is going to be selective and particular; it will only reflect the line of thought motivated by a single, pre-established interpretation of the subject part. All this is readily seen from Wilson’s study.

In conclusion to these observations, it seems reasonable to postulate that Wilson’s mode of research has been dominated by his being an ‘outsider’ to the situation depicted. Himself British, Wilson disregards cultural and temporal setting of the speech and tries to derive interpretation from an autonomous analysis of the language form. This is obviously no methodological accusation since in a great many cases an analyst simply cannot have a full access to all cultural determinants of the analyzed text (let us just mention, for instance, studies in ethnography of communication). It is important, however, to stress that ignorance of such factors tends to get offset an apparently exaggerated awareness of ‘objective’ text properties, which come to dominate analysis. The analysis is thus essentially cumulative and inductive, especially when the text chunk is a short one.

3. *Will* and parliamentary questions in Britain

The structure of the analysis in 2. was one where the argument followed the actual text sample elected for investigation. A reverse structure is adopted by Wilson in his study of parliamentary questions in Britain. In his argument, Wilson (1991: 151-5) first outlines

their form-based function and then supplies some cultural background for his hypothesis. Finally, he reiterates his claim in a thesis format. Only later comes the text illustration, which apparently concludes the analysis. I shall now quote the major points of Wilson's argument and re-quote the examples given, in order to show how (and why) the present account differs from the analysis of Reagan's metaphor in 2.:

Most of parliamentary questions are indirect requests containing modal form *will*, which 'politely' commits the hearer to action [...] Rejecting any indirect request made through the interrogative use of *will* creates a problem situation for the respondent. Because of the increased politeness of *will*, any rejection of the indirect request is essentially a "face threatening act" (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987). Rejecting any indirect request requires interactional sensitivity. As the general politeness of the indirect act increases the problem of sensitively constructing a rejection becomes more complex. If [...] *will* carries an increased politeness marking, while at the same time indicating a specific expectation that the response/request will be fulfilled, then it is a useful discourse marker (cf. Schiffrin 1987) for making any refusal or rejection that much more difficult for the respondent. Such a claim seems consonant with the context of parliament, where despite rivalries and antagonisms, members are expected to maintain a civilized and respectful form of confrontation. By constructing a parliamentary question using *will*, members can indicate their expectation of a response while at the same time laying adherence to a specific polite form [...] These facts suggest some reasons why *will* may be the preferred form within the oral question and answer sessions. First, it commits (through implication) the hearer to the action; and second, it is a polite request, and, therefore, any simple rejection of the request reflects back on the individual who has refused to perform what has been implicated as a reasonable action:

*(2) Mr. Mallon: Will the Secretary of State confirm that a sizeable section of the population of Northern Ireland is in favor of the accord and wants to see it working? Will the Secretary of State consider directing some of his remarks to that section of the community at the earliest possible opportunity instead of expressing his own inherent Unionism at every opportunity?*²

(3) Mr. Heffer: Will the Government inform their colleagues in America that they should consider United States history? The United States gained power after a struggle against the British, and only later did it have democratic elections. Nicaragua is in precisely the same position. Nicaragua has a democratically elected government. The United States of America should not support those who are trying to overthrow a democratically elected government who are carrying out policies on behalf of the people.

² US spelling modification, numbering and italics mine. For overall consistency, font size has been changed in relation to the quoted text.

Let us first deal with example (2). The role of the text chunk provided by Wilson is to show that *will* is part of an integrated expression of indirect request and institutional politeness formula. This integrated function follows from, as has been *a priori* postulated, the cultural context of the event. Since the nature of both an act of request and any politeness-marked act is interactional, Wilson's thesis invites consideration of the meaning of words in terms of the anticipated answer (or problems therewith) rather than, say, a self-contained assertion of belief. The way the thesis has been formulated prior to text illustration leaves the analyst with a constrained commentary space; all that remains to be added is a prediction of the effects of a Yes/No answer expected from the addressee. And indeed, within the space of one sentence Wilson rightly observes that a positive response admits to a long-standing bias on the part of the government while a negative answer sounds strongly arrogant. However, none of these (truthful) observations does a full justice to the overall pragmatic load of the analyzed question. The fact is that a more componential approach to the text, while not detracting from the text's global function (understood as creation of a problem situation for a political opponent), reveals many intricacies that get overlooked if the analysis starts from largely cultural premises.

What are these missing points in Wilson's argument? There is, quite evidently, some acute criticism of the addressee which never gets adequately accounted for. This criticism is of the addressee (Secretary of State) considered both as a person and a politician. On the one hand, ridiculed is his mental ability to react promptly to changes in situation. This is achieved by the use of phrase *consider directing some of his remarks*, which not only implies that a straightforward action requested from the addressee needs unnecessary abundance of time (*consider*) to be completed, but also acknowledges inherent limitations upon a successful performance of that action (*some of*). On the other, the addressee is shown to give unjustified preference to private beliefs over what is implied to constitute a global cause. To that end the speaker chooses to portray the addressee in terms of an isolated party (*expressing his own inherent Unionism at every opportunity*). Lastly, it is worth noting that even the observations which **have** been made in Wilson's argument could further benefit from such componential analysis of the text. In fact, a problem situation for the respondent arises right from the beginning of the question, due to a specific lexical choice made by the speaker. The presupposition of truthfulness of the proposition following verb *confirm* puts the addressee in a position in which indeed neither of the responses anticipated by Wilson seems reasonable.

Also in the case of (3), the pre-postulated interactional character of analysis leads to merely an isolated comment on the anticipated answer to Mr. Heffer's question, at the expense of some conclusions which could be drawn from an independent study of the question contents. Wilson observes that the question puts the addressee in an uncomfortable position in the sense that it can only be answered by directly stating that Nicaragua does **not** have a democratic government, i.e. by making a premise whose contents and structure detract from the politeness formulae enacted by the speaker through the application of *will*-sequence. This is certainly true, but Mr. Heffer's question is again part of a larger strategy of criticism which equally manifests itself in the use of specific words and phrases whose function is much more assertive (in fact, accusatory) than directive. The presence of phrase *their colleagues in America*, for instance, implies that British government is at least indirectly supportive of certain

negative actions undertaken by its American partner and other allies (...*trying to overthrow...*).

4. Conclusions from Wilson's research

We have seen that Wilson analyzes the texts quoted in 2. and 3. in a radically different way. In the former study, he proceeds from one data chunk to another and inductively generates a conclusion. In the latter, he starts with a thesis, and subsequently verifies it, in a “top-down” manner, against individual data. These regularities seem to be explained by a couple of factors, some of which concern the person of the analyst. First of all, Wilson's familiarity with cultural background of the analyzed discourse is greater in the second case and, consequently, his ability to predefine language norms as following from this background is considerably larger there. Secondly, the cue for the postulated macroproposition of the parliamentary texts is virtually one lexical item, which, by occurring at the beginning of the text, constrains further investigation. This is evidently not the case with Reagan's metaphor, whose internal structure is sufficiently complex to attract the analyst to componential research. Thirdly, it is also because the texts in 2. and 3. differ in overall length that a closer look is given to the former, while the latter is accounted for in a less detailed and hence predictive way. These variations in approach cause limited effectiveness of both analyses, though each gets affected in a different way. While in 2. the analysis is shown to take a fallacious track, in 3. it is not so much incorrect as incomplete. The macroproposition described in 3. is truthfully identified, and so are its auxiliary, politeness-based components. The missing element of the analysis, however, is some acknowledgement of the assertion structures playing, ironically, a very similar auxiliary role. Wilson has shown how certain indirect acts in parliamentary sessions create a problem situation for the addressee, yet has failed to mention the role of multiple assertive chunks contributing toward precisely the same objective. But more importantly, the quoted analyses prompt consequential methodological questions, namely: are the described limitations set upon by the operation of “bottom-up” and “top-down” modes going to generate comparable analytic shortcomings in the case of other political texts studied by other analysts? Is the adoption of or over-attachment to the former mode *always* more hazardous, as has been shown thus far? And lastly, which of the modes should be more popular with a majority of political discourse analysts?

5. (Methodological implications of) first-hand analyses: address of Deputy's Group “Anti-NATO” (1997) and statement of the Taliban (2001)

The questions I have posed cannot be possibly answered in full, but their investigation seems capable of revealing more regularities about the adoption of the particular research mode (i.e. “bottom-up or “top-down”). In what follows I refrain from making a simple commentary and undertake two first-hand analyses. These analyses differ from the studies quoted from Wilson in that the current goal is to pursue the analytic processes and their textual and non-textual determinants, rather than concentrate on reaching a ready-made conclusion. The character of the analyses is hence speculative; it involves adoption of different political standpoints, a purposeful over-attachment to one research mode at the expense of the other, a simultaneous and consecutive application

of both modes, a purposeful exclusion of cultural background from the investigatory activity, and many other analytic ploys. The tentativeness of the studies serves to account for the full complexity of a situation where none of the modes seems clearly dominant or where both may successfully complement each other. In the case of the first text, the determinism-related considerations are withheld till the end of the critical study. In the second case, the discussion is integrated, the methodological element being, however, in the clear foreground of analysis.

5.1. Analysis of address by Deputy's Group "Anti-NATO"

The first text to be analyzed is a joint statement of the "Anti-NATO Deputy's Group", signed by the members of parliaments of Russia, Byelorussia, Latvia, and the Ukraine a few days after the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997, during which the governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were officially invited to the NATO membership negotiations. The statement has been commonly considered as one of the strongest articulations of resentment over NATO expansion ever since the Madrid conference took place.³ The following study does not disqualify this interpretation but suggests another one, which better demonstrates the structural complexity of the declaration and the arising methodological implications of analysis. The critical thesis underlying the study is that the primary intention of the statement has not been to oppose the expansion of the Alliance as such, but to use the critique as a facade for an enactment of political control and accomplishment of popular support. Accordingly, the statement of the anti-NATO fraction can be considered a manifestation of multifarious power, exercised within a pragmatic frame constructed to ensure credibility and acceptance of particular messages. The principal elements of this frame include a (quasi)realistic assessment, simplicity of expression, and moderate idealism. All three serve to build up the perception of responsibility on the part of the authors of the declaration. A successful enforcement of the concept of responsibility is thus crucial to the successful enactment of leadership and power.

There are a number of linguistic indicators of power and responsibility in the declaration. Having first quoted its full text, I shall concentrate of those which best illustrate the consistency and congruity of the overall pragmatic frame and the layers that interact therein. Hence, subsections 5.1.2-5.1.4 will be devoted to the analysis of issues that bridge pragmatic, sociolinguistic, and psychological considerations. Among others, addressed will be the questions of the use of assertion and repeated exposure, construction of argument and addressee appeals, organization of text and sentence arrangement, and the role of intended vagueness. The closing subsection 5.1.5. will attempt to position all of the critical findings in the context of exclusively methodological considerations.

5.1.1. Joint statement of Deputy's Group "Anti-NATO" of the Parliaments of Russia, Byelorussia, Latvia, and the Ukraine⁴

³ Cf. *Die Welt* (3/12, 1998), *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (3/6, 1998), *Segodnya* (2/13, 1998), *Slovo* (2/6, 1998), *Rzeczpospolita* (10/11, 1997), *Gazeta Wyborcza* (10/15, 1997), *Magyar Hirlap* (2/19, 1998).

⁴ Original version of the text was published in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 8, 1997. The English language translation is by United States Information Agency (July 9, 1997).

(4) At the NATO Summit in Madrid, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic were officially invited to join NATO. At the same time the participants in the Summit have confirmed that they intend to continue the process of expansion of this military block to other countries of the European continent. This decision indicates that the USA which virtually control NATO as well as their closest allies have adopted a policy of the use of force or the threat thereof as the main factor of the international relations.

NATO is moving towards the change of its mission from ensuring the security of its members to various forms of coercion and armed intervention into the affairs of the states and regions outside of the zone of NATO responsibility, towards the revival of 'Drand nach Osten' policy which provoked wars on many occasions. Under the disguise of collective peace-keeping war is reintroduced as an instrument of policy.

By creating new dividing trenches and barriers in Europe, by setting some European states against the others NATO – whether it will admit it or not – is reviving the policy of division of spheres of interests and of influence, of dictate and expansion which characterized the periods of preparations of WWI and II.

The undeniable fact is and will remain that NATO has neither convincing explanations nor objective reasons for the decisions adopted in Madrid except for one – the intention to divide the world on the basis of the new balance of forces.

The existence of NATO as a defense alliance has lost its meaning with disbandment of the Warsaw Treaty. But NATO is responding to the changes in the world and to the end of the 'cold war' by transformation into an offensive block which clearly reveals NATO founding fathers' original intentions which remain intact.

The expansion of NATO will lead to the dramatic increase in military spending of members of the Alliance and in particular of its new members, to the redirection of tens of billions of dollars from economic to military programs, to militarization of Central and Eastern Europe. It will make far more difficult reaching agreements on nuclear and other weapons reduction. We, members of parliaments of Byelorussia, Latvia, Russia and the Ukraine believe it necessary to warn that that expansion of NATO will jeopardize security and sovereignty of Europe and other regions of the world. Each new step in the Alliance's movement to the East will again and again put to test its relations with other countries, will poison the atmosphere in Europe and the world as a whole.

The signing by the leaders of Russia and the Ukraine of agreements with NATO changed nothing in our principled negative attitude to the plans of NATO expansion. We were and will remain opponents of these plans and will use all resources in our disposal to hinder and to stop the expansion of the Alliance, to make the benefits of pulling in new members incomparable with those political, strategic, material and moral losses which the initiators, organizers and participants of this short-sighted, dangerous adventure alien to the spirit of the times will have to sustain.

The expansion of NATO will be a victory of NATO's bureaucracy, of a small group of hawks in Western political establishment and of the American arms manufacturers over common sense, over objective demands of stability, security, democracy and prosperity in Europe.

We are calling on the parliaments and peoples of NATO member countries not to allow the ratification of NATO expansion and not to allocate money for this purpose. Europe is being dragged to the road leading to a new catastrophe. It is in our common interests to prevent this deadly mistake.

We are calling on those who do not want the return to the confrontational past, who believe in the new Europe of peace, partnership and mutual respect to support our actions.

The struggle against NATO expansion is just starting. The contribution of everybody notwithstanding political, party or religious adhesion will matter. The issue in point is the vital national interests of our countries. We declare the intention to create permanent Co-ordinating Committee to organize joint actions of public forces and state structures.

Members of parliaments of Byelorussia, Russia and the Ukraine are convinced that that main tool of combating NATO expansion will be the unity of our peoples, of other peoples of the CIS. The first step in this direction has been made by the creation of the Union of Byelorussia and Russia. We are calling on presidents and governments of Byelorussia, Russia and the Ukraine to start immediate consultations in order to prepare an effective program of joint actions to combat the new 'Drang nach Osten'. We are declaring our determination to do everything to speed up the integration process, to make it broader and deeper, to break the artificial obstacles and hindrances which are created by the external and internal forces.

We are moved by our unbending will to live in peace with all peoples of Europe, by confidence in correctness of our commitment.

5.1.2. 'Realistic' accounts and 'controllable' events

The statement of the anti-NATO group opens with a sequence of assertions:

(5) At the NATO Summit in Madrid, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic were officially invited to join NATO.

(6) At the same time the participants in the Summit have confirmed that they intend to continue the process of expansion of this military block to other countries of the European continent.

(7) This decision indicates that the USA which virtually control NATO as well as their closest allies have adopted a policy of the use of force or the threat thereof as the main factor of the international relations.

Even though, principally, all of the three sentences carry assertive acts, there are discernible differences between the acts in (5) and (6) on the one hand, and the act(s) in (7) on the other. Namely, examples (5) and (6) carry acts that describe a past state of affairs, while (7) contains an act that describes a future or predicted state of affairs. Yet, all of these acts describe the state of affairs as settled. This is so because the assertions in (5) and (6) are verifiable by facts, and the assertion in (7) is construed relative to these facts, as well as to their description. In other words, the assertion in (7) is validated on the basis of the truthfulness of the former assertions. The interpretation of the claim in (7) in terms of a fact rather than simple prediction is supported by a number of psychological factors which determine the addressee's attitude. The most important factor is the addressee's drive toward consistency in belief. The addressee is likely to accept the message as true if he/she has accepted the earlier messages and thereby instituted perception of credibility toward their author.

Having the addressee accept a prediction as a fact, as is the case with the interplay of assertions in the opening part of the statement, is an instance of discourse power motivated by psychological background behind the speaker-addressee relation. Importantly, once the addressee has been prompted to believe in the truthfulness of an assertion such as in (7), he/she may turn apt to believe, generally, in the predictive, deductive, and explicative capacity of the speaker. This may happen as a result of the addressee uniting with the speaker in an intimate bond of deductive insight, according to which a proposition such as in (7) is construed relative to the former propositions. It is worthwhile to observe at this point that the addressee's inferences from (5), (6) and (7) are made relatively straightforward, unbiased, and uncomplicated since the entire paragraph is built upon an array of cohesion relations. They are produced largely by repetition of elements in the text such as anaphoric reference based on the application of pronouns (e.g. *participants* vis a vis *they* in (6)) and lexical substitution based on synonymy (e.g. *NATO* vis a vis *this military block* in (5) and (6)). Since the use of cohesion forms facilitates the comprehension of the text, cohesion can be applied purposefully in order to ensure that the addressee interprets the message according to the speaker's intention. Such 'correct' interpretation is not always possible if the text is coherent rather than cohesive, because coherence involves connexity of the text based on inferences from the arrangement of propositions in the text and not just formal meanings of words. The use of cohesion, rather than coherence, in building the speaker's argument is thus another manifestation of discourse power in the anti-NATO text (this issue will be addressed more fully in 5.1.3.).

The power characteristic of the implication of ability to approach and assess events realistically is supplemented by the power that resides in implying intellectual capacity for an instant consideration and elimination of antagonistic attitudes and opinions. The ability to predict and disqualify or reject an argument before it is actually made fosters the image of preparedness, political competence and responsibility on the part of the speaker. This kind of power is exercised at several places throughout the text (marked in bold in examples (8) and (9)):

(8) *By creating new dividing trenches and barriers in Europe, by setting some European states against the others NATO – **whether it will admit it or not** – is reviving the policy of division of spheres of interests and of influence, of dictate and expansion which characterized the periods of preparations of WWI and II.*

(9) *The undeniable fact is and will remain that NATO **has neither convincing explanations nor objective reasons** for the decisions adopted in Madrid except for one – the intention to divide the world on the basis of the new balance of forces.*

Finally, there is a type of moral power elucidated through a clash between the enforced perception of the adversary and an implied perception of the self. In the text of the statement, supporters of the NATO expansion are presented as an isolated political group pursuing individual interests (*a small group of hawks*). This implies that the opponents must pursue contrary goals, which in the context come to be understood as global ones. Consequently, the opponents of the NATO expansion (i.e. the politicians signing the declaration) are construed in terms of defenders of a greater political cause, which makes them morally powerful and politically responsible:

(10) *The expansion of NATO will be a victory of NATO's bureaucracy, of a small group of hawks in Western political establishment and of the American arms manufacturers over common sense, over objective demands of stability, security, democracy and prosperity in Europe.*

5.1.3. Argument and organization of discourse

The manifestation of power, responsibility, and realism is fostered by the application of several rhetorical, language-autonomous forms which strengthen the effect of particular messages. Virtually all of these 'packaging' forms aim to instill in the addressee a firm and unequivocal perception of events. Presenting information in black-and-white terms helps the speaker sustain the aura of competence and credibility.

What follows is that, principally, the argument in the text is one-sided, rather than two-sided. This means that there is a lot of support for and discussion of one point of view, and little or no interest in the other. Consecutive messages carry similar information which is reiterated in order to prevent controversy in the addressee (cf. Jowett and O'Donnell 1992):

(11) *It [the expansion of NATO] will make far more difficult reaching agreements on nuclear and other weapons reduction.*

(12) *Expansion of NATO will jeopardize security and sovereignty of Europe and other regions of the world.*

(13) Each new step in the Alliance's movement to the East will again and again put to test its relations with other countries, will poison the atmosphere in Europe and the world as a whole.

The portrayal of the situation in black-and-white terms is also reflected in the frequent application of thesis-antithesis relations. The use of a thesis-antithesis framework involves the speaker's contrastive presentation of two disparate conceptions, one of which is accepted and the other which is rejected. The overall structure aims to provide a simplistic account of a situation or an event, and thereby facilitate the addressee's acceptance of the speaker's attitude. In the text of the statement, the supported opinion has a tendency to follow (rather than precede) the rejected one:

(14) We are calling on those who do not want the return to the confrontational past, who believe in the new Europe of peace, partnership and mutual respect to support our actions.

Characteristically, elucidation of the propagated ideas often involves the use of universally appealing words, such as *peace*, *partnership* or *national interests* whose reference is to conceptions that are rarely elaborated on later in the text. By using them, the speaker is able to synthesize the attitudes of multiple groups of addressees, who in actuality may have widely different opinions and perspectives. In fact, in an elaborated context it could be hardly possible for all addressees to agree on the particular entailments of these "vessel words" (cf. Lutz 1990). However, the imposition of a universally appealing word with no inferential hints attached precludes any such disagreement and increases the chances of positive feedback in a maximum number of addressees.

Furthermore, there is a widespread and powerful application of fear appeals, which are targeted at preventing attitudes alternative to the ones enforced by the text (cf. Bandura 1986). These fear appeals regularly refer the addressee to issues that trigger uncomfortable associations or memories:

(15) NATO is moving towards the change of its mission from ensuring the security of its members to various forms of coercion and armed intervention into the affairs of the states and regions outside of the zone of NATO responsibility, towards the revival of 'Drand nach Osten' policy which provoked wars on many occasions.

(16) Under the disguise of collective peace-keeping war is reintroduced as an instrument of policy.

Finally, it needs to be stressed again (cf. 5.1.2.) that almost the entire text is composed according to cohesion relations. Coherence relations only exist between the parts that announce the speaker's own initiatives (and as such do not include critique) and the parts that deal with their motives or consequences. The use of coherence relations might thus reflect a tendency to minimize precision when talking about issues that can win support due to different interpretations of the same part of text by different individuals. Among cohesion relations applied in the text, the most frequent forms are various kinds of anaphoric reference which possess the power to reduce the interpretative effort of the addressee. By using them, the speaker attempts to make the addressee's inferences from the text unambiguous, so that their function could be construed effectively.

5.1.4. Critical summary of analysis

The analysis of the anti-NATO statement has revealed a potential for identification of the function of the text as enactment of multi-faceted power, performed deftly under the disguise of critique of a certain reality state. Such kind of power seems to involve, as has been proved in the study, more than one aspect of discourse. This can obviously affect both the mode and methods of analysis (cf. the following subsection). First, there is semantic power of lexical items, which consists in the ability to trigger an emotional response in the addressee. Second, there is pragmatic power of messages, which consists in the ability to influence the addressee's mental state. Under this influence, the addressee may either undertake an action or, more frequently, develop a perception of the speaker. Third, there is power coming from discourse organization. This kind of power is exercised in an attempt to reinforce one or both of the former kinds. Some aspects of power, such as those relating to the enactment of leadership, are associated with the concept of responsibility on the part of the speaker. In a political context, one might talk of political power stemming from political responsibility and the performance thereof.

5.1.5. Methodological remarks

The fact that the interpretation of macro function of the anti-NATO statement can be at least diadic (an attempt to reverse the state of affairs or an attempt to enact power under the façade of critique of the settlement) indicates that there are multiple extralinguistic pre-conditions which govern the selection of a given analytic track. The consideration of these pre-conditions and a subsequent expression of them as an auxiliary element of functional hypothesis points to (as well as follows from) the possibility of interpreting the function of the text in a deductive, "top-down" manner. Which of the interpretations is going to be adopted in such a way depends on how close the analyst is to the scene of events underlying the text. For instance, given an exclusively Russian perspective, the hypothesis about the text's function might well be different from what was suggested above. One needs to remember that the moment at which the decision was made in favor of the eastward expansion of NATO not only indicated an end to the exertion of Russia's political control over the countries of Central Europe, but was generally considered the 'day of Russia's shame'⁵. In the media, the feeling of shame was

⁵ Quotation after *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 8, 1997.

expressed along with the aura of political anxiety and uncertainty about the security of the country. Statements by Russian politicians and political experts would only perpetuate these attitudes. Thus, a critique of the Madrid settlement *could* be seen and analyzed in terms of its primary function, i.e. an attempt to defend vital national interests in a time of apparent jeopardy. But on the other hand, given the definitive character of Madrid resolution and little room for any substantial changes to it, the anti-NATO statement signed by the deputies would seem futile in its ‘direct’ function. Hence, the statement has created a potential for its indirect reading, especially by an analyst from outside of the Russian scene. Naturally, the comprehension of background events from a certain distance could not much alter the principal layout of a “top-down” analysis. This can be seen, for instance, from the fact of the introduction of hypothesis in section 5.1., and the gradual unfolding of the data chunks in later subsections.

It has to be added, however, that the analysis of the text has been significantly enriched by considerations involving certain inductive processes. This applies mainly to the findings described in 5.1.3. For instance, the conclusions about the function of fear appeals or the premeditated cohesion of text could not have been reached in its critical entirety but for a continual inquiry into a series of like language forms. In other words, it was only verification of regularity of function salient in a given structure that gave a license to voice a global claim. For that reason, the function of the inductive element in analyses such as the above should not be disregarded or underrated.

5.2. Analysis of the Taliban’s statement

The other text I have selected for analysis is the final decree of Afghan Islamic clerics (Ulema), on US demands for the handover of Osama bin Laden, the world number one terrorism figure, apparently responsible for the attacks on US Pentagon and World Trade Center which took place on September the 11th, 2001. The text was distributed nine days later by the Taliban (a self-appointed ruling group in Afghanistan suspected of harboring bin Laden) in the Pashtu language and was translated by The Associated Press:

(17) Afghanistan’s Ulema is sad over the losses in the United States and hopes that the United States will not launch an attack on Afghanistan. Ulema hopes that the US will show patience and flexibility and will take more time to properly investigate the incident.

The Afghan Ulema demands the United Nations and the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) hold an inquiry into the incident in the United States to know who were behind the incidents and to prevent the killing of innocent people in the future.

The United Nations and the OIC should take note of the American president’s remarks, who said that the war will be a crusade.

In order to prevent such kind of incidents and that there should be no misunderstanding in the future, this Ulema council requests the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to persuade Osama bin Laden to leave Afghanistan and select a new place for himself.

If the United States attacks Afghanistan after these proposals, any US action will be against the sacred Islamic law. It will amount to an act against Islam. We have found it in all Islamic jurisprudence if the non-Muslims attack Muslim land, jihad is obligatory on the Muslims and Quran, Sayings of the Prophet and all the books of jurisprudence urge the Muslims to wage the jihad.

If the non-Muslim invades or attacks the land of Muslims, in this situation Muslims can seek assistance from the Muslims and non-Muslim governments but with the condition that the Islamic orders should remain supreme. This has been proven in the books of Islamic jurisprudence.

Apparently, this text again has a background as well as idiosyncratic properties which encourage an analysis involving both “top-down” and “bottom-up” processes. The prompts for a “top-down” study include primarily a uniform perception of the background, i.e. the terrorist attack which has been denounced worldwide, providing a broad understanding for and expectation of a retaliatory action against a country harboring the perpetrators. In view of a prospective US intervention, the Ulema statement could be seen as a move to avoid war by promising a handover of chief terrorist Osama bin Laden. However, since such move would discredit the Ulema and the ruling Taliban in the eyes of some of the more radical Arab audience, a safer presupposition about the text would be that it stands open to interpretation rather than any direct reading. In other words, the delicacy of the situation in which the text was written could make an analyst postulate its flexibility with the fulfilment of expectations of all addressee groups. This in turn means that the analyst could safely presuppose about the occurrence of specific language forms and logical formulae in the text, such as implicature, impersonalization, or ambiguity of reference of some deictic expressions.

Also, the Ulema statement invites “top-down” approach on account of the text length which makes feasible the hypothesis-data-thesis formula (cf. 3). The length and structure of the text sample prevents an inductive computation of meaning (cf. 2.) since, as we shall see in a moment, the major inferential cues are randomly scattered across the text. Additionally, there are text elements which have no “cue” status whatsoever, and this encourages selectivity in data presentation.

The fact that the status of macropropositional cues in the text calls for a “top-down” analysis follows from little possibility of interpreting them relative to any immediate context. For instance, *should take note of* may be judged (generally) to constitute a directive, but whether its (specific) function is to simply denounce the *remarks* or possibly draw some share of importance by identifying with them cannot be successfully inferred from the text surrounding. From the deductive standpoint, it seems logical to assume the former interpretation and this is what an analyst is prompted to do, given the knowledge of the Taliban attitude to Americans. A similar problem arises with single words such as *were* in the second paragraph or *select* in the fourth paragraph. The use of *were* rather than ‘was’ could follow from an option provided by grammatical rules, yet it could also imply that Osama bin Laden had, according to the Taliban, nothing to do with the terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the use of *select* could suggest that there are multiple places in the world where Osama is welcome, but again, the overall coherence of the passage is such that it cannot be determined which interpretation should be a correct one. The loose connections between major cues for the macroproposition

encourage looking beyond the text to postulate deductive, *a priori* claims about its function.

For all these “top-down” prompts, it would be a mistake to say that the Ulema statement contains no text elements which fit the canons of a “bottom-up” analysis. In fact, albeit the loose connectedness holding **between** the particular sections of the text encourages a “top-down” approach, a corresponding lack of coherence **within** single sentences seems to prompt an inductive computation of meaning, comparable to one we have seen from Wilson’s analysis of the Statue of Liberty metaphor in 2. This can be readily observed from the structure of the first sentence in the Ulema text which, though clearly non-metaphoric, invites speculation almost identical to that generated by Reagan’s words. The reason is the presence of the two apparently disparate thematic segments (*is sad over the losses and hopes that the United States will not launch an attack*) linked together by conjunction *and*. Since this structuring evokes natural bewilderment, there arises a temptation to search for the sentence function via establishing some common ground between the themes. In fact, having recognized little such ground, an analyst may ultimately define the speaker’s intention as one to present the threat of American intervention in terms of an **action** rather than (justified) **reaction**. Yet whatever the specific conclusion, such kind of analysis as a whole should be considered manifestation of “bottom-up” processes, as the latter clearly underlie the analyst’s investigation of analogies and disanalogies holding between the themes.

Also, an analyst investigating the Ulema statement must leave a margin for ‘the unexpected’. In other words, a text motivated by the political situation so complex as in the Taliban case (or the case of the NATO expansion, for that matter) can hardly be judged on the basis of sole anticipation of meaning. For instance, if in actuality Osama bin Laden *is* harbored in Afghanistan, an expectation of the Taliban trying to buy time by their response seems perfectly logical. Consequently, a phrase such as *requests (...) to persuade (...) to leave* can be approached as a manifestation of this strategy, linguistically expressed in infinitive duplication (cf. Halliday 1985). If, however, the above condition does not hold and bin Laden has his shelter elsewhere, the expectation of the time-buying strategy is nothing but wrong and the fact that the infinitive has been duplicated is, for the analyst, quite unlikely to testify to such function. As a result, the phrase is going to be either completely ignored in analysis or, possibly, associated with some other function. But considering that the analyst is unaware of bin Laden’s whereabouts, he or she is likely to approach the cue without a ready-made conclusion at hand and hence devote more attention to its linear investigation. This again entails more time to be spent on the “bottom-up” componential analysis, thoroughly grounded in the study of all the lexical items involved.

This last “bottom-up” prompt might indeed show that the methodological hazards which are consequential for the ultimate meaning interpretation are more likely to occur in studies of inductive orientation (cf. Wilson’s analysis of Reagan’s metaphor) and less likely in deduction-based analyses (cf. Wilson’s analysis of the parliamentary questions in Britain), but a more important conclusion is that in the case of many political texts both these approaches will merely complement each other. It seems that the quoted situations in which an analyst is exposed to either a hundred percent figurative text, being at the same time ignorant of its background (cf. 2.), or to a text which fully

reiterates his or her daily experience (cf. 3.) are non-representative of a vast majority of the standpoints underlying analyses of political discourse. I have, nevertheless, decided to comment on Wilson's considerations in order to pre-establish, in a purposefully extreme and atypical context, what *exactly* are the kinds of conflicting tendencies which are going to pervade analysis of texts such as the Ulema statement or the 'anti-NATO' declaration. These two texts have been discussed in a more detailed manner because of bearing, to my mind, all the many characteristics of what might be called a representative example of political discourse. It appears that the common features, qualities and determinants typifying a political text could be identified as:

- the speaker trying to instil a belief and further mental compliance therewith in at least one of the addressees (cf. *We have found it...* in the Ulema text)
- the speaker using reference to indisputable issues or credibility sources in order to establish this belief (cf. *...Quran, Sayings of the Prophet...* in the Ulema text or, for instance, the first two sentences of the anti-NATO text)
- the speaker attempting to get at least one of the addressees to perform an action as part of the compliance with the belief (cf. *...urge the Muslims to wage...* in the Ulema text)
- the speaker standing in ideological conflict with at least one of the addressees (cf. *...an act against...*)
- the speaker seeking alliance with some of the addressees, against the adversary (cf. *...can seek assistance...*)

6. Conclusion

Even though these observations may seem primarily indicative of the language of military conflict, a closer look at many other contexts (say, rhetoric of a studio debate) does not appear to detract from their general accuracy. The ultimate finding is that, as the Ulema and the 'anti-NATO' examples have proved, an analysis of the above regularities *must* invite *both* the "bottom-up" and the "top-down" approach. For instance, an ability to judge and measure the speaker's reliance on some attitudinal 'anchors' requires awareness of the audience predispositions, which is voiced in the actual argument prior to formulating a thesis. On the other hand, the measurement of the performative value of the text, that is of the speaker's attempts to get the addressee to undertake an action (such as, for example, joining the Muslim alliance in the Ulema case), does not always require looking beyond the actual words as they are used in the analyzed sample. In other words, studying some of the properties of a political text postulated above necessitates a "top-down" perspective, but investigating some others apparently not. And vice versa, there are conclusions which can be reached on the basis of a sole "bottom-up" look, without deduction-based considerations. However, as has been seen from the first of Wilson's accounts (though not really proved in the analysis of the Taliban statement or the anti-NATO declaration), an analyst might probably feel slightly 'safer' in adopting the deductive mind-set, if, naturally, any such 'conscious' decision should ever be made.

Chapter Two

Advertising: Hypothesis and Deduction

1. Introduction

The present chapter aims at outlining ways in which analytic determinism affects another type of persuasion-based discourse, i.e. discourse of (commercial) advertising. We have seen from previous considerations that discourses which rely on high density of macropropositional cues as well as discourses which involve more condensed or consolidated text samples have a tendency to be approached in analysis in an inductive, “bottom-up” manner. Since discourse of advertising is to a large extent a discourse of highly meaningful word-puns, hard-hitting slogans or other textual devices characteristic of a maximum economy of expression, it might seem logical to expect language-of-advertising analysts to follow largely similar tracks, whereby data collection and componential analysis are both necessary and sufficient tools to generate thesis.

While not detracting from partial accuracy of this assumption, the following discussion brings up a prevailing proportion of argument to the contrary. It attempts to show that, although discourse of advertising is not completely devoid of “bottom-up” prompts, a vast majority of analytic activity in the field is affected by “top-down” determinism, which manifests itself in particular texts being approached with a clear-cut hypothesis regarding their function and indicators of this function represented in both form and content of the analyzed text sample.

2. Literature on advertising and idealized models of advertising rhetoric

Post-war discourse analysis and explorations in propaganda and persuasion in particular get a high mileage out of language-of-advertising research, on both sides of the Atlantic. Studies by Ogilvy (1964), Leech (1966), Turner and Pearson (1966), Goffman (1976),

Williamson (1978), Dyer (1982), Schudson (1984), Vestergaard and Schroeder (1985), Chapman (1986), Lutz (1990), Myers (1994), and Goddard (1998) are only among better-known instances of this massive research, but they nonetheless give a fair picture of the analytic attitude to discourse of advertising which has developed over the past fifty years. To put it somewhat simplistically, all these studies demonstrate a tendency to presuppose *a priori* about manipulative character of advertisements, reflected in a clever application of several standard (though definitely heterogeneous) features, such as the use of alliteration/assonance, rhyme, reiteration of weasel words, unfinished comparisons, parity claims, etc. In the quoted literature, practically all research into these features is a research in cue distribution, not interaction. This appears to follow from the relatively uncomplicated character of developing a hypothesis concerning the function of advertising, which is commonly (and by no means truthlessly) seen as a tool to make the addressee pursue an action (i.e. buy a product) or develop some kind of favorable mental state toward an action (i.e. admit possibility of buying a product at a later date). The point is, however, that although this hypothesis is probably true, the readiness of developing it seriously hinders further investigation into the many consistently-structured, homogeneously grammatical elements which underlie such effective advertising.

In fact, little needs to be said about why analysts should be so prone to postulate *a priori* claims concerning language of advertising. Over years, as world markets have come to be dominated by same product brands, so have the marketing and advertising outlets. A Coca-Cola ad is nowadays much more likely to attract (in the same form) worldwide attention than it used to, say, thirty years ago. And since majority of language analysts are exposed to similar advertising experience, with similar products, in similar time, it comes hence as little surprise to see similar analytic layouts pursued worldwide.¹

Post-war analytic attitude to discourse of advertising is still representatively manifested in Lutz (1990), Myers (1994), and Goddard (1998), though these works, being relatively new in the field, do invite certain shift in approach to analysis of advertisements, which, ironically, might well result from the proliferation of similar attitudes demonstrated in earlier studies. For all these reasons, analyses by Lutz, Myers, and Goddard will be quoted and commented on extensively in this chapter.

3. Criteria of manifestation of “top-down” approach to discourse of advertising

In subsections 3.1-3.4 I look at how studies by Lutz, Myers, and Goddard have been affected by “top-down” determinism and which of the tenets and strategies of their analyses have undergone such overdetermination to greatest extent. There are four analytic activity domains postulated, each of which is claimed to have been affected differently in each of the quoted studies. These are:

¹ This observation has much in common with the description of some political language analysts as being ‘part of the scene of events’ and therefore offering studies of highly deductive nature (cf. Chapter One).

- *data vs thesis placement*, involving the placement of definition of (a) given discourse function(s), in relation to the whole of the data examined with a view to formulating this definition;
- *degree and frequency of occurrence and placement of componential data support*, involving absence/presence and status of textual exemplification of thesis definitions, as well as placement of particular samples vis a vis the thesis;
- *ratio of data amount to thesis amount*, involving a statistical look at the analyst's balancing of the data/thesis parts in terms of management of the writing space;
- *radicalism of thesis*, involving investigation of language forms and their illocutionary capacity of scientific persuasion.

3.1. Data vs thesis placement

One of the most striking manifestations of “top-down” determination in studies by Lutz, Myers and Goddard is placement of thesis statement prior to data analysis. The latter is hardly ever (occasionally in Lutz) followed by any reiteration of the thesis, since the thesis is considered too evident to pose a need for reiteration. The assumption of clarity and straightforwardness of the thesis further affects data presentation, in the sense that data components are shown to occur randomly, rather than interact with one another. In other words, the analysis adheres predominantly to the visuality of the text/image sample, at the expense of an autonomous investigation of the lexis/grammar used.

These tendencies are most radically exemplified in Goddard's study, where thesis statements about advertisements are all voiced in the “Introduction” (and never reiterated later), while the question of the definition of advertisement is first tackled (in, arguably, somewhat trivialized manner) in “Chapter 1”, with a sample analysis (or rather simple description of an ad) following yet later in Chapter 2:

Make no mistake: advertising works [...]. It is not difficult to see that and why advertisers should want to make their texts capture our attention. The whole aim of the copywriters is to get us to register their communication either for purposes of immediate action or to make us more favourably disposed in general terms to the advertised product or service. (1998:2, “Introduction”)

Advertising is so familiar to modern readers that it may seem odd to ask what an advertisement is [...]. At the root of the word ‘advertisement’ is the Latin verb ‘advertere’, meaning ‘to turn towards’ [...]. Often, though, classifications [of advertisements] are more a question of degree rather than of absolutes. For example, clothing in its broadest sense can be seen as advertising ideas about the wearer, but manufacturer's labels on clothing are a direct strategy of getting free

publicity. Therefore, central to the idea of an advert appears to be the factor of conscious intention behind the text, with the aim of benefiting the originator... . (:7, “Chapter 1”)

[...] One attention-seeking strategy [...] is the startling image, combined with emotionally stirring text. The Benetton clothing company, for example, showed a series of large-scale hoardings which featured real scenes of life and death - a baby being born, covered in blood from the mother’s womb, a man on his deathbed, some of them shockingly coupled with a sequence of universally-appealing, emotion words... . (:13, “Chapter 2”)

It seems from Goddard’s study that an approach so radical, in terms of the formulation of hypothesis about function of the text, might strongly affect what I shall henceforth call ‘management of the writing space’, that is, the whole complexity of the build-up of analysis, or, in yet other words, any analytic activity involving the quantity and sequencing of data and theory. Before commenting further on Goddard, however, it is worthwhile to point to a couple of issues underlying the study by Lutz (1990), an analysis being eight years older than Goddard’s, and apparently indicative of methodological tendencies which have subsequently grown into a problem for analysts of advertising in late 1990s.

Lutz’s study offers what might be called a ‘deductive catharsis’ in advertising analysis. He is in fact the first analyst to have posed an ultra-clear set of hypothesis concerning the language of advertising (“advertisers try to wrap their claims in language that sounds specific and objective, when in fact the language of advertising is anything but”, “Unfinished comparisons abound in advertising since they create a possibility of filling the claims differently by different addressees”, “The biggest weasel word used in advertising is ‘help’; once the advertisement starts with ‘help’, it can develop to make whatever (insincere) promise or claim, because ‘help’ qualifies all the follow-up of the sentence” (:85-9), and many more), to have limited data’s function to *a posteriori* presentation, and to have gone to the final extreme of almost ignoring data analysis after its presentation. As a result, Lutz’s analysis would turn into a series of exemplification chunks, each looking more or less in the following way:

HYPOTHESIS

(e.g.)

One of the most powerful weasel words is “virtually” [...]. “Virtually” is used in advertising claims that appear to make specific, definite promises when there is no promise. (:88)

DATA

(ctd. from the same example)

In 1971 a federal court rendered its decision on a case brought by a woman who became pregnant while taking birth control pills. She sued the manufacturer for breach of warranty. The woman lost her case. Basing its ruling on a statement in the pamphlet accompanying the pills, which stated that, “When taken as directed, the tablets offer virtually 100% protection,” the court ruled that there was no warranty, expressed or implied, that the pills were absolutely effective. In its ruling, the court pointed out that, according to *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary*, “virtually” means “almost entirely” and clearly does not mean “absolute” (*Whittington versus Eli Lilly and Company*, 333 F. Supp. 98). (:88)

THESIS

(ctd. from the same example)

[...] So whenever one encounters an ad claim that uses the word “virtually”, one should translate that claim into its real meaning, which is “in essence or effect, although not in fact.” (:88)

However, in an attempt to keep the addressee constantly preoccupied with his (hypo)thesis claims, Lutz would use a massive number of examples, each needing or in fact just naturally entailing a hypothesis-thesis wrap-up of the kind quoted above. Goddard, in turn, is quite reluctant to use multiple examples, especially if they should concern everyday commercial advertising. Whatever the reason (reluctance of mental plagiarism?; fear of triviality?), this seems to prove that with the ‘hypothesis space’ almost filled up (here: by authors such as Lutz), the analyst is tempted to take all the established pre-conceptions about the function of the analyzed discourse ‘for granted’, voice them out concisely, and possibly look for some atypical instances of this discourse, which have not yet been accounted for. And this is what is clearly manifested in Goddard’s writing, as she makes up for the limited hypothesis space with an inflated data-analysis space - yet never concerning the principal issue of commercial advertising, but an apparently marginal subject of non-profit advertising (this tendency is especially provoking in the light of Goddard’s “Introduction”, in which there is no hint whatsoever as to her being interested in this subtype of ad discourse).

3.2. Degree and frequency of occurrence and placement of componential data support

This last observation on Goddard’s writing leads us to consideration of language of advertising via the prism of its increasing and ever-changing (also diachronically) determination of data support. A diachronic look at works by Lutz, Myers, and Goddard reveals an increasingly greater role of the status of function-defining hypothesis in data presentation and/or analysis. Seemingly, the bigger the perception of hypothesis as objective (this awareness will naturally grow in the analyst over time, as homogeneity of the discourse and its source in real-world context increases), the smaller

the amount of data related to the principal discourse under investigation. And consequently, the bigger the perception of hypothesis as objective, the bigger the amount of data related to atypical manifestations of the same discourse. These observations are reflected in Goddard's (1998:9-13) analysis of an anti-tobacco ad, which takes the space of four pages to develop (contrary to mini-analyses of commercial advertising), offers linear approach to the study of wording (a substantial degree of pragmatics-based metalanguage is used - "pragmatically presupposes...", "illocutionary point", etc. - unlike in analyses of commercial ads), and although does not reiterate the hypothesis of the effectiveness of advertising (:9), still goes a long way in data presentation to have the addressee develop such reiteration for him/herself.

In her analysis Goddard is unable, however, to restructure her hypothesis in such a way as to make it stem from anything but 'visuality' of the discourse context. Hence, her study is overdetermined by the perception of the effectiveness of commercial advertising, quite fallaciously applied in her approach to non-profit advertising, a subtype which must be, logically, quite different from the main type.

Myers (1994) encounters the same problem of visual determination, by real-world factors. His study is also somewhat more clearly indicative of the determination of (specifically) the frequency and placement of data. Therefore, in the rest of the present subsection I shall first quote (with minor cuts) a sample analysis by Myers, then point to data determination manifested in it, and finally offer an enriched analytic approach to the quoted case, applying some of the "bottom-up" orientation which has been missing from the original analysis.

(quoted after Myers 1994:2-4, paragraph structure retained, numbering mine)

(1)

Here is a description of an exciting advertisement for a chocolate bar that appeared in the middle of a broadcast of Disney's *The Reluctant Dragon*. [...] The ad begins with the pop song 'Oh oh oh it's magic', and the O on the screen becomes lips. Then it runs through a series of snatches of songs and phrases, each with an 'Oh' in it, each for just a few seconds (a doctor saying 'Say oh,' a reggae song, Mendelsohn's 'Oh for the wings of a dove', Al Jolson, from *The Jazz Singer*) and for each the cartoon O is transformed to illustrate the soundtrack. The slogan 'It's the air in your Aero that makes you go O' comes with a picture of the chocolate bar at the end [...].

(2)

Now you could argue that with so much exciting going on, language was not very important to this ad. It would certainly fall flat if you just read the script for it, or just had the slogan. But it makes extraordinarily deft play with language at a number of levels [...].

(3)

We could start with the slogan *It's the air in your Aero that makes you go O*. This plays on the relationship between *Oh*, the exclamation, the shape of the letter *O*, and the sound /o/ as part of the product name. The pattern of these *Oh*-

O-/o/s relies on linked choices. The sounds that go with the letters *air* and the *o* are both repeated. [...] Not only that, the pattern of stresses makes a regular metre - two unstressed syllables followed by a stressed syllable (*It's the AIR in your AERo that MAKES you go O*). You can test the effect by trying to rephrase the ad without the poetic effects - *An Aero is full of holes that make you say Ah* - the point is the same but it's not very catchy or memorable [...].

(4)

The rest of the ad is an elaborate series of plays on the slogan. It starts with a metaphorical relation between the *O* at the end of the product name and the mouth that eats the product. This provides the basis for a series of phrases, all linked by an *Oh* [...].

(5)

The structure of this slogan is also crucial to its effect. It is constructed to put the product name near the end, where it will have maximum weight. But the Aero slogan is a statement. It doesn't tell us or ask us to eat Aero chocolate but states something about the Aero bars we already eat - one important result of stepping back from the ad this way and analysing the language is that we learn to see choices; we realize even with a slogan that has been thoroughly drummed into us, it could have been otherwise [...].

(6)

We can get that far just looking at the linguistic features of the ads in isolation - in some ads there will be very complex formal play with these patterns, and in others not much. but of course the effect does not just arise from a repeated *O*, from the regularity in the occurrence of a letter. Each variation of the *O* has different associations - medical language, a concert recital, rock and roll, reggae, soul. They are not only different kinds of music, they are done with identifiably different social varieties of English. It's an effect like flipping the channels on a TV, or like the snatches juxtaposed in house music, or like leafing through some pop music magazines. And the different voices alternate male and female, high and low, ending with a very deep voice with exaggerated intonation, and a very feminine voice, also with exaggerated intonation [...].

(7)

These associations and meaning are confirmed by the little sketches that flash around the *O* - palm trees or hands or a mirror or wings [...]. The associations are crucial to the effect of the ad - for instance the suggestive mock sexiness of the last two voices. It's not sex it promises; it's a kind of excitement - as if adding holes was adding something. There are also double meanings, so that the *Os* are at the same time holes, letters, and exclamations. Puns like this are particularly common in contemporary British advertising [...]. Part of the effect of these ads is their relation to other cultural artefacts - what is called *intertextuality*. One may not be able to trace all the linguistic and musical allusions in the Aero ad, but one does recognize them as allusions to different periods and subcultures. All ads, even those making no explicit allusions, carry

associations from other texts: ads, movies, novels, everyday talk. Language in ads comes to us used.

As can be seen from this study, almost each time a linguistic point is made, it is offset by an extralinguistic observation. It is somewhat as if Myers couldn't stop being monitored by what he (in some probability, subconsciously) perceives to be the genuine reason for the effectiveness of advertising, that is, a well-worked out and consistent build-up of image. In his analysis, Myers typifies an analyst of a homogeneous discourse genre whose function is pre-defined and therefore calls for little data support. There are language data points raised throughout the argument (cf. para. 2, 3, 5, 6), but these are invariably interspersed with real-world-context based clarifications (esp. para. 1, 2, 4, 7). Occasionally, a language data point is made implicitly; for instance, the closing part of para. 3 invites discussion of theme and rheme, or topic/comment, but a further interrelated observation is withheld until para. 5 (“...to put the product name till the end...”), and even as such gets downplayed by the general comment that follows (“...one important result of...”). It is also interesting to look at the placement of the word “exciting” in the analysis. As this word, in Myers's (subconscious?) understanding, provides a bridge with the effect of advertising that can be observed in real-world context (and it is probably a well-entrenched image of consumer behaviour that serves as a basis here), the distribution of “exciting” or “excitement” is always among visual data, not language data (cf. para. 1, 2, 7). In paragraph 1 it occurs with localization of the advertisement, in paragraph 2 it precedes a strong assertion of the action movement underlying the ad (“going on”), and in paragraph 7 it occurs with an image description. Finally, it has to be noted that the bulk of the ‘linguistic’ commentary on the ad relies on phonetic and phonological accounts, that is, the accounts of sounds and sound patterns which can again be “seen” (or rather sensed in an act of hearing) in real-world context.

As a result of being monitored by extralinguistic considerations, the structure of the argument gives the analyst little space to “pick up speed” to develop the otherwise interesting points which could explain the effectiveness of the advertisement in linguistic terms, by adhering to such concepts as pragmatic presupposition (para. 5: “...but states something about the Aero bars we already eat...”) or cleft sentence structuring (cf. later analysis in the present subsection). The use of these concepts should not entail any unnecessary and abundant formalization; it should be approached as a tool for generalization of the analytic findings characteristic of the given sample, but at the same time clearly representative of the whole of the source discourse. Thus Myers's analysis turns out not so much faulty as simply incomplete, both critically at the sample level and methodologically at the genre level. And it should be stressed again at this point that the incompleteness of Myers's study results from the fragmented occurrence of language data support within an analytic space which is dominated by all kinds of extralinguistic accounts. Ironically, it is a linguist here that tends to admit the inferiority (!) of language description (cf. para. 6: “We can get that far just looking at the linguistic features of the ads in isolation...”) or dares to make a strong claim in favor of componential research (cf. para. 2: “But it makes extraordinarily deft play with language at a number of levels...”), with little or no follow-up to come. But this tendency only goes to show the degree of determination in analysis of a discourse which an analyst is part of and thus holds a well-defined, homogeneous attitude to its function. The following discussion

attempts to show how the quoted analysis could possibly profit from the shake-off of such attitudes which, as has been claimed, appear to stem largely from over-attachment to cognitive factors.

Predominantly, it is the status and function of the presupposition made in the ad (“your Aero”) that needs to be accounted for. It is an existential presupposition (cf. Karttunen 1973; Kempson 1975; Cole 1981; Levinson 1983 and later works), under which it is taken for granted that the addressee is familiar with the object being referred to, which in this case is the advertised chocolate bar. Assuming that the addressee, under normal circumstances, has a variety of chocolate bars to choose from and therefore cannot be reasonably expected to show any particular familiarity with (or priority for) a specific brand, the use of presupposition in the advertisement goes a long way toward establishing addressee’s favorable attitude to the very product which is advertised. It is namely quite clear (cf. Festinger 1957; Fishbein and Ajzen 1980; Bandura 1986; Noelle-Neumann 1991; Jowett and O’Donnell 1992, and others²) that an addressee will better accept a novel idea or develop a novel behavior which is in line with his/her predispositions. The presupposition made in the ad defines these predispositions. Furthermore, by imposing relationship between the brand name and the consumer, it paves the way for perception of familiarity with the product and makes it possible for the product to fall within the addressee’s latitude of acceptance, rather than rejection. Far from ruining the addressee’s psychological need for *homeostasis*, it actually fosters his/her consistency in belief. In short, the use of the existential presupposition in the Aero ad seems to be a conscious strategy on the part of the slogan’s author, a strategy of constructing a linguistic facilitator of acceptance and internalization of a novel behavior desired from the addressee.

As it seems, this last observation could apply to the whole category of advertisements carrying existential (as well as non-existential) presuppositions. Even though neither Lutz, Myers, nor Goddard approach presuppositions analytically (or, in fact, hardly ever use the very term “presupposition” in the first place), the examples used in particular analyses abound with them:

(1) *The wonder drug that works wonders* (Lutz 1990: 101)

(Bayer aspirine ad, presupposing familiarity with Bayer aspirine tablets)

(2) *Your oil for life* (Lutz 1990: 101)

(Puritan cooking oil ad, presupposing previous use of the oil)

(3) *A cocoa you can enjoy* (Myers 1994: 30)

² The quoted works give a fair diachronic outline of one of the most influential theories in post-war studies in social psychology, usually referred to as “consistency theory”. This theory provides a methodological basis for all psychologically-oriented claims made in the analysis of the presupposition in the Aero advertisement.

(Van Houten's cocoa ad, presupposing previous negative experience with other cocoa brands)

(4) *Amazingly pays in your glazing* (Myers 1994: 35)

(Pilkington glass ad, presupposing existence of context for use of the product)

(5) *It can stop the pain* (Goddard 1998: 33)

(Sinutab painkiller ad, presupposing addressee's condition)

The parenthesis explanations of particular presuppositions are missing from the studies by Lutz, Myers, and Goddard, while each of these explanations could signpost a larger functional domain in advertising in general. It is beyond the scope of the present work to develop these considerations further. The point has to be made, however, that it is the absence of metalanguage that hinders the analytic generalizations. And in turn, the use of metalanguage - as has been argued before - is seriously constrained in a deductive, "top-down" approach to the analysis of advertising.

3.3. Ratio of data amount to thesis amount

Although previous subsections have offered several observations on how Lutz, Myers, and Goddard manage exemplifications of claims on the function(s) of advertising, some further comments need to be made on representation of thesis and data in statistical terms. Simultaneously, there are certain diachronically-oriented implications of this representation that deserve a separate comment. Assuming that thesis parts are those in which the analyst makes a point on the function and effectiveness of advertising, either in the case of an individual sample or in general (including hypothetically-put claims), and the data parts are those where particular text samples are presented and analyzed, a breakdown look at studies by Lutz, Myers, and Goddard reveals the following figures and regularities. Within the domain of commercial advertising, there are 35 thesis paragraphs vis a vis 105 data paragraphs in Lutz, 25 thesis paragraphs versus 40 data paragraphs in Myers, and, astonishingly, 5 (!) thesis paragraphs vis a vis 5 data paragraphs in Goddard. This doesn't, however, mean that Myers and Goddard offer pamphlet-like discussions. Quite to the contrary, there are as many as 30 data paragraphs which deal with *non-commercial* (e.g. by non-profit institutions) advertising in Myers (accompanied by no respective thesis paragraphs), and further 50 (!) non-commercial data paragraphs in Goddard (again, with no extra thesis parts) - cf. fig. 1 for graphic breakdown of all these statistics. In the light of Lutz, Myers, and Goddard starting out their arguments with introductory claims adhering solely to *commercial* advertising, it seems logical to postulate the following hypothesis: analysis of advertising suffers from increasing overdetermination by 'self-monitor of descriptive triviality'. Over time, analysts of advertising keep cutting down on self-evident claims and examples, but at the same time, finding themselves with less and less principal data remaining to support introductory thesis parts, they back up the latter with atypical data.

In so doing, they invariably pursue analytic manipulation, stemming from proliferation of like studies of the analyzed genre and like attitudes to it.




Fig. 1

3.4. Radicalism of thesis

This parameter of “top-down” determination has been remaining relatively stable over the past decade of advertising studies (at least in terms of its presence), though, as has been mentioned before, there is a tendency among analysts to postulate increasingly radical claims regarding nature, function, or effectiveness of advertising. The radicalism of these claims is manifested in the way particular points are made, how categorical they are (for instance, in terms of the economy of argument layout), how global or far-reaching they are, and what degree of illocutionary force they possess. First of all, (hypo)thesis claims are radicalized by virtue of being packaged as directives or strong, occasionally metaphorized, assertions, imposing ‘undeniable’ truths in limited language context within single-sentence space. This is readily seen from Goddard and Lutz:

(6) *Make no mistake: advertising works* (Goddard 1998: 2)

(7) *Children eat, drink, and breathe commercials* (Lutz 1990: 74)

(8) *Now comes the interesting part. Follow this closely [...]* (Lutz 1990: 74)
(description of the mechanism of advertising industry follows)

Secondly, thesis claims are made radical by being presented as containing elements of threat to the addressee of advertising. Since there are also the ‘advice’ parts, attempting to help the addressee neutralize the threat, such structuring of thesis claims tends to produce slightly longer sentences:

(9) *The next time you see an advertisement for... [...], don't rush out to buy it* (Lutz 1990: 86)

(10) *Helpless audiences reconstruct advertisements in diverse ways, filling them in with their own meanings* (Myers 1994: 7)

Coupled with the threat elements are, finally, lexical structures which radicalize thesis claims by pointing to the globality or macro-range of advertising industry. These are responsible for constructing the aura of overall advertising experience whereby not a single addressee remains beyond the effect of advertising. Again, the presence of such structures may affect length or complexity of argument undertaken within single-sentence space (cf. forthcoming examples from Myers and Lutz):

(11) *Advertisements offer a world-extensive relationship between the advertiser and all possible audience members, based on the associations of all possible meanings with all possible commodities* (Myers 1994: 8)

(12) *Advertising is so familiar to modern readers that it may seem odd to inquire what an advertisement is* (Goddard 1998: 5)

(13) *Studies such as... [...] offer a lot of information about the sheer size and influence of advertising, but a person usually maintains that, while others may be and probably are affected by advertising, he/she knows that he/she is not, and this is exactly what advertisers attempt to accomplish* (Lutz 1990: 77)

On a somewhat digressive note, it has to be pointed that example (12) from Goddard is also quite indicative of what was called ‘self-monitor of descriptive triviality’ (cf. subsection 3.3).

However, the most important observation is that the overwhelming majority of suchlike claims will be inalienable property of introductory parts of the particular studies. Highly

radical (hypo)thesis claims are made prior to actual data presentation and analysis. And the reason why these claims can hardly be called either ‘hypotheses’ or ‘theses’ is that the analysis itself is hardly ever profound enough to allow such distinction.

4. A “bottom-up” element in the analysis of advertising

Under specific circumstances, language of advertising may invite a minor dose of inductivist analysis. It can be seen from Goddard’s case that if hypothesis space is limited and/or if (hypo)thesis claims are, in analyst’s eyes, too evident to be reiterated after presentation of data, the analyst may choose to investigate data in a componential, linear manner, as well as treat the parameters of such investigation as mutually interactive rather than mutually exclusive. Though in Goddard this has meant merely illustrating conventionalized claims with atypical data samples, it seems possible to imagine a different analytic track, where the hypothesis is still clearly definable, but where the data gets to be thoroughly examined for derivation of a subsequent thesis claim. Consider the following slogan.

(14) *Up to 50% off!*

There is little that can be postulated prior to the analysis of this ad other than that the author attempts to persuade the addressee into buying the product by making the addressee pick out a single, non-representative meaning of (exactly) *50% off*, out of the whole range of meanings which are less ‘acceptable’. This hypothesis naturally stays in line with the general hypothesis of the effectiveness of advertising as based on manipulative enactment of various linguistic and non-linguistic ploys. But at the same time the analyst might ask him/herself the following question: how come that with the initial conclusion being so readily available to *both* analysts *and* consumers (though a layman-consumer will probably ‘skip’ the latter part of it), the slogan still seems to work? And the result of posing such question might well be an analysis whereby the apparently clear and evident hypothesis gets to some degree modified before it is reiterated in a thesis format.

The considerations that the analyst might want to undertake involve, namely, an essentially paradigmatic look at the occurrence and status of other *up to* advertisements. There are ads for medicines that work ‘up to ten times faster’, batteries that last ‘up to twice as long’, and soaps that get the skin ‘up to twice as clean’. They are all based on ideal situations for using those products, which the addressee is hardly likely to experience him/herself. But still, the addressee may and usually will aspire to find him/herself in such privileged position and it is the advertisement as a whole that fosters this aspiration. The point is that the effectiveness of *up to* slogans lies not so much in what the target of addressee’s aspirations (exactly) is, as in the very existence of a certain range of lucky options available to the addressee to make his/her aspirations fulfilled. It is at least doubtful the addressee should develop the same perception of quality of the sale products from a shorter, standardized *50% off!* slogan. Rather, he/she would question their quality on the very basis of this standardness. In that sense,

the *up to* part is just as crucial to the effectiveness of the advertisement as is the *50% off!* part, or rather, what is really crucial is the swift interaction of both. To recognize this, however, one needs a paradigmatic look which takes into account the maximum manifestation of consumer behavior in a maximum number of situations, a look which builds up a social rule out of a range of individual cases.

5. Conclusion

In comparison with discourse of politics and the media, the discourse of advertising invites a substantial degree of “top-down”, deductive determination. Simultaneously, it offers relatively limited scope for “bottom-up”, inductive research. There is a vast number of analytic activities which are affected. The major and most typical manifestations of “top-down” determinism are the following:

- redefinition of the status and the role of hypothesis and thesis in construction of analytic argument; treatment of hypothesis and thesis in like terms and the resulting placement of most or even all hypo(thesis) claims prior to data presentation/analysis;
- selection of data adhering mostly to visual/sensory experience; underassessment of intralinguistic, autonomous data chunks;
- little or no concern for data interaction, i.e. derivation of larger functional units (of, for example, speech event format) out of individual data samples;
- occasional reliance on data atypical of the principal manifestations of the analyzed discourse genre, following from perception of the general hypothesis as ‘too’ objective or evident to yield interesting discussion throughout the development of the argument;
- ever-increasing radicalism of (hypo)thesis claims, manifested in sentence structuring, length, as well as their illocutionary load.

Chapter Three

Discourse of Science: Induction from Data Amassment

1. Introduction¹

In this chapter I deal with discourse of ‘scientific argument’, concentrating on the language of medicine and medical inquiry. In so doing, I remain fully aware of the limitations of such literal approach; it is neither the case that language of medicine represents ‘all’ of ‘scientific discourse’ (actually, both definition and boundaries of the latter seem at least arbitrary and certainly worth a separate dispute), nor is it the case that all findings stemming from analysis of medical discourse can feasibly apply to other discourses behind the traditional Humanities/Sciences dichotomy (but it will be shown that some of them may). However, it is discourse of medicine that offers one irresistible temptation for an analyst of scientific persuasion patterns, as well as determination of the analysis of these patterns: there is hardly another scientific discourse in which persuasive claims, if effective, have a comparably profound and long-lasting effect on the addressee’s follow-up practice in his/her professional field and, subsequently, on the ultimate humanly implications of this practice. This goes a long way toward an importance of analysis of medical persuasion.

Analysis of medical persuasion is, modestly speaking, underrepresented in discourse analysis literature (with the exception of fragmentary studies in Johnson 1998, Mayer 2001, Sager 1987, and Wagner 1998) and this has affected the structuring of the present chapter, esp. in comparison to what has been demonstrated in chapters 1 and 2. In the first part of the chapter, I start out with a necessarily long quotation of an original text sample, an argument which has been considered (almost unanimously; cf. footnote 1) as highly representative of a majority of persuasive texts within the field. In the second part, I analyze the text sample, testing it for particular persuasion patterns, as well as their distribution and interaction with the remaining lexical data. Finally, on a strictly methodological note, I postulate a number of claims regarding a list of possible alterations to the analysis which might have occurred had my competence in the field been different (which would in fact mean being unsupported by the in-field consultations) at the consecutive stages of the undertaken research. In this last part, I propose that studies in medical discourse should be seen as principally determined by the “bottom-up” analytic procedures, though certainly not devoid of a number of “top-down” prompts. The “bottom-up” determination of medical studies is shown as resulting mainly from the majority of thesis-oriented claims being the necessary property

¹ Innumerable thanks go to members of the Department of Oncology, Lodz Medical Academy, for extensive, in-depth consultations which enabled me to write this chapter.

of highly condensed, cue-bound textual chunks which tend to occur toward the closing stages of the overall argument under analysis.

2. Text of an article *Tumor marker terrorism* by Dieter K. Hossfeld (1996)²

(1)

In this contribution, only serological tumor markers will be addressed. Serological tumor markers are substances of protein, lipid or carbohydrate character which occur in or on tumor cells and which are associated with origin, growth, progression, and therapy-related changes of tumors.

(2)

The ideal tumor marker should be specific, sensitive, and should have an absolute correlation with the extent (stage) of the disease. Such a tumor marker would be instrumental in the detection of cancer in an asymptomatic, seemingly healthy population (screening), in diagnosis and staging, in the evaluation of therapeutic measures, and in the documentation of relapse.

(3)

To date, no such tumor marker exists. The main reason for this is that all serological tumor markers are also produced by normal cells; thus, interpretation of assay results depends on the quantitative value reported and not merely on the presence or absence of the substance. Another reason why tumor markers so far failed in *screening* is the low prevalence of any cancer at a given point in time.

(4)

The low impact of serological tumor markers on screening has been demonstrated, for instance, in ovarian cancer. Even for prostate cancer, a widespread population screening could not be recommended, although prostate-specific antigen (PSA) is nearly an ideal tumor marker due to its organ specificity. Yet, PSA is not cancer-specific; it is expressed equally by normal, benign, hyperplastic prostate glands. The mean PSA value in patients with benign prostatic hyperplasia is 3.4 mg/ml, not significantly different from mean values found in patients with stage A prostatic cancer. With regard to ovarian cancer, screening of 1082 women revealed elevated CA 125 levels in 36, one of whom had ovarian cancer. The situation is similar for other tumor markers (CEA, CA 15-3, CA 19-9, AFP, beta-HCG), so that their low specificity and sensitivity in addition to a low prevalence of cancers should prevent clinicians considering them useful tools to detect a malignancy in an asymptomatic population.

(5)

² The present quotation bears two modifications to the original. First, consecutive paragraphs have been numbered for the sake of forthcoming analysis. Second, parenthetical references to other medical works have been removed; a full list of those is included in "Appendix to Chapter Three", as well as re-quoted among References at the end of the book.

With the exception of PSA, the usefulness of serum tumor markers in the *diagnosis* of a malignant disease is also limited. Apart from low tumor sensitivity and specificity this is related to a low organ specificity. The list of malignancies in which CEA, CA 125, CA 15-3, etc. can be elevated, is rather long. There is also a long list of benign diseases in which increased amounts of these substances can be measured in the serum. It is realized that benign conditions are rarely a cause of extreme marker elevation. Yet, for most tumor markers, a positive correlation exists between tumor mass and marker level; in early stage colon cancer (Dukes A), just 28% of the patients exhibit a slightly elevated CEA value. In patients with stage I breast cancer, CA 15-3 is increased in less than 5% of the patients.

(6)

Thus, serum tumor markers did not live up to the initially high expectations that they would enable diagnosis of early stage cancer and thereby would result in improved prognosis. In symptomatic patients, tumor markers are rarely needed to make the diagnosis. Only in prostatic cancer and in extragonadal germ cell tumors the diagnostic value of serum tumor markers cannot be questioned.

(7)

Monitoring the course of the disease following tumor resection or radiochemotherapy has been considered the main indication for the use of serum tumor markers. Tumor markers which do not normalize following an operation point to persistent disease. A postoperative rise of markers indicated a recurrence or metastatic spread. A persisting or increasing marker in a patient under chemotherapy suggests resistant disease.

(8)

Ample evidence exists that the measurements of serum tumor markers in the follow-up of patients with breast and colon cancer, but also other cancers, lead to earlier diagnosis of relapse. The lead time between detection of relapse by tumor marker assay and discovery by clinical means is commonly 3-8 months. However, there is no proof that the earlier diagnosis of relapse results in a generally improved prognosis. The lack of curative therapy, particularly for metastatic disease, accounts for this situation. The few patients with an operable local recurrence or an isolated liver or lung metastasis do not contribute to recommend serial tumor marker determinations in the follow-up of patients with a large variety of epithelial tumors.

(9)

There are only two malignancies where the value of tumor markers in the follow-up is unquestioned, and these are gonadal and extragonadal germ cell tumors in males and trophoblastic tumors in females.

(10)

Considering what has been known for years now about the role of serum tumor markers in screening, diagnosis and follow-up, the question arises why

physicians continue to ask for them and why there is an ever-increasing number of new marker tests offered by the industry. Besides the enormous economic burden - in some hospitals the money spent on tumor marker assays amounts to US\$ 500 000 annually - our main concern should be directed to our patients. With regard to screening, it is not acceptable for a woman or man who feels healthy to be suspected of having a cancer, to be investigated extensively and then to be told that nothing has been found. Even worse, it is almost cynical to perform serial tumor marker measurements during follow-up and, once 'early' recurrence or metastatic disease has been discovered, only to inform the patient that a curative approach is no longer available.

(11)

To measure tumor markers without asking whether it is good for the patient resembles terrorism. It is realized that not rarely patients insist on tumor marker determinations and some of them even ask for a whole battery of markers not knowing that a healthy person who undergoes 13 tumor marker tests has, by chance alone, a probability of only 51% of being classified as 'normal'. It is also acknowledged that it may have medicolegal consequences to withhold tumor marker tests if the outcome of the disease is fatal. This is so because it is widely believed that the more diagnostics are done the, better the patient is taken care of, and if, under these conditions, the disease ends fatally, then nobody can be blamed. This situation reflects the other side of tumor marker terrorism.

3. Analysis of persuasion strategies

In subsections 3.1-3.4. I single out only the most striking observations on the persuasive load of the text. The description is also determined by an element of critical consistency; I concentrate on those strategies which complement each other, i.e. refer to manifestations of different types of interface between the same data- and thesis-oriented text chunks.

3.1. Amassment of data

In comparison with text types studied in chapters 1 and 2, Hossfeld's text brings in an exceptionally high (though not for its genre) number of data claims. These claims, mostly statistical in nature, occur continually prior to enactments of the main thesis. If we accept that the main thesis of Hossfeld's argument is that measurement of tumor markers is ineffective from a curative standpoint and that it should be abandoned for both moral and economic reasons, and furthermore that the situation as of today is morally abhorrent, then the elements of the thesis are to be found in para. 4 (end), 6, 10, and the full thesis segment is available from para. 11. In all these places the text that precedes an element of thesis is dense in empirical data which is inherently indisputable. With an element of thesis to be suggested for the first time (cf. end of para. 4), the density of factual data is the greatest. This follows from the need for a strong enactment of credibility at a place where the addressee's perception of the speaker has not yet been (favorably) established. The placement of indisputable data prior to a (controversial)

thesis claim also applies to those chunks of text where the thesis is implied by means of randomization of an apparently anti-thesis observation. This can be seen from para. 8 and 9, where para. 9 contains (conventional) implicature to the effect that tumor marker measurement is ineffective (*There are only...*) and the bulk of statements in para. 8 give factual data which is, in a sense, anticipatory of this implicature. The same correlation holds between the data-(implied)thesis chunks in para. 5 (whole) and para. 6 (last sentence) respectively. Altogether, there are over 30 simple sentences and subordinate clauses carrying empirical data, a number quite remarkable considering the overall length of the text sample.

It is not only, however, the mere amassment of indisputable data occurring prior to thesis that lies at the root of Hossfeld's 'persuasion through credibility' or, in other words, of *ethos* of the text³. It is also, if not mainly, a diligent arrangement of data within itself that makes such amassment effective. It can be readily observed from the text that figure-based factual data nearly always precedes data which is given in a simple assertion form, with no statistics attached. A classic example of that is the interplay of paragraphs 4 and 5, in which former there is much more statistical data than in the latter. Such structuring reflects a set-up of credibility which normally takes place once thesis is interpreted relative to data; in Hossfeld it is also a chunk of data as such that derives credibility from another, earlier provided one. Altogether, Hossfeld's persuasion demonstrates a rhetorical continuum, whereby more controversial points undergo constant neutralization by the precedent, unequivocal claims.

This last observation holds true (partly, at least) for the *internal* structure of the last paragraph, which, in addition to synthesizing all thesis points in first two sentences, reveals a mechanism that is just as much analytically baffling as representative of a majority of medical persuasion texts. Namely, it seems from the last sentence as if Hossfeld is trying to extend the thesis to cover yet another claim, to the effect that it is also medical industry that is to blame for continuous practice of pursuing inefficient measurements of tumor markers. But if Hossfeld's point is really to foster such understanding, then a question arises why no neutralization device has been applied to prepare the addressee for so radical a claim, in a way the addressee has been prepared for other thesis elements. This leads us to consideration of the claim made in the last sentence in terms of an element functioning irrespective of the main thesis. A synchronic look at a variety of medical persuasion texts justifies such approach: there is a vast number of texts having the structure of the last paragraph nearly identical to Hossfeld's. Moreover, if there is a written response (by another author) to the thesis voiced in the last paragraph, such response almost always ignores the 'by-thesis'.⁴ This, however, does not mean that the claim made in the last sentence of para. 11 is simply irrelevant; in fact it interacts with the thesis within a neutralization frame similar to the global frame of continuum of indisputable data followed by controversial thesis. The difference is,

³ cf. e.g. Billig 1987; Cockcroft and Cockcroft 1992; Cap 1999a and 2002. These works, among others, offer a feasible merger of theories of credibility based on psychological consistency, and both classical and modern studies in rhetoric of persuasion.

⁴ A sample proof of this regularity is available from, e.g., the book of proceedings of 21st ESMO (European Society for Medical Oncology) Congress in Vienna (1996), in which several contributors question Hossfeld's argument; yet, without referring to the observation made in the closing sentence.

however, that here the claim detracts from possible unacceptability of the main thesis by offering a novel look, which is digressive and forward-oriented, and whose function is to shift the addressee's attention onto another thematic domain, at the 'expense' of belaboring with controversies included in the thesis. The 'by-thesis' about the workings of medical industry does not *prepare* the thesis in the sense of pre-neutralizing controversy; it neutralizes the *effect* of the thesis *post factum*, and only in that sense it belongs to the overall argumentative continuum adopted by Hossfeld.

3.2. Acknowledgement of opposition

If we look at the structures which have been discussed in terms of their being triggers of conventional implicature (cf. 3.1), such as the *only*-phrases in para. 6 and 9, we find that it is also the very mention of the underrepresentation of these counter-examples that makes up another persuasive ploy in Hossfeld's text. By building up a wobbly counter-argument which only apparently jeopardizes the principal thesis, Hossfeld enters into what Billig (1987) first called "dialogic discourse in monologue of persuasion", a rhetorical strategy aimed at, again, establishing or enhancing speaker's credibility. While applying this strategy, the speaker presents himself as a person who is able to anticipate controversy and, hence, to behave accordingly. The enactment of 'I've been over it' attitude adds to the speaker's being perceived as competent and credible. In medical persuasion, one could also talk of an application of dialogic discourse in relation to expert knowledge, and the rhetorical consequences of this relation. In fact, what the speaker does by singling out such specific 'counter-data' as in Hossfeld's text is not only the mere performance of his/her own expert skills and knowledge; it is also request for addressee's share in this knowledge. In his paper and by the use of the quoted phrases in particular, Hossfeld invites a certain bond of intellectual intimacy which is to be set between him and the addressee. This bond, which bears indelible marks of rhetorical flattery, relies on recognition of a chunk of expert knowledge by both parties involved. Therefore, it can be claimed that dialogic discourse in Hossfeld (and in medical persuasion in general) means somewhat more than it does in the case of other types of persuasive discourse. It is not only that the speaker underlines his competence by acknowledging controversy; it is also that the speaker may use this occasion to build up a more direct and attractive appeal to the mind-set of the addressee (with an intention of changing it, though).

The extended view on dialogic discourse in medical language, in the form it has been proposed above, needs a comment from the perspective of another type of persuasive discourse, i.e. political language, where manifestations of dialogic discourse in monologue persuasion have long been considered as something standard (cf. Billig 1987; Cockcroft and Cockcroft 1992). In political language, dialogic discourse is usually manifested in the speaker's addressing an indefinite party, by words which impose agreement on account of the fact that (a) the suggested idea is vague and therefore difficult to approach attitudinally, and (b) there is a strong lexical backup of agreement from modality of the text, whereby the message is, in a sense, 'framed into' addressee's predispositions. For instance:

(1) On the experience and analysis of the first wave of the reforms, anyone will agree that the proposed measures have proved ineffective; one will not deny that the program is not even a remedy, let alone a cure.

But as much as these sample words do acknowledge the existence and handling of controversy and thereby enact speaker's competence, they obviously contain little that could foster 'intellectual closeness' of the speaker and his/her addressee. This is so because of the limited specificity of the message; there is virtually no common ground where expert knowledge of the speaker and the addressee could possibly meet. In medical persuasion, the degree of specificity of the message is invariably higher, and so is the chance that the addressee will find it 'attractive'. And this is what marks the principal difference that justifies the extended look on dialogic discourse in medical texts.

3.3. Direct preparation of thesis paragraph

We have seen from the discussion in 3.1. that the major points constituting the thesis of Hossfeld's argument are all synthesized in the last paragraph of the text (para. 11). This adds to the importance of (an analysis of) the claims which are made in the paragraph immediately preceding the thesis paragraph. As if in line with some unwritten rule that holds for medical persuasion texts, paragraph 10 takes up a role of preparing the final thesis paragraph by a swift change in lexical register. Unlike para. 1-9 and 11, which conform to all norms of formal language of scientific argument, para. 10 contains lexical structures which not only stand to verification by the mere reasoning but which are also emotionally-appealing. Unlike elsewhere, in para. 10 Hossfeld uses a handful of phrases whose function is to give his claims a humanly dimension. This is done by targeted personalization ('a woman or man'), by setting up the common 'agent(physician)-experiencer(patient)' activity domain into which the addressee is indiscriminately included ('our main concern should be directed to our patients'), and, among other ploys, by the application of lexis which in itself is to be interpreted from a subjective standpoint (cf. the use of inverted commas in 'early'). Moreover, in para. 10 there is a whole array of lexical expressions that stand in paradigmatic relation to their formal-language equivalents which can be found elsewhere in the text. For instance:

para. 10	para. 1-9 and 11
told	informed
healthy	asymptomatic
feels healthy	reports no symptoms
a woman	patient
(a) man	patient
found	diagnosed

nothing	no indication
‘early’	belated ⁵
for a woman or man	in patients

Such structuring of the preparatory paragraph 10 draws, again, upon an aspiration to establish a scope of common, intimate insight which should in turn bring concrete persuasion benefits for the speaker. As the speaker chooses to adopt a register which is atypical in the given context, the addressee is naturally forced to speculate why such register should be applied and hence how it interplays with the rest of the speaker’s argument. By presupposing co-operation from the speaker, the addressee is prompted to consider the atypical chunk as a valid part of argument, but what is really important is that the addressee, while searching for clues that would dispel his perplexity, works out an intellectual closeness to the speaker. This closeness makes the addressee recognize the speaker as a valid discussion partner, which increases the chances of the speaker’s claims being approached more favorably later in the text.

Of course, another way in which para. 10 enacts the speaker’s credibility is by an increasingly radical reiteration of unquestionable points, amassing into continuum described in 3.1. The thematicity of para. 10 is particularly beneficial for a successful enactment of such points, as the speaker brings up claims which simply must be accepted given the situation where both speaker and addressee subscribe to the same principles dictated unequivocally by their profession (‘our main concern should be directed to our patients’).

3.4. Lacunas of uninterpreted form

Finally, some comment should be made on those persuasion strategies which rely on the speaker’s use of ‘unfinished meaning’, a meaning which is designated to be worked out by the addressee according to his/her preferences. A number of interesting observations is available from a comparison of paragraphs 10 and 11, the former being relatively specific as to the reference of meaning, and the latter, quite conversely, packed up with structures (single words and phrases) carrying multiple manifestations of conventional and conversational implicature. A classic example of this discrepancy is the different structure of the *ask*-sentences which, incidentally, both tackle the same issue of the feeble effectiveness of tumor marker measurement (‘the question arises why physicians continue to ask for them [tumor markers]’ in para. 10, versus ‘To measure tumor markers without asking whether it [=tumor markers] is good for the patient resembles terrorism’ in para. 11). In para. 10, the predicate *ask* has its subject and is followed by a prepositional phrase. The agentive-objective elaboration determines the specificity of the claim; there is little meaning left for an extra interpretation by the addressee. In fact, there seems to be no need for any ‘dilution’ or neutralization of the principal meaning as the message resembles a rhetorical question, devoid of any major illocutionary force. In

⁵ This equivalent has been provided by myself. Hossfeld’s text does not contain the word ‘belated’, though it seems that some longer chunks in the argument *are* reducible to phrases which ‘belated’ could be part of.

para. 11, *ask* has been virtually nominalized (or, precisely, turned into a gerundive form), at the expense of its principal subject/agent. Of course, the most probable and plausible agent remains ‘the physician’, but there are also other interpretations that are possible, for instance, *all* parties involved in the practice: physicians, medical administration, pharmaceutical industry, etc. The lacuna of uninterpreted form in para. 11 invites an addressee’s own interpretation, according to whatever he/she considers desirable. The claim is therefore relatively easy to accept, even though it finishes with a highly radical comparison. What adds to the acceptability of the claim is also the impersonal character of the immediate context: the infinitival subject in the main clause and the passive form in the following sentence. Altogether, the initial sentence of para. 11 has a clear status of implicature whereby the radicalism of the claim gets neutralized by the imposition of a vast spectrum of interpretations concerning its agentive elaboration.

From the overtone of the later writings by Hossfeld (cf. Hossfeld 1997, 1998), it appears that the primary intention behind the implicature in the first sentence of para. 11 has been to criticize fellow practitioners, and not the whole medical industry as such. This, of course, does not detract from the power of the implicature in the present sample as there is no cancellation of the mistaken interpretation elsewhere in the text; in fact, there is even little space for it. An interesting generalization about medical persuasion is that implicatures used in argumentative texts such as Hossfeld’s indeed tend to target at the primary, close-reaching interpretation, even when offering multiple peripheral possibilities. In so doing, they function as neutralizers of the attached claims, rather than providers of novel ideas or extended spectrum views. But this function cannot be determined from an analysis of a single argumentative text as there is usually no cancellation of any of the implicata within it.

4. Methodological remarks

4.1. Inductive determinism

In general, medical texts such as Hossfeld’s tend to prompt a “bottom-up” inquiry. There are few language analysts who can claim expert knowledge within a medical domain and probably still fewer physicians who can be labelled as ‘linguists’. But even if a discourse analyst is supported in his/her investigation by in-field consultations, it is the very structure of medical persuasion that imposes an inductive work-out of the text’s function. This is because the main thesis is not revealed fully until the closing stages of the argument; even though the thesis is usually signalled in the title, it takes a laborious analysis of the consecutive segments of data to get it successfully elucidated. In Hossfeld, the amassment and the foregrounding of data, which dominates paragraphs 1-10, testifies to an **informative** function of the text. It is, however, the closing paragraph that turns it **persuasive**, to the specific effect coherent with the text’s title. It is also the last paragraph that fully explains the function of other thesis-oriented claims which are scattered within paragraphs 1-10 (as in, for instance, first sentences of para. 5 and para. 10). Generally, the function of precisely targeted persuasion which the text involves cannot be inferred unless linear processing of data has been completed by the addressee and/or the analyst. In cognitive terms, it seems relatively insignificant how much

asymmetry there holds between the addressee and the analyst, or how much subjectification by the analyst is theoretically possible. The properties of medical persuasion texts are (largely) such that they demand an inductive reasoning irrespective of the degree of expert knowledge and of the presence or absence of the analyst within the *on-stage* region.

This major characteristic (or rather, an analytic entailment) of medical persuasion applies not only to (an analysis of) the function of entire texts, but also to the function of the many minor chunks within them. For instance, in Hossfeld's text the interaction that holds between data and thesis *globally* at text level is reflected in the more *local* interaction between data and implied thesis in para. 10, and the principal thesis in para. 11. This local arrangement of the argument entails just as much inductive effort from the addressee and/or the analyst as it is the case with the entire text, no matter again how egocentric the viewing of the *stage* is.

4.2. Interchangeability of inference tracks

While not detracting from the general accuracy of observations made in 4.1., it needs to be pointed out that there are parts of Hossfeld's argument where text's function can be determined based on inductive *or* ("inclusive *or*") deductive reasoning. It has been claimed in 3.1. that the function of the 'by-thesis' does not really overlap with the function of the principal thesis. Such difference can be inferred inductively from the analysis of consecutive stages of the argument whereby the principal thesis is fostered by the amassment of data chunks. The absence or underrepresentation of similar preparation of the 'by-thesis', which is to be seen (almost incidentally) from such analysis, testifies to the difference of the two functions. The postulate about this difference is thus established on inductive grounds and it can be, for instance, the insufficient expert knowledge of the addressee and/or the analyst that will prompt the adopted "bottom-up" look. But if the degree of expert knowledge is high, the addressee/analyst can derive the same conclusion from consideration of other texts within the whole of the thematic domain. From the very analyst's perspective (i.e. the perspective which does not allow for the rather unlikely synonymy of the addressee and the language analyst), it seems that the process of analysis may involve either the assumption of the addressee's *on-stage* position and hence a subjective construal of other elements of the *stage*, especially other addressees, or the assumption of an *off-stage* position and, consequently, an objective viewing of all these elements. In the first situation, the analyst will undergo subjectification resulting in the ultimate confrontation of himself and other addressees, i.e., in discourse terms, the comparison of all claims available from all parties as relevant to the function of a given chunk of the target text. In the second, the analyst will undergo subjectification evading such confrontation.⁶ But whatever the particular characteristics, of primary importance is the fact that the analyst seems able to generate the conclusion about a fragment of a text based on a solely "top-down" approach, if he/she is assisted by a substantial degree of expert knowledge. This naturally applies to a vast majority of medical persuasion texts.

⁶ These subjectification patterns seem parallel to what Langacker terms "Subjectification I" and "Subjectification II" (cf. Langacker 1991: 216).

A similar interchangeability of inference tracks can be observed in the analysis of the dialogic discourse, adopted by Hossfeld to acknowledge familiarity with the opposing argument (cf. section 3.2.). If an analyst possesses expert knowledge which is insufficient to establish the function of the acknowledgement of opposition on the fragmentary basis of an isolated text sample carrying such acknowledgement, he/she is naturally prompted to search for other samples which, when confronted against the rest of the text, could possibly form some sort of functional continuum. This inductive practice seems far more arduous than the “bottom-up” search undertaken in the case of outlining the function of the ‘by-thesis’ (cf. 3.2.); it is quite clear that the data-thesis interaction which can be used to explain the function of the ‘by-thesis’ shows much more regularity than the data-data interaction which could potentially explicate the function of the dialogic discourse chunks. But if an analyst displays a substantial degree of expert knowledge, he/she can safely *hypothesize* about the logic of the dialogic discourse, in the whole of the text. In so doing, the analyst can rely on the following functional generalization underlying the bulk of medical argumentation, including Hossfeld: a premeditated application of the underrepresentation of ‘counter-data’ works toward establishing credibility and competence of the speaker, and hence toward an acceptance of his/her principal thesis indicated elsewhere in the text.

4.3. Implicature: a “bottom-up” hazard

Let us finally return to the function of the *ask*-phrase in the final paragraph of Hossfeld’s text (cf. 3.4.). As has been argued before, the phrase creates a lacuna of uninterpreted form, an implicature to the effect that there are multiple parties responsible for the excessive demand for measurement of tumor markers. In actuality, however, Hossfeld’s claim seems to apply to his fellow practitioners only, as proves the analysis of the later data (cf. 3.4.). The controversy that arises thereby is an underlying clash between two interpretations of the *ask*-phrase: one which is based on expert knowledge, and the other which is based on attachment to language data that is autonomous against all possible considerations reaching beyond a given text. The ‘autonomous’ interpretation may turn fallacious, but it is, ironically, only the proliferation of linguistic competence that renders it so. It is namely the case that linguistic literature concerning implicature has come to be dominated by instances of conversational implicatures where, upon inference, the ‘correct’ meaning seems to be also the very peripheral meaning (cf. e.g. Schiffrin 1994; Vanderveken 1991, etc.). This regularity in discussing implicature is readily explicable: it is simply quite feasible, from a given writer’s standpoint, to describe a language phenomenon in a maximum of its (indirect) manifestation. Still, for an analyst of texts such as Hossfeld’s, the character of the legacy of works dealing with implicature breeds serious confusion. It causes him/her to abandon the more central (though still implied) meaning and unnecessarily search for atypical interpretations which ultimately appear to be unlikely. Since medical persuasion abounds with implicatures which trigger relatively close-reaching inferences, the probability of an erroneous conclusion by an ‘*off-stage*’ analyst who adopts a solely inductive track of analysis is constantly high.

5. Conclusion

Analysis of the discourse of medical persuasion involves a primarily inductive approach to data, thesis, and mutual interaction of both. On the other hand, an analyst may sometimes choose between inductive and deductive track, depending on how much background knowledge is available to him/her. Lastly, in a number of isolated cases, such as the analysis of implicature, the excessive attachment to “bottom-up” investigation may lead to fallacious conclusions. This is all so because of the following characteristics of medical discourse:

- amassment of (factual) data preceding the thesis and, specifically, such arrangement of both as to define the function of the text;
- delayed occurrence of thesis-oriented claims, inviting linear investigation of consecutive chunks of the analyzed text;
- little reiteration of the apparent ‘by-theses’ stemming from the principal text in later texts by the same author; also, little concern for the ‘by-theses’ in works (by other authors) directly responding to the text and its thesis.
- acknowledgement of the presence of data selectively countering (but not jeopardizing) the principal thesis;
- little orientation toward exceptionally novel or unique meaning in construction of claims involving the use of implicature.

6. Appendix to chapter three

Below is the full list of references underlying Dieter K. Hossfeld’s article *Tumor marker terrorism* (1996).

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Chapter Four

Language of the Law: Determination by Message Type

1. Introduction

Throughout chapters 1-3 we have observed how different types of persuasive discourse undergo different kinds of analytic determination, according to a number of factors such as the degree of expert knowledge in the analyst, the arrangement of data and thesis in the text, the density of macropropositional cues, or even the length of the investigated text chunk. As can be seen from this exemplification, some factors determining the analytic approach to a given discourse type could be roughly classified as ‘interlocutors-oriented’ (i.e. stemming from, in cognitive terms, the *on/off-stage* status of the speaker and the addressee in a given discourse situation, as well as from the speaker’s and the addressee’s/the analyst’s *viewing arrangement* of the *stage*), and some as ‘message-oriented’ (i.e. stemming from autonomous properties of the text). We have seen that an analysis of the discourse of advertising undergoes mostly “top-down” determination, while the discourse of scientific argument (exemplified through a medical argument) invites a prevailing number of “bottom-up” prompts. The discourse of politics and political persuasion has come to be positioned somewhere in between the above extremes.

The present chapter discusses the determination that affects the discourse of legal texts, a type which is going to be shown, quite unsurprisingly, to possess all previously-mentioned kinds of persuasive characteristics and many methodological analogies as well. In particular, the legal discourse seems to be similar to the discourse of politics, in the sense that, most of the time, it is a mixture of inductive and deductive processes that decides upon its interpretation. However, unlike in the discourse of politics, where the logical interface results from the heterogeneous status of the parties involved in a communicative act, the discourse of the law undergoes analytic determination largely relative to the message itself, rather than to the producer of this message (who almost invariably tends to be a ‘lawyer’). Since legal ‘messages’, as we shall see, are strongly different across the different types of legal texts, so is the analytic determination. Therefore, the argument undertaken in the chapter aims to show that the different (by mode, style or situational context) subtypes of texts within the legal genre can generate different analytic approaches to them, either inductive or deductive in nature. This naturally draws on an approach to the legal discourse seen as a principally heterogeneous type - similar to the discourse of politics - but of a structure whose heterogeneity is a message-, not interlocutors-oriented phenomenon.

In the first part of the chapter I shall discuss, having first defined the concept of 'language of the law', as well as having identified its place within the domain of pragmatic persuasion, the theoretical properties of the legal discourse encouraging the particular analytic approaches adopted in order to specify the function of a given legal text. In the second part, I shall direct these observations at a number of real-life text samples.

2. Language of the law and language of jurisprudence

Language of the law should not be confused with language of jurisprudence, i.e. actual performance of lawyers, attorneys, judges, etc. in specific situations of legal proceedings such as trials or questionings (cf. Conley and O'Barr 1990; Conley and O'Barr 1998; Philips 1985, etc.). Idiolect-like in nature, language of jurisprudence carries persuasion patterns which should be approached in the way the patterns of political persuasion are; the crucial determinators of function remain the speaker, the addressee, and their relationship underlying the communicative act. In that sense, the patterns of persuasion in language of jurisprudence possess little analytic matrix, since the function of a given text chunk is not necessarily determined by the targeted message format. On the contrary, language of the law, which manifests itself in less spontaneous situations (including the many pre-defined parts of courtroom interaction) and which, in a majority of cases, consists in formal conferring of rights of some kind, does follow such matrix. The latter is, naturally, different in degree for different subtypes of texts, therefore allowing consideration of disparate analytic approaches to the principal discourse type.

3. Language of the law versus pragmatic inquiry

In order to properly prepare the discussion of analytic determinism of legal language it is crucial to look at whether and how it has been approached in the development of linguistic pragmatics and discourse analysis. A very tentative yet plausible reason that can be given at this point is that, for instance, if one can find substantial evidence of legal language falling within the latitude of interest of linguistics, then it can be presupposed that an analyst of legal language may be drawing from a large legacy of expert knowledge underlying his/her investigation. Such analyst could hence be prompted to postulate *a priori* claims about the text, and generally follow a deductive track of reasoning.

It has to be noted that, obviously enough, both pragmaticists and lawyers talk about 'acts'. This analogy, however, goes deeper than the mere term may suggest. Linguists such as Kurzon (1986) point to a close correspondence between works by Austin (1962 and later ones) and works by another Oxford philosopher and lawyer H.L. Hart. Hart (1961) comments, for instance, on the parallels between illocutionary act theory and the construction of legal acts such as will-making or property transfer. He further suggests that performative utterances be called 'operative utterances', drawing on the concept of the so-called 'operative words' in legal language. Recently, Witczak-Plisiecka (2001) acknowledges more analogies. Acts in the law presuppose that the performer, in order to perform the act, needs to be able to exercise legal power. This partly corresponds to Searle's (1969, 1979) concept of necessary and sufficient conditions for successful

performance of speech acts. Finally, it is recognized both in the law and in many pragmatic and discourse analysis theories (cf. Van Dijk 1977 and later works) that acts tend to join in sequences which generate (and at the same time subscribe to) the macro acts of highest functional value. This last observation is again crucial to the determinism of legal language analysis since the adherence to macro act derivation is a clear indication of inductivism in linguistic research. In consequence, what seems to emerge from the whole of this sketchy description is a kind of methodological paradox. When dealing with a concrete text, an analyst of 'legal language' may be well aware, as has been mentioned at the beginning of this section, of some stable characteristics of the principal discourse type. But *in effect* his/her expert knowledge may not only invite but also prevent the *a priori* claims, if they should be considered *necessarily* inaccurate on account of being unsupported by the derivation of the global function of the text. The logical conclusion from the above remains that it is probably only a subdivision of 'legal language' that can help resolve the analytic controversies pertaining to the genre of legal discourse as a whole.

4. Linguistic and paralinguistic pre-conditions of analytic determination

Before making this subdivision, however, it seems worthwhile to look further for some general factors under which the particular domains of legal language could fall subject to either inductive or deductive determination.

First, with the development of *forensic linguistics*, multiple professional contacts have been established between linguists and lawyers. In addition, multiple linguists have undergone substantial legal training and, vice versa, a number of lawyers have acquired language analysis skills (cf. Gibbons 1994; Maley and Fahey 1991, etc.). Consequently, virtually all basic legal concepts, such as "caution", "sentence", or "guilt" have been defined linguistically, according to a finite number of specific semantic features (cf. Witczak-Plisiecka 2001). The possession of knowledge of the exact meaning carried by the prevailing proportion of lexical items within a legal text has thus become a signpost for legally-trained linguists wishing to determine the function of the text upon the mere skimming of it. Whether this finds plausible reflection in actual data analysis will be discussed later in the chapter, but the undeniable fact remains that the relatively short forensic legacy has incidentally created potential for a "top-down" approach to persuasion patterns used in some of the legal texts.

Second, in by-consequence of the American trend of the early 80s which advocated simplification of legal documents or even the complete rewriting of some (cf. e.g. Charrow and Charrow 1979), the analysis of legal language has been jeopardized by perception of legal texts as *necessarily* vague, in order to bring concrete persuasion benefits to their authors. The simultaneous coinage of such pejorative terms as, for example, "gobbledegook" (cf. Lewis and Pucelik 1982) has only increased a temptation to approach a legal text with a certain dose of analytic cynicism and a ready-made conclusion about it at hand. As we shall see, several analysts such as Lutz (cf. e.g. Lutz 1990) have already fallen victim to this temptation.

Yet another “top-down” prompt has emerged from historical transformation of legal language. In countries where process of codification was, for social or other reasons, somewhat delayed (as was the case, for instance, in Britain), interpreters of legal language were given a chance to pre-postulate about functions of some legal discourses only when dealing with chunks which had already been (literally) written down and brought to light (cf. Gibbons 1994). Consequently, it was also the titling or naming of legal documents that started to play a significant role in approaching the text from an analytic standpoint. For a present-day linguist this means that, at least apparently, legal texts from more recent times stand a better chance of being interpreted deductively than the older, less worked-out ones do. The same phenomenon bears responsibility for perception of older ‘texts’ (such as, for example, the yet non-institutionalized instances of wills or the early statutes - cf. Gibbons 1994; Bhatia 1994, etc.) as more ‘friendly’ data for “bottom-up” research.

The last remark points to the possibility of finding some further prompts for inductive analysis of legal texts. As Goodrich (1987) suggests, certain instances of language of the law, being on the one hand apparently fixed and all-inclusive in meaning, on the other have to be flexible enough to enable future interpretation and adjustment. This concerns mainly all legal systems which have developed, less or more directly, from the British common law tradition: in particular, the contemporary legal systems in the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The common law heritage is in fact responsible for a mental paradox that is often addressed by legal experts (cf. MacCormick 1990): *how* can the law be certain and stable and yet achieve flexibility? Certainty is demanded by justice and the rule of law which require *predictability* of outcome: like cases must be decided alike (this naturally translates into the above-mentioned suggestion that, from an analytic standpoint, a legal provision should possess definite function which is traceable upon a glance-like look). When the facts are the same, the outcome should be the same. But no set of facts is ever *quite* the same and, again, the question arises: does the new set of facts arising from different times and different circumstances really fall within the ambit of the same legal rule as the earlier set? What are the mechanisms by which the legal rule can be adjusted, made flexible, in order to accommodate the new set of circumstances? How is the rule extended or restricted in order to do justice to this particular case? Parallel are the questions that could be posed by a legal language analyst: isn’t it possible that in a given legal text the function of its contents can be stretched to embrace more than the ‘label’ of the text originally suggests? If so, isn’t it worthwhile to reconsider the initial, deduction-based conclusions by a thorough, linear investigation of particular words and phrases? Hesitations of that kind seem to apply to analysis of both the written language and some (initially) spoken (yet institutionalized) instances of legal discourse such as, for instance, judicial resolutions in courtroom situations.

Also, an analyst of legal language whose expert knowledge is yet incomplete for a given field of investigation may get somewhat baffled by the text chunks containing a high number of nominalizations representing processes, as well as passive clauses with agents deleted. As they are used in some legal discourses (for instance, written legislation), nominalizations and passive structures plus their immediate contexts constitute, for extremely qualified experts, the ultra-clear indicators of meaning and function of the

text, though these features may remain relatively vague for analysts of slightly lower expertise (cf. Maley 1994). The latter are thus forced to work out the function of the text by looking at the *series of like constructions* involving the ‘vague’ phenomena (naturally, if the text format allows) and thereby get conclusions about the particular structures, whether nominal or passive, inductively and not sooner than toward the end of the text. To illustrate this, let us consider the following example. In most English-written legislations the term ‘homicide’ is technically a superordinate category for a number of subordinate terms such as ‘murder’ or ‘manslaughter’. Yet for a less expert analyst, it only covers-up the important technical differences between these terms. Whether ‘homicide’ should be considered synonymous to ‘murder’ or ‘manslaughter’ remains, in hundred percent probability, to be worked out from the immediate context that follows its initial use in the text chunk, but it does take the knowledge of a full paradigm of its lexical collocations to derive the correct conclusion. Since with the repetition of the principal term ‘homicide’ the number of contexts increases, so does the chance that an analyst will interpret the term correctly, from finally knowing a consecutive collocation in the paradigm.

5. Determinism of sample subtypes of legal discourse

Having discussed the analytic determinants of legal discourse as a whole, let us look at the construction of a number of real-life samples, exemplifying some more specialized discourse domains. In order to talk about analytic determination of specific instances of legal discourse, one needs to make a plausible subdivision of the principle type. It is frequently maintained (cf. Shuy 1986; Danet 1990; Maley 1994; etc.) that the classification of legal discourse is best laid out by the consecutive stages in what might be called a ‘conflict resolution’ scheme. Let us assume that there is a ‘social conflict’ between parties which comes under the rubric of a rule of law, either a statutory or a common law one. If the parties decide to litigate, each party will consult a lawyer and the case will be *prepared* (Stage 2), with all the attendant *documentation* (Stage 1). If the next step is taken, the parties appear in court and a *trial* before a judge (and sometimes a jury) follows (Stage 3). At the end of the trial, the judge will give judgment which is an integral part of the trial process itself. However, if the judgment has any significance in terms of extending or restricting a rule of law, or establishing a rule of statutory interpretation (cf. Maley 1994), then it is *reported* and becomes part of the huge volume of precedents that constitute case law (Stage 4). There is, apparently, some *circularity* in the process: once a case is reported and becomes a precedent for later cases, it is then a source of law and potentially an originating point for a new trial process with a new set of parties (Stage 1, Stage 2). Thus, the classification of subtypes of legal discourse based on a sequence of conflict resolution might look as follows:

STAGE 1

SOURCES OF LAW; ORIGINATING POINTS OF LEGAL PROCESS			
Legislature	Regulations, by-laws, etc.	Precedents	Wills, contracts, etc.



STAGE 2

PRE-TRIAL PROCESSES			
Police interviews	Lawyer pleadings	Lawyer/client consultations	Subpoena and jury summons



STAGE 3

TRIAL PROCESSES			
Witness examination and cross-examination	Judge/counsel interaction	Jury summation	Judge's decision



STAGE 4

RECORDING AND LAW-MAKING			
Case reports			

Obviously, this sequence is not inevitable. Wills and contracts, for instance, once drafted and made effective, may never give rise to legal process; or, after consultation with lawyers, the parties may settle the dispute privately; some, perhaps a majority of cases, are recorded but not reported and collected in law reports. But these different structural and discourse situations exist, as a potential, where needed, for the regulation and facilitation of social life. They also provide a feasible classification of major subtypes of legal discourse, one that allows for discernible function differences between constructions of each of them.

As the notion of circularity of legal discourse situations indicates, the most significant structural differences can be derived from the confrontation of the subtypes which fall within the very 'distant' domains of Stage 1 and Stage 3. Consequently, the member discourses of Stage 1 and Stage 3 seem to offer the most promising observations as regards the heterogeneity of legal discourse and its reflection in different kinds of analytic determination. Therefore, in what follows we shall discuss the internal structure and analytic construal of some sample instances of legislature (a member discourse of Stage 1) and witness examination and cross-examination (a member discourse of Stage 3).

5.1. Legislation: statutes

The construction of statutes, i.e. acts of parliament, allows to a large extent an *a priori* specification of the function of a given text.¹ This is possible because, first of all, all modern statutes follow a regular form (cf. Maher et al. 1971; Enright 1983; Maley 1994) which constitutes their generic structure. The actual configuration of elements, both obligatory and optional, may be dictated by jurisdiction and certain types of statute have a specific generic structure. However, some generalizations across the different types and jurisdictions can be made. There is first pre-material, giving long title, year and number, short title, preamble and, importantly, an *enacting formula*. The body of the statute follows, divided into numbered sections, subsections and paragraphs. Larger units may be used; for example, a definitions part or division, followed by a substantive part and a procedural part. Schedules are appended as end material. Definitions may occur here as a schedule, if they do not constitute a separate part in the body of the act. Some elements are optional, e.g. short title and preamble, division into parts, but the sequence of elements is invariable.

It is frequently argued that (cf. e.g. Maley 1994), apart from the meaning and function constituting the specifics of individual legislative documents, the universal performative function underlying most English-written statutes is that of expressing a perpetual command from the sovereign power to its subjects. The rule expressed in a statute is assumed to be forever-speaking; it is supposed to acquire continuity and permanence as an authoritative text. This function is initially realized in the ‘enacting formula’, a textual chunk such as (1), which precedes all British statutes:

(1) Be it enacted by the Queen’s Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

The enacting formula makes law the entire text which follows it. The positioning of the enacting formula is crucial for the performative function of the text; the formula comes early enough to be a cue for perpetuity and permanence of the law it announces. Therefore, its lexical structure involves a number of regularities which help the addressee establish and accept this function. The most important element of the structure is naturally the archaic jussive subjunctive which expresses the relationship between the speaker and the addressee. As has been noted, this relationship is based on a huge power differential which fosters the authoritative character of the later words. Also, the enacting formula usually makes use of the pattern of repetition which is supposed to stress the globality and perpetuity of the message. In (1) this is done with the help of *by*-repetitions which not only reiterate the many authority parties from which the legal message originates, but again, underline the profundity of the addressee’s subordination to the rule enforced.

¹ The forthcoming observations apply to the legal systems in the ‘post-common-law’ countries. This includes, predominantly, Britain, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

From an analytic standpoint, of crucial importance is the fact that all these lexical devices are part of a structure which appears right at the outset of the message expressed in a statute. This makes it easy for the analyst of the statute to work out such functions as perpetuity, globality or permanence relatively early in the analysis of the text. It can thus be pre-postulated that the body message of the statute is going to have as its central task the identifying and empowering of rights and duties in a manner which follows the initiated overtone of permanence and authority, as well as allows the presence of lexical structures capable of enacting these functions. What occurs in the process of analysis is then a deduction of a certain fixed form and function of the text (the statute), out of a 'frozen' structure underlying the main functional indicator of it (the enacting formula of the statute).

Fixed lexical data is a chief instrument whereby the analyst of a statute can postulate about its function at an early point of analysis. Let us consider the following example:

*(2) 1. A person, whatever his nationality, who, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,
(a) detains any other person (the hostage), and
(b) in order to compel a State, international governmental organisation or person to do or abstain from doing any act, threatens to kill, injure or continue to detain the hostage, commits an offence.²*

In this statute, the words *whatever*, *elsewhere*, and the defining relative clause serve to establish a range of application of the legal rule that follows, a spectrum that is broad enough to cover as many foreseeable cases of violation of the rule as possible. The use of such lexis is typical of most kinds of prohibitive legislation or the legislation which is supposed to specify all the conditions under which a person may be labelled as 'guilty'. Interestingly, the use of *whatever* or *elsewhere* in discretionary (i.e. permissive) legislation is much less common. This shows that the analyst can readily work out a prohibitive function of a statute by looking at some specific instances of lexical data occurring early in the text. At the same time, discretionary legislation requires the analyst to go beyond such deductive approach.

The certainty of law which is sought by the application of fixed lexical terms and other textual features entails a number of ensuing considerations which may ultimately give rise to a paradoxical situation wherein the analyst admits to the inaccuracy of "top-down" analysis and, in consequence, makes an expert assumption about the need for componential study of the whole of the text. In other words, he/she 'deductively' draws upon his/her expertise, only to postulate an 'inductive' approach further in analysis, which then turns into a series of mutual confrontations of lexical environments surrounding each consecutive occurrence of the item in question (cf. section 3). Subordinate to this problem are some micro-concerns: about the analytic value of technical terms such as, for example, nominalizations and passive structures (cf. section

² Taking of Hostages Act 1982, United Kingdom.

3), or about the many words and phrases which are, by virtue of being perceived by some analysts as ‘too technical’, often reduced to the function of vagueness-carriers (cf. Lutz 1990). Consider the following example:³

(3) 1. *A person who attempts or incites another to commit, or becomes an accessory after the fact to an offence (in this subsection called ‘the principal offence’) commits-*

(a) *if the principal offence is an indictable offence, the indictable offence; or*

(b) *if the principal offence is a simple offence, the simple offence,*

but is liable on conviction-

(c) *to a fine not exceeding half of the fine; and additionally or alternatively,*

(d) *to imprisonment for a term not exceeding half of the term,*

to which a person who commits the principal offence is liable.

2. *A person who conspires with another to commit an offence (in this subsection called ‘the principal offence’) commits-*

(a) *if the principal offence is an indictable offence under section 6(1) or 7(1), the indictable offence, but is liable on conviction to the penalty referred to in section 34(1);*

This section has some technical, nominal-phrase terms or nominalizations (‘accessory after the fact’, ‘indictable offence’, ‘on conviction’), and is a general rule (‘a person who ...’). The present tense of the rule (‘attempts’, ‘commits’, ‘is liable’) provides continuity over time, a function which we have seen to be normally deducible at an early stage of analysis. There is also a typical pattern of participants processes and circumstances - in legal terms, the legal subject, the legal operative verb and the conditions (cf. Renton 1975). In addition, textual features, in the sense of the management and packaging of information (the retention of one-sentence layout of consecutive subsections, the use of repetition rather than pronouns, etc.), are intended to make the section explicit and precise and therefore certain as to the function. The global function is to be inferred, as we have seen before, as enactment of permanence or continuity of prohibition and penalty for ignoring it. On a micro-scale, however, it is tempting to postulate that subsection 1 also seeks to enact the concept of penalty for inciting a rule violation as imposed in some way *proportionate* to the principal penalty imposed for the actual commitment of the principal offence.

But despite the lexicogrammatical and textual contributions to precision, Section 33 is not, as it turns out, entirely clear or certain, especially with regard to the last function above. Its uncertainty derives from an intertextual clash between it and the section referred to in the final subsection, which provides a *different* way of penalizing a person for the same offence. Ambiguity of this kind can be attributable either to the wish to allow some judicial flexibility (most statutes have to be understood and interpreted against a background legislation) or, as is the case here (cf. Maley 1994), plainly to

³ Re-quoted after Maley (1994: 24). The text is an excerpt from Section 33 of Drugs Act, Western Australia 1981.

faulty drafting. For the analyst this situation means a continual risk of overinterpreting texts of such high lexical density as in Section 33. Furthermore, it sometimes means approaching the text with a tendency for treating fixed lexical data not in terms of its primary function (which remains to be the precision of reference), but in terms of an analytic ‘catch’ about which no functional presupposition should be made, at least not until further contextual and confrontative testing has been performed.

Finally, the density of fixed lexical data in legal texts (not necessarily statutes) may, in extreme though imaginable cases, contribute to the perception of legal language as not just flexible to allow judicial interpretation but merely vague on purpose, to serve the benefit of a specific party engaged in a legal dispute. However infrequently, pre-conceptions of that kind do exist in some studies, especially those immediately following the campaign for simplification of legal language as a whole (cf. section 4). A good example of such cynical predisposition affecting the actual analysis is Lutz’s (1990: 4) discussion of a legal concept termed *involuntary conversion*:

[...] Lawyers speak of an “involuntary conversion” of property when discussing the loss or destruction of property through theft, accident or condemnation [...]. When used by lawyers in a legal situation, such jargon is a legitimate use of language, since lawyers can be expected to understand the term. However, when a member of a specialized group uses its jargon to communicate with a person outside the group, and uses it knowing that the nonmember does not understand such language, then there is doublespeak. For example, on May 9, 1978, a National Airlines 727 airplane crashed while attempting to land at the Pensacola, Florida airport. Three of the fifty-two passengers aboard the airplane were killed. As a result of the crash, National made an after-tax insurance benefit of \$1.7 million, or an extra 18c a share dividend for its stockholders. Now National Airlines had two problems: it did not want to talk about one of its airplanes crashing, and it had to account for the \$1.7 million when it issued its annual report to its stockholders. National solved the problem by inserting a footnote in its annual report which explained that the \$1.7 million income was due to “the involuntary conversion of a 727”. National thus acknowledged the crash of its airplane and the subsequent profit it made from the crash, without once mentioning the accident or the deaths. However, because airline officials knew that most stockholders in the company, and indeed most of the general public, were not familiar with legal jargon, the use of such jargon constituted doublespeak.

Clearly, the early positioning of the (hypo)thesis claim (‘..., then there is doublespeak’) indicates Lutz’s firm perception of some legal texts as instruments of manipulation. This analytic attitude affects the data part of the argument. Within the data part, most lexical choices serve the purpose of presenting National Airlines side as parasiting on the consequences of the accident. For example, there is a metonymic relation established between ‘the crash’ and ‘the after-tax insurance benefit’. Thereby, National Airlines side is shown to have derived the \$1.7 million income ‘from the crash’, and not, as it *really*

happened, from insurance compensation. Instances of that kind of data presentation reinforce the predisposition voiced in the initial claim.

However, analyses such as Lutz's have little to do with the many approaches recognizing the *constructive* aspect of legal flexibility and the inevitable intricacies that follow it (cf. e.g. Goodrich 1987; Bhatia 1994). It is well known and accepted that many legal texts, and statutes in particular, make use of the so-called "legal fiction". Legal fiction is a kind of enabling or facilitating device which enables a lawyer to say, 'X is Y', or, more precisely, 'For the purposes of this enactment or statute, X is *deemed* to be Y' (cf. Maley 1994). Because deeming clauses of this kind bring together two disparate elements into a temporary text-specific equative relationship, they have affinities with metaphor (which, incidentally, entails a necessarily *inductive* computation of meaning; cf. Chapter One). Just as a literary metaphor enables readers (or analysts) to think of an entity as being in some sense the same as another and thus enlarges the system of meaning relations for the literary work, so the legal fiction allows lawyers (or legal analysts) to treat disparate entities as similar and thus enlarges the legal meaning relationships for the purpose of the particular statute or section. Therefore, the constructive effect of deeming consists in the fact that a new rule for a new circumstance does *not* have to be made. The existing rule applies, simply by 'deeming' one circumstance, participant or process to be the same as another. Naturally, acknowledgement of the positive aspects of the legal fiction and deeming means adopting an inductive approach to analysis, since, as is the case with metaphoric expressions, it is mostly linear processing of lexical data that is crucial to working out the meaning and function of a given text.

5.2. Courtroom discourse: witness examination and cross-examination

Compared to study of legislation, analysis of courtroom discourse entails substantially more of inductive computation of meaning and function behind each discourse subtype, whether it should be a 'text proper' or merely a recorded oral performance of any of the session participants. This is so because of a number of analytic beliefs concerning the conceptual framing of courtroom discourse, as well as because of the autonomous, generic structure of the discourse itself. It seems plausible to say that many approaches to courtroom discourse have been deeply affected by the common conceptualization of the discourse situation and structure as that of a 'story'. The initial impetus toward such trial-as-story metaphor came from Bennett and Feldman's pioneering study (1981) in which they claimed that in a criminal trial a jury interprets the evidence presented to it from the opposing sides and constructs a story. That is to say the jury accepts from the opposing versions or 'stories' of the event placed before them a single story which fits with their everyday knowledge of what people are likely to do and should do. It is true that in many cases, counsel, particularly defending counsel, may be more concerned to throw doubt on the prosecution story than to construct an alternative version, but in raising a 'reasonable doubt' in the minds of jury members, an alternative version is normally implied. The trial-as-story metaphor, despite a certain vagueness about the linguistic and discoursal criteria for storiness has proved to be a very fertile one and has been the framework around which a great deal of analysis and comment has been made of courtroom language from expert linguists and lawyers (cf. Kurzon 1986; Den Boer

1990; Maley and Fahey 1991, Maley 1994, etc.). These studies have come to reveal a necessarily linear and componential investigation of textual properties, as if to demonstrate the need for looking at the accumulation of all possible cues that might lead toward the ‘point’ of the story. In this way, they have simultaneously acknowledged the existence of autonomous generic features of courtroom language which thus prompt its “bottom-up” analysis, for instance, the changing degree of cue density and the accumulation speed across the different subtypes of the principal discourse, or the variations of function caused by the apparent margin of unpredictability in participants’ interaction.

An illuminating instance of “bottom-up” analysis of courtroom discourse is Maley’s (1994: 36-8) study of witness examination (by prosecution counsel, example (4)) and cross-examination (by defense counsel, example (5)) in an Australian trial. The witness is a key witness for the prosecution, a criminal who has turned police informer:

(4)

Counsel: *After having given those documents to Mr. H, did you see Mr. H again?*

Witness: *Yes, I did.*

Counsel: *When was that?*

Witness: *About the second or third week of June.*

Counsel: *Did you have a conversation with him regarding M?*

Witness: *Yes, I did.*

Counsel: *What did you say?*

Witness: *I said to him, ‘There seems to be some holdup with the M money. The chap didn’t turn up. I’ll have to wait for the weekend and go out and see M’.*

Counsel: *Then Mr. H said something to you?*

Witness: *That is correct.*

Counsel: *After that meeting with Mr. H, when was the next time that you saw him?*

Witness: *In July of 1983.*

(5)

Counsel: *And I suppose it would be fair to say that as they came to recognize the extent of your knowledge about overseas drugs, so they became more and more interested?*

Witness: *No, that would be incorrect. They already knew where I stood, much prior to July of 1982.*

Counsel: *You say that their own intelligence was sufficient to let them know how important you were even before you spoke to them?*

Witness: *They had been following me...*

Counsel: *Is that right or not?*

His Honour: *Just a moment, Mr. B. I am allowing the witness to answer that question.*

Counsel: *With respect, Your Honour...*

His Honour: *I am allowing him to answer it.*

Counsel: *I am asking that my objection be noted.*

His Honour: *Every objection that you have ever made in this case has been noted, Mr. B.*

Counsel: *I must be allowed to make it, with respect, or it does not go down.*

His Honour: *Would you say what you were saying, Mr. C?*

Witness: *They had been following me, monitoring telephones that I was associated with and raiding premises that I was associated with since 1979.*

The global function of the exchanges in (4) is, Maley suggests, to build up a ‘story’ in which both sides are congruent and cooperative enough to make the whole of the sequence plausible. The counsel is thus reluctant to ‘lead’ or ask questions which presuppose their answer, so his questions tend to alternate between indefinite polars (‘Did you have a conversation...?’) and open information seeking questions (‘When was that?’). The witness, right on cue, responds with the required information, in the desired sequence. His composure and consistency, Maley observes, is enacted in the easy and appropriate way in which he quotes conversations, that is in direct, as against indirect, reported speech, thus conforming to evidential requirements. Closing the analysis, Maley notes that the question ‘Then Mr. H said something to you?’ is answered only by a confirmation, since the witness does not elaborate unless his counsel gives him a prompt. This, Maley concludes, enhances the character of the examination as that of a “carefully rehearsed performance” (Maley 1994: 38).

Methodologically, Maley’s study of (4) relies heavily on continual accumulation of lexical cues for the macro function of the text. The cues are varied (two different types of questions, direct speech chunks, two different patterns of confirmation, etc.) and distributed freely around the text. The macro function of the text is thus derived dynamically, from analysis of consecutive ‘regularity spots’ revealing the accomplishment of plausibility of the interaction through smoothness of cooperation between the interactants. Even though, at the beginning of analysis, Maley does make a presupposition about the tentative function of ‘storiness’ and cooperation, he is nonetheless reluctant to reiterate it (“carefully rehearsed performance”) until a thorough study of the particular lexical data has been completed. This is no surprise since the analyzed text does not possess any early or immediate indicators of function, at least not of the kind we have seen from, for example, the enacting formulae in written legislation (cf. 5.1). As a result, it is a ‘(theory)-data-thesis’ sequence that underlies the analysis. Given the remaining variety of lexical choices which were *not* made by the interactants to contribute to the macro function but *could* have been, it is problematic to imagine this sequence otherwise.

In his analysis of (5), Maley stresses the adversarial character of the counsel’s performance; the counsel apparently targets at elucidating the fact that the Australian Federal Police (‘they’) could have managed without the involvement of the witness. Although Maley fails to acknowledge it explicitly, the macro function of the counsel’s performance is thus to discredit the witness, by showing superficiality of his expertise in the workings of the drug gang. Since the witness, motivated by prospects of mitigation, has exactly opposite goals, the global meaning and function of the event consists in the

clashing ‘stories’ presented by both interactants. The lexical manifestations of the occurring conflict are again to be found across the entire text and, as has been the case with the examination in (4), none of the cues seems significantly more important than any other one. They are also comparably heterogeneous, in terms of length, grammatical mode or prosodic load (the counsel’s alternating between encouraging and curbing the answers, his posing the questions as true interrogatives or a declarative with a rising tone, the different length of particular confirmation or denial phrases by the witness, etc.). Thus, the mechanisms governing the inference of macro function of the cross-examination in (5) reflect largely the same “bottom-up” processes as they underlie the analysis of the examination in example (4). Naturally, there are some hypotheses that can be made about both texts, prior to actual analysis. They include, for instance, the pre-conception of the witness examination as necessarily supportive and of the cross-examination as necessarily adversarial; also, and perhaps more importantly, they involve the very basic belief that the undertaking of analysis of courtroom discourse as such *entails* an inductive quest for function of the investigated text.

6. Conclusion

Approached in terms of an analytic determinant, language of the law can be defined as follows:

- as a principal discourse type, it invites both the “top-down” and the “bottom-up” modes of analysis;
- it is according to the lexical and semiotic construction of a subtype of the principal discourse that either of the analytic approaches is better adopted; the discourse of legislation, for instance, entails mostly deductive approach, while the discourse of the courtroom is more feasibly analyzable in an inductive manner;
- thus, the major cues for macropropositions in legal language involve the message as such, rather than the discourse participants or interlocutors;
- the assumption of an inductive study in a subtype of legal language (for instance, in witness (cross)-examination patterns) is nonetheless predefined deductively, from the general analytic construal of language of the law as a whole;
- in random cases, the density of fixed lexical data may cause legal language to be accounted for in a necessarily deductive manner, which may in turn render the analysis superficial (cf. Lutz’s case in 5.1).

Chapter Five

Analytic Determinism and Cognitive Implications

1. Introduction

The discussion in chapters I-IV has yielded a number of conclusions involving the multi-faceted status of analytic determinism of persuasive discourse. These observations have been concisely enumerated and described, with regard to each discourse type, at the end of each chapter. Most of them are now going to serve as landmarks for the current argument. Addressed in the present chapter will thus be,

(a) from the domain of political discourse analysis: analytic inductivism following from analyst's ignorance of audience predispositions and/or analyzability of text regardless of its background; and conversely, analytic deductivism following from awareness of contextual factors or being part of depicted events and/or impossibility of carrying out an autonomous analysis of text due to its idiosyncratic properties;

(b) from the domain of discourse of advertising analysis: excessive application of hypothetical claims and treatment of hypothesis and thesis in like terms, underrepresentation of relevant data or use of data atypical of hypothesis, and selection of data reflecting predominantly cognitive-visual experience;

(c) from the domain of scientific discourse analysis: total absence or underrepresentation of hypothesis, amassment of 'interactive' data prior to thesis, and delayed manifestation of thesis;

(d) from the domain of legal discourse analysis: presence of inductive/deductive interface following from heterogeneity of principal discourse and presumption of methodological approach being tied to subtype of message rather than to status of discourse participants.

If one attempts to classify discourse analyses (a)-(d) according to the degree of determination by the source discourse, there emerges the following polarity: analysis of the discourse of advertising seems most affected by deductive approach and least affected by inductive approach, and the analysis of the discourse of science is affected precisely vice versa, i.e. it is overdetermined by inductive approach and underdetermined deductively. Analyses of political and legal discourse seem in turn to position themselves somewhere in between the two poles, though since they involve differences in incompatible focus fields (autonomous language form versus contextualized discourse form) their mutual relationship and distance cannot be adequately measured. The position of a given discourse type on the determination axis depends, as is reflected in most of the observations within (a)-(d), on the analyst's closeness to the discourse under investigation. To put it somewhat simplistically, being part of the discourse context, the analyst undergoes overdetermination by deductive processes and, conversely, being out

of the discourse context he/she produces a study that is overdetermined inductively. Therefore, in order to account more fully for the differences in the degree of (persuasive) discourse determination it seems worthwhile to look exactly at the anchoring of the analyst in discourse and his/her *conceptualization* of the scope of analysis. Quite obviously, the apparatus of the mainstream discourse analysis and linguistic pragmatics appear insufficient for a genuine success of such task.

2. A Cognitive Grammar extension of analysis

However, substantial reinforcement and elaboration on the conceptual aspects of (persuasive) discourse analysis seems to be at hand from Langacker's (1987, 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1995, 1996, 2001) Cognitive Grammar (CG) model. Thus, it is the primary goal of the present chapter to postulate substantial congruence of conclusions drawn from the mainstream models of discourse analysis applied in chapters I-IV with an analysis of the same persuasive discourse types pursued according to Langacker's cognitive apparatus. The objective is necessarily modest and the discussion tentative, targeting at mere acknowledgement of existing analogies and thus comment-like, as attempts at bringing Cognitive Grammar and discourse analysis together are still a very recent time phenomenon (cf. Langacker 2001). Such an apparent lack of contact seems somewhat astonishing since, while the grounding of all language in discourse and social interaction is central to the functionalist tradition and most discourse studies, the latter is certainly no less true for cognitive linguistics. Furthermore, as Langacker argues (cf. Langacker 2001), cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar make more than evident relationship with discourse through the basic assumption that all linguistic units are abstracted from *usage events*, that is, actual instances of language use.

As has been suggested, there seem to exist **analogies** between the mechanisms which govern the analysis of a given discourse type and which have been described as such by mainstream discourse theories, and the mechanisms of conceptualization which, as part of Langacker's Cognitive Grammar apparatus, have thus far been addressed predominantly in the explanation of such phenomena as structure of grammatical categories, predication or the Speaker/Conceptualizer-Hearer relation. The latter have not, however, been adequately applied in the study of natural discourse nor, of course, in the elucidation of the complexities pertaining to the determination of discourse analysis. At least two such analogies should be brought up for satisfactory description of the status of an analyst facing the task of persuasive discourse investigation. The first is the apparent logical correspondence between the dynamic status of the analyst confronting the background of the analyzed text (i.e. his/her distance to/from the actual scene of events) and the equally dynamic mechanism of conceptualization of the *on-stage region* (OS) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer in CG model of *viewing arrangement* of the stage in the process of predication (cf. Langacker 1987). Analogous to the situation whereby the analyst becomes part of the investigated discourse is namely the process that Langacker (1999b) terms *subjectification* and that consists in Speaker's/Conceptualizer's assumption of place within the OS and/or within the scope of predication, a move which marks the change of *viewing arrangement* of the OS from objective (*Objective Viewing Arrangement – OVA*) to egocentric (*Egocentric Viewing Arrangement – EVA*). Although the difference remains that in CG model *subjectification*

involves the conceptualizing party and not the discourse-analyzing one, this does not detract from the logical similarity of the process itself, as long as it is acknowledged that in the 'analytic subjectification' the *OS* encompasses the analyzed discourse area and that such concepts as *trajector* and *landmark*, originally being the main elements of the *OS*, now turn subordinate to the Speaker entity and the Hearer entity, both of which thus become part of the newly-created 'discourse stage'. The discussion of the analytic value stemming from an application of Langacker's *subjectification* characteristics to the description of the status of a discourse analyst confronting a persuasive text will take place in section 3. In section 4, we shall concentrate on the other interesting and analytically feasible analogy holding between classical discourse analysis and Langacker's CG model. This will involve the correspondence between the reciprocity of data-theory determination as accounted for by mainstream discourse theories and Langacker's concept of *Current Discourse Space (CDS)* wherein language expressions stand in apparently 'reciprocal' relation to the *CDS*, in the sense that they at the same time follow from the *CDS* and serve as *instructions* to further modify or augment it (cf. Langacker 2001: 151). As in the case of *subjectification*, the acknowledgement of this kind of analogy will be shown to possess substantial capacity of enriching the analysis of (persuasive) discourse determination.

Before setting out to investigate discourse determination issues via the prism of Langacker's CG model, we still need to acknowledge a very important fact: it is only a close correspondence between certain phenomena discussed in chapters 1-4 and those accounted for in some of Langacker's works that, if approached in relation to the *specific* structure and the *concrete* goals of the present book, allows us to talk about the mainstream discourse theories and Langacker's CG in such a close proximity. Thus, one must not disregard the legacy of the 'pre-cognitive' studies of the 1970s and 1980s that consists in paving the way for the current attempts (random as yet, but growing in popularity - cf. Harder 1996; Langacker 2001) at reconciling traditional discourse analyses with theories such as Langacker's. Among those who have contributed to the growth of this kind of dialogue are, for instance, Haiman (1980, 1983), Talmy (1975, 1977, 1978, 1983), Fillmore (1982), Barwise and Perry (1983), Wierzbicka (1975, 1985) and, most notably, Givon (1979, 1984, 1989) and Chafe (1970, 1979, 1994). Interestingly, it is Langacker himself who postulates (cf. Langacker 1999) that linguistic pragmatics and discourse analysis should best draw upon the foundations laid by Wallace Chafe's works. Accordingly, some of the observations made in the present chapter reflect probably just as much of Chafe's legacy as of Langacker's own reformulations and modifications to Chafe's ideas, intriguingly implicit in a number of CG micro-models, including the *CDS* model. This is particularly true of the use of such concepts as hypothesis, data, theory and, most importantly, the interplay between data and theory or, as Chafe himself puts it, between 'observing and theorizing' (cf. Chafe 1994: 22). Thus, the discussion of Langacker's concepts such as the *CDS* in section 4 presupposes awareness of the methodological *productivity* stemming from the interplay between individual chunks of data, hypothesis and theory. Chafe's contribution to the understanding of the above interplay, a prerequisite necessary not only for Langacker's construction of the *CDS* model (clearly anchored in Chafe's 'flow' of consciousness), but also for my own analytically-minded reformulation thereof, is best seen from the following passage:

[...] The hypothesis, as first conceived on the basis of ‘quick and dirty’ observations, is easily seen to be untenable as soon as further data are examined. [...] However, when the counterexamples are examined carefully, they reveal consistent properties that might not have been noticed if they had not been illuminated by the initial hypothesis. These properties then lead to restatements of the hypothesis, followed by further observations. These reciprocal activities eventually lead to more satisfying theory-data matches. (Chafe 1994: 22)

3. Analyst’s status in discourse in the light of Langacker’s subjectification theory

Before elucidating the relevance of subjectification to the analytic construal of (persuasive) discourse, one needs to look at, first, how subjectification works (in its classic CG form) and second, how it relates to some other root concepts of CG, which, as was claimed in 2., have thus far been of little concern for a majority of discourse analysts. These involve the afore-mentioned notions of the two viewing arrangements *OVA* and *EVA*, as well as the shifting degree of asymmetry between the *ground* (consisting, in Langacker’s terms, of the conceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject, the setting and circumstances of the verbal event, and the participants of the event¹), and the *OS* region and/or the scope of predication.

3.1. Construal of the on-stage region and the mechanism of subjectification

At the root of Langacker’s concept of subjectification is the *asymmetry* (or the lack thereof) that holds between the conceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject, and the on-stage region and/or the scope of predication in the process of construing the stage of a verbal event. As Langacker (1990b) points out, the process is similar to that in which a person looks at or through a pair of glasses. In the first case, i.e. when a person looks *at* the glasses, they are merely a part of the entire viewing frame of this person. Such situation is an example of the objective construal of the on-stage region (to which the glasses evidently belong). If, however, a person decides to put the glasses on and look *through* them, they become part of a cognitive apparatus of the person; in other words, they are construed subjectively from the person’s standpoint. In the latter case, the asymmetry that normally exists between the conceptualizer and the on-stage region in an objective construal of the stage disappears. The conceptualizing subject (or, in this case, rather a conceptualized one²) enters the on-stage region and is no longer construed objectively by the conceptualizer.

In order to apply these observations to a verbal event, let us work with the following sentence:

¹ Cf. Langacker 1990b.

² The term “conceptualizing” would much better fit an actual *verbal* situation involving the construction of a sentence where *glasses* would function as an active subject element, e.g. *The glasses are on the table*, etc. In a theoretical discussion (such as Langacker’s) of a non-verbal situation, the passive form seems to my mind more appropriate.

(1) *BMW is doing better than Mercedes.*

Let us first account for the situation in which sentence (1) is uttered by a third party, such as, for instance, a representative of another car manufacturer. The viewing arrangement of the stage and the relation between the Speaker/Conceptualizer and the on-stage region will then look as follows (Figure 1):




Fig. 1

In example (1) the elements of the ground (G) such as the Speaker/Conceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject *BMW*, and the Hearer remain beyond the scope of predication of the sentence. At the same time, they are positioned off-stage (outside of the OS ellipsis), as the Speaker/Conceptualizer has not elected himself to be part of the communicated message and hence has not applied the conceptualizing subject *BMW* to create such effect. The vertical line is thus a symbol of an *objective* construal of the verbal event occurring in (1) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer and the Hearer. It relates the ground elements to a horizontal axis which connects the trajector (tr) with the landmark (lm). These are the two basic figures profiled by the subject-predicate relation in sentence (1), the trajector being the most salient entity (*BMW*) and the landmark (indicated by *doing better than Mercedes*) serving as point of reference for locating the trajector. The range of the horizontal axis also involves elements X and Y (indicated in verbal terms by '*BMW*' and '*Mercedes*' respectively) which stand within an objective relation to each other. This kind of relation holding between X and Y on the one hand and between the trajector and the landmark on the other makes the horizontal axis the *objectification*

axis. The fact that the latter is connected with the vertical line signifies the *potential* within the capacity of the Speaker/Conceptualizer to become part of the communicated message³. This potential can be realized through a change in such elements of the ground as the setting or the circumstances of the verbal event (for instance, a change in professional background of the Speaker).

In order to further elucidate the objective construal of the verbal event occurring in (1), let us attempt to turn Langacker's spatial configuration into a linear one:

$$\text{OVA}(1) = G \{[(BMW_x)_{tr} \text{ is } (doing \text{ better than } Mercedes_y)_{lm}]_{OS}\}_{scope}$$

By integrating a symbolic portrayal of the construing relation with its verbal manifestation, this linear configuration offers some additional insight into the mutual correspondence of elements of the ground and the stage. It is clear that the ground is a category that is 'superordinate' toward both the stage and the scope of predication, in the sense that some of its elements (the Speaker/Conceptualizer, the conceptualizing subject) govern the degree of asymmetry between G and the OS. As we shall see, it is the Speaker/Conceptualizer that decides whether to become part of the on-stage region or merely part of the scope of predication. This choice affects in turn the linguistic form of the verbal event; in the case of an utterance such as (1), the Speaker/Conceptualizer will either enter the OS by explicitly stating the identity relationship with the conceptualizing subject (e.g. by means of a determiner) or enter the scope alone, by presupposing such relationship. The dominance of the ground in evoking the dynamics of G-OS interaction might now seem a trivial observation, but in actuality it is going to matter much to the later considerations concerning 'analytic subjectification'.

So let us imagine now that the claim in (1) is to be made by a person in some way associated with the entity indicated by the conceptualizing subject. The person might then state the association explicitly or leave it presupposed. This renders the form of sentence (1) into a couple of related forms, such as e.g.:

(2) (*Our company*) *BMW is doing better than Mercedes.*

The parenthesis serves to mark the option the person has in deciding whether to be explicit about his/her status toward the subject or not. This choice affects, in Langacker's terms, the position of the ground elements in relation to the stage and the scope of predication. If the Speaker/Conceptualizer chooses to voice his status toward the conceptualizing subject explicitly and thereby affect the language form used, the ground gets positioned within **both** the on-stage region and the scope of predication.

³ In his description of OVA, Langacker (1990b) uses a vertical arrow, not a vertical line. This is, to my mind, insufficient to illustrate the closeness of interaction between elements of the ground and the on-stage region (albeit it works elegantly in the description of the process of subjectification alone).

Langacker (1990b) terms such move *subjectification I*. If, however, the Speaker/Conceptualizer takes it for granted that his status toward the subject is clear for the Hearer and hence merely presupposes his identity, the ground assumes its position within the scope of predication of the sentence though not within the OS. In the latter case, one talks of the so-called *subjectification II* (cf. Langacker 1990b). The essence of the change in construing relation remains identical in both situations; the Speaker/Conceptualizer is no longer an objective commentator on the verbal event as his viewing of the OS and/or the scope of predication turns largely egocentric. Yet his *movement along* the vertical axis or, hence, subjectification axis (cf. Fig. 1) may be of a different degree and depth. This kind of difference is reflected in an evident contrast between Fig. 2 which depicts subjectification I, and Fig. 3 which illustrates subjectification II:




Fig. 2





Fig. 3

3.2. ‘Analytic subjectification’

As has been suggested in 2., Langacker’s model of subjectification has a potential which allows an extension beyond its primary scope of application. The cornerstone of this extension is the apparent correspondence between the dynamic status of the analyst in relation to the background of the analyzed text and the comparably dynamic mechanism of conceptualization of the on-stage region (OS) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer in CG model of viewing arrangement of the stage in the process of predication. In other words, there exists an analogy between the Speaker’s/Conceptualizer’s assumption of place within the OS and/or within the scope of predication on the one hand, and the positioning of the analyst as part of the analyzed piece of discourse on the other. Although in the former case the subjectification involves the conceptualizing party and in the latter the discourse-analytic party, the two processes are intrinsically similar and so are the initial, objective viewing arrangements which underlie them. Namely, as a prerequisite for the process of ‘analytic subjectification’, the range of the OS extends over the analyzed discourse area and the concepts such as trajector and landmark, which in the source model of subjectification are the main elements of the OS, in the discourse-analytic model turn subordinate to the Speaker’s party and the Hearer’s party. Accordingly, both the Speaker and the Hearer become part of thus created ‘discourse stage’.

The analyst’s objective viewing arrangement (OVA) of the discourse stage and his/her potential for the accomplishment of the egocentric viewing arrangement (EVA), through the process of the analytic subjectification discussed above can be depicted as follows (Fig. 4)⁴:



⁴ Symbol “An” indicates Analyst .




Fig. 4

Thus, if a claim such as (1) *BMW is doing better than Mercedes* was to constitute, say, a speaker's piece of argument in a larger discourse structure aimed at affecting the addressee/hearer in some way, whether mental or physical, then any attempt to provide the resulting *linear* configuration of the objective viewing arrangement adopted by the analyst of such discourse structure would necessitate turning Fig. 4 into the following complex transcription:

$$OVA_{\text{analysis } (1)} = \text{An}\{G[S_{\text{il}}(BMW_{\text{tr,x}} \text{ is } (\text{doing better than Mercedes})_{\text{lm}})H_{\text{perl}}]\}_{\text{analytic scope}}^5$$

The proposed linear version may seem an intricate one, however, the relations of subordination and superordination indicated by the sophisticated bracketing cast much light upon the complexities following from the supra-status of the analyst depicted in Fig. 4. The positioning of the categories of S, H, and the message-bound categories of tr and lm inside of the main brace reflects in the vast range of options the analyst has in entering the stage in the process of the analytic subjectification. Namely, the analyst may become part of the OS by assuming the H's position, or the S's position, or both. Furthermore, the analyst may become part of the OS by demonstrating the expert knowledge of the message formula as such (cf. legal language), with no clear attachment to, or identification with, the Hearer's party or the Speaker's party. As we shall see, all those options have their anchoring in the nature of the particular types of discourse discussed in chapters 1-4. The potential of the analytic subjectification can thus be best described by a triangular area (cf. Fig. 5) whose in-ground part specifies the region of the egocentric viewing arrangement (EVA) of the stage by the analyst, the remaining part marking the analyst's distance to/from the investigated discourse and the dotted lines indicating patterns of directionality (toward H, toward S, or toward message only) from the objective viewing arrangement (OVA) to the egocentric one:

⁵ 'Il' indicates 'illocutionary force'; 'perl' indicates 'perlocutionary effect'.




Fig. 5

3.3. Subjectification in the analysis of persuasive discourse

In what follows, we shall make use of the basic arrangement in Fig. 5 to elaborate on these many issues of methodological determination of persuasive discourse which pertain to the mechanism of the analytic subjectification. As has been observed in section 1., the position of a given discourse type on the axis of the deductive-inductive determination depends, to a large extent, on the analyst's closeness to the discourse under investigation. This translates into the claim that by being part of the discourse context, the analyst undergoes overdetermination by deductive processes and, conversely, by being out of the discourse context the analyst gets overdetermined inductively. Putting this claim into the context of subjectification schema indicated by Fig. 5 necessitates a redefinition and the resulting restructuring of the triangular configuration for each of the member types of persuasive discourse. This task will be covered in the following subsections 3.3.1-3.3.4. The chronology of the presentation will draw upon the (decreasing) degree of subjectification involved; we shall begin with the deduction-oriented analysis of the discourse of advertising, to end up with the study of the discourse of scientific inquiry, a type entailing little or no subjectification at all.

3.3.1 Discourse of advertising

The conceptualization of the on-stage region by a discourse-of-advertising analyst involves a substantial degree of subjectification. The subjectification is predominantly hearer-directed; the analyst derives the function of a particular discourse manifestation from the assumption of the hearer's position on the discourse stage. The role of analysis of the message body in evaluating the function is normally negligible, though the analyst may sometimes resort to provision of data atypical of the functional hypothesis. These regularities make the *in-elliptical region of the An-tr/lm-H triangle* the most genuine portrayal of the analyst's field of conceptualization in the case of the discourse of advertising (cf. Fig. 5a). Since there is a clear contrast between the degree of subjectification 'via Hearer' on the one hand and 'via message' on the other, the An-H connection is represented by a continuous line, while the An-tr/lm connection remains symbolically 'dotted':




Fig. 5a. Field of analytic conceptualization in discourse of advertising

3.3.2. Political discourse

If one wishes to make a comparison between the fields of analytic conceptualization as determined by the discourse of advertising and the discourse of politics, the arrangement in Fig. 5a calls for two major alterations. First, since the discourse of politics entails a considerable dose of analytic inductivism, its field of conceptualization must reach beyond the boundaries of the on-stage region and the ground. Thereby, the process of subjectification can be portrayed in terms of a potential, rather than an analytic routine.

Consequently, it is also the configuration of the relationship holding between the analyst and the hearer/addressee that needs a substantial modification. It is quite clear that the analyst may enter the OS by identification with H, but it would be an unjustified exaggeration to claim that this should constitute an analytic norm. Furthermore, in some cases (e.g. of an analysis pursued by a linguist-political scientist or an analysis of a text whose function is prescribed by some cultural or institutional pre-conditions) it is virtually impossible to specify how much of the analytic subjectification occurs as a result of the sole assumption of the H's position and how much (more) is enhanced by the possession of expert knowledge which does not necessarily follow from identification with the hearer/addressee. Therefore it is difficult to conceive of the An-H and An-tr/lm segments being represented differently. All these observations are reflected in the configuration offered by Fig. 5b below. It should be added that, as has been the case with the previous arrangement, the subjectification potential indicated by the An-tr/lm-S region remains as yet unfulfilled:




Fig. 5b. Field of analytic conceptualization in discourse of politics

3.3.3. Discourse of the law

Similar to what we have seen in the case of political discourse, legal discourse does not invite the process of analytic subjectification indiscriminately. As a result, the configuration of the field of discourse conceptualization needs again to account for the fully dynamic relationship that holds between the analyst and the on-stage region. However, in contrast to the discourse of politics, the subjectification that may potentially

occur in the analysis of legal discourse is much more message-directed. This follows from the fact that, as has been observed in Chapter Four, it is relative to the lexical structure of a given subtype of the principal discourse that either an inductive approach or a deductive approach to analysis is more feasibly adopted. Hence, since the macropropositional cues that occur in discourse of the law hardly ever reflect the status of discourse participants, the ‘field’ of analytic conceptualization (or rather a direction thereof) seems best depicted by merely a continuous line linking the An and tr/lm categories:




Fig. 5c. Direction/field of analytic conceptualization in discourse of the law

3.3.4. Discourse of scientific argument

Finally, let us attempt to provide a configuration of the field of conceptualization for a discourse which, as was indicated in Chapter Three, involves little analytic subjectification or, in a vast majority of cases, no subjectification at all. The discourse of scientific argument seems, on the one hand, antithetical to the discourse of advertising (cf. 3.3.1.); while the latter positions the analyst *inside* of the on-stage region, the former positions him/her, clearly, *outside* of the OS and the ground. The important difference about these extreme manifestations of analytic determinism lies, however, in the *directionality* of (actual or potential) subjectification. In the analysis of the discourse of advertising, the subjectification, which is actual and almost necessarily present, targets predominantly at the Hearer’s party. On the other hand, in the case of scientific

language analysis, though the process of subjectification is curbed by social reality constraints, its potential cannot be possibly described as, specifically, Hearer-, Speaker-, or message-directed. The absence of expert knowledge in the analyst is a fact that follows from the general absence of the analyst on the discourse stage, whichever segment of the S-H axis is talked about. One could in fact assume that a hypothetical minority of analysts who are at the same time part of the ‘Hearer’ domain is no bigger than that of the analysts who would belong to the ‘Speaker’ domain. Therefore, albeit the field of analytic conceptualization for the discourse of science remains outside of the ground boundaries, it simultaneously extends all over the area between the An-S and An-H directionality lines, with no clear attachment to either of them:




Fig. 5d. Field of analytic conceptualization in discourse of scientific argument

4. Discourse space, discourse expectations and analytic expectations

Apart from analytic subjectification, there seems to be the other interesting and analytically feasible model (or, as yet, formula) emerging from the confrontation of mainstream discourse analysis and Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar. The underlying tenet of this formula is the apparent correspondence that holds between the reciprocity of data-theory determination as accounted for by traditional discourse theories and Langacker’s concept of *Current Discourse Space (CDS)*. According to the latter, all language expressions stand in apparently ‘reciprocal’ relation to the *CDS*, in the sense that they at the same time follow from the *CDS* and serve as *instructions* to further modify or augment it (cf. Langacker 2001: 151; also Harder 1996). The usefulness of reconciling the classic models of data-theory interaction (as proposed in multiple works

of Beaugrande, Kintsch and others) with Langacker's *CDS* model consists in, as has been the case with subjectification theory, a further elaboration on the anchoring of the analyst in discourse and his/her conceptualization of the scope of analysis. The specific insight that is available from the *CDS* model involves in particular an illuminating account of the cases in which it is the expert knowledge possessed by the discourse analyst that prompts, somewhat ironically, a genuinely "bottom-up" study as a result of which the expert knowledge becomes, itself, further enhanced and modified.

4.1. Current Discourse Space (CDS) and discourse expectations

In Langacker's view (cf. Langacker 2001), the CDS is defined as the mental space comprising elements of the ground and the relations between them, construed by both the speaker and the hearer for successful communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse. The CDS thus includes the whole body of (contextual) knowledge which is readily accessible by discourse participants at any stage of verbal interaction. Importantly, it includes the speaker's and the hearer's apprehension of the ongoing discourse itself: a series of previous discourse usage events, as well as subsequent events that might be predicted. All facets of these events, whether previous or anticipated, can be drawn upon or alluded to in the current utterance.

This last observation goes to suggest that any (signalling) aspect of a single usage event or a sequence of events in a discourse is capable of being abstracted as a conventional linguistic unit. Thus, Langacker argues, many units make detailed specifications in regard to multiple events within a sequence. Such units embody established discourse patterns and dependencies. When associated with particular lexical elements, they amount to *discourse expectations* symbolized by those elements. One can find regularities in discourse sequences of any size, viewed at any level of organization. It is then equally a matter of discourse expectation that, say, an enacting formula will be followed by a main body of a statute (cf. Chapter Four) and that a prefix will be followed by a stem. In all that, Langacker's theory invites a unified approach for lexical items, grammatical constructions, and discourse patterns of any size.

Furthermore, Langacker claims that linguistic structures, once they have been abstracted from usage events, serve in turn as *instructions* to modify and update the current discourse space in particular ways. Each instruction involves the focusing of attention within a viewing frame. A discourse comprises a succession of frames each representing the scene being viewed and acted on by the speaker and the hearer at a given time. The frame which is currently being acted on is referred to as *zero frame*. It is preceded by a *minus frame* and followed by a *plus frame* (cf. Langacker 2001: 149; Fig. 6).

The ultimate finding within the CDS theory to be feasibly addressed from a discourse-determination perspective is that reference to a sequence of frames is incorporated as part of linguistic units. A particular linguistic element can be *retrospective*, in the sense of making a specification concerning the prior discourse, and/or *prospective*, by virtue of evoking the subsequent discourse. Illustrating a retrospective element, making a specification in its minus frame, is a lexical item such as 'therefore'. Conversely, illustrating a prospective element, making a specification in its plus frame, would be, for

instance, any noun phrase functioning as a topic marker. Naturally, the latter would also be retrospective, in the sense that a topic, apart from providing a reference point for purposes of interpreting a subsequent proposition, needs to be an entity already accessible in the prior discourse.



Fig. 6. A series of frames updating the CDS

4.2. Analytic awareness and application of the CDS model

Most fundamentally, the CDS model involves the continual accumulation, updating and modification of the speaker's knowledge which is derived from the unfolding discourse. The relation between the speaker and a given series of discourse frames is one whereby the speaker, him-/herself positioned in the current, zero frame, draws upon the contents of the (immediately) retrospective frames, to finally determine the contents of the (immediately) prospective ones. This process is by no means alien to analytic activity of a linguist, as long as: first, he/she possesses a substantial degree of expert knowledge about the investigated discourse type, and second, the discourse itself displays lexical and functional heterogeneity, either within the principal type, or by virtue of having a large number of manifestations in different subtypes. In the persuasive domain, the latter is true, for example, about legal language as a whole, and the courtroom language in particular (cf. Chapter Four, section 5.2). In other words then, it is postulated that from the perspective of knowledge management, the categories of the speaker and the zero frame in the CDS theory are analogous to, respectively, the category of the analyst and the other category of what might be called the "currently-analyzed-discourse" ("CAD"). This can be proved by looking at the activity of the analyst dealing with the above-mentioned example of courtroom discourse. The analyst gets a high mileage from consideration of the "retrospective frames", which in this case is a number of his/her previous contacts with the target discourse or with the analytic literature concerning it. As a result of this inductively-derived but in fact now deductive expertise, he/she develops an attitude which precludes any early hypothesizing about the discourse function; quite contrarily, in view of the heterogeneity of the analyzed discourse, the analyst feels obliged to approach (or rather, keep approaching) it inductively. At this point the analyst starts to engage in a process of collecting new cues for the macrofunction of the analyzed discourse, as a result of which the approach to the category of currently-analyzed-discourse (CAD) gets modified. The analyst's mental state is 'augmented' by further "top-down"-deterministic observations, affecting further analytic activity and in particular fostering, ironically enough, still more of the "bottom-

pragmatics, phonology, and more. But since at the same time linguistic pragmatics is working on, producing, re-producing and reformulating its own methodologies such as theories of implicature, illocutionary acts, face-management, etc., which all somehow relate, in different degrees, to these traditional components, the apparent gap between the explanatory status of cognitive linguistics and linguistic pragmatics is starting to shrink (cf. Kalisz 1993, 2001; Kalisz and Kubiński 1993; Kubiński and Stanulewicz 2001; Langacker 2001). This fact is in turn a recurrent prompt for implementation of models of cognitive linguistics into studies of discourse determination. In Conclusions part, therefore, we shall look at some ideas which, while drawing upon the analytically conciliatory overtone of the present chapter, have not been described in it, because of being either too tentative in themselves or perhaps insufficiently related to the four types of discourse accounted for.

Conclusions

The primary objective of the present book has been to assess and account for the degree of analytic determinism pertaining to a given kind of persuasive text. In order to accomplish this objective I have studied selected types of persuasive discourse as well as looked at the ways they have been dealt with in relevant literature on discourse analysis. The discussion of which discourse types invite which of the cornerstone analytic approaches (i.e. “top-down” and “bottom-up” approach) has gradually evolved into speculation about the existence of a methodological model under which the analysis of discourse determination in general, and the status of the analyst toward discourse in particular, would seem maximally elucidated. This speculation has been largely prompted by a mounting necessity to further theorize upon the analyst’s conceptualization of the scope of analysis.

The shift of attention which has occurred as a result of the attempt to maximize the outcome of the descriptive task regarding the aspect of discourse determination has meant a natural emergence of a secondary objective of the book, a goal involving the search for relevant ways of reconciliation of the traditional discourse theories and cognitive approach to discourse and discourse analysis. It seems that the cognitive approach (out of which Langacker’s CG has been singled as the most elegant model for extra description of discourse determination) has proved immensely useful in accounting for the varying degree of the analytic determinism as following from the conceptualization of the investigated text chunk by discourse analyst. Furthermore, Langacker’s CG has shown to possess a substantial explanatory potential as regards the

interface of the two extreme poles (the deductive and the inductive one) of discourse determination.

The following two sections both aim at recapitulating the major findings concerning the two objectives of the book, though there are some recognizable differences between the first and the second section. In the first section I confine myself to going over the most important observations concerning discourse determination, as voiced originally in chapters 1-4. In the second section, while reiterating the potential of Langacker's CG with regard to the enrichment of the particular issues of analytic determinism, I also go on to postulate some extra points conducive to further interaction between cognitive approach to discourse on the one hand and the traditional apparatus of linguistic pragmatics and discourse studies on the other. In my argument this kind of dialogue is primarily advocated with a view to further elucidation of the nature of the deterministic phenomena, though at times the discussion becomes somewhat more oriented toward specification of the very immediate potential for further integrated research in cognitive grounding of discourse in general.

1. Analytic determinism of (persuasive) discourse: concluding remarks

1.1. The existence and analytic manifestation of deterministic processes

Discourse determination consists in the analyst's approaching a given textual chunk with some sort of mental predisposition affecting perception of the text's function. Crucial to defining this predisposition are such concepts as data, theory, thesis, hypothesis, structure of argument and more. In the case of some texts the analyst is prone to postulate claims regarding their function at an early stage of analysis, however, in the case of others, such claims tend to be voiced only after a substantial amount of data has been processed and accounted for. We have seen from the present book that the almost 'prototypical' examples of these disparate procedures are, respectively, the multiple analyses of the discourse of advertising and the studies into the functional structure of scientific discourse. Though the analyst can never be said to adhere to either method of analysis in hundred percent, his/her differences in approach seem as true reflections of the conflicting yet complementary nature of deductive and inductive processes underlying scientific activity reaching far beyond the domain of language studies as such.

1.2. Text features and expert knowledge as prompts for deductive ("top-down") and inductive ("bottom-up") procedures

In previous chapters I have been trying to point to a vast number of prompts favoring a "top-down" and/or a "bottom-up" approach to analysis. It seems that among the most widespread of these are, first and foremost, the analyst's distance to the investigated discourse (consisting in whether the analyst is in a sense part of the analyzed stage of events or, alternatively, remains a distant observer or objective commentator on the S-H/Addressee interaction), the degree of expert knowledge of the analyst concerning the background to the investigated discourse (following in turn from the degree of the analyst's distance to the discourse stage), the metaphoric load of the text, the length of the text sample elected for analysis, and finally, the number and density of

macropropositional cues occurring in the sample. The prompts for adoption of a given method of analysis are thus less or more text-bound; for instance the last two examples relate to autonomous properties of text whereas the first two apparently not. Furthermore, some prompts are typically of the kind favoring deductive analysis and some others tend to foster a “bottom-up” approach. For instance, as has been proved in chapters 1 and 3, dense metaphorization or even the mere amassment of data-based cues for functional macropropositions encourage an inductive method of analysis, while in turn vast expert knowledge stimulates mostly deductive research (cf. chapter 2). In actuality, the expert knowledge of the analyst, derived from his/her position vis a vis the discourse stage can also be seen as a parameter prompting an approach continually oscillating between the “top-down” and “bottom-up” extremes (cf. chapters 1 and 4).

1.3. Expert knowledge and the deductive/inductive interface

The degree of expert knowledge possessed by the analyst is, as has already been said, one of the most important factors in the analyst’s adherence to a given method of his/her research. Equally, it is the expert knowledge concerning a principal discourse type under investigation that determines some of the analytic activities which draw upon an interplay of the deductive and inductive approach. Prior to actual study, the analyst may have tacit idea of the text’s being structured in such a way as to preclude any approaching it with a ready-made hypothesis concerning its macrofunction (cf. chapters 3 and 4). The analyst may as a result handle the text in an inductive manner, only to find out that his/her preconceptions regarding the method of analysis had been correct. Following from this is an augmented instillation or enhancement of the initial methodological predispositions within his/her analytic mind-set. Should the analyst then confront a text generically similar to the previous one, he/she will embark upon componential or linear analysis more naturally than before, as his/her pre-beliefs have already been verified successfully. Thus, it is very often the case that although the analyst may develop an intrinsically deductive approach to the method of analysis, the actual study as such is pursued in an inductive way (cf. chapters 3, 4 and section 4.2 in chapter 5).

1.4. Evident hypothesis and underspecification of data

If the distance that holds between the analyst and the discourse stage is small or virtually non-existent (cf. chapter 2), the analyst tends to demonstrate a substantial degree of expert knowledge concerning the analyzed text sample. As a result, he/she pursues an inherently deductive study whereby an initial hypothesis about the function of the text is strong enough to make the data space in the argument relatively constrained. The discussion in chapter 2 has proved that the more evident and thus stronger the hypothesis, the smaller the data space. Moreover, the more evident the hypothesis the more chance of the data chunks being atypical of the principal discourse type covered by the primary analysis. In other words, if the analyst elects to voice a highly uncontroversial claim at an early stage of the argument, he/she is consistently prone to illustrate the claim by non-prototypical examples which usually have to do with the peripheral subtypes of the principal discourse. As has been suggested in chapter 2, this tendency might be called ‘a monitor of critical triviality’.

2. Analytic determinism, discourse studies and cognitive description: summary and prospects for further research

2.1. Concluding remarks on subjectification and ‘analytic subjectification’

With the degree of distance between the analyst and the discourse stage being perhaps the most significant factor in an account of discourse determination, Langacker’s model of subjectification offers some elegant critical elaboration on the size and direction of deterministic processes underlying a given discourse type. At the root of this potential is, as I have claimed in chapter 5, a clear correspondence between the dynamic status of the analyst in relation to the background of the analyzed text and the equally dynamic mechanism of conceptualization of the on-stage region (OS) by the Speaker/Conceptualizer in CG model of viewing arrangement of the stage in the process of predication. In chapter 5 thus suggested extension of Langacker’s theory has been referred to as ‘analytic subjectification’, a process that has proved different in range or directionality for each of the analyzed discourse types. Consequently, we have seen cases in which analytic subjectification was extensive and ‘hearer-oriented’, the ones in which it involved the message rather than a ‘discourse participant’, or the cases where its range was merely negligible (cf. analysis of medical discourse). A result of these accounts has been an emergence of an apparently feasible micro-level model bridging traditional approaches to discourse analysis with an intrinsically cognitive approach.

2.2. CDS and ‘CAD’

If the postulate for the existence of analytic subjectification involves in a sense a provision of accounts of discourse determination from the perspective of relatively static distance points or fields marking particular analytic approaches to the particular discourse types (though, of course, the status of analytic approach to ‘discourse’ as such or at least to the ‘discourse of persuasion’ in general is dynamic), then the reformulation of Langacker’s CDS into my Currently-Analyzed-Discourse (CAD) model is a postulate that draws upon an interplay of inductive and deductive processes pertaining primarily to a global analytic activity, consisting in a continual intake of information, internalization and demonstration thereof. Most essentially, I have argued that the use of Langacker’s CDS for the CAD postulate is beneficial, as has been the case with the subjectification theory, for some further elaboration on the anchoring of the analyst in discourse and his/her conceptualization of the scope of analysis. However, it needs to be reiterated that the very specific insight available from the CAD model involves a particularly interesting description of the cases in which it is the “deductive”, expert knowledge possessed by the discourse analyst that prompts, paradoxically enough, a truly inductive study as a result of which the expert knowledge becomes itself augmented.

2.3. (Determination of) discourse analysis in the light of cognitive linguistics: some rough ideas for further enhancement of integrated discourse studies

As I have pointed out in chapter 5 (cf. section 5), cognitive linguists (of various scholarly backgrounds) had long been reluctant to engage in the description of phenomena related directly to linguistic pragmatics and discourse analysis. Naturally, there had been random calls for such a kind of dialogue; a selection of these is discussed in e.g. Nuyts (1996). Among primarily advocated issues was, notably, setting up a link between CL approach and the approach demonstrated by text linguists, including Beaugrande, Kintsch, Dressler and others. But it can still be claimed that a common, genuine and systematic interest in bridging CL and discourse was to arise not earlier than in 1990s.

Kubiński and Stanulewicz (2001) argue, with good reason, that this state of affairs was probably due to the fact that, at the outset of what is acknowledged as cognitive approach to language study, cognitive linguists were mostly preoccupied with defining some macro concepts which were supposed to be fundamental to their theories. This refers to Langacker's construction of "space grammar" and later CG, Lakoff's early work on categorization and metaphor, or Fauconnier's initial outline of mental spaces. One might add to that some kind of prohibitive discrepancy resulting from an entrenchment of CL and pragmatics/discourse theories in different source disciplines; while the former adheres to an inherently psychological model, the latter are clearly sociological developments. At some time all these factors might have indeed prevented cognitive linguists from going deeper into more sophisticated manifestations of language use, a traditional domain of pragmatics and discourse analysis. But now, with multiple cognitive models having been adequately developed, this problem seems to have ceased to exist. Accordingly, cognitive linguists are no longer that much reluctant to advocate implementation of CL apparatus in discourse analysis, and this can be seen from works such as Langacker's (2001), a paper which has been quoted extensively in chapter 5.

It seems that much extra insight in discourse analysis (as well as determination thereof) could be generated as a result of cognitive research into the many diverse phenomena covered by the traditionally pragmatic categories of implicature and speech acts. For instance, many interesting observations concerning a cognitive approach to implicature (both conversational and conventional) are available from Kalisz (2001), who plausibly claims that all implicatures are 'gradable' in conversationality, in a way similar to the character of gradation of more or less prototypical objects. Hence, for example, conventional implicatures are less prototypical than truly 'conversational' implicatures are. Accepting the fact that implicatures undergo cognitive categorization means in turn an opportunity to deal with some intriguing repercussions that involve a description of discourse determination, by the processes which have been defined in the present book. Namely, it can be argued that a text which includes a large number of highly 'specific' conversational implicatures is going to invite an essentially inductive approach to analysis, whereas a text displaying multiple markers of conventional implicature will allow more of the deductive approach whereby the text's function could be easier and earlier pre-postulated.

As far as speech act theory is concerned, it is equally tempting to apply Fauconnier and Turner's (1996) concept of blending to look closer at a traditionally baffling class of "assertive declarations" proposed by Searle (1977) as part of what is still considered to

be one of the most popular and influential taxonomies of illocutionary acts. A clear inspiration for such an analysis comes from the combination of two kinds of mental processes underlying the construal of an act of declaration. In declaring something, the speaker gives a stimulus for an action or a series of actions to happen, and thereby performs an act similar in power and “direction of fit” to that of a directive. But at the same time, he/she indirectly acknowledges a present state of affairs, or rather a state of affairs that has already been put in place in order for the declaration to be performed successfully. This again translates into deterministic observations. Since at the root of the directive load of declaration is usually an explicitly stated performative verb, one might be prone to consider declarative acts carriers of function to be deciphered deductively, by mere ‘looking at’ or ‘scanning’ all performative verbs in all declarations within a text. But what may prevent an analyst from such a simplistic approach is the assertive component which entails a consistent analysis of all background to a given chunk of text or, in fact, to all “declarative” chunks in the text.

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Index

acknowledgement of opposition
analyst
analytic
 determinism,
 prompt,
 scope,
 subjectification
a posteriori (claim)
a priori (claim)
assertive declaration
asymmetry
blending
categorization
Cognitive Grammar (CG)
cognitive linguistics
commercial advertising
conceptualization
conceptualizer
Currently-Analyzed-Discourse (CAD)
Current Discourse Space (CDS)
data
 amassment,
 interaction,
 overdetermination,
 space,
 underdetermination
deductive (“top-down”) analysis
directionality
direction of fit
discourse
 (of) advertising,
 analysis,
 comprehension,
 (of) the courtroom,
 determination,
 (of) the law,
 (of) medicine,
 (of) persuasion,
 (of) politics,
 (of) science
egocentric viewing arrangement (EVA)
enacting formula

ethos
flow (of consciousness)
forensic linguistics
frame
 minus,
 plus,
 zero
ground
hypothesis
implicature
 conventional,
 conversational
inductive (“bottom-up”) analysis
jurisprudence
landmark
legislation
linguistic pragmatics
macroproposition
macropropositional cue
mental spaces
message
metaphor
NATO
non-profit advertising
objectification
objective viewing arrangement (OVA)
on-stage region (OS)
off-stage (region)
predication
presupposition
propaganda
prospective analysis
retrospective analysis
rhetoric
space grammar
speech act
statute
subjectification
 type I,
 type II
Taliban
text
 analysis,
 chunk,
 sample
theory
 overdetermination,

underdetermination
thesis
trajector
tumor marker
witness
cross-examination,
examination

Analytic Determinism of the Study of Persuasive Discourse: Inductive and Deductive Processes

Piotr Cap

Łódź 2003

CONTENTS

Preface and Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter One

Political Talk: Inductive and Deductive Methods of Analysis

Chapter Two

Advertising: Hypothesis and Deduction

Chapter Three

Discourse of Science: Induction from Data Amassment

Chapter Four

Language of the Law: Determination by Message Type

Chapter Five

Analytic Determinism and Cognitive Implications

Conclusions

References

Index