Theory of Beliefs
A theory of beliefs
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Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 20, 6:44 pm show options
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From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 20 Jul 2004 18:44:52 -0700
Local: Tues, Jul 20 2004 6:44 pm
Subject: A theory of beliefs
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Giventhat beliefs is ambiguous and knowledge (its acquisition) an
everpresent, defining problemfor living beings, when confronted with
decisions about a world state which, to simplify things, will be
considered binary, both rational and irrational beings are forced in a
first moment to choose from either one of thr possibilities and remain
attached to that selection as a matter of belief which then becomes
their elected stance against the World in that issue, or the
individual`s truth.
In a first moment each individual makes his\her decision when
confronted with the issue as in an (almost) independent way. At each
moment there are always individuals who have not been confronted with
the issue and therefore hold no belief.
But in a later moment interactions among individuals, when related to
the issue in question, makes a confrontation of particular beliefs,
that is, of the particular decision taken among the possibilities by
each individual. If the issue can be solved by confronting the belief
against Reality (thoughsometimes not even then), it is possible to
expect a (gradual) concordance on the `right` decisio to take so that
a consensus is reached, thoough there may remain individuals who, by
the necessity of diversity of Living Beings may hold a belief that
goes against yje consensus, which in this case is formed by the
adequacy of decisios to Reality as a de facto and ex post experience
that yields a known and (quasi) repeatable result. In this case
beliefs turn into Knowledge and the actual confronting of belief
against Reality takes the form of Method, be it trial and error or
scientific or anything in between. In this case too it is also to be
expected that individuals without contact reach the same basic
decision and consensus as a form of Truth in case they confront the
exact same issue.
But when there is no direct way to decide whether a belief (decision)
truly conforms to Reality, that is, there is no direct link between
holding the belief and experiencing (predicting) results based on that
belief, it is to be expected a particular dynamic in the way a certain
belief propagates in a population of beings which is akin, and can be
seen as such, as the phenomenon of magnetization of particles (spins)
in metals. In other words, for a simple model of binary beliefs, say,
whether something is valuable or not or somebody is good or evil, the
tools and metaphors of statistical mechanic fields can be applied as
models. This leads to interesting possibilities for the study of
formation, propagation of beliefs and other problems in the sociology
of Knowledge.
Reply
Uncle Al Jul 20, 7:13 pm show options
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From: Uncle Al - Find messages by this author
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 2004 21:13:42 -0500
Local: Tues, Jul 20 2004 7:13 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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"Fabrizio J. Bonsignore" wrote:
> Giventhat beliefs is ambiguous and knowledge (its acquisition) an
> everpresent, defining problemfor living beings, when confronted with
> decisions about a world state which, to simplify things, will be
> considered binary, both rational and irrational beings are forced in a
> first moment to choose from either one of thr possibilities and remain
> attached to that selection as a matter of belief which then becomes
> their elected stance against the World in that issue, or the
> individual`s truth.
[snip]
That's a 78-word sentence,
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/sunshine.jpg
> This leads to interesting possibilities for the study of
> formation, propagation of beliefs and other problems in the sociology
> of Knowledge.
Bullshit. Lightspeed is not subject to vote and resistors have
their tolerences appended.
--
Uncle Al
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/
(Toxic URL! Unsafe for children and most mammals)
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/qz.pdf
Reply
Sam Wormley Jul 20, 8:51 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Sam Wormley - Find messages by this author
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2004 03:51:12 GMT
Local: Tues, Jul 20 2004 8:51 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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See: http://www.csicop.org/si/9907/
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Sam Wormley Jul 20, 8:51 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Sam Wormley - Find messages by this author
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2004 03:51:12 GMT
Local: Tues, Jul 20 2004 8:51 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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See: http://www.csicop.org/si/9907/
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Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 21, 5:19 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 21 Jul 2004 05:19:09 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 5:19 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Uncle Al wrote in message ...
> "Fabrizio J. Bonsignore" wrote:
> > Giventhat beliefs is ambiguous and knowledge (its acquisition) an
> > everpresent, defining problemfor living beings, when confronted with
> > decisions about a world state which, to simplify things, will be
> > considered binary, both rational and irrational beings are forced in a
> > first moment to choose from either one of thr possibilities and remain
> > attached to that selection as a matter of belief which then becomes
> > their elected stance against the World in that issue, or the
> > individual`s truth.
> [snip]
> That's a 78-word sentence,
There is people who can digest it 8)
> > This leads to interesting possibilities for the study of
> > formation, propagation of beliefs and other problems in the sociology
> > of Knowledge.
> Bullshit. Lightspeed is not subject to vote and resistors have
> their tolerences appended.
Missed the point. Knowledge is at first a belief (hypothesis) that can
be `confronted` against Reality and `proved` true or false. But then
there is knowledge that cannot be corroborated truly and yet people
`know`. That is a belief and that kind of knowledge has a certain
dynamic. For instance, political rumors. BTW, corroboration may be a
matter of cost; you cannot corroborate because it is too costly, thus
your knowledge turns ito belief and is subject to change according to
the beliefs of other people you discuss the issue with.
Reply
Johnny 5 Jul 21, 9:20 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
Followup-To: alt.religion,sci.econ
From: Johnny 5 - Find messages by this author
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2004 16:20:13 GMT
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 9:20 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
news:768f7623.0407201744.3414348e@posting.google.com:
> Giventhat beliefs is ambiguous and knowledge (its acquisition) an
> everpresent, defining problemfor living beings, when confronted with
> decisions about a world state which, to simplify things, will be
> considered binary, both rational and irrational beings are forced in a
> first moment to choose from either one of thr possibilities and remain
> attached to that selection as a matter of belief which then becomes
> their elected stance against the World in that issue, or the
> individual`s truth.
But we are becoming GLOBAL citizens. TV, internet, satellite, cellphone,
things are changing, getting better all the time. Allowing us to change
our minds more quickly and make better informed decisions.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEM.html
> In a first moment each individual makes his\her decision when
> confronted with the issue as in an (almost) independent way. At each
> moment there are always individuals who have not been confronted with
> the issue and therefore hold no belief.
But
the BORG is upon us, we have groupthink. My own opinions have changed
RAPIDLY with the flow of information I have been able to get in the modern
day.
> But in a later moment interactions among individuals, when related to
> the issue in question, makes a confrontation of particular beliefs,
Those confrontations of beliefs are becoming less and less as we get
smarter collectively.
> that is, of the particular decision taken among the possibilities by
> each individual. If the issue can be solved by confronting the belief
> against Reality (thoughsometimes not even then), it is possible to
> expect a (gradual) concordance on the `right` decisio to take so that
> a consensus is reached, thoough there may remain individuals who, by
> the necessity of diversity of Living Beings may hold a belief that
> goes against yje consensus,
He will be SO disadvantged to the groupthink collective he will have NO
CHOICE but to join up and receive all the benefits. This is all covered at
that website link I sent you a few paragraphs up - read the GLOBAL BRAIN
FAQ and all the other ideas presented there.
which in this case is formed by the
> adequacy of decisios to Reality as a de facto and ex post experience
> that yields a known and (quasi) repeatable result. In this case
> beliefs turn into Knowledge and the actual confronting of belief
> against Reality takes the form of Method, be it trial and error or
> scientific or anything in between. In this case too it is also to be
> expected that individuals without contact reach the same basic
> decision and consensus as a form of Truth in case they confront the
> exact same issue.
An apple here falls just like an apple 10 miles up the road, the constant
of gravity is the same.
> But when there is no direct way to decide whether a belief (decision)
> truly conforms to Reality, that is, there is no direct link between
> holding the belief and experiencing (predicting) results based on that
> belief,
At the end of the day, even the smartest scientist can't give you the TRUE
fundamentals of the universe and existance, you just have to accept it for
now on FAITH.
it is to be expected a particular dynamic in the way a certain
> belief propagates in a population of beings which is akin, and can be
> seen as such, as the phenomenon of magnetization of particles (spins)
> in metals. In other words, for a simple model of binary beliefs, say,
> whether something is valuable or not or somebody is good or evil, the
> tools and metaphors of statistical mechanic fields can be applied as
> models.
You don't have to re-invent the wheel - many people have already made more
progress in this line of thinking. Absorb all the ideas at this website.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/WORLVIEW.html
Values
This is the more fundamental issue of value: "What is good and what is
evil?" The theory of values defines the fourth component of a world view.
It includes morality or ethics, the system of rules which tells us how we
should or should not behave. It also gives us a sense of purpose, a
direction or set of goals to guide our actions. Together with the answer to
the question "why?", the answer to the question "what for?", may help us to
understand the real meaning of life.
This leads to interesting possibilities for the study of
> formation, propagation of beliefs and other problems in the sociology
> of Knowledge.
Like Kevin Costner said in the movie THE POSTMAN, things are getting
better, getting better all the time.
--
Government policy in interest rates, and on finance generally, has been
marked by vacillation, wishful thinking, electoral expediency of the most
shameful type towards the end of last year, contortions and contradictions,
all to accommodate the redneck economics of the National Country Party.
(Harsard Aug.27 1981)
Reply
Johnny 5 Jul 21, 9:24 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
Followup-To: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism
From: Johnny 5 - Find messages by this author
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2004 16:24:31 GMT
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 9:24 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
news:768f7623.0407210419.24dd3ff9@posting.google.com:
> Missed the point. Knowledge is at first a belief (hypothesis) that can
> be `confronted` against Reality and `proved` true or false. But then
> there is knowledge that cannot be corroborated truly and yet people
> `know`.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies knowledge. It
attempts to answer the basic question: what distinguishes true (adequate)
knowledge from false (inadequate) knowledge? Practically, this questions
translates into issues of scientific methodology: how can one develop
theories or models that are better than competing theories? It also forms
one of the pillars of the new sciences of cognition, which developed from
the information processing approach to psychology, and from artificial
intelligence, as an attempt to develop computer programs that mimic a
human's capacity to use knowledge in an intelligent way.
That is a belief and that kind of knowledge has a certain
> dynamic. For instance, political rumors. BTW, corroboration may be a
> matter of cost; you cannot corroborate because it is too costly, thus
> your knowledge turns ito belief and is subject to change according to
> the beliefs of other people you discuss the issue with.
When we look at the history of epistemology, we can discern a clear trend,
in spite of the confusion of many seemingly contradictory positions. The
first theories of knowledge stressed its absolute, permanent character,
whereas the later theories put the emphasis on its relativity or situation-
dependence, its continuous development or evolution, and its active
interference with the world and its subjects and objects. The whole trend
moves from a static, passive view of knowledge towards a more and more
adaptive and active one.
Let us start with the Greek philosophers. In Plato's view knowledge is
merely an awareness of absolute, universal Ideas or Forms, existing
independent of any subject trying to apprehend to them. Though Aristotle
puts more emphasis on logical and empirical methods for gathering
knowledge, he still accepts the view that such knowledge is an apprehension
of necessary and universal principles. Following the Renaissance, two main
epistemological positions dominated philosophy: empiricism, which sees
knowledge as the product of sensory perception, and rationalism which sees
it as the product of rational reflection.
--
Government policy in interest rates, and on finance generally, has been
marked by vacillation, wishful thinking, electoral expediency of the most
shameful type towards the end of last year, contortions and contradictions,
all to accommodate the redneck economics of the National Country Party.
(Harsard Aug.27 1981
)
Reply
MorituriMax Jul 21, 9:33 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: "MorituriMax" - Find messages by this author
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2004 16:33:16 GMT
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 9:33 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Fabrizio J. Bonsignore wrote:
> Missed the point. Knowledge is at first a belief (hypothesis) that can
> be `confronted` against Reality and `proved` true or false. But then
Probably missed the point because this isn't a philosophy forum. Might do
everyone a favor and go there.
Reply
Johnny 5 Jul 21, 9:37 am show options
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Followup-To: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism
From: Johnny 5 - Find messages by this author
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2004 16:37:07 GMT
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 9:37 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
news:768f7623.0407210419.24dd3ff9@posting.google.com:
> Missed the point. Knowledge is at first a belief (hypothesis) that can
> be `confronted` against Reality and `proved` true or false. But then
> there is knowledge that cannot be corroborated truly and yet people
> `know`.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
You got any good weblinks like
this?
Indeed, a social group can be defined by the fact that all its members
share the same meme (Heylighen, 1992)
That is a belief and that kind of knowledge has a certain
> dynamic. For instance, political rumors. BTW, corroboration may be a
> matter of cost; you cannot corroborate because it is too costly, thus
> your knowledge turns ito belief and is subject to change according to
> the beliefs of other people you discuss the issue with.
As long as a meme spreads more quickly to new carriers, than that its
carriers die, the meme will proliferate, even though the knowledge it
induces in any individual carrier may be wholly inadequate and even
dangerous to survival. In this view a piece of knowledge may be succesful
(in the sense that it is common or has many carriers) even though its
predictions may be totally wrong, as long as it is sufficiently
'convincing' to new carriers. Here we see a picture where even the
subject of knowledge has lost his primacy, and knowledge becomes a force
of its own with proper goals and ways of developing itself. That this is
realistic can be illustrated by the many superstitions, fads, and
irrational beliefs that have spread over the globe, sometimes with a
frightening speed.
--
Government policy in interest rates, and on finance generally, has been
marked by vacillation, wishful thinking, electoral expediency of the most
shameful type towards the end of last year, contortions and
contradictions, all to accommodate the redneck economics of the National
Country Party. (Harsard Aug.27 1981
)
Reply
The Trucker Jul 21, 10:45 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,comp.ai.philosophy
Followup-To: sci.econ,alt.politics.economics
From: The Trucker - Find messages by this author
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2004 10:45:02 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 10:45 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Fabrizio J. Bonsignore wrote:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> Uncle Al wrote in message
> ...
>> "Fabrizio J. Bonsignore" wrote:
>> > Giventhat beliefs is ambiguous and knowledge (its acquisition) an
>> > everpresent, defining problemfor living beings, when confronted with
>> > decisions about a world state which, to simplify things, will be
>> > considered binary, both rational and irrational beings are forced in a
>> > first moment to choose from either one of thr possibilities and remain
>> > attached to that selection as a matter of belief which then becomes
>> > their elected stance against the World in that issue, or the
>> > individual`s truth.
>> [snip]
>> That's a 78-word sentence,
> There is people who can digest it 8)
>> > This leads to interesting possibilities for the study of
>> > formation, propagation of beliefs and other problems in the sociology
>> > of Knowledge.
>> Bullshit. Lightspeed is not subject to vote and resistors have
>> their tolerences appended.
> Missed the point. Knowledge is at first a belief (hypothesis) that can
> be `confronted` against Reality and `proved` true or false. But then
> there is knowledge that cannot be corroborated truly and yet people
> `know`. That is a belief and that kind of knowledge has a certain
> dynamic. For instance, political rumors. BTW, corroboration may be a
> matter of cost; you cannot corroborate because it is too costly, thus
> your knowledge turns ito belief and is subject to change according to
> the beliefs of other people you discuss the issue with.
Economics depends utterly on one's religious predisposition defining
"good". Is the ascent of man as a species the definition of "good"
or is obedience of "God" the definition of "good"? And then there is
the definition of the word "ascent". Political economy is normative.
--
http://GreaterVoice.org (a work in progress)
Reply
John Schoenfeld Jul 21, 11:36 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: j.schoenf...@programmer.net (John Schoenfeld) - Find messages by this author
Date: 21 Jul 2004 11:36:40 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 11:36 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in message ...
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> Uncle Al wrote in message ...
> > "Fabrizio J. Bonsignore" wrote:
> > > Giventhat beliefs is ambiguous and knowledge (its acquisition) an
> > > everpresent, defining problemfor living beings, when confronted with
> > > decisions about a world state which, to simplify things, will be
> > > considered binary, both rational and irrational beings are forced in a
> > > first moment to choose from either one of thr possibilities and remain
> > > attached to that selection as a matter of belief which then becomes
> > > their elected stance against the World in that issue, or the
> > > individual`s truth.
> > [snip]
> > That's a 78-word sentence,
> There is people who can digest it 8)
> > > This leads to interesting possibilities for the study of
> > > formation, propagation of beliefs and other problems in the sociology
> > > of Knowledge.
> > Bullshit. Lightspeed is not subject to vote and resistors have
> > their tolerences appended.
> Missed the point. Knowledge is at first a belief (hypothesis) that can
> be `confronted` against Reality and `proved` true or false.
It can only be falsified.
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> But then
> there is knowledge that cannot be corroborated truly and yet people
> `know`. That is a belief and that kind of knowledge has a certain
> dynamic. For instance, political rumors. BTW, corroboration may be a
> matter of cost; you cannot corroborate because it is too costly, thus
> your knowledge turns ito belief and is subject to change according to
> the beliefs of other people you discuss the issue with.
Reply
Igor Jul 21, 12:40 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: thoov...@excite.com (Igor) - Find messages by this author
Date: 21 Jul 2004 12:40:57 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 12:40 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in message ...
> Uncle Al wrote in message ...
> > "Fabrizio J. Bonsignore" wrote:
> > > Giventhat beliefs is ambiguous and knowledge (its acquisition) an
> > > everpresent, defining problemfor living beings, when confronted with
> > > decisions about a world state which, to simplify things, will be
> > > considered binary, both rational and irrational beings are forced in a
> > > first moment to choose from either one of thr possibilities and remain
> > > attached to that selection as a matter of belief which then becomes
> > > their elected stance against the World in that issue, or the
> > > individual`s truth.
> > [snip]
> > That's a 78-word sentence,
> There is people who can digest it 8)
> > > This leads to interesting possibilities for the study of
> > > formation, propagation of beliefs and other problems in the sociology
> > > of Knowledge.
> > Bullshit. Lightspeed is not subject to vote and resistors have
> > their tolerences appended.
> Missed the point. Knowledge is at first a belief (hypothesis) that can
> be `confronted` against Reality and `proved` true or false. But then
> there is knowledge that cannot be corroborated truly and yet people
> `know`. That is a belief and that kind of knowledge has a certain
> dynamic. For instance, political rumors. BTW, corroboration may be a
> matter of cost; you cannot corroborate because it is too costly, thus
> your knowledge turns ito belief and is subject to change according to
> the beliefs of other people you discuss the issue with.
The only reason those people 'know' those things that cannot ever be
substantiated is that they're either too stupid or too stubborn to
actually admit that they don't know. Such is the difference between
an atheist and an agnostic.
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 21, 3:34 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2004 22:34:16 GMT
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 3:34 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On 21 Jul 2004 11:36:40 -0700, j.schoenf...@programmer.net (John
Schoenfeld) in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in message ...
>> Uncle Al wrote in message ...
>> > "Fabrizio J. Bonsignore" wrote:
>> > > This leads to interesting possibilities for the study of
>> > > formation, propagation of beliefs and other problems in the sociology
>> > > of Knowledge.
>> > Bullshit. Lightspeed is not subject to vote and resistors have
>> > their tolerences appended.
>> Missed the point. Knowledge is at first a belief (hypothesis) that can
>> be `confronted` against Reality and `proved` true or false.
>It can only be falsified.
Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
Regards - Lester
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Ron Peterson Jul 21, 3:41 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2004 22:41:18 -0000
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 3:41 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
> Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
> demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical content.
--
Ron
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Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 21, 3:44 pm show options
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From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 21 Jul 2004 15:44:40 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 3:44 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Johnny 5 wrote in message ...
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
> news:768f7623.0407210419.24dd3ff9@posting.google.com:
> That is a belief and that kind of knowledge has a certain
> > dynamic. For instance, political rumors. BTW, corroboration may be a
> > matter of cost; you cannot corroborate because it is too costly, thus
> > your knowledge turns ito belief and is subject to change according to
> > the beliefs of other people you discuss the issue with.
> When we look at the history of epistemology, we can discern a clear trend,
> in spite of the confusion of many seemingly contradictory positions. The
> first theories of knowledge stressed its absolute, permanent character,
> whereas the later theories put the emphasis on its relativity or situation-
> dependence, its continuous development or evolution, and its active
> interference with the world and its subjects and objects. The whole trend
> moves from a static, passive view of knowledge towards a more and more
> adaptive and active one.
We tend to see knowledge as somethig that is aqcuired and done. But it
has to be propagated. Scientifically gathered knowledge has a certain
formal way of propagation, but to most people knowledge is what they
believe, whether true or not scientifically and it is that dynamic I
am interested in. Seeing beliefs as fields, we can understand how fads
spread and die, for instance, or how full countries can fall in a
delusion of the kind that generates wars... Phenomena like racism also
spread in this way. Maybe throught he use of these SMF models we can
find ways to stop socially dangerous beliefs from spreading while
rmoting socially convenient ones...
Reply
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 21, 4:35 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 21 Jul 2004 16:35:37 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 4:35 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Johnny 5 wrote in message ...
(snip)
> Indeed, a social group can be defined by the fact that all its members
> share the same meme (Heylighen, 1992)
I am not very convinced about the idea of memes... I like this
characterization of social group, yet it is somewhat limited. The
basic principle of Living Beings is diversity, so it must be either a
very diverse, complex meme and therefore analyzable, or a very small
and close social group (sect? fanatic?). More likely than not a social
group would hold a basic set of beliefs strongly correlated (coheret)
about certain basic issues, while its members diverge in details and
other issues. I believe it is very difficult if not impossible to find
really basic and indivisible memes... at most the meme is a fuzzy
concept, like trying to isolate the set of connections that identify a
category in a neural network.
(snip)
> As long as a meme spreads more quickly to new carriers, than that its
> carriers die, the meme will proliferate, even though the knowledge it
> induces in any individual carrier may be wholly inadequate and even
> dangerous to survival. In this view a piece of knowledge may be succesful
> (in the sense that it is common or has many carriers) even though its
> predictions may be totally wrong, as long as it is sufficiently
> 'convincing' to new carriers.
One of the points of my post Alive and Human. The Human (Rational
Beings`) environment is more complex than the Natural World in which
we evolved as living beings. Reason is detached from evolution,
orthogonal if you like, and presents a more convoluted hyperplane for
exploration. And the necessary condition of living beings of being
diverse guarantees that we`ll see ideas that are contrary to
biological survival, when biological survival is no longer the main
determinant of living (Rational) conduct. Reason has the meaning of
searching possibilities in a chaotic Reality, which further guarantees
the appearance of beliefs contrary to what from other points of view
(methods of inquiry) would be called `truth`.
> Here we see a picture where even the
> subject of knowledge has lost his primacy, and knowledge becomes a force
> of its own with proper goals and ways of developing itself. That this is
> realistic can be illustrated by the many superstitions, fads, and
> irrational beliefs that have spread over the globe, sometimes with a
> frightening speed.
I cannot yet conceive of a `knowledge field` without a physical
support. It would either degenerate into Chaos or become static.
Certainly knowledge evolves independently of individual carriers
(mostly, but not totally), but it is not a living force by itself. Its
dynamic depends on a synamic support. There is static knowledge, but
its nature as knowledge reveals only after it is dynamically
confronted against Chaos, i. e., used. A hammer is just a piece of
metal until someone uses it to break something...
And yes, fads tend to spread with alarming speed, but not always. It
would be interesting to know why, and how. I guess marketers would be
very interested in knowing too. And it would also have social positive
effects if it leads to beneficial patterns of demand that in turn
would lead to an increased production level (a bigger cake to
distrbute).
Reply
patty Jul 21, 7:25 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 02:25:15 GMT
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 7:25 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Ron Peterson wrote:
> In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>>demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical content.
... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition relative
to the assumptions of some system. A universally true proposition is a
pipe dream.
patty
Reply
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 21, 7:29 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 21 Jul 2004 19:29:57 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 7:29 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Sam Wormley wrote in message ...
> See: http://www.csicop.org/si/9907/
Can you be more specific?
Reply
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 21, 7:39 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 21 Jul 2004 19:39:48 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 7:39 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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thoov...@excite.com (Igor) wrote in message ...
> The only reason those people 'know' those things that cannot ever be
> substantiated is that they're either too stupid or too stubborn to
> actually admit that they don't know. Such is the difference between
> an atheist and an agnostic.
What about political beliefs? Can you know if a candidate is serious
or not? Can you know if political defamation is true or not? Can you
know if a political affair/scandal is true or not? Or gossip. Can a
saint be passed as the meanest man on Earth while an archcriminal be
considered the holiest of men? Not all knowledge is amenable to
scientific research and things human are notoriously difficult to
`prove` or investigate. Stating otherwise would be like asserting that
it is impossible to condemn an innocent because we can always _know_
if a suspect is guilty, for sure. The belief in the guilt or innocence
of a man can change according to the weight of opinions of expert
witnesses and advocates, for instance. An SMF model can model this
situations too.
Reply
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 21, 7:50 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 21 Jul 2004 19:50:31 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 7:50 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Johnny 5 wrote in message news:...
> fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
> news:768f7623.0407201744.3414348e@posting.google.com:
> > Given that Reality is ambiguous and knowledge (its acquisition) an
> > everpresent, defining problemfor living beings, when confronted with
> > decisions about a world state which, to simplify things, will be
> > considered binary, both rational and irrational beings are forced in a
> > first moment to choose from either one of thr possibilities and remain
> > attached to that selection as a matter of belief which then becomes
> > their elected stance against the World in that issue, or the
> > individual`s truth.
> But we are becoming GLOBAL citizens. TV, internet, satellite, cellphone,
> things are changing, getting better all the time. Allowing us to change
> our minds more quickly and make better informed decisions.
It would be equivalent to a NN model where decision nodes (neurodes,
people) would be clamped to and receive input from the same node (mass
communication media); each node/person would assign a specific weight
to any particular input. Of course the velocity of the change in
beliefs is modified by the instantaneousness of modern communications.
Problem is that too many inputs may be counterproductive as to make
better decisions, i.e., hold more `true-to-Reality` beliefs. But then
even the media are subject to this `magnetization` of decisions; an
specific program woud be more likely to assume a position according to
the position of another more respected program, etc. The
`respectability` of inputs would be modeled by weights in a NN
translation.
Reply
Johnny 5 Jul 21, 7:59 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
Followup-To: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism
From: Johnny 5 - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 02:59:02 GMT
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 7:59 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
news:768f7623.0407211444.45650f8d@posting.google.com:
>> When we look at the history of epistemology, we can discern a clear
>> trend, in spite of the confusion of many seemingly contradictory
>> positions. The first theories of knowledge stressed its absolute,
>> permanent character, whereas the later theories put the emphasis on
>> its relativity or situation- dependence, its continuous development
>> or evolution, and its active interference with the world and its
>> subjects and objects. The whole trend moves from a static, passive
>> view of knowledge towards a more and more adaptive and active one.
> We tend to see knowledge as somethig that is aqcuired and done. But it
> has to be propagated.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
Neither correspondence, nor coherence or consensus, and not even
survivability, are sufficient to ground a theory of knowledge.
Scientifically gathered knowledge has a certain
> formal way of propagation, but to most people knowledge is what they
> believe, whether true or not scientifically and it is that dynamic I
> am interested in. Seeing beliefs as fields, we can understand how fads
> spread and die, for instance,
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
A piece of knowledge that can be transmitted or replicated in such a way
is called a 'meme'. The death of an individual carrying a certain meme
now no longer implies the elimination of that piece of knowledge, as
evolutionary epistemology would assume.
As long as a meme spreads more
quickly to new carriers, than that its carriers die, the meme will
proliferate, even though the knowledge it induces in any individual
carrier may be wholly inadequate and even dangerous to survival. In this
view a piece of knowledge may be succesful (in the sense that it is
common or has many carriers) even though its predictions may be totally
wrong, as long as it is sufficiently 'convincing' to new carriers. Here
we see a picture where even the subject of knowledge has lost his
primacy, and knowledge becomes a force of its own with proper goals and
ways of developing itself. That this is realistic can be illustrated by
the many superstitions, fads, and irrational beliefs that have spread
over the globe, sometimes with a frightening speed
.
or how full countries can fall in a
> delusion of the kind that generates wars... Phenomena like racism also
> spread in this way.
How come we can have a NAACP and I can't have a NAAWP? Why can we have a
mrs. black america pageant and I get called a racist if I want a mrs.
white america? Reverse discrimination is still RACISM.
Teddy Roosevelt
"There is no room in this country for hyphenated Americanism...The one
absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin...would be to
permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities."
(Speech, New York, 1915)
I am not the one calling myself a scottish american, why do blacks who
want to call themselves african american and wear t shirts that say
AFRICA - its a black thing - you wouldn't understand - why do they call
me racist and a destructor of unity? They are hypocrites and need to be
revealed as such.
Maybe throught he use of these SMF models we can
> find ways to stop socially dangerous beliefs from spreading while
> rmoting socially convenient ones...
Things are
getting better all the time.
--
Government policy in interest rates, and on finance generally, has been
marked by vacillation, wishful thinking, electoral expediency of the most
shameful type towards the end of last year, contortions and
contradictions, all to accommodate the redneck economics of the National
Country Party. (Harsard Aug.27 1981
)
Reply
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 21, 8:04 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 21 Jul 2004 20:04:19 -0700
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 8:04 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Johnny 5 wrote in message ...
> fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
> news:768f7623.0407201744.3414348e@posting.google.com:
(snip)
> > But in a later moment interactions among individuals, when related to
> > the issue in question, makes a confrontation of particular beliefs,
> Those confrontations of beliefs are becoming less and less as we get
> smarter collectively.
Not necessarily... except in societies with a single party. And when
it comes to whole societies, as they confront different issues, or the
same issue from different points of view, this confrontation can be
quite violent, like two fields with the same polarity, (though in this
the magnetic metaphor brakes: different polarities would repel each
other). This point of view can be applied to issues in international
policy.
> > that is, of the particular decision taken among the possibilities by
> > each individual. If the issue can be solved by confronting the belief
> > against Reality (thoughsometimes not even then), it is possible to
> > expect a (gradual) concordance on the `right` decisio to take so that
> > a consensus is reached, thoough there may remain individuals who, by
> > the necessity of diversity of Living Beings may hold a belief that
> > goes against yje consensus,
> He will be SO disadvantged to the groupthink collective he will have NO
> CHOICE but to join up and receive all the benefits. This is all covered at
> that website link I sent you a few paragraphs up - read the GLOBAL BRAIN
> FAQ and all the other ideas presented there.
There is people who like to be `disadvantaged` and profit from going
countercurrent (journalists). But the fact is that a *whole* society
can be *wrong* and the dissenters are disadvantaged because they know
they are *right*. It depends in this case whether holding a belief has
a value of survival or not. When it doesn`t a societies belief field
can fluctuate without settling, or can stabilize until an external
force makes it change. This seems to be the case of Religions, tough
in this case it is iteresting to note how a sigle individual (messiah)
can eventually change the whole filed, like coloring a lake... A SMF
can be used to model te spreading of religious beliefs, thigh maybe
only in a very abstract way. But it can also model phenomena like
schisms or, in the christian tradition, the Reform.
Reply
Ron Peterson Jul 21, 8:07 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 03:07:09 -0000
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 8:07 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In sci.econ patty wrote:
> Ron Peterson wrote:
>> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical content.
> ... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition relative
> to the assumptions of some system. A universally true proposition is a
> pipe dream.
Mathematical and logical propositions include their assumptions.
--
Ron
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Kenneth Doyle Jul 21, 8:18 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism
From: Kenneth Doyle - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 03:18:43 GMT
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 8:18 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Johnny 5 wrote in
news:Xns952DE9D768A49Johnny5yahoocom@65.32.1.7:
> Reverse discrimination is still RACISM.
Yes, and the term 'reverse discrimination' is itself indicative of a meme.
Think about it.
--
CodeCutter - good, fast and cheap; pick two.
Reply
Johnny 5 Jul 21, 9:21 pm show options
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Followup-To: alt.religion,sci.econ
From: Johnny 5 - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 04:21:09 GMT
Local: Wed, Jul 21 2004 9:21 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
news:768f7623.0407211535.3c3eb1ce@posting.google.com:
> (snip)
>> Indeed, a social group can be defined by the fact that all its
>> members share the same meme (Heylighen, 1992)
> I am not very convinced about the idea of memes... I like this
> characterization of social group, yet it is somewhat limited.
The
models are never perfect, but right now they are the best we got.
The
> basic principle of Living Beings is diversity,
The borg would disagree. Are all our wants and needs really that
different, we want food, security, safety, entertainment. Is maslow's
hierarchy different for the spear chucker in africa versus the nuclear
scientist in russia versus the kitty cat on the street?
> very diverse, complex meme and therefore analyzable, or a very small
> and close social group (sect? fanatic?). More likely than not a social
> group would hold a basic set of beliefs strongly correlated (coheret)
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
We can distinguish two approaches trying to avoid such an 'absolute
relativism'. The first may be called individual constructivism. It
assumes that an individual attempts to reach coherence among the
different pieces of knowledge. Constructions that are inconsistent with
the bulk of other knowledge that the individual has will tend to be
rejected. Constructions that succeed in integrating previously incoherent
pieces of knowledge will be maintained. The second, to be called social
constructivism, sees consensus between different subjects as the ultimate
criterion to judge knowledge. 'Truth' or 'reality' will be accorded only
to those constructions on which most people of a social group agree.
In these philosophies, knowledge is seen as largely independent of a
hypothetical 'external reality' or environment. As the 'radical'
constructivists Maturana and Varela argue, the nervous system of an
organism cannot in any absolute way distinguish between a perception
(caused by an external phenomenon) and a hallucination (a purely internal
event). The only basic criterion is that different mental entities or
processes within or between individuals should reach some kind of
equilibrium.
> about certain basic issues, while its members diverge in details and
> other issues.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
Though these constructivistic approaches put much more emphasis on the
changing and relative character of knowledge, they are still absolutist
in the primacy they give to either social consensus or internal
coherence, and their description of construction processes is quite vague
and incomplete. A more broad or synthetic outlook is offered by different
forms or evolutionary epistemology. Here it is assumed that knowledge is
constructed by the subject or group of subjects in order to adapt to
their environment in the broad sense. That construction is an on-going
process at different levels, biological as well as psychological or
social. Construction happens through blind variation of existing pieces
of knowledge, and the selective retention of those new combinations that
somehow contribute most to the survival and reproduction of the subject
(s) within their given environment. Hence we see that the 'external
world' again enters the picture, although no objective reflection or
correspondence is assumed, only an equilibrium between the products of
internal variation and different (internal or external) selection
criteria. Any form of absolutism or permanence has disappeared in this
approach, but knowledge is basically still a passive instrument developed
by organisms in order to help them in their quest for survival.
I believe it is very difficult if not impossible to find
> really basic and indivisible memes... at most the meme is a fuzzy
> concept, like trying to isolate the set of connections that identify a
> category in a neural network.
Like social constructivism, memetics attracts the attention to
communication and social processes in the development of knowledge, but
instead of seeing knowledge as constructed by the social system, it
rather sees social systems as constructed by knowledge processes. Indeed,
a social group can be defined by the fact that all its members share the
same meme (Heylighen, 1992).
>> As long as a meme spreads more quickly to new carriers, than that its
>> carriers die, the meme will proliferate, even though the knowledge it
>> induces in any individual carrier may be wholly inadequate and even
>> dangerous to survival. In this view a piece of knowledge may be
>> succesful (in the sense that it is common or has many carriers) even
>> though its predictions may be totally wrong, as long as it is
>> sufficiently 'convincing' to new carriers.
> One of the points of my post Alive and Human. The Human (Rational
> Beings`) environment is more complex than the Natural World in which
> we evolved as living beings. Reason is detached from evolution,
> orthogonal if you like, and presents a more convoluted hyperplane for
> exploration.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
We have come very far indeed from Plato's immutable and absolute Ideas,
residing in an abstract realm far from concrete objects or subjects, or
from the naive realism of the reflection-correspondence theory, where
knowledge is merely an image of external objects and their relations. At
this stage, the temptation would be strong to lapse into a purely
anarchistic or relativistic attitude, stating that 'anything goes', and
that it would be impossible to formulate any reliable and general
criteria to distinguish 'good' or adequate pieces of knowledge from bad
or inadequate ones. Yet in most practical situations, our intuition does
help us to distinguish perceptions from dreams or hallucinations, and
unreliable predictions ('I am going to win the lottery') from reliable
ones ('The sun will come up tomorrow morning'). And an evolutionary
theory still assumes a natural selection which can be understood to a
certain degree. Hence we may assume that it is possible to identify
selection criteria, but one of the lessons of this historical overview
will be that we should avoid to quickly formulate one absolute criterion.
And the necessary condition of living beings of being
> diverse guarantees that we`ll see ideas that are contrary to
> biological survival, when biological survival is no longer the main
> determinant of living (Rational) conduct. Reason has the meaning of
> searching possibilities in a chaotic Reality, which further guarantees
> the appearance of beliefs contrary to what from other points of view
> (methods of inquiry) would be called `truth`.
Neither correspondence, nor coherence or consensus, and not even
survivability, are sufficient to ground a theory of knowledge
. At this
stage we can only hope to find multiple, independent, and sometimes
contradictory criteria, whose judgment may quickly become obsolete. Yet
if we would succeed to formulate these criteria clearly, within a simple
and general conceptual framework, we would have an epistemology that
synthesizes and extends al of the traditional and less traditional
philosophies above.
I just watched a special on the science channel hosted by Kirk about
search for ET's, they have concluded any sufficiently advanced society
has long let the biological pink meat forms and are borg or V-ger. To
continue to look for similar planets like earth around other suns is only
going to find life perhaps, but not the ADVANCED life we wish to find
that has a lot of superior knowledge. One of the astronmers said we need
to be looking for a race of robots and machines probably with a spaceship
parked next to a big black hole or some other interesting phenomena in
the universe.
> I cannot yet conceive of a `knowledge field` without a physical
> support. It would either degenerate into Chaos or become static.
Hobbes said only through our senses to interface with the universe can we
understand it. I remember reading about a book called flatworld, it was
2D beings that lived in a flat plane that existed in our 3d universe.
From my understanding of what you are saying and the smarties at the
weblink, we have to always understand that even the most widely accepted
fundamental consensus - the one absolute criterion - has to always be
recgonized for what it really is - just the current best consensual guess
and faith is all that is underneath it - the turtle holding up the
planet.
Just because gravity works here, it may be very different in a black
hole, and dark matter that we don't understand makes up 2/3 of the
universe and what we do understand is just 1/3.
> Certainly knowledge evolves independently of individual carriers
> (mostly, but not totally), but it is not a living force by itself. Its
> dynamic depends on a synamic support. There is static knowledge, but
> its nature as knowledge reveals only after it is dynamically
> confronted against Chaos, i. e., used. A hammer is just a piece of
> metal until someone uses it to break something...
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
Neither correspondence, nor coherence or consensus, and not even
survivability, are sufficient
to ground a theory of knowledge. At this
stage we can only hope to find multiple, independent, and sometimes
contradictory criteria, whose judgment may quickly become obsolete. Yet
if we would succeed to formulate these criteria clearly, within a simple
and general conceptual framework, we would have an epistemology that
synthesizes and extends al of the traditional and less traditional
philosophies above.
> And yes, fads tend to spread with alarming speed, but not always. It
> would be interesting to know why, and how. I guess marketers would be
> very interested in knowing too.
Oh I am quite convinced that the expert marketers are very good at
understanding consumer decisions and
A theory of beliefs
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David Longley Jul 22, 12:48 am show options
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From: David Longley - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 08:48:47 +0100
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 12:48 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In article , patty
writes
>Ron Peterson wrote:
>> In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>>>demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
>> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical
>>content.
>... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition
>relative to the assumptions of some system. A universally true
>proposition is a pipe dream.
>patty
Pipe dream(s) indeed.
But you can set your doubts lower still - "propositions" are intensions.
--
David Longley
http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Freg.htm
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patty Jul 22, 1:45 am show options
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From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 08:45:18 GMT
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 1:45 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Ron Peterson wrote:
> In sci.econ patty wrote:
>>Ron Peterson wrote:
>>>That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical content.
>>... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition relative
>>to the assumptions of some system. A universally true proposition is a
>>pipe dream.
> Mathematical and logical propositions include their assumptions.
Example, please ...
patty
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patty Jul 22, 1:55 am show options
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From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 08:55:37 GMT
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 1:55 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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David Longley wrote:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> In article , patty
> writes
>> Ron Peterson wrote:
>>> In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>> Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>>>> demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
>>> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical
>>> content.
>> ... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition
>> relative to the assumptions of some system. A universally true
>> proposition is a pipe dream.
>> patty
> Pipe dream(s) indeed.
> But you can set your doubts lower still - "propositions" are intensions.
Well i take a proposition to be a *statement* in some language, for
example "1 + 2 = 3". Do you still call that an "intension" ?
patty
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David Longley Jul 22, 2:53 am show options
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From: David Longley - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 10:53:25 +0100
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 2:53 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In article , patty
writes
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
>David Longley wrote:
>> In article , patty
>> writes
>>> Ron Peterson wrote:
>>>> In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>> Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>>>>> demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
>>>> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical
>>>>content.
>>> ... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition
>>>relative to the assumptions of some system. A universally true
>>>proposition is a pipe dream.
>>> patty
>> Pipe dream(s) indeed.
>> But you can set your doubts lower still - "propositions" are
>>intensions.
>Well i take a proposition to be a *statement* in some language, for
>example "1 + 2 = 3". Do you still call that an "intension" ?
>patty
It doesn't matter what *you* take a proposition to be (there are no
private languages). Proposition is an alternative term for intension.
Contrast "Philosophical Investigations" with "Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus" if evidential behaviourism hasn't yet convinced
you of the folly of such talk.
Why is it still with us (we have been through this before surely)? The
fact that there are lots of folk around who don't understand the nature
of our folk psychological folly shouldn't persuade one of anything other
than the fact that there are lots of folk about who don't see that it's
folly, and why. But you'll find that more people believe in astrology
etc than most of the scientific facts that regulate how they live - yet
most people will follow what most people think as common-sense. Go
figure!).
(Perhaps you think folk psychology doesn't permeate the language of
other disciplines? - "Cognitive Science" is spreading like HIV - and
why, you might ask, is it so hard to control in some parts of the
world?)
e--
David Longley
Reply
Eray Ozkural exa Jul 22, 3:45 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: e...@bilkent.edu.tr (Eray Ozkural exa) - Find messages by this author
Date: 22 Jul 2004 03:45:12 -0700
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 3:45 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Johnny 5 wrote in message ...
> fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
> news:768f7623.0407210419.24dd3ff9@posting.google.com:
> > Missed the point. Knowledge is at first a belief (hypothesis) that can
> > be `confronted` against Reality and `proved` true or false. But then
> > there is knowledge that cannot be corroborated truly and yet people
> > `know`.
> http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html You got any good weblinks like
> this?
> Indeed, a social group can be defined by the fact that all its members
> share the same meme (Heylighen, 1992)
Hmmm. I think some people make a living from inventing fuzzy concepts
like "meme" or "mimesis". Oh, those social scientists!
In my opinion, a social group can be defined by sharing a
communication protocol and cognitive procedures (like say this
newsgroup), but I think no single definition is going to capture it.
It's almost as elusive as defining the mind.
Reply
Traveler Jul 22, 6:00 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Traveler - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 09:00:28 -0400
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 6:00 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In article , patty
wrote:
>Ron Peterson wrote:
>> In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>>>demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
>> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical content.
>... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition relative
>to the assumptions of some system. A universally true proposition is a
>pipe dream.
You do notice the blinding circularity of your assertion, uh,
proposition, don't you? Kind of like this one: "I am a Cretan and all
Cretans are liars."
Louis Savain
Artificial Intelligence From the Bible:
http://users.adelphia.net/~lilavois/Seven/bible.html
Reply
Ron Peterson Jul 22, 6:41 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 13:41:19 -0000
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 6:41 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In sci.econ patty wrote:
> Ron Peterson wrote:
>> In sci.econ patty wrote:
>>>Ron Peterson wrote:
>>>>That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical content.
>>>... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition relative
>>>to the assumptions of some system. A universally true proposition is a
>>>pipe dream.
>> Mathematical and logical propositions include their assumptions.
> Example, please ...
Euclidian geometry is an example of a mathematical system that has
axioms (assumptions). Each proposition (theorem) is established based on
those axioms.
That is sort of what you are saying, but I think that you aren't
identifying that with mathematics and logic.
--
Ron
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 22, 7:06 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,sci.econ
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 14:06:25 GMT
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 7:06 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Thu, 22 Jul 2004 04:21:09 GMT, Johnny 5 in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
>news:768f7623.0407211535.3c3eb1ce@posting.google.com:
>> (snip)
>>> Indeed, a social group can be defined by the fact that all its
>>> members share the same meme (Heylighen, 1992)
>> I am not very convinced about the idea of memes... I like this
>> characterization of social group, yet it is somewhat limited.
>The models are never perfect, but right now they are the best we got.
Or the worst. A year or so ago I checked into what a meme is and found
no one willing to get very specific. It seems to be a buzzword analog
for idea.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 22, 7:06 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 14:06:26 GMT
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 7:06 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Wed, 21 Jul 2004 22:41:18 -0000, Ron Peterson
in comp.ai.philosophy
wrote:
>In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>> Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>> demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
>That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical content.
So you're only interested in illogical propositions? I think you'll
find that logic applies to all propositions mathematical and physical.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Johnny 5 Jul 22, 7:11 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,sci.econ
From: Johnny 5 - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 14:11:19 GMT
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 7:11 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) wrote in
news:40ffc5b0.77956629@netnews.att.net:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> On Thu, 22 Jul 2004 04:21:09 GMT, Johnny 5 in
> comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
>>news:768f7623.0407211535.3c3eb1ce@posting.google.com:
>>> (snip)
>>>> Indeed, a social group can be defined by the fact that all its
>>>> members share the same meme (Heylighen, 1992)
>>> I am not very convinced about the idea of memes... I like this
>>> characterization of social group, yet it is somewhat limited.
>>The models are never perfect, but right now they are the best we got.
> Or the worst. A year or so ago I checked into what a meme is and found
> no one willing to get very specific. It seems to be a buzzword analog
> for idea.
They seem to get pretty specific at this site:
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/MEMIN.HTML
Memes: Introduction
by Glenn Grant, Memeticist
"An idea is something you have;
an ideology is something that has you."
--Morris Berman
What if ideas were viruses?
Consider the T-phage virus. A T-phage cannot replicate itself; it
reproduces by hijacking the DNA of a bacterium, forcing its host to make
millions of copies of the phage. Similarly, an idea can parasitically
infect your mind and alter your behavior, causing you to want to tell
your friends about the idea, thus exposing them to the idea-virus. Any
idea which does this is called a "meme" (pronounced `meem').
Unlike a virus, which is encoded in DNA molecules, a meme is nothing more
than a pattern of information, one that happens to have evolved a form
which induces people to repeat that pattern. Typical memes include
individual slogans, ideas, catch-phrases, melodies, icons, inventions,
and fashions. It may sound a bit sinister, this idea that people are
hosts for mind-altering strings of symbols, but in fact this is what
human culture is all about.
As a species, we have co-evolved with our memes. Imagine a group of early
Homo Sapiens in the Late Pleistocene epoch. They've recently arrived with
the latest high-tech hand axes and are trying to show their Homo Erectus
neighbours how to make them. Those who can't get their heads around the
new meme will be at a disadvantage and will be out-evolved by their
smarter cousins.
Meanwhile, the memes themselves are evolving, just as in the game of
"Telephone" (where a message is whispered from person to person, being
slightly mis-replicated each time). Selection favors the memes which are
easiest to understand, to remember, and to communicate to others. Garbled
versions of a useful meme would presumably be selected out.
So, in theory at least, the ability to understand and communicate complex
memes is a survival trait, and natural selection should favor those who
aren't too conservative to understand new memes. Or does it? In practice,
some people are going to be all too ready to commit any new meme that
comes along, even if it should turn out to be deadly nonsense, like:
"Jump off a cliff and the gods will make you fly."
Such memes do evolve, generated by crazy people, or through mis-
replication. Notice, though, that this meme might have a lot of appeal.
The idea of magical flight is so tantalizing -- maybe, if I truly
believed, I just might leap off the cliff and...
This is a vital point: people try to infect each other with those memes
which they find most appealing, regardless of the memes' objective value
or truth. Further, the carrier of the cliff-jumping meme might never
actually take the plunge; they may spend the rest of their long lives
infecting other people with the meme, inducing millions of gullible fools
to leap to their deaths. Historically, this sort of thing is happening
all the time.
Whether memes can be considered true "life forms" or not is a topic of
some debate, but this is irrelevant: they behave in a way similar to life
forms, allowing us to combine the analytical techniques of epidemiology,
evolutionary science, immunology, linguistics, and semiotics, into an
effective system known as "memetics." Rather than debate the inherent
"truth" or lack of "truth" of an idea, memetics is largely concerned with
how that idea gets itself replicated.
Memetics is vital to the understanding of cults, ideologies, and
marketing campaigns of all kinds, and it can help to provide immunity
from dangerous information-contagions. You should be aware, for instance,
that you just been exposed to the Meta-meme, the meme about memes...
The lexicon which follows is intended to provide a language for the
analysis of memes, meme-complexes, and the social movements they spawn.
The name of the person who first coined and defined each word appears in
parentheses, although some definitions have been paraphrased and altered.
--
Government policy in interest rates, and on finance generally, has been
marked by vacillation, wishful thinking, electoral expediency of the most
shameful type towards the end of last year, contortions and
contradictions, all to accommodate the redneck economics of the National
Country Party. (Harsard Aug.27 1981)
Reply
Traveler Jul 22, 8:15 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Traveler - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 11:15:17 -0400
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 8:15 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In article , David Longley
- Hide quoted text -
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wrote:
>In article , patty
> writes
>>Ron Peterson wrote:
>>> In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>>>>demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
>>> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical
>>>content.
>>... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition
>>relative to the assumptions of some system. A universally true
>>proposition is a pipe dream.
>>patty
>Pipe dream(s) indeed.
Wrong. Patty merely made a self-referential assertion. You are guilty
of intensional thinking. Longley life-long self-referential crusade:
we, humans suffer from being folk-psychologists, therefore we cannot
be trusted." Of course, Longley excludes himself form the set of all
humans.
Louis Savain
Artificial Intelligence From the Bible:
http://users.adelphia.net/~lilavois/Seven/bible.html
Falsifiable Predictions:
http://users.adelphia.net/~lilavois/Seven/predictions.html
Reply
patty Jul 22, 8:29 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 15:29:04 GMT
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 8:29 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Ron Peterson wrote:
> In sci.econ patty wrote:
>>Ron Peterson wrote:
>>>In sci.econ patty wrote:
>>>>Ron Peterson wrote:
>>>>>That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical content.
>>>>... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition relative
>>>>to the assumptions of some system. A universally true proposition is a
>>>>pipe dream.
>>>Mathematical and logical propositions include their assumptions.
>>Example, please ...
> Euclidian geometry is an example of a mathematical system that has
> axioms (assumptions). Each proposition (theorem) is established based on
> those axioms.
> That is sort of what you are saying, but I think that you aren't
> identifying that with mathematics and logic.
Yes, mathematical and logical systems (and more generally formal
systems) are the only systems in which it makes any sense for the word
"proof" to be used *as Zick used the word*. You can prove things in a
non formal system too. Example: I assert that a box is too heavy to be
picked up; but you proceed to pick it up anyway; my assertion has been
proved false. Ask yourself which kind of proof is Zick's proof of
universals; if the is the former, then he needs to play by a set of
rules; if it is the latter then he needs to do something very dramatic.
patty
Reply
patty Jul 22, 9:12 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 16:12:46 GMT
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 9:12 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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David Longley wrote:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> In article , patty
> writes
>> David Longley wrote:
>>> In article , patty
>>> writes
>>>> Ron Peterson wrote:
>>>>> In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>>> Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>>>>>> demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
>>>>> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical
>>>>> content.
>>>> ... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition
>>>> relative to the assumptions of some system. A universally true
>>>> proposition is a pipe dream.
>>>> patty
>>> Pipe dream(s) indeed.
>>> But you can set your doubts lower still - "propositions" are
>>> intensions.
>> Well i take a proposition to be a *statement* in some language, for
>> example "1 + 2 = 3". Do you still call that an "intension" ?
>> patty
> It doesn't matter what *you* take a proposition to be (there are no
> private languages).
Well language does change with its usage. I think fue people today
distinguish between a statement and the abstract thing to which it
refers. If you substitute "statement" for "proposition" in the dialog
above, then my statements and ron's would not switch from true to false.
> Proposition is an alternative term for intension.
Ok, i'll try to remember that.
> Contrast "Philosophical Investigations" with "Tractatus
> Logico-Philosophicus" if evidential behaviourism hasn't yet convinced
> you of the folly of such talk.
I'm working on it, Wittgenstein is hard reading.
> Why is it still with us (we have been through this before surely)? The
> fact that there are lots of folk around who don't understand the nature
> of our folk psychological folly shouldn't persuade one of anything other
> than the fact that there are lots of folk about who don't see that it's
> folly, and why. But you'll find that more people believe in astrology
> etc than most of the scientific facts that regulate how they live - yet
> most people will follow what most people think as common-sense. Go
> figure!).
Well regarding that i was struck by something Glen said today:
""
GS: In what sense would they be meaningless to behaviorists? Have you
forgotten that all behaviorists are indoctrinated into folk psychology
(as well as academic mentalism) before they become behaviorists? Whether
the statement "humans cannot survive without them" is true is moot. The
way we talk about behavior has some utility or else a culture would not
sustain it for long in the absence of other maintaining reasons. Such
terms are not, however, of much scientific use.
""
So that "the way we talk about behavior" (read: our folk psychology)
*does* have some utility to our culture. Maybe we should be careful how
we change it. Don't you think?
patty
Reply
Ron Peterson Jul 22, 9:16 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 16:16:14 -0000
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 9:16 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In talk.philosophy.humanism patty wrote:
> Yes, mathematical and logical systems (and more generally formal
> systems) are the only systems in which it makes any sense for the word
> "proof" to be used *as Zick used the word*.
I was premature in joining this thread. I think that you are right to be
skeptical of Zick's idea about a "proof".
> You can prove things in a non formal system too. Example: I assert
> that a box is too heavy to be picked up; but you proceed to pick it
> up anyway; my assertion has been proved false.
I would consider that to be an observation rather than a type of
scientific knowledge. That meaning of the word 'proof' is different from
the meaning in a mathematical or logical sense.
> Ask yourself which kind of proof is Zick's proof of
> universals; if the is the former, then he needs to play by a set of
> rules; if it is the latter then he needs to do something very dramatic.
Since Zick doesn't seem to treat mathematics as universally true, I
can't make sense of what he means by universality.
--
Ron
Reply
Ron Peterson Jul 22, 9:21 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 16:21:05 -0000
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 9:21 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In talk.philosophy.humanism Lester Zick wrote:
> On Wed, 21 Jul 2004 22:41:18 -0000, Ron Peterson
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical content.
> So you're only interested in illogical propositions? I think you'll
> find that logic applies to all propositions mathematical and physical.
I was referring to propositions with *only* logical and mathematical
content.
--
Ron
Reply
David Longley Jul 22, 10:13 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: David Longley - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 18:13:01 +0100
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 10:13 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In article <2IRLc.144611$JR4.20...@attbi_s54>, patty
writes
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
>David Longley wrote:
>> In article , patty
>> writes
>>> David Longley wrote:
>>>> In article , patty
>>>> writes
>>>>> Ron Peterson wrote:
>>>>>> In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>>>> Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>>>>>>> demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
>>>>>> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical
>>>>>>content.
>>>>> ... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition
>>>>>relative to the assumptions of some system. A universally true
>>>>>proposition is a pipe dream.
>>>>> patty
>>>> Pipe dream(s) indeed.
>>>> But you can set your doubts lower still - "propositions" are
>>>>intensions.
>>> Well i take a proposition to be a *statement* in some language, for
>>>example "1 + 2 = 3". Do you still call that an "intension" ?
>>> patty
>> It doesn't matter what *you* take a proposition to be (there are no
>>private languages).
>Well language does change with its usage. I think fue people today
>distinguish between a statement and the abstract thing to which it
>refers. If you substitute "statement" for "proposition" in the dialog
>above, then my statements and ron's would not switch from true to false.
>> Proposition is an alternative term for intension.
>Ok, i'll try to remember that.
>> Contrast "Philosophical Investigations" with "Tractatus
>>Logico-Philosophicus" if evidential behaviourism hasn't yet convinced
>>you of the folly of such talk.
>I'm working on it, Wittgenstein is hard reading.
>> Why is it still with us (we have been through this before surely)?
>>The fact that there are lots of folk around who don't understand the
>>nature of our folk psychological folly shouldn't persuade one of
>>anything other than the fact that there are lots of folk about who
>>don't see that it's folly, and why. But you'll find that more people
>>believe in astrology etc than most of the scientific facts that
>>regulate how they live - yet most people will follow what most people
>>think as common-sense. Go figure!).
>Well regarding that i was struck by something Glen said today:
>""
>GS: In what sense would they be meaningless to behaviorists? Have you
>forgotten that all behaviorists are indoctrinated into folk psychology
>(as well as academic mentalism) before they become behaviorists?
>Whether the statement "humans cannot survive without them" is true is
>moot. The way we talk about behavior has some utility or else a culture
>would not sustain it for long in the absence of other maintaining
>reasons. Such terms are not, however, of much scientific use.
>""
>So that "the way we talk about behavior" (read: our folk psychology)
>*does* have some utility to our culture. Maybe we should be careful
>how we change it. Don't you think?
>patty
That's why those in the Experimental and Applied Analysis of Behaviour
do what they do - i.e. research. If it was all fine as it is why would
they bother?
This is a question I've been urging those in c.a.p (and elsewhere) to
give some more serious thought to than they have to date. It seems to me
that all too many take for granted what the above experts say is highly
problematic!
It strikes me as odd that mathematicians and computer scientists think
they know better! It should strike them as odd too given their
demonstrable incompetence to date!! That's intensional opacity for you.
Even though some of the leaders in the field have recently described
"AI" as "brain dead", the fact that they demonstrably don't know much
about the science of behaviour doesn't seem to provide them with any
clues as to *why* that may be so. In fact, pointing this out explicitly
just seems to offend them!
--
David Longley
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 22, 12:56 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 19:56:00 GMT
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Thu, 22 Jul 2004 16:16:14 -0000, Ron Peterson
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Since Zick doesn't seem to treat mathematics as universally true, I
>can't make sense of what he means by universality.
I don't consider mathematics and geometry as proven universally true
because they rely on undemonstrated axiomatic foundations.
I take universality to mean simply that a universal is demonstrable of
all things to the exclusion of all possible alternatives.
Your claim with respect to falsifiability is the commonly accepted
standard with respect to non universal systems of knowledge such as
the physical and axiomatic sciences. So I don't see your contribution
to the the thread as premature. But this shouldn't be taken to imply
no universal proof of truth is possible.We just use the falsifiability
standard in the absence of a general standard of universal truth.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 22, 12:56 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 19:56:00 GMT
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Thu, 22 Jul 2004 16:21:05 -
0000, Ron Peterson
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>In talk.philosophy.humanism Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Wed, 21 Jul 2004 22:41:18 -0000, Ron Peterson
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical content.
>> So you're only interested in illogical propositions? I think you'll
>> find that logic applies to all propositions mathematical and physical.
>I was referring to propositions with *only* logical and mathematical
>content.
Sure. The problem is that physical sciences have to deal with logical
considerations in addition to physical properties. We couldn't very
well disprove or falsify hypotheses without some specific concept of
truth subject to falsification.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Albert Jul 22, 3:55 pm show options
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From: Albert - Find messages by this author
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 17:55:06 -0500
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 3:55 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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David Longley wrote:
Is 'intensional' the British spelling of 'intentional?'
--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express
it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"
Reply
Neil W Rickert Jul 22, 6:38 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Neil W Rickert - Find messages by this author
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2004 01:38:11 +0000 (UTC)
Local: Thurs, Jul 22 2004 6:38 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Albert writes:
>David Longley wrote:
>
>Is 'intensional' the British spelling of 'intentional?'
No, it isn't. It's a term that comes from certain philosophies
of language.
Reply
David Longley Jul 23, 5:02 am show options
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From: David Longley - Find messages by this author
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2004 13:02:13 +0100
Local: Fri, Jul 23 2004 5:02 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In article <20040722175506.39260...@lfs.mydomain.com>,
Albert
writes
>David Longley wrote:
>
>Is 'intensional' the British spelling of 'intentional?'
No
.
Intention is intensional, but so are other locutions. Look up Quine and
extensionality.
(Or read some of the latter parts of the following).
--
David Longley
http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm
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Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 23, 6:03 am show options
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From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 23 Jul 2004 06:03:12 -0700
Local: Fri, Jul 23 2004 6:03 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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patty wrote in message ...
(snip)
> Yes, mathematical and logical systems (and more generally formal
> systems) are the only systems in which it makes any sense for the word
> "proof" to be used *as Zick used the word*. You can prove things in a
> non formal system too. Example: I assert that a box is too heavy to be
> picked up; but you proceed to pick it up anyway; my assertion has been
> proved false. Ask yourself which kind of proof is Zick's proof of
> universals; if the is the former, then he needs to play by a set of
> rules; if it is the latter then he needs to do something very dramatic.
> patty
In formal systems you do acquire Knowledge, but Reality is not a
formal system... Once you prove something you *know*.
If you assert that the box is heavy you are expressing a belief.
Whoever hears about the box and has no experience of that box may
_believe_ or not. If you do pick up the box it means you didn`t
believe it was too heavy and viceversa. My point is how the
`knowledge` about te box`s weight propagates to people who have no
direct experience of it. Whoever accepts an assertion about the box
without corroborating it is holding a belief andmay be right or wrong.
Tell two or three people about the box. Then they tell others, etc.
How many will `know` the box is too heavy and how many that the box
can actually be lifted? And this particular segment of Reality can be
easily corroborated...
Reply
patty Jul 23, 6:48 am show options
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From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2004 13:48:07 GMT
Local: Fri, Jul 23 2004 6:48 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Fabrizio J. Bonsignore wrote:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> patty wrote in message ...
> (snip)
>>Yes, mathematical and logical systems (and more generally formal
>>systems) are the only systems in which it makes any sense for the word
>>"proof" to be used *as Zick used the word*. You can prove things in a
>>non formal system too. Example: I assert that a box is too heavy to be
>>picked up; but you proceed to pick it up anyway; my assertion has been
>>proved false. Ask yourself which kind of proof is Zick's proof of
>>universals; if the is the former, then he needs to play by a set of
>>rules; if it is the latter then he needs to do something very dramatic.
>>patty
> In formal systems you do acquire Knowledge, but Reality is not a
> formal system... Once you prove something you *know*.
> If you assert that the box is heavy you are expressing a belief.
> Whoever hears about the box and has no experience of that box may
> _believe_ or not. If you do pick up the box it means you didn`t
> believe it was too heavy and viceversa. My point is how the
> `knowledge` about te box`s weight propagates to people who have no
> direct experience of it. Whoever accepts an assertion about the box
> without corroborating it is holding a belief andmay be right or wrong.
> Tell two or three people about the box. Then they tell others, etc.
> How many will `know` the box is too heavy and how many that the box
> can actually be lifted? And this particular segment of Reality can be
> easily corroborated...
Yes clearly beliefs spread around, get mutated, and can be verified to
be true or false based on other beliefs. These beliefs infect our
thinking. What is not so clear is that those kind of beliefs affect
much of anything in the world. What does affect things is the strong
interactions we have with the groups with which we are involved, and
what behavior is reinforced within those groups. The rest is just
propaganda ... no?
patty
Reply
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 23, 7:09 am show options
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From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 23 Jul 2004 07:09:59 -0700
Local: Fri, Jul 23 2004 7:09 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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For instance, the field for the `belief` in gravity is well combed
though there are always a few that entertain the notion they can
actually fly (not including children, who start `believing` only after
they get tired of _jumping_). So there is _knowledge_ about gravity
(without recurring to explaining theories), and everybody _knows_ that
things fall to the floor.
But what about levitation? In this case the field is not homogeneous,
the notion that some people may actually levitate may be widespread
and some people will at any moment drop or acquire this belief. And
there are pics of people levitating! (at least I can remember one). In
this case we have a field fluctuating continuously. How does this
belief propagates through society? This is the kind of dynamics that
can be modeled through statistical mechanics fields.
Reply
patty Jul 23, 7:14 am show options
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From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2004 14:14:17 GMT
Local: Fri, Jul 23 2004 7:14 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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David Longley wrote:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> In article <2IRLc.144611$JR4.20...@attbi_s54>, patty
> writes
>> David Longley wrote:
>>> In article , patty
>>> writes
>>>> David Longley wrote:
>>>>> In article , patty
>>>>> writes
>>>>>> Ron Peterson wrote:
>>>>>>> In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>>>>> Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>>>>>>>> demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
>>>>>>> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical
>>>>>>> content.
>>>>>> ... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition
>>>>>> relative to the assumptions of some system. A universally true
>>>>>> proposition is a pipe dream.
>>>>>> patty
>>>>> Pipe dream(s) indeed.
>>>>> But you can set your doubts lower still - "propositions" are
>>>>> intensions.
>>>> Well i take a proposition to be a *statement* in some language, for
>>>> example "1 + 2 = 3". Do you still call that an "intension" ?
>>>> patty
>>> It doesn't matter what *you* take a proposition to be (there are no
>>> private languages).
>> Well language does change with its usage. I think fue people today
>> distinguish between a statement and the abstract thing to which it
>> refers. If you substitute "statement" for "proposition" in the dialog
>> above, then my statements and ron's would not switch from true to false.
>>> Proposition is an alternative term for intension.
>> Ok, i'll try to remember that.
>>> Contrast "Philosophical Investigations" with "Tractatus
>>> Logico-Philosophicus" if evidential behaviourism hasn't yet convinced
>>> you of the folly of such talk.
>> I'm working on it, Wittgenstein is hard reading.
>>> Why is it still with us (we have been through this before surely)?
>>> The fact that there are lots of folk around who don't understand the
>>> nature of our folk psychological folly shouldn't persuade one of
>>> anything other than the fact that there are lots of folk about who
>>> don't see that it's folly, and why. But you'll find that more people
>>> believe in astrology etc than most of the scientific facts that
>>> regulate how they live - yet most people will follow what most
>>> people think as common-sense. Go figure!).
>> Well regarding that i was struck by something Glen said today:
>> ""
>> GS: In what sense would they be meaningless to behaviorists? Have you
>> forgotten that all behaviorists are indoctrinated into folk psychology
>> (as well as academic mentalism) before they become behaviorists?
>> Whether the statement "humans cannot survive without them" is true is
>> moot. The way we talk about behavior has some utility or else a
>> culture would not sustain it for long in the absence of other
>> maintaining reasons. Such terms are not, however, of much scientific use.
>> ""
>> So that "the way we talk about behavior" (read: our folk psychology)
>> *does* have some utility to our culture. Maybe we should be careful
>> how we change it. Don't you think?
>> patty
> That's why those in the Experimental and Applied Analysis of Behaviour
> do what they do - i.e. research. If it was all fine as it is why would
> they bother?
> This is a question I've been urging those in c.a.p (and elsewhere) to
> give some more serious thought to than they have to date. It seems to me
> that all too many take for granted what the above experts say is highly
> problematic!
> It strikes me as odd that mathematicians and computer scientists think
> they know better! It should strike them as odd too given their
> demonstrable incompetence to date!! That's intensional opacity for you.
But intensional opacity is a fact that is enforced by physical barriers.
I could say the skull or the blood brain barrier, but that would be just
a metaphor, we know we are talking only of language here. What is
clear, though, is that this intensional opacity is here to stay. For
you in particular to keep railing against it (i really don't think
this comes from the EAB), is just propaganda - me thinks it is very
unscientific.
> Even though some of the leaders in the field have recently described
> "AI" as "brain dead", the fact that they demonstrably don't know much
> about the science of behaviour doesn't seem to provide them with any
> clues as to *why* that may be so. In fact, pointing this out explicitly
> just seems to offend them!
If you stopped being so unscientifically judgmental about intensional
opacity, then perhaps your point would come through louder and clearer.
It is so very hard for me to separate your science from your politics.
Your combination of the two, at least for me, is making for bad science
and bad politics.
Now, on the other hand, i can see that it is a mistake to glorify
mentalism and folk psychology; and that does happen in today's world.
Perhaps somebody has to stand up and tell the rest of the story. I
respect that. But in the process of doing that, let's not swing the
pendulum to the point of vilifying what is best in our very humanity.
A little balance here, please!
patty
Reply
THeory of Beliefs
A theory of beliefs
« Older Messages 51 - 75 of 86 in topic - view as tree Newer »
Johnny 5 Jul 23, 8:55 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
Followup-To: alt.religion,sci.econ
From: Johnny 5 - Find messages by this author
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2004 15:55:00 GMT
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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patty wrote:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
>>>Yes, mathematical and logical systems (and more generally formal
>>>systems) are the only systems in which it makes any sense for the
>>>word "proof" to be used *as Zick used the word*. You can prove
>>>things in a non formal system too. Example: I assert that a box is
>>>too heavy to be picked up; but you proceed to pick it up anyway; my
>>>assertion has been proved false. Ask yourself which kind of proof is
>>>Zick's proof of universals; if the is the former, then he needs to
>>>play by a set of rules; if it is the latter then he needs to do
>>>something very dramatic.
>>>patty
>> In formal systems you do acquire Knowledge, but Reality is not a
>> formal system... Once you prove something you *know*.
>> If you assert that the box is heavy you are expressing a belief.
>> Whoever hears about the box and has no experience of that box may
>> _believe_ or not. If you do pick up the box it means you didn`t
>> believe it was too heavy and viceversa. My point is how the
>> `knowledge` about te box`s weight propagates to people who have no
>> direct experience of it. Whoever accepts an assertion about the box
>> without corroborating it is holding a belief andmay be right or
>> wrong. Tell two or three people about the box. Then they tell others,
>> etc. How many will `know` the box is too heavy and how many that the
>> box can actually be lifted? And this particular segment of Reality
>> can be easily corroborated...
> Yes clearly beliefs spread around, get mutated, and can be verified to
> be true or false based on other beliefs. These beliefs infect our
> thinking. What is not so clear is that those kind of beliefs affect
> much of anything in the world. What does affect things is the strong
> interactions we have with the groups with which we are involved, and
> what behavior is reinforced within those groups. The rest is just
> propaganda ... no?
> patty
Please read this short webpage in its entirety - it covers the concepts
you are thinking about very clearly.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
Neither correspondence, nor coherence or consensus, and not even
survivability, are sufficient to ground a theory of knowledge.
--
Government policy in interest rates, and on finance generally, has been
marked by vacillation, wishful thinking, electoral expediency of the most
shameful type towards the end of last year, contortions and
contradictions, all to accommodate the redneck economics of the National
Country Party. (Harsard Aug.27 1981)
Reply
Johnny 5 Jul 23, 9:02 am show options
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Followup-To: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism
From: Johnny 5 - Find messages by this author
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2004 16:02:24 GMT
Local: Fri, Jul 23 2004 9:02 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
news:768f7623.0407230609.314a3938@posting.google.com:
> For instance, the field for the `belief` in gravity is well combed
> though there are always a few that entertain the notion they can
> actually fly (not including children, who start `believing` only after
> they get tired of _jumping_). So there is _knowledge_ about gravity
> (without recurring to explaining theories), and everybody _knows_ that
> things fall to the floor.
> But what about levitation? In this case the field is not homogeneous,
> the notion that some people may actually levitate may be widespread
> and some people will at any moment drop or acquire this belief. And
> there are pics of people levitating! (at least I can remember one). In
> this case we have a field fluctuating continuously. How does this
> belief propagates through society? This is the kind of dynamics that
> can be modeled through statistical mechanics fields.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/MEMIN.html
So, in theory at least, the ability to understand and communicate complex
memes is a survival trait, and natural selection should favor those who
aren't too conservative to understand new memes. Or does it? In practice,
some people are going to be all too ready to commit any new meme that
comes along, even if it should turn out to be deadly nonsense, like:
"Jump off a cliff and the gods will make you fly."
Such memes do evolve, generated by crazy people, or through mis-
replication. Notice, though, that this meme might have a lot of appeal.
The idea of magical flight is so tantalizing -- maybe, if I truly
believed, I just might leap off the cliff and...
This is a vital point: people try to infect each other with those memes
which they find most appealing, regardless of the memes' objective value
or truth. Further, the carrier of the cliff-jumping meme might never
actually take the plunge; they may spend the rest of their long lives
infecting other people with the meme, inducing millions of gullible fools
to leap to their deaths. Historically, this sort of thing is happening
all the time.
Whether memes can be considered true "life forms" or not is a topic of
some debate, but this is irrelevant: they behave in a way similar to life
forms, allowing us to combine the analytical techniques of epidemiology,
evolutionary science, immunology, linguistics, and semiotics, into an
effective system known as "memetics." Rather than debate the inherent
"truth" or lack of "truth" of an idea, memetics is largely concerned with
how that idea gets itself replicated.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
--
Government policy in interest rates, and on finance generally, has been
marked by vacillation, wishful thinking, electoral expediency of the most
shameful type towards the end of last year, contortions and
contradictions, all to accommodate the redneck economics of the National
Country Party. (Harsard Aug.27 1981
)
Reply
Albert Jul 23, 8:26 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Albert - Find messages by this author
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2004 10:26:59 -0500
Local: Fri, Jul 23 2004 8:26 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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David Longley wrote:
> Albert wrote:
> >Is 'intensional' the British spelling of 'intentional?'
> No.
> Intention is intensional, but so are other locutions. Look up
> Quine and extensionality.
Ah. So 'intensional' is professional jargon used only by
philosophers of natural language. Which of the diverse NGs
crossposted are you posting from?
--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express
it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"
Reply
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 24, 3:22 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 24 Jul 2004 03:22:36 -0700
Local: Sat, Jul 24 2004 3:22 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Johnny 5 wrote in message ...
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
> news:768f7623.0407230609.314a3938@posting.google.com:
> > For instance, the field for the `belief` in gravity is well combed
> > though there are always a few that entertain the notion they can
> > actually fly (not including children, who start `believing` only after
> > they get tired of _jumping_). So there is _knowledge_ about gravity
> > (without recurring to explaining theories), and everybody _knows_ that
> > things fall to the floor.
> > But what about levitation? In this case the field is not homogeneous,
> > the notion that some people may actually levitate may be widespread
> > and some people will at any moment drop or acquire this belief. And
> > there are pics of people levitating! (at least I can remember one). In
> > this case we have a field fluctuating continuously. How does this
> > belief propagates through society? This is the kind of dynamics that
> > can be modeled through statistical mechanics fields.
> http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/MEMIN.html
> So, in theory at least, the ability to understand and communicate complex
> memes is a survival trait, and natural selection should favor those who
> aren't too conservative to understand new memes. Or does it? In practice,
> some people are going to be all too ready to commit any new meme that
> comes along, even if it should turn out to be deadly nonsense, like:
Natural selection doesn`t work as such in a Living Rational
environment. Humans stopped being naturally selected when Reason
evolved.
> This is a vital point: people try to infect each other with those memes
> which they find most appealing, regardless of the memes' objective value
> or truth. Further, the carrier of the cliff-jumping meme might never
> actually take the plunge; they may spend the rest of their long lives
> infecting other people with the meme, inducing millions of gullible fools
> to leap to their deaths. Historically, this sort of thing is happening
> all the time.
And the propagation of beliefs (not sustantiated by some form of truth
value proof) can be modeled as fields over discrete `particles`
affecting each other, here people. A SMF model models precisely the
dynamics of such infectations.
> Whether memes can be considered true "life forms" or not is a topic of
> some debate, but this is irrelevant: they behave in a way similar to life
> forms, allowing us to combine the analytical techniques of epidemiology,
> evolutionary science, immunology, linguistics, and semiotics, into an
> effective system known as "memetics." Rather than debate the inherent
> "truth" or lack of "truth" of an idea, memetics is largely concerned with
> how that idea gets itself replicated.
I can`t see any evolution here. For any given issue there may be
several beliefs regading that issue; some appear at some time, compete
and then dissapear until for this particular issue the matter
stabilizes, or remain in the pool of beliefs propagating through
populations. Genesis theories don`t precisely evolve; suddenly a
cosmology appears, is carried by a population and eventually it is
suplanted by a new cosmology, or continues living on as a tradition.
The Bible`s Genesis is considered still by many as The Genesis, and it
has changed not a single comma since its inception. Now we have the
Big Bang as the scientific genesis `belief` and it truly evolves, but
according to the scientific method not by selection mechanisms. The
main problem I see is that ultimately life forms are individually well
defined and discrete, while beliefs (regarding complex issues) are
fuzzy and not well defined; DNA is a tighter language than human
languages.
Reply
Ron Peterson Jul 24, 6:45 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 2004 13:45:27 -0000
Local: Sat, Jul 24 2004 6:45 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
> On Thu, 22 Jul 2004 16:21:05 -0000, Ron Peterson
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>I was referring to propositions with *only* logical and mathematical
>>content.
> Sure. The problem is that physical sciences have to deal with logical
> considerations in addition to physical properties. We couldn't very
> well disprove or falsify hypotheses without some specific concept of
> truth subject to falsification.
My point is that general knowledge can be partitioned between those
things that can be proved (mathematics) and the hypotheses that can't be
proved (scientific knowledge of the real world).
--
Ron
Reply
Johnny 5 Jul 24, 7:06 am show options
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Followup-To: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism
From: Johnny 5 - Find messages by this author
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 2004 14:06:12 GMT
Local: Sat, Jul 24 2004 7:06 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
news:768f7623.0407240222.75185884@posting.google.com:
> Natural selection doesn`t work as such in a Living Rational
> environment. Humans stopped being naturally selected when Reason
> evolved.
The towelheads in Iraq are gonna suicide bomb you so they can get 77
virgins.
> And the propagation of beliefs (not sustantiated by some form of truth
> value proof) can be modeled as fields over discrete `particles`
> affecting each other, here people. A SMF model models precisely the
> dynamics of such infectations.
How does your model predict the end of Bin Laden and his towelheads?
> The Bible`s Genesis is considered still by many as The Genesis, and it
> has changed not a single comma since its inception.
My professors back at college said at the end of the day, at the base
fundamentals, you have faith.
Now we have the
> Big Bang as the scientific genesis `belief` and it truly evolves, but
> according to the scientific method not by selection mechanisms. The
> main problem I see is that ultimately life forms are individually well
> defined and discrete, while beliefs (regarding complex issues) are
> fuzzy and not well defined; DNA is a tighter language than human
> languages.
True.
--
Government policy in interest rates, and on finance generally, has been
marked by vacillation, wishful thinking, electoral expediency of the most
shameful type towards the end of last year, contortions and
contradictions, all to accommodate the redneck economics of the National
Country Party. (Harsard Aug.27 1981
)
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 24, 8:57 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 2004 15:57:23 GMT
Local: Sat, Jul 24 2004 8:57 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Sat, 24 Jul 2004 13:45:27 -0000, Ron Peterson
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Thu, 22 Jul 2004 16:21:05 -0000, Ron Peterson
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>I was referring to propositions with *only* logical and mathematical
>>>content.
>> Sure. The problem is that physical sciences have to deal with logical
>> considerations in addition to physical properties. We couldn't very
>> well disprove or falsify hypotheses without some specific concept of
>> truth subject to falsification.
>My point is that general knowledge can be partitioned between those
>things that can be proved (mathematics) and the hypotheses that can't be
>proved (scientific knowledge of the real world).
Except that here again there is no way to invalidate or falsify things
without some applicable concept of truth to begin with. What the
axiomatic sciences do is prove that theorems don't result in self
contradiction with the edifice and its axioms. Experimental sciences
do the same in testing for hypothetical self contradiction. They do so
in different terms because non axiomatic sciences have no way except
existing results to interpret what they know.
In effect, existing results in non axiomatic sciences are the axioms
of that science, at least temporarily. If Newtonian gravitation, for
example, describes an inverse square force, that becomes an axiom of
gravitational mechanics to which other results are expected to
conform. Some would call it a paradigm instead of an axiom, but it's
function is the the same. We could call physical sciences paradigmatic
instead of axiomatic. Then we would have axiomatic sciences like math
and geometry and paradigmatic sciences like physics and chemistry. But
the role of axioms and paradigms is identical in the sense of forming
a basis for testing self contradiction as a way of establishing truth.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Robert J. Kolker Jul 24, 10:33 am show options
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From: "Robert J. Kolker" - Find messages by this author
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 2004 17:33:28 GMT
Local: Sat, Jul 24 2004 10:33 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Lester Zick wrote:
> In effect, existing results in non axiomatic sciences are the axioms
> of that science, at least temporarily. If Newtonian gravitation, for
> example, describes an inverse square force, that becomes an axiom of
> gravitational mechanics to which other results are expected to
> conform. Some would call it a paradigm instead of an axiom, but it's
> function is the the same.
A general statement on how things are supposed to act is called a Law.
> We could call physical sciences paradigmatic
> instead of axiomatic. Then we would have axiomatic sciences like math
> and geometry and paradigmatic sciences like physics and chemistry. But
> the role of axioms and paradigms is identical in the sense of forming
> a basis for testing self contradiction as a way of establishing truth.
Quite so. The only difference is that physical sciences come with a
dictionare, of sorts, which translate a subset of the theorems deduced
from the axioms (or laws) into quantitative conditional statements about
the world. It is these statements that are tested by experiment.
Bob Kolker
Reply
Albert Jul 24, 10:01 am show options
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From: Albert - Find messages by this author
Date: Sat, 24 Jul 2004 12:01:19 -0500
Local: Sat, Jul 24 2004 10:01 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) wrote:
> But the
> role of axioms and paradigms is identical in the sense of
> forming a basis for testing self contradiction as a way of
> establishing truth.
This is my understanding of Wittgenstein's work.
--
"
Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express
it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984
"
Reply
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Jul 24, 6:23 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 24 Jul 2004 18:23:02 -0700
Local: Sat, Jul 24 2004 6:23 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Johnny 5 wrote in message ...
> fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
> news:768f7623.0407240222.75185884@posting.google.com:
> > Natural selection doesn`t work as such in a Living Rational
> > environment. Humans stopped being naturally selected when Reason
> > evolved.
> The towelheads in Iraq are gonna suicide bomb you so they can get 77
> virgins.
Reason includes suicide! Irrational Living beings don`t (normally)
suicide. You imply that all suicides will end dissapearing from the
human species? What that has not happened yet?
> > And the propagation of beliefs (not sustantiated by some form of truth
> > value proof) can be modeled as fields over discrete `particles`
> > affecting each other, here people. A SMF model models precisely the
> > dynamics of such infectations.
> How does your model predict the end of Bin Laden and his towelheads?
Precisely. They may never end, but the model gives us a (tested) way
to finish them. Ask the catholic missionaries. (Haven`t had time to
make models; fighting my own (dis)belief field). Visit
http://ghamac.org http://ghamac.org/miniface.jpg
> > The Bible`s Genesis is considered still by many as The Genesis, and it
> > has changed not a single comma since its inception.
> My professors back at college said at the end of the day, at the base
> fundamentals, you have faith.
Your spin stabilized (8D
Reply
Mason A. Clark Jul 24, 6:29 pm show options
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Followup-To: sci.econ
From: Mason A. Clark - Find messages by this author
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2004 01:29:45 GMT
Local: Sat, Jul 24 2004 6:29 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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If I understood one word of this thread I'd post a
comment, having published a book on the subject with
one chapter headed: "What We Believe."
http://masonc.home.netcom.com/quimby/quimby.html#TOP6
or read the whole thing:
http://masonc.home.netcom.com/quimby/quimby.html#TOP
You're welcome.
Mason C
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 25, 1:32 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2004 20:32:16 GMT
Local: Sun, Jul 25 2004 1:32 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Sat, 24 Jul 2004 17:33:28 GMT, "Robert J. Kolker"
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
>Lester Zick wrote:
>> In effect, existing results in non axiomatic sciences are the axioms
>> of that science, at least temporarily. If Newtonian gravitation, for
>> example, describes an inverse square force, that becomes an axiom of
>> gravitational mechanics to which other results are expected to
>> conform. Some would call it a paradigm instead of an axiom, but it's
>> function is the the same.
>A general statement on how things are supposed to act is called a Law.
>> We could call physical sciences paradigmatic
>> instead of axiomatic. Then we would have axiomatic sciences like math
>> and geometry and paradigmatic sciences like physics and chemistry. But
>> the role of axioms and paradigms is identical in the sense of forming
>> a basis for testing self contradiction as a way of establishing truth.
>Quite so. The only difference is that physical sciences come with a
>dictionare, of sorts, which translate a subset of the theorems deduced
>from the axioms (or laws) into quantitative conditional statements about
>the world. It is these statements that are tested by experiment.
Thanks. But I'm not clear what you mean by dictionaire. Physical laws
I'm familiar with don't make quantitative predictions. They just note
qualitative considerations related to equivalences between material
interactions and relative quantitative predictions based on those
equivalences.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Robert J. Kolker Jul 25, 3:26 pm show options
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From: "Robert J. Kolker" - Find messages by this author
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2004 22:26:53 GMT
Local: Sun, Jul 25 2004 3:26 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Lester Zick wrote:
> Thanks. But I'm not clear what you mean by dictionaire. Physical laws
> I'm familiar with don't make quantitative predictions. They just note
> qualitative considerations related to equivalences between material
> interactions and relative quantitative predictions based on those
> equivalences.
An interpretation of the formal statements. A way of translating the
math into measurables and the operations needed to do the measurements.
In quantum theory learn how quantum states are represented as vectors in
a Hilbert Space and how observables are equivalenced to Hermitean
Operators on the hilbert space. The eigen values are the possible values
of the obsservation.
Bob Kolker
Reply
Ron Peterson Jul 26, 6:35 am show options
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From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 13:35:55 -0000
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 6:35 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In talk.philosophy.humanism Lester Zick wrote:
> On Sat, 24 Jul 2004 13:45:27 -0000, Ron Peterson
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>My point is that general knowledge can be partitioned between those
>>things that can be proved (mathematics) and the hypotheses that can't be
>>proved (scientific knowledge of the real world).
> Except that here again there is no way to invalidate or falsify things
> without some applicable concept of truth to begin with. What the
> axiomatic sciences do is prove that theorems don't result in self
> contradiction with the edifice and its axioms. Experimental sciences
> do the same in testing for hypothetical self contradiction. They do so
> in different terms because non axiomatic sciences have no way except
> existing results to interpret what they know.
The concept of truth for mathematics is that a proposition is derivable
from the assumed axioms. That concept of truth doesn't work for the
scientific knowledge.
> In effect, existing results in non axiomatic sciences are the axioms
> of that science, at least temporarily. If Newtonian gravitation, for
> example, describes an inverse square force, that becomes an axiom of
> gravitational mechanics to which other results are expected to
> conform. Some would call it a paradigm instead of an axiom, but it's
> function is the the same. We could call physical sciences paradigmatic
> instead of axiomatic. Then we would have axiomatic sciences like math
> and geometry and paradigmatic sciences like physics and chemistry. But
> the role of axioms and paradigms is identical in the sense of forming
> a basis for testing self contradiction as a way of establishing truth.
The sciences form hypotheses which are essentially models of the real
world. We use those models to guide our actions to meet our needs
and desires. If the models don't correspond to reality, the models are
discarded and new models are invented.
--
Ron
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 26, 8:25 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 15:25:14 GMT
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 8:25 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 13:35:55 -
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
0000, Ron Peterson
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>In talk.philosophy.humanism Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Sat, 24 Jul 2004 13:45:27 -0000, Ron Peterson
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>My point is that general knowledge can be partitioned between those
>>>things that can be proved (mathematics) and the hypotheses that can't be
>>>proved (scientific knowledge of the real world).
>> Except that here again there is no way to invalidate or falsify things
>> without some applicable concept of truth to begin with. What the
>> axiomatic sciences do is prove that theorems don't result in self
>> contradiction with the edifice and its axioms. Experimental sciences
>> do the same in testing for hypothetical self contradiction. They do so
>> in different terms because non axiomatic sciences have no way except
>> existing results to interpret what they know.
>The concept of truth for mathematics is that a proposition is derivable
>from the assumed axioms. That concept of truth doesn't work for the
>scientific knowledge.
If the concept of truth doesn't work for scientific knowledge, I don't
see how it is possible to falsify any theory of science.In other words
if it is possible to falsify something, there is an implicit standard
of truth applicable to science and scientific theories.
>> In effect, existing results in non axiomatic sciences are the axioms
>> of that science, at least temporarily. If Newtonian gravitation, for
>> example, describes an inverse square force, that becomes an axiom of
>> gravitational mechanics to which other results are expected to
>> conform. Some would call it a paradigm instead of an axiom, but it's
>> function is the the same. We could call physical sciences paradigmatic
>> instead of axiomatic. Then we would have axiomatic sciences like math
>> and geometry and paradigmatic sciences like physics and chemistry. But
>> the role of axioms and paradigms is identical in the sense of forming
>> a basis for testing self contradiction as a way of establishing truth.
>The sciences form hypotheses which are essentially models of the real
>world. We use those models to guide our actions to meet our needs
>and desires. If the models don't correspond to reality, the models are
>discarded and new models are invented.
Which is exactly what happens in the axiomatic sciences like geometry
and math as well. The models just happen to be constructed in the form
of axioms instead of laws.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 26, 8:25 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 15:25:15 GMT
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 8:25 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Sun, 25 Jul 2004 22:26:53
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GMT, "Robert J. Kolker"
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Lester Zick wrote:
>> Thanks. But I'm not clear what you mean by dictionaire. Physical laws
>> I'm familiar with don't make quantitative predictions. They just note
>> qualitative considerations related to equivalences between material
>> interactions and relative quantitative predictions based on those
>> equivalences.
>An interpretation of the formal statements. A way of translating the
>math into measurables and the operations needed to do the measurements.
>In quantum theory learn how quantum states are represented as vectors in
>a Hilbert Space and how observables are equivalenced to Hermitean
>Operators on the hilbert space. The eigen values are the possible values
>of the obsservation.
But none of this is possible without the eigen values to begin with.
So either the eigen values are part of the paradigm or they are the
mechanical result of some other paradigm.
Regards - Lester
Reply
patty Jul 26, 9:15 am show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,sci.econ,comp.ai.philosophy
From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 16:15:40 GMT
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 9:15 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Johnny 5 wrote:
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- Show quoted text -
> patty wrote:
>>>>Yes, mathematical and logical systems (and more generally formal
>>>>systems) are the only systems in which it makes any sense for the
>>>>word "proof" to be used *as Zick used the word*. You can prove
>>>>things in a non formal system too. Example: I assert that a box is
>>>>too heavy to be picked up; but you proceed to pick it up anyway; my
>>>>assertion has been proved false. Ask yourself which kind of proof is
>>>>Zick's proof of universals; if the is the former, then he needs to
>>>>play by a set of rules; if it is the latter then he needs to do
>>>>something very dramatic.
>>>>patty
>>>In formal systems you do acquire Knowledge, but Reality is not a
>>>formal system... Once you prove something you *know*.
>>>If you assert that the box is heavy you are expressing a belief.
>>>Whoever hears about the box and has no experience of that box may
>>>_believe_ or not. If you do pick up the box it means you didn`t
>>>believe it was too heavy and viceversa. My point is how the
>>>`knowledge` about te box`s weight propagates to people who have no
>>>direct experience of it. Whoever accepts an assertion about the box
>>>without corroborating it is holding a belief andmay be right or
>>>wrong. Tell two or three people about the box. Then they tell others,
>>>etc. How many will `know` the box is too heavy and how many that the
>>>box can actually be lifted? And this particular segment of Reality
>>>can be easily corroborated...
>>Yes clearly beliefs spread around, get mutated, and can be verified to
>>be true or false based on other beliefs. These beliefs infect our
>>thinking. What is not so clear is that those kind of beliefs affect
>>much of anything in the world. What does affect things is the strong
>>interactions we have with the groups with which we are involved, and
>>what behavior is reinforced within those groups. The rest is just
>>propaganda ... no?
>>patty
> Please read this short webpage in its entirety - it covers the concepts
> you are thinking about very clearly.
> http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
> Neither correspondence, nor coherence or consensus, and not even
> survivability, are sufficient to ground a theory of knowledge.
Yes, Heylighen has given us an excellent review of epistemology. I think
Memetics is a bit hard for some of us to swallow whole, however in
todays Internet world where we fight viruses on a daily basis it is
becoming more palatable. But you should get someone to fix the button
at the bottom of the page, apparently rateit.cgi no longer exists at
philosophysearch.com.
patty
Reply
Ron Peterson Jul 26, 9:27 am show options
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From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 16:27:02 -0000
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 9:27 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 13:35:55 -0000, Ron Peterson
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>The concept of truth for mathematics is that a proposition is derivable
>>from the assumed axioms. That concept of truth doesn't work for the
>>scientific knowledge.
> If the concept of truth doesn't work for scientific knowledge, I don't
> see how it is possible to falsify any theory of science.In other words
> if it is possible to falsify something, there is an implicit standard
> of truth applicable to science and scientific theories.
I said *that* concept of truth.
Why do you need a standard of truth for scientific theories? And, what
is a standard of
truth?
>>The sciences form hypotheses which are essentially models of the real
>>world. We use those models to guide our actions to meet our needs
>>and desires. If the models don't correspond to reality, the models are
>>discarded and new models are invented.
> Which is exactly what happens in the axiomatic sciences like geometry
> and math as well. The models just happen to be constructed in the form
> of axioms instead of laws.
It's not the same thing. The sciences match up the models with some of
the things that we perceived as being part of the real world.
Mathematics has no need to do that.
--
Ron
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 26, 11:48 am show options
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From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 18:48:42 GMT
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 11:48 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 16:27:02 -
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
0000, Ron Peterson
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 13:35:55 -0000, Ron Peterson
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>The concept of truth for mathematics is that a proposition is derivable
>>>from the assumed axioms. That concept of truth doesn't work for the
>>>scientific knowledge.
>> If the concept of truth doesn't work for scientific knowledge, I don't
>> see how it is possible to falsify any theory of science.In other words
>> if it is possible to falsify something, there is an implicit standard
>> of truth applicable to science and scientific theories.
>I said *that* concept of truth.
OK, the scientific standard of truth is not derived from axioms. But
there is a paradigm of experimentally defined properties against
which the truth of scientific theories is gauged in terms of self
contradiction. If there is no contradiction the theory is assumed
true.
>Why do you need a standard of truth for scientific theories? And, what
>is a standard of truth?
You need a standard of truth for scientific theories for the same
reason you need a standard of truth for axiomatic theorems, to judge
the self consistency of theories drawn in terms of the paradigm in
terms of self contradiction. In geometry and mathematics generally
axioms provide the basis against which to judge self consistency. In
non axiomatic science an experimentally determined paradigm is used.
The origins of axioms and physical paradigms are different. But that
doesn't mean that axioms are any less experimentally determinate.
For example, the geometric axiom that a straight line is the shortest
distance between two points is experimentally validated to the extent
possible. So are scientific paradigms. But both serve as a conceptual
basis against which to gauge the self consistency of ideas drawn on
their respective subject matters.
A standard of truth is just the basis against which the consistency of
theorems and theories are drawn. The difference between axiomatic and
paradigmatic sciences is that axiomatic properties are well defined in
axiomatic terms whereas paradigmatic properties are not well defined
in terms of the paradigm so paradigmatic properties cannot be analyzed
directly in logical terms but have to be analyzed experimentally.
>>>The sciences form hypotheses which are essentially models of the real
>>>world. We use those models to guide our actions to meet our needs
>>>and desires. If the models don't correspond to reality, the models are
>>>discarded and new models are invented.
>> Which is exactly what happens in the axiomatic sciences like geometry
>> and math as well. The models just happen to be constructed in the form
>> of axioms instead of laws.
>It's not the same thing. The sciences match up the models with some of
>the things that we perceived as being part of the real world.
>Mathematics has no need to do that.
Actually it is exactly the same thing except for the experimental
validation. When you refer to "things perceived as being part of the
real world" you're imputing some special kind of reality to
paradigmatic as opposed to axiomatic things. In point of fact both are
real and are equally real. The only difference is that paradigmatic
things define the result of material interactions. In other words it's
just the subject studied and not the method of study that defines the
reality of things of all types. There is no special reality attributed
to experimental things apart from the properties of the subject.
Regards - Lester
Reply
patty Jul 26, 12:14 pm show options
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From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 19:14:21 GMT
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 12:14 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Lester Zick wrote:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 16:27:02 -0000, Ron Peterson
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 13:35:55 -0000, Ron Peterson
>>>in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>>The concept of truth for mathematics is that a proposition is derivable
>>>>from the assumed axioms. That concept of truth doesn't work for the
>>>>scientific knowledge.
>>>If the concept of truth doesn't work for scientific knowledge, I don't
>>>see how it is possible to falsify any theory of science.In other words
>>>if it is possible to falsify something, there is an implicit standard
>>>of truth applicable to science and scientific theories.
>>I said *that* concept of truth.
> OK, the scientific standard of truth is not derived from axioms. But
> there is a paradigm of experimentally defined properties against
> which the truth of scientific theories is gauged in terms of self
> contradiction. If there is no contradiction the theory is assumed
> true.
... or perhaps is not falsifiable.
patty
Reply
Ron Peterson Jul 26, 12:18 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 19:18:11 -0000
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 12:18 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 16:27:02 -0000, Ron Peterson
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>I said *that* concept of truth.
> OK, the scientific standard of truth is not derived from axioms. But
> there is a paradigm of experimentally defined properties against
> which the truth of scientific theories is gauged in terms of self
> contradiction. If there is no contradiction the theory is assumed
> true.
No, scientific theories are never assumed true. The best we have is a
working hypothesis.
>>Why do you need a standard of truth for scientific theories? And, what
>>is a standard of truth?
> You need a standard of truth for scientific theories for the same
> reason you need a standard of truth for axiomatic theorems, to judge
> the self consistency of theories drawn in terms of the paradigm in
> terms of self contradiction. In geometry and mathematics generally
> axioms provide the basis against which to judge self consistency. In
> non axiomatic science an experimentally determined paradigm is used.
The
consistency of a theory is a separate issue from whether the theory
is true.
> The origins of axioms and physical paradigms are different. But that
> doesn't mean that axioms are any less experimentally determinate.
> For example, the geometric axiom that a straight line is the shortest
> distance between two points is experimentally validated to the extent
> possible. ...
The truth of mathematical propositions don't depend on experimental
validation.
--
Ron
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 26, 3:04 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 22:04:54 GMT
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 3:04 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 19:14:21 GMT, patty
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
>Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 16:27:02 -0000, Ron Peterson
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 13:35:55 -0000, Ron Peterson
>>>>in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>>>The concept of truth for mathematics is that a proposition is derivable
>>>>>from the assumed axioms. That concept of truth doesn't work for the
>>>>>scientific knowledge.
>>>>If the concept of truth doesn't work for scientific knowledge, I don't
>>>>see how it is possible to falsify any theory of science.In other words
>>>>if it is possible to falsify something, there is an implicit standard
>>>>of truth applicable to science and scientific theories.
>>>I said *that* concept of truth.
>> OK, the scientific standard of truth is not derived from axioms. But
>> there is a paradigm of experimentally defined properties against
>> which the truth of scientific theories is gauged in terms of self
>> contradiction. If there is no contradiction the theory is assumed
>> true.
>... or perhaps is not falsifiable.
We can't know a theory is not falsifiable because experimentation
relies on possibilities not evident in the paradigm. We can only
know it is consistent or not of what we know of the paradigm.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 26, 3:04 pm show options
Newsgroups: alt.religion,talk.philosophy.humanism,sci.econ,sci.physics,comp.ai.philosophy
From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 22:04:58 GMT
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 3:04 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 19:18:11 -
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
0000, Ron Peterson
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 16:27:02 -0000, Ron Peterson
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>I said *that* concept of truth.
>> OK, the scientific standard of truth is not derived from axioms. But
>> there is a paradigm of experimentally defined properties against
>> which the truth of scientific theories is gauged in terms of self
>> contradiction. If there is no contradiction the theory is assumed
>> true.
>No, scientific theories are never assumed true. The best we have is a
>working hypothesis.
Scientific theories are assumed true in the sense that experiments
show no inconsistency between the paradigm and theory. I didn't mean
that theories are assumed true without validation. I just meant that
theories aren't proven true as the result of experimental validation
because we can't test every aspect of paradigm-theory consistency.
Rather by experiment theories are shown to be consistent with paradigm
parameters to the extent tested. However this isn't to imply that
there is no standard of experimental truth. It just means we don't
know how to test paradigmatic truth exhaustively.
>>>Why do you need a standard of truth for scientific theories? And, what
>>>is a standard of truth?
>> You need a standard of truth for scientific theories for the same
>> reason you need a standard of truth for axiomatic theorems, to judge
>> the self consistency of theories drawn in terms of the paradigm in
>> terms of self contradiction. In geometry and mathematics generally
>> axioms provide the basis against which to judge self consistency. In
>> non axiomatic science an experimentally determined paradigm is used.
>The consistency of a theory is a separate issue from whether the theory
>is true.
Actually not. Paradigm-theory consistency is the only standard of
experimental truth.
>> The origins of axioms and physical paradigms are different. But that
>> doesn't mean that axioms are any less experimentally determinate.
>> For example, the geometric axiom that a straight line is the shortest
>> distance between two points is experimentally validated to the extent
>> possible. ...
>The truth of mathematical propositions don't depend on experimental
>validation.
Well, the truth of mathematical theorems does depend on validation of
the axioms on which it is based. These can be arbitrarily assumed but
by and large are taken to reflect actual circumstances as nearly as
anyone can make out. And to this extent the experimental validity of
theorems does depend on the experimental validation of axioms. The
most we can know is that theorems and axioms are mutually consistent.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Robert J. Kolker Jul 26, 3:10 pm show options
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From: "Robert J. Kolker" - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 22:10:06 GMT
Local: Mon, Jul 26 2004 3:10 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Ron Peterson wrote:
> The truth of mathematical propositions don't depend on experimental
> validation.
Determining whether a propostion is true, however, does depend on
demonstrating the proposition, as in producing a proof. This is somewhat
analagous to empirical corroberation in the sciences.
Bob Kolker
A theory of beliefs
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Ron Peterson Jul 27, 6:35 am show options
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From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2004 13:35:20 -0000
Local: Tues, Jul 27 2004 6:35 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In talk.philosophy.humanism Robert J. Kolker wrote:
> Ron Peterson wrote:
>> The truth of mathematical propositions don't depend on experimental
>> validation.
> Determining whether a propostion is true, however, does depend on
> demonstrating the proposition, as in producing a proof.
That's correct.
> This is somewhat analagous to empirical corroberation in the
> sciences.
Analogies frequently lead people to the wrong conclusions. My point is
that the scientific method is all that we have now and that it's concept
of truth is merely that of working hypotheses. Many of those working
hypotheses are used continually to provide for peoples wants and needs
and that is all the proof that is needed.
--
Ron
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Ron Peterson Jul 27, 6:48 am show options
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From: Ron Peterson - Find messages by this author
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2004 13:48:46 -0000
Local: Tues, Jul 27 2004 6:48 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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In talk.philosophy.humanism Lester Zick wrote:
> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 19:18:11 -0000, Ron Peterson
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>The consistency of a theory is a separate issue from whether the theory
>>is true.
> Actually not. Paradigm-theory consistency is the only standard of
> experimental truth.
The Postmodern philosophy of science that you are advocating is
unintelligible nonsense.
--
Ron
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 27, 8:13 am show options
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From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2004 15:13:22 GMT
Local: Tues, Jul 27 2004 8:13 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 22:10:06 GMT, "Robert J. Kolker"
in comp.ai.philosophy
wrote:
>Ron Peterson wrote:
>> The truth of mathematical propositions don't depend on experimental
>> validation.
>Determining whether a propostion is true, however, does depend on
>demonstrating the proposition, as in producing a proof. This is somewhat
>analagous to empirical corroberation in the sciences.
>Bob Kolker
Yes. But axioms on which proof depends do require experimental
validation to the extent they can be validated at all.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 27, 8:13 am show options
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From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2004 15:13:23 GMT
Local: Tues, Jul 27 2004 8:13 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Tue, 27 Jul 2004 13:35:20 -0000, Ron Peterson
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
>In talk.philosophy.humanism Robert J. Kolker wrote:
>> Ron Peterson wrote:
>>> The truth of mathematical propositions don't depend on experimental
>>> validation.
>> Determining whether a propostion is true, however, does depend on
>> demonstrating the proposition, as in producing a proof.
>That's correct.
>> This is somewhat analagous to empirical corroberation in the
>> sciences.
>Analogies frequently lead people to the wrong conclusions. My point is
>that the scientific method is all that we have now and that it's concept
>of truth is merely that of working hypotheses. Many of those working
>hypotheses are used continually to provide for peoples wants and needs
>and that is all the proof that is needed.
Proof from utility. Utilitarian proof is often cited as a basic
criterion by those unable to provide analytical proof. Behaviorists,
for example, claim the success of their animal training regimens as
evidence for the correctness of their speculative philosophy of
behaviorism when they can't show that their philosophy is the source
of that utility.
Similarly in the physical sciences, Edison didn't wait around for
materials science to invent the light bulb. Nor did he need Planck's
equations and constant. The point is that proofs from utility don't
demonstrate the source of the utility in what they claim to prove
utilitarian. Science may or may not produce correct insights. But
evidence of utility doesn't prove the case one way or the other.
Something similar occurs in sciences devoted to artificial
intelligence. The nominal objective is to produce machines which are
intelligent. Yet scientists continually install their own intelligence
in machines and call the result intelligent machines. Their is a vast
difference between robots and intelligent machines just as there is
between scientific proof and utilitarian results.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 27, 8:13 am show options
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From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2004 15:13:24 GMT
Local: Tues, Jul 27 2004 8:13 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Tue, 27 Jul 2004 13:48:46 -
0000, Ron Peterson
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>In talk.philosophy.humanism Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 19:18:11 -0000, Ron Peterson
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>The consistency of a theory is a separate issue from whether the theory
>>>is true.
>> Actually not. Paradigm-theory consistency is the only standard of
>> experimental truth.
>The Postmodern philosophy of science that you are advocating is
>unintelligible nonsense.
So are the mechanical origins of quantum effects and relativity.
Regards - Lester
Reply
patty Jul 27, 8:17 am show options
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From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2004 15:17:45 GMT
Local: Tues, Jul 27 2004 8:17 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Lester Zick wrote:
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> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 19:14:21 GMT, patty
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 16:27:02 -0000, Ron Peterson
>>>in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>>In sci.econ Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>>On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 13:35:55 -0000, Ron Peterson
>>>>>in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>>>>The concept of truth for mathematics is that a proposition is derivable
>>>>>>from the assumed axioms. That concept of truth doesn't work for the
>>>>>>scientific knowledge.
>>>>>If the concept of truth doesn't work for scientific knowledge, I don't
>>>>>see how it is possible to falsify any theory of science.In other words
>>>>>if it is possible to falsify something, there is an implicit standard
>>>>>of truth applicable to science and scientific theories.
>>>>I said *that* concept of truth.
>>>OK, the scientific standard of truth is not derived from axioms. But
>>>there is a paradigm of experimentally defined properties against
>>>which the truth of scientific theories is gauged in terms of self
>>>contradiction. If there is no contradiction the theory is assumed
>>>true.
>>... or perhaps is not falsifiable.
> We can't know a theory is not falsifiable because experimentation
> relies on possibilities not evident in the paradigm. We can only
> know it is consistent or not of what we know of the paradigm.
> Regards - Lester
Here is a twister. Assume that a paradigm meets all empirical tests;
but is logically inconsistent. What then?
patty
Reply
Lester Zick Jul 27, 11:36 am show options
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From: lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) - Find messages by this author
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2004 18:36:13 GMT
Local: Tues, Jul 27 2004 11:36 am
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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On Tue, 27 Jul 2004 15:17:45
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GMT, patty
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 19:14:21 GMT, patty
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>>OK, the scientific standard of truth is not derived from axioms. But
>>>>there is a paradigm of experimentally defined properties against
>>>>which the truth of scientific theories is gauged in terms of self
>>>>contradiction. If there is no contradiction the theory is assumed
>>>>true.
>>>... or perhaps is not falsifiable.
>> We can't know a theory is not falsifiable because experimentation
>> relies on possibilities not evident in the paradigm. We can only
>> know it is consistent or not of what we know of the paradigm.
>> Regards - Lester
>Here is a twister. Assume that a paradigm meets all empirical tests;
>but is logically inconsistent. What then?
This is actually quite a good question. This is exactly the situation
in several areas of contemporary theoretical physics, most notably
quantum theory and relativity. We have wave-particle duality and
certain logically contradictory aspects of special relativity that
defy mechanically self consistent explanation.
When this happens the conventional response is to suspend judgment
or argue against the logic or the experimental results. It's somewhat
more difficult to revise the paradigm along self consistent lines, but
that's what has to be done. The same is true in certain qualitative
areas of mathematics. The numbers come out right, but application of
the numbers becomes problematic and leads to further obscurity.
Regards - Lester
Reply
Eray Ozkural exa Jul 27, 12:37 pm show options
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From: e...@bilkent.edu.tr (Eray Ozkural exa) - Find messages by this author
Date: 27 Jul 2004 12:37:39 -0700
Local: Tues, Jul 27 2004 12:37 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Terms like "meme" are a way of talking about knowledge in vague terms.
These ideas are all common-sense precursors to a theory of knowledge,
in my opinion. It's an odd form of street epistemology we have been
hearing for years, but I can't say I like it. I'm sure it's a good
concept if you want to teach the influence of knowledge, how knowledge
can transcend a single mind, to those who would not be willing to be
drowned in serious philosophy of mind: like the audience of graphics
design, sociology, economy, etc.
But evolution of ideas get interesting only when you have a theory of
mind... So, if you can't explain how ideas get built or replicated in
a single mind, then you will have a hard time explaining how they get
replicated across minds. Unless a theory of memetics can formalize
"idea" and how it is manipulated in a mind, it would be of little
interest to serious-minded philosopher. Otherwise, it's just lots of
talk.
Ideas evolve, I agree with that, but whether we need some new
nomenclature, ah, I think not! It's inaccurate to say "we have
co-evolved with our memes". For the most part, we have created ideas,
and transmitted/replicated them via signals in various media, in hope
that they were interesting in and of themselves (such as a book). The
ideas in return have had little impact on our genetic structure.
(Demonstrate the opposite) It may have in the future with genetic
engineering. But the "meta-meme" that you unveil will not. It's sort
of obvious to think of the consequences of changing the environment or
engineering the human genome.
A better sentence IMO would be "Societies evolve ideas: knowledge,
hypothesis, arguments, procedures, and not only physical structure
(like cities or various artifacts)."
The measure of interestingness depends on a mind, and the context. But
it first needs a mind... Where is the mind? What makes a slogan stick
in your mind and not the other? How do you assign value to a
particular piece of information?
Cheers,
Johnny 5 wrote in message ...
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
> lesterDELz...@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) wrote in
> news:40ffc5b0.77956629@netnews.att.net:
> > On Thu, 22 Jul 2004 04:21:09 GMT, Johnny 5 in
> > comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
> >>fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) wrote in
> >>news:768f7623.0407211535.3c3eb1ce@posting.google.com:
> >>> (snip)
> >>>> Indeed, a social group can be defined by the fact that all its
> >>>> members share the same meme (Heylighen, 1992)
> >>> I am not very convinced about the idea of memes... I like this
> >>> characterization of social group, yet it is somewhat limited.
> >>The models are never perfect, but right now they are the best we got.
> > Or the worst. A year or so ago I checked into what a meme is and found
> > no one willing to get very specific. It seems to be a buzzword analog
> > for idea.
> They seem to get pretty specific at this site:
> http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/MEMIN.HTML
> Memes: Introduction
> by Glenn Grant, Memeticist
> "An idea is something you have;
> an ideology is something that has you."
> --Morris Berman
> What if ideas were viruses?
> Consider the T-phage virus. A T-phage cannot replicate itself; it
> reproduces by hijacking the DNA of a bacterium, forcing its host to make
> millions of copies of the phage. Similarly, an idea can parasitically
> infect your mind and alter your behavior, causing you to want to tell
> your friends about the idea, thus exposing them to the idea-virus. Any
> idea which does this is called a "meme" (pronounced `meem').
> Unlike a virus, which is encoded in DNA molecules, a meme is nothing more
> than a pattern of information, one that happens to have evolved a form
> which induces people to repeat that pattern. Typical memes include
> individual slogans, ideas, catch-phrases, melodies, icons, inventions,
> and fashions. It may sound a bit sinister, this idea that people are
> hosts for mind-altering strings of symbols, but in fact this is what
> human culture is all about.
> As a species, we have co-evolved with our memes. Imagine a group of early
> Homo Sapiens in the Late Pleistocene epoch. They've recently arrived with
> the latest high-tech hand axes and are trying to show their Homo Erectus
> neighbours how to make them. Those who can't get their heads around the
> new meme will be at a disadvantage and will be out-evolved by their
> smarter cousins.
> Meanwhile, the memes themselves are evolving, just as in the game of
> "Telephone" (where a message is whispered from person to person, being
> slightly mis-replicated each time). Selection favors the memes which are
> easiest to understand, to remember, and to communicate to others. Garbled
> versions of a useful meme would presumably be selected out.
> So, in theory at least, the ability to understand and communicate complex
> memes is a survival trait, and natural selection should favor those who
> aren't too conservative to understand new memes. Or does it? In practice,
> some people are going to be all too ready to commit any new meme that
> comes along, even if it should turn out to be deadly nonsense, like:
> "Jump off a cliff and the gods will make you fly."
> Such memes do evolve, generated by crazy people, or through mis-
> replication. Notice, though, that this meme might have a lot of appeal.
> The idea of magical flight is so tantalizing -- maybe, if I truly
> believed, I just might leap off the cliff and...
> This is a vital point: people try to infect each other with those memes
> which they find most appealing, regardless of the memes' objective value
> or truth. Further, the carrier of the cliff-jumping meme might never
> actually take the plunge; they may spend the rest of their long lives
> infecting other people with the meme, inducing millions of gullible fools
> to leap to their deaths. Historically, this sort of thing is happening
> all the time.
> Whether memes can be considered true "life forms" or not is a topic of
> some debate, but this is irrelevant: they behave in a way similar to life
> forms, allowing us to combine the analytical techniques of epidemiology,
> evolutionary science, immunology, linguistics, and semiotics, into an
> effective system known as "memetics." Rather than debate the inherent
> "truth" or lack of "truth" of an idea, memetics is largely concerned with
> how that idea gets itself replicated.
> Memetics is vital to the understanding of cults, ideologies, and
> marketing campaigns of all kinds, and it can help to provide immunity
> from dangerous information-contagions. You should be aware, for instance,
> that you just been exposed to the Meta-meme, the meme about memes...
> The lexicon which follows is intended to provide a language for the
> analysis of memes, meme-complexes, and the social movements they spawn.
> The name of the person who first coined and defined each word appears in
> parentheses, although some definitions have been paraphrased and altered.
Reply
patty Jul 27, 1:19 pm show options
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From: patty - Find messages by this author
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2004 20:19:38 GMT
Local: Tues, Jul 27 2004 1:19 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Eray Ozkural exa wrote:
> Terms like "meme" are a way of talking about knowledge in vague terms.
> These ideas are all common-sense precursors to a theory of knowledge,
> in my opinion. It's an odd form of street epistemology we have been
> hearing for years, but I can't say I like it. I'm sure it's a good
> concept if you want to teach the influence of knowledge, how knowledge
> can transcend a single mind, to those who would not be willing to be
> drowned in serious philosophy of mind: like the audience of graphics
> design, sociology, economy, etc.
Congratulations, Eray, you have the coin on "street epistemology"
exclusive of its use on Sesame Street.
So here's my new meme:
"The mind is the graffiti of street epistemology."
patty
Reply
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Aug 9, 2:17 pm show options
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From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 9 Aug 2004 14:17:21 -0700
Local: Mon, Aug 9 2004 2:17 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Individuals form their beliefs according to a) what they find about
Reality to be true (an operative concept of truth) and b) what other
individuals believe about that same issue. But individuals don`t
sustain their beliefs in the same way, as it is a necessary
caracteristic of living beings to be diverse. So we have different
models of individuals interacting at the moment a belief propagates.
We can distinguish two poles: one where individuals once they form a
belief sustain it for the rest of his life, and another where the
individual changes his beliefs every time he confronts a different
belief abot the same issue. The former act like constants once
`initialized`, the latter act like an almost random quantity. Between
these two extremes we must be able to find several different dynamics
of belief change. For instance, simple majority rules, minority rules
(I believe the contrary of the majority), catastrophic rules (at some
point I suddenly change my belief, evidential thinking), probability
rules (after a time I will change my belief, (poisson distribution)),
hebbian learning, bayesian change, etc.
These leads to several models of belief fields, from single individual
models to mixed individual belief fields. The dynamics of propagation
will be different for each type of model, (considering binary belief
issues).
Reply
Marvin Edwards Aug 9, 4:59 pm show options
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From: "Marvin Edwards" - Find messages by this author
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 23:59:40 GMT
Local: Mon, Aug 9 2004 4:59 pm
Subject: Re: A theory of beliefs
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Beliefs are acquired as needed to give us a sense of knowing what we need to
cope with reality. We retain them as long as they continue to be useful or
at least go unchallenged. We re-evaluate them when they appear to fail us or
cause real-world problems.
"Fabrizio J. Bonsignore" wrote in message
news:768f7623.0408091317.24181ec3@posting.google.com...
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> Individuals form their beliefs according to a) what they find about
> Reality to be true (an operative concept of truth) and b) what other
> individuals believe about that same issue. But individuals don`t
> sustain their beliefs in the same way, as it is a necessary
> caracteristic of living beings to be diverse. So we have different
> models of individuals interacting at the moment a belief propagates.
> We can distinguish two poles: one where individuals once they form a
> belief sustain it for the rest of his life, and another where the
> individual changes his beliefs every time he confronts a different
> belief abot the same issue. The former act like constants once
> `initialized`, the latter act like an almost random quantity. Between
> these two extremes we must be able to find several different dynamics
> of belief change. For instance, simple majority rules, minority rules
> (I believe the contrary of the majority), catastrophic rules (at some
> point I suddenly change my belief, evidential thinking), probability
> rules (after a time I will change my belief, (poisson distribution)),
> hebbian learning, bayesian change, etc.
> These leads to several models of belief fields, from single individual
> models to mixed individual belief fields. The dynamics of propagation
> will be different for each type of model, (considering binary belief
> issues).
Reply
Somewhere along the original thread (sorry, have no clipboard here 8),
I mention that to keep a field polarized you need to clamp a value to
allow the `magnetization` of adjacent particles (adjacency need not be
on a plane, first approximation, this is actually more like a charged
plasma, dense, though I do imagine particles as spinning in a plane).
Spinmasters would be control particles; they are independent in that
they define an orientation and can change it more or less
independently of other particles. They help define the orientation of
the whole fa field, acting as impurities do in transistors, though
unlike the source of bri clamping I was thinking of zio (TV, mainly),
they would isDa be interior to the field. ni They would also be lo
movable, though my first insight is that of an almost grid with fixed
particles as in a magnet. The truth is that it is the first time I
find the concept, though as far as I understand it a spinmaster would
be a particle orienting other particles strategically and more or less
permanently. The intermmediate point between propaganda and knowledge
is ideology. Spinmasters are ideologic particles, hence their
inpendence. Am I right?
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore Nov 10 2004, 5:35 pm show options
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From: fbonsign...@beethoven.com (Fabrizio J. Bonsignore) - Find messages by this author
Date: 10 Nov 2004 17:35:45 -0800
Local: Wed, Nov 10 2004 5:35 pm
Subject: Re: Theory of beliefs (model of browhaha)
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Spinmasters would be modeled as ideologic (charged) particles (see
previous post). 8)>
Spin operators seen as an relation I guess would have a complex form,
unlike a vectorial operator. I am thinking in algebraic terms. But my
first approximation is binary, so it would be a logic operator 68. The
interesting thing is that through empirical psychologic research their
actual form can be understood 164, though in an statistical way 138,
so in a real life model they would be conditional probability
distributions over a set of adjacency relatiobetween particles195.
Tough job to model mathematically... any idea?
Fabrizio J Bonsignore Jan 20, 7:59 am show options
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From: "Fabrizio J Bonsignore" - Find messages by this author
Date: 20 Jan 2005 07:59:41 -0800
Local: Thurs, Jan 20 2005 7:59 am
Subject: Re: Theory of beliefs (model of browhaha)
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The model of browhaha has not yet been published here.
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore, now Danilo J Bonsignore
(fbonsignore at beethoven and hotmail, danilo at ghamac.org, syntotic
at yahoo, I may not receive mails in those accounts because of the
hackers but those are my accounts).
Fabrizio J Bonsignore Feb 6, 10:31 am show options
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From: "Fabrizio J Bonsignore" - Find messages by this author
Date: 6 Feb 2005 10:31:54 -0800
Local: Sun, Feb 6 2005 10:31 am
Subject: Re: Theory of beliefs (model of browhaha)
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When everybody is certain of a non scientific fact, it is as good as
false, because it can be true or false...
[The model of browhaha has not yet been published here. Have they
already published a model? There are several...]
Fabrizio J. Bonsignore, now Danilo J Bonsignore
(fbonsignore at beethoven and hotmail, danilo at ghamac.org, syntotic
at yahoo, I may not receive mails in those accounts because of the
hackers but those are my accounts
).
Reply
Fabrizio J Bonsignore Feb 17, 4:20 pm show options
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From: "Fabrizio J Bonsignore" - Find messages by this author
Date: 17 Feb 2005 16:20:11 -0800
Local: Thurs, Feb 17 2005 4:20 pm
Subject: Re: Theory of beliefs (model of browhaha)
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This ball was combed, and I was kept stading on the same point...
Fabrizio J Bonsignore, now Danilo J Bonsignore
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Fabrizio J Bonsignore Feb 18, 8:05 am show options
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From: "Fabrizio J Bonsignore" - Find messages by this author
Date: 18 Feb 2005 08:05:15 -0800
Local: Fri, Feb 18 2005 8:05 am
Subject: Re: Theory of beliefs (model of browhaha)
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The ball was combed and I was kept standing in the same place
A model of browhaha can be found in the thread: `Double Entendre, this
is how it works formally, may day`.
Once the issue of individual A is raised, a high level of tempreture in
the Boltzman sense is created by the (simultaneous) exposure to each of
the nodes comforming the belief field (individuals), collectively
termed U, with an identity A[(B)] and identities Xi[Yj]. While
individual A exercises a number of connections in the belief field to
make each node settle in the direction a, the browhahers execise
multiple connections whi tempreature is high to influence the nodes u
to point to direction A[B] and/or directions Xi[Yj], where Yj = {B[Bi],
A[(B)][Bi], B[A],...}. The specific weights (credibility? authority?
credit? prestige?) of each of the inputs, in this case browhaher nodes
P and individual A are important to influence the nodes u to pot in
certain direction, where a direction can be defined as a particular set
of identitiess and characteristics assumed by each node:
du{A[B]{-b1,-b2,...}, B[Bi]{a1,a2,a3...}, Xi[Yj]{=/-x1, +/-x2}}
After a (decreasing) number of interactions have taken place among the
nodes, with specific inputs by browhahers and A, each u will stabilize
in a certain du, which then conforms the belief for such node. The sum
of all nodes` du is the belief field, which not necessarily will be
ordered, though it can be ordered in te `directions` of certain
definitions of du, that is, it will be ordered respect to some
intersection of du`s whie being disordered for the comlete definition
of du`s (different du`s held by different u`s). The field can be
cristalyzed after a certain period of time into a belief that does not
approach knowledge (in the terms of this model, single true identities
are not known, A, B, but only impersonations and confused
characteristics, see the confusion operators in the thread `Double
Entenndre, More Notation`). As long as the issue is presented and the
whole field is disordered, it will not achieve the level of minimum
energy, truth, even if stabilized at a higher level of energy, belief.
Even small interactions by A or the browhahers will stir the field with
a higher temperature, browhaha, while the field is stabilized at a
higher level of energy than that of Truth. Note that in this model
browhaha (disorder) is done by those presenting impersonations and the
result of confusion operators to the nodes u, while Truth is
represented by the input of a du consisting of simple identities and
ordered characteristics for this identities.
In order to stabilize the field in its level of minimum energy (Truth),
the same inputs presented to nodes u have to be presented
*simultaneously* to all nodes u, i.e., the whole repertoire of du or a
supercompound du have to presented in a fully connected network of
inputs to belief nodes.
Fabrizio J Bonsignore, now Danilo J Bonsignore, still outside and
browhahed...
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Fabrizio J Bonsignore Feb 23, 6:53 am show options
Newsgroups: sci.econ, sci.physics
From: "Fabrizio J Bonsignore" - Find messages by this author
Date: 23 Feb 2005 06:53:09 -0800
Local: Wed, Feb 23 2005 6:53 am
Subject: Re: Theory of beliefs (model of browhaha)
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In a model with a single node u (individual), once an issue is
presented the individual will tend to point to direction d, the value
presented by the issue. Depending on the specific credibility of the
input (a weight), the node may end up assuming a d different from that
one presented by the input. The repertoire of the input as a set will
determine the possible d`s that can be assumed. For instance, if the
issue is binary (`God exists` as an example), the set of d`s is {true,
false}. u can assume any of the values, depending on the weight u
assigns to the input; the final value d may not be forecasted by u as
the weights of the input`s input is not readily observable; if u
`believes` that the input tells the truth, the weight will be positive,
otherwise it will be negative and the contrary direction will be
assumed by u. Note that in this simple example model u will end up with
either a true or false value, yet this value d can be, in a more
complex model, accompanied by a specific weight for the belief, that
is, for the possibility of d being true, which in essence reflects the
multivalued truth logic human beings follow. It can be written:
du = b(i, w) =
In the simplest case, u(w) = w, that is, the truth value of the assumed
belief is that of the weight (credibility) attached to the input`s
input. This value can be zero, which can be interpreted as a `no
belief` value or doubt, which would be, fundamentally, the position of
philosophers and scientists. In other words, a scientist or philosopher
node would need *further* input in order to assume a *definite* d:
dp = s(i, wi) = = ?
? can be used as a symbol for doubt or no belief. Models without this
special value can be called credulity models, which would characterize
systems with no discerning individuals, like sects or fanatic
organizations or societies. Of course, weights can still be attached to
the truth value of d, so basically a cut value similar to that of fuzzy
logics can be used to define doubt: below the a value doubt would be
assumed or, alternatively, below the a value the *negative* of the
input`s d can be assumed, which is what fanatic groups assume de facto
(thus the need for reinforcement, to increase the credibility value of
d). Note that it is not necessary to assume ternary repertoires, as any
ternary repertoire can be converted into a binary repertoire with an
arbitrary alpha cut. So, credulity models would turn any complex input
into a binary repertoire consisting of the expected value u`s will
assumed plus its negative, with an implicit alpha cut to determine
whether node u points to the `right` direction d or to -d. The alpha
cut technique can be used to `fanatize` (binarize) any complex
repertoire of d`s. (This is true also of many votings, if abstentions
are considered as individuals leaving the system). In fanatized
credulity models scientists and philosophers are either considered
negative d`s de facto or are left out of the system. Their influence in
the system is null, and the resulting field will tend to become ordered
(combed) or polarized.
It can be postulated the existence of a universal input R called
reality, consisting in an infinite (not numerable?) set of binary
issues, which is by default connected to each node u in the system with
different weights, where a null weight would characterize madness, a
unity weight would characterize illumination and the middle value can
be interpreted as cotidianeity). This special node would influence the
direction nodes assume after an issue is presented. Several
possibilities for interpretation and the building of models can be
found by introducing this concept.
(below, full browhaha model with impersonations)
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
The ball was combed and I was kept standing in the same place
A model of browhaha can be found in the thread: `Double Entendre, this
is how it works formally, may day`.
Once the issue of individual A is raised, a high level of tempreture in
the Boltzman sense is created by the (simultaneous) exposure to each of
the nodes comforming the belief field (individuals), collectively
termed U, with an identity A[(B)] and identities Xi[Yj]. While
individual A exercises a number of connections in the belief field to
make each node settle in the direction a, the browhahers execise
multiple connections whi tempreature is high to influence the nodes u
to point to direction A[B] and/or directions Xi[Yj], where Yj = {B[Bi],
A[(B)][Bi], B[A],...}. The specific weights (credibility? authority?
credit? prestige?) of each of the inputs, in this case browhaher nodes
P and individual A are important to influence the nodes u to pot in
certain direction, where a direction can be defined as a particular set
of identitiess and characteristics assumed by each node:
> du{A[B]{-b1,-b2,...}, B[Bi]{a1,a2,a3...}, Xi[Yj]{=/-x1, +/-x2}}
> After a (decreasing) number of interactions have taken place among
the
> nodes, with specific inputs by browhahers and A, each u will
stabilize
> in a certain du, which then conforms the belief for such node. The
sum
> of all nodes` du is the belief field, which not necessarily will be
> ordered, though it can be ordered in te `directions` of certain
> definitions of du, that is, it will be ordered respect to some
> intersection of du`s whie being disordered for the comlete definition
> of du`s (different du`s held by different u`s). The field can be
> cristalyzed after a certain period of time into a belief that does
not
> approach knowledge (in the terms of this model, single true
identities
> are not known, A, B, but only impersonations and confused
> characteristics, see the confusion operators in the thread `Double
> Entenndre, More Notation`). As long as the issue is presented and the
> whole field is disordered, it will not achieve the level of minimum
> energy, truth, even if stabilized at a higher level of energy,
belief.
> Even small interactions by A or the browhahers will stir the field
with
> a higher temperature, browhaha, while the field is stabilized at a
> higher level of energy than that of Truth. Note that in this model
> browhaha (disorder) is done by those presenting impersonations and
the
> result of confusion operators to the nodes u, while Truth is
> represented by the input of a du consisting of simple identities and
> ordered characteristics for this identities.
> In order to stabilize the field in its level of minimum energy
(Truth),
> the same inputs presented to nodes u have to be presented
> *simultaneously* to all nodes u, i.e., the whole repertoire of du or
a
> supercompound du have to presented in a fully connected network of
> inputs to belief nodes.
> Fabrizio J Bonsignore, now Danilo J Bonsignore, still outside and
> browhahed...
Reply
Fabrizio J Bonsignore Feb 18, 8:16 am show options
Newsgroups: sci.econ, sci.physics
From: "Fabrizio J Bonsignore" - Find messages by this author
Date: 18 Feb 2005 08:16:08 -0800
Local: Fri, Feb 18 2005 8:16 am
Subject: Re: Theory of beliefs (model of browhaha)
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Why does it take so long to appear a full model of browhaha?
The full stabilizing solution consists in the cross product of the du`s
presented to each node plus A`s du, presented simultaneously.
Syntotic = Fabrizio J Bonsignore, now Danilo J Bonsignore
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robert j. kolker Feb 18, 10:03 am show options
Newsgroups: sci.econ, sci.physics
From: "robert j. kolker" - Find messages by this author
Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2005 13:03:23 -0500
Local: Fri, Feb 18 2005 10:03 am
Subject: Re: Theory of beliefs (model of browhaha)
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Fabrizio J Bonsignore wrote:
> Why does it take so long to appear a full model of browhaha?
> The full stabilizing solution consists in the cross product of the du`s
> presented to each node plus A`s du, presented simultaneously.
By the way, cross products exist only for 3 component vectors. Are you
referring to asymmetric tensors of any order?
Bob Kolker
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Fabrizio J Bonsignore Feb 19, 6:35 am show options
Newsgroups: sci.econ, sci.physics
From: "Fabrizio J Bonsignore" - Find messages by this author
Date: 19 Feb 2005 06:35:13 -0800
Local: Sat, Feb 19 2005 6:35 am
Subject: Re: Theory of beliefs (model of browhaha)
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robert j. kolker wrote:
> Fabrizio J Bonsignore wrote:
> > Why does it take so long to appear a full model of browhaha?
> > The full stabilizing solution consists in the cross product of the
du`s
> > presented to each node plus A`s du, presented simultaneously.
> By the way, cross products exist only for 3 component vectors. Are
you
> referring to asymmetric tensors of any order?
> Bob Kolker
As far as I can see, you have to show to all nodes all the inputs
(external) to the system. Actually it would be more a vector, but the
total of inputs would form a tensor, that is, all the individually
presented inputs to each and all nodes. Like a sparse matrix, an entry
for each (in this model) individual identity plus combination of
characteristics, which besides is dynamic. By simultaneously presenting
all inputs discrepancies will be noticed and resolved.