The Role of Imagination in Kant's Critical Philosophy

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In the beginning was the Logos; the Logos was with God and the Logos was God.

.... All things were made by the Logos; without him nothing was made. It was by him that all things came into existence.

.... What came about in him [the Logos] was life, and the life was the light [of God] in man. The light shines in the darkness [of world manifestation], but the darkness did not understand it. (New Testament, John 1:1).

So in the structure of an organized body, the end of each member can only be deduced from the full conception of the whole. It may, then, be said of such a critique that it is never trustworthy except it be perfectly complete, down to the smallest elements of pure reason. In the sphere of this faculty you can determine either everything or nothing. (Prolegomena, 11)

The above two quotes may seem unrelated. However, critical philosophy will be Kant’s unique solution to traditional metaphysical problem of “the One and the many.” The “One and the many” is ultimately a mystical notion which the great philosophers, theologians, and poets of the East and West have been trying to express to the unconscious masses (who are either deaf to the mystic’s love-struck ravings or too caught up in their own material problems to grasp the concept of “duality-in Unity”) for millennia. The problem “lies” (in both senses of the term) in trying to explain the mystical Unity in a logical manner. For such a concept (or Form or whatever term we use to attempt to grasp such a Unity) can only be understood by our logical understanding as transcending our logical understanding, i.e. the root of all Logos in-itself is sublime.
Plato’s solution to the problem of “the One and the many” was his theory of Forms or Ideas (*Eidos*). After elevating the Idea of the Good to an absolute status as the end of all Knowledge, Truth and Beauty in the *Republic*, Plato then had the problem of bringing the Forms down to earth, i.e. down to knowledge and aesthetics in the sensible world (the many). Plato’s Socrates is perplexed as to whether such appearances as mud, hair, dirt, etc. have a Form, or separate existence, in themselves. Dialectic, which he refers to as “the coping-stone as it were, placed above the sciences,”\(^1\) offered the supreme philosophical method for the apprehension of the truth of reality (the Forms). Plato, then, attempts to solve this problem via dialectic in the *Sophist* and in the *Parmenides*.

This is Kant’s problem with Plato, i.e. that Plato believed that the ideas could somehow be reached through speculative reason via dialectic and in mathematics. Kant claims that “Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance -- meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion.”\(^2\)

Such an extension of the categorical laws of the understanding into the sublime realm of the Ideas, Kant contends, contradicts man’s moral destiny. That is to say, although Kant praises Plato’s use of the Ideas, or Forms, as far as morality, legislation and religion are concerned, Plato’s failure to separate speculative reason (by which we can

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\(^1\) *Republic*, 534e.

\(^2\) *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR), A5, B9.
only understand nature and her laws, i.e. “what is done”) from practical reason
(whereby we give unconditioned laws to ourselves and to nature, i.e. “what ought to
be done”) is, according to Kant, the ultimate sin of philosophy. “Nothing is more
reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is
done, or to impose upon the limits by which the latter is circumscribed.” But
philosophers are not quick to listen to commands of their brethren; Hegel bit into the
forbidden fruit and reinstated the sin of Plato not long after Kant had published these
words.

Thus, as we have it, the “is-ought” distinction will be of essential importance for Kant
in his explanation of the many and the One. The difference between these two
extremes will be held throughout his philosophical texts, often under other guises, as
will be obvious in the following table.

Kant’s Essential Dualisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ought</th>
<th>Is</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>Many</td>
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<tr>
<td>Idea(s)</td>
<td>Representations</td>
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<td>Homogeneity (generality)</td>
<td>Specification</td>
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<td>Synthesis (Synthetic Unity)</td>
<td>Analysis (Analytic Unity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Practical Reason</td>
<td>Speculative (Theoretical) Reason</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rational (free) will/ Duty</td>
<td>Elective will</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faith (Glaube)</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
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<td>Imagination (Einbildungskraft)</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
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<td>Unconditioned</td>
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<td>Laws of Freedom</td>
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<td>Thing-In-Itself</td>
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<td>Form</td>
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<td>Ends (Purposiveness, Finality)</td>
<td>Matter</td>
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<td>Praxis</td>
<td>Means</td>
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<td>Possibility</td>
<td>Theory</td>
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<td>Metaphysics</td>
<td>Actuality</td>
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<td>Art (Kunst)</td>
<td>Nature (physics)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Art (Kunst) causality by Ideas of ends</td>
<td>Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural causality (tekné) - skill, craft</td>
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3 CPR, A319, B375.
But although Kantian dualism is essential - there is always an *affinity* between the two extremes when understood systematically. The extremes are mediated via the power of judgment (Urteilskraft). In its highest form judgment is understood as synthesis, and synthesis is made possible by the creation of a very special analogy (schema or symbol). Synthesis and the creation of schema and symbols are functions of pure *a priori* imagination.

One method Kant uses to illustrate the “is-ought,” “One-many” distinction is to demonstrate **synthetic unity** and **analytic factuality**. Absolute synthetic unity represents the One, the “ought,” i.e., pure possibility and form, and ultimately the highest Good; analytic factuality pertains to what “is,” i.e., the (many) elements that make up our intuitions, or the, at least, conceptual-propositional “content” of appearances. Analysis is a reductive process which cuts into and dissects the Oneness of the whole or systematic unity and breaks it down into parts or elements. The goal of analysis is thus to break (partial) wholes down to their bear atomic essence or their ground. However, analytic parts are always synthetic wholes/unities themselves. Analysis can not reduce to anything below the conceptual content of thought, i.e. what is always already synthetically determined.

It will easily be observed that this action [synthesis] is originally one and is equipollent for all combination, and that its dissolution, namely, *analysis*, which appears to be its opposite, yet always presupposes it. For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot dissolve, since only as having been combined by *the understanding* can anything that allows of analysis be given to the faculty of representation.⁴

⁴ CPR, B130.
Synthetic unity transcends analytic unity; simply stated, synthetic unity contains all analytic unity in itself and is what makes analytic unity possible. But synthetic unity is always more than just the sum of its analytical parts. An element of transcendence always remains - ultimate synthetic unity is always sublime.

The priority of synthetic unity over analytic factuality is perhaps best exemplified when Kant refers to the givenness (i.e. the receptive nature) of sensible intuition. That which immediately affects us i.e. the sensible, is always in excess of analysis. The manifold of intuition must be synthesized before analysis is possible. The problem for Kant will be to demonstrate how exactly this synthesis takes place.

Synthesis, which occurs in all judgments of objects, refers to the spontaneous, perception of the form of that which affects us (i.e. “us” referring to rational, potentially apperceptive\(^5\), i.e. potentially transcendental, self-conscious, subjects). The formal elements of appearances are within us, i.e. in our understanding. How the forms of appearances (i.e., time and space) can be both within us and outside us at the same time is one of the most puzzling aspects of Kant’s philosophy. I do not claim to understand this notion completely (I will discuss Kant’s notion of form in the main text), but the solution will have to do with the pure a priori imagination.

As I have already stated, the source of all synthesis is imagination. Synthesis occurs ultimately in a logical, dialectical process in which an infinite manifold of parts are progressively combined into ever more universal wholes which approach the always projected absolute end, i.e. the ideas, either theoretically or practically. Such ends,

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\(^5\) Apperception will become more evident in the main text. Here I will just mention that apperception entails the unity of a subject, and that our entire past experience, inclusive of all knowledge that we have learned, is potentially “there,” within this unity, for recall in every potential experience we are faced with via synthesis. It will become evident, however, that if the subject does not discover anything “new,” i.e. if he remains within the realm of analytic facticity, apperception, i.e. self-consciousness, is negligible.
which are ends of pure reason, are teleological\textsuperscript{6}. They are teleological in that at its highest most all-inclusive, universal, systematic level, synthetic unity is inferred to be both the ultimate ground from which all life begins and the end result of a process of synthesis - synthetic unity being achieved, or at least approached, via an epigenetic\textsuperscript{7} growth process or movement of consciousness toward absolute unity. The progress toward this ultimate unity is, however, said to be infinite. The “ideas of reason” will serve as reference points for the synthetic unity of the One, while what we know and individually perceive represents the analytic factuality of “the many.”

The idea of reason that Kant will focus upon in his philosophy will be freedom. **Kant’s philosophy is a philosophy of freedom.** The freedom of mankind from the bounds of tyranny, the dialectical-historical movement of man toward self-realization and independence in thought and action, and the realization of our highest potential (the highest good) in the world in time, these are essential things that Kant will teach us with his philosophy.\textsuperscript{8}

Since freedom is a metaphysical concept or “idea of reason,” Kant understands by idea “a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in

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\textsuperscript{6} The teleological aspects of Kant’s philosophy will become more evident as this thesis unfolds. Teleology entails that there is an ultimate purpose that underlies all that is and all that ought to be. Uncovering this purposiveness of man and the universe is Kant’s goal.

\textsuperscript{7} I will speak a bit more over the epigenesis of pure reason (mentioned in the Transcendental Deduction (B167)) in the main text. Its definition will, however, give us a general idea what is proposed by such a notion:

epigenesis  \textit{n. 1. Biology. The theory that an individual is developed by successive differentiation of an unstructured egg rather than by a simple enlarging of a preformed entity. (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Third Edition))}

In other words, in the evolutionary growth process of human reason, man will have the ability to freely determine himself via laws that he gives to himself, rather than being pre-determined by laws (natural or otherwise) that are forced upon him.

\textsuperscript{8} Kant will also speak of mankind realizing immortality in a “kingdom of ends” in connection with the Idea of a purely intelligible world where happiness will correspond with virtue. However, such an end is not so much to be strived for as to be the projected result of following the moral law within - with all of one’s heart and soul.
sense-experience."9 Ideas are the highest principles of *a priori* knowledge supplied by reason. Pure reason is “that which contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely *a priori.*”10

In the process of criticizing the capacities of pure reason, Kant finds that reason can be divided into two paths: *speculative reason* and *practical reason.* He makes a distinction between what we “**know**” or “**understand**” and what we can only “**infer**” or “**think.**” What we know ultimately and necessarily relates to *appearances* in the world, i.e. *phenomena.* What we can only infer or think relates in due course to the metaphysical ideas, which correspond, dialectically and *practically* speaking to the *real,* or *things in themselves,* i.e. *noumena.* “To **know** an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its actuality as attested by experience, or *a priori* by means of reason. But I can **think** whatever I please, provided that I do not contradict myself, that is, provided my concept is a possible thought.”11 What we understand is “all that is” via our speculative (theoretical) reason. We think “all that *ought to be*” via practical reason.

The ideas are essentially three12. Speculative reason and practical reason are two different approaches to the same ideas.

Metaphysics has as the proper object of its enquiries three ideas only: *God,* *freedom,* and *immortality* -- so related that the second concept, when combined with the first, should lead to the third as a necessary conclusion.

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9 CPR, A327, B383.

10 CPR, A11, B24.

11 CPR, Bxxvi.

12 That is not to say that the ideas of reason exist as a plurality. Kant is merely trying to illustrate the ultimate synthetic unities necessary to illustrate the possibility of any kind of meaning or purpose or freedom for man, whatsoever. The ultimate synthetic unity is always the idea of God (alias the *sumum bonum,* or the Good-in-itself).
Any other matters with which this science may deal serve merely as a means of arriving at these ideas and of establishing their reality. It does not need the ideas for the purposes of natural science, but in order to pass beyond nature. Insight into them would render *theology* and *morals*, and, through the union of these two, likewise *religion*, and therewith the highest ends of our existence, entirely and exclusively dependent on the faculty of speculative reason. In a **systematic representation of the ideas**, the order cited, the *synthetic*, would be the most suitable; but in the investigation which must necessarily precede it the *analytic*, or reverse order, is better adapted to the purpose of completing our great project, as enabling us to **start from what is immediately given us in experience** -- advancing from the doctrine of the *soul*, to the doctrine of the *world*, and thence to the knowledge of *God*.13

Speculatively (i.e. theoretically) speaking, the ideas are *soul*, *world*, and *God*, and are **inferred** by “unjustifiably”,14 and, yet, quite naturally, dialectically extending the **synthetic a priori concepts (i.e. categories) of understanding** by which we know objects in the world - the concepts of understanding being empty and useless without “something” (concepts or intuitions), being given to them, in experience - to that which transcends experience. What we know with any kind of certainty for Kant is known via these concepts, or categories, and is classified as *science*. Science consists of two general studies: physics and mathematics (including geometry). Kant will demonstrate how the **synthetic a priori propositions** of which both mathematics and physics are composed are possible. He will then illustrate the contradictions that arise when we dialectally extend the categories of what we know to what can only be ideas of things-in-themselves. The *Critique of Pure Reason*, then, will be Kant’s answer to the metaphysical problem of “the One and the many” in relation to knowledge, i.e. of what *is*, and will be approached both analytically and dialectically (parts → whole).

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13 CPR, A337, B395, fn.

14 They are unjustifiable in the sense that it is impossible to prove the existence of something synthetic (i.e. transcendent of experience) via logical arguments which are based upon the categories and are valid only in the world of experience. This is essentially the basis of Kant’s refutation of the proofs of the existence of God. This is why it is essential for Kant to prove the actuality of at least one of the ideas, namely freedom, via a synthetic approach, i.e. by beginning with the assumption of the absolute ground (the noumenally free, phenomenally determined autonomous subject) which makes all experience possible. That is to say, it is based upon man’s ability to create, via his synthetic *a priori* judgments (when those judgments are based upon a universal law of willing), the reality that he perceives.
Practically speaking, the ideas are inversely said to be the unconditioned, synthetic unities, (a.k.a. “first principles”) which supply the basis or absolute ground and end for all desire, thought, action, and even existence. Kant distinguishes three such unities: God, freedom, and immortality. The Critique of Practical Reason will thus be Kant’s solution to the same metaphysical problem of “the One and the many” in terms of morality, i.e. what ought to be, and will be approached synthetically, beginning from “a systematic representation of the ideas of reason” (namely, via the idea of freedom)\(^\text{15}\) and will proceed to demonstrate their relation to what is given (whole → parts).

Practical reason is in its essence a demonstration of the idea of freedom. Simply stated, according to Kant, Freedom ought to be thought synthetically, in relation to absolute synthetic unities. Thus, not only is freedom to be thought in relation to the absolute individual subjective entity (being a unity and end-in-oneself\(^\text{16}\)), but, also, in terms of one’s affinity with many other subjective entities (as individual unities and ends-in-themselves) in the world, and, finally, in connection with the synthesis of the

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\(^{15}\) Freedom will be the focus though God and immortality are necessary assumptions. As Kant states, “Without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not springs of purpose and action” (A813, B841).

\(^{16}\) The word used by Kant to refer to “end,” “design,” or “purpose” is Zweck. Zweckmäßig refers to “purposive”; and Zweckmäßigkeit to “finality” or “purposiveness.” Such a reference to ends or purposes is an indication of the teleological structure that underlies Kant’s system (I will discuss this further in the chapters that follow). When Kant refers to the purpose, end or finality of “something” that exists, be it a living or inanimate object or substance, he is speaking of the formal or universal nature of that something (which Kant will claim is in us - man) versus its material content or appearance. However, when speaking in a practical context, the end of a rational being is its matter. That is to say, without man, without freedom, there is no purposiveness, or end, but a mere random chain of cause and effect with no value or existence. The formal nature of man is the rational supersensible freedom which allows him to give (moral) value to all things, and to bring into existence, i.e. to make actual, what was before mere (formal) possibility. Therefore, understood in terms of his supersensible, rational, free nature, every man is an end-in-oneself.
entire species of mankind as residing in a universal-collective-purposive whole (i.e. a cosmopolitan community of ends\textsuperscript{17}). This is not a stagnant, logical whole, but entails life and movement from within, a dialectical movement toward universality, driven on by free individuals in reciprocal relation with other member in their communities infinitely striving toward fulfilling the highest projected goal for all of mankind - the highest good in the world.

In order to prove his solution to this metaphysical problem, one of the major problems that Kant will have to resolve is the “immense gulf” [unübersehbare Kluft] which he perceives to exist between what happens according to the laws of nature and what ought to happen according to the laws of freedom.\textsuperscript{18}

In the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} Kant indicates that “concepts of reason may perhaps make possible a transition from the concepts of nature to the practical concepts, and in that way may give support to the moral ideas themselves, bringing them into connection with the speculative knowledge of reason.”\textsuperscript{19} And he indicates that this will be done “in the sequel.”\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} One can also refer to this unity as a “kingdom of ends.” Kant refers to a “kingdom of ends” as “a systematic union of rational beings under common laws” (GM, 74, (95)). That is, insofar as rational agents are subject to the universal laws which they themselves have made, as a whole, they constitute a kingdom or commonwealth. In the final chapter to GM Kant will speak of a “kingdom of ends” in connection with the Idea of a purely intelligible world.

\textsuperscript{18} CJ, 175.

\textsuperscript{19} CPR, A329, B386.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. H. Allison \textit{Kant’s Theory of Taste}, (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Pr., 2001, pp. 197-8) suggests that “the sequel” was within the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} itself. He quotes from two other authors who make this claim. H. Heimsoeth, \textit{Transzendentale Dialektik}, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyer & Co., p. 59) refers to the treatment of the idea of freedom in the Third Antinomy and its resolution, whereby Kant introduces freedom in a theoretical context as a cosmological idea, i.e. as the undetermined cause or ground of the world as a whole; and then later discusses its role in the conception of the practical freedom of the will. The other author Allison quotes is K. Düsing, \textit{Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriffe}, (Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 96, p. 103) who points out that in the chapter the
One may assume “the sequel” to be The Critique of Judgment where aesthetic judgment\(^1\), via purposiveness\(^2\) (the transcendental principle of judgment which Kant proves to conclude his critical philosophy), will be the mediating link between understanding and reason (i.e. between understanding and the supersensible ideas). The Critique of Judgment will thus offer an explanation to the metaphysical problem of “the One and the many” in terms of judgment, which will play the role of mediator between the “two” - that is, between “what is” and “what ought to be” (or, one could say, judgment will be the mediator between all forms of dualism in Kant’s philosophy).

However, Kant has already prepared the path between nature and freedom with his idea of “the purposive unity of things” in the Critique of Pure Reason. He states: “The speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the purpose of a supreme reason.”\(^3\) And further: “This highest formal unity, which rests solely on the concepts of reason, is the purposive unity of things.”\(^4\) In the Critique of Pure Reason, however, the idea of purposiveness

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21 There are at least five ways that Kant “links” man, as a part of nature, to man, as “free.” These will be brought out in the text and include: determinative judgments, i.e. in connection with maxims and duty; and reflective judgments, both teleological and aesthetical, i.e. on beauty and the sublime. Some offshoot elements that help to bridge the “gulf” are 1) the “intellectual interest” that is connected with natural beauty; and 2) art as symbolizing the morally good. All of these can ultimately be related to purposiveness - the a priori first principle of judgment.

22 See fn 16 above.

23 CPR, A686, B714, emphasis added.

24 Ibid, emphasis added.
remained a transcendental regulative idea\textsuperscript{25}. By the time that he wrote the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant found it necessary to utilize the idea of purposiveness as a constitutive\textsuperscript{26} idea in order to further justify himself.

How can a transcendental idea be constitutive? This is a very serious question for in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant had stated that “[T]ranscendental ideas never allow of any constitutive employment.”\textsuperscript{27} Kant *escapes* this potential contradiction when, in his Preface to *Critique of Judgment*, Kant claims that the *Critique of Pure Reason* dealt only with pure reason in its theoretical use, and thus “the cognitive power, to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and of the power of desire.”\textsuperscript{28}

Thus, we could say that, in terms of our theoretical cognitive power, the ideas of reason are transcendent and never allow of any constitutive employment, but, in terms of aesthetic and practical judgment, they necessarily provide for such employment. It will have to do with the distinction Kant makes in the *Critique of Judgment* between: a **metaphysical** principle vs. a **transcendental** principle. Reference *Critique of Judgment* p. 182: “The principle of the purposiveness of nature (in the diversity of its

\textsuperscript{25} Reason *demands* that all fragmentary elements of the world be synthesized, i.e. gathered into a final interconnected systematic unity. Speculative reason - that which corresponds to what we can theoretically know and understand, thus, has an *interest* in knowing the unconditioned totality and unity represented by each supersensible idea. Since the ideas are supersensible we can only imagine what they might entail. In this instance, following the demand of reason, it is *necessary* to regard all order in the world *as if* it had originated in the purpose of a Supreme Reason. Thus, the highest formal unity (which consists of the systematic unity and totality of all connections in the world, and is represented by the *regulative idea* of a Supreme Reason) is the *purposive* unity of things. “Such a principle opens out to our reason, as applied in the field of experience, altogether new views as to how the things of the world *may be* connected according to teleological laws, and so enables it to arrive at their greatest systematic unity” (A687, B715, emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{26} That is to say, the transcendental idea of purposiveness, which Kant had before (in the *Critique of Pure Reason*) inferred to be located in a Supreme Reason as its source, is now “within” us, and is there to back up whatever judgment we make (“as long as we do not contradict ourselves”), and, indeed, *must* be there, if man is to have the freedom to determine anything whatsoever.

\textsuperscript{27} CPR, A644, B672.

\textsuperscript{28} *CJ*, 167.
empirical laws) is a *transcendental* principle. For the concepts of objects, insofar as they are thought as subject to this principle, is only the pure concept of objects of possible empirical cognition in general and contains nothing empirical. On the other hand, the principle of practical purposiveness, the purposiveness that must be thought in the idea of the *determination* of a free will, is a metaphysical principle, because the concept of a power of desire, considered as a will, does have to be given empirically (i.e., it does not belong to the transcendental predicates).”

The idea of purposiveness is then a metaphysical principle. It is constitutive in the sense that we utilize it in everything that we do (*facere*) as opposed to acting or operating in general (*agere*). It is what distinguishes a work (*opus*) of man from an effect (*effectus*) of nature. “Everything we know (*Wissen*) is science (*Wissenschaft*), everything we can do (*Können*) is *art* (*Kunst*).”29 What we can do stops being art the moment we *know* what the desired effect of our action will be. There is a deep connection between art and *practical reason*, as demonstrated when Kant claims that “everything that we do with our powers must in the end aim at the practical and unite in it as its goal.”30 And Kant understands *art* (*Kunst*) as *causality in terms of ideas (of purposes)*. Thus, the idea of purposiveness is constitutive of everything that we can do (art).

Practical reason and art are the topics of the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment*. In our analysis of these works we shall see Kant demonstrate that there are “higher” and “lower” forms of art - depending on the freedom

29 CJ, §43, 303, paraphrased.

30 CJ §3, 206.
demonstrated by the subject in his/her actions and creations, i.e. by the degree to which the individual acts (or creates) purposively (i.e. universally) without “knowing what the desired effect of one’s action will be.”

Being a source of causality and creativity in ourselves, we have the innate capacity to transcend the laws of nature and “to pass beyond any and every specified limit” with our freedom. However, the progress of freedom is slow. Within our social-historical-political environment and upbringing, both our freedom and imagination are repressed and remain, for the most part, hidden from us. Mankind is held back by the “self-imposed” limitation (what one could also call the “ultimate challenge”), that we must learn to recognize and be conscious of the freedom hidden within the depths of our souls in order to grow to maturity, and to make a just claim to our independence - an independence that, because of the moral law within, and our existence in One “world,” can only be realized together with “others.”

In his short treatise *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, Kant indicates the difficulties involved for a philosopher trying to discover a purpose in this idiotic course of things human. He says it is hard to find any purpose whatsoever when, on the whole, besides the wisdom that appears here and there among individuals, one witnesses man’s brutishness, folly, childish vanity, and destructiveness. It would be easier, he claims, to apply such a history to bees or

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31 CPR, A318, B374.

32 Kant does not hold out the possibility that there may exist other “worlds” (In fact, Kant alludes to the hoped for existence of, at least, one other “invisible” world as necessary for us to act on the laws of morality (A813, B841). And in the final chapter to GM Kant will speak of a “kingdom of ends” in connection with the Idea of a purely intelligible world). However, all “worlds” would still be contained within One universal idea of “world” or “cosmos,” and all such worlds would still rely upon rational beings to determine their existence. I intend to show that we have access to any possible world that may exist by means of the imagination - the key link to the unknown and the source of our relation to all that exists.
beavers. However, Kant says he will leave it up to nature [or providence] to provide the answer. For he believes that, even while individual men and entire nations are “pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are **unconsciously** promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest.” And, like Newton, who discovered universal laws in physics, Kant will try to do the same for the course of things human.

In the *Critique of Judgment* Kant says, rather bluntly, that things are either here by some freak accident, by blind necessity, or else they are here for a purpose. And it is only through this concept of a purpose that things are given value for us. As he says, “only if we presupposed that the world has a final purpose, could its contemplation itself have a value by reference to that purpose.”

For Kant it is man through the freedom which he displays in his moral actions, which is the final purpose of creation. For without man, “all of creation would be a mere wasteland, gratuitous and without a final purpose.” If there is purposiveness in the world, then we have to assume a source of causality which acts intentionally and is outside the natural chain of causality. Man is the only natural being in which we can “recognize, as part of his constitution, a supersensible ability (*freedom*), and even recognize the law and the object of this causality, the object that this being can set

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33 *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, 41, emphasis added.

34 CJ, §84, 434.

35 CJ, §86, 442.

36 Ibid.
before itself as its highest purpose (the highest good in the world).”\textsuperscript{37} Such a purpose entails universal understanding, happiness and perpetual peace in the world. The highest good (the \textit{summum bonum}) is thus postulated as practically achievable by man through the “infinite progress”\textsuperscript{38} of a “beautiful soul.” We shall see what Kant means by a “beautiful soul” when I discuss aesthetic judgments, but I shall point out here that, for Kant, the process of civilization and acculturation provides the locus for the “beautiful soul” to develop and bloom.

Culture is that Janus-headed gift of nature that, on the one hand, provides the setting for our knowledge, art and ethical progress via education and \textit{sensus communis}; and, on the other hand, is the diabolical limitation to our freedom via extreme conservatism, dogmatism, protectionism, and is marked by seemingly endless struggles for power, control, manipulation and greed. Yet, we have to believe that there is some kind of purposiveness in all this. This dual nature of culture offers us the background for the soul to progress \textit{epigenetically}\textsuperscript{39} and to overcome evil.

Kant claims evil arises with the true birth of freedom, or man’s “release from the womb of nature,”\textsuperscript{40} i.e., when he starts to becomes conscious of his actions. Kant, then, would equate “evil,” with the “awareness” that one is following one’s “natural” impulses, i.e., with acting consciously only for one’s “self”-pleasure, failing to heed the moral law within which demands that we recognize all other rational beings, i.e.,

\textsuperscript{37} CJ, §84, 435.

\textsuperscript{38} CPrR, V, 122, 226.

\textsuperscript{39} See p. 6, fn7, above.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History} (CBHH), Beck ed., 59, 60.
other “selves,” as “equal” - when understood as ends-in-themselves - those who, together with the “self,” are striving to reach the same goal - freedom and happiness.

He says natural impulse will interfere with culture “until such a time as art will be strong and perfect enough to become a second nature. This indeed will be the ultimate end of the human species.”[41] In other words, “evil” will be a problem until such a time as the reflective judgments of art will be on the same level as the determinative judgments of theoretical understanding (i.e., hypothetical imperatives of science) and of the categorical imperative. Or, as I will argue, “evil” will be a problem until such a time as synthetic judgments a priori (that is, the ability to think and act according to laws that one provides for oneself) become a second nature.

The challenge for man is thus to recognize his supersensible ability (freedom), i.e. to become conscious of the moral law within, and “the object of this causality” - the highest good in the world, before he can hope to realize it. Such recognition of one’s supersensible ability is tied together with the epigenetic development of reason and judgment (Urteilskraft) of the beautiful soul, mentioned above, which, via the freedom of the imagination, recognizes the beautiful and sublime in nature and in the creations of man. The beautiful will correspond to the “feeling of life” (Lebensgefühl), and the sublime to moral feeling (‘Geistesgefühl’).

A major premise of this thesis will be to demonstrate how one comes to perceive and think, orient oneself and act within the world via the imagination. My ultimate goal is to show how, according to Kant, the imagination (in its pure, productive form)

transcends the realm of temporality and immanence. As such, it is intimately intertwined with the idea of freedom and, thus, with pure reason and the ideas in general, which are distinctly moral.

The imagination is deeply involved with:

1) The recognition, or consciousness, of freedom via the feeling of respect for the synthetic *a priori* moral law within which governs our judgments (aesthetic and determinative);

2) The idea of purposiveness which is the source of creativity, and of meaning and value judgments which are the mark of freedom in the world; and

3) The progress of man, which is nothing but the symbol of the progress of freedom within the universe.

INTRODUCTION

By way of introduction we will first answer a few questions, and set the stage for the opening argument:

I. What is Critical Philosophy?

II. What do we mean by imagination? And how is imagination used to resolve the problems criticized by Kant?

III. The critical texts

IV. Three essential questions of the critical texts
V. The opening argument - A brief synopsis in defense of Kantian logic

I. What is Critical Philosophy?

Kant understood his time, the period leading up to, and including, the 18th century, as the “Age of Criticism” - a criticism which can be understood as a rational tribunal to which everything which concerns man is obliged to submit. “Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, and law-giving through its majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they then awaken just suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination.”

His era is alternatively classified as an “Age of Enlightenment” which Kant refers to as “man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity” - immaturity being “the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another,” and is best exemplified by the motto which Kant uses in his thesis What is Enlightenment?: ‘Sapere Aude!’ i.e. “Dare to think for yourself!”

If we look at the history of mankind from a superficial, psychological perspective we see all the war, genocide, torture, rape, pillage, petty jealousy and extreme naivety that compose it, and it is hard to see any kind of progress, let alone freedom, within it. It appears to be one mass power struggle that follows the laws of nature (i.e. the law of cause and effect) where only the strongest (those who best utilize their prudence in

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42 CPR, B xii.
order to manipulate others to promote their own limited ends) “succeed.”\textsuperscript{43} However, Kant refuses to view history in this way. He sees it, rather, on a deeper, metaphysical level, as a movement toward the universal - toward a recognition of the universal power of freedom which exists within (the self), without (in our worldly social context) and on a universal level (the Good as the source and end of all).

Nature, Kant claims, by inspiring the very few men of genius in our history, has brought us relatively \textit{unconsciously}, i.e. via no effort whatsoever by the great majority of us, to the point of scientific knowledge and virtual freedom we experience today. Laziness and fear are the reasons why most of us do not dare to make a move to realize our true free natures: \textbf{Laziness}, in the sense that, “It is so convenient to be immature! If I have a book to have understanding in place of me, a spiritual adviser to have a conscience for me, a doctor to judge my diet for me, and so on, I need not make any efforts at all. I need not think, so long as I can pay; others will soon enough take the tiresome job over for me.”\textsuperscript{44} \textbf{Fear}, in the sense that, our guardians are quite happy to make us aware of the difficulties and dangers of free societies, “Having first infatuated their domesticated animals, and carefully prevented the docile creatures from daring to take a single step without the lead-strings to which they are tied, they next show them the danger which threatens them if they try to walk unaided. Now this danger is not in fact so very great, for they would certainly learn to walk eventually after a few falls. But an example of this kind is intimidating, and usually frightens them off from further attempts.”\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} An interesting footnote to this rather dark portrayal of history is made by Horkheimer and Adorno in \textit{Dialectic of Enlightenment} (p. 134): [T]he deceived masses are today captivated by the myth of success even more than the successful are. Immovably, they insist on the very ideology which enslaves them.”

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{What is Enlightenment?} (WIE), 54.
Kant argues that having the “freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters,” i.e. having the guts and the “legal right” to argue, to challenge and question those dogmas and formulas which are the “ball and chain of his permanent immaturity,” are the essential elements man needs to become conscious and to realize his freedom. Thus, one could suppose that lacking this right (of free speech) one would have a just cause for revolution, though Kant speaks out against revolutions as the norm. “A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism and to rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the ones they replaced, will serve as a leash to control the great unthinking masses.”

Nonetheless, many revolutions occurred within this period of which Kant speaks. Revolutions in knowledge, thought and politics mark the rise of individual subjects questioning the authority and foundation of the dogmatic laws that bind them, and in process transcending them, constructing and incorporating new more universal laws in their place.

The Copernican Revolution in science provides the exemplar for this historical-revolutionary process, or movement, towards the enlightenment of mankind as a whole. In this case Copernicus dared to challenge a dogmatically rigid “truth” held in place by the force of the religious and scientific authorities of his day, i.e. versus the

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45 Ibid.
46 WIE, 55.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
truth that explained the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved around the spectator, he hypothesized rather that “he might have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest” (Bxvii). Such boldness of thought in the hypotheses put forth by the likes of Copernicus, Kepler, Bruno and Galileo (Bruno was executed by the Catholic church for his “observations” and Galileo recanted his theories before an Inquisition a century later), paved the way to further advancements in science and to the “discovery” of first principles or universal laws of nature as would be presented by such men as Newton.

With the analogy of such accomplishments in science, Kant’s goal will then be to discover first principles or laws of freedom within metaphysics. Kant sees that metaphysics (a.k.a. the philosophy of pure reason), is marked by apparent conflicts with itself which cannot logically be resolved. The conflicts are between, what Kant classifies as the “dogmatic” position (mainly in reference to “rational idealism” - traditional Western metaphysics, as it is historically received by Kant) and the “skeptical” position (mainly in reference to the empiricist philosophers of his day).

To this dilemma, Kant will propose a dialectical solution.

The analysis of the metaphysician separates pure a priori knowledge into two very heterogeneous elements, namely, the knowledge of things as appearances, and the knowledge of things in themselves; his dialectic combines these two again, in harmony with the necessary idea of the unconditioned demanded by reason, and finds that this harmony can never be obtained except through the above distinction, which must therefore be accepted.49

49 CPR, B xxi, emphasis added.
One way to illustrate Kant’s dialectical solution to this *antinomy of reason*\(^50\) (see table below), i.e., conflict of reason with itself, follows:

\[
Thesis (+) + Antithesis (-) \rightarrow \text{Dialectical Solution}
\]

A *thesis* is given, usually in a dogmatic, though positive, sense which takes for granted the knowledge of *things in themselves* (e.g. freedom is a spontaneous first cause, prime mover or law, in itself, from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived; it is transcendent of the causality we observe in the world which is in accordance with the laws of nature).

The *antithesis* corresponds to a negative, skeptical or empiricist perspective which claims that we can only “know” the *appearances* of things (such an antithesis would deny, for instance, that freedom is at all possible; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with the laws of nature).

\(^{50}\) The antinomies are the second of three dialectical inferences of reason whereby reason gathers a manifold of understanding into one unconditioned idea of reason. Antinomies refer ultimately to the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance, i.e. to the “world” - the infinite manifold contained in the appearance of an object. The other two dialectical inferences are paralogisms (the absolute unity of the subject: soul) and the ideal (the absolute unity of all: God).
Kant's Antinomies

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Kant’s *solution* to this problem or *antinomy of reason* in which the thesis asserts that we have knowledge of things in themselves, while the antithesis asserts that all follows from purely logical necessity and that we are forever trapped in immanence, is to infer a *transcendental idea*, the “necessary idea of the *unconditioned demanded by reason*” that can never be more than a dialectical illusion. It is illusive in the sense that reason, and we shall see reason’s relation to imagination in a moment, naturally infers the concept of the *unconditioned*, to be the first member of a natural series of events (i.e. reason posits an entity which displays freedom as representative of the
first member of a series of causes (and effects) in the world) on the basis of the totality and synthetic unity which such a series presupposes, but such an inference can never be “known” - at least not with the certainty or in the same sense in which mathematics and physics are known. For mathematics and physics rely upon sensibility, and the imagination and its schema, in order to come to an understanding of the corresponding particular synthetic unities obtained via these operations. However, the method by which we come to knowledge in mathematics and physics will serve as the pattern, or standard, for how we can come to “know,” or, at least, to “think,” ideas of reason.

The task of Kant’s critical philosophy is thus revolutionary. His task is to perform a “Copernican Revolution” in metaphysics. “This attempt to alter the procedure which has hitherto prevailed in metaphysics, by completely revolutionising it in accordance with the example set by the geometers and physicists, forms indeed the main purpose of this critique of pure speculative reason [i.e. the Critique of Pure Reason].”\(^51\) In his critical philosophy Kant will adopt the “Copernican hypothesis” that “we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them.”\(^52\) And he says that “in the Critique [of Pure Reason] itself it [the Copernican hypothesis] will be proved, apodeictically\(^53\) not hypothetically, from the nature of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding.”\(^54\)

\(^51\) CPR, Bxxiii, emphasis added.

\(^52\) CPR, Bxviii.

\(^53\) “The term apodeictic is borrowed by Kant from Aristotle who uses it in the sense of ‘certain beyond dispute.’ The word is derived from apodeiknumi (=I show) and is contrasted to dialectic propositions, i.e., such statements as admit of controversy” (Editor’s remark in Prolegomena, n.1).

\(^54\) (CPR, Bxxii n., emphasis added). That Kant will prove this thesis (“we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them”) apodeictically is essential. For he will utilize the grounds and
His aim is to “level the ground” of philosophy (critiquing the limits, possibilities and impossibilities of speculative reason) and replace it with a transcendental ground which we can only “hope” to attain, via a practical use of reason whereby man gradually matures and asserts his freedom. As he says in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: “I have found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith [Glaube]; the dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the preconception that it is possible to make progress in metaphysics without a critique of pure reason, is the true source of all that unbelief [Unglaube], always very dogmatic, which clashes with morality.”

Further:

[W]hen all progress in the field of the supersensible has thus been denied to speculative reason, it is still open to us to enquire whether, in the practical knowledge of reason, data may not be found sufficient to determine reason’s transcendent concept of the unconditioned, and so to enable us, in accordance with the wish of metaphysics, and by means of knowledge that is possible *a priori*, though only from a practical point of view, to pass beyond the limits of all possible experience. Speculative reason has thus at least made room for such an extension; and if it must at the same time leave it empty, yet none the less we are at liberty, indeed we are summoned, to take occupation of it, if we can, by practical data of reason.  

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method established in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (i.e. whereby the *categories* are established as the subjective forms of understanding required for objectivity, and *time* and *space* as subjective forms of sensibility required for intuition) as giving the proof of how synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible. He will analogously prove the synthetic *a priori* moral law to be an apodeictic fact of practical reason in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

55 *Glaube* has a broader meaning then “faith”; it also refers to “belief,” i.e. a belief in the highest ends or purposes of mankind.

56 CPR, Bxxx.

57 CPR, Bxiii, emphasis added.
II. What do we mean by imagination? And how is imagination used to resolve the problems criticized by Kant?

Kant’s philosophy is a philosophy of transcendence and infinite progress. Objectively, it concerns the movement of mankind as a whole towards an ideal unity in knowledge (i.e. in science) and thought (i.e. in art, religion and his social-political environment); and subjectively, it involves the striving of individuals towards universal ends (in concordance with freedom, i.e. as commanded by the moral law within) in the world, in time. By indicating the role of imagination in Kant’s three critiques, we shall see that it is imagination which provides the force for this entire purposive dialectical movement - both subjectively and objectively. I will thus propose that imagination (in its pure sense) is the fundamental power that, not only, binds subjectivity with objectivity, but, also, has its source in the purposive ideal unity which includes subjectivity and objectivity in itself. That is to say, the imagination has its origin in that “supreme reason,” i.e. in the “highest formal unity, which rests solely on the concepts of reason,” and “is the purposive unity of things” 58

Kant leads us in this direction when he states:

We have to enquire whether imagination combined with consciousness may not be the same thing as memory, wit, power of discrimination, and perhaps even identical with understanding and reason. Though logic is not capable of deciding whether a fundamental power actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a systematic representation of the multiplicity of powers. 59

58 CPR, A686, B714, mentioned above (p. 10-11).

59 CPR, A649, B677.
This is my task, my “Copernican hypothesis,” a metaphysical enquiry into the depths of reason itself - utilizing the exemplar of Kantian thought and imagination - in order to discover “there” whether a fundamental power - the imagination - actually exists as “the common root of our faculty of knowledge [whereby it] divides and throws out two stems, one of which is reason.”

It is a daring project, but I am not its originator. Heidegger, among others, has followed this Kantian-prepared path before me and has left signs of how to deal with it. I am merely following a universal law within us all, a command of reason, which demands that our subjective maxim be one of seeking a Unity in Totality, Totality in Unity. It is our duty, that our maxim be one of seeking a systematic synthetic representation, not only of the multiplicity of our powers, but, also, of the objects of our experience (i.e. our knowledge of them); and that all of our actions be aimed at a universal end. I will thus search for systemic unity, not only in Kant’s portrayal of reason itself, but in my (re)presentation of the Kantian Critiques as a whole - with

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60 CPR, A835, B863.


62 There are three other authors who have notably influenced my enquiry into the Kantian imagination: J. Michael Young, John Sallis and Bernard Freyberg.

I quote significantly from Young’s “Kant’s View of Imagination” in the main text.

In his The Gathering of Reason, Sallis gives an excellent elucidation of Kantian dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason, and one of the best accounts of Kant’s use of imagination that I have read.

Freyberg (Imagination and Depth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason) offers another exceptional exposition of the Kantian imagination. He hesitates, however, to agree with Heidegger and Sallis that: ‘imagination is the “unknown root” from which understanding and sensibility stem,’ on the grounds that this account would suggest the homogeneity of the two stems. And though his analysis is pretty much limited to the Critique of Pure Reason he points in the direction as to how imagination can be understood as the source of unity for Kant’s entire critical system.

63 To an extent I will agree with Heidegger’s brilliant and very original interpretation of the Kantian imagination in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Cassirer will challenge Heidegger’s interpretation and offer an alternative view. My interpretation will differ significantly from both views. I will therefore utilize Heidegger, and the challenge of Cassirer, as the setting for the opening argument of my thesis (in section V of my Introduction below, p. 35).
imagination always playing a central and critical, though, for the most part, unconscious, role.

Where this quest will lead us, its outcome and success, can only be left to our ability to properly analyze the theoretical, practical and aesthetic works of Kant and his interpreters; and to providence, i.e., to our ability to actively participate in the “productive (pure) imagination,” (which we may assume is the Imagination of the ultimate Unity in Totality and Unconditioned Source of All) in order to be able to synthesize our analyses into a projective whole.

That is not to say that the Unconditioned Source of nature and its laws, and the law of freedom, is “given” to us in itself - in our understanding. Such a Being is sublime (as is our freedom), i.e. beyond all rational-theoretical comprehension, and transcendent of anything that we can experience in the world - via the categories of understanding. However, we necessarily possess the transcendental idea of such an entity, and we naturally infer that such a Being exists in itself. The ideas are “completely determined in the Supreme Understanding […] and are the original causes of things. But only the totality of things in their interconnection as constituting the universe is completely adequate to the idea.”64

Therefore, to go into a bit more detail upon what I have introduced above, transcendental ideas are necessary, pure, a priori concepts (i.e. concepts which transcend experience, and in which no given empirical content can ever coincide) which we may call concepts of pure reason. Reason with its ideas never deals directly

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64 CPR, A318, B374-5.
with objects as they are given in perception, but only indirectly as they are determined by our understanding.

[T]ranscendental ideas never allow of any constitutive employment. When regarded in that mistaken manner, and therefore as supplying concepts of certain objects, they are but pseudo-rational, merely dialectical concepts. On the other hand, they have an excellent, and indeed indispensably necessary, regulative employment, namely, that of directing the understanding towards a certain goal upon which the routes marked out by all its rules converge, as upon their point of intersection. This point is indeed a mere idea, a focus imaginarius, from which, since it lies quite outside the bounds of possible experience, the concepts of the understanding do not in reality proceed; none the less it serves to give to these concepts the greatest [possible] unity combined with the greatest [possible] extension.

The transcendental ideas - the soul, the world (i.e. the cosmological ideas) and God are each a universal, concept, the name of which, in the context of speculative (theoretical) reason, is the representative of the unity and totality of an infinite series of natural conditions.

Each of these concepts, when regarded “mistakenly,” i.e. dialectically, provides the focus imaginarius to which our finite understanding strives to comprehend and systematically complete itself. That they are dialectical concepts is exemplified by the fact that they are inferred via the pure unity of thought in itself, which is presupposed

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65 (see pp. 12-13 above)

66 It is easy to see the relation and tension here between the focus imaginarius of the regulative employment of reason with ‘aesthetic ideas’ (to be discussed in the main text). It is also interesting to note that “in the case of a rational idea the imagination with its intuitions does not reach the given concept” (CJ, §57, 343). In fact Kant will say in CJ that rational ideas are sublime. It would seem that we can only refer to rational ideas by means of aesthetic ideas. And we may only become “aware” of, at least one of these sublime ideas, the idea of freedom, by a feeling of respect for the moral law within. Thus, one could assume that the rational ideas when viewed from their regulative employment follow from the awareness of the ideas in their sublime presentation to the morally “self-conscious” individual, and are made available for theoretical use via their aesthetic representation in the aesthetic idea of the artist-genius.

67 CPR, A 644, B 672, emphasis added.

68 Just a reminder: Alternatively, Kant will speak of these same three concepts in a practical context under the heading, and God, freedom, and immortality. See above p. 8.
in all knowledge, to be *noumena*, or things in themselves. They are *regulative* in the sense that, although they lack objectivity and we have no right to use them as a basis of knowledge, they guide, stimulate and direct the understanding toward ever-expanding heights of synthetic unity and universality. They are purposive, or one could say *ends-in-themselves*, because they provide the unconditioned, highest goals, or ends, for a rational being to realize, i.e. they compose the *unconditional ground and end of the gathering/synthesis of reason itself in an infinite dialectical progress*. And they are “*imaginary*” because although we can imagine, quite happily, what fulfilling, or reaching, or even approaching each of these universal concepts would consist of, since such conceptions transgress what we can know and experience with our concepts of understanding - which are valid only in determining relations of time and space - they can never be more than mere illusion. An illusion that, though irresistible and quite natural, must be subjected to the most intense philosophical criticism in order to salvage metaphysics - and thus man’s highest purposes, knowledge, morality and reason itself - from the abyss of absurdity.

III. The critical texts

The focus of this thesis will be upon three main texts of the Kantian system of which the rest of his work is an offshoot: the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the *Critique of Judgment*.

Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* is the beginning and end of transcendental philosophy - transcendental philosophy being “a philosophy of pure and merely speculative reason.”\(^{69}\) It can thus be seen as the “clearing of the ground” for, and as constituting

\(^{69}\) CPR, A15, B29.
the possibility of, metaphysics by answering the question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? Kant will proceed analytically, identifying the elements of pure reason and constructing the method and the architectonic of his metaphysical system. After demonstrating the limitations and possibilities of synthetic a priori theoretical knowledge, focusing upon the purposiveness of nature for our affectation, perception and understanding, and the constitution and ordering of such knowledge by the scientist, Kant will conclude with a transcendental dialectic in which speculative reason is stretched to its breaking point. His conclusion will be that only practical reason can solve the problems of metaphysics, though a critique of pure reason has demonstrated that the ideas of reason are indeed synthetically possible a priori, if only as regulative ideas in a speculative context. Transcendental philosophy has thus prepared the ground for man’s infinite, universal path to freedom - freedom being the only transcendental idea of which man can experience via the feeling of respect, and by the fruits of his free actions which are perceivable in nature.

Since ideas “are the original causes of things,” and since ideas are ends or purposes, “nach Zwecken, d. i. nach Ideen”), and since “it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every specified limit,” it is man’s freedom, in the synthetic a priori form of the moral law within, which allows for any kind of “progress” or “purposiveness” in the world - purposiveness being directly related to

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70 Prolegomena, 26.
71 Kant has a different idea of “science” than contemporary notions of it. And by “scientists” Kant will be much more concerned with the originators of science’s laws than its mere practitioners.
72 CPR, A318, B375.
73 c.f. CPR, A319, B375.
74 CPR, A318, B374.
human values and meaning. The dialectical-historical movement of freedom (i.e. via the practical employment of reason) toward the One - the highest universal Good, i.e. the *summum bonum*, will be the focus of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The morally conscious man of taste and wit who has the courage and wisdom to think and act on universal principles, despite his/her subjective whims and the resistance of society and the powers-that-be, and who will thus set possibilities and example for others to learn from and to follow, will be the theme of this text.

Judgments, both determinative and reflective, will be criticized in the *Critique of Judgment* within the sphere opened up by the first two *Critiques*. The freedom of imagination, tempered by understanding, will be seen as the source of *genius* and as the gift of Spirit [Geist]. Here Kant will put forth his Critique of aesthetic judgments - judgments which must be seen as the source of *aesthetic ideas* (the symbolic reference to the sublime transcendental ideas), via the genius-artist in society, which lead man toward his highest teleological fulfillment.

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**IV. Three essential questions which set the stage for the Critiques**

Kant will set up the framework for his three *Critiques* in answer to three major, interrelated metaphysical questions or problems:

(1) Kant insists the ideas “are not arbitrarily invented; they are imposed by the very nature of reason itself.”

75 Since “[e]verything that is grounded in the very nature of

75 CPR, A327, B384.
our mental powers, must have a meaning and purpose which is in harmony with the proper use of these powers”\(^{76}\), the transcendental ideas, the “illusion” produced by human reason, must have a meaning and purpose in regards to our destiny. Now, what is natural to us must be given to us, that is, “within us” in some way.

[I]n a certain sense, this kind of knowledge is to be looked upon as given; that is to say, metaphysics actually exists, if not as a science, yet still as natural disposition (metaphysica naturalis). For human reason, without being moved merely by the idle desire for extent and variety of knowledge, proceeds impetuously, driven on by an inward need, to questions such as cannot be answered by any empirical employment of reason, or by principles thence derived. Thus in all men, as soon as their reason has become ripe for speculation, there has always existed and will always continue to exist some kind of metaphysics.\(^{77}\)

The first question will then be: “How is metaphysics, as natural disposition possible?”\(^{78}\)

(2) It is by means of the “drive,” natural tendency, or desire\(^{79}\), which human reason has to transgress the limits of understanding (i.e. by its production of transcendental ideas) that the understanding advances beyond its mere analytical-logical-historical framework (i.e., theoretical knowledge - where objects of experience have been constituted and determined as objects, i.e. “the greatest part of the business of our reason consists in analysis of the concepts which we already have of objects”\(^{80}\)).

\(^{76}\) (CPR, A642, B670) „Alles, was in der Natur unserer Kräfte gegründet ist, muß zweckmäßig und mit dem richtigen Gebrauche derselben einstimmig sein.“ I have chosen the Caird translation of this passage (The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Volume II, Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1969, p. 130) for I feel that, in this instance, Caird portrays a better indication of what Kant intends than the Smith translation.

\(^{77}\) CPR, B21, emphasis added.

\(^{78}\) CPR, B22.

\(^{79}\) In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant even refers to reason, in one of its modes, as “the power of desire.”

\(^{80}\) CPR, A5, B9.
Transcendental ideas will then “determine according to principles” how understanding is to be employed in dealing with experience in its totality. Thus the transcendental ideas lead the multiple fragmentary elements within the various analytic modes or frameworks of understanding towards affinity and unity within a self-conscious, thinking subject. And, on a universal scale, the transcendental ideas lead all (the various branches) of knowledge towards the interconnected synthetic unity of a purposive, systematic whole. “It is the business of reason to render the unity of all possible empirical acts of the understanding systematic.”

System is “the unity of manifold modes of knowledge under one idea.” Since “systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, i.e. makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge,” we are led to a second problem that Kant will be trying to resolve. Kant’s goal with his three Critiques is to provide an in-depth philosophical system which answers the question: “How is metaphysics, as a science possible?”

(3) The above two questions pertaining to the possibility of metaphysics can be brought into the formula of a single essential problem: “How are a priori synthetic
judgments possible?" Kant claims that the proper problem of pure reason, that power which produces the transcendental ideas and composes the principles whereby we know anything a priori, is contained in this question. Understanding “How a priori synthetic judgments are possible?” is thus the key to Kant’s critical philosophy. This is what I will try to illustrate with this thesis, the importance of which will become more evident in my “opening argument” which follows.

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V. The opening argument - A brief synopsis in defense of the Kantian view of the transcendence of the imagination

At this point I would like to open my thesis with an argument against Heidegger’s interpretation of the Kantian imagination. I will not go into depth about Heidegger’s position here. I will only briefly discuss some points he makes, the challenge of Cassirer, and conclude with the beginning of a possible resolution of the problem.

Heidegger will argue in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics that the design of his own ontology is implied in Kant’s portrayal of the finite constitution of human knowledge. He will claim that imagination is the root of human understanding, and of the temporal structure in which we perceive.

In his review of this book, Cassirer’s problem is not so much with this analysis as with Heidegger’s claim that imagination is also the root of our practical reason. As Cassirer says, “The power of imagination is the connection of all thought to the

87 CPR, B19.
intuition.” By “intuition” he is referring to “empirical intuition” (and, indirectly, to the understanding’s dependency upon it) being the restriction of man to the temporal-finite nature which is entailed in Heidegger’s ontology. Is Heidegger then, basing practical reason on something conditional and finite? “Does he want to withdraw completely to the finite creature?” Cassirer asks.

Thus, what we are left with would seem to be, what Schalow refers to as, an either-or alternative. “[E]ither we define practical reason in terms of the individual’s finitude and deny the a priori necessity of moral commands, or we uphold the a priori necessity of moral commands and define practical reason independently of the individual’s finitude.”

My thesis will disagree with both options.

The problem: What Cassirer says of the imagination is indeed true: “imagination is the connection of all thought to the intuition.” However, both Cassirer and Heidegger miss the point which I shall bring out with my text, that only reproductive imagination is necessary for empirical intuition; imagination, in its productive, free, form, not only makes appearances, via reproductive imagination, possible, but, more importantly, is the connection of thought to pure practical reason. The realm of pure practical reason is transcendent of time and space.

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88 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Appendix IV, 194.
89 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 196.
90 Imagination and Existence: Heidegger’s Retrieval of the Kantian Ethic, p. x.
Both Heidegger and Cassirer limit imagination to the temporal-(in)finite sphere. But neither of them allow for man to be “truly” transcendent, i.e. immortal, of the world in which we perceive and know. Heidegger refers to a “going-beyond of finitude,” and Cassirer refers to an “immanent infinitude” - “Man cannot make the leap from his own proper finitude into a realistic infinitude.”

Perhaps we can understand imagination in terms of a Kantian antinomy:

**Thesis:** The true essence of man is freedom. Imagination is our direct relation to freedom. The freedom of imagination transcends understanding, time and space.

**Antithesis** (Heidegger and Cassirer): Imagination, while being the root of our “way of seeing,” is limited to the immanence of man’s existence. The imagination has only an indirect relation to freedom. The only freedom man can achieve is an immanent freedom, i.e. it is only valid and achievable in the world in which we perceive and know.

This account of freedom, for Kant, would be absurd. “God, freedom, and immortality -- [are] so related that the second concept, when combined with the first, should lead to the third as a necessary conclusion.” The world in which we perceive and know is nature. Saying that freedom is a “going-beyond of finitude,” or even that man can only realize an “immanent infinitude,” is equivalent to saying: there is no freedom. In the world of appearances (time and space) man is only subject to the laws of nature.

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91 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 197.

92 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 201.

93 CPR, A337, B395, fn.
Thus, as I state it, the problem of imagination is another form of the antinomy of freedom. The solution to the antinomy of freedom can not be reached dialectically-theoretically, but must be resolved practically. I will, thus, agree with Heidegger that “the origin of practical reason is to be found in the transcendental power of imagination,” however, the transcendental power of imagination must be shown to transcend the realm of temporality and immanence. Demonstrating this will be the heart of my thesis.

94 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 112.
Part One

The Starting Point for the Laying of the Ground of Metaphysics

As stated in the Introduction my thesis will essentially be to demonstrate that, as Heidegger has asserted, “the origin of practical reason is to be found in the transcendental power of imagination,”\(^{95}\) however, the transcendental power of imagination must be shown to transcend the realm of temporality and immanence in order to be worthy of Kant’s intention.

As Heidegger astutely points out in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* “the origin of practical reason cannot be disclosed through argumentation. […] Rather, what is required is an express unveiling by means of an elucidation of the essence of the ‘practical self’.”\(^{96}\) I believe that this is correct. However, in order to commence the unveiling process I will begin my analysis at the opposite end of the spectrum of ideas than both Heidegger and Kant chose. That is to say, I will begin, not with intuition, i.e. what is immediately given in experience, but with an enquiry into the ground of pure (practical) reason itself. The first stage in the ground-laying of metaphysics will thus begin with what I believe to be Kant’s original enquiry:

> We have to enquire whether imagination combined with consciousness may not be the same thing as memory, wit, power of discrimination, and perhaps even identical with understanding and reason. Though logic is not capable of deciding whether a *fundamental power* actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a systematic representation of the multiplicity of powers.\(^{97}\)

\(^{95}\) *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 112.

\(^{96}\) *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 109.

\(^{97}\) *CPR*, A649, B677.
Keeping this in mind throughout, in order to illustrate this enquiry I will begin with the presupposition that the systematic synthetic unity that Kant strived for, and claims to have achieved, with his *Critiques* has been attained. By this I have an advantage over Kant in that I may freely utilize, integrate and synthesize various elements of his three *Critiques* while analyzing each one independently. I will also integrate related elements from his political and historical works where I deem necessary. In this manner I will show that an express unveiling of ‘imagination combined with consciousness’ will provide the elucidation of the essence of the ‘practical self’ as immortal and free.

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**ASPECTS OF THE PRACTICAL SELF**

*The First Stage in the Ground Laying:*

*Reason is one, and when one uses one’s understanding to think and act a priori one is not subject to the form of time*

It is, according to Kant, a demand of reason that we seek a systematic representation of all things - intuition, knowledge, and thought inclusive. Accordingly, Kant will deduce the source of such a demand in three ideas or first principles of reason, i.e. *unity* (homogeneity, generalization or identity), *distinction* (specification, manifoldness, multiplicity, or differentiation) and *continuity* (affinity).

The principle of *unity* is evident in physics and chemistry where we seek the underlying fundamental element or force which underlies and explains the differences of substances and the variety of their changes. This tendency to generalization, identity and ideality is balanced by the tendency to seek *specification*, difference and
empirical data. “The knowledge of phenomena in their complete determination (which is possible only through the understanding) demands an endless progress in the specification of our conception of them; and in this progress differences always remain behind, from which, in defining the species, and still more the genus, we were obliged to abstract.”\(^98\) Finally, in order to make systematic unity complete, the law of affinity commands us to seek mediation between the extremes of generalization and specification in all of our judgments, and to bind together in continuity the highest unity with the lowest difference. “The third law combines these [first] two laws by prescribing that even amidst the utmost manifoldness we observe homogeneity in the gradual transition from one species to another, and thus recognize a relationship of the different branches, as all springing from the same stem.”\(^99\)

These principles do not directly bring about knowledge of objects, but merely enable us to organize our experience. Experience cannot occur without them, and yet, since they are ideas of reason, they cannot be realized. That is to say, the empirical use of reason stands in an asymptotical relation to these ideas, i.e., it can approximate to them but it can never reach them.\(^100\)

These ideas are another way of examining the three ideas of reason we have looked at earlier, i.e. ‘God, freedom, immortality’ and ‘soul, world, God’ with God always pertaining to the principle of absolute unity and totality. As far as human beings are concerned, “if a multiplicity of representations are to form a single representation,

\(^{98}\) CPR, A656, B684, Caird translation.

\(^{99}\) CPR, A660, B688.

\(^{100}\) CPR, A663, B691.
they must be contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject.” The absolute unity of the thinking subject pertains to the soul. And as far as the fundamental powers of the soul are concerned:

The logical principle of reason calls upon us to bring about such unity as completely as possible; and the more the appearances of this and that power are found to be identical with one another, the more probable it becomes that they are simply different manifestations of one and the same power, which may be entitled, relatively to the more specific powers, the fundamental power. The same is done with the other powers. The relatively fundamental powers must in turn be compared with one another, with a view to discovering their harmony, and so to bring them nearer to a single radical, that is, absolutely fundamental, power. But this unity of reason is purely hypothetical. We do not assert that such a power must necessarily be met with, but that we must seek it in the interests of reason, that is, of establishing certain principles for the manifold rules which experience may supply to us. We must endeavor, wherever possible, to bring in this way systematic unity into our knowledge.

Reason, being one of the fundamental powers is also subject to this systematic unity.

Two passages, one from the Critique of Practical Reason, another from Kant’s Reflections, lead us in this direction:

[1]If pure reason of itself can be and really is practical, as the consciousness of the moral law shows it to be, it is only one and the same reason which judges a priori by principles, whether for theoretical or for practical purposes.

But without understanding, which I will try to equate with “imagination combined with consciousness” which are synthesized with and into one’s character or personality, there would be nothing to determine.

All our activities and those of other beings are necessitated. However, only understanding (and the will insofar as it can be determined by understanding) is free and is pure self-activity which is determined by nothing other than by itself. Without this original and unchangeable spontaneity we would be determined in everything and even our thoughts would be subject to empirical laws. The faculty to think and to act a priori is the soul condition for the

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101 CPR, A352.
103 CPrR, V, 21, 224-5.
possibility of the origin of all other appearances. [Otherwise] even “ought” would have no meaning.\textsuperscript{104}

Here Kant would seem to be referring to understanding without mention of any relation to imagination whatsoever. However, in his Anthropology Kant will go so far as to call understanding “a faculty of imagination” (though he seems to hesitate here, in the footnote we are told by the editor that this passage has been crossed out):

All cognition depends on the understanding as a prerequisite […] This faculty needs \textit{understanding, a faculty of imagination} with the awareness of action, whereby this relationship is thought through. But we do not understand anything correctly unless we are able to put it together ourselves as long as the material to do so is supplied to us. Consequently, understanding is a faculty of spontaneity within our cognition; it is a higher faculty of understanding because it submits ideas [Vorstellungen] \textit{a priori} to certain laws. Also, understanding itself makes experience possible.\textsuperscript{105}

Further, in the A edition of the Transcendental Deduction in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} Kant will put forth that:

There are three subjective sources of knowledge upon which rests the possibility of experience in general and of knowledge of its objects -- \textit{sense, imagination, and apperception}. Each of these can be viewed as empirical, namely, in its application to given appearances. But all of them are likewise \textit{a priori} elements or foundations, which make this empirical employment itself possible.\textsuperscript{106}

Now, what Kant seeks is a thorough-going unity or identity of self in all possible representations of this self. This is achieved though synthesis. Synthesis is the result of the power of imagination [Einbildungskraft]. Even transcendental apperception (i.e. consciousness of one’s transcendental self, or personality) seems to follow from the synthesis of pure \textit{a priori} imagination:

The transcendental unity of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an \textit{a priori} condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge. [….T]he principle of the necessary unity of pure

\textsuperscript{104} From Kant’s \textit{Reflexionen II}, p. 286. Quoted from M. Heidegger, \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason}, 251.

\textsuperscript{105} Anthropology, §7, n. 52, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{106} CPR, A115.
(productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.107

“Understanding” is then recognized in the light of the unity of apperception made possible by the synthesis of imagination:

The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding; and this same unity, with reference to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the pure understanding.108

In the end it will thus be pure apperception and imagination, i.e., “imagination and consciousness” which form the essence of the intellectual, knowing self.

The abiding and unchanging 'I' (pure apperception) forms the correlate of all our representations in so far as it is to be at all possible that we should become conscious of them. [...] It is this apperception which must be added to pure imagination, in order to render its function intellectual. [...] And while concepts, which belong to the understanding, are brought into play through relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception, it is only by means of the imagination that they can be brought into relation to sensible intuition.

A pure imagination, which conditions all a priori knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other.109

We shall inaugurate our analysis of these quotes with Kant’s famous statement pertaining to the Enlightenment of man: Sapere Aude!

107 CPR, A118.
108 CPR, A119.
109 CPR, A124, emphasis added.
§1. Sapere Aude!

Sapere Aude! -- “Dare to think for yourself!” How is this possible?

Thinking for oneself should not be confused with “free-thinking,” a popular, artsy manner of thinking without any rules whatsoever. Kant claims that “the inevitable result of self-confessed lawlessness in thinking (i.e. of emancipation from the restrictions of reason) is this: freedom of thought is thereby ultimately forfeited and, since the fault lies not with misfortune, for example, but with genuine presumption, this freedom is in the true sense of the word thrown away.”\textsuperscript{110} To think for oneself means “to look within oneself (i.e. in one’s own reason) for the supreme touchstone of truth […].” To employ one’s own reason means simply to ask oneself, whenever one is urged to accept something, whether one finds it possible to transform the reason for accepting it, or the rule which follows from what is accepted, into a universal principle governing the use of one’s reason.”\textsuperscript{111}

Though Kant will never officially endorse such a formulation, this last statement sounds like nothing less than the “categorical imperative” (“a universal principle governing the use of one’s reason”) in terms of thinking in general. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant states the categorical imperative in one of its modes: “The rule of judgment [Urteilskraft] under laws of pure practical reason is: Ask yourself whether, if the action you propose should take place by a law of nature of which you yourself were a part, you could regard it as possible of your will.”\textsuperscript{112} Thus, it may be argued that “employing one’s own reason,” that is, “thinking (universally) for

\textsuperscript{110} What is Orientation in Thinking, 248.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 249.

\textsuperscript{112} CPrR, V, 70, 178.
oneself,” and “acting universally (i.e. determining one’s will by a universal law which one gives to oneself),” are implicitly subject to “the same reason which judges a priori by principles, whether for theoretical or for practical purposes.” This one reason originates in a transcendental subject, in a simple substance, in the idea we have of a soul within us which is our true essence. This one reason lies behind our understanding - the faculty to think and act a priori. And “the faculty to think and to act a priori is the soul condition for the possibility of the origin of all other appearances,” and is the free and pure self-activity which is determined by nothing other than by itself. The “understanding” when comprehended in this light is the essence of the ‘practical self.’

Demonstrating how a subject may “think for oneself” and “act universally,” i.e. how a subject may judge a priori by principles one gives to oneself, are possible are the implicit goals of Kant’s entire philosophical system. His answer will be set up in the form of answering the question, “How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?”

§2. The ground of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments is a mystery

Thus, as we have it then, the problem involved in a systematic representation of the multiplicity of powers is the mystery that Kant will try to bring to the fore for us, and its adumbration¹¹³ is deeply intermingled with the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments:

A certain mystery lies here concealed; and only upon its solution can the advance into the limitless field of the knowledge yielded by pure understanding be made sure and trustworthy. What we must do is to discover, in all its proper universality, the ground of the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments, to obtain insight into the conditions which make

¹¹³ I hold to the definition of ‘adumbrate’ as: “To disclose partially or guardedly.” (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition)
each kind of such judgments possible, and to mark out all this knowledge, which forms a genus by itself, not in any cursory outline, but in a system, with completeness and in a manner sufficient for any use, according to its original sources, divisions, extent, and limits. So much, meantime, as regards what is peculiar in synthetic judgments.\textsuperscript{114}

Kant is not going to solve the mystery of \textit{what} such judgments are in a determinative sense. He will merely ask \textit{how} such synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments are possible, seek their possibility and set up his system around their necessity. The mystery remains concealed and, above all, respected. Synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments, and their relation to the freedom of the practical self, will thus hold the key to deciphering Kantian metaphysical logic. An elucidation of these judgments also hold the key to his defense, versus the likes of Cassirer and Heidegger, who understand such judgments as limited to the immanent, finite realm because of the human subject’s reliance upon the forms of intuition - primarily time.

If it can be shown that “imagination combined with consciousness” constitutes the fundamental power that unifies the powers of the soul in personality, and that this fundamental power is “identical with understanding and reason,” then we will not have to make too great of a leap to assert that, when one utilizes one’s “imagination combined with consciousness,” in a purely rational context, to determine oneself according to a law that one gives to oneself in accordance with the moral law within, one is “not subject to the form of time, nor consequently to the conditions of succession in time.” This will follow from the fact that:

Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time, nor consequently to the conditions of succession in time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character does not, in producing an effect, \textit{arise} or begin to be at a certain time.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{CPR}, A10, B14, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{CPR}, A551 B579.
§3. Setting up the Argumentation - making sense of paradox

To construct my argumentation it is necessary to illustrate and explain two deeply related and intertwined aspects of synthetic a priori judgments.

1) The first being that synthetic a priori judgments do not occur merely in time and space, but, also in the realm of pure reason which is transcendent of time and space.

2) The second aspect of synthetic a priori judgments is the apparent paradox that underlies them - the “paradox” being that such judgments not only serve as the given norm, or example, which determine our judgments in relation to scientific and common sense knowledge and perception; but, also, such judgments set the standard a priori which allow for the determinative judgments of scientific and common sense knowledge and perception to occur in the first place. That is to say, synthetic a priori judgments, in essence, “construct” or “produce” - via schema and symbols - the reality that we know, think and intuitively feel, perceive, and “reproductively” imagine. We utilize them when we make rationally valid and universal judgments, but we, as individuals, are not, in general, their originators. Someone (the scientist and genius) will have always already produced such judgments for us beforehand, and this is where the productive imagination comes in - which I will discuss in relation to culture in a moment.

To begin with the first aspect, Kant will indeed say that “Synthetic a priori propositions are only possible in pure a priori intuition - space and time.”116 But we exist in “two worlds”117: phenomenal and noumenal. This will become more evident as we move along, but I will give the reader a taste of what is to come by quoting a

117 CPrR (V, 86, 193).
most revealing few lines in which Kant gives us a rare glimpse of his passionate, romantic side - in both his manner of speech and in what he is describing:

Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror but only holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience) - a law before which all inclinations are dumb even though they secretly work against it: what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations and from which to be descended is the indispensable condition of the only worth which men can give themselves?

It can be nothing less than something which elevates man above himself as a part of the world of sense, something which connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can think and which has under it the entire world of sense, including the empirically determinable existence of man in time, and the whole system of all ends which is alone suitable to such unconditional practical laws as the moral. It is nothing else than personality, i.e., the freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature regarded as a capacity of a being which is subject to special laws (pure practical laws given by its own reason), so that the person as belonging to the world of sense is subject to his own personality so far as he belongs to the intelligible world. For it is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to two worlds, must regard his own being in relation to his second and higher vocation with reverence and the laws of this vocation with the deepest respect.\(^{118}\)

Personality, then, is the source of duty. It is the “idea of the moral law” along “with the respect which is inseparable from it.”\(^{119}\) It is the “moral I, the authentic self and essence of man.”\(^{120}\) I think we can also safely say, that personality reflects the character, or moral disposition of a soul for Kant. And, represented as the “understanding” mentioned above, i.e. as “the faculty to think and to act a priori,” it is the essence of the ‘practical self.’

\(^{118}\) Ibid.


\(^{120}\) Heidegger, M. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 110.
If we recall an earlier statement concerning the ideas, as far as our theoretical knowledge is concerned, we must advance via analysis “from what is immediately given us in experience -- advancing from the doctrine of the soul, to the doctrine of the world, and thence to the knowledge of God.”\textsuperscript{121} The soul, in the path to consciousness of itself,\textsuperscript{122} in the first instance, i.e. in the empirical, phenomenal world of sense, must be able to intuit itself as a subject among objects.

In terms of theoretical knowledge in the phenomenal world, the determination of an object takes place spontaneously in time and space and is dependent upon the givenness of sensation. The affectation or arousal of the “personality” which artlessly determines the object in theoretical judgment is minimal, if not negligible. And I will assert the personality here to be relatively non-conscious, at least of its true nature, although it necessarily underlies all of our experiences. “The recognition of one’s self according to the constitution of the self cannot be acquired through inner experience and it does not come from knowing man’s nature, but it is merely and solely the awareness of his freedom which reveals itself to him through the categorical imperative of duty, the highest level of practical reason.”\textsuperscript{123}

When enquiring into the intelligible, noumenal world of things themselves, on the other hand, we must begin from a systematic representation of the ideas (God, freedom, and immortality) in which the ideas will be approached synthetically via the use of practical reason. Here the only guiding intuitive consciousness available to the

\textsuperscript{121} A337, B395, fn.

\textsuperscript{122} By referring to a stage in a path to consciousness of oneself I am referring to what Kant calls an epigenesis of reason - to be discussed further shortly.

\textsuperscript{123} Anthropology, §7, n. 52 -- from a crossed out passage.
thinking subject will be the feeling of respect, or moral feeling, which Kant says follows from determining oneself according to the moral law within, i.e. the law of freedom. In such a determination the moral possibility of the action takes precedence over the determination of an object.

By a concept of an object of practical reason I understand the idea of an object as an effect possible through the law of freedom. To be an object of practical knowledge as such signifies, therefore, only the relation of the will to the action whereby it or its opposite is brought into being. To decide whether or not something is an object of practical reason is only to discern the possibility or impossibility of willing the action by which a certain object would be made real [...]. The only question is whether we should will an action directed to the existence of an object if it were within our power. Consequently, the moral possibility of the action takes precedence, for in this case it is not the object but the law of the will which is the ground of determination.124

If the will is determined by the sense of duty to the supersensible moral law within, then a “good” object will necessarily follow.

The soul objects of a practical reason are thus those of the good and the evil. By the former one understands the necessary object of the faculty of desire, and by the later a necessary object of aversion, both according to a principle of reason.125

On this level of consciousness it must be shown that it is pure reason itself that both affects and determines, i.e. commands, us.

Reason is a sublime, supersensible power that governs and lies within the universe as a whole. It is not something outside and beyond us. We are in it, and it is in us - in a transcendental sense. We understand nature via our access to the theoretical aspect of reason, i.e., to the categories of theoretical understanding. But such an access is made possible by schema - a creation of the productive imagination of a transcendental subject. Reason, in its practical aspect, is what governs and creates nature - in the sense of making nature intelligible, i.e., possible for our understanding. Could it be then that when one creates a schema (by accessing the productive imagination) for our

124 CPrR (V, 57, pp. 166-7), emphasis added.

universal understanding of nature and her laws, that one is utilizing practical reason? This would seem to be the case for Kant, though he does not say this outright. This should become clearer when I discuss judgment in a moment.

It is by his use of practical reason, therefore, that man has access to freedom, “i.e., the freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature”\(^\text{126}\) (from the causality and determinate judgments of science which pertain to sensible nature which is always already there). Thus, practical reason cannot be demonstrated in any scientific, theoretical, purely logical determinative sense whereby we know the laws of nature and of mathematics - it is the source of such laws. It is the moral law within, a fact of reason that can only be proven by faith, and felt by a pure feeling of respect which Kant claims is “produced solely by reason”\(^\text{127}\) and which “always applies to persons [i.e. personalities] only, never to things”\(^\text{128}\).

§4. On the Moral Law Within and Determinative Judgment

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily they are reflected upon: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not merely conjecture them and seek them as though obscure in darkness or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon: I see them before me, and I associate them directly with the consciousness of my own existence.\(^\text{129}\)

Some things we just have to “feel” to be right, because we have nothing to relate such things to besides the judgments (aesthetic or rational) that we make when we are subjected to them; take, for instance, something we write, a piece of art, music, an

\(^{126}\) CPrR (V, 86, 193).

\(^{127}\) Critique of Practical Reason (hereafter CPrR), V, 76, 184.

\(^{128}\) Ibid.

\(^{129}\) CPrR, V, 161, 258.
attractive person, a good action, a bad action, a cruel action, a foolish action, purposiveness, etc. Kant would say that we can feel correct in our judgments only when we subjugate them to objective laws, or standards, of reason. Such judgments are ‘value’ judgments - which only a rational being may have. These judgments are, in the end, based upon practical reason (the faculty of desire) - by which, I will assert, they are all related to the “active” (i.e., free) nature of man, which comes about through his/her participation in the “productive imagination” - which is always in correspondence with the “reproductive imagination” and “understanding” (of the “self” and “others”). We feel “pleasure” when the subjective faculty (imagination) is in harmony with the objective faculty (understanding).

Kant claims that: “Judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal” (CJ, 179). He distinguishes between determinative and reflective judgments.

Determinative judgments are transcendental, i.e., the universal law, i.e., imperative (hypothetical or categorical) is given (i.e., it comes from within) and judgment subsumes the particular (subjective intuition) under it. Still, however, judgment “must formulate by means of universal but sufficient marks the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with these concepts.”\(^{130}\) Such universal but sufficient marks are provided, in theoretical understanding (i.e., in hypothetical imperatives) by the transcendental schema (which will be discussed in more detail in the following section *On Analogy*); but also, one’s actions are determined good (i.e., free) or bad, “practically,” depending on whether the “maxims” one chooses conform to the

\(^{130}\) CPR, B175.
“categorical imperative” - whose “universal but sufficient marks” are given by the “typus” (to be discussed shortly).

Reflective judgments note the particular and seek a universal concept or principle. The principle behind this judgment, is beyond all experience, and, acts as a law only to the power of judgment itself, not to nature. These include not only aesthetic judgments of taste (i.e., of beauty), and of the sublime, but also teleological judgments of purposiveness (and perhaps most importantly, though Kant will only briefly mention these modes of judgment in the Critique of Judgment: speculative reflective judgments and practical reflective judgments). I will discuss reflective judgments in detail shortly - where I shall also assert that the “maxims” one chooses to “determine” one’s judgment, though binding, are closely related to judgments of taste. As such, judgments of taste are often in conflict with the “determinative judgments” spoken of above -- as are speculative reflective judgments and practical reflective judgments. This “conflict” allows for the influence of both “new” scientific “discoveries” (though Kant is not clear about this), and for the “aesthetic ideas” of genius to enter in - i.e.,

131 CJ, 180.

132 See the “Preface to the Second Edition,” CPR (Bxi-Bxii), where Kant refers to a transformation in thought (i.e., in mathematics, which “must have been due to a ‘revolution’ brought about by the happy thought of a single man [who brought out] what was necessarily implied in the concepts that he had himself formed a priori, and put into the figure in the construction by which he presented it to himself.” Also see CPR, Bxiii, where he says, “[N]ature has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own.” And the “rational man” must “approach nature in order to be taught by it [...] not, however, [...] in the character of a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, but [as] an appointed judge who compels the witness to answer questions which he has himself formulated” (Ibid.). **Whatever is not knowable “through reason’s own resources has to be learnt, if learnt at all, only from nature, it must adopt as its guide, in so seeking, that which it has itself put into nature”** (CPR, Bxiv). This would seem to suggest one’s right to question current “hypothetical imperatives.” For why else would he even call them “hypothetical”?

However, Kant further states, “[I]f we observe [the] examples of mathematics and natural science, which by a single and sudden revolution have become what they now are [...][their] success should incline us, at least by way of experiment, to imitate their procedure, so far as the analogy which, as species of rational knowledge, they bear to metaphysics may permit” (CPR, Bxvi). Which is why Kant can only offer critiques of, i.e., reflective judgments upon, pure reason - by analogously utilizing the “methods” of the sciences as the “propaedeutic” - attempting to discover “its sources and limits” (CPR, B25).
for the transformation of thoughts and ideas and, thus, for the advancement of freedom from within one’s identity structure. But for now we shall discuss practical determinative judgments.

In his *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant states, “Everything in nature works in accordance with laws.”\(^{133}\) By this he suggests that man, as an object of nature, is subjected to the laws of necessity imposed by nature. But for Kant, man has the ability to break from such determinism by the use of rational thought, or by the pure practical reason, exemplified in one’s actions. As he says, “Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws [or principles] - and only so has he a will.”\(^{134}\) The will (or desire) is equated, by Kant, with practical reason, for he says, reason is required by man *before* he will act upon laws. Such an idea is reflective of Aristotle’s belief that practical reason has governance over the passions and is definitive of the active nature of man.\(^{135}\) Philosophers, such as Hume, will argue that “there is no innate power of reason to determine action objectively.”\(^{136}\) For Hume, “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.”\(^{137}\)

Kant’s task is to refute such skepticism by demonstrating, through practical reason, an objective motive, or basis, for our moral actions, i.e., which allows us to “freely” determine our actions within the natural realm. Since the will (desire) is determined by reason, Kant says the will “is then a power to choose only that which reason

\(^{133}\) *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (GMM), 76.

\(^{134}\) Ibid.


\(^{136}\) R. Scruton, Ibid, p. 150.

\(^{137}\) Ibid, p. 130.
independently of inclination recognizes to be [objectively] good. Kant realizes, however, that subjective impulses still contribute to our decisions, often overriding the objective input of reason. Such actions, which are not decided by pure reason, Kant refers to as subjectively contingent. The determining of a will in accordance with objective laws is “necessitation.” This “necessitation,” which the will may choose to follow or not, is an objective principle commanded by reason in the form of, what Kant refers to as, an “imperative,” which we have a moral duty to obey (however, when one does not follow hypothetical imperatives well, Kant is more likely to account this to stupidity).\(^\text{140}\)

As has been mentioned, the will is not always in accord with pure reason, being bombardied with sensual inclinations and passionate desires. Therefore, all imperatives are expressed as an “ought.” All they can do is indicate to us, through reason, what would be the practically good thing to do, that is - what is objectively good “on grounds valid for every rational being as such.”\(^\text{141}\) Imperatives thus, only express “the relation of the objective laws of willing to the subjective imperfection of the will.”

Kant divides his imperatives into two classes: hypothetical and categorical. This division corresponds to the division of practical reason (or the power of desire) into the lower power and the higher power. Hypothetical imperatives (pertaining to the lower power of desire - the elective will) are purely objective, i.e., being determined

\(^{138}\) GMM, 77.

\(^{139}\) Ibid.

\(^{140}\) CPR, B173fn.

\(^{141}\) GMM, 77.
by an ‘a posteriori’ material object or end, and are conditional, being deduced by analytic means (deriving their truth from concepts alone). “It is only practical in so far as the faculty of desire is determined by the sensation of agreeableness which the subject expects from the actual existence of the object.”142 Such imperatives “declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something one [may] will.”143 Since they are practical precepts, influencing the will through reason, they are always, in some sense, “good” - that is, good for achieving what one wills. They tell us what action is good for some purpose or another, either “possible” (i.e., problematic) or “actual” (i.e., assertoric).

A “problematic” hypothetical imperative indicates everything possible for a rational being to achieve, that can be conceived of as a possible purpose of the will. This includes all sciences and imperatives of skill. Here there is no question about the rationality or goodness of the end, but only what must be done to attain it. All scientific problems which suppose some end may be solved by following such imperatives. Kant indicates that the methods used by a doctor to heal are equivalent to those used by a murderer to kill, in that each serves its purpose effectively. Kant shows concern here that parents should educate their children, not only in the acquisition of skill - in the use of means to achieve arbitrary ends, but they should correct and try to influence their judgment in selecting worthy ends.

The “assertoric” hypothetical imperative applies to the natural necessity which Kant says all humans have in common - the pursuit of personal happiness. Achieving one’s end in this imperative is governed by “prudence.” Kant defines prudence in two ways.

142 CPrR, V, 22, 133.
143 Ibid.
Firstly, it is defined as the ability to manipulate others to achieve one’s ends. He calls this “worldly wisdom.” The second sense is “sagacity in combining all these ends to [one’s] lasting advantage”\textsuperscript{144} - this sense is labeled “personal wisdom.” “So we see, that, happiness (in the world) for Kant has to do with control and manipulation of others to achieve one’s ends. “Personal wisdom” is the prudence one utilizes in achieving one’s most pleasant earthly well-being. And the “skills” one has in achieving such pleasure are governed by the assertoric hypothetical imperative.

How is this imperative possible? The concept of happiness, Kant says, is such an indefinite concept that, although each person wishes to attain it, he can never definitely and self-consistently state what it is he really wishes and wills.”\textsuperscript{145} One can act only according to empirical councils, such as diet, courtesy, and restraint, which he claims are shown by experience to promote one’s welfare. By this, Kant leaves open the most macabre, libertine means of fulfilling this imperative when he claims: “Happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination; and hence one can only ‘imagine’ what will give one the most gratification in life.”\textsuperscript{146}

The final imperative is a synthetic \textit{a priori} command of reason, which “concerns knowledge in so far as it can itself become the ground of the existence of objects, and in so far as reason, by virtue of this same knowledge, has causality in a rational being.”\textsuperscript{147} It is practically necessary or apodeictic, in the sense that it is an absolute and unconditional imperative of morality. However, we are aware that we can do

\textsuperscript{144} GMM, 79.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 82.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} CPrR, V, 46-7, 156-7.
otherwise. This “categorical imperative” (the higher power of desire) expresses how
one “ought” to act in accordance with objective laws of (rational) willing, disregarding one’s imperfect (elective) will, and sets this forth as an intrinsic, universal law to be fulfilled by one’s sense of duty (or feeling of respect) for the moral law within.

The categorical imperative in its first and most all-encompassing form states, “I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim (a subjective principle devised by one’s self to determine the elective will) should become a universal law.” It is a fact of reason “of which we are a priori conscious, even if it be granted that no example could be found in which it has been followed exactly.”\(^{148}\)

And it has objective reality, as we can discover in our own “free” acts, manifested in experience. In other words, one can, through universally influenced choice (what Kant relates to “an inner but intellectual compulsion”\(^{149}\), act spontaneously, initiating (creating) a new series of efficient causes in nature.

Thus, the moral law “is, in fact, a law of causality through freedom and thus a law of the possibility of a supersensuous nature, just as the metaphysical law of events in the world of sense was a law of the causality of sensuous nature.”\(^{150}\) This indicates the “two worlds” that we, at once, participate in. The supersensuous nature and the sensuous nature of man are marked by the “immense gulf” [unübersehbare Kluft] between them that I have mentioned in the Preface (p. 10). This gulf is there because Kant has seemingly closed off his mediating power of imagination from the

\(^{148}\) CPrR, V, 47, 157, my emphasis.

\(^{149}\) CPrR, V, 33, 144.

\(^{150}\) CPrR, V, 47, 157, my emphasis.
supersensuous realm. “The moral law,” he says, “has no other faculty to mediate its application to objects of nature than the understanding (not the imagination).”\textsuperscript{151} I will suggest, however, that what Kant intends by “imagination” here is the reproductive form of imagination which is necessary in order to perceive an object of sense perception, and not the \textit{a priori} pure imagination which, along with self-consciousness, is an essential faculty of one’s personality. Demonstrating this, I will once more mention the difference between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics.

Transcendental philosophy is a philosophy of pure speculative reason and concerns only what we can \textit{know} spontaneously and synthetically \textit{a priori} - the highest knowledge being given with the determinative judgments of mathematics and physics. The ideas, or concepts, which make such knowledge possible, remain transcendent. Such knowledge begins from, and is dependant upon what is given to us in sensibility, i.e. intuition. Such givenness or receptivity, although ultimately dependent upon schema - creations of the pure \textit{a priori} imagination of scientist-metaphysicians, is, in general, i.e. in our common sense knowledge, a byproduct of the imagination in its reproductive form. I will discuss this further in §8 and §9.

In metaphysics, or practical philosophy, we presuppose the metaphysical principle itself, i.e. “a power of desire, considered as a will,”\textsuperscript{152} as empirically given, i.e. as the elective will. However, we can only \textit{think} and feel it. Determinative judgment here is directly related to the personality, i.e. the moral subject or rational will, who spontaneously acts in a given situation. I have suggested above that when the

\textsuperscript{151} CPr, V, 69, 177.

\textsuperscript{152} CJ, 182.
personality is represented as the “understanding,” i.e. as “the faculty to think and to act *a priori*,” it is the essence of the ‘practical self.’

The person who acts is driven by an intellectual compulsion. This intellectual compulsion is none other than duty. As I have stated above, personality, “i.e., the freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature regarded as a capacity of a being which is subject to special laws (pure practical laws given by its own reason),” is the source of duty - duty being an indication of our higher vocation, caused directly by one’s own reason. Moral feeling is how the moral law within, i.e. reason, affects the personality spontaneously in one’s actions via the feeling of respect for one’s self and other moral selves as ends in themselves.

Although I have suggested that the personality is itself a synthesis of *a priori* imagination and apperception, it is aesthetic reflective judgment that will allow Kant to “in-directly” unify these two “laws” (i.e., the “law of freedom” and the “law of understanding”) through a postulated “supersensible,” i.e. the Good, in his *Critique of Judgment* (which I shall discuss in the section *On Aesthetic Judgments, Imagination and Freedom*). But first, we should discuss how the purely formal moral law is “known” to us.

Since the moral law is synthetic *a priori* and unconditional it cannot be determined in connection with empirical ends, and thus, it cannot be known in conjunction with schema. In other words, whereas the schema is a universal procedure provided by the imagination which presents “*a priori* to the senses a pure concept of the understanding which is provided by the law,” the law-in-itself can only be “known” -
that is, cognized theoretically - only when stated analogously to, i.e., symbolically as, a natural law. The “typic” of pure practical reason, then, is the categorical imperative regarded as if it were a law of nature, i.e., “Act only as if the maxim which you propose should become a universal law of nature.” Since “the law” of freedom can only be “felt” within and cognized “symbolically,” we shall see the need for the genius, i.e. the beautiful soul, to re-present it in the world.

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Part Two

Carrying Out the Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics

Part One has been concerned with the laying of the ground for metaphysics via the clarification of the essence of the ‘practical subject’ - which I have claimed to be a combination of “imagination and apperception” or personality. Now, we will focus upon the carrying out of the laying of the ground by illustrating the ‘theoretical self’ and the ‘aesthetic self’ or genius.

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§5. On Analogy

Now, since “God, freedom, and immortality of the soul are the problems at whose solution all the apparatus of metaphysics aims as its ultimate and sole purpose,”153 and since these are all three supersensible elements, Kant claims that “we must always resort to some analogy to natural existences to render supersensible qualities intelligible to ourselves.”154 Analogy will be a primary ingredient utilized by Kant throughout his philosophical texts in order to exhibit the sublime supersensible principles - or to make them, and other concepts, “imaginable” to our senses. He refers to such exhibition as hypotyposis.

“All hypotyposis (exhibition, subjection ad adspectum155) consists in making [a concept] sensible, and is either schematic or symbolic.”156 Both a schematic

153 CJ, §91, 473.
154 Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore Greene and Hoyt Hudson (Chicago, 1934), n. 58.
155 [Submission to inspection.]
156 CJ, §59, 351.
hypotyposis (i.e., schema) and a symbolic hypotyposis (i.e., symbol) are creations of the productive *a priori* imagination [*Einbildungskraft*]. The primary difference between schema and symbols is that whereas schema are only valid in the sensible realm of experience and are governed by hypothetical imperatives of theoretical understanding, symbols pertain to ideas both aesthetic and rational. With schemata an intuition is given *a priori* which corresponds directly to a pure concept of the understanding; with a symbol, however, “there is a concept which only reason can think and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, and this concept is supplied with an intuition that judgment treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows in schematizing.”\(^\text{157}\)

As far as the schemata for sensible concepts go, they are in essence procedures for the production of images for concepts, i.e., without the schema there would be no intuition. The schema of pure concepts of the understanding, on the other hand (i.e., the categories), can never be brought to an image. In this case, the schema “is simply the pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that unity, in accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression.”\(^\text{158}\) They provide the universal but sufficient marks by which objects can be given in harmony with the transcendental concepts of understanding. For instance:

The schema of possibility is the agreement of the synthesis of different representations with the conditions of time in general. [….] The schema is therefore the determination of the representation of a thing at some time or other.

The schema of actuality is existence in some determinate time.

The schema of necessity is existence of an object at all times.\(^\text{159}\)

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\(^\text{157}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{158}\) *CPR*, A142, B181.

\(^\text{159}\) *CPR*, A144-5, B184.
What one should notice is that whereas schema provide us with relatively direct, spontaneous, determinate representations of understanding’s concepts; symbols are indirect and relate to concepts of pure reason. Symbols “are merely instruments of the understanding; but they are only indirect instruments by analogy to certain perceptions to which the notion of the symbol can be applied, so that the notion can be provided with meaning, through the presentation of an object.”\(^{160}\) Symbolic relations are the essence of aesthetic reflective judgments.

In *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* Kant will refer to a “schematism of analogy” which seems to be intermediate to what he refers to with symbol in the *Critique of Judgment* and the *Anthropology* and schematism in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He states: “It is indeed a limitation of human reason, and one which is ever inseparable from it, that we can conceive of no considerable moral worth in the actions of a personal being without representing that person, or his manifestation, in human guise.”\(^{161}\) This is in reference to the use of such analogy in “the Scriptures,” in reference to God and to Christ, and in the work of the “philosophical poet.” He claims in reference to *John 3:16* of the *Bible* that: “though we cannot indeed rationally conceive how an all-sufficient Being could sacrifice a part of what belongs to His state of bliss or rob Himself of a possession. Such is the schematism of analogy, with which (as a means of explanation) we cannot dispense.”\(^{162}\) Another example Kant uses is in reference to Christ:

> Now if it were indeed a fact that such a truly godly-minded man at some particular time had descended, as it were, from heaven to earth and had given men in his own person, through his teachings, his conduct, and his sufferings,

\(^{160}\) *Anthropology*, §38, 191.

\(^{161}\) *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, n. 58.

\(^{162}\) Ibid.
as perfect an example of a man well-pleasing to God as one can expect to find in external experience (for be it remembered that the archetype of such a person is to be sought nowhere but in our own reason), and if he had, through all this, produced immeasurably great moral good upon earth by effecting a revolution in the human race--even then we should have no cause for supposing him other than a man naturally begotten. (Indeed, the naturally begotten man feels himself under obligation to furnish just such an example in himself.) This is not, to be sure, absolutely to deny that he might be a man supernaturally begotten. But to suppose the latter can in no way benefit us practically, inasmuch as the archetype which we find embodied in this manifestation must, after all, be sought in ourselves (even though we are but natural men).  

In other words, if man had a pure holy will he would have no need of a moral law within for he could do no wrong and would not be subject to temptations, and he would have no freedom - at least in the sense that it is possible for ‘natural men.’ Thus, such a holy-begotten archetype would be no benefit to us, for He could not help us to realize our true practical potential. This is exemplified in a poem that Kant quotes from the “philosophical poet” Haller:  

"The world with all its faults  
Is better than a realm of will-less angels."  

What Kant would seem to be referring to with this text and with ‘schematism of analogy’ is reflective practical judgments - i.e. they require analogy and reflection in a practical context.

Another form of such a ‘schematism of analogy’ will seem to be at work in the Critique of Pure Reason when Kant speaks of an analogon to the schema of sensibility necessary to justify the extension of the categories of understanding in order to “mark out the whole plan of a science for metaphysics.” Though Kant does not say this, such judgment would seem to refer to reflective speculative cognition as

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163 Ibid. 64-65.

164 Ibid., n. 58 [Albrecht Haller, in his poem Über den Ursprung des Übels (1734), ii, 33-34.]
opposed to determinative theoretical cognition which I will discuss in the next section.

There is one thing that should be remembered about schematism in general: “between the relation of a schema to its concept and the relation of this same schema of a concept to the objective fact itself there is no analogy, but rather a mighty chasm.”

If one were to transform the schema of analogy “into a schematism of objective determination (for the extension of our knowledge) [this would result in] anthropomorphism, which has, from the moral point of view [….] most injurious consequences.”

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§6. That Kant’s Critique of reason and his attempt to set metaphysics up as a science is the result of speculation - which is more a combination of both genius and science then of science alone

One of the most brilliant and yet perplexing elements of Kant’s philosophy is his notion of synthetic a priori judgments. Kant’s use of the notions of synthesis and analysis (ditto, synthetic judgments and analytic judgments in general), and their links to the sources which ground his philosophical system, likewise lead to confusion in their interpretations. I have yet to read a clear elucidation of this doctrine, not even by Kant himself, who, with his genial, whirling mind, quite often takes it for granted that we follow his holistic reasoning. He notes that it is the usual fate of worthy metaphysicians, that they will not be understood. But Kant does not make it easy for us. He indicates that he is not providing his passionate readers, i.e. “those who

165 Ibid., n. 59 emphasis added.

166 Ibid., n. 58.

167 Prolegomena, 5.
think metaphysics worth studying” with a “ready-made science,” but, rather, he expects one to read his text with the mind of a teacher, and not as a pupil who merely uncritically digests everything that is spoon fed to him.\textsuperscript{168} Thus he is requiring his readers to utilize speculative reason - what I can only “critically” understand to be \textbf{reflective} synthetic judgments \textit{a priori} - for themselves in order to follow him and to take his work further. (I will discuss this further below.)

One does not have to go too far with their imagination to see the similarities of Kant’s advice to his metaphysically-minded readers to his quote in the \textit{Critique of Judgment} where Kant speaks of the product of genius:

[T]he product of a genius (as regards what is attributable to genius in it rather than to possible learning or academic instruction) is an example that is not meant to be imitated, but to be followed by another genius. (For in mere imitation the element of genius in the work - what constitutes its spirit - would be lost.) The other genius, who follows the example, is aroused by it to a feeling of his own originality, which allows him to exercise in art his freedom from the constraints of rules, and to do so in a way that art itself acquires a new rule by this, thus showing that the talent is exemplary.

But since a genius is nature's favorite and so must be regarded as a rare phenomenon, his example gives rise to a school for other good minds, i.e., a methodical instruction by means of whatever rules could be extracted from those products of spirit and their peculiarity; and for these followers fine art is to that extent imitation, for which nature, through a genius, gave a rule.\textsuperscript{169}

Now, I will argue that Kant’s argumentation in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, which proposes to provide us with the \textit{propaedeutic} for metaphysics as a science, is more the result of genius and science then the result of mere science alone. That is to say, Kant is laying the ground for understanding metaphysics as a “new” science. Per se, such a “laying of the grounds” fits in quite nicely to the four requirements for a product of genius. (We should all the while keep in mind that genius requires scientific

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Prolegomena}, 1.

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{CJ}, §49, “On the powers of the mind which constitute genius.”
knowledge,170 but the scientist, who discovers the universal laws of nature, does not, in general, require genius.171)

**First** of all, in science we “begin from distinctly known rules which determine the procedure we must use in it.”172 It should be obvious that Kant is not laying the grounds for metaphysics by any “distinctly known rules.” Kant is uncovering the rules (i.e. categories) themselves which make science possible.

“(Second, since [genius] is an artistic talent, it presupposes a determinate concept of the product, namely, its purpose; hence genius presupposes understanding, but also a presentation (though an indeterminate one) of the material, i.e., of the intuition, needed to exhibit this concept, and hence presupposes a relation of imagination to the understanding.”173 Kant presupposes the idea of reason as a purposive, systematic completed system. Underlying Kant’s system is an implicit teleology which postulates the rational ideas, most pronouncedly, freedom, as the ends of pure reason. In order to reach these ends, dialectic is necessary: “[P]ure reason always has its dialectic, for it demands the absolute totality of conditions for a given conditioned thing, and this can only be attained in things-in-themselves.”174

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170 *CJ*, §44.

171 It will become evident, however, that the scientist does indeed require the power of judgment (*Urteilskraft*) - which is strongly connected with practical reason - in order to discover-construct the universal laws of science.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.

174 *CPrR*, V, 107, 212.
I will argue here that **transcendental dialectic is a speculative art (Kunst)** which utilizes thought (analogous to the method used by understanding to acquire theoretical knowledge in the Transcendental Analytic) by extending the categories of understanding to judge what can only be ideas (of reason), i.e. things-in-themselves. As I have already stated in the Introduction, **Kant understands art (Kunst) as causality in terms of ideas (of purposes).** As such, an exhibition occurs “by means of our own imagination where a concept which we have already formed of an object that is a purpose for us is made real.”\(^{175}\) This is in contrast to the causality that we attribute to nature, where nature through its technic produces the exhibition.\(^{176}\) Since analogy to natural existences is necessary “to render supersensible qualities intelligible to ourselves,”\(^{177}\) i.e., in order to refer to such ideas, **reflective, synthetic a priori** judgments are necessary, i.e., such judgments are not made in reference to a given intuition, but in terms of **ideas** of ends, and reflection is thus necessary.

In the **Critique of Judgment** Kant makes a distinction between theoretical reflective judgment and practical reflective judgment.\(^{178}\) Both of these are teleological judgments, i.e., “the power to judge the real (objective) purposiveness of nature by understanding and reason.”\(^{179}\) Practical reflective judgment concerns the attestation of a supersensible idea, i.e., freedom, from the concept of a final purpose in terms of creation from a practical perspective. Theoretical reflective judgment sufficiently

\(^{175}\) **CJ**, 193.

\(^{176}\) (Ibid.) The ‘technic of nature’ is “nature’s power to produce things in terms of purposes” (CJ 390-1). This is in reference to the Greek tékne, i.e., ‘art’ in the sense that Heidegger understands it - as referring to craft or skill.

\(^{177}\) *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, n. 58.

\(^{178}\) **CJ**, §88, 456.

\(^{179}\) **CJ**, 193.
proves the existence of an intelligent cause via the purposiveness of nature in physical teleology. However, lacking intuition of such an intelligent cause we have no means of providing it with reality in a theoretical perspective.

Theoretical reflective judgment would seem to refer to speculative cognition which Kant distinguishes (in general) from theoretical cognition as follows: “Theoretical cognition is speculative if it concerns [such] an object, or such concepts of an object, as we can not reach in any experience. It is contrasted with cognition of nature, which concerns only those objects which can be given in a possible experience.”180

Since the categories are stretched beyond the realm of their validity, i.e. the realm of sensibility, what is “correct” and necessary in such a context can only be subjectively felt, and it is arguable whether, or not, speculative cognition (i.e. what I have claimed to be “reflective,” synthetic judgments a priori utilized in transcendental dialectic), provides us with a science of metaphysics. As stated in the Introduction, such dialectic can only result in an unavoidable illusion which symbolizes the conflict of reason with itself in antinomies. It does, however, “mark out the path towards systematic unity,”181 that reason demands. This is where the idea of reason, i.e., the analogon of a schema of sensibility182 comes into play. An analogon, or analogy, is a “symbolic” presentation, i.e., “a presentation (though an indeterminate one) of the material, i.e., of the intuition” needed to exhibit the concept of unconditioned totality, and hence, “presupposes a relation of imagination to the understanding.”183 However,

180 CPR, A634-5, B662-3.
181 CPR, A668, B696.
182 CPR, A665 B693.
such a presentation is not a symbol and it is not a schema, and I suggest here that it
can only be referred to in an intermediate way as a ‘schematism of analogy’ - which
Kant explains in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*: “we must always resort
to some analogy to natural existences to render supersensible qualities intelligible to
ourselves.” That such a notion is not a symbol will become evident in the following
paragraph.

“Third, it manifests itself not so much in the fact that the proposed purpose is
achieved in exhibiting a determinate concept, as, rather, in the way *aesthetic ideas*,
which contain a wealth of material [suitable] for that intention, are offered or
expressed; and hence it **presents the imagination in its freedom from any
instructions by rules, but still as purposive for exhibiting the given concept**.”184

There is a problem here when we try to conform speculative reason to genius in that
since it is the idea of reason itself (in its regulative mode) which serves as an
analogon to a schema of sensibility which allows Kant to mark out his “science” of
metaphysics, such an idea is not an aesthetic idea. Aesthetic ideas are rather the
symbol, or one could say, the analogon for rational ideas. This is my main reason for
asserting that an intermediate between schema and symbol is required for such a task.
This I have put forth as the ‘schematism of analogy’ utilized in speculative reason.

For now we should only realize that Kant is providing us with what, he hopes, will be
a system for clarifying metaphysics as a science, and thereby to enable us, by studying
his system, to be better able to understand our own inherent metaphysical capabilities.
That is to say, Kant has no underlying desire to entice us to believe or to know

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183 *CJ*, §44.

184 Ibid., emphasis added.
anything. He wants us to realize our true nature (i.e., freedom) for ourselves. As Heidegger astutely points out, “In Kant as in no other thinker one has the immediate certainty that he does not cheat.”185

“Finally, fourth, the unstudied, unintentional subjective purposiveness in the imagination’s free harmony with the understanding’s lawfulness presupposes such a proportion and attunement of these powers as cannot be brought about by any compliance with rules, whether of science or of mechanical imitation, but can be brought about only by the subject’s nature.”186 By referring to the “free harmony” of the relation between the imagination and understanding Kant is implicitly referring to judgment; and by indicating that such “proportion and attunement of these powers as cannot be brought about by any compliance with rules” can only be brought about by the “subject’s nature,” Kant is indirectly referring to the personality, or moral disposition, of those who are “impetuously driven on by an inward need to [metaphysical] questions such as cannot be answered by any empirical employment of reason, or by principles thence derived.” Thus he refers to “all men, as soon as their reason has become ripe for speculation.”187 Becoming ripe for speculation has to do with the epigenesis of pure reason which we have briefly mentioned. When all men become “ripe for speculation” all men will utilize synthetic a priori judgments in order to determine their thought and actions for themselves. Such will be the true age of enlightenment to which Kant “dares” mankind to realize.

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185 M. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 293.

186 *CJ*, §44.

187 *CPR*, B21, emphasis added.
§7. Science as Logic, Teleology as purposiveness (Zweckmässigkeit) and the Epigenesis of Reason

As already pointed out in the introduction, Kant is trying to construct a system of metaphysics analogous to the model of the theoretical sciences. “Whether the treatment of such knowledge as lies within the province of reason does or does not follow the secure path of a science, is easily to be determined from the outcome.”

Kant understands science by analogy with a natural body as an organic whole, i.e. as the idea of a complete system of knowledge which may grow from within, but not by external addition. “So in the structure of an organized body, the end of each member can only be deduced from the full conception of the whole.”

I propose that such an analogy is in essence based upon the transcendental idea of “world,” that is, with the idea of the interconnected totality of all that we may possibly perceive and know in the cosmos. Such a natural and complete organic whole is delimited via Gestalt form (i.e. we discover a particular figure-Gestalt always against and within the background of a larger Gestaltian whole). Fritjof Capra explains that “the German word for organic form is Gestalt (as distinct from Form, which denotes inanimate form).” Such Gestalt form is real in the sense that it serves as the aesthetic base which, along with the transcendental subject or the idea we have of a soul, composes the atomic substrate of Kantian dialectic. The real is that which corresponds to sensations in general, the very concept of which includes being.

188 CPR, Bvii.
189 Prolegomena, 11.
and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical consciousness. That is to say, the real corresponds to a synthesis of the form of that which affects us in sensibility with transcendental apperception. Gestalt form, in essence, is what separates Kant’s critical-transcendental philosophy from idealism, and even from solipsism. Form and personality (i.e. imagination and consciousness) remain apart in the Kantian ideas of reason: as “world” and “soul.” And yet they are necessarily interconnected and intertwined in the synthetic a priori judgments that we make, and in the ultimate idea we have of “God.”

Now, metaphysics is, according to Kant, “the science which exhibits in systematic connection the whole body (true as well as illusory) of philosophical knowledge [i.e. knowledge derived purely from concepts] arising out of pure reason.”

Pure reason, so far as the principles of its knowledge are concerned, is a quite separate self-subsistent unity, in which, as in an organized body, every member exists for every other, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can safely be taken in any one relation, unless it has been investigated in the entirety of its relations to the whole employment of pure reason.

Since Kant will only focus upon theoretical (i.e. what we know analytically) and speculative (what we think dialectically) aspects of the “body” of pure reason in the Critique of Pure Reason, this text alone will not provide us with “a system of the science itself,” but with a propaedeutic (preparation). Here he will investigate the faculty of reason in respect of all its pure a priori knowledge, his goal being to

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191 CPR, A176, B217.
192 CPR, A841, B869.
193 CPR, Bxxiv.
194 CPR, Bxxiii.
195 CPR, A841, B869.
“mark out the whole plan of the science [metaphysics], both as regards its limits and as regards its entire internal structure.”

[P]ure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that it can measure its powers according to the different ways in which it chooses the objects of its thinking, and can also give an exhaustive enumeration of the various ways in which it propounds its problems, and so is able, nay bound, to trace the complete outline of a system of metaphysics.

As I have suggested above, speculative reason utilizes the ‘schematism of analogy.’ The analogon of the schema of sensibility by which Kant will “mark out the path towards systematic unity” is an idea of pure reason. It is the “pure synthesis,” the “focus imaginarius,” the “imaginary end,” the regulative and “guiding idea” which leads Kant in his construction of metaphysics as a system, as a science. The end of reason is the transcendental idea of reason-in-itself. The end is the universal. The One.

In the End is the beginning...

When understood as a whole one could say, the end determines the first principles which govern the whole, or “In the End is the beginning,” and according to Kant man is an end of both nature and reason.

Science then is nothing more than understanding the ends of things. When ends are understood in terms of space and time we have natural science and mathematics. When brought to a higher, meta-physical level science is the knowledge, or at least the idea, of the ultimate ends-in-themselves of things. Thus Kant believes that with

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196 CPR, Bxxiii, emphasis added.
197 CPR, Bxxiv.
198 CPR, A668, B696.
199 CPR, A142, B181.
200 CPR, A 644, B 672.
the idea of metaphysics as a completed system he will, not only, be able to *analytically* descend to the first principles (i.e. the categories) which make synthetic *a priori* judgments of natural science and mathematics possible, but also, by means of speculative thought he will be able to *synthetically* extend the categories of understanding to the ultimate ends-in-themselves - the ends-in-themselves being shown to be the essential, necessary unconditional realities - although they can only be represented as regulative ideas of reason and can not be said to be known or proved in any determinate manner whatsoever.

The knowledge of ends (*Zwecke* (see fn10 above)), follows from ancient Greek ‘teleology.’ The English word "teleology" is derived from two Greek words: *telos* meaning "end" or "finality;" and *logos* generally refers to our ability to “speak” something with a “word,” but can be linguistically extended to mean “the logical considerations of something.” Thus teleology pertains to “logical considerations of the end/finality of something.” By "end" we do not mean the "termination", "elimination" or "cessation" of something in a chronological-temporal sense, but rather the end-purpose, the end-objective, the end-goal. We are referring to the *meta-*logical201 or transcendental end rather than the logical or chronological end.

To attempt to understand this notion a bit better from the ancient Greek perspective, W.K.C. Guthrie points out: “Some [ancient Greeks] defined things with reference to their matter, or as the Greeks called it, ‘the out-of-which.’ Others saw the essential in purpose or function, with which they included form, for […] structure subserves function and is dependent on it. […] And so the primary opposition which presented

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201 I call teleological ends *meta-logical* in the sense that, according to Kant, logical ends are discursive and analytic; he will refer to teleological ends as aesthetic and synthetic *a priori* and thus transcendental of time and chronological order.
itself to the Greek mind was that between matter and form, always with the notion of function included in that of form." As Guthrie has stated, for those ancient Greeks who identified things in terms of ends, the functionality or purpose of something is always tied together with the notion of form. Functionality and purposiveness are primary characteristics of form for Kant, but, again, his notion of form is living, organic, Gestaltian form, as mentioned above.

Kant’s notion of function is directly related to the synthetic power of imagination [Einbildungskraft] which brings about unity in form in all judgments that we make. He states: “By 'function' I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation. [...] Accordingly, all judgments are functions of unity among our representations.” Thus the forms of time and space would seem to be translated into the forms of judgment via “the act of bringing various representations under one common representation.” Judgment, then, is nothing less than the act of synthesis which is made possible by the construction, or use, of schema or symbols (inclusive of the typic and ‘schematism of analogy) which I have discussed above. This becomes evident when Kant states, “instead of an immediate representation, a higher representation, which comprises the immediate representation and various others, is used in knowing the object, and thereby much possible knowledge is collected into one.” Thus the immediate representation presented by the forms of time and space is translated into a “higher” form of unity via the schema of understanding. Therefore Kant claims that “we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, and the understanding may

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203 CPR, A68, B93, emphasis added.
204 CPR, A68, B93-4.
therefore be represented as a faculty of judgment.\textsuperscript{205} As I have claimed above ‘all synthesis is a function of imagination,' and ‘understanding is a faulty of imagination.’ Now, it would seem to follow that imagination in its highest form, i.e. the productive pure \textit{a priori} imagination (together with transcendental apperception) can be represented in one of its many vital aspects as the power of judgment (\textit{Urteilskraft}).

Kant’s notion of formal purposiveness (sometimes referred to as subjective purposiveness) has to do with aesthetic judgments which I will discuss shortly. All aesthetic judgments are teleological, though not all teleological judgments are aesthetical. Although teleology will not be a part of scientific knowledge, it contains the idea of purposiveness which makes all knowledge and all sensibility possible. Teleology points toward a purposiveness which underlies ‘all that is,’ ‘All that is’ must be understood as involved in a process of becoming that has both a beginning and an end-purpose or finality. Kant distinguishes between ends of nature and ends of reason. We understand the ends of nature in terms of empirical concepts, i.e. representations. As such, the representation of something (i.e. wood) can be thought of as permanent (i.e. as a permanent representation) even though a particular piece of wood may no longer exist. The ends of reason we think of, or represent, as the permanent in existence. I quote:

\begin{quote}
The representation of something \textit{permanent} in existence is not the same as \textit{permanent representation}. For though the representation of [something permanent] may be very transitory and variable like all our other representations, not excepting those of matter, it yet refers to something permanent. This latter must therefore be an external thing distinct from all my representations, \textbf{and its existence must be included in the determination of my own existence}, constituting with it but a single experience such as would not take place even inwardly if it were not also at the same time, in part, outer. How this should be possible we are as little capable of explaining further as
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., emphasis added.
we are of accounting for our being able to think the abiding in time, the coexistence of which with the changing generates the concept of alteration.\textsuperscript{206}

This can be understood as follows: In nature we witness a series of transformations in which both the external appearance and the organic form (\textit{Gestalt}), of a substance or body, change with time (i.e. a piece of burning wood becomes particles in the air and ashes; trees “breath” the air and transform it to oxygen, ashes over time become hardened, and perhaps later fluid - oil, etc.). Still, the form (\textit{Gestalt}) of wood remains a \textbf{permanent representation}. I can imagine a piece of wood burning whenever I want (as you and I just have).

However, ‘what is,’ i.e. the thing-in-itself, does not change. That is to say, the external appearance and the organic form (\textit{Gestalt}) of a thing-in-itself may change while its substance remains through all metamorphoses. “A philosopher, on being asked how much smoke weighs, replied: ‘Subtract from the weight of the wood burnt the weight of the ashes which are left over, and you have the weight of the smoke.’ He thus presupposed as undeniable that even in fire the matter (substance) does not vanish, but only suffers an alteration of form.”\textsuperscript{207} The \textbf{permanent in existence} is thus substance. Substance is the “substratum proper of all time-determination” and is a “consequence of the principle of permanence, or rather of the ever-abiding existence, in the appearances, of the subject proper.”\textsuperscript{208}

The ultimate form, or thing-in-itself, of the totality of all conscious, self-determining thoughts and acts is the idea we have of the “soul” or transcendental subject. The

\textsuperscript{206} CPR, Bxliii, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{207} CPR, A185, B228.

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
ultimate form, or thing-in-itself, of the totality of all appearances in nature is the idea we have of the “world” or “cosmos.” Knowledge for Kant will be knowledge of forms. And Kant will say that the forms of all thought and appearances are within us. However, the world must also be said to exist outside of us, “and its existence must be included in the determination of my own existence.” In the *Opus Postumum* Kant will go so far as to allude to ether as being the *a priori* substrate of all spatial-determination, and thus of the material content of all intuition. If there is immortality for the human subject, i.e., “ever-abiding existence, in the appearances, of the subject proper,” as Kant holds that there is, then one may assume that such a substance must adhere within an ethereal substrate - along with personality, of course.

In due course, Kant will claim two ends: one pertaining to the purpose or finality of nature, and the other to the final purpose of mankind and thus of reason. The highest end (final purpose) of nature is culture and all the benefits that result from it. The end (ultimate purpose) of practical reason is the realization of the highest good in the world. Such purposiveness would not be necessary or even conceivable without the idea of the *epigenesis of reason*.

There are only two ways in which we can account for a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make experience possible. The former supposition does not hold in respect of the categories (nor of pure sensible intuition); for since they are *a priori* concepts, and therefore independent of experience, the ascription to them of an empirical origin would be a sort of *generatio aequivoca*. There remains, therefore, only the second supposition -- a system, as it were, of the *epigenesis of pure reason* -- namely, that the categories contain, on the side of the understanding, the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general. How they make experience possible, and what are the principles of the possibility of experience that they supply in their application to appearances, will be shown more fully in the following chapter on the *transcendental employment of the faculty of judgment*.  

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209 *CPR*, B167, emphasis added.
The epigenesis of reason indicates a growth process, a movement of consciousness, an expansion of knowledge and the advancement of culture all of which are dependent upon the gradual “progressive organization of the citizens of the earth within [i.e., within the personality of each individual human being] and toward the species as a system which is united by cosmopolitical bonds.”\textsuperscript{210} It is an indication of the freedom that each man must strive to realize, and, as indicated, the “transcendental employment of the faculty of judgment” will specify how it is that “the categories contain, on the side of the understanding, the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general.”

On this note, we move on to an introductory explanation of the power of judgment (\textit{Urteilskraft}) itself.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Anthropology}, 333.}

\textbf{§8. The power of Judgment (\textit{Urteilskraft}) and Sensis Communis (or Common Sense)}

Since “thinking for oneself” and “acting universally” are far from the norm for Kant, and, indeed, are what Kant makes a plea for, i.e. for mankind to wake up from the unconscious determination of his thought patterns by whatever “authority” is in vogue at the time, and his childish servitude to laws which he does not give to himself, one can hypothesize that “synthetic judgments \textit{a priori},” insofar as they set the norm or standard for our way of perceiving and understanding the world, are, likewise, exceptional within the history of mankind. That is to say, although synthetic judgments \textit{a priori} are responsible for both “thinking for oneself” and “acting universally,” mankind does not, in general, \textit{consciously}, subjectively determine society.
himself by synthetic judgments *a priori*, even though he is relatively *unconsciously*, objectively determined by such judgments (as they have been historically made before him) in the judgments that he makes every day. The key to this dilemma is to show that there are two forms, or *kinds*, of synthetic *a priori* judgments: determinative and reflective.

Judgment (*Urteilskraft*) is a *talent*, and I will here equivocate the power of judgment (*Urteilskraft*) with one’s ability to think and act universally according to universal principles that one gives to oneself. As such, the power of judgment is necessary for the implementation of schema in science, the creation of aesthetic ideas in art, and, most importantly, the power of judgment is necessary for the ability to act morally, i.e. the ability to submit one’s *maxim* (the subjective principle of volition) to an objective principle, *i.e.* the practical *law* - “that which would also serve subjectively as a practical principle to all rational beings if reason had full power over the faculty of desire.” Since reason does not have full power over the faculty of desire, I will here make a rather daring and controversial hypothesis: the reflective power of judgment is necessary to submit one’s maxim to a universal principle of reason.

On reflective judgments, Kant states: “When judgment reflects [....] it has to subsume under a law that is not yet given, and hence must subsume under a law that is in fact only a principle of reflection on [certain] objects for which we have no objective law

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211 What we must do is to discover, in all its proper universality, the ground of the possibility of *a priori* synthetic judgments, *to obtain insight into the conditions which make each kind of such judgments possible*, and to mark out all this knowledge, which forms a genus by itself, not in any cursory outline, but in a system, with completeness and in a manner sufficient for any use, according to its original sources, divisions, extent, and limits. So much, meantime, as regards what is peculiar in synthetic judgments. (A10, B14, emphasis added)

212 *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, §15 emphasis added.
at all, no concept of the object adequate as a principle for the cases that occur.”

Insofar as the presentational powers [imagination and understanding] refer a given presentation to cognitions in general, “the cognitive powers brought into play by this presentation are in free play, because no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition.”

Now, all judgment requires an element of reflection in order to distinguish “whether something does or does not stand under a given rule.” But if the rule is not produced by the subject himself, then the reflection is minimal. The most reflection that would arise from a determinative judgment of the understanding would be if someone challenged the correctness of the judgment, and only then if the subject gave it a bit of original thought.

Reflective judgments include aesthetic judgments (of taste and of the sublime), teleological judgments, theoretical reflective judgment and practical reflective judgment. However, when they become the norm they become determinative for oneself and others who follow tasteful, witty, and intelligent examples in a community. “Determinative judgment, which operates under universal transcendental laws given by the understanding, is only subsumptive. The law is marked out for it a priori [via schema and the typic], and hence it does not need to devise a law of its own.” In other words, there is inter-play in oneself and in one’s community

\[\text{213 CJ, §69, 385.}\]
\[\text{214 CJ, §9, 217.}\]
\[\text{215 CPR, A132, B171.}\]
\[\text{216 I will try to indicate how it is that the typic is provided by the moral environment, i.e., by the examples of moral individuals (who utilize practical reflective judgment) in one’s culture.}\]

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between reflective judgments and determinative judgments. Such inter-play takes place in a movement - a process of the emergence of consciousness, and with it, the freedom of the self-determining subject in humanity’s advance towards ever higher levels of fulfillment. Further, this interplay takes place in an infinite teleological process of progress of an individual, one’s community, and of the world as a whole, towards a universal end - universal understanding, perpetual peace and the highest good in the world. This infinite process is the epigenesis of reason within the Spirit (Geist) of the “world” (or cosmos).

The majority of judgments that we make are determinative judgments of common sense, however, reflective judgments are what make common sense (determinative) judgments possible. Likewise, reflective judgments would not be possible without the determinative judgments that one has learned from via examples in one’s community.

Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, &c.), of which he gives us an example. Since we also look on the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that we see in a person of talents, as it were, the example of a law (viz. to become like him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our respect. All so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for the law.218

Sensis communis, or common sense, provides us with the realm of “Everydayness,” and refers to the way in which the communication and expansion of reason and ideas takes place in the world as a whole. In the Critique of Judgment Kant speaks of a sensis communis logicus, (which refers to our logical understanding/knowledge in general) as being bound together with scientific/technological progress and the material benefits therefrom; and a sensis communis aestheticus (which refers to the aesthetic-intuitive knowledge) which can lead us to a higher level of thinking. He will

217 CJ, 179, emphasis added.

218 Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, §16n, emphasis added.
emphasize *sensis communis aestheticus* as providing man with the Art (*Kunst*) which can lead him to a recognition of his freedom.

“It is indeed a great gift of God to possess […] But this common sense must be shown practically, by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing to it as an oracle, when no rational justification can be advanced.”\(^{219}\) Such a manner of acquiring ideas and knowledge allows for progress both objectively and subjectively. Objectively, *sensis communis* takes place on the cultural-historical level (via providence, i.e. nature - the highest end of nature is culture) in which social beings, for the most part, *unconsciously*, advance in an infinite progress toward the highest good in the world - which entails universal freedom for all of mankind. And subjectively, *sensis communis* still allows for the individual to *consciously* and freely determine oneself, and to thus contribute to the development of *sensis communis* by setting an *example* for others to follow, by the construction of universal schema (in science), symbols, i.e. aesthetic ideas (in art (*Kunst*)), ‘schema of analogy’ in speculative cognition and reflective practical cognition, and the typic of the moral law (in one’s actions) which essentially influence our manner of seeing, understanding, and behaving in the world.

This can be further understood from the fact that, according to Kant:

> The manner in which something is apprehended in appearance can be so determined *a priori* that the rule of its synthesis can at once give, that is to say, can bring into being, this [element of] *a priori* intuition in every example that comes before us empirically.\(^{220}\)

\(^{219}\) *Prolegomena*, 6.

\(^{220}\) CPR, B221.
Such an apprehension of a given intuition via an example is the synthetic work of the **reproductive imagination** _a posteriori_ (i.e. “the rule of its synthesis” is learned), as opposed to the **productive _a priori_ synthesis of imagination** which provides us with “the rule of its synthesis” (i.e. the schema) - which makes the appearance possible in the first place.

The actual connection of concepts to objects, i.e. “the faculty of subsuming particulars under concepts or rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule,” is the power of **judgment** (_Urteilskraft_). But, just as learning to dance challenges the application of technique to our bodies, some are more **naturally talented** at, what can only be called, a “feel for correctness” in judgment than others. By “feel for correctness” I intend only the pleasure that is experienced as a result of the harmony between the imagination and understanding in the judgment of an object that is not determined beforehand by a rule or example.

Such a “natural gift” thus separates those supposedly tasteful and witty people who strive to think for themselves from those who lack or are deficient in such astute capabilities. Kant goes so far as to say that “deficiency in judgment is just what is ordinarily called stupidity, and for such a failing there is no remedy.” By referring to some people as **stupid**, Kant refers to those “obtuse, narrow-minded” people who

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221 CPR, A132, B171.

222 CPR, B173n.

* Just as a side note, one can sense a bit of snobbery here. But Kant is not trying to put people into classes, i.e. the **tasteful** versus the **stupid**. Every human being (besides perhaps someone suffering from a natural limitation of the brain) has the inherent ability to think for oneself. But, as I have pointed out in the introduction, we all have to become aware of, i.e. awakened to, this ability. Kant himself, as we shall soon see, can not be said to have utilized synthetic _a priori_ judgment in a **productive** manner, i.e. he can not be said to have thought for himself, until he was awakened from his “dogmatic slumber” by David Hume.
cannot seem to see beyond the analytical argumentation and definitions that they have learned and which have become dogmatically ingrained in their minds.

“[I]t is not unusual to meet learned men who in the application of their scientific knowledge betray their original want [of judgment (Uteilskraft)], which can never be made good.”223 In other words, we can have an abundance of synthetic a priori rules, regulations and laws in our head, but to have the ability to apply them in practice requires a naturally acquired ability to judge synthetically a priori. And many of us are lacking in this ability. By this “original want of judgment” Kant would seem to be referring to one’s culturally-socially conditioned moral disposition (a.k.a. personality or character) as what limits one’s ability to judge, i.e. one’s ability to think and act openly and universally.

In the Critique of Judgment (Uteilskraft) only those souls “whose way of thinking is either already trained to the good or exceptionally receptive to this training” are disposed to take a direct interest in the beautiful in nature (not merely to have the taste to judge it). And he says such a disposition is not common.224 In other words, one’s culture would seem to have a major role to play in “training,” and influencing, one to be good, i.e. to think openly and universally and to take a direct interest in the beautiful in nature. Such a disposition is required, Kant seems to be saying, before one is “naturally” able to apply even one’s scientific knowledge via judgments in one’s daily affairs. But the fact that such a disposition is rare, says something about the limitations of culture and common sense itself. One’s culture, and the common sense that follows from it, must also be pushed along and advanced by individuals

223 Ibid.

224 CJ, §42, 301.

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who, here and there, realize the productive power of imagination in reflective synthetic *a priori* judgments.

That is to say, the great majority, or perchance all, of the judgments that most of us, perhaps even “intelligent” people (e.g. doctors, lawyers, scientists, philosophers, garbage men, factory workers), make in our entire lives are relatively determined for us by the examples, the determinate synthetic *a priori* judgments, of others that we have learned from in experience. This can be understood from the following excerpt about the power of judgment (*Urteilskraft*) in general:

[I]t appears that, though understanding is capable of being instructed, and of being equipped with rules, judgment is a peculiar talent which can be practiced only, and cannot be taught. It is the specific quality of so-called mother-wit; and its lack no school can make good. For although an abundance of rules borrowed from the insight of others may indeed be proffered to, and as it were grafted upon, a limited understanding, the power of rightly employing them must belong to the learner himself; and in the absence of such a natural gift no rule that may be prescribed to him for this purpose can ensure against misuse. A physician, a judge, or a ruler may have at command many excellent pathological, legal, or political rules, even to the degree that he may become a profound teacher of them, and yet, none the less, may easily stumble in their application. For, although admirable in understanding, he may be wanting in natural power of judgment. He may comprehend the universal *in abstracto*, and yet not be able to distinguish whether a case *in concreto* comes under it. Or the error may be due to his not having received, through examples and actual practice, adequate training for this particular act of judgment. Such sharpening of the judgment is indeed the one great benefit of examples. Correctness and precision of intellectual insight, on the other hand, they more usually somewhat impair. For only very seldom do they adequately fulfill the requirements of the rule (*as casus in terminis*). Besides, they often weaken that effort which is required of the understanding to comprehend properly the rules in their universality, in independence of the particular circumstances of experience, and so accustom us to use rules rather as formulas than as principles. Examples are thus the go-cart of judgment; and those who are lacking in the natural talent can never dispense with them.  

Kant clarifies this further when he makes a distinction between subjective knowledge, both historical and rational:

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225 CPR, A134, B173-4, emphasis added.
All knowledge, subjectively regarded, is either historical or rational [...] However a mode of knowledge may originally be given, it is still, in relation to the individual who possesses it, simply historical. [...] Anyone, therefore, who has learnt (in the strict sense of the term) a system of philosophy, such as that of Wolff [Kant is probably poking fun at himself here in his dogmatist days], although he may have all its principles, explanations, and proofs, together with the formal divisions of the whole body of doctrine in his head, and so to speak, at his fingers’ ends, has no more than a complete historical knowledge of the Wolffian philosophy. He knows and judges only what has been given him. If we dispute a definition, he does not know whence to obtain another. He has formed his mind on another’s, and the imitative faculty is not itself productive. In other words, his knowledge has not arisen out of reason, and although, objectively considered, it is indeed knowledge due to reason, it is yet, in its subjective character, merely historical. He has grasped and kept; that is, he has learnt well, and is merely the plaster-cast of a living man. Modes of rational knowledge which are rational objectively (that is, which can have their first origin solely in human reason) can be so entitled subjectively also, only when they have been derived from universal sources of reason, that is, from principles - the sources from which there can also arise criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt.226

It would seem that, in order to participate in the “intelligible world” or in the “universal sources of reason” in a direct, i.e. subjective, manner, one must take part in the productive imagination227 - which produces the schema (through which one has access to the a priori categories of understanding, and thus, through which one may “intuit” the image of anything - be it a triangle or an elephant); and also, the “productive imagination” provides us with “symbols.” Symbols, i.e. aesthetic ideas, which ultimately reference the rational ideas, are provided by the “productive imagination” of genius in aesthetic understanding (sensus communis aestheticus) - which we can assume to be present in such disciplines as politics, religion, morality, art and philosophy, i.e. the “non-sciences.”

226 CPR, A836-7, B864-5, emphasis added.

227 CPR, B179.

* Before going further, we should note that the inclusion of politics and philosophy as “non-sciences,” is questionable. I am not prepared to comment on politics here, but the status of philosophy is certainly open to discussion - especially since Kant is trying to establish metaphysics as a science, Kant will, indeed, utilize a schema of reason analogous to a schema of sensibility to unify his system architectonically. I am merely indicating the necessity of genius (i.e. Kant) in order to make philosophy, i.e. metaphysics, as a science possible. As I have pointed out, above, art (Kunst) as a
Very few “human subjects” ever participate subjectively in the “productive imagination,” not because we do not have the potential, but, because we have not been awakened to the fact that we have such a power - a power to think and act for ourselves. Most of us are fated (perhaps, for a large part, because of cultural-social indoctrination and repression) to only follow examples which are provided for us in order to “succeed,” i.e. examples are the go-cart of judgment. Examples are set for us by the “scientist” in logical understanding (via schema for the categories). But examples also have a practical value, “for if common sense did not have something [e.g. natural law] to use in actual experience as an example, it could make no use of the law of pure practical reason in applying it to that experience.”

Most of us, then, learn purely through examples and symbols provided by the scientist and genius (and the perhaps intermediate category of the philosopher). That is to say, most people will never “create” truth, nor will they say anything that will “lead” (set examples for) others in the infinite journey to freedom and truth; though Kant would seem to leave open the “possibility” for all “men” to be “transcendental subjects,” if not now, then in the future; i.e., it would seem possible that someday “all men” will have the “natural gift,” or ability, to participate in the “productive imagination” - an “art hidden in the depths of the human soul.”

Thus, we all participate in the intelligible world, but, in general, merely indirectly, i.e. objectively, via the schema, examples and symbols that are always already

production of the imagination of genius requires science, but science does not require art. Science does, however, require the subjective reason, i.e. judgment (Urteilskraft), of individuals in order to progress (though scientific progress is perhaps only related to technology (teknē) and not to the progress of art (Kunst) - which is more closely related to morality. This will become more evident when I discuss the Critique of Judgment).

228 CPrR, V, 70, 178.
provided for us in *sensis communis* of our culture, and which, nevertheless, allow us to have an immediate (i.e. spontaneous) relation to the empirical world. We can thus say that “common sense and *speculative understanding* are each serviceable in their own way, the former in judgments which apply immediately to experience [i.e., in *determinative* synthetic *a priori* judgments], the latter when we judge universally from mere concepts [i.e., in *reflective* synthetic *a priori* judgments], as in metaphysics, where sound common sense, so called in spite of the inapplicability of the word, has no right to judge at all.”

229 Prolegomena, 7, emphasis added.
A. ASPECTS OF THE THEORETICAL SELF

§9a. The “self” in relation to Kant’s first Critique

To begin this critique of Kant’s ‘1st Critique’, I will critique the “self.” I ask, “Who am ‘I’?!” “What am ‘I’?” Goethe tells “us”:

What am I myself? What have I done? All that I have seen, heard, noted I have collected and used. My works are reverenced by a thousand different individuals. [...] Often I have reaped the harvest that others have sown. My work is that of a collective being and it bears Goethe’s name.230

Or as Hegel would say, “Each individual is in any case a child of his time; thus philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts.”231

To go along with Hegel, I will admit that I am a “child of my time,” however, being that I am, I cannot help but to question “the way things are,” to question the “established order,” as it is being questioned by many of my contemporaries. I am a historical being, but I can not help but be horrified by the actions of mankind in the past, and indeed, by many of the present trends, i.e., the resurgence of a politics of “fascism” - which appears to be an extreme conservative desire for a return to “traditional values;” to an “ideal” which has never “Truly” existed.

As Lyotard says: “To fix” the historical significance of any object of language, to fix any meaning whatsoever, is itself to constitute an “idealizing fiction,”232 a fiction that is perhaps necessary to speak of the object but “not ascribable once and for all [...] its


meaning is still ‘in process,’ unfinished precisely because it is historical.”

Lyotard interprets Merleau-Ponty from *Humanism and Terror*: “To refuse history a meaning is equally to refuse its truth and its responsibility to the political.” If we keep to the “axiom” that “the end justifies the means” to defend whatever political agenda “we” desire to promote, as in the past with - i.e., “Communism” in Russia under the leadership of Stalin, the “Colonialist Imperialism” of European rulers - “Manifest Destiny” in America versus the Indian “savages,” “Nazism” under Hitler - then we will have learned nothing.

As Merleau-Ponty says: “We give history its meaning, but not without it proposing it to us.” Lyotard points out that: “this implies not that history has a meaning - unique, necessary, and thus inevitable, [...] but that history has some meaning.” It is a “collective meaning” that has resulted from “meanings projected by historical subjectivities at the heart of their coexistence.” And it is this “collective meaning” that must be thought over and analyzed in philosophy, in order to arrive at an understanding of history. Lyotard says, “[T]here is no greater task for philosophy.”

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233 Ibid., p. 34.
234 Ibid., p. 132.
235 Ibid., p. 129.
238 Ibid.
239 Ibid.
The problem here seems to be a problem of “identity” and “difference”: of “Otherness.” What is it that causes us to “see” each other as different, i.e., opposed (“black” versus “white”): as “Other”? What is it that causes a “Wallonian” to see himself as “different” from a “Flem”? A “Serb” from a “Croat”? A “Kurd” from a “Turk”? A “Christian” from a “Moslem” or “Jew”? I think that first of all we have to admit that a problem exists.” You exist, I exist, and there definitely is a problem here. It is a problem that is so deeply entrenched in “our” consciousnesses, and thus in our language and thought, that it seems almost impossible to “identify” - especially if it is at the “source” of identity itself.

Lyotard states, in his Phenomenology that idealism cannot explain “why fascism threatens our times.” In search of an answer, let us now explore the idea of “existence” within the Christian, European Idealist tradition (with Kant as the “Pietist” exemplar).

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240 In the Saturday, March 9, 1996 issue of The Kansas City Star (A-6), I read where “special Israeli army undercover units created during the intifada, made up of soldiers who sometimes dress as Arabs to grab suspects, were active in recent days and arrested five Palestinians in the West Bank.” This was in response to the recent series of “suicide bombings” by “Palestinians” on the “Israelis.” My question is: How could one tell a “Palestinian” from an “Israeli” besides perhaps from the clothes worn, language variation, or perhaps to check for “circumcision”? In America every one of these “distinctions” becomes distorted. Clothing is rarely distinguishable - though occasionally one may find a devout “Jewish” man wearing a “beanie,” or a “Moslem” with some cloth rapped around his head - but the “climate” (social and otherwise) tends to make such distinctions rather redundant, sometimes dangerous, and often, the clothing one wears is discreetly regulated - as in public schools. As far as language goes, most “citizens” of America speak “English” - though they may not be able to read or write. And as for circumcision - the majority of babies born in “America” are circumcised, regardless of religious belief or ethnic identity, mainly, it is said, for hygienic purposes. And I believe that many devout Moslems are also circumcised in accordance with the Koran.

241 F. Lyotard, Phenomenology, p. 131.
I have heard it said that: “Existence is not a predicate.”²⁴² What if I was to say: “The predicate of this sentence is existence.”? Can we still say that existence is not a predicate? Does this sentence exist? Perhaps I have not said anything, and thus, “you” are not even reading this. At any rate, I will assume that “you exist.”²⁴³ Whether your own existence is a problem for yourself I cannot say. And since we are on this topic….

I wonder, did Kant have a “pen”? Many “philosophers” would perhaps question the “philosophical merit,” or “relevance” of such a question. Hume, I am “sure,” would say that we cannot say with any “certainty” that Kant had a pen (nor that he himself had one for that matter). He would call this “making an inference.” And for him,

²⁴² This is in reference to Kant’s hypothesis that: “‘Being’ is obviously not a real predicate” (CPR, B626). What Kant is trying “to say” is that: “Being” is not whatever we may say about “it,” that is, “it is not the concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves” (CPR, B62 6). Although this argument is in the context of refuting the “Ontological Argument for the existence of God,” one would also have to admit that it also pertains to his ‘ontological argument for the existence of the transcendental subject.’

The problem here, “I think,” is that Kant thinks we would have to know the “word” (or Category, i.e., Modality (B106)): “existence,” i.e., what the word has been determined to refer to, before we can “exist,” i.e., before one can “exist,” one must be “aware” of “existing” - as a “transcendental subject.” I wonder, does a baby “exist”? Does someone who has never read Kant “exist”? i.e., Does anyone who does not know that they are a “transcendental subject” “exist”? Is it possible to be a “transcendental subject” without “knowing” it?

Although one would perhaps agree with Kant’s argument that: “A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers” (CPR, B627), and that “My financial position is [...] affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere concept of them (that is, of their possibility)” (Ibid.) - this argument would not work very well today, i.e., in this age of massive business transactions, credit cards, and automatic teller machines.

But, put this in perspective, Kant is speaking of the necessity of the concept, and of the “subject” who “knows,” or has access to the concept, in order to “say,” with any authority, that something “exists.” In other words, “distantiation” from an “object” has to taken place, i.e. “Whatever and however much, our concept of an object may contain, we must go outside it, if we are to ascribe existence to the object” (CPR, B629). Or, as Merleau-Ponty would say, besides the “subject” (which, he believes, “exists” as his/her “flesh,” i.e., the “corps sujet”), language - along with all of its institutions of meaning, must also “exist.”

²⁴³ Aristotle states in the opening line to his Analytica Posteriora that: “All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from preexistent knowledge.” But by “pre-existent knowledge” he means that, “in some cases admission of fact must be assumed, in others comprehension of the meaning of the term used, and sometimes both assumptions are essential” [(Bk l: Ch l, 71a), transl. by G.RG. Mure, Intro, to Aristotle, ed. by R. McKeon].

I, therefore, assume that: “If ‘you’ are ‘reading this’, ‘you exist’ - if only as ‘you’ ‘reading this.”“
inferences are as close as we can get to the “truth.” Kant says “experience never confers on its judgments true or strict, but only assumed and comparative universality, through induction.”

Okay, so let us infer that someone named “Immanuel Kant,” who “lived, i.e., ‘existed’ in the last half of the 18th century,” etc., had a pen. I must admit that we can not say what color (“secondary quality”) it had, nor the type (“form”) of ink or quill he used, but I cannot help but to think, i.e., infer, that Kant had a pen - or some instrument to write down his thoughts, in language.

Now the problem is: Would Kant be willing to admit that his pen had existence? To illustrate how Kant felt about the existence of a pen, I will just say to refer to the hundreds of thousands of words that he wrote in his life challenging our ability to speak about the existence of such “objects.” He would probably say something like...

“My ‘pen’ is the representation, i.e., conception, of a pen created by ‘my’ imagination’s matching - through ‘schema’: ‘a universal rule of synthesis’ in some kind of ‘transcendental language’ - the pure intuition of a time relation to the timeless, unconditional, ‘a priori’ categories of theoretical understanding. I can say nothing of the pen’s existence in-itself.”

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244 CPR, B4.

245 CPR, A146.

246 Whereas concepts are abstract and intuitions (of time and space) are concrete” representations, the products of our intuition are matched with the categories through schema - rules which state the intuition’s position in time and space. For example, an intuition of cause would follow the schema: “The effect must follow the cause in time;” and for substance: “All substances have permanence in time.” Since these rules, like the categories on which they are based, apply to any experience we have, they are “Universal Laws of Nature,” i.e., laws given to nature by the understanding.

It is interesting to compare the “transcendental language” involved in schema to Pascal’s comments on language - I quote from Pensees (§557): “Languages are ciphers in which letters are not changed into letters, but words into words, so that an unknown language can be deciphered.”
But please, my dear Kant, how can you even write down that the pen you are using is
the “representation of a pen”? Would you not then have to say that everything that
you have written is all just a representation, having no existence in-itself? I.e.,
everything that you have written is all merely a representation” created by your
“transcendental processes” (a pure intuition of time, and the schemata of judgment)
and is thus nothing more than a figment of imagination? But how are your
“transcendental processes” represented? And how do “they” even have existence
without the words - that you have thought or written “about” them, or to distinguish
(name) them, for that matter? How can you say, i.e., “think” anything without some
form of “language”?.

It seems that I must infer that your “words” have at least as much existence as the
“transcendental processes” that they designate or “represent.” I infer that your words
exist because I have read them, in their translated form, in the “present” time relation,
in which my “mental processes” are interpreting, i.e., reflecting, upon them. And,
since I have inferred that your “words” have, at least, as much existence as the
“transcendental processes” that they designate, I also infer that you wrote them down
and that you must have had a pen!

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As you have probably noticed, the “connection,” the “entity,” which allowed me to
infer that “Kant had a pen,” and even that someone named “Kant,” himself, had
existence, was through language - the “words” which he had written down and which
have been copied and “passed down” to the “present” moment in history. I am aware
that “history” itself is a very ambiguous word;\textsuperscript{247} I have merely stated that I have read what Kant had written down, and I have thus assumed that both he and his pen (or ‘\textit{Feder}’) had existence.

For it seems that it is only through - the writing (inscription) of a text (mathematical, philosophic, scientific, etc.), the creation of an image or symbol (a tool, language, sculpture, building, painting, etc.), sound (music, speech), or the initiation of a recognized event (a ‘\textit{coup d’etat},’ Revolution, or even a theater piece) - that anything does, indeed, became “history.”

But just because something, someone, or some event is not “history” does not mean that it did not “exist” or “happen.” It only means that “it” was not “recorded” - though “it” could, still, be passed on from generation to generation. Perhaps “it” went unnoticed, or was not recognized as “important” by a culture or individual; perhaps “it” was forgotten, perhaps “it” was unrepresentable - and yet, can always only be re-presented - as the source, or presentation, of re-presentation itself; or, perhaps “it” was not discovered and thus designated by man - for his “use.”\textsuperscript{248}

For instance, I do not think there would have been any way for Kant to know that “dinosaurs” existed. The “fact” of their existence can be confirmed by the “community of speakers” who understand what one is referring to when one says “dinosaur.” If one were to say this to someone who did not know what a “dinosaur” was, then one would have to explain to him/her (with perhaps a drawing, or a

\textsuperscript{247} F. Lyotard, \textit{Phenomenology}, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{248} On the same note, just because something is “history” does not mean that it has to be believed by everyone. For instance there are those who do not believe that mankind has landed on the moon. I am not saying that it did not happen; I am just saying there are some people who question it.
“picturesque” description with words) exactly what a dinosaur was, and also give him/her some idea of the time in which they existed - depending on the time relations he/she is familiar with. And this will go along quite well with what Kant says in the *Critique of Judgment* where Kant does not deny that, “the natural beings on earth formed a purposively ordered whole,” nor that “[l]and and sea contain memorials of mighty devastations that long ago befell them and all creatures lying on or in them.”\(^{249}\) He only claims that “an exposition of the earth’s former ‘ancient’ state, could be called instead the ‘archaeology of nature,’ as distinguished from [the ‘archeology of] art’\(^{250}\) - (He even claims that ancient “cut stones, etc.” could be covered in the ‘archeology of art’). He only suggests that such an ‘archeology of nature,’ when limited to theoretical understanding, can only be an “imaginary investigation” and not one in which “nature itself [i.e., nature as a “purposive” product of imagination] invites and summons us to.”\(^{251}\) As we shall see when I analyze the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant relates all of “imaginary history” as “being” there mainly in conjunction with man (“the rational artist”) as nature’s “ultimate purpose.” And the “truth” of history rests ultimately on “rational faith”.

I think the reason Kant was so worried about “speaking” of his own, or anything else’s, “existence” for that matter, is because if he spoke of the existence of his body and the things around him, he felt he would be limiting himself to “contingent facts” and “finality.” Kant wanted to “live forever” (as most people do). We can see this quite clearly in the following statement which, I think, pretty much gives insight to his entire philosophy:

\(^{249}\) CJ, §82, 427.

\(^{250}\) Ibid, 428, fn20.

\(^{251}\) Ibid.
I will that there be a God, that my existence in this world be also an existence in a pure world of connections and finally that my duration be endless. I stand by this belief and I will not give up this belief, for this is the only case where my interest inevitably determines my judgment because I will not yield anything of this interest; I do so without any attention to sophistries, however little I may be able to oppose them with others more plausible.\(^{252}\)

Kant’s philosophy will develop around a “transcendental dialectic” which asserts: “God,” “the soul,” and “freedom,” as “Ends” of Pure Reason.

Kant does allow for some form of “existence” of a “world.” This “world,” however, is a world of appearances, i.e., “representations,” posited by his “Transcendental, Subjective Self” in discovering himself as the necessary subject which “thinks” and “Acts” through and according to the universal, \textit{a priori} Categories or Laws of “Pure Reason.”

By his “brilliant,” but incredibly confusing, “Transcendental Deduction” Kant “determines” the “transcendental,” “True,” “infinite,” “\textit{a priori},” “unconditional” existence of the “Categories” and “himself” - as the thinking subject through which these Categories of Pure Reason are judiciously “applied” - in Time.

Time is, for Kant, a Pure, \textit{a priori}, necessary representation, or form, of Intuition.\(^{253}\) It is always already “there,” laying open, ready, that “place” whereby the subject discovers itself in “its” transcendence. The “Self” actively posits itself as the determiner, i.e., “judge,” through schema, of the time relations of representations - of which “it” has passively been affected by through intuition - in a moment of “reflectivity.” Thus time, is both: that which is \textit{a priorily} given to the subject (the

\(^{252}\) CPrR, V, 143-44.

\(^{253}\) CPR, B46.
horizon through which objects, i.e., appearances, are given to the subject); and, that which is “posited by” the subject in a moment of reflection: in its “awareness” of being “affected by” the time relations which “it” itself has posited as the ground for objective appearance. Thus, Kant feels that he has no grounds for speaking of the “existence” of anything - except the a priori grounds that made his perception possible. Though he says, “All of our knowledge begins with experience,”\(^{254}\) this experience is always “internal” - an internal consciousness, i.e., understanding,” of the time relations of representations given to us (as possible “transcendental subjects”\(^{255}\)) in experience. He says, “[P]roperties that belong to things in themselves can never be given to us through the senses.”\(^{256}\)

Space exists for Kant as an a priori intuition - “the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.”\(^{257}\) It is some kind of geometrical extension - a negative intuition of “that” which objects (intuited by and in time) are “contained” within. And he says that without the human subject, that “condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever.”\(^{258}\)

In other words, “spatiality” is a mere representation dependent upon the “existence” of the “human subject,” and “temporality” is the mere understanding, of the time relations of representations given to us human subjects. It would seem, however, that

\(^{254}\) CPR, B1.

\(^{255}\) See §8, above.

\(^{256}\) CPR, A36.

\(^{257}\) CPR, B42.

\(^{258}\) CPR, B43.
in order to be “in space,” or even “in time” for that matter, one must take part in the transcendental productive imagination.

That the essence of time and space is imagination

“[A]pppearances in themselves are nothing but sensible representations, which, as such, and in themselves, must not be taken as objects capable of existing outside our power of representation.”

The imagination is both the faculty of a priori synthesis and the power of representation. Representations are, in essence, images that come about with a synopsis of the imagination in its reproductive mode which is merely empirical. However, the reproductive mode of imagination is dependent upon the productive mode in order to gather the representations into the unity of an image and to gather them into the presence of a self-conscious subject.

As sense contains a manifold in its intuition, I ascribe to it a synopsis. But to such a synopsis a synthesis must always correspond; receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with spontaneity.

Receptivity, here, refers to the gathering together of given sensations into a general image, or Gestalt form, via a synopsis. The rule of association is the subjective and empirical ground of reproduction by which representations connect in the imagination with one representation in preference to another in time. However, to such a synopsis, an a priori synthesis must always spontaneously correspond. “Since imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an image, it must previously have

259 CPR, A104.

260 CPR, A97, emphasis added.
taken the impressions up into its activity, that is, have apprehended them.”\footnote{CPR, A120.} Such a synthesis provides an objective ground, antecedently to all empirical laws of the imagination. This objective ground of all association of appearances Kant entitles their \textit{affinity}. If we recall, affinity is one of the essential ideas of reason. The law of affinity commands us to seek mediation between the extremes of generalization and specification in all of our judgments, and to bind together in continuity the highest unity with the utmost difference. “It is nowhere to be found save in the principle of the unity of apperception, in respect of all knowledge which is to belong to me.”\footnote{CPR, A122.}

In the Aesthetic Kant treated synoptic unity as belonging merely to sensibility in order to emphasize that it precedes any concept. However, “as a matter of fact, it \textit{presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible.}”\footnote{CPR, B160-1, emphasis added.} What Kant refers to here is the “intellectual synthesis” which corresponds to the unity of apperception. Or, stated otherwise, \textit{things in space and time} are given only in so far as they are perceptions. Perception is the “empirical consciousness of the intuition (as appearance).”\footnote{CPR, B160.} Accordingly, “the empirical consciousness of a given manifold in a single intuition is subject to a pure self-consciousness \textit{a priori.}”\footnote{CPR, B144.}

“Now it is imagination that connects the manifold of sensible intuition; and imagination is dependent for the unity of its intellectual synthesis upon the
understanding, and for the manifoldness of its apprehension upon sensibility. All possible perception is thus dependent upon synthesis of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis in turn upon transcendental synthesis, and therefore upon the categories.”

Although Kant would seem to make transcendental synthesis subject to the categories of understanding, it should be noted that this is just a matter of naming different functions of the soul. As I have pointed out above, “understanding” can be understood as a combination of imagination and apperception. Or to state it more decisively:

“It is one and the same spontaneity, which in the one case, under the title of imagination, and in the other case, under the title of understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition.”

Further:

[W]hile concepts, which belong to the understanding, are brought into play through relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception, it is only by means of the imagination that they can be brought to sensible intuition.

A pure imagination, which conditions all a priori knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other. The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination, because otherwise the former, though indeed yielding appearances, would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and consequently no experience.

Now, the only kind of object that pure productive imagination would give itself would be one capable of being intuited independently of affectation, i.e., it would have to be intuited a priori. And only space and time, the mere forms of intuited objects, satisfy this condition. That is to say, pure intuitions of space and time are original

266 CPR, B164.
267 See p. 43f. above.
268 CPR, B161n.
269 CPR, A124.
exhibitions; all others presuppose empirical intuition. Thus, one can only conclude that productive imagination brings forth originally the forms of time and space.

*That knowledge is always only of appearances and this includes knowledge of the self.*

The self, insofar as theoretical knowledge is concerned, is only appearance.

If [...] we admit that we know objects only in so far as we are externally affected, we must also recognize, as regards inner sense, that by means of it we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by ourselves; in other words, that, so far as inner intuition is concerned, we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself.270

Knowing oneself merely as appearance one is subject to time. And this leaves open determination of the subject by laws that he/she does not give to him/herself, but of which are merely inherited with one’s cultural upbringing, and thus to the laws of cause and effect.

Things in themselves would necessarily, apart from any understanding that knows them, conform to laws of their own. But appearances are only representations of things which are unknown as regards what they may be in themselves. As mere representations, they are subject to no law of connection save that which the connecting faculty prescribes.271

Now, the “connecting faculty” is none other than the power of imagination. And, although all knowledge is referable to the pure self-consciousness of apperception, and although apperception is the source of all combination,272 the subject is not necessarily conscious of oneself as the “producer” of this knowledge. All we can say is that “the understanding, under the title of a transcendental synthesis of imagination, performs this act [i.e., the act of synthesis of the manifold of intuition] upon the

270 CPR, B156.

271 CPR, B164.

272 CPR, B154.
passive subject, whose faculty it is, and we are therefore justified in saying that inner sense is affected thereby.”

Now, what can we “know” with any “certainty” for Kant? Well, Kant tells us that: “Any knowledge that professes to hold a priori lays claim to be regarded as absolutely necessary.” And what “knowledge” is this? “Scientific knowledge,” under which Kant includes: “Mathematics and physics, the two sciences in which reason yields theoretical knowledge.” And how did these two “marvels” come about? Let us begin with mathematics. Kant says that, “that wonderful people, the Greeks,” were the first to enter this “pure path of science.” However:

I believe that it long remained, especially among the Egyptians, in the groping stage, and that the transformation must have been due to a revolution brought about by the happy thought of a single man [....] A new light flashed upon the mind of the first man (be he Thales or some other) who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle. The true method, so he found, was not to inspect what he discerned either in the figure, or in the bare concept of it, arid from this, as it were, to read off its properties; but to bring out what was necessarily implied in the concepts that he had himself formed a priori, and had put into the figure in the construction by which he presented it to himself. If he is to know anything with a priori certainty he must not ascribe to the figure anything save what necessarily follows from what he has himself set into it in accordance with his concept.

I shall comment upon mathematics in the following section (§9b. On the role of imagination in Kant’s theory of mathematics). Now, as for “natural science,” i.e.,

273 CPR, B153.

274 CPR, Axx.

275 CPR, Bx.

276 Ibid.

277 CPR, Bxii, my emphases.
“physics,” Kant says that it took natural science a lot longer to arrive on the scene. He says it was not until:

Bacon, by his ingenious proposals, partly initiated this discovery, partly inspired fresh vigor in those who were already on the way to it. In this case also the discovery can be explained as being the sudden outcome of an **intellectual revolution**. In my present remarks I am referring to natural science only in so far as it is founded on **empirical** principles. 278

He goes on to note that when such men as Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl came on the scene with their discoveries: “they learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces,” 279 and that they **learned** to approach nature, not “in the character of a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, but as an appointed judge who compels the witness to answer questions which he has himself formulated.” 280

In other words, “experience is itself a species of knowledge which involves understanding; and understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me […] we can know **a priori** of things only what we ourselves have put in them.” 281

This goes along with Boorstin, who points out that: “Nothing could be more obvious than that the earth is stable and unmoving, and that we are at the center of the universe. Modern Western science takes its beginning from the denial of this common

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278 CPR, Bxi, my emphases.
279 CPR, Bxii.
280 CPR, Bxiii.
281 CPR, Bxvii, my emphasis.
sense axiom.”

Kant notes that Copernicus: “Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved around the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest.” Thus Kant says “if Copernicus had not dared, in a manner contradictory to the senses, but yet true, to seek the observed movements, not in the heavenly bodies but in the spectator [...], the invisible force [the Newtonian laws of motion and attraction] which holds the universe together [...], would have remained forever undiscovered.”

Thus, Kant’s “Categories” are an attempt to “determine” how Newton could “discover” his “laws” which had been based upon a hypothesis (of Copernicus) in the first place. “Necessity,” did not exist until the “that wonderful people, the Greeks” discovered “mathematical” and “geometrical axioms,” and Newton “created” his “Laws.”

I will just quote Nick Herbert here from the “Foreword” to Quantum Reality:

One of the curious features of modern physics is that in spite of its overwhelming practical success in explaining a vast range of physical phenomena from quark to quasar, it fails to give us a single metaphor for how the universe actually works. The old mechanical metaphor “The world is a giant clock” condensed in one image the principal features of Newtonian

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283 CPR, Bxvii, emphasis added.

284 CPR, fn(a), Bxxii.

285 W. K. C. Guthrie states, in “Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism”: “Copernicus in De Revolutionibus says that his reading of this Pythagorean doctrine gave him the courage to consider explaining the heavenly motions on the basis of a moving earth.”

physics - namely, atomicity, objectivity, and determinism. However, physicists today do not possess a single metaphor that unites in one image the principal features of quantum theory. [...] The search for a picture of “the way the world really is” is an enterprise that transcends the narrow interests of theoretical physicists.” For better or for worse, humans have tended to pattern their domestic, social, and political arrangements according to the dominant vision of physical reality. Inevitably the cosmic view trickles down to the most mundane details of everyday life.286

A few months ago, I was looking through a friend of mine’s telescope at the moon. I was amazed for it was the first time I had seen the moon so “close” (“live”) without looking at a photograph, or seeing it on television. But I noticed that the moon kept “moving” out of the lens frame. I told my friend about this, and he reminded me of what I had learned in grade school, that: the moon is not moving, so much as, the earth is rotating upon its axis. It was the first time I had ever thought about this - “practically.” A feeling of embarrassment struck me, and I had to laugh.

I thought of a poem by Eliot (“Burnt Norton,” from The Four Quartets) where he spoke of “the still point of the turning world.” He had said: “Except for the point, the still point, there would be no dance, and there is only the dance.” ...I thought of the “Paradoxes” of Zeno... If the world is turning, it has an “axis,” - is this a monad or unit, or what? How “big” would it have to be? 50M? 2 billion/billionth of a micron? “Where” would it be? I have heard that it often changes with magnetic forces...Etc. And I realized, despite what anyone had told me, despite my ‘a priori knowledge, when I looked through the telescope...the moon did move.

Kant would not hesitate to proclaim my “mistake,” saying: “Deficiency in judgment is just what is ordinarily called stupidity, and for such a failing there is no remedy.”287

286 N. Herbert, quoted from the “Foreword” to Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics, Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Pr., 1985, p. xi.

287 CPR, B173a.
But, I will fall back upon Wittgenstein, who declares in the *Tractatus* (6.36311): “We do not know whether the sun will rise tomorrow.”

It should also be noted that Wittgenstein borrowed this enlightening phrase from David Hume’s *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (in his chapter *Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding*). Kant’s “awakening” from his self-affirmed “dogmatic slumber” which led to the development of his entire system based upon the idea of synthetic *a priori* judgments, can be seen as the direct result of this - David Hume’s “attack” upon traditional philosophical-metaphysical dogma, where Hume divides what we can know via human reason into two distinct divisions *Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact*:

“All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact*. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. *That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides*, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty*, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never was a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

“Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. *That the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, *that it will rise*. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind” 288

The “Idea” of Science which Hume adopts here can be said to be influenced by the objective, reductionist model promoted by the Royal Society which originated in

1640s London. Science, in such a context, emphasizes that knowledge can only arise empirically, via analysis, by breaking things down into their constituent parts. By this idea of science, the “ideas” would in general follow from experimental investigation - except, Hume thought, within “Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic.” Thus, Hume considers Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic to be the only sciences where their logical propositions can be known conceptually with no necessary relation to objects of nature, i.e. they can be known purely analytically via a deduction from first principles (first principles for Hume being merely the Ideas which can be inferred from the propositional meanings, or definitions, we have given to various terms). However, although “propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought,” their truth or falsehood can still be demonstrated in nature. This is why Hume refers to them as “either intuitively or demonstratively certain.” The truth of the proposition three times five is equal to the half of thirty can thus be said to be provided by the “principle of contradiction,” i.e. by denying the truth of the statement one would, at once, clearly contradict both the inherent logic of the proposition, and its demonstrability in nature.

This interpretation of the sciences will indeed be a problem for Kant, but Kant’s main concern is with Hume’s challenge upon the legitimacy of rational a priori concepts, exemplified in Hume’s contention that the so-called “principle of causality” has no rational a priori basis being a mere proposition - “cause” and “effect” being two separate events, the relation of which can only be discovered by inferences upon empirical observation and habit. That is to say, the principle of causality is no principle at all but is a mere “matter of fact.” And according to Hume, a matter of fact can be denied without contradiction, i.e., “We do not know whether the sun will rise tomorrow.”
Kant saw Hume’s argumentation as potentially devastating for metaphysics if it could not be refuted. “Metaphysics stands or falls on this problem: its very existence depends on it.” Kant understood, however, that the problem, which he will refer to as ‘Hume’s Problem’ in the *Prolegomena*, is not a question of the actuality (*quid facti*) of the a priori laws of reason, but of their legitimacy (*quid juris*). Hume understood well that we depend on such metaphysical judgments. Kant explains: “Metaphysics and morals [Hume declares in the fourth part of his *Essays*] are the most important branches of science; mathematics and physics are not nearly so important;” the only problem, he believed, is that we have no means of accounting for their legitimacy.

Kant's solution to the *quid juris* in the *Critique of Pure Reason* will be the argument of the "Transcendental Deduction" (in the "Analytic of Concepts") that concepts like substance and causality are "conditions of the possibility of experience," because they are the rules by which sensibility and understanding are united into a single consciousness, and thus constitute experience. This unity is achieved, however, in the background - through a relatively unconscious activity attributed to the imagination called “synthesis.” We shall discuss this further in a moment. For now, we will just note that Kant begins his *Preface to the First Edition* of the *Critique of Pure Reason* with the recognition of ‘Hume’s Problem’: “Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.”

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289 *Prolegomena*, 27.

290 *Prolegomena*, 5n.
The *Critique of Pure Reason* will thus be “an inquiry into purely rational cognition,”\(^{292}\) i.e. like Hume, Kant will make an *Enquiry* into the legitimacy of *a priori* rational principles - the question in general being “How is pure rational cognition possible (“Allgemeine Frage, Wie ist Erkenntnis aus reiner Vernunft möglich?”). In order to answer this question Kant found it necessary “to alter the procedure which has hitherto prevailed in metaphysics, by completely revolutionizing it in accordance with the example set by the geometers and physicists.” A revolution in the procedure of metaphysics thus “forms indeed the main purpose of this critique of pure speculative reason.”\(^{293}\) Kant will even go so far as to say that “there is, as yet, no such thing as Metaphysics,”\(^{294}\) at least, as a science.

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*Science can be understood as a system of Logical propositions.*

In Kant’s *Prolegomena* he will formulate the question “How are synthetic judgments (*Urteile*) *a priori* possible?” in two other, seemingly, synonymous manners: “How are synthetic cognitions (*Erkenntnisse*) *a priori* possible?” and “How are synthetic propositions (*Sätze*) *a priori* possible?”\(^{295}\) Now, what is the relation of *judgments* (*Urteile*), *cognitions* (*Erkenntnisse*) and *propositions* (*Sätze*)? The answer: *Logos* - i.e. ‘logic’ in its original Greek meaning - “a saying of things” - of concepts spontaneously coming to life in our cognition and imagination with words.

We shall therefore follow up the pure concepts to their first seeds and dispositions in the human understanding, in which they lie prepared, till at last, on the occasion of experience, they are developed, and by the same

\(^{291}\) CPR, Avii.

\(^{292}\) *Prolegomena*, 26.

\(^{293}\) CPR, Bxxiii.

\(^{294}\) *Prolegomena*, 3.

\(^{295}\) *Prolegomena*, 29.
understanding are exhibited in their purity, freed from the empirical conditions attaching to them.\textsuperscript{296}

There has to be a minimal tacit \textit{a priori} understanding of linguistic elements, or structures (forms), before any kind of (linguistic) communication is possible. Kant refers to the system of such expressions (concepts), when utilized purely analytically (without reference to empirical content), as "general logic." "Pure general logic has to do [...] only with principles \textit{a priori}, and is a \textit{canon of understanding} and of reason, but only in respect of what is formal in their employment, be the content what it may, empirical or transcendental."\textsuperscript{297} Further, general logic "deals with nothing but the mere form of thought [...] Pure logic is a body of demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain entirely \textit{a priori}."\textsuperscript{298}

Judgments for Kant are the putting-together, or gathering (\textit{legein}), of a subject and predicate into a conceptual unity. That unity is analytic if the judgment that determines it is one of identity between concepts, i.e. the subject and predicate only depend upon the law of contradiction to think them in a logical statement. Such analytic, purely logical, judgments of identity cannot be denied without contradiction (e.g. ‘P is P’), “for the predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained within the concept of the subject.”\textsuperscript{299} Truth and falsity are, therefore, nothing but the analytical agreement of the subject and predicate in a proposition according to the law of contradiction. Since such propositions are nothing more than

\textsuperscript{296} CPR, A65-6, B90-1.

\textsuperscript{297} CPR, A53.

\textsuperscript{298} CPR, A54-A55.

\textsuperscript{299} \textit{Prolegomena}, 15.
relations of predetermined identical concepts, and do not rely upon anything empirical for their proof, “all analytical judgments are a priori.”

A supposed problem for general logic arises in the proposition known as the ‘Liar’s Paradox’ accredited to Eubulides in IV century BC when he suggested, "I am lying." I.e. he said that he is lying right now. Is this true or false?

a) If this is true, then Eubulides is lying (right now), and hence, his statement must be false. We have come to a contradiction.

b) If this is false, then Eubulides is not lying, and hence, his statement must be true. We have come to a contradiction.

Solution: If Eubulides intends the statement "I am lying" analytically, it implies, implicitly, that one knows the difference between "truth" and "falsehood," i.e. between lying and telling the truth. "Truth," in this context, must only obey the "principle of contradiction." That is, one can not communicate with others if one contradicts the general forms of understanding. If he intends it poetically, metaphorically, or even dialectically, such forms of expression still rely on the tacit understanding of basic linguistic "truths" before such "meta-languages" are possible.

Kant would say that it (the statement, "I am lying") is a "careless formulation" which "involves the quite unnecessary admixture of a synthetic element." The "paradox," or misunderstanding, that arises "results from our first of all separating the predicate of a thing from the concept of that thing, and afterwards connecting this

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300 Ibid.
301 CPR, A152.
302 Ibid..
predicate with its opposite - a procedure which never occasions a contradiction with the subject but only with the predicate which has been synthetically connected with that subject, and even then only when both predicates are affirmed at one and the same time."

The statement "I am lying" is saying nothing more than "I am contradicting myself." Which, having no clear reference, relies on confusion and incompleteness with regards to its content to emphasize its elusiveness. And Kant says that "[t]houghts without content are empty." 303

As already mentioned, general logic is only valid in terms of relations of concepts, and must only obey the law of contradiction. If “something more” is “added” to the subject, i.e. “existence,” this cannot be contained in a conceptual, propositional predicate because it relies upon the aesthetic element of experience to confirm its reality via the affectation of the senses. That is the reason Kant says that existence is not a real predicate.

A problem would arise if one were to say: “The predicate of this sentence is existence.” Obviously, the sentence exists and existence is its predicate. However, in this sense, the proposition is synthetic a posteriori.

Synthetical a posteriori judgments, i.e. judgments of experience, offer an intermediate category of judgment. They require no explanation, Kant claims, because “experience

303 CPR, B75.
is nothing but a continual synthesis of perceptions.”\textsuperscript{304} Such judgments would probably most easily fit into the second kind of reason mentioned by Hume, above, referring to “matters of fact.”

Finally, Kant postulates, contrary to Hume, that although the laws of mathematics, geometry and even physics adhere to the law of contradiction, they are not analytical “relations of ideas,” but are rather synthetic and \textit{a priori} relations of concepts which always involve sensibility. Such judgments are a priori “because they carry with them necessity, which cannot be obtained from experience;”\textsuperscript{305} and they are synthetic because they rely on “something more” to give them validity. Such judgments, not only, rely upon a “concrete image” (\textit{Anschauung}) to give them content, but they are also \textit{ampliative}, i.e. the predicate contains more than is merely given in the subject of the proposition. For instance, in the mathematical equation “7 + 5 = 12,” “7 + 5” is the subject and “12” is the predicate. Kant argues that the concept “twelve is by no means thought by merely thinking of the combination of seven and five.”\textsuperscript{306} Concepts are always in general, according to Kant, and we can know nothing of them, in actuality, unless we are ultimately given a particular temporal/spatial content (representation or image) to apply them to (i.e. fingers or points in space); and we also necessarily require a schema (i.e. number) to mediate between rational concepts and particular occurrences of a representation.

\textsuperscript{304} Prolegomena, 26.

\textsuperscript{305} Prolegomena, 15.

\textsuperscript{306} Prolegomena, 17.
Now, when Kant claims that “understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me” and “we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put in them;”\(^3\) I will assert that the “rules” and “laws” which precede us and allow us to determine objects, or to understand them, are given in the epigenesis of reason via the pure a priori imagination, i.e., in the “first seeds and dispositions”\(^4\) of imagination and consciousness which becomes the human subject. The first principles are developed and become clearer for us “on the occasion of experience,” i.e., in language and communication in the culture one identifies with, and grows up within. And this will go along pretty closely with what Kant, himself, says in the Critique of Judgment. Kant identifies the “world” through the language and ideas of the “Western” tradition - a tradition that is gradually evolving through “revolutions” and “transformations” in thought. His historical tradition is his a priori. How did Kant discover the “Laws” of Newtonian physics? Did he not read them in a book?

This reminds me of a scene from Through the Looking-Glass,\(^5\) by Lewis Carroll...

Alice discovers a book, which, at first, appears to be written in some “strange language”:

She puzzled over this for some time, but at last a bright thought struck her.

“Why, it’s a Looking-glass book, of course! And, if I hold it up to a glass, the words will all go the right way again.” This was the poem that Alice read:

*Jabberwocky*

Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:

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\(^3\) CPR, Bxviii.

\(^4\) CPR, A65-6, B90-1.

All mimsy were the borogoves,  
And the mome raths outgrabe.

“Beware the Jabberwock, my son!  
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch! 
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun 
The frumious Bandersnatch!”

He took his vorpal sword in hand:  
Long time the manxome foe he sought--  
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,  
And stood a while in thought.

And, as in uffish thought he stood,  
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,  
Came whiff ling through the tulgey wood,  
And burbled as it came!

One, two! One, two! And through and through  
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!  
He left it dead, and with its head  
He went galumphing back.

“And hast thou slain the Jabberwock?  
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!  
frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!”  
He chortled in his joy.

‘Twas brillig, and the slithy toves  
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:  
All mimsy were the borogoves,  
And the mome raths outgrabe.

What follows is Humpty Dumpty’s Explication of Jabberwocky310:

“You seem very clever at explaining words, Sir,” said Alice. “Would you kindly tell me the meaning of the poem Jabberwocky?”

“Let’s hear it,” said Humpty Dumpty. ‘I can explain all the poems that ever were invented - and a good many that haven’t been invented just yet.’ This sounded very hopeful, so Alice repeated the first verse:

“All mimsy were the borogoves,  
And the mome raths outgrabe.”

310 Ibid., p. 826, From Through the Looking-Glass, Ch. VI.
That’s enough to begin with,” Humpty Dumpty interrupted: “there are plenty of hard words there. ‘Brillig’ means four o’clock in the afternoon - the time when you begin ‘broiling’ things for dinner.”

“That’ll do very well,” said Alice; “and ‘slithy’?”

“Well, ‘slithy’ means ‘lithe and slimy’. ‘Lithe’ is the same as ‘active.’ You see it’s like a portmanteau - there are two meanings packed up into one word.”

“I see it now,” Alice remarked thoughtfully: “and what are ‘toves’?”

“Well, ‘toves’ are something like badgers - they’re something like lizards - and they’re something like corkscrews.”

“They must be very curious creatures.”

“They are at that,” said Humpty Dumpty: “also they make their nests under sundials - also they live on cheese.”

“And what’s to ‘gyre’ and to ‘gimble’?”

“To ‘gyre’ is to go round and round like a gyroscope. To ‘gimble’ is to make holes like a gimlet.”

“And the ‘wabe’ is the grass plot round a sundial, I suppose?” said Alice, surprised at her own ingenuity.

“Oh course it is. It’s called ‘wabe’, you know, because it goes a long way before it, and a long way behind it—”

“And a long way beyond it on each side,” Alice added.

“Exactly so. Well then, ‘mimsy’ is ‘flimsy and miserable’ (there’s another portmanteau for you). And a ‘borogove’ is a thin shabby-looking bird with its feathers sticking out all round - something like a live mop.”

“And then ‘mome raths’?” said Alice. “If I’m not giving you too much trouble.”

“Well, a ‘rath’ is a sort of green pig: but ‘mome’ I’m not certain about. I think it’s short for ‘from home’ - meaning that they’d lost their way, you know.”

“And what does ‘outgrabe’ mean?”

“Well, ‘outgribing’ is something between bellowing and whistling, with a kind of sneeze in the middle: however, you’ll hear it done, maybe - down in the wood yonder - and when you’ve once heard it you’ll be quite content. Who’s been repeating all that hard stuff to you?”

“I read it in a book,” said Alice.

Obviously, Alice is not learning about “physics” here. But could we perhaps say that Carroll is demonstrating for us the absurdity of someone who claims to know Truth by some Absolute Rationality? Certainly Humpty Dumpty can “explain,” i.e., “define,” what Alice is asking about, he can give her a wonderful “logical” analysis of “word-relations” - the words make sense even though what they refer to may be non-

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311 Ibid., p. 826 fn.: Concerning the pronouncing of these words, Carroll later said: “The ‘i’ in ‘slithy’ is long, as in ‘writhe’; and ‘toves’ is pronounced so as to rhyme with ‘groves.’ Again, the first ‘o’ in ‘borogoves’ is pronounced like the ‘o’ in ‘borrow.’ I have heard people try to give it the sound of the ‘o’ in ‘worry.’ Such is Human Perversity.”
sensical. Alice can even deduce, from her imagination, what the “invisible, nonsensical” referent of one of the words “is.”

However, by “knowing,” for instance, that the words “mome raths” refer to “green pigs who have lost their way from home,” does she “know” any more or less than if she were told that: “The sky is blue because of Molecules.”? Or that “1 + 1 = 2”? Are “these” not merely a way of believing or saying: “This is how things are”?

Let us examine the proposition: ‘This is how things are. - How can I say that this is the general form of propositions? - It is first and foremost itself a proposition, an English sentence, for it has a subject and a predicate. But how is this sentence applied--that is, in everyday language? For I got it from there and nowhere else.’

We understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in flash.

What really comes before our mind when we understand a word?--Isn’t it something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture?

What follows, in the next few pages, is an aide for those philosophers who have a problem with the correspondence between: words and the world. One could say, along with Lyotard: The philosopher is already in the midst [of ....] determinations already supplied. [...]The philosopher, artist, the writer is situated in an interval [...] a nascent state.” And likewise, one could say, so are children...


313 Ibid., §138.

314 Ibid., §139.

MIJN EERSTE WoORDJES

TUUT! TUUT!
RIJ JE MEE?
Tellen

Deltas
trein

1

Links zit één reiziger.
Ollie Olifant leest zijn krant.
Waarom is de lucht blauw?

Een vraag maar raak boekje
Kijk, de zonnestralen schijnen door de lucht! Ook door de moleculen. Het licht gaat alle kanten op. Zie je wel?
To return to the opening question of this introductory critique of a Critique: Who am I?

I am my body: my brain, my neurons, my organs, tissues, bones, blood, hormones, sperm, urine, feces; I am my cells (and the atoms which compose them: the electrons, protons, neutrons, and so on...); I am my heartbeat, my breathing; I am everything (animals, plants, nutrients, chemicals) that I have eaten and drunk, all of the
movements I have made, all of the pain and pleasure, happiness and sadness that I have felt, all of the perceptions and thoughts, dreams, drives, desires, imaginations and illusions, that I have “experienced;” I am my mother and father, their mothers and fathers, and so on... I am everything I have made: the skills I have learned, the art I have created, the poetry I have written, the thesis I am writing, the tools that I have used, the words that I have learned, spoken, written, heard or read... I am all of my “ethical” actions: I am the way I have treated other people and animals... I am everyone (plants, animals and people) who I have met, observed, and talked to: my friends, my family, my Grandma; the homeless man who JUMPED up when I passed him lying under newspapers, in the crevice of a deserted building, on a cold, dark night in K.C.; the drug addict who cried to me, pleading for money; the hardened, bitter face, and burning eyes of the man with no legs who had fought in Vietnam; the dying, agonizing children who I see in a magazine article on Ruwanda; the “retarded” people who I recently saw perform, quite well, in a play; my Indian friend from K.C. who gave me his medicine bag and called me his brother; my dog (“Bubba”), who I once observed giving another dog his food under the railing of our fence; the cat who visits me and had her kittens in my room; I am everyone who I have read, the teachers and professors in my life who I have learned from; the women that I have loved; I am the music that I listen to, the poetry I have “experienced,” the art that I have seen... And I am the places that I have visited and lived: the Grand Canyon, my Grandma’s house, my home in Leuven, the sound of the trains, the streets, the buildings, the gray skies of Belgium; I am the earth, the sky, the stars, the sun, the moon... I am the Universe..... Who am I?
Perhaps Borges says it much better than I ever shall... From The Book of Sand:

I

The skull within, the secret, shuttered heart,
the byways of the blood I never see,
the underworld of dreaming, that Proteus,
the nape, the viscera, the skeleton.
I am all those things. Amazingly,
I am too the memory of a sword
and of a solitary, falling sun,
turning itself to gold, then grey, then nothing.
I am the one who sees the approaching ships
from harbour. And I am the dwindled books,
the rare engravings worn away by time;
the one who envies those already dead.
Stranger to be the man who interlaces
such words as these, in some room, in a house.

The point of all of this is: What or whoever “I” may be - I exist. And everything that I have mentioned exists, also (the words and what they refer to). Why? Because I have said it, and you have read what I have said, and you have understood it. And you have understood “it” because “you” exist in the same “world,” and participate in the same general rational “myth,” the same language game, as “I” do.

The question this all comes down to is: Does existence - with all of its infinite relations and transformations - precede rationality...or, does rationality precede existence? Or, perhaps, do they both come about together---not necessarily simultaneously---but somehow “together” - as part(s), or form(s), of an infinite source - be it Imagination, Desire, or “together” under one designation - Love? Could we perhaps say that if everything were not already related and existent - though always undergoing change in varying degrees, transforming and renewing itself - then there

would be nothing for rationality to “discover”? Perhaps rationality is a limitation to transformation, itself being a “form,” or “style,” of transformation (as Kant suggests)?

Now, how do we relate all of this to Kant? First of all, as we have seen, in his *Critique of Pure Reason* all that Kant has demonstrated for us is the “method” through which we gain theoretical, i.e. logical and necessary (i.e., mathematical and scientific) knowledge - through a synthesis with *a priori* Categories. The access to these Categories being limited to a gifted few - who share their “wonderful” knowledge with others through a historic and cultural process. Such “knowledge,” when extended to what we “know” from everyday aesthetic experience, would seem to “lack” something - we do not always think in analytic, scientific terms. And those who “try” to think in such terms, even Kant will admit, are rather boring, and they do not lead us to freedom so much as the “genius.” On this note, after taking a brief look at the role of imagination in mathematical judgments, let us move on to the *Critique of Judgment*, shall we?

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§9b. On The Role of Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Mathematics

In order to understand Kant’s theory of mathematics we must first receive some background knowledge (which is greatly assisted by the “example” interpretation provided by J. Michael Young in “Kant’s View of Imagination”).

First, we note that Kant’s *Logic* he distinguishes between the genus of knowledge (‘*erkenntnis*”) and one of the specific forms, or grades of knowledge (“*Kenntnis*”).

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317 CPR, Bvii.
Young states that here the point is that “Kenntnis is a form of Erkenntnis, but a lower form, lacking the full range of features that characterize the latter. Similarly, I will suggest, the synthesis of imagination is a lower form of the synthesis of understanding.”319 Given this hypothesis, we shall see that the imagination will play an essential role in the “grounding” of mathematical judgements;320 the imagination being that faculty which “represents in intuition an object that is not itself present (i.e. not empirically present).”321 Young represents the Kantian notion of imagination in two moments: 1) as it applies to sensory awareness, i.e., in representing something in empirical intuition; 2) representing something ‘not present,’ i.e. the addition of “something more” than is empirically received (i.e. the act of “interpretation”).322

Perception for Kant requires both having certain sensible states (affections), plus, the ability to “associate” those states “within a range of (possible) mental “images.”323 Young asserts that this last function implies “an awareness of something.” Now, how is it that these “possible” mental images are there in the first place?

The synthesis of intuitions (i.e. representations) of time relations is, in general, a function of the imagination - “a blind but indispensable function of the soul […] of which we are scarcely ever conscious.”324 The imagination, in general, is that faculty

318 (Logic, Intro., viii, pp. 71-2 (Ak IX, 64-5), Young, 152, fn20).

319 Young, “Kant’s View of Imagination,” 152, n.20.

320 CPR, B741, B176.

321 CPR, B151.

322 Young, 142.

323 Young, 143.

324 CPR, A78.
through which sensible intuitions are apprehended, “stored,” and compared (reproduced and associated). However, it is the understanding through which this synthesis is brought to concepts, i.e., through which we are conscious of the “self,” in apperception, giving objective determinations to given particular representations by matching these particulars to universal a priori concepts. I will assert, therefore, that the synthesis of the manifold which takes place in imagination must be a form of “unconscious consciousness” [to borrow a Freudian term ... In Freud’s “The Unconscious” he speaks of the possibility of a ‘second consciousness,’ i.e., of “the existence of ‘psychical acts’ which lack consciousness.” These acts are “united in oneself with the consciousness one knows”]. We could say, therefore, that the imagination is a “subjective source of knowledge,” i.e., it “is a necessary ingredient of perception itself;” while the synthesis with the a priori categories provides the determinative, “objective” source of unity – i.e., what allows for discursive, abstract, reflective representation of universal rules to “actively” follow, or apply, to given particular representations; and, it provides us with our Yes-No/True-False logical determinations regarding the identities of particulars already apprehended, associated and reproduced within – through the “unconsciously conscious” process of imagination. But how do we have access to this objective realm? How do we know

325 CPR, A101-3.
326 CPR, A78-9, A126, B136.
328 Ibid.
329 CPR, B115.
330 CPR, A120n.
331 cf. Kant’s Logic §§1-6, Young, 150.
if our subjective decisions about identity are “correct” or not? How are these two “realms” connected? Through judgement, a “natural gift,” which is closely intertwined with the power of imagination [Einbildungskraft].

Judgement is “the faculty of subsuming particulars under concepts or rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule.” We shall see how judgement pertains to aesthetic, i.e., reflective judgements, in a moment, but now we will see its application in “determinative judgements” of mathematics. It should first be noted that pure concepts of the understanding can only be employed in empirical cognition, and then only insofar as they are schematised, and that schematization of the pure concepts of the understanding is a function, or product of imagination. What is the schema in arithmetical judgements? It would appear to be “(a) number” itself.

To understand this we should realize that, in order for Kant to give mathematics a semblance of “reality” he must relate it to the apprehension of particular identities intuited within the sensible realm. As Young points out, Kant solves this problem by making arithmetical judgements pertain to “collections or sets of particulars viewed as possessing number” (i.e., judging $1 + 1 = 2$ asserts that every collection of $1 + 1$ things is necessarily a collection of 2 things). Young further states that “when we make a categorical judgement, we affirm (or deny) a predicate of certain things… we

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332 CPR, 293, B350.
333 CPR, A132, B171.
334 CPR, A140.
335 Young, 157.
affirm (or deny) it ...either of ‘all’ the things in question or only of ‘some’ of them.”\(^337\) And this “determination” relates to the concept of totality - seen as the concept of a collective unity of particulars having a “determinate membership,”\(^338\) i.e., of having an already determined identity. In the mathematical sense, such identity revolves around the logical notions of quantity and magnitude, i.e., “every collection, viewed as a totality of its elements or members, has a certain magnitude or quantity (\textit{Grosse, quantatis}).”\(^339\) for besides asking how many things are in a collection – all or some – of which a predicate is to be affirmed or denied, we can also ask, for a collection viewed as a totality, how many things it contains.”\(^340\)

Now, since Kant claims that the notion of number can be ascribed neither to sensibility nor to understanding, i.e., “we cannot frame a concept of number,”\(^341\) arithmetical knowledge must depend upon our “ability to identify collections of sensible things as collections possessing and exhibiting determinate quantity,”\(^342\) to which we apply a number or schema. To phrase it differently, a number (“schema”) constitutes the representation – of the determinate identity of a collection of objects – conceived of as related units possessing a determinate quantity – the quantity being dependent “on our ability to run through the members of that collection one after the other,”\(^343\) i.e., through the “successive addition of unit to (homogenous) unit.”\(^344\) Or

\(^337\) Young, 157.
\(^338\) Ibid.
\(^339\) CPR, A142, B182.
\(^340\) Young, 158.
\(^341\) Young, 161.
\(^342\) Young, 161-2.
“simply” stated, “number” is the appropriate rule (for enumeration) through which a phenomenon, or sensible concept, of an object [is] in agreement with the categories.”\(^{345}\)

It would seem then that logical determinations of identity and difference, i.e., of what is correct-false, in mathematics, hangs off on if the “number,” to which one “labels” a collective identity, conforms to preordained rules which relate to categories – in this case, made accessible through the schema established-“discovered” by the productive imaginations of “that wonderful people the Greeks.”\(^{346}\) And what are these “determinations” anyway?

A reply to Kant from a Distant Relative

“Number” is a word. For example, what is this: “1”? Whether you say it is: “een”, “one,” “a ‘shape’,” “a ‘symbol’,” “nothing,” “a representation,” or whatever, you will have to admit that it is something which you perceive and is referred to with, and as, a word. Would you have known that “1 + 1 = 2 “ if someone had not taught you the word for “1” (“een”) and “2” (“twee”), and “+” (“plus”), and “=” (“gelijk zijn aan “), and then, if they had not taught you what they referred to, i.e., “een muisje,” “twee muisjes,” and that “‘een muisje’ ‘plus’ ‘een muisje’ ‘gelijk zijn aan’ ‘twee muisjes’”?  

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\(^{343}\) Young, 160.

\(^{344}\) CPR, A142, B182.

\(^{345}\) CPR, A146, B186.

\(^{346}\) CPR, Bx.
And what is this: □? In English it is “a square.” But how would I have known this unless someone had first told, or taught, me? Is it possible to have □□□□ and the word for “them”: “squares” floating around in my head? Or at least, is it possible before I learn what this: □ is: “square,” and then I imagine “more than one square”: □□□□: “squares” floating in my head?

You may say, “Oh well how did I know that a square had four equal sides, and that a diagonal through it gives me two right triangles, and that these triangles have one 90° (“ninety degree”) angle and two 45° (“forty-five degree”) angles, etc…? Well, did you know this before someone taught you? I am sorry but I do not have any stupid slaves around – who will agree with everything I say – to “test” this “theory” on. But I do think it can be demonstrated with children. And I do think it goes along with Kant’s theory, i.e. that our “theoretical knowledge,” at least in mathematics and physics, is “produced” by “mathematicians” and “scientists”, all we can ever do, unless we can “create” a “new” theory, and thus build upon other theories, is to follow the “synthetic,” or “transcendental knowledge” “discovered” by the “scientists,” and utilize them as “examples.”

But on a deeper level here, Young had led us to what can be called the “unthought” in the thought of Kant. He has pointed out to us that the imagination - that “blind but indispensable function of the soul of which we are scarcely ever conscious,” i.e., that function of the soul which I have related to the Freudian idea of an “unconscious consciousness” - is, perhaps in itself, a “subjective source of knowledge” - the

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347 CPR, B174.

348 CPR, A115.
“ability to bring sensible affection under a rule, to construe it as the awareness of something manifesting certain general features.” In other words, we subjectively (“unconscious consciously”) make general determinations of identity and difference apart from being made relatively conscious of them through their objective, more “absolutized,” application to universal categories (and to apperception), i.e. without having to think about them from a position of complete separation. Such general “determinations” of identity and difference (made subjectively by the imagination) would, then, seem to be interconnected with consciousness, or at least the identity, of “self.”

What should be noted here is that while the subjective “imaginary” portion of the synthesis tends to unite differences into general features or identities, the objective “intellectual” moment of synthesis would seem to divide differences into “absolutized” Categories. Is there a level of awareness of self which precedes objective Categorical determinations? That is, is it possible that animals have a form of consciousness?

Now, when Kant states, “All appearances as possible experiences, lie a priori in the understanding,” we have already seen that these appearances also lie a priori in the “productive imagination” — the “unconscious consciousness” within all of us (awaiting “discovery,” i.e., awaiting their formal possibility – i.e. awaiting our absolutized “consciousness” of them “in the world”. My question is: Do scientists

349 Young, 164.

350 CPR, A127.

351 CPR, A120.
who provide us with exemplary ways of “seeing” the universe have contact with some “ideal,” rational realm, or, are they merely discovering general relations, or features, which already exist “in the world” and which they already recognize in the imagination – which they put into scientific “objective” language, i.e., expressions? In other words, are the universal (purely formal) categories, which Kant speaks about, “located” in some timeless absolute realm above and beyond being? Or, do they exist at a much deeper level – at a level of universal relation which precedes the “imaginary-intellectual synthesis” and the objective consciousness of “self” that comes with it?

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B. ASPECTS OF THE AESTHETIC SELF

On the Transition from Theoretical Reason to Practical Reason
via Aesthetic and Teleological Judgments

As we have seen, although Kant believes that “all of our knowledge begins with experience”\(^3\) (i.e., ways of “perceiving” the external “phenomenal world” - in time and space) there is a “deeper” level involved which leads to this experience. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant related this deeper level to the *a priori* categories of understanding (i.e., “understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being *in me* prior to objects being given to me”\(^4\)) which give “form” to all possible perceptions, i.e., “while the matter of all appearance is given to us *a posteriori* only, its form must lie ready for the sensations *a priori* in the mind, and so must be considered apart from all sensation.”\(^5\) We have access to these categories through judgment, i.e., through the schema. The schema is *actively* provided by the productive imagination of the scientist-metaphysician. But I will assert that the great majority of us rely upon schema that are always already there when we *passively* receive empirical concepts in the sensible moment of the synthesis of imagination.

All that the categories of understanding would seem to provide us with is objective, scientific knowledge (i.e., numerical manipulations in mathematics and access to physical laws of the universe), and also, they give credence to the necessary, logical, analytic judgments - which, in general, pertain to the language (i.e., predicates already

352 CPR, B1.

353 CPR, Bxvii, my emphasis.

354 CPR, B34.
given to “things”) used by scientists and “philosophers” (i.e., those philosophers who cannot see beyond rational “necessity,” i.e., judgments already determined for them). All such “judgments,” it would seem, can “theoretically” take “place” purely in time - “in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible.” That is to say, it would seem theoretically possible that logical judgments may exist purely in the mind without the need of space - “the form of all appearances of outer sense.” However, “practically” the human subject is in need of “outer intuition” (i.e., nature) in order, not only to be conscious of “oneself,” but also, in order to consciously (re)act in time. In other words, objects perceived in space (nature) provide the necessary material to which the human subject may provide the form, i.e., nature provides the affect, to which we supply the underlying notion of “purposiveness,” and is ultimately connected to the freedom which allows man to think and act beyond the stagnant realm of analytic, logical necessity.

We shall enter into this more fully when I discuss the *Critique of Judgment*. But for now we should note that the majority of men are not thinking “scientifically” most of the time. There must be some way of accounting for our everyday “surface” perceptions of the “world,” i.e., the “place” in which we selectively, and subjectively, perceive particular things within the “whole.” Thus Kant must account for common sense understanding - of “my” perceived body, “other’s” bodies, and the external (phenomenal) world of appearances, as a whole, i.e., in Nature - the realm in which subjective “determinations” of identity and difference take place. Kant is never clear about this, and it would seem that he relates all determinations of identity and

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355 CPR, A23, B37.

356 CPR, B42.
difference to the categories, but I will seek the source of such subjective “determinations” within his theory of art.

The “subjective source of knowledge,” within Kant’s philosophy, has been discussed briefly in section §9b where Young has pointed out to us that the imagination - the subjective moment of the “temporal synthesis” which, together with its objective moment, leads to understanding, perception and apperception - is, in itself, “the ability to bring sensible affection under a rule, to construe it as the awareness of something manifesting certain general features.”

I shall relate the “rule” involved in this portion of the synthesis (i.e., the “rule” which allows us to synthesize the manifold into the “intuition” of a particular “object” - not itself present, i.e., not empirically present to judgments of taste, and to the “law of freedom.” But first, let us look at some ambiguities pertaining to Kant’s theory of the “subjective source of knowledge.”

Lyotard will relate the “advent” of these subjective rules (or aesthetic “determinations” of identity and difference), within Kant’s philosophy, to “the law” which is given to the subject. I quote:

To be, aesthetically (in the sense of Kant’s First critique), is to be-there, here and now, exposed in space-time, and to the space-time of something that touches before any concept or even any representation. This before is not known, obviously, because it is there before we are. It is something like birth and infancy (Latin, ‘in-fans’) - there before we are. The there in question is called the body. It is not “I” who am born, who is given birth to. “I” will be born afterwards, with language, precisely upon leaving infancy. My affairs will have been handled and decided before I can answer for them - and once and for all: this infancy, this body, this unconscious remaining there my entire life. When the law comes to me, with the ego and language, it is too late.


358 CPR, B151.
Things will have already taken a turn. And the turn of the law will not manage to efface the first turn, this first touch. Aesthetics has to do with this first touch: the one that touched me when I was not there. [....] The touch is necessarily a fault with regard to the law.  

But where does this “law,” that Lyotard is talking about, come from? ...That is, is the “touch” necessarily a fault with regard to the “law” within? The “law” of culture? Or does it (the “law”) come from “Beyond”? According to Lyotard, the law is “inscribed” upon man within a historical framework - beginning with the acquisition of written language. This “law,” also marks the incorporation into “civilization” - i.e., into the “white Western European” - i.e. “Egypto-Greco-Judeo-Christian” tradition. Lyotard illustrates this within a context of Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony.”

“In the Penal Colony” revolves around a “death machine” that tortuously “inscribes” the law upon the body of the innocent savage,” i.e., the “savage, or “child,” whose only crime is “being-there” when “the law” is given to, or perhaps better, forced upon, him. The body, Lyotard says, “will be sanctified only by this prescribed inscription of the prescription. This inscription must suppress the body as an outlawed savagery. [....] As for the law, this innocence of the flesh is criminal.”

Thus we see what Lyotard refers to as: the “necessary cruelty” - required in order to bring the “other” (i.e., the “savage”) to consciousness or awareness - filling his “with the “right ideas.” Once the savage “grows up” politics enters, and the “new Commandant” apparently does away with the “death machine.” “Politics abhors the

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362 Ibid. p. 185, my interpretation.
machine and cruelty,” Lyotard claims. The “new Commandant” brings freedom and Enlightenment, trial by ‘disputatio’, and Reason to the “Other.”

But is not Lyotard missing something here? No matter how hard he tries to cover it over, he has just given a defense to every violent act that went into the “inscription” of “European Law” upon her colonies of savages. By transferring his allegiance to a “new Commandant” - i.e., when the “savage” reaches his “adulthood” (i.e., independence) - the now former savage is ideally on the same level as the “European” who provided him with her “gifts.” But I wonder if this is actually the case. Is there something else involved here besides helping the savage to “see the light”? Is not “the machine” still functioning quietly, but quite well, today?

Whatever is the case, Lyotard has led us to an extreme ambiguity in Kantian thought. Is it necessary for the European to bring “the savage” the Good, i.e., the Law, in the first place? What, or should we say, “whose,” purpose is the Good serving here? It seems clear that Kant associates the Good with rationality, but he also associates it with aesthetic judgments which can only take place in time. As such, the rational realm enters “aesthetically,” - i.e., from “the depths of the soul” (even in the case of the scientist-mathematician) -- within (one could say simultaneously with) an always already functioning cultural identity, or framework - i.e., the subjective moment of synthesis is simultaneous with the objective moment, i.e., the “ego and language” are always already there.

363 Ibid, p. 189.
364 Ibid., my interpretation.
Now, the question is: Why should written (i.e., “European”) language be the sign of
the Good (or rationality) any more than these “Other” (i.e., “savage”) languages?
languages which, without utilizing “writing” (i.e., the “Greek alphabet”), still allow
for cultural harmony - a perfectly adequate means of communication, law and
economic exchange? And why should the Good be given to the savage from without,
i.e., from outside of his already functioning identity structure?

This “necessity” of “the law” entering from the outside would seem to go against the
grain of Kantian thought, for, according to Kant, the moral law comes from within.
There is no way to justify a “law” coming from the outside. In fact, Kant will say that
a law which comes from the outside is tyranny and must be overcome. We shall
discuss Kant’s ideas on “rebellion” a little later, but for now, let us just say that such
“determinations” (of identity and difference), which Lyotard associates with the
“law,” are, for Kant, at least partly, based upon “reflective judgments” - which are, by
no means, certain and absolute. Kant believed in revolution and change from within -
not just for “savages” but - for all of mankind to advance, in time, towards an “end”
of freedom in the world. As such, it would seem possible that the European may learn
something from the “savage,” if merely spiritually; just as a “savage” may learn
from the European - “legally” and technologically.

In tribute to his mentor Rousseau, and in reply to those elite, “authentic” intellectuals
of society, Kant states:

365 My mentioning that the “European” may learn something “spiritually” from the “savage” would
perhaps go along with Kant’s influence by Rousseau’s ideas. While Rousseau sought to discover
man’s nature by “historical analysis,” i.e., by resorting to the “noble savage” theme, Kant believed that
“he did not so much wish that man should return to the state of nature as that, from his present position,
he should look back upon his natural condition as a means of discovering in himself the universal -
the essence of what he is, apart from the various distortions introduced by society” (Beck, Intro, to CPrR,
7, quoted from Kant’s Anthropology, II, E (Cassirer ed., VII, 326)).
By inclination I am an inquirer. I feel a consuming thirst for knowledge, the unrest which goes with the desire to progress in it, and satisfaction at every advance in it. There was a time when I believed this constituted the honor of humanity, and I despised the people who know nothing. Rousseau corrected me in this. This blinding prejudice disappeared. I learned to honor man, and I would find myself more useless than the common laborer if I did not believe that this attitude of mine [as an investigator] I can give worth to all others in establishing the rights of mankind.\textsuperscript{366}

Although Kant believes that all men, as rational beings, are ends in themselves, and that all men have in common a moral law within, i.e., a good will, he realized how twisted and mangled it becomes in “reality,” i.e. in one’s social environment. He tries to solve this problem by discounting all sensual pleasures - besides drinking Claret, having pleasant dinner conversations with friends, taking regular walks, playing billiards and listening to German marching music; he even had a piece of art (if one could call it art) - a picture of Rousseau (i.e., a man “who would rebuke the vanity of the great who spend the people’s sweat on such superfluous things”\textsuperscript{367}) hanging on his wall.\textsuperscript{368} Kant was human, after all. But, nevertheless, he tried to find something universal underlying all empirical phenomena, pleasures, and actions. What follows is Kant’s view (i.e., definition) of “life”:

‘Life’ is the faculty of a being by which it acts according to the laws of the faculty of desire [i.e., practical reason]. The ‘faculty of desire’ is the faculty such a being has of causing, through its ideas, the reality of the objects of those ideas. ‘Pleasure’ is the idea of the agreement of an object or an action with the ‘subjective’ conditions of life, i.e. with the faculty through which an idea causes the reality of its object (or the directions of energies of a subject to such an action as will produce the object).\textsuperscript{369}


\textsuperscript{367} CJ, §2, 205.


\textsuperscript{369} CPrR, V9, 124.
This definition makes “life” sound almost magical - though I do not think Kant would ever have admitted it. Now, where do these ideas, of the ‘faculty of desire’ come from? Kant will say that they come from the human subject - but this is always rather in-directly as we shall see. For now, let us return to aesthetic judgments, shall we? How does one cause particular “objects” (i.e., determinations of identity and difference) to “appear,” within the manifold of the universe, in the first place?

What I will demonstrate with my analysis of the Critique of Judgment, and Kant’s historical theses, is the necessity for an ongoing search for identity and meaning - which involves the continued need for transformation, within the instituted identity structure of a “culture.” Such evolution involves re-newing, and re-finding, one’s “self” through communication with the “other” - i.e., losing oneself in the rain of words and re-finding one’s “self” in the reign of words...losing oneself in the beauty of the world and finding one’s “self” in one’s duty to the world. It involves participation in the communication of ideas through utilizing reflective judgments of taste; and, for some naturally gifted individuals, it involves providing culture with the ideas which they reflect upon, and which, in a sense, “determine” culture’s perceptions of identity and difference. The scientist and the artist, then, participate in the productive imagination of Being - (i.e., it is the scientist who “provides the schema” for a natural law - laying the basis for how we understand the world; but it is the artist (genius) who “creates the rule” for art that leads mankind to freedom). And both of these “artists” receive their gifts from an art concealed in the depths of the human soul.” 370

370 CPR, B181, CI, 253 fn17 & 287 fn8.
§10. On Aesthetic Judgments, Imagination and Freedom

Kant states in a reflection that imagination must be disciplined in order to be “productive” - otherwise one risks losing track of the actual by crediting the unreal.371 This remark, originating in the late 1770s, is in reply to the fanaticism, which Kant sensed, surrounding the rise of the Sturm und Drang movement - led by his former student, Johann Herder, and Herder’s companion, the young Goethe.372 Zammito points out that, “Herder and the Sturm und Drang were the main targets of Kant’s theory of art and genius.”373

One of the major tenets of this movement is the adherence to the proto-Romantic “cult of the genius” - the genius being “exempt from the customary rules and judgments of society [....] and once it was coupled with that sentimental, melancholy sensitivity which was known as Empfindsamkeit it produced an intellectual and emotional mood in which everyone (as Goethe put it in Dichtung und Wahrheit) felt he could be the Prince of Denmark.”374 The emergent German culture was quick to back such ideas of the Sturm und Drang as: ethnic and linguistic uniqueness and creativity, along with a pride in religious tradition “and a staunch aversion to Western rationalism and its

371 J. Zammito, p. 44 fn156, quotes from Kant’s Reflection 369 and 499, found in Kant’s Gesamte Schriften Herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-83), usually called the Akademie-Ausgabe (A.A.), 15:144, 217.

372 M. Hulse, in the Introduction to his translation of J.W. Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther, (N.Y.: Penguin Group, 1989), p. 17, points out that Goethe’s works reflect an awareness of the conflict between individual and society, and that this conflict remained unresolved within himself. However, one should recognize that Goethe, after all, was a Doctor of Law; and following a period of reflection after the French Revolution Goethe writes: “Only Law can give us Freedom” (Ibid.). Perhaps this reflects his reading of Kant.

373 J. Zammito, p. 10.

374 M. Hulse, p. 17.
Latin classicist aesthetic,\textsuperscript{375} (i.e., they advocated “Greek,” instead of “Roman,” rational origins).

These ideas, coupled with the “new ‘dogmatic metaphysics’ of hylozoism”\textsuperscript{376} and pantheism connected with the philosophy of Spinoza, especially as it was being propagated by Herder in the late 1780s, posed a threat, not only to Kant’s commitments to moral freedom, cosmopolitanism, and rational theism, but also to the \textit{Aufklärung} movement in Germany as a whole. The \textit{Aufklärung}, which had its roots in intellectual and political freedom within the cultural milieu of Germany, was also being jeopardized by the increased censorship, imposed upon rational theologians, by the conservative reactionary Protestant orthodoxy.

Kant saw that, in order to deal with these fanatical “ethnic purists” and dogmatic religious zealots, and in order to save intellectual “freedom,” he would have to somehow mediate between the two extremes (i.e., between the particular ideas of ethnic “uniqueness” and the universal ideas of freedom and cosmopolitanism”). To do this he would have to turn to aesthetic judgments of taste.

Early in his philosophical career Kant did not believe that subjective judgments could have a valid and universal ground. He states in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}:

\begin{quote}
The Germans are the only people who make use of the word ‘aesthetic’ in order to signify what others call the critique of taste. This usage originated in the abortive attempt made by Baumgarten [i.e., \textit{Aesthetica} (1750)], that admirable analytic thinker, to bring the critical treatment of the beautiful under rational principles, and so to raise its rules to the rank of a science. But such endeavors are fruitless. The said rules or criteria are, as regards their
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{375} J. Zammito, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{376} J. Zammito, p. 6.
sources merely critical, and subsequently can never serve as *a priori* laws by which our judgment of taste must be directed.\(^{377}\)

Zammito relates this to the problem of singular “intuition.”\(^{378}\) This can be exemplified by the problem of, what Kant has referred to in the *Prolegomena* as - “common sense’ knowledge. Common sense is, for Kant, demonstrated in the manner of our actions which we perform daily. But this common sense must be shown practically, by the thoughtfulness and reasonableness of what one thinks and says. It is not, he strongly pronounces, something that can be appealed to “as an oracle when no rational justification can be advanced.”\(^{379}\)

But he fails, at this period, to make the link (through the subject) between objective “perceptions” and the subjective source of “truth.” He states in a paper which he hands to the Berlin Academy in 1763, “[T]he faculty of perceiving truth is intellection, while that of sensing the good is feeling, and [...] they must not be interchanged.”\(^{380}\)

In the 1760s Kant states that, “Knowledge of beauty is only criticism [...] its proof is *a posteriori.*”\(^{381}\) However, in the late 1770s Kant’s thought begins to turn, while still denying that one can have intellectual intuitions, he says, “[T]here are only two sources of valid insights: rational science and critical clarity.”\(^{382}\)

\(^{377}\) CPR, A27.

\(^{378}\) J. Zammito, pp. 20, 343.

\(^{379}\) *Prolegomena*, 6.


\(^{381}\) Kant, *Reflection* 622 (1760s), A.A. 15:268; J. Zammito, p.31, fn88.

\(^{382}\) Kant *Reflection* 897 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:392; J. Zammito, p. 43, fn148.
Now, how is “critical clarity” possible? Perhaps Kant now realizes that he must also defend his “critiques,” and that critical clarity must have to do with “knowledge of beauty” - or at least with aesthetic judgments. Earlier, in 1755-6, he reflects that “the beautiful sciences are those which make ready to hand the rules for the inferior capacities of knowledge, that is confused knowledge.”\textsuperscript{383} Now, how are these “rules made ready to hand”? And what are these rules? To answer this it seems that Kant must provide “confused knowledge” with some form of credibility.

In the late 1770s, Kant concedes to the existence of genius while still allowing no place for the genius in science.\textsuperscript{384} He warns against its excessive “uncontrolled” influence, saying that “true genius” seeks universality of access and meaning, while those who insist upon mystification, refusing to be examined in the clear light of reason, are not participating in genius but illusion.\textsuperscript{385}

With the rising influence of the \textit{Sturm und Drang} upon the German people Kant stresses the need for “self-control”:

Charms and emotions move one against one’s will; they are always impudent because they rob others of their peace. (To storm [‘sturmen’] against my sensibilities is rude. I may want to have my emotions stirred, but only in a way in which I keep those under control. When that line is crossed over, then others playing with me rather than letting me into their game).\textsuperscript{386}

\textsuperscript{383} Kant, \textit{Reflection} 2387, (1755-6); J. Zammito, p. 21, fn21.

\textsuperscript{384} J. Zammito, p. 41, fn139. Zammito points out that such authorities, as P. Menzer (in \textit{Kants Aesthetik in ihrer Entwicklung}, Berlin: Akademie, 1952, p. 87), were mystified” by Kant’s choice to depart from the majority of the “wise” men who, though they shared his “cold-blooded view of reason,” chose not to reject the idea of genius in science. Zammito says that, “What Menzer missed was Kant’s outrage at the excesses of the ‘\textit{Sturm und Drang}’ cult of genius, and hence the polemical slant behind the theory of genius Kant constructed” (Zammito, n. 139, p. 358-9).

\textsuperscript{385} Kant, \textit{Reflection} 899 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:393; J. Zammito, p. 43, fn150.

\textsuperscript{386} Kant, \textit{Reflection} 767 (1772-3), A.A. 15:334; J. Zammito, p.37 fn119 states, “The parenthetical remark was lined out later by Kant, but it is the most revealing passage in the ‘Reflection’” (Ibid, p. 358).
In another reflection, Kant contrasts the Schwarmerei ("emotional fervor") raised by the Sturm und Drang version of genius with the "dryness and laboriousness and cold-bloodedness of judgment." However, he concedes that schwarmersch authors could be of value, but only if they present before the public matters of importance, i.e., entertainment (fine art), invention (technology), or understanding (scholarship).

In other words, it looks as though Kant is seeking credibility for subjective knowledge through the particular "productions" of genius - who, at least, seeks universally valid forms for the judgment, entertainment and contemplation of society. Kant will indicate that the "productions" of "true genius," not only give expression to spirit and freedom (i.e., the "law" underlying these productions [which shall be discussed shortly]), but also they serve to reveal an "empirical concept," i.e., "aesthetic idea," that is "original." Does the genius, then, provide us, in-directly, with our particular perceptions and interpretations of nature? Does he give us access to, or at least greatly influence, our subjective "determinations" of identity and difference? In the Critique of Judgment Kant indicates that:

[G]enius actually consists in the happy relation - one no science can teach and that cannot be learned by any diligence - allowing us, first, to discover ideas for a given concept, and second, to hit upon a way of expressing these ideas that enable us to communicate to others, as accompanying a concept, the mental attunement that those ideas produce. The second talent is properly the one we call spirit. For in order to express what is ineffable in the mental state accompanying a certain presentation and to make it universally communicable - whether the expression consists in language or painting or plastic art - we need an ability [viz., spirit] to apprehend the imagination's rapidly passing play and to unite it in a concept that can be communicated without the constraint of rules a concept that on that very account is original, while at the same time it reveals a new rule that could not have been inferred from any earlier principles or examples).

387 Kant, Reflection 771 (1774-5), A.A. 15:337; J. Zammito, p. 38, fn126.

388 Kant, Reflection 921 (late 1770s), A.A. 15:406; J. Zammito, p.44, fn152.

389 CJ, §49, 317.
A good example to exemplify this notion (of a “new rule” that could not have been inferred from any previous principles or examples) is made by Schopenhauer in *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* where he speaks of “Cheselden’s blind man.”\(^{390}\) Apparently, those who obtain the use of their eyes late in life have “no objective perception of things;” they have “only a general impression of a totality” and see what they take to be “a smooth surface of different colors;” they rely upon “the sense of touch to which things are already familiar [....to] make them acquainted with the sense of vision;” they have “absolutely no capacity for judging distances, but grasp at everything.” We can interpret this, as Schopenhauer does, by saying “their understanding must first learn to apply its causal law to the data that are new to it, and to the changes thereof,” or, we could perhaps conclude along with Kant that objects must be apprehended, and given order and “general form” (Gestalt) to, by the imagination apart from being applied to categories of understanding, i.e., apart from applying “understanding’s causal law” the subject must learn to distinguish “objects” as they have been expressed for him by “someone” - ultimately the scientist and genius (i.e., the spirit as it is manifested purposively within one’s culture, and “other” cultures s within the world, at a specific moment in time).

This positing of “common sense” knowledge within culture by genius relates to Kant’s idea of the “ultimate purpose” of spirit (‘*Geist*’) in nature (in the world). “*Geist* is the active principle; ‘soul’ is what is animated. *Geist* is the source of animation and can be derived from nothing prior.”\(^{391}\) Kant states that:

> Because spirit involves the universal, it is so to speak ‘*divinae particula auras*’ [a particular emanation of the divine] and it is created out of universal


\(^{391}\) Kant, *Reflection* 934 (1776-8), A.A. 15:326; J. Zammito, p. 304, fn59.
spirit. That is why spirit has no specific properties; rather according to the
different talents and sensibilities it affects, it animates in varying ways, and,
because these are so manifold, every spirit has something unique. One ought
to say not that it belongs to genius. It is the unity of the World soul
(‘Weltseele’).  

The “aesthetic idea” produced by the genius:

is a presentation of the imagination which is conjoined with a given concept
and is connected, when we use imagination in its freedom, with such a
multiplicity of partial presentations that no expression that stands for a
determinate concept can be found for it. Hence it is a presentation that makes
us add to a concept the thoughts of much that is ineffable, but the feeling of
which quickens our cognitive powers and connects language, which otherwise
would be mere letters, with spirit.

In the Anthropology Kant refers to language as signification of thought; “the supreme
way of indicating thought is through language, the greatest instrument for
understanding ourselves and others. Thinking is speaking to ourselves.”

Accordingly, “Signs (characters) mean nothing by themselves, but mean something
by joining with perceptions and then lead through them to notions.” It would seem
then, that it is the genius which presents us with the “ideal,” “model,” or “archetype of
taste” - which is necessary” apart from “knowing” anything through formal
categories; and that allows us to connect words (i.e., letters) with subjective
“thoughts,” i.e., the archetype, (re)presented by the genius (through the productive
imagination), allows us to speak “about” things - to identify objects with words
and empirical concepts - without having to “know” what it (i.e., the thing-in-
itsel)f is that we are talking about. That is to say, although our words are always
referring to the experiences of particular “objects” which we distinguish in the world,

392 *Reflection* 938 (1776—8), A.A. 15:326; J. Zammito, p. 304, fn60.

393 CJ, §49, 316.

394 *Anthropology*, §39, 192.

395 *Anthropology*, §38, 191.

396 CJ, §17, 232.
i.e., in time and space, these experiences are only of “identities” that we make, subjectively (“unconscious consciously”), in time (i.e., in “inner sense - apart from space “outer sense”). In other words, this accounts for one being able to recognize a concept in one’s mind apart from having to “see” it in the world, i.e., the imagination has already apprehended and associated, compared and interpreted the “image” in relation to a wealth of other images, which allows us to freely think about “it” (i.e. the “empirical concept”) in time, in imagination.

By this, I am referring to Kant’s notion of the so-called **passive process involved in the reproductive imagination** which I have compared to Freud’s idea of an “unconscious consciousness”; and to Young’s idea of an ‘awareness of something’ (*Gestalt*), and an the ability to interpret it, which follows from the synthesis of the manifold in imagination - separately from the synthesis with the understanding and apperception.\(^{397}\) Thus, we have a form of “consciousness” in reflective judgments which is perhaps “unintentional” i.e., the purposiveness of the “form” (*‘Gestalt’*) for our “awareness” does not belong to the subject but only to the nature within the subject.\(^{398}\)

Kant does not limit this ability to formulate “archetypes” only to cultures with written language. **Genius is “the guardian and guiding spirit that each person is given as his own at birth**, and to whose inspiration [‘Eigebung’] those original ideas are due” (CJ, §46, 308). **I shall try to show that this ability - to create archetypes - which we all possess, is related to one’s freedom in choosing one’s maxims of duty according to the universal law which we feel within, i.e., the maxim one chooses**

\(^{397}\) See my §9.

\(^{398}\) CJ, 151 First Intro., XII, 251°.
becomes an archetype for others, depending on the universality judged to be inherent in the maxim. This “judged universality” will vary according to one’s culture and will be influenced by inter-communication with other cultures.

The symbolic archetypes, which allow us to make “determinations of identity and difference - in the world” - are always already there a priori. They are always already (re)presented (symbolically) for us - in-directly - by the productive imagination of the genius, at a particular moment in time, in culture, in history. However, with every new presentation of the genius we are confronted with an image for which “no determinate concept can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it. [The aesthetic idea] arouse[s] in us] more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words.”

Kant foreshadows “post-modern linguistics” when he divides language into a relatively determined or “dead,” grammatical version and a “living” version which allows for artistic expression and change:

Models of taste in the arts of speech must be composed in a language both dead and scholarly; dead so that it will not have to undergo the changes that inevitably affect living ones, whereby noble expressions become flat, familiar ones archaic, and newly created ones enter into circulation for only a short while; scholarly, so that it will have a grammar that is not subject to the whims of fashion but has its own unalterable rule.

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399 CJ, §49, 314-5.

400 Saussure, like Kant, understands language as a social institution relative to one’s historical position in time - and changes accordingly. By this, I am comparing Kant’s idea of “a language both dead and scholarly” to Saussure’s notion of “la langue.” And Kant’s reference to “living language” - language which is always undergoing transformation - could be compared to Saussure’s denotation for “la parole.”

See also Merleau-Ponty’s “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence” where he distinguishes between “empirical language” and “creative language,” whereby, the former follows from the latter (The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, 82).

401 CJ, §17, 232, fn49.
This is all very well “said,” but still - What is the “object” in the world apart from language? “What” is referred to with language and art - in space, in nature? What is our own “body”? To answer these questions we will first turn to Kant’s view of an empirical concept:

[A]n empirical concept cannot be defined at all, but only made explicit. For since we find in it only a few characteristics of a certain species of sensible object, it is never certain that we are not using the word, in denoting one and the same object, sometimes to stand for more, and sometimes so as to stand for fewer characteristics. [...]. The word, with the few characteristics which attach to it, is more properly to be regarded as merely a ‘designation’ than as a ‘concept’ of the thing.

In other words, all we can ever do is “designate” and “speak about,” i.e., ‘explicate,’ objects. And what does Kant say about an “object”?

Everything, every representation even, in so far as we are conscious of it, may be entitled object. But it is a question for deeper enquiry what the word object ought to signify in respect of appearances when these are viewed not in so far as they are (as representations) objects, but only in so far as they stand for an object. The appearances, in so far as they are objects of consciousness simply in virtue of being representations, are not in any way distinct from their apprehension, that is, from their reception in the synthesis of imagination.

That is, the form (Gestalt) of an object apprehended in subjective intuition, i.e., its imaginative representation, is given simultaneously with the form of understanding that corresponds to “it.” In order for the object to be given in empirical, i.e., subjective intuition, it must “stand under a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessitates some one mode of connection of the manifold. The object is that in the appearance which contains the conditions of the necessary rule of apprehension.”

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402 CPR, A727-8, B755-6. 403 CPR, A189-90, B234-5, my emphases. 404 CPR, A191, B236.
Is this necessary rule, then, given with the ("dead") rules and syntax of language that we learn? And is the perception of the "object" then made possible by the ‘explication,’ i.e., exhibition, of it by the genius and the scientist in the "live" version of language, i.e., the version that allows for transformation and change within one’s identity structure? I will go into this further in a moment, but what should be noted here is that: What matters to Kant is not what the object is in-itself, in nature, but what the object ought to signify, i.e., the meaning and value which is given to it by man. In other words, the only way nature can ever have meaning for man is if it is given some meaning and value by man. This is why he relates subjective judgments, or intuitions, more to a "feeling" within, received from nature, than to some "dead" analytic linguistic knowledge imposed upon nature. And this also leaves open the active free role of the imagination “to go further” with the object.

Kant says that "the power of exhibition is imagination" (Ibid.). "To exhibit" ("darstellen") is defined as "to place beside [a] concept an intuition corresponding to it." In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant had related this "exhibition" to the "construction of a concept." That is, to construct a concept is ""to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it [i.e. the concept].” There are two classes of men that may exhibit an a priori concept - the scientist and the artist.

Everything that man does, as distinguished from nature, is considered art (Kunst) for Kant; while everything man knows is considered science. In §4 I have demonstrated that Kant places everything that we can know (science) and do

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405 CJ, 192.
406 CPR, A713, B741.
407 CJ, §43, 303, paraphrased.
(naturally, i.e. skillfully, technically) under determinative judgments governed by the “problematic” hypothetical imperative. What separates works of man from works of nature is the thought that goes into them. In determinative judgments the “thought” required is minimal. The end or purpose of the object to be produced is provided by the hypothetical imperative. The subject merely \textit{(re)produces} the object with the expectation of pleasure which he will receive by the existence of the object.

What separates art from science is that art is practical ability while science is theoretical ability - although Kant allows them to be intertwined in some cases, particularly in fine art\textsuperscript{408} and, as I have mentioned above, in speculative reason (as opposed to purely theoretical reason).

Under the heading of “art” Kant distinguishes between “mercenary art” and “free art.” Mercenary art, or craft, refers to common labor, “i.e., as an occupation that on its own account is disagreeable (burdensome) and that attracts us only through its effect (e.g., pay), so that people can be coerced to it”.\textsuperscript{409} Free art is an art which can only achieve its end, i.e., succeed, if it is play, and only strives for agreeableness on its own account. However, free art requires rules, or a “mechanism” (such as “correctness,” richness of language, as well as prosody and meter in poetry).

\textbf{Fine art}, the production of the genius, is the highest form of free art - providing us with beauty. As has been mentioned, it requires much science. Also:

\begin{quotation}
[It] is a way of presenting that is \textbf{purposive} on its own and that furthers, even though without a purpose, the culture of our mental powers to facilitate social communication. The very concept of the \textbf{universal communicability} of a
\end{quotation}

\textsuperscript{408} CJ, §44, 305.

\textsuperscript{409} CJ, §43, 304.
pleasure carries with it the requirement that this pleasure must be a pleasure of reflection rather than one of enjoyment arising from mere sensation. Hence \textit{aesthetic art that is also fine art is one whose standard is the reflective power of judgment, rather than sensation proper}.  

Here we see Kant referring to fine art as producing, beyond sentiment, a subjective reflective judgment which leads to “something more” than is contained in the concept of the object. Reflective judgments, thus allow us to break from the “dead” circular realm of logical analyticity (i.e., to escape from the fanatic conservatism and dogmatic stagnancy which surrounds a “fixed” identity structure), arousing us to approach universality in our judgments through communication with “others.” On this note, utilizing reflective judgment, I will seek the essence of Kant’s “Third Critique.

\textbf{§11. On the essence of the Critique of Judgment}

In trying to extract the “essence” of Kant’s \textit{Critique of Judgment}, I will conclude with section §59, “On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality,” in which Kant will analogously “connect” a judgment of taste to moral judgment in general. For he claims: “everything we do with our powers must in the end aim at the practical and unite in it as its goal.”  

But I will begin by outlining the problems which Kant has

\footnote{410 CJ, §44, 306.}

\footnote{* Although I feel that the “sublime” is indeed an essential part of this “Critique,” it does not fit into the schem(a) of this section - which will be concerned with the “objective purposiveness” of nature. Kant himself says that because the concept of the sublime “indicates nothing purposive whatever in nature” but “merely” a purposiveness that we feel within ourselves “entirely independent of nature [this] separates our ideas of the sublime completely from the idea of a purposiveness of ‘nature,’ and turns the theory of the sublime into a mere appendix to the aesthetic judging of the purposiveness of nature” (CJ, §23, 246). However, I will just note here that, like judgments of beauty, “a judgment about the sublime in nature requires culture” and “has its foundation in human nature: in something that, along with common sense, we may require and demand from everyone” (CJ, §29, 265). The “feeling” within ourselves, that results from the sublime, Kant says, is “the predisposition to the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e., to moral feeling,” namely, respect for the moral law (Ibid.).}

\footnote{411 CJ, §3, 206.}
presented for himself, then, after basically demonstrating how Kant will solve these problems, I will go into a more detailed analysis in leading to my conclusion.

In his “Preface,” Kant makes it clear that what he will try to establish with this “Critique” is that “judgment, which in the order of our specific cognitive powers is a mediating link between understanding and reason,”\(^\text{412}\): 1) has a priori principles of its own; 2) these principles are constitutive rather than merely regulative; and 3) “judgment gives the rule \textit{a priori} to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, the mediating link between the cognitive power in general and the power of desire (just as the understanding prescribes laws \textit{a priori} to the cognitive power and reason to the power of desire).”\(^\text{413}\)

To understand that judgment is the “mediating link” between understanding and reason we should first of all realize that judgments are involved, not only aesthetically in judgments of taste, but also in cognizing objects of experience, and in the intellectual realm - in which we “judiciously” subject our will, through maxims, to objective laws of willing. Kant goes so far as to say in the Critique of Pure Reason that: “we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, the ‘understanding’ may therefore be represented as a ‘faculty of judgment.’”\(^\text{414}\)

The problem will then be to demonstrate how judgments (which always must take place in subjective experience, i.e., in nature, in time and space) can lead to cognition under the concepts of understanding and under the laws of reason.

\(^{412}\) CJ, 168.

\(^{413}\) Ibid.

\(^{414}\) CPR, B94.
Now, since we cannot rely on some a priori concept to “schematically” determine this for us, Kant says, “judgment itself must provide a concept, a concept through which we do not actually cognize anything but which only serves as a rule for the power of judgment itself.”\cite{415} We will see then, that since we can only reflect upon what this concept (which serves as a rule for the power of judgment) “is,” we can only exhibit the concept “symbolically,” i.e., analogously. This is why Kant will focus upon aesthetic judgments of the beautiful, in nature or in art, where he says such a perplexity, as to the principle responsible for such judgments, stands out most clearly.\cite{416}

The major feature of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful is a feeling of pleasure that we receive from a presentation. Remember this because Kant will indicate, in solving the antinomy of a judgment of taste that: “what counts in judging beauty is not what nature is, nor even what purpose it has for us, but how we receive it.”\cite{417}

This feeling of pleasure, that we receive from beautiful objects in nature or art, must be derived from some rule or principle, for though it is a feeling that not everyone may have, Kant says that we may demand, in such judgments of taste, that everyone “ought” to have it. Therefore, a concept is involved (but in-directly or “in-determinatively”\cite{418}).

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \cite{415} CJ, 169.
\item \cite{416} Ibid.
\item \cite{417} CJ, §58, 350.
\item \cite{418} By using the hyphen in “in-determinate” I am indicating a relative indeterminacy. This has to do with what has already been mentioned, that there is an “unintentional” awareness involved in a judgment of taste which connects it to the objective purposiveness of nature for “arousing” us and making us aware of its “form” [See my p. 155]. It also has to do with the intermediacy of the
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Since this feeling of pleasure is indeterminate, i.e., its source is not made cognizable for us, we must therefore assume that the basis of aesthetic feeling lies “beyond” (or “beneath,” i.e., intertwined with) the logical judging of nature, and: “when experience manifests in things a lawfulness that understanding’s concept of the sensible is no longer adequate to help us understand or explain, judgment can find within itself a principle that refers the natural thing to the unrecognizable supersensible.” Kant says, “such an a priori principle can and must indeed be employed if we are to cognize the beings in the world, and it also opens up prospects advantageous to practical reason.”

Thus we see Kant has delegated the a priori concepts of understanding, reason, and the “in-determinate concept” of their mediator - judgment, to the universal realm of the supersensible. Kant says that the task of judgment “is to exhibit the [supersensible] concept, i.e., to place before the concept an intuition corresponding to it.” This “exhibition” may occur, either “by means of our imagination, as happens in art,” or it may come about through “the technic of nature”: nature’s power to produce things in terms of purposes, “where we attribute to nature our concept of a purpose in order to judge its product.”

representative archetypes which give us an in-direct access to the “rational ideas,” and which aid us in determining our universal maxims.

419 By saying “beyond” I am not referring to something “beyond being” or beyond the universe. It only refers to the “beyond” which a well-said metaphor, or piece of art, leads us to - a feeling of transcendence which lies within us - which no analytic circular definition can help us realize.

420 CJ, 169, my emphasis.

421 Ibid., my emphasis.

422 CJ, 192.

423 CJ, 193, fn.35.

424 CJ, 193.
The task of the *Critique of Judgment* will then be to try to make this “supersensible” realm “sensible” (“exhibited”), and thus “available” for comprehension, through the idea (the in-determinate concept) of purposiveness - both subjectively and objectively. Purposiveness occurs subjectively in aesthetic judgments, i.e., it is the “subjective purposiveness” of the free form of the ‘‘appearance ‘‘ of an object in nature or art, for arousing our contemplation. And objectively, it is evident in teleological judgments, i.e., the idea of an “objective purposiveness” - which follows from the former “transcendental” principle of the “subjective (formal) purposiveness” of nature.

The “supersensible purposiveness” of nature for our subjective affectation, contemplation and understanding, “has already prepared the understanding to apply the concept of a purpose (at least in terms of form) to nature.”425 This “objective purposiveness of nature (subjective purposiveness with an objective purpose in view - which Kant will call: “Providence” in his historical theses), corresponds (aesthetically) “sensibly” to the “supersensible (rational) goal” of “freedom,” and thus enhances our faith in a “final purpose” of mankind - the attainment of the ultimate good, and thus, universal happiness - to be achievable on earth in time).

Now that I have outlined, what I believe to be, the project of this “Critique,” I will begin my “analysis”:

What should be noted in the above appraisal is our need for an *arousal* in order for us to contemplate the supersensible in the first place. This “arousal” lies in the subjective condition of aesthetic reflective judgments as such, and thus enables us to expand

425 CJ, 194.
upon knowledge achievable through logical judgments which are limited in their capacity to what is already determined by the concepts of the understanding (through schema and symbolic representations) upon the sensible realm of experience. Kant says in the “Introduction”: “We need something that in our judging of nature makes us pay attention to this purposiveness of nature for our understanding.”

He says: “A judgment of taste differs from a logical one in that a logical judgment subsumes a presentation under concepts of the object, whereas a judgment of taste does not subsume it under any concept at all.”

For, he adds, “a judgment of taste must rest upon a mere sensation, namely our sensation of both the imagination [the power of intuitions or exhibitions] in its freedom and the understanding [the power of concepts] with its lawfulness, as they reciprocally quicken each other [...] it must rest on a feeling that allows us to judge the object by the purposiveness that the presentation (by which the object is given) has insofar as it furthers the cognitive powers in their free play.”

We may then “call the object purposive only because its presentation is directly connected with the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and this presentation itself is an aesthetic presentation of purposiveness.”

The problem, for Kant, will now be to show how the “subjective purposiveness” received in a pure judgment of taste can be connected/transferred to an “objective purposiveness” through the direct interest which follows from reflection upon the

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426 CJ, 188.
428 CJ, §35, 287.
429 CJ, 189, my emphases.
subjectively purposive presentation. For Kant says if it can be shown that in the pure form of a judgment of taste:

an interest were to reveal itself as connected with it, then taste would reveal how our ability to judge provides a transition from sense enjoyment to moral feeling [“without taking too violent a leap”\(^{430}\)]. Moreover, not only would we then have better guidance in using taste purposively, but we would also be showing that judgment is a mediating link in the chain of man’s a priori powers, the powers upon which all our legislation must depend.\(^{431}\)

Kant says, “Only in society is the beautiful of empirical interest.”\(^{432}\) In this sense of man, as a social being, “taste” can be regarded as a way of furthering something that everyone’s natural inclination demands. “Only in society does it occur to him to be, not merely a human being, but one who is refined in his own way (this is the beginning of civilization).”\(^{433}\) In other words, as social beings, we like to impress and please others with our appearance, creations, actions and “good taste.” Kant points out that someone who is stranded on a desert island would have no desire to adorn himself, or his hut, with insignificant luxuries and trinkets. He says we possess these things mainly for an interest of vanity, and Kant says that such views of taste, which are empirical and cater to social inclinations, are “of no importance to us here, since we must concern ourselves only with what may have reference a priori, even if only indirectly [as in fine art], to a judgment of taste.”\(^{434}\) Kant says that: “If a judgment of beauty is mingled with the least interest then it is very partial, and is not a pure judgment of taste.”\(^{435}\)

\(^{430}\) CJ, §59, 354.

\(^{431}\) CJ, §41, 297-8.

\(^{432}\) CJ, §41, 297.

\(^{433}\) Ibid., my emphasis.

\(^{434}\) Ibid.

\(^{435}\) CJ, §2, 205.
In works of art, vanity and social mores are often entangled in a judgment of taste, and thus “corrupt” it with an empirical interest.” Even though Kant admits that fine art can lead to a pure judgment of taste, it can arouse only an indirect interest in the underlying cause, namely, [it] can interest us only by its purpose [i.e., that it either imitates nature to the point of deception, or is aimed at our liking] and never in itself.”

Our disinterested liking for an object must be connected with our mere judging of the form of an object, which Kant says is “nothing but our consciousness of the form’s subjective purposiveness for the power of judgment.” If such a condition is met (i.e., the imagination “freely” apprehends these forms and judgment compares them, even if unintentionally, to concepts of the understanding, whereby we are made “aware” of the presentations s harmony with these concepts by the feeling of pleasure in our reflective judgment) it follows that we may assume an a priori basis for the presentations s harmony with these conditions of the power of judgment, and that this “harmony” is valid for everyone. Or as Kant says: “Beauty is an object’s form of purposiveness insofar as it is perceived in the object without the presentation of a purpose.”

The question is, where can we see this harmony most clearly manifested?

Kant stresses the purity of natural beauty over that of man-made art exquisitely:

A man who has taste enough to judge the products of fine art with the greatest correctness and refinement may still be glad to leave a room in which he finds

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436 CJ, §42, 301.
437 CJ, §38, 290.
438 CJ, 190-2.
439 CJ, §11, §38.
440 CJ, §17, 236.
those beauties which minister to vanity and perhaps to social joys, and to turn instead to the beautiful in nature, in order to find there, as it were, a voluptuousness for the mind in a train of thought that he can never fully unravel. If that is how he chooses, we shall ourselves regard this choice of his with esteem and assume that he has a beautiful soul, such as no connoisseur and lover of art can claim to have because of the interest he takes in his object [of art].

In other words, Kant feels that it is only in nature that we can find true beauty-in-itself, beauty beyond all interest and charm.

So, we have seen that the beauty which we experience in a pure judgment of taste is directly related to the subjective purposiveness of the form of nature for our understanding. Kant says that the aesthetic purposiveness “is the lawfulness of the power of judgment in its freedom.” Now, when we (alone) contemplate the beauty of nature, out of admiration and love, this is not only a “liking” of nature for its form, but is also the taking of a “direct intellectual interest” in nature’s existence - even though no charm of sense is involved; and even though one does not connect that existence with any purpose whatsoever. And Kant says: “The object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual liking is the moral law in its might.” Can we now say that Kant has demonstrated the “transition, through judgment, from sense enjoyment to moral feeling,” and that judgment is indeed the “mediating link in the chain of man’s a priori powers”?

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441 CJ, §42, 30.
442 CJ, §29, 270.
443 CJ, §42, 299.
444 CJ, §29, 271.
He maintains that when one does indeed “take a direct interest in the beauty of nature (not merely to have the taste to judge it) [it] is always the mark of a good soul,” and indicates “at least a mental attunement favorable to moral feeling.” For this direct interest is “not common, but is peculiar to those whose way of thinking is either already trained to the good or exceptionally receptive to this training.”

Here we see an analogy made by Kant between a pure judgment of taste - “which depends on no interest whatever and yet makes us feel a liking that it also presents a priori as proper for mankind generally,” and moral judgments - which do the same from a determinative concept. The only difference is that the first interest is “free,” while the second is based on “objective laws of willing.” But what should be noted here is that (as quoted above) one must be “trained to the good, or be exceptionally receptive to this training.”

This implies, not only, the “ultimate objective purposiveness” which man attributes to nature (i.e., culture) as aiding him in the infinite progress of reason toward the “final purpose - the “highest good in the world that we are to achieve through freedom,” but also the role of the artist “genius” who - through the innate “talent” provided “purposively” from supersensible forces of nature - produces the “aesthetic ideas” which arouse us “purposively” to contemplate the supersensible “rational ideas” (God, freedom, and immortality). Kant claims that the “aesthetic ideas,” the presentations (i.e., exhibitions) of the imagination of the genius, “do at least strive

445 CJ, §42, 298.
446 CJ, §42, 301.
447 CJ, §42, 301.
448 CJ, §91, 462.
toward something that lies beyond the bounds of experience, and hence try to approach an exhibition of rational concepts (intellectual ideas), and thus these concepts are given a semblance of objective reality.”\textsuperscript{449}

Now, to return to the “rational ideas,” Kant says that “among the three pure ideas of reason, ‘God’, ‘freedom’, and ‘immortality’, that of freedom is the only concept of the supersensible which (by means of the causality that we think in it) proves in nature that it has objective reality, by the effects it can produce in it.”\textsuperscript{450} And also “freedom (the concept underlying all unconditioned practical laws) can expand reason beyond those bounds within which any concept of nature (i.e., theoretical concept) would have to remain hopelessly confined.”\textsuperscript{451} (It is interesting to note here that Kant says: “Everything that shows stiff regularity (close to mathematical regularity) runs counter to taste because it does not allow us to be entertained for long by our contemplation of it; instead it bores us”\textsuperscript{452}).

Correspondingly, fine art, the product of the genius, “is a way of presenting that is purposive on its own and that furthers, even though without a purpose, the culture of our mental powers to facilitate social communication.”\textsuperscript{453}

So we see that it is the genius that promotes the universal communicability of all men through his creations. He goes so far as to say “that the aesthetic power of judgment

\textsuperscript{449} CJ, §49, 314.
\textsuperscript{450} CJ, §91, 474.
\textsuperscript{451} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{452} CJ, §22, General Comment, 242.
\textsuperscript{453} CJ, §44, 306.
deserves to be called a shared sense \textit{sensus communis aestheticus} more legitimately than can sound understanding \textit{sensus communis logicus}.\textsuperscript{454} And it is the “spirit” within him (providing him with “inner intuitions (to which no concept can be completely adequate))\textsuperscript{455}, which allows the genius to produce “freely,” i.e., “through a power of choice which bases its acts on reason.”\textsuperscript{456}

Kant says it is spirit alone that animates the work of art,\textsuperscript{457} but the genius, “nature’s favorite,” still requires training. It is:

taste, like the power of judgment in general, [that] consists in disciplining or training the genius. It severely clips its wings and makes it civilized, or polished; but at the same time it gives it guidance as to how far and over what it may spread while still remaining purposive. It introduces clarity and order into a wealth of thought, and hence makes the ideas durable, fit for approval that is both lasting and universal, and hence fit for being followed by others and fit for an ever advancing culture.\textsuperscript{458}

The pleasure that we take in the purposive form of fine art, Kant says, is none other than culture, “and it attunes the spirit to ideas, and so makes it receptive to more such pleasure and entertainment.”\textsuperscript{459} Kant says that “unless we connect the fine arts, closely or remotely, with moral ideas, which alone carry with them an independent liking” the aesthetic ideas created by the genius are destined to cater to mere enjoyment, “which leaves nothing behind as an idea and makes the spirit dull, the

\textsuperscript{454} CJ, §40, 295.
\textsuperscript{455} CJ, §49, 314.
\textsuperscript{456} CJ, §43, 303.
\textsuperscript{457} CJ, §43, 304.
\textsuperscript{458} CJ, §50, 319.
\textsuperscript{459} CJ, §52, 326.
object gradually disgusting, and the mind dissatisfied with itself and moody because it is conscious that in reason’s judgment its attunement is countrapurposive.\textsuperscript{460}

It is thus, this “attunement to ideas,” both aesthetic and rational which enables culture to advance - beyond the realm of the senses and logical thought - through employing our subjective, reflective judgments of taste. (“Pure” understanding may also be included here, if we include the “talents” of the scientist, as “continuing to increase the perfection of our cognitions and of all the benefits that depend on these”\textsuperscript{461}). After this preparation, we can now move to section §59 - “On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality” - ‘without too violent a leap’.

This section is pretty much a summary of what has just been covered. For it is here that Kant synthesizes all of his previous thoughts, preparing (easing) the transition from the subjective purposiveness of nature (as made evident in aesthetic judgments of taste) to the objective purposiveness of nature (i.e., culture) which is deeply intertwined with the final purpose of reason - the highest good to be achieved in the world, in time. As we will see, this transition can only be made analogously (i.e., symbolically).

Kant begins by comparing our ability to make determinative logical judgments (based upon pure concepts of the understanding) through the mediation of schema, with our ability to make determinative “practical” judgments (based upon the “idea” of a supersensible realm - which lies behind the possibility of experience as such) through the mediation of “aesthetic ideas” or symbols. We will start by discussing schema.

\textsuperscript{460} CJ, §52, 326.

\textsuperscript{461} CJ, §47, 309.
“Establishing that our concepts have reality,” Kant says, “always requires intuitions."[462] Now, if a concept is empirical (that is, a concept of sensibility or appearance) the intuitions are examples. What are concepts of sensibility exactly?

A concept of sensibility would refer to the relatively “unintentional” and therefore “unconscious conscious” apprehension and interpretation, etc. of an empirical concept, made possible by the objective purposiveness of nature to make all humans “conscious” - although they do not necessarily have to “think” productively or creatively on their own. As Kant points out in ‘What Is Enlightenment?’ political and clerical guardians like to keep their “cattle” dumb and placid, under their complete control. This would seem the easiest way to keep an identity and power structure in tact - without resistance. In reply to these “guards,” Kant makes a plea for all men to strive to realize their freedom, to take responsibility upon themselves, and to take part in the advancement of ideas, i.e. to have the courage to think a little bit for themselves and to make their thoughts known. He feels that sometimes it may be necessary to overcome “personal despotism” or “tyrannical oppression” by revolution. But this can never lead to true reform or new ways of thinking. “Rather, new prejudices will serve as well as old ones to harness the great unthinking masses”[463]

Kant feels that the best way to fight the system is from within, by arguing, making injustices publicized, standing up for one’s rights and beliefs. But he says one should still obey. Kant is one of the first great thinkers to appeal for the achievement of freedom, of all, by non-violent means. However, those who will lead us in this non-violent resistance are a relative few - those who have cultivated their minds.

[463] ’What is Enlightenment?’, 55.
Thus we see the necessity of the genius to create the examples, i.e. “archetypes” - in fine art, the humanities and politics - to “plant the seeds of freedom,” and thus, to provide the incentive for more and more people to make judgments of taste, which go together with making more responsible, involved and conscious decisions. Kant says that it is apparent in nature that once the seeds of freedom have been planted, and the public is allowed to think for themselves, the people gradually become capable of handling their freedom. And it is to a government’s best advantage, in the end, to treat its citizens, who are now more than mere machines, with respect and dignity.

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant says: “Examples are the go-cart of judgment,”\(^{464}\) and apparently they not only serve to sharpen the judgments of “intelligent” men, but also, for those who are lacking in the natural talent for making intelligent judgments on their own (i.e., stupid, narrow-minded people), they can never dispense with them. For one who dares to use her “intelligence,” that is, one who opens her mind to her infinite capabilities, it is possible to have relatively direct access to the pure concepts of the understanding via the mediation of schematic intuitions. I say relatively direct access to the categories because no one can be in absolute contact with the categories. The “contact” is made through the mediation of the schema, produced by the already well-disciplined imagination of the “talented” and broad-minded scientist.\(^ {465}\) And as we have seen, Kant tends to understand the ultimate scientists as metaphysicians. I shall have to rehash and elaborate here upon points that I have already mentioned.

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\(^{464}\) CPR, B174.

\(^{465}\) CJ, §40, 294 & §47, 309.
It must first be understood that “knowledge,” according to Kant, “is essentially a whole in which representations stand compared and connected.” It relies upon the spontaneous synthesis of three necessary conditions: firstly, the apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in intuitions (an act of the productive a priori imagination); secondly, they must be reproduced/associated in the (the passive reproductive) imagination; and thirdly, they must be recognized in a concept.

Since every appearance contains a manifold, a “pure transcendental synthesis” of the “active a priori imagination” is required for conditioning the very possibility of experience (i.e., allowing us to apprehend appearance separately and selectively in a single experience). Kant notes that: “Since the [active] imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an image, it must previously have taken the impressions up into its activity, that is, have apprehended them.”

Comment 1: This, “‘a priori’ apprehension” I have attributed, through Kant, to the function of the genius and the scientist, i.e., they provide the access to the forms of the productive imagination through participation in the productive imagination - by “constructing,” (i.e., exhibiting) rules for language and art, and the universal communicability which follows from them, within culture.

At the same time as this apprehension of the manifold, “there exists a subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the

466 CPR, A97.
467 Ibid.
468 CPR, A101, A120.
469 CPR, A120.
subsequent perception that has passed, and so form a whole series of perceptions.”

This is the “reproductive faculty of imagination” and is deeply intertwined with the “productive” part.

Comment 2: I have tried to demonstrate above (notably in §9b), through Young and Freud, that there exists in this phase of the Kantian synthesis (i.e., in the subjective imaginary moment) an ‘unconscious conscious’ awareness of the general form (Gestalt) of an object - in which identification and interpretations are performed relatively unconsciously. Zammito points out that, “Kant’s phenomenology of subjective consciousness clearly recognized the presence to consciousness of representations [Vorstellungen] which could not yet be considered cognitions [Erkenntnisse].” He quotes from a Kantian “reflection” that within the synthesis of the manifold of sense, a shape or figure (Gestalt) is created which involves “not only the form of the object according to the relations of space in the appearance, but also the matter, i.e., sensation (color).” And in another “reflection” Kant says, “All objects can be known sensibly or via intuition only in a given figure [Gestalt]. Other appearances cannot form an object, but are merely [subjective] changes [involving succession in time];” but he adds that such forms are not yet sufficient to provide “determinate form [bestimmte Form].” Kant has related this “form” (Gestalt), or representation, to a subjective state of arousal which coincides with the

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470 Ibid.


472 Kant, Reflection 638, A.A. 15:276; J. Zammito, p. 50, fn25.

end one expects from the actual existence of the object. However, the thing-in-itself always remains in excess.\(^{474}\)

The third phase of this spontaneous synthesis occurs through the recognition of a representation in a concept. For Kant it seems that: “All appearances as possible experiences, lie \emph{a priori} in the understanding, and receive from it their formal possibility [i.e., their rules or \emph{bestimmte Form}].”\(^{475}\)

Comment 3: I have related these “rules,” above (pp. 156-7), to the “dead” version of language which Kant says contains grammatical rules and nodes of reference.\(^ {476}\) Thus, at least in “discursive” (i.e., logical) knowledge appearances are not things-in-themselves, but are merely within us - “the play of our representations” - which reduce, through judgments (in connection with “problematic” hypothetical imperatives) to “objective” determinations of the inner sense, and thus to unified relatively conscious perceptions in time.

But in order for judgment to determine these representations according to pure concepts (which are abstract and not in space and time - again, I stress, not in the “objects” which we “perceive” in space and time) a “transcendental schema” is involved. Such a schema, which is always a product of the “productive \emph{a priori} imagination”\(^{477}\) (of a scientist-metaphysician), is “the representation of a universal

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\(^{474}\) See my pp. 156-7, CPR, A189-90, B234-5, CP\(r\)R, V, 22, CJ, §17 & §49.

\(^{475}\) CPR, A127.

\(^{476}\) CJ, §17, 232, 316.

\(^{477}\) CPR, A140, B179.
procedure of imagination [to be followed by judgment] in providing an image for a concept.”

For example, an intuition of cause would follow the schema: “The effect must follow the cause in time;” and for substance: “All substances have permanence in time.” Since these rules, like the categories on which they are based, apply to any experience we have, they are universal laws of nature, i.e., laws given to nature by the understanding (through logical determinative judgments). Thus, schema are one form of (the hypotyposis - sensible “exhibition” of concepts); symbol being the other.

Just as a side note here, Kant distinguishes both forms of hypotyposes (intuitive presentations: schema and symbols) from “characterizations” or logical “signs,” which he says “contain nothing whatever that belongs to the intuition of the object.” They only function, he says, as a subjective means of reproducing concepts in accordance with the imagination’s law of association - which occurs in the passive reproductive imagination. They “express” concepts, but they are always either mere words, or visible (algebraic or even mimetic) signs - by which I suppose he includes such things as road and direction signs (or maps?).

Now, imagination’s law of association - which occurs in the passive reproductive imagination, is none other than the logical form of the rational law of affinity that I have mentioned above (pp. 41-2). This becomes evident when Kant claims: “The ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold, so far as it lies in the

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478 CPR, B180.

479 CJ, §59, 352.
object, is named the *affinity* of the manifold."\(^{480}\) And "all appearances stand in thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and therefore in a transcendental affinity, of which the empirical is a mere consequence."\(^{481}\) In other words, even passive reproductive imagination is functioning under the guidance of reason or purposiveness.

To take this further, the transcendental law of specification is responsible for the infinite manifoldness of space and time, i.e., the multiplicity of empirical concepts given in the sensible moment of the synthesis of imagination. As such it is the *a priori* ground of the intuitions of sensibility.

And, finally, the intellectual moment of the synthesis of imagination (what is sometimes referred to as a synthesis of understanding) is, together with transcendental apperception, the ground for the *unity* of the manifold in one consciousness. "All possible appearances, as representations, belong to the totality of a possible self-consciousness. But as self-consciousness is a transcendental representation, numerical identity is inseparable from it, and is *a priori* certain. For nothing can come to our knowledge save in terms of this original apperception." (A113). When Kant says ‘possible self-consciousness’ here he is referring to the fact that transcendental apperception (i.e. consciousness of one’s transcendental self, or personality) is dependent upon the synthesis of pure *a priori* imagination in order to render its function intellectual and in order to bring about its unity:

The transcendental unity of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an *a priori* condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge. [....T]he principle of the necessary unity of pure

\(^{480}\) CPR, A113.

\(^{481}\) CPR, 113-14.
(productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.\textsuperscript{482}

Now, a pure synthesis of imagination is only possible in judgment when one constructs-creates either a schema or symbol (inclusive of the typic and ‘schematism of analogy’) which I have discussed above.

However, even this will not bring about consciousness of one’s true personality: “The recognition of one’s self according to the constitution of the self cannot be acquired through inner experience and it does not come from knowing man’s nature, but it is merely and solely the awareness of his freedom which reveals itself to him through the categorical imperative of duty, the highest level of practical reason.”\textsuperscript{483} Such an awareness is sublime (i.e. Geistesgefühl), which I will discuss shortly. But, for now we will continue with a discussion of schema and symbol.

Whereas, with “schematic hypotyposis,” there “is a concept that the understanding has formed, and the intuition corresponding to it is given \textit{a priori},”\textsuperscript{484} a “symbolic hypotyposis” pertains to a “rational idea (concept)” to which no sensible intuition can be adequate.\textsuperscript{485} As, I hope, it has been made clear, this rational idea is supplied with an intuition through the aesthetic idea (symbol) which is produced by the genius in fine art. By this, the rational idea is supplied with an intuition which Kant says, “judgment treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows in

\textsuperscript{482} CPR, A118.

\textsuperscript{483} *Anthropology*, §7, n. 52 -- from a crossed out passage.

\textsuperscript{484} *CJ*, §59, 351.

\textsuperscript{485} Ibid.
schematizing,” i.e. it thinks the particular as contained under the universal. However, whereas the “content” (intuition) is given in schematic hypotyposis, with symbolic hypotyposis we can only “reflect” upon the universal form of the exhibition.

Accordingly, while schematic hypotyposes express concepts by means of a direct intuition, symbolic hypotyposes express the rational concepts by means of an analogy with one. In reflecting upon the aesthetic idea - an object of intuition created by the genius - our thoughts are transferred to a rational idea, to which no intuition can ever directly correspond. Hence, Kant says, “all our cognition of God is merely symbolic.” Anyone who tries to prove God’s existence schematically, he says, “falls into anthropomorphism.” As I have already pointed out above, Kant’s definition of symbol comes very close to what he refers to with ‘schematism of analogy’ which I have claimed to be present in both speculative and practical reflective judgments.

Kant then claims that “the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good.” After having shown that the pure beauty in nature brings about a subjectively purposive feeling of pleasure - in those of us who have acquired taste; and after having shown that the direct intellectual interest we take in the beauty of nature is in, none other than, “the moral law in its might,” he now says that it is our duty to refer the beautiful to the morally good. For only by doing this does our liking for the beautiful include “a claim to everyone else’s assent.” Also, the mind which feels this “pleasure” (arousal)

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486 Ibid.
487 CJ, §59, 353.
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
which results from a pure judgment of beauty (i.e., with no interest in using or manipulating nature to achieve one’s ends), is then conscious of being “ennobled” (i.e., one recognizes one’s freedom within the realm of the laws of nature) as a result of this “receptivity.” We can then judge others according to whether they have a similar maxim in their power of judgment.

And finally, it is here that Kant asserts his boldest claims that, not only is the morally good “the intelligible that taste has in view,” but also it is “the supersensible, in which the theoretical and practical power are in an unknown manner combined and joined in a unity.” Kant then moves into an analogy between the beautiful and the morally good.

I think Kant could sum this all up by saying: Beauty is the aesthetic idea - purposefully provided by a sublimely rational Good Spirit (through Its Productive Imagination) which manifests itself in nature and man - which arouses us and urges us (through our own access to Productive Imagination) to strive for universal freedom and happiness, e.g., “the highest good in the world”...

Isn’t that just beautiful?

“Theoretically,” I can demand that you find Kant’s “judgment” beautiful. But I refuse. Why? Because I myself am a judging subject, and as such, Kant’s texts have aroused me. Indeed, it sounds very nice to say that man’s final purpose is to achieve “the highest good in the world,” i.e., universal happiness, perpetual peace, and freedom. I

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490 Ibid.
cannot deny that something about the “essence” of Kant’s words attract me and make me think. But, since I am a judging subject, I am a critical subject - I must try to understand why I am attracted beyond/beneath the context of my affectation. On this note, I refuse to be commanded to do anything or to feel in any certain way - unless I feel that the command comes from within myself. Likewise, I refuse to demand the same of you.

If you answered “yes” to the above question, (e.g., ‘Isn’t that [Kant’s “judgment”] just beautiful?’) then Kant has achieved his purpose. He was trying to show us the essence of beauty, i.e., he was trying to exhibit before us the formal “quantum” which lies behind the beauty of all things. Kant had to, in a sense, produce the a priori principle, or rule (i.e., purposiveness), which governs our judgment. As Lyotard states, this principle is “the result of art rather than reason.” One could say that, through his use of reflective judgment Kant “exhibits” the rule which allows him/us to have judgment(s): “Only a final purpose would instruct me how I must conceive of the supreme cause of nature in order to judge nature as a teleological system,” and “it is I who put it there, on a morally sufficient basis.”

If you answered “no” to the above question, you would perhaps admit that you were affected in some manner, and perhaps it has opened your mind to some critical aspects of Kant (my portrayal of Kant) or your own aesthetic tastes.

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493 CJ, §85, 441.
494 CJ, §91, 471, fn90.
It may be said that Kant has, in a sense, de-sensualized man (i.e., the human subject) and all of nature in the process of his reflective “speculations” Lyotard states, “aesthetic judgment reveals reflection in its most ‘autonomous’ state, naked, so to speak.” When “stripped of its teleological function,” i.e., without man, all of nature would be one vast wasteland with no color, texture, depth, value or “existence.” What Kant has revealed to us, in aesthetic judgments of taste, would appear much more sublime (i.e., “contra-purposive” - lacking in “objective” purposiveness’) than beautiful; that is, unless judgments of taste can never be pure.

Kant has indicated to us that the feeling of pleasure that we experience, in a pure judgment of beauty, i.e., the feeling which accompanies our awareness of the subjective purposiveness of the “form” (Gestalt) of nature for our affectation, apprehension and comprehension; is also “directly” related to an intellectual interest in the form’s “existence,” that is, in the form’s “objective purposiveness” for our “logical” understanding and apperception. The two “forms” of purposiveness cannot be “separated” (at least “temporally”) - they are simultaneous, i.e., the subjective synthesis (of imagination) and the objective synthesis (of understanding) occur together in time. Kant never denies that an object has “perceived” sensual qualities, he only asserts that there is a deeper (or “higher meaning”) involved.

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496 CJ, 86, 442.
497 CJ, §26, 251.
498 CJ, §42, 302.
Still, there is a problem here if these two forms of purposiveness (i.e., subjective and objective) are simultaneous. And this problem is also Kant’s deliverance. For it would seem that because even in the contemplation of the particular beauties in nature, out of admiration and love, it is a liking directly entangled (i.e., “mingled”) with an “intellectual interest.” That is, because this is not only a liking of nature’s product for its form, but also of the form’s existence - even though no charm of sense is involved; and even though one does not connect that existence with any purpose whatsoever.\(^{499}\) **Judgments of taste are always tainted.** Kant had said earlier, “[if a judgment of beauty is mingled with the least interest then it is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste.”\(^{500}\) And, “All interest either presupposes a need or gives rise to one; and, because interest is the basis that determines approval, it makes the judgment about the object unfree.”\(^{501}\) Can we, then, ever judge anything without an interest or desire? Can we ever act think or judge without the influence of our imperfect, animal, sensual will? For all practical purposes, I think we would have to say: NO. Human beings are always both animal and rational together, i.e., “it is not enough that they be rational (e.g., spirits) but they must be animal as well.”\(^{502}\)

It seems that the only way out of this dilemma of one’s rational-animal existence, i.e., the only way that Kant can provide his “personality” with any “unquestionable” rational faith in eternal “life” (e.g., “life” without need of sensuality) is by separating the two “forms” of purposiveness -- they will never be completely separated, but will always analogously parallel and infinitely influence one another.

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\(^{499}\) CJ, §42, 299.

\(^{500}\) CJ, §2, 205.


\(^{502}\) Ibid.
Kant has two “final purposes” in view: First, an empirical (i.e., objective) purpose; this purpose is the “ultimate purpose” of nature - which Kant says is man. And “only culture can be the ultimate purpose that we have cause to attribute to nature.”\(^{503}\) For it is only through culture that man can be the “lord of nature” through understanding and science; but culture is also that through which man can give nature value by utilizing judgments of taste. The “ultimate purpose,” then, is made possible through judgments of taste, i.e., judgments of beauty - which, not only reflect upon the “objective purposiveness” of nature for our apprehension, contemplation and understanding, but also are always mingled with an “intellectual interest” (i.e., with the second form of purposiveness) and thus, can never be pure, but which allow for the infinite progress of beautiful souls (i.e., lover’s of natural beauty) towards a goal of universal freedom in the “world” - that is, when the world and mankind are viewed as a cosmopolitan whole. Fine art cultivates our mental powers exposing us, through education, criticism and the study of “the humanities” (i.e., of the works of genius produced in all cultures) to a universal feeling of sympathy and the ability to engage universally in a very intimate communication.\(^{504}\) The feeling we receive from our judgment of “the beautiful prepares us for loving something.”\(^{505}\)

The second purpose is the final purpose - a purely rational (subjective) purpose which “indicates nothing purposive whatever in nature” but merely a purposiveness that we feel within ourselves “entirely independent of nature.”\(^{506}\) This is the realization of a connectedness to a “higher purpose” (the immortality of the spirit and the highest

\(^{503}\) CJ, §83, 431.

\(^{504}\) CJ, §60, 355.

\(^{505}\) CJ, §29, 267.

\(^{506}\) CJ, §23, 246.
good in the world that we are to achieve through the infinite progress of freedom) - which one can “know” (or perhaps more appropriately - “feel” and “hope” for [‘Glaube’]) only through our feeling of wonder and respect for the moral law within. But we require something to humble us - a realization of one’s “smallness” within the infinite vastness and magnitude of the universe. That is, one needs to be made aware of one’s impotence to do or achieve anything unless there was some form of “higher purpose” involved within oneself. The “sublime [prepares us] for esteeming it [i.e., “something” in the world, in the universe, in ourselves] even against our feeling of sense.”^507

We will come to see that just as “beauty is a symbol for the morally good”: Kant will analogously connect the “intellectual liking” involved in the first form of purpose (i.e., the “objective purpose”) - made possible by aesthetic judgments of taste (beauty) - to “human love,” love, being that which makes freedom possible; and respect for the moral law within will be analogously connected to the feeling acquired in aesthetic judgments of the sublime.

We shall now discuss love and beauty, showing their connectedness to respect and the feeling of the sublime. Ultimately we will realize that Kant’s philosophy is a “philosophy of love”...but an extremely cold one.

^507 CJ, §29, 267.
§12. On Love and Beauty

Love, according to Kant, is perfect freedom and perfect understanding. In *The Conjectural Beginnings of Human History* he equates love with the higher power of desire, i.e., with the moral law (pure reason) and with the spiritual ['idealischen'] attractions that surround it.\(^\text{508}\) In other words, Love is the Good when viewed as the active (arousing and productive) force within man - it is the source of beauty and the sublime...the source of human love and respect. And, likewise, it is the source of understanding. Love is what gives us any semblance of a purpose in life.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant says that the command to, “Love God above all and thy neighbor as thyself” is the “law of laws.”\(^\text{509}\) However, the Gospel:

> presents the moral disposition in its complete perfection, and though as an ideal of holiness it is unattainable by any creature, it is yet an archetype which we should strive to approach and to imitate in an uninterrupted infinite progress.\(^\text{510}\)

For, since man is a creature, “and consequently is always dependent with respect to what he needs for complete satisfaction with his condition, he can never be wholly free from desires and inclinations which, because they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves agree with the moral law.”\(^\text{511}\) In other words, a “gap” will always remain between man and the “highest love, i.e., the “highest understanding,” the “highest imagination,” the “highest good.” But this “gap” is what allows for our freedom. We are free when we strive to imitate “it.” That is to say, through striving to

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\(^\text{508}\) *The Conjectural Beginnings of Human History*, 57.

\(^\text{509}\) CPrR, V, 83, 189-90.

\(^\text{510}\) Ibid., 190.

\(^\text{511}\) Ibid.
be universal in our thought and creative actions - when we strive to love and understand the “other” - we attain a kind of purposiveness and worth.

This “universalizable” worth (or value) stands in a direct relation, and contrast, to those who would limit their “love” only to those within their “own” historically culturally imposed identity (or tradition) - their only interest being to preserve “the law,” i.e., the identity of the “self.” ‘Jouissance,’ for them, is forbidden and must be prevented at all costs. The “Other” becomes absolutized and is seen as a threat to the well-being of one’s logical, authentic Identity. But what is this “authentic Identity”?

In the fourth thesis of Kant’s Idea for a Universal History, Kant speaks of an unsocial sociability” of man as being the antagonistic force, provided by nature, which impels him to act. He says man has a desire to associate with others in order to feel as a part of a larger whole, while, at the same time, he desires to isolate himself because of a selfish desire to have everything his own way. “Thus he expects opposition on all sides, he knows that he, on his own part, is inclined to oppose others.” There arises in man a heartless, competitive vanity, and an insatiable desire to possess and rule. He claims that it is this antagonistic drive, within man, which separates him from a bunch of complacent sheep. Is this antagonistic force within man, which entails both the desire to peacefully identify with others and the desire to dominate and oppose others, “love”? If so, we can definitely see the need for mediation.

We have seen that the moral law (i.e., the law of freedom) as an unconditional “rational idea” can only be cognized theoretically when stated symbolically, or

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513 Ibid.
analogous to a natural law - with the “typus”; that is: “Act only as if the maxim you choose ought to become a universal law of nature.” Kant says everyone does, in fact, follow such a typus, and this is realized in our common sense judgments, “for if common sense did not have something to use in actual experience as an example, it could make no use of the law of pure practical reason in applying it to that experience.”

Thus, it would seem that the determination of our actions, through maxims, according to the categorical imperative are made possible for us by the examples (i.e., “archetypes”) set before us by the genius - in civil society - which entails the evolution of a just civic constitution of human relations. Such a determination of our maxims will, then, have to do with judgments of taste.

This is not to say that:

taste can be acquired by imitating someone else’s. For taste must be an ability one has oneself; and although someone who imitates a model may manifest skill insofar as he succeeds in this, he manifests taste only insofar as he can judge that model himself. From this, however, it follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, an idea which everyone must generate within himself and by which he must judge any object of taste, any example of someone’s judging by taste, and even the taste of everyone else.

It has already been pointed out that man can never act except by determinate laws - be they based upon natural inclination or rational imperatives. Likewise, judgments of taste can never be “pure” - that is, they can never be “free” of a direct intellectual interest which is related to the objective purposiveness of the “object” (i.e., its “existence” as an identity in a “discursive” representation) for the understanding. I

514 CPrR, V,70, 178.
516 CJ, §17, 232, emphasis added.
have pointed out that this is the “problem” that, in a sense, “saves” Kant’s reasoning.

Let us go further.

Kant states (CJ, §16, 230):

[I]f a liking for the manifold in a thing refers to the intrinsic purpose that determines how the thing is possible, then it is a liking based on a concept, whereas a liking for beauty is one that presupposes no concept but is directly connected with the presentation by which the object is given (not by which it is thought). Now if a judgment of taste regarding the second liking is made to depend on the first liking, it is a rational judgment, and so is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste.

We can hear Sartre coming⁵¹⁷ when Kant states:

Freedom of choice with respect to human actions as phenomenon consists in the capacity of choosing between two opposing things, the lawful and the unlawful. Herein man regards himself as phenomenon, but as noumenon he himself is theoretically and practically legislative for objects of choice. In this respect he is free, but he has no, choice.⁵¹⁸

That is, we are “condemned” to follow examples that have been “relatively determined” for us; examples that have been instituted and made valid (lawful) by those who precede us - that allow us to already have value, meaning and purpose in our culture.

However, one could say that, in respect to his striving to act universally - based upon maxims that he has himself determined (through his productive imagination...through the spirit within him) - the genius in man is “beyond good and evil.” That is, the genius transcends the identity structure and the laws prescribed for him - allowing his culture (and in the long run “all” cultures) to “advance,” or at least to adapt to changing circumstances in the world - through initiating a universally communicable

⁵¹⁷ By this I am referring to Sartre’s “existential” notion that man is “condemned to be free.”

⁵¹⁸ From Kant’s Lose Blatter, (Reicke ed.), II, pp. 139-40. Quoted by L. Beck in Intro, to CPrR, p. 30.
“aesthetic idea.” That is to say, he presents an example - which is always connected to
the traditional examples which have historically preceded him, but goes “beyond”
them - enabling other “selves,” within his identity structure, to expand the range of their
maxims. Insofar as we generally follow these examples, set for us by the genius, “we
are free, but we have no choice.” The choice is determined by providence.

Since man is always within the world his actions can never be “purely” rational, and
thus, the imperatives which determine us, along with the maxims by which we follow
them, should not, and indeed, ultimately cannot become “fixed.” I am not saying by
this that “understanding” in-itself is a dead realm. I am merely indicating, along with
Kant, that as long as understanding remains “trapped” in a realm of analytic logicity
and fixed identity “it” is dead. That is to say, it is hoped by Kant that scientist’s will
continue to “increase the perfection of our cognitions and [...] all the benefits that
depend on these, as well as [...] imparting that knowledge to others.”519 Kant himself
distinguishes between the realm of “dead and scholarly” language (which contains the
rules and grammar) and “living” (used, expansive) language.520 The universe is
always wide open for new “discoveries,” i.e., new “life.” By connecting judgments of
taste to rationality, along with, and yet “above” predetermined judgments of the
“dead” realm of logical understanding, Kant (or perhaps we could say “providence”)
thus allows for inter-communication with “others,” and for the advancement of
freedom in the world.

Kant says:

519 CI, §47, 309.
520 CI, §17, 231, fn49.
Taste gains nothing by this combination of aesthetical with intellectual satisfaction in as much as it becomes fixed; yet, though it is not universal, in respect to certain purposively determined objects, it becomes possible to prescribe rules for it. These, however, are not rules of taste, but merely rules for the unification of taste with reason, i.e., of the beautiful with the good, by which the former becomes available as an instrument of design of the latter, so that the mental attunement that sustains itself and has subjective universal validity may serve as a basis for that other way of thinking that can be maintained only by [painful] laborious resolve but is of objective universal validity.\textsuperscript{521}

This is one of the most subtly “pregnant” quotes in Kant’s philosophy. One could say his entire philosophical system is compacted within it. But to comprehend the whole of it, we must analyze it in parts.

Let us begin by emphasizing the “yet,” i.e., taste gains nothing (when combined with intellectual satisfaction) insofar as it becomes fixed (i.e., absolutely determinative), yet, judgments of taste, by their connection to the objective purposiveness of nature (i.e., providence) for our judgment - reflective and determinative - provide us with the examples, which affect us, and which provide us with the initial “content” through which we determine our maxims (i.e., the “rules for the unification of taste with reason, i.e., of the beautiful with the good”). But these “examples” are always only “in general.” That is, they provide us with the “ideal” or the “aesthetic ‘standard idea’.”\textsuperscript{522} And as we have seen, the “aesthetic ideas” are always merely a symbol for the supersensible “rational idea” - “behind” and “beyond” them, i.e., which the aesthetic ideas actively express through their universal communicability.

\textsuperscript{521} CJ, §16, 230. With an interest in clarity, in this quote, I have combined the translations-interpretations of both W. Pluhar and J. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964) - as it has been quoted by J. Zammito, p.291.

\textsuperscript{522} CJ, §17, 233.
Now, what is this “mental attunement” that Kant spoke of above, and how does it allow us to have subjective universal validity? How does this subjective “determination” take place? And, does the pleasure that we feel in such judgments precede the judging of the object, or does the judging precede the pleasure? Kant says that the answer to this last question will be “the key to the critique of taste,” but I shall assert here that it is also the key to the sublime involved with “that other way of thinking” (also mentioned above). We shall begin with a judgment of taste.

The answer hinges on the universal communicability (“sensus communis aestheticus”) involved in the subjective presentation. There must be some form of “awareness of something” which everyone may acquire in order to have such presentations. That is, before we can experience the “feeling” of pleasure, the aesthetic judgment of the presentation must have already taken place. And, since this “awareness” is purely subjective, it cannot be in relation to a determinate concept of the understanding. In other words the imagination must connect the “general form” (Gestalt) of the object which affects us (or better, will affect us) to a cognition in general - without a determinate concept which restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. The imagination and understanding must be in free play.

We have already seen that this “general cognition” takes place with the sensible moment of the imaginary synthesis where one can “unconscious consciously” discern identity and difference in the apprehension of “forms” (Gestalt) in space, and

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523 CJ, §9, 216.
524 CJ, §40, 295.
525 CJ, §9, 218.
526 CJ, §9, 217-19, see also my §9.
we can interpret and associate them in a temporal series - apart from apperception.
The problem is - the imagination cannot “bring forth a sense representation that was never before given to sense.”527 We have seen that this was the task of the genius, who (through his participation in the productive imagination) provides us with the “archetypes” by which we are made aware of representations, and which connect words to thoughts (in-directly through spirit and a learning-training process in culture).

Kant refers to the feeling of pleasure that arises from a judgment of the beautiful as ‘*Lebensgefühl*’ (“the feeling of life”) - whereby “the mind becomes conscious of its own state.”528 The feeling of pleasure (or displeasure) that arises in a “reflective judgment” is what makes us “conscious” of the “general cognition’s” harmony with the categories of the understanding. However, it is an awareness of “something more” than was present in the categories of understanding, i.e., beyond logical apperception. The categories allow us to affirm the “existence” of the “object,” but the pleasure we feel is related to the value that has been given to the “object” above determinative hypothetical categories and sensual inclinations.

This would seem to indicate that in judgments of taste the sensual element is never completely divested. That is to say, even in one’s disinterested “liking” (love) for nature (which one could assume includes “other” humans - which are always “creatures,” i.e., works of Art) one is still interested (even if intellectually) in the existence” of the loved one [which leaves open the possibility of the darkest thoughts

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528 CJ, §1, 204.
and actions which may follow from such an interest; it would also indicate that the sexual element is always involved with a judgment of “beauty” - though Kant definitely tries to down-play this aspect].

Whatever is the case, our initial reception of the loved one, is marked by an arousal (i.e., the feeling of pleasure).\textsuperscript{529} As we have seen, Kant claims that this arousal is secondary, in tasteful judgments, to our “freely” apprehending, comparing and associating the “form” (‘Gestalt’) of the “object,” through the imagination, to pre-established “lawful” concepts of the understanding, whereby the powers reciprocally quicken each other and the presentation thus furthers the powers in their free play.\textsuperscript{530} However, I will speculate a bit here, that the “lawful concept” which furthers the powers here is none other than the “aesthetic idea” created by the genius which has been established as the “ideal” or “archetype,” within one’s society.

The state of mind, then, is enhanced by the aesthetic ideas whereby we elevate the “object” perceived, which gives us pleasure, to a “higher purpose” (or “higher interest”). That is, we are then in a position to take an interest in the “object” above a mere” desire to obtain sensual pleasure (from sex, or what have you). That is to say, the loved one is given value above what can be analytically achieved through hypothetical imperatives - which view the object as a mere means to pleasure through the possible achievement of an end.\textsuperscript{531}

\textsuperscript{529} CJ, 190.

\textsuperscript{530} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{531} CPrR, V, 22, 133.
The key “force” behind this “higher value judgment” is the imagination which “moves us inwardly” in our thoughts and in our dreams.\textsuperscript{532} When we judge beauty in nature, Kant say, we may imagine (or regard) “nature as having held us in favor when it distributed not only useful things but a wealth of beauty and charms as well; and we may love it for this, just as its immensity may lead us to contemplate it with respect and to feel that we ourselves are ennobled in this contemplation - just as if nature had erected and decorated its splendid stage quite expressly with that aim.”\textsuperscript{533}

The major difference in these two “feelings,” i.e. love and respect, is that the beautiful “is what we like when we merely judge it (and hence not through any sensation by means of sense in accordance with some concept of the understanding).”\textsuperscript{534} This “some” concept of the understanding is related to “another kind of knowledge” which I have related to the “common sense knowledge” (‘\textit{sensus communis aestheticus}’) - in which we “unconscious consciously” become aware of “relatively fixed” aesthetic ideals that provide society with the mental attunement to judge nature in general, through ‘\textit{Lebensgefühl}.’ The other feeling whereby we are “ennobled” is moral feeling (‘\textit{Geistesgefühl}’). It has to do with “that other way of thinking” mentioned above, i.e., “the sublime way of thinking.” The sublime “is what, by its resistance to the interest of the senses, we like directly,”\textsuperscript{535} as opposed to the beautiful which is liked “in-directly.” The “beautiful prepares us for loving something, even nature,

\textsuperscript{532} CJ, §67, 380.
\textsuperscript{533} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{534} CJ, §29, 267.
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid.
without interest; the sublime, for esteeming it even against our feeling of sense [i.e., ‘Lebensgefühl’].”

Now, beauty and sublimity are both “aesthetic ways of presenting things” to ourselves. In both cases it is the imagination which “must on its own sustain the mind in a free activity,” and “the presentation has a merely subjective determining basis.” But whereas in judgments of the beautiful we are always intellectually interested in the existence of the form of an object; the sublime is interested in the incomprehensibility, i.e., the “formlessness” of ____________.

§13. On Love and the Sublime

Whether the treatment of such knowledge as lies within the province of reason does or does not follow the secure path of a science, is easily to be determined from the outcome. For if after elaborate preparations, frequently renewed, it is brought to a stop immediately it nears its goal; if often it is compelled to retrace its steps and strike into some new line of approach; or again, if the various participants are unable to agree on any plan of procedure, then we may rest assured that it is very far from having entered upon the secure path of a science, and is indeed a merely random groping [...]. It is remarkable that to the present day [...], logic has been unable to advance a single step, and is thus to all appearance a closed and completed body of doctrine.

Thus, begins the “Preface to Second Edition” of the Critique of Pure Reason. Due to the incapacity for logical-analytic “knowledge” to advance - being trapped in a continuous circle of logical definitions - Kant goes on to state, “I have found it

536 Ibid.
537 CJ, §29, 271.
538 CJ, §29, 270.
539 CJ, §9, 217.
540 CPR, Bvii-Bvii.
necessary to deny ‘knowledge,’ in order to make room for ‘faith’ [Glaube].”\textsuperscript{541} In other words, he must make room for freedom, beyond the “dead” language games, dogmatic “truths” and natural laws of science. He does this by separating objective ‘knowledge’ from subjective ‘thought’:

To know an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its actuality as attested by experience, or \textit{a priori} by means of reason. But I can \textit{think} whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself, that is, provided my concept is a possible thought. This suffices for the possibility of the concept, even though I may be able to answer for there being, in the sum of all possibilities, an object corresponding to it. But \textit{something more} is required before I can ascribe to such a concept objective validity, that is, real possibility; the former possibility is merely logical. This something more need not, however, be sought in the theoretical sources of knowledge; it may lie in those that are practical.\textsuperscript{542}

As we have seen, in order to get in touch with this “something more,” Kant has had to provide subjective “‘common sense knowledge’” (what has earlier been referred to as “‘confused knowledge’”\textsuperscript{543}) with some kind of credibility, or form. He has tried to achieve this through postulating the supersensible concept of purposiveness as underlying all of our subjective reflective judgments, i.e., orderly thoughts which - when the free play of imagination is in harmony with the free play of the understanding - “do not contradict themselves,” and which apprehend, associate, and comprehend the general form of an object (this form being made already available for the subject by the aesthetic idea of the artist-genius (in judgments of taste)).

Reflective judgments, in judgments of taste, arise when we are aroused by “something” (through the free play of imagination) and a subject seeks a universal concept upon which to base this arousal. This supersensible “universal concept” is

\textsuperscript{541} CPR, Bxxx.

\textsuperscript{542} CPR, Bxxvi, fn(a), emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{543} See my p. 151. Kant, \textit{Reflection} 2387, (1755-6); J. Zammito, p. 21, fn21.
cognized symbolically by the “aesthetic idea” provided by spirit - either in nature, or in the “depths of the soul” of the genius who expresses-exhibits it. However, as we have seen, this “archetype” is only an indirect way of cognizing the “rational idea.” An “intellectual interest” is always involved pertaining to the existence of the “object” (empirical concept) which aroused us. Although this liking of nature’s product is above any charm of sense and even though one does not connect the existence of the “object” with any purpose whatsoever, this aesthetic judgment remains connected (“unintentionally”544) to the objective purposiveness of the form, which aroused us, for our “logical” understanding.

Now, without dropping the supersensible concept of purposiveness which lies behind our aesthetic judgment, Kant must find a way to attach the arousal that we receive from “nature” directly to the thinking-imagining-feeling subject - without regard to objective “predetermined” logical knowledge, i.e., the subject must determine him/herself directly in accordance with the “rational concept” through “feeling” (or rational faith (Glaube)) alone. Kant does this by symbolically equating moral feeling (‘Geistesgefühl’), or “respect” (Achtung), for the moral law within to the feelings of awe, esteem, and wonder that we experience when confronted with the sublime.545 As he says in The Critique of Practical Reason:

It is a very sublime thing in human nature to be determined to actions directly by a pure law of reason, and even the illusion wherein the subjective element of this intellectual determinability of the will is held to be sensuous and an effect of a particular sensuous feeling (an “intellectual feeling” being self-contradictory) partakes of this sublimity.546

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544 CJ, 190.
545 CJ, §27, 257.
546 CPrR, V, 117, 221.
Here we see the “intellectual feeling” (‘*Geistesgefühl*’),\textsuperscript{547} involved in a pure judgment of the sublime, as being the contradictory of ‘*Lebensgefühl*’ which informs us of the existence of “something” which gives us pleasure (or pain). As we have seen, even in judgments of beauty, Kant asserts that the feeling of pleasure is determined by the reflective judgment of the subject and not by the object. The intellectual interest in something/someone’s existence, in “pure” judgments of taste, gives rise to the illusion that the pleasure arose from the loved entity.

However, despite this “illusion,” it was “intellectual interest” (in the existence of the beautiful entity) which brought about this transition to moral feeling. For, Kant had attributed the primary concern of the “fine artist,” and those with acquired taste, to be distinctly moral. In other words, “taste is basically an ability to judge the way in which [sublime] moral ideas are made sensible.”\textsuperscript{548} And ‘*Geistesgefühl*’ is the “ability to present a sublimity in objects.”\textsuperscript{549} Could we say, then, that the artist is “representing the sublimity in objects,”\textsuperscript{550} i.e., by exhibiting “aesthetic ideas” with a “tasteful appearance,” the artist arouses us and provides an in-direct social access to the sublime “rational ideas” which lie beneath them?

If so, it would appear, then, that the artist must have experienced ‘*Geistesgefühl*’ before he can create a universalizable representation of “It” (the supersensible). Kant says that when we judge something to be supersensible, this judging “strains the

\textsuperscript{547} CJ, 1st Intro., 251’ & §54, 335 fn76.

\textsuperscript{548} CJ, §60, 356, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{549} Ibid, 251’, emphasis added .

\textsuperscript{550} Ibid. In the sentence above, I have quoted from the Pluhar transl. of Kant’s *The Critique of Judgment*, “First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment,” p. 251’; while the quote footnoted is the same quote found in J. Meridith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964).…as utilized by J. Zammito in *The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment*, p. 275.
imagination to its limit [...], because it is based on a feeling that the mind has a moral vocation that wholly transcends the domain of nature (namely moral feeling), and it is in regard to this feeling that we judge the presentation of the object subjectively purposeful.\footnote{CJ, §29, 265, emphasis added.} Now, what exactly occurs in an experience of the sublime? And how does the “transition” take place to “moral “rational concepts as ends of practical reason (i.e., with the mere ideas of “infinite progress” and “totality”), we carry the limits of the sensible world beyond the comprehension of imagination, and we can thus be said to understand them “rationally.”

In judgments of the sublime we are faced with “something” of which the imagination cannot comprehend (i.e., something “boundless,” “formless,” and “unpurposive” (at least for the objectively purposive synthesis of understanding)). However, the apprehension of its sensual incomprehensibility must lie already in us through our subjective, “unconscious conscious” awareness of “rational concepts.” Therefore, when we are presented with “something” beyond the bounds of our sensual conception, (i.e., when we are “as it were [faced with] an abyss in which the imagination is afraid to lose its “self”\footnote{CJ, §27, 258.}, “it” (the imagination) arouses us to connect the presentation to the supersensible concepts within us, whereby, we receive a liking (or love) of the presentation.

This liking that we “feel” is based upon “a negative pleasure,” that is, a pleasure, not so much connected to beauty and love, as to admiration and respect for our own moral
vocation. That is to say, it is ‘Geistesgefühl.’ However, such judgments of the sublime are marked by “a certain subreption.” And this is how Kant distinguishes, however refinedly, between the feeling of respect and the feeling of the sublime.

Subreption occurs when, in judgments of the sublime, the subject “mistakenly” attributes one’s respectful affectation to have arisen from the “sublime presentation” (i.e., nature), rather than from the “idea of humanity within oneself.” In other words, respect can only be connected with the moral law within (oneself and other humans), but those who respect nature as the cause of the sublime feeling have not yet read Kant’s Critique of Judgment, and thus, are not aware of their error.

....Since nature has seen fit to limit my time here, i.e., since I have approached my “dead”-line, it is only fitting that I should reach a sublime conclusion. Therefore, with this interest in mind I shall begin my conclusion with “The End of All Things”.....

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553 CJ, §27, 257.
554 Ibid.
555 Ibid.
“The End of All Things” is a kind of anti-Revelations, satirical essay by Kant, against the dictatorial powers of political clericism that were gaining influence in Germany at the time. One of their major tenets was the use of “Doomsday” threats to coerce their “brethren.” Kant asks, “Why do people expect an end of the world at all?”

Guilt and a sense of justice are the major source of such a doctrine, he says. And it is man himself who created it. He notes that in the progress of the human race, through art and taste, enjoyment and self-fulfillment naturally precedes the advent of morality, and “needs increase much more vigorously than the means to satisfy them” (Ibid, 75). But he asserts that the moral disposition of mankind will surely overtake these desires eventually.

The major problem with this doctrine (i.e., that ‘the world is going to end’) is that it is incompatible with the postulates of pure reason, and with the ultimate purpose, which we must infinitely progress toward in the world in time. Infinity in-itself is beyond our empirical understanding and we can only formulate a negative concept of it (i.e., where there is no time, no end is possible). For the ultimate purpose entails a path of perpetual changes. If reason attempts to conceptualize “it” positively by employing such principles as “rest” and “immutability” as the condition of the world’s creatures “it would not only be just as unsatisfactory with regard to its theoretical use but,


557 "The End of All Things,” 75.
rather, would end in total thoughtlessness.”\textsuperscript{558} He says that contentment with oneself is a misconception within the chain of infinite progression. Camus formulates this message quite clearly when he says:

We suffocate among people who think they are absolutely right whether in their machines or in their ideas. And for all who can live only in an atmosphere of human dialogue and sociability, this silence is the end of the world.\textsuperscript{559}

Mysticism results, Kant says, when one turns to “the beyond” for an explanation “when his reason does not understand itself and what it wants.”\textsuperscript{560} He puts down Eastern thought and Spinozaism saying they desire a destruction of personality in order to reside within the Godhead. What they really want he says is a final resting place where “understanding disintegrates and all thinking comes to an end.”\textsuperscript{561}

Kant notes that the “wise” men occasionally come up with fanatical religious schemes designed to infect entire nations, but, in the long run, they will generally aid in the advancement of practical reason in their domains. Thus, it seems best to:

leave the sages alone to make and pursue their course since they are satisfying progress with respect to the ‘idea’ to which they are attending; and to leave to Providence the outcome of the means selected toward the best ultimate purpose, since it remains always uncertain what the issue may be according to the course of nature.\textsuperscript{562}

For we must always give credence to a “concurrence of divine wisdom with the course of nature in the practical sense, if we do not wish to relinquish our ultimate

\textsuperscript{558} “The End of All Things,” 77.

\textsuperscript{559} Albert Camus, \textit{Neither Victims Nor Executioners}, as quoted by Rhonda P. La Cocq in \textit{The Radical Thinkers}. India: Sri Aurobindo Ashram Pr., 1972, p.24.

\textsuperscript{560} “The End of All Things,” 79.

\textsuperscript{561} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{562} “The End of All Things,” 80-81.
purpose altogether.” But what is this “divine wisdom,” according to Kant? Is there not “something,” some kind of “substance,” which remains “stable” within all of this change?

It would seem to be “the disposition” which “endures and is itself constant, a disposition which is not mutable like that progression of a phenomenon, but is rather something supersensible and is, consequently, not fluctuating in time.” In other words, it would appear to be one’s moral disposition, or “personality,” which endures through time. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states:

The substance, merely as object of inner sense, gives the concept of immateriality; as simple substance, that of incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, personality; all these three together, spirituality; while the relation to objects in space gives commercium with bodies, and so leads us to represent the thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as soul (anima), and as the ground of animality. This last, in turn, as limited by spirituality, gives the concept of immortality.

This “disposition” would also seem to give us a “kind of knowledge,” or “cognition [...] although one that is possible only from a practical point of view.” That is to say, as opposed to “common sense knowledge,” which arises from ‘Lebensgefühl’ achieved in judgments of taste, when one becomes aware of the sublimity of the moral law within oneself, through Geistesgefühl (or “respect,” Achtung) one acquires a kind of “rational faith” that one is here for a “higher purpose.” The geistige Gefühl gives us a sense of “participation in an ideal whole.” It follows from this

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563 Ibid.
564 “The End of All Things,” 77-78.
565 CPR, A345, B403.
566 CJ, §91.
567 Kant, Reflection 782, (1772—5), A.A. 15:342; J. Zammito, p. 304, fn52.
recognition that we must live, not “as if” we are here for a purpose, but “knowing”
that we are - and we must act accordingly.

To return to “the End,” Kant praises Christianity, but only insofar as it promotes love,
sacrifice and freedom. However, he feels that respect - “for the moral constitution that
He instituted”568 - is the primary thing that Christianity promotes. For without respect,
he claims, there can be no genuine love. But did Kant not earlier (in the “Third
Critique”) say that judgments of taste prepare us for loving something, and that they
also “provide for the transition from sense enjoyment to moral feeling”569 “without
too violent a leap”570?

There seems to be a distinction here between “genuine love,” i.e., love for the
noumenal essence of nature and of “man - as an end-in-himself and as a fellow
representative of the moral law; and love which is not “pure” because of the interest
(intellectual) in the loved one’s existence. He praises love as the free reception of the
“other” into one’s “own” maxims, and claims that this is an indispensable
complement to the imperfection of human nature. That is to say, Kant believes that
“human nature must be constrained to do that which reason prescribes through
law.”571 The love which arises in judgments of taste, involved in common sense
knowledge, would seem to be the peaceful way of going about this. “For what a

568 “The End of All Things;” 82.
569 CJ, §41, 297.
570 CJ, §59, 354.
571 “The End of All Things;” 82, emphasis added.
person does unwillingly he does so poorly. [And] it is a contradiction to command someone not just to do something but also to do it willingly.”

Kant praises Christianity insofar as it promotes love for the performance of duty, and insofar as the man who calls himself Christian acts in the name of humanitarian purposes. “The feeling of freedom in the choice of their ultimate purpose is what makes the legislation worthy of their love” However, Kant still holds that, “Only a desire for such actions which arise from disinterested motives can inspire human respect toward the one who does this desiring; and without respect there can be no true love.”

Kant beautifully criticizes the clerics, saying that once Christianity ceases to be worthy of love (utilizing dictatorial powers, Doomsday threats and the like), then men will react against it losing all ties. And this, in turn, will enhance an early arrival of the Antichrist.

Kant wrote this piece in 1794. Two months after its publication the Berlin ministry forbid Kant to lecture or write on religious matters.

572 Ibid.

573 “The End of All Things,” 83.

574 “The End of All Things,” 83-4.
Epilogue

As we have seen, freedom is what life is all about for Kant. Freedom, not only as morality, but as intelligence in general - a mixture of imagination, rationality, love and understanding - the only thing that separates man from cattle and sheep (as Kant has said, or perhaps we could add lions and tigers (and rabbits - if one would include man’s sexual appetite and his desire to proliferate)). It is only through the use of freedom - which Spirit has provided us with from within, in combination with culture which has been purposively provided for us to live within (which provides us with judgments of taste, logical knowledge, and identity) - that we can give value, meaning, and purpose to life. And this value always stands in relation to our being in the world in time.

Science provides us with logical knowledge through the schematic participation in the productive imagination of Spirit. And art provides us with the skills which allow us to create-construct empirical ideas within the world. The “fine artist,” with the influence of genius, combines these two abilities whereby, through his participation in the productive imagination, he institutes “aesthetic ideas” which symbolize the “rational ideas” and, thus, provide for the transition, within culture, to moral freedom. And this transition comes about through aesthetic reflective judgments of taste.

Judgments in art always rely on the particular taste of an individual. But this taste is always very much influenced by the interactions with “others” within one’s life. Kant says that one’s sense of taste: “the disinterested judgment of the form of an object (in nature or a work of art)” - is acquired through a learning-training process within one’s culture. He attributes this acquirement to the purposiveness of nature; where nature,
through its beautiful forms and also, through its influence upon the genius (through spirit), and aiding him to acquire taste (through culture) - promotes harmony in one’s judgments, and thus a sort of sensis communis within one’s culture.

The fine artist, through his examples, thus allows, not only for the constant input of new expansive ideas, and the ability for renewal and change within one’s culture; but also for the influx of ideas to enter from outside of his culture, or identity structure, allowing those within his culture to think on a more universal level. Through his productions, when they are affective-effective and universalizable, the artist, in a sense, then, allows one to transcend the relatively fixed identities and laws of one’s culture. Hence, it is through the productions-archetypes-exemplars of the fine artist that the “ultimate purpose,” which man attributes to nature (culture), aids man in the infinite progress of reason toward the “highest good in the world that we are to achieve through freedom.” And the “final purpose,” postulated as achievable through the infinite progression of the spirit of man in the world, is possible only in time. There can be no “end” (of time). Though, as I have pointed out earlier, the essence of man - his spirit, i.e. the practical self (the source of all possibility and the home of pure a priori transcendental imagination) - is outside of the restrictions of time.

Consequently, for Kant, there is no heaven or hell. For with such ideas as these as the basis for one’s judgment there can be no true freedom - in the sense of acting in the name of duty (moral feeling or respect). Only when we act out of respect for the

\[575\] CJ, §91, 462.
moral law within can we act out of “love” for the good-in-itself in “others” and in the “self.”

Love, for Kant, is a beautiful interest, and it is achievable only through, what he calls, the “highest feeling” (respect). But it is still judging by one’s interest in another’s existence. It is the free sharing of one’s will with another, but it still does not allow for true freedom, nor true appreciation of the essence of beauty-in-itself, nor true respect for the good-in-itself which we must always strive to realize by acting universally. But does not Kant go a bit too far here?

He has already indicated to us that although the command to “Love God and thy neighbor as thyself” is the “law of laws,” man can never reach such genuine love, just as one can never act “perfectly” out of respect for the moral law within (which one could assume is the law mentioned above). For man “can never be free from desires and inclinations which because they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves agree with the moral law.”\(^{576}\) He has mentioned that this law of the Gospel can only serve as an “archetype” (or we could say “parable”) to guide our actions by. Why does he insist that respect must precede love? Can they not come about together? Does not respect, in a sense, follow from our intellectual liking (love) for something’s/someone’s existence? Should we not be concerned about the existence and welfare of something/someone that we love? By relating all of our “pure” judgments as arising out of an original “disinterest” does not this contradict what I have just mentioned, i.e., that we can never be free of our sensual inclinations and desires? Such inclinations will always be involved in any judgment we make. All

\(^{576}\) CPrR, V, 83, 190.
we can do is strive to rise above them, even Kant admits, through our “mental attunement,” or taste, acquired through culture. But even this “striving” would seem to indicate a sense of both love and respect for an “other” - which does, indeed, transcend his/her identity (and alterity) and one’s own. But why should such a love not include an interest in the loved one’s existence?

“Nature” has never been more for Kant than an imaginary product of an inconceivable Good - which we “participate” in through our judgments involving: imagination, understanding and practical reason. But somehow we become aroused by “our” imaginary exhibitions to formulate (schematize) concepts and to strive (through following “universalizable” maxims) to reach the Good (or the highest Love) - the supersensible which is at the root of theoretical and practical reason. The essence of the subject would, then, appear to be the productive imagination, whereby one formulates one’s “personality” (disposition) through acting upon the knowledge gained through schema and symbols, already provided, which give mankind and nature value.

As such, the genius will lead mankind as a whole to the highest good in the world - a world” in which a lot of “happy” peoples will be ever more remote from nature.”\textsuperscript{577} But they will live together as of “one and the same people [under] the law-governed constraint coming from highest culture with the force and rightness of a free nature that feels its own value.”\textsuperscript{578}

\textsuperscript{577} CJ, §60, 232.

\textsuperscript{578} Ibid.
This would seem to be nothing less than the postulated end of absolute Identity of all men in the “world.” By postulating such an Identity is he not going against what he has said in “The End of All Things,” i.e., that perpetual change and transformation must take place in order to have infinite progress? And why should man have to be ever more remote from nature? That is, unless he destroys it all? We are approaching the sublime.

Kant states in Observations on the Sublime and the Beautiful “[T]rue virtue can be grafted only on principles which are nobler and more sublime the more universal they are. These principles are not speculative rules but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and that extends far wider than if based on particular motives of sympathy and amiability.” Kant states in Observations on the Sublime and the Beautiful “[T]rue virtue can be grafted only on principles which are nobler and more sublime the more universal they are. These principles are not speculative rules but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and that extends far wider than if based on particular motives of sympathy and amiability.” 579 And as soon as this affectation for humanity has risen to its proper universality it has become sublime, but also colder. 580

Why should anyone want to strive to be a cold hormone-less “happy” soul? By turning sensuality into an illusion has Kant not sucked the life out of man? And God? Turning him/Him into some kind of rule-making mechanism, that has no need of anything “other” than Itself? And where is freedom? By postulating a “happy” absolute, sublime End for man, what is left to give rules and value to, besides this “dead” Self? And why should “the law” be any more, or less, “real” than the “illusion” of sensuality? Though we would have to admit that Kant’s is a philosophy of love, it seems as though he has taken the heart out. But I wonder if this is so....


First of all, identity and difference are transcended and intermediated in every judgment that we make by the transcendental law of reason known as affinity. The law of affinity thus commands us to seek mediation between the infinite gap that separates the extremes dictated by the laws in which we seek identity (homogeneity) and difference (specification) “by prescribing that even amidst the utmost manifoldness we observe homogeneity in the gradual transition from one species to another, and thus recognize a relationship of the different branches, as all springing from the same stem.”\(^{581}\) In other words, all things are related, and relationship and continuity should always take precedence over any form of identity or difference.

As I have pointed out already, “all appearances stand in thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and therefore in a transcendental affinity, of which the empirical is a mere consequence.”\(^{582}\) In other words, even passive reproductive imagination is functioning under the guidance of reason or purposiveness via the law of affinity. Ultimately, however, transcendental affinity takes place in the transcendental imagination combined with apperception. The law of affinity “is nowhere to be found save in the principle of the unity of apperception, in respect of all knowledge which is to belong to me.”\(^{583}\)

Now, as far as the “end” of nature, it is obvious by now that Kant appreciated the beautiful in nature. He saw the necessity, however, of man giving nature meaning and value through his aesthetic judgments of beauty, and through his moral actions, to raise nature, or at least the nature in man, from the status of being an unconscious,

\(^{581}\) CPR, A660, B688.

\(^{582}\) CPR, A113-14.

\(^{583}\) CPR, A122.
dogmatically-mechanically determined, fanatically manipulated, non-thinking entity. The ability to find and give beauty and meaning to nature is related to a learning and training process, in one’s culture, but the feeling for the beautiful and the good are always free - they come from the spirit within. It is not the identity (or alterity) that matters so much, for Kant, as that one should only respect the “other” (the spirit) - within all of nature and within all men, and to act appropriately with regard to that “other.” As we have seen, love also plays an important role, along with respect and purposiveness, in elevating man and nature above the level of an unconscious, dogmatically determined entity.

“The admiration for the beauty of nature, as well as the emotion aroused by the so diverse purposes of nature [....] have something about them similar to a ‘religious’ feeling.”584 Such feelings inspire us, from within, to a free contemplation of the essence of being “beyond/beneath” identity structures, allowing us to transcend the realm of analytic identity and understanding. “For I know that intuitions are given to the senses of man, and that his understanding brings them under a concept and hence under a rule. I know that this concept contains only the certain characteristics (and omits the particular) and hence is [never more than] discursive.”585 Finally, “God is not a being outside me [i.e., God is not “above and beyond being”], but merely a thought in me. God is the morally practical reason legislating for itself. Therefore there is only one God in me, about me, above me.”586

584 CJ, §91, 482, fn105.

585 CJ, §91, 484.

586 Kant’s *Opus postumum*, ed. Erich Adickes (Berlin: Reuher & Reichard, 1920), p. 819...Quoted by L. Beck, Intro, to Kant’s CPrR, p. 48, emphasis added.
And finally, to conclude, and to demonstrate that passion is alive and well in Kant’s philosophy, we shall now take a brief glance at a comparison between Kant’s “practical reason” as it is manifested through the genius (which must include passionate philosophers) and Leone Ebreo’s “extraordinary reason” in his work *The Philosophy of Love (Dialoghi d’Amore)*.\textsuperscript{587}

Leone Ebreo (Judah Abrabanel) was a renaissance Jew, originally born (c. 1460) and educated (as a philosopher and physician) in Lisbon, who, after the Expulsion of the Jews from the Spanish empire, settled with his family (for a time) in Naples, Italy, where he was a practicing physician. “In addition to his medical studies, he was well versed in Latin and Arabic scholastic learning, Talmudic and Cabalistic doctrine, and in astrology, which was related to medicine.”\textsuperscript{588} It is also interesting to note that Spinoza “had in his library a copy of the Spanish edition of the Ebreo’s work, and, according to a view which has recently gained ground, derived from it his doctrine for the Intellectual Love of God.”\textsuperscript{589}

Ebreo holds that God is Love, and as such, is the ground of all that is - including all existent beings and knowledge of them. Love of God is forever connected with a passionate desire to gain whatever knowledge we lack of God. But some are more passionate than others in this vocation and these are the men who are possessed with “extraordinary reason.” These are the men who are driven to go beyond “ordinary reason” - which is merely a “logical reason” of identity and difference, i.e., reason


\textsuperscript{589} Roth, in the Intro to Ebreo’s *The Philosophy of Love*, p. xv.
through which one strives to preserve the “self” and the benefits associated with this identity.

“Extraordinary reason” would seem to be a cross between an extreme form of love (both passionate and intellectual - which Ebreo represents with ‘Philo’) in which one desires to consummate one’s “self” with an “other” loved one (which Ebreo represents with ‘Sophia’, “wisdom’); and a purely intellectual love of God. When under the spell of this extraordinary reason, one is faced with an “other” which is “unpossessable” but which drives him, nonetheless, to experience the most heart-wrenching torments in seeking “her.” The lover loses his “self” (or at least the pleasures and “knowledge” that coincide with this “self”) in the all-consuming aim of expanding his “knowledge” of “the loved one.” And ultimately, this love is connected with the goal of achieving a noble end in the world.

Does this sound a bit similar to Kant when he says, “By inclination I am an enquirer. I feel a consuming thirst for knowledge, the unrest which goes with the desire to progress in it, and satisfaction at every advance in it. [In the midst of this enquiry] I learned to honor man, and I would find myself [...] useless [...] if I did not believe that this attitude of mine can give a worth to all others in establishing the rights of mankind.”\(^{590}\) Need one say more? As much as Kant tries to deny his “passionate” inclination, in his other works, I think one would have to agree that “it” is there. And although Kant did not emphasize the passionate aspect of his philosophy, at least he had the “guts” to stand up to the representatives of power and identity, and to say what he felt had to be said.

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