University of Massachusetts Boston
Conflict Studies Conference
FROM STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS: Successes and
Failures of the Third-Party Interventions in Cyprus: A Systemic
Approach
By Idil P. Izmirli, George Mason University
Capturing the Complexity of the Cyprus Conflict through a Systemic
Framework:
Protracted, intractable and complex ethnic conflicts, such as the
one in Cyprus, can not be analyzed in isolation, separate from the
larger systems surrounding the conflict. In addition to the
historical grievances, physical and psychological traumatic
experiences, the analysis of the conflict from the social systems
point of view might be very helpful in identifying the conflict
within a larger framework, where we can analyze each structure and
their functions (structural-functional paradigm ) in relation to the
other.
``Social system analysis involves identifying and analyzing the
complex networks of interpersonal and intergroup relationships, and
determining the larger sociopolitical contexts in which that are
entwined. '' Social systems are ``open systems that exchange matter,
energy, and information with other systems and their environments ''
as opposed to close systems that these exchanges do not occur. Social
systems are self regulating, self adapting, and self organizing, and
their analysis involve identifying, and analyzing the complex
networks of interpersonal and group relationships, and determining
the larger sociopolitical contexts in which they are entwined. ''
Let us think of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot
communities in Cyprus as social systems, ``each comprised of a system
of systems, with many different organizations, institutions, and
components, '' that can be differentiated from their constituents by
a definable boundary (in this case it is a physical border; the
green-line) ``who are non-system members. '' Moreover, in Cyprus,
Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities are composed of individuals
embedded in ``social systems that were identified with and aligned
with the larger systems of Greece and Turkey respectively. '' Before
the construction of the green-line, the barbed wire border and armed
forces separating the two communities, both systems in Cyprus were
open systems that could exchange matter, energy, and information
between the two communities. However, with the construction of
green-line which was the first blow to energy exchange between the
open systems, the passageway that allowed this exchange was blocked
indefinitely turning both systems into closed systems with no
exchange opportunities between them. This blockage continued until
the start of multi-track efforts (including the bi-communal talks)
that mainly focused to open up the communication channels between the
two closed systems by bringing their respective members from all
walks of life face-to-face in a neutral zone. The second blow to this
collaboration process, that were furthering the long-suppressed
energy exchange between the two communities, occurred in December
1997, when a decision was made by Denktash to close down all the
bi-communal talks in Cyprus without a further notification. Since
then the Turkish Cypriots in the north are not allowed to freely
associate with Greek Cypriots or hold bi-communal talks with them on
the island. In fact, according to McDonald, since the closedown the
parties have tried to meet in other places such as Jerusalem, Jordan,
Nova Scotia, and Le Hague, but each time, the TRNC created some kind
of an excuse, or a last minute cancellation of trips for not letting
the Turkish Cypriots out of the island. McDonald states:
These meetings are important, because the some of the first people
we have trained (in track II) now have important positions in the
respective governments (track I) where they can influence the policy
and decision making.
According to the general systems theory, there exist a
hierarchical levels of organizations such as subsystems, systems, and
supra systems. In each community (system), there occur vertical
(within the community) and horizontal (across the structures)
transactions among various subsystems, supra systems and meta systems
within and outside the system. The social systems approach
(analysis), then, helps in identifying the `boxes within the boxes, '
and ``seeks to increase the permeability of boundaries through
activities leading to increased positive interaction among the
citizens of both communities [systems]. '' Here, I coin a
term ``Matroshka model, '' that consist of 4 Matroshka dolls to
explain the systems and their component parts. When the doll is in
tact, it is just an object that is open to overall external
influences as any other object in this particular time and space.
Now, let us to think about the external doll (the biggest one that
contains all the other pieces inside) as the meta system, the very
external crust (international arena that is somewhat can have an
impact on the conflict) with its external influence and input
including the third-parties such as the UN, UNHCR, and EU which are
the primary game players in the Cyprus conflict. The second Matroshka
doll represents the larger influential supra system(s) Greece,
Turkey, Great Britain, and the USA. The third doll is the system(s)
-Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities- and it (they) contains the
smallest doll (sub system) in it. The third Matroshka can be thought
of as the Greek and/or Turkish Cypriot social system(s), that can be
also viewed as the subsystems of Greece and Turkey. In other words,
although both (GC/TC) are a separate entity that each have been
conditioned ``to respond to situations according to their cultural
socialization, experiences, and sociopolitical relationships'' within
their own realm, they can not be viewed as free agents totally
independent (isolated) from their supra systems respectively.
For the purpose of simplicity of the explanation, let us consider
Cyprus as an individual general system. At one level of generality
one can characterize system performance in three domains. Input of
the data, domain of system processing, and the domain of system
output including feedback. Here, the reader is referred to figure 3
for a schematic representation of the relationships between these
domains.
How systems work?
External factors
Input Process
Output
feedback
Figure 3
A system is determined by a given set of system objects,
properties, and their relationships. The system objects are input,
process, output, feedback and a restriction. The life cycle of the
operation starts once the input data enter the system. After the
process of this input within the system, a transformation occurs, and
based on this transformation, system emits an outcome which is the
final stage of the process. ``The interconnection, or relationships
between systems determines the continuation of process: i.e. the
output of one process, may be the input to some other. Each input of
a system is also the output of some other system and conversely. ''
The outcome has two functional elements, and one of these called the
designated outcome, and the other is designated output model (for
simplicity, we can look at it as the undesignated, unexpected
outcome). The difference between the two is called the feedback (or
system error) and feeds back into the system for the control of
performance. In other words, for the next cycle, this feedback also
becomes a part of the input, increasing the overall input data.
``Theoretically, a point can be reached where the rate of data input
exceeds the capability of the system to act in response to it. '' At
this point, the stability and the predictability (or the equilibrium)
of the system is threatened by excessive information, and system can
no longer handle the input data without requiring a system change. In
this case, there needs to be a restriction initiated by the purchaser
to utilize the output without a need to a system change. ``This
restriction limits the products of the system, conditioning them, so
they may ultimately correspond to the demands of the
user..…[and these constraints] should be consistent with
aims .'' Using this analogy, we can think about Cyprus without the
third-party interventions or the bi-communal talks, as a system with
a regular input that does not threaten the equilibrium. Based on this
input, there is a designated (predictable) output and an output model
where the difference between the two is minimal or even negligible.
Under the circumstances, in the next cycle, the feedback that is
being fed into the system in addition to the input is manageable and
does not threaten a system change. The status quo is preserved, and
life goes on. However, the system produces a different outcome when
the Track II (or multi-track) interventions, as well as the self or
third-party initiated bi-communal talks have an extra impact on the
whole process. Then, the difference between the designated output and
output model becomes no longer negligible and the positive feedback
exceeds the manageable limits. In the next cycle, when this positive
feedback feeds into the system in addition to the input, it threatens
the equilibrium. In other words, when a point is reached where the
rate of data input exceeds the capability of the system, there has to
be a system change to prevent the system failure. This obviously
means an unavoidable impact on the status quo. Based on the systems
analysis, in order to avoid this systemic change, there needs to be
some restrictions by the user on the system. One way to apply these
restrictions in Cyprus is to block the additional input that is
created by the extra positive feedback as a result of these
bi-communal talks and multi-track third-party interventions. When the
talks are blocked, there is no extra positive feedback produced by
the process, there is no additional input to the regular input, there
is no medium for the development of a Cypriot civil society,
equilibrium and stability is maintained and the status quo is
preserved. Here, one of the users who is applying these restrictions
to the system to avoid the system change can be viewed as Mr.
Denktash, who blocked the bi-communal talks in December 1997.
The systemic reasoning behind his act can be explained as the
following: Historically, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in
Cyprus were more loyal to their motherlands Greece and Turkey
respectively, and Cypriot patriotism and Cypriot civil society was
lacking. With the initiation of the bi-communal talks, this lack
started to lessen, civil societies on both sides started to develop
and function, and externally and/or internally initiated dialogues
started to devise a change within the system thus creating an
obstacle to the status quo that needed to be suppressed by the user's
restrictions.
The recent bi-communal talks in Cyprus were aimed at providing a
deeper understanding of the issues in Cyprus, building a common
Cypriot political identity, and developing options for increased
economic cooperation, political reconciliation, and regional
stability through informal contacts between the communities. Within
this suggested new multi-ethnic framework, things were slowly but
surely were progressing toward a united Cyprus. From a systemic point
of view, then, the recent inter-communal talks did not fail, they
were rather interrupted by Mr. Denktash and other actors that are
systemically related to the Cyprus conflict.
On September 30th 2000, Cypriot president Glafcos Clerides stated
that he would never agree to the two-state agreement proposed by the
Turkish Cypriots to reunite the divided island. "We shall never agree
to a confederal solution," Clerides announced in a public address at
an event celebrating Cyprus's anniversary of independence on October
1, which was just after his return from two weeks of inconclusive
talks at the UN. Clerides said "in the absence of a settlement, his
side would continue to beef up its military defenses with the help of
close ally Greece." In some minds, this was the result of an
separation anxiety caused by fear of freedom (independence) that
produced a negative reaction against the independence by opening the
memories of the old wounds igniting the fears of another Turkish
invasion after the exit of the UNFICYP. For CR scholars, this
stalemate seemed like a part of two-fold interlocking issues: the
inter-party issues between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the
intra-party issue that each leader is connected to within their own
constituencies. The latter, is related to the face-saving issues of
the leaders from both sides vis-a-vis Greek and Turkish governments,
as well as their dependence to the perspective governments. However,
from a systemic angle, one can view Clerides as another "systemic
user" who applies restrictions on the system to avoid the unwanted
feedback that might not be beneficial for the preservers of the
status quo in Cyprus, as well as elsewhere (specifically in Greece as
well as in Turkey) including the supra, and meta level system
members. On one level, Mr. Clerides applies the restrictions
internally within the sub-system (southern Cyprus) to pacify the GC
who are the supporters of enosis, or just basic hard-liners to avoid
the possibility of internal feedback, and on the supra level to
please Greece to avoid more negative feedback that may shake the
structure of the status quo. On the other hand, by these two-level
restrictions, he is causing negative feedback from EU, and UN who are
not pleased with his decision, but he chooses the trade off, because
this particular negative feedback has a smaller impact on the whole
situation in comparison with the combination of the previous two
feedback that can effect the preservation of the status quo
extensively in Cyprus.
With this systemic analysis, the other "user" actors can be
thought of the supra level system members (such as Greece, Turkey,
Great Britain, and the USA), and/or meta level system members, or all
of the above in concert. First let us investigate the relationships
between the supra level system members, specifically Greece and
Turkey.
In January 1996, both Greeks and Turks deployed their military
forces into the Aegean Sea over a dispute on two unpopulated rocks
(called Kardak by the Turks, and Imia by the Greeks) occupying less
than ten acres in the Aegean Sea. The Kardak/Imia crisis was rooted
in the sovereignty claim of the small islands, islets, and rocks in
the region . This particular conflict between Greece and Turkey,
which can be labeled as an "irrational" one even by the Greeks and
Turks themselves (that did not fit with the rational actor model)
somewhat influenced by the Cyprus conflict, but also, in return,
impacted the ethnic relations in Cyprus, almost following a cyclical
route between different systems. In fact, this conflict can be viewed
as one of the many reasons that influenced the decision for ending
the bi-communal talks (self-fulfilled prophecy of the Turkish side
that Greeks and Greek Cypriots can not and should not be trusted) in
Cyprus in December 1997. This prophecy was strengthened by the
following events. In April 1998 the Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cyprus)
announced that they were about to purchase long-range ground missiles
S-300 from Russia to be aimed at Turkey for self-defense. As a
response, to ``defend'' the security of their subsystem, with whom
they share the same religion, language, and currency, Turkey
threatened to invade Cyprus if the missiles were purchased. Turkey
also indicated that it would deploy its own missiles on Cyprus. After
heavy pressure from the International actors, mainly the U.S, the
Greek Cypriots backed down, with the missiles now stored but not
deployed on the Greek island of Crete.
At the end of February 1999, the Ocalan affair has inflamed
tensions between Greece and Turkey even further. This incident
emerged after the capture of PKK's leader in-exile, Abdullah Ocalan
(Apo) at the Greek ambassador's residence in Nairobi with a Greek
Cypriot diplomatic passport. After his arrest, Apo admitted that
Greece supported PKK and its cause fully by giving them arms and
rockets and providing guerrilla training to PKK militants at a UN
refugee center east of Athens in Lavrion, as well as in Greek Cyprus
(Hurriyet). In addition to the historical facts of 1963, and 1974,
these recent events clearly indicated the inter-systemic relations
between Greece and the Greek Cypriot government as well as between
Turkey and de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Among the meta level system members, we can count Germany who
until very recently opposed to the Turkish entry to the EU, and
Russia who sees Greek Cyprus as a potential market for the sale of
their short-range Russian missiles as two of the important actors
that impact this specific conflict. Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia is in desperate need of developing financial and
political relations with the regional actors and sees Greece as well
as the Greek Cyprus as a potential market for sale of their missiles
against the Turks, the grandchildren of the old enemy Ottoman Empire.
The 1998 sale of long-range missiles to the Greek Cypriots by Russia,
is a clear indication of Russian desires of trying to open up a
sea-trail toward Mediterranean sea via camaraderie with Greece (or
Greek Cypriots) and/or trying to find a regional market in Cyprus
after the end of the Cold War.
In summary, from a systemic angle, in addition to the lack of
ripeness, hurting stalemate and other causes that are suggested by
conflict resolution theorists/practitioners for the termination of
the conflict in Cyprus, the restrictions implied on the system to
avoid the system change can be better understood if these
inter-systemic relations are considered holistically. In other words,
physical systems do not exist merely in an environment; they exists
by means of an environment. ``For a given system, the environment is
set of all objects outside the system: (1) a change in whose
attributes affect the system and (2) whose attributes are changed by
the behavior of the system. '' For Cyprus (system), its environment
consist of the supra and meta level systems which are Greece, Turkey,
Great Britain, USA and UN/UNHCR, NATO, EU, Germany, Russia, and
others respectfully.
Conclusion:
If one examines the development of the third-party interventions
in Cyprus, it becomes clear that until recently, the Cypriots were
dependent upon the hierarchical constraints established by the
political agenda of larger influential systems (supra and meta
systems). In other words, the third-party interventions (such as the
recent talks by the UN), as well as the decision making process for
both Cypriot communities were encouraged by/at those supra and/or
meta level external actors (high-intensity, top-down), rather than by
democratic process of individuals (or groups - civil society) within
the two communities (low-intensity, bottom-up) of Cyprus. However,
within the last decade through the second track and multi-track
third-party interventions that encouraged joint problem-solving, and
interactive conflict resolution, individuals from the two communities
in Cyprus were finally starting to talk to each other after so many
years of separation by physical, psychological, and political
boundaries. For conflict transformation in Cyprus, both communities
were moving toward improving collaborative process relationships
between two communities by getting involved in joint-decision making
through several projects (as superordinate goals) such as mental
health services, sewage, water etc., in addition to bi-communal talks
that was bringing mid-range and grassroots levels citizens from both
sides face-to-face for more future collaboration. This was a
threatening action for some, especially for the supporters of the
status quo, who did not lose but gained from the separation of two
communities. For the supporters of enosis, this closeness meant a
sovereign Cyprus that can cut the umbilical cord that connected them
to their supra system big brother Greece. Under the circumstances,
the benefactors of the status-quo on the Greek side needed to keep
things as they are, i.e. in stalemate. According to the systems
theory, users of the systems need to put some restrictions to avoid
the feedback, that in return, may backfire on their own faces. That's
why the Greek Cypriot leadership had to do what they had to do.
Similarly, Turkish Cypriot leadership support taksim (partition).
Based on the historical memories of pre-1974 forced living in
enclaves as a minority, and mostly for the fear of extinction under
the possible Greek rubric based on collective chosen traumas, the
independent Cyprus is also a non-solution. As Denktash indicated to
Clerides in Davos, when there is no hurting stalemate between the two
communities ``sometimes a non-solution is the solution.'' In fact,
during a visit to Turkey in July, 1997, TC leader Mr. Denktash
explicitly mentioned on a Turkish television that he would prefer the
"permanent continuation of the current status quo" no matter how the
TC were in economically bad conditions, since the withdrawal of the
Turkish troops would encourage the GC to change the divided status of
the island by any means including the use of force. Less than five
months after this statement, Denktash made his decision of raising
the invisible walls by shutting down the bi-communal talks in Cyprus.
Some scholars suggest that ``lack of ripeness is a frequent
explanation of why diplomacy and third-party mediation efforts have
failed to resolve the ongoing dispute in Cyprus .'' Others claim that
local leaderships support the status quo in Cyprus, because straying
away from it towards a sovereign Cyprus can pose unavoidable risks.
``Neither Cypriot community is sufficiently dissatisfied with the
status quo to make the difficult compromises necessary for resolving
the conflict ." However, the failure to resolve the conflict in
Cyprus by lack of ripeness, or hurting stalemate would be a limited
explanation without considering the larger systems. For a more
holistic explanation, the social systems analysis can serve a better
purpose. In supra level, for Greece, the sovereignty of Cyprus can
constitute a threat, since an independent Cyprus could mean a loss of
a ``Greek'' base in the Mediterranean, only 40 miles away from
Turkey, yet closely linked with Greece that gives Greece an upper
hand in terms of their international relations with Russia, Israel,
and other regional actors. For Turkey, a sovereign Cyprus would mean,
less control in Mediterranean that also can be interpreted as loss of
yet another island to Greece. Turkey has a lot of investments in
Cyprus, including the 35,000 troops that would need to go back to
Turkey in case of a sovereign Cyprus. It also means loss of a
bargaining chip against Greece in official negotiations in terms of
other conflictual issues between the two countries, as well as loss
of vacation homes for the ex-Turkish army officials. A two-state
solution that is supported by the de facto TRNC which is officially
recognized only by Turkey implies recognition of their breakaway
state in northern Cyprus. There are also such reasons as the economic
aid as well as the security, recognition, and identity (BHNs) that at
the moment requires a dependency on Turkish government's support.
In meta level, for one, especially during the cold war, the US's
and NATO's obvious reluctance to put real pressure on either Greece
or Turkey over Cyprus to maintain the unity on NATO's southern flank
can be viewed as one of the obstacles for peace building. After the
cold war, with the onset of new regional conflicts (in Bosnia,
Kosovo), US and NATO's attention were diverted to new directions,
once again, failing to put pressure on these two NATO allies for the
resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Again within the meta level, based
on the historical records, during the UN initiated mediation efforts,
that included intercommunal talks between the two systems of Greek
and the Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus, each time a proposed
settlement ``has not been to the liking of Greece or Turkey, neither
country hesitated to use its power to undermine the proposal, ''
indicating the interconnectedness between meta, supra, systemic and
sub-systemic levels. However, these negotiated proposals were always
initiated by external third-parties (from above) and not by the
people of Cyprus themselves (from below). On the other hand,
initiated by second-track and multi-track diplomacy, the recent
bi-communal talks with the third party just being a catalyst between
two groups, were slowly encouraging people of Cyprus to initiate
their own bi-communal talks with their own initiations toward a
building of a civil society of united Cypriots.
This development was a threat to the hierarchical inter-systemic
relations established by the political agenda of larger political
systems, giving more power and sovereignty to the Cypriots themselves
as a separate entity instead of an integrated part of the whole
system.
If the total independence was possible for each system from their
supra and meta levels, the Cypriot leaders on both sides might have
been acted differently and move toward the peace process on a
different path. However, since the systems are boxes in boxes, the
both leadership need to comply with the requirements of being
confined in those boxes.
This paper has no conclusion as long as the presence of the boxes
within the boxes continues. However, in my opinion the conclusion
will be written by the Cypriot civil societies on both sides within
the next 2-5 years. Because, within the last decade, ignited by the
multi-track low-intensity third-party interventions, the civil
society in Cyprus was started to form regardless of the obstacles
created by Mr. Denktash and Mr. Clerides and other actors who tried
to block passageway toward the united Cypriot identity. However, once
it is rekindled, as once told by a Latin American feminist writer
Alicia Partnoy:
YOU CAN'T DROWN THE FIRE!
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