UH-60 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

Below are the major portions of Chapter 9 of TM 1-1520-237-10, but it is not necessarily the chapter in its entirety. Some symbolism such as circled numbers are changed due to HTML constraints and will be noted by a bold italicized number instead. Light blue text (not the links immediately below) indicate changes since Change 5 of the last edition of the -10.

Engine Malfunctions
Rotors, Transmissions, and Drive Systems
Fire
Fuel System
Electrical System
Hydraulic System
Landing and Ditching
Flight Control/Main-Rotor System Malfunctions
Mission Equipment

AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

9.1 HELICOPTER SYSTEMS

This section describes the helicopter systems emergencies that may reasonably be expected to occur and presents the procedures to be followed. Emergency operation of mission equipment is contained in this chapter, insofar as its use affects safety of flight. Emergency procedures are given in checklist form when applicable. A condensed version of these procedures is contained in the condensed checklist TM 1-1520-237-CL.

9.2 IMMEDIATE ACTION EMERGENCY STEPS

NOTE: The urgency of certain emergencies requires immediate and instinctive action by the pilot. the most important single consideration is helicopter control. All procedures are subordinate to this requirement. The MASTER CAUTION should be reset after each malfunction to allow systems to respond to subsequent malfunctions. If time permits during a critical emergency, transmit MAY DAY call, set transponder to emergency, jettison external stores if required, turn off boost pumps, and lock shoulder harnesses.

Those steps that shall be performed immediately in an emergency situation are underlined. These steps must be performed without reference to the checklist. Nonunderlined steps should be accomplished with use of the checklist.

9.3 DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY TERMS

For the purpose of standardization, these definitions shall apply.

a. The term LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE is defined as landing at the nearest suitable landing area (e.g., open field) without delay. (The primary consideration is to ensure the survival of occupants.)

b. The term LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE is defined as landing at a suitable landing area. (The primary consideration is the urgency of the emergency.)

c. The term AUTOROTATE is defined as adjusting the flight controls as necessary to establish an autorotational descent and landing.

d. The term EMER ENG SHUTDOWN is defined as engine shutdown without delay. Engine shutdown in flight is usually not an immediate-action item unless a fire exists. Before attempting an engine shutdown, identify the affected engine by checking engine-out warning lights, torque, TGT, NG, NP, and engine oil pressure indicators.

1. ENG POWER CONT lever(s) - OFF.

2. ENG FUEL SYS selector - OFF.

3. FUEL BOOST PUMP CONTROL switch(es) - OFF.

CAUTION: If TGT rises above 538 ºC after shutdown, place AIR SOURCE HEAT/START switch as required, turn ENGINE IGNITION switch OFF, and press starter to motor engine for 30 seconds or until TGT decreases below 538º C.

e. The term LOCKOUT is defined as manual control of engine RPM while bypassing (700) ECU, or (701C) DEC functions. Bypass of the engine control will be required when % RPM 1 or 2 decreases below normal demand speed.

CAUTION: When engine is controlled with ENG POWER CONT lever in LOCKOUT, engine response is much faster and TGT limiting system is inoperative. Care must be taken not to exceed TGT limits and keeping % RPM R and % RPM 1 and 2 in operating range.

ENG POWER CONT lever - Pull down and advance full forward while maintaining downward pressure, then adjust to set % RPM R as required. Engine control malfunctions can result in % RPM R increasing or decreasing from normal demand speed. Under certain failure conditions, % TRQ, Np and Ng may not be indicating and the possibility of the engine-out warning light and audio activating exits. The most reliable indication of engine power will be TGT.

f. The term EMER APU START is defined as APU start to accomplish an emergency procedure.

1. FUEL PUMP switch - APU BOOST.

2. APU CONTR switch - ON.

9.5 EMERGENCY EXITS

Emergency exits are shown in Figure 9-1. Emergency exit release handles are yellow and black striped.

WARNING: For helicopters without a roll-trim actuator, the cyclic shall be held at all times with the rotor turning. In cases where emergency exit is required prior to rotor costing to a stop, make sure that the cyclic stick is centered until the last crewmember can depart the cockpit. since the main rotor shaft has a 3º forward tilt, an exit to the right rear or left rear will provide the greatest rotor clearance safety.

a. Each cockpit door is equipped with a jettison system for emergency release of the door assembly. Jettison is done by pulling a handle marked EMERGENCY EXIT PULL, on the inside of the door (Figure 9-1). To release the door, the jettison handle is pulled to the rear; the door may then be jettisoned by kicking the lower forward corner.

b. Cabin door window jettison. To provide emergency exit from the cabin, two jettisonable windows are installed in each cabin door. To release the windows, a handle (under a jettison lever guard) marked EMERGENCY EXIT PULL AFT, (left side; right side, PULL FWD) on the inside of the cabin door (Figure 9-1), is moved in the direction of the arrow, releasing the windows. The windows can then be pushed out.

9.6 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT (PORTABLE)

Emergency equipment consists of two hand held fire extinguishers, one crash ax, and three first aid kits, as shown in Figure 9-1.

9.7 ENGINE MALFUNCTION - PARTIAL OR COMPLETE POWER LOSS.

WARNING: Prior to movement of either power-control lever, it is imperative that the malfunctioning engine and the corresponding power-control lever be identified. If the decision is made to shut down an engine, take at least five full seconds while retarding the ENG POWER CONT lever from FLY to IDLE, monitoring engine torque, Ng, TGT, Np, and ENG OUT warning light on.

The various conditions under which engine failure may occur, prevent a standard procedure. A thorough knowledge of emergency procedures and flight characteristics will enable the pilot to respond correctly and automatically in an emergency. The engine instruments often provide ample warning of a malfunction before actual engine failure. The indications of engine malfunction, either partial or complete power loss, may be as follows: Changes in affected engine Np, TGT, Ng, engine torque, engine oil pressure, rotor RPM, LOW ROTOR RPM and/or ENG OUT warning lights and audio, and change in engine noise. The amount of change in each depends upon the type of failure, e.g. compressor stall as opposed to complete power loss on one or both engines.

9.8 FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS.

DUAL- ENGINE FAILURE: The flight characteristics and the required crew member control responses after a dual-engine failure are similar to those during a normal power-on descent. Full control of the helicopter can be maintained during autorotational descent. In autorotation, as airspeed increases above 70-80 KIAS, the rate of descent and glide distance increase significantly. As airspeed decreases below 64 KIAS, the rate of descent will increase and glide distance will decrease.

SINGLE-ENGINE FAILURE: When one engine has failed, the helicopter can often maintain altitude and airspeed until a suitable landing site can be selected. Whether or not this is possible becomes a function of such combined variables as aircraft weight, density altitude, height above ground, airspeed, phase of flight, single engine capability, and environmental response time and control technique may be additional factors. In addition, these factors should be taken into consideration should the functioning engine fail and a dual-engine failure results.

9.9 SINGLE-ENGINE FAILURE - GENERAL.

WARNING

When the power available during single engine operation is marginal or less, consideration should be given to jettisoning the external stores. The engine anti-ice and cabin heater switches should be turned off as necessary to ensure maximum power is available on the remaining engine.

Crew member recognition of a single-engine failure and subsequent action are essential and should be based on the following general guidelines. At low altitude and low airspeed, it may be necessary to lower the collective only enough to maintain RPM R (normal range). At higher altitude, however, the collective may be lowered significantly to increase RPM R to 100 percent. When hovering in ground effect, the collective should be used only as required to cushion the landing, and the primary consideration is in maintaining a level attitude. In forward flight at low altitude (as in takeoff), when a single-engine capability to maintain altitude does not exist, a decelerating attitude will initially be required to prepare for landing. Conversely, if airspeed is low and altitude sufficient, the helicopter should be placed in an accelerating attitude to gain sufficient airspeed for single-engine fly-away to a selected landing site. The light regions in the height velocity avoid region diagrams (Figures 9-2 and 9-3) define the ground speed and wheel-height combinations that will permit a safe landing in the event of an engine failure for various gross weights at both sea level 15°C (59F), and 4,000 feet/35°C (95F), ambient conditions.

9.10 SINGLE-ENGINE FAILURE.

WARNING: Do not respond to engine-out audio and warning light until checking TGT and % RPM R.

1. Collective - Adjust to maintain RPM R.

2. External cargo/stores - Jettison (if required).

If continued flight is not possible:

3. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

If continued flight is possible:

4. Establish single-engine airspeed.

5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.

9.11 ENGINE RESTART DURING FLIGHT

After an engine failure in flight, an engine restart may be attempted. If it can be determined that it is reasonably safe to attempt a start, the APU should be used. Use of a cross-bleed start could result in a power loss of up to 18% on the operational engine.

9.12 DUAL-ENGINE FAILURE - GENERAL.

a. If both engines fail, immediate action is required to make a safe autorotative descent. The altitude and airspeed (Figure 9-4) at which a two-engine failure occurs will dictate the action to be taken. After the failure, main rotor rpm will decay rapidly and the aircraft will yaw to the left. Unless a two-engine failure occurs near the grounds, it is mandatory that autorotation be established immediately. During cruise, reduce collective immediately to regain RPM R and then adjust as required to main % RPM within power off rotor speed limits. The cyclic should be adjusted as necessary to attain and maintain the desired airspeed. The recommended airspeed for autorotation is 80 KIAS. Autorotation below 80 knots is not recommended because the deceleration does not effectively arrest the rate of descent. Adjusting the cyclic and collective control to maintain 100 % RPM R and 110 KIAS (100 KIAS high drag) will result in achieving the maximum glide distance. A landing area must be selected immediately after both engines fail. Throughout the descent, adjust collective as necessary to maintain RPM R within normal range. Figure 5-1 shows the rotor limitations. RPM R should be maintained at or slightly above 100 percent to allow ample rpm before touchdown.

b. Main rotor rpm will increase momentarily when the cyclic is moved aft with no change in collective pitch setting. An autorotative rpm of approximately 100 percent provides for a good rate of descent. RPM R above 100 percent will result in a higher rate of descent. At 50 to 75 feet AGL, use aft cyclic to decelerate. This reduces airspeed and rate of descent and causes an increase in RPM R. The degree of increase depends upon the amount and rate of deceleration. An increase in RPM R can be desirable in that more inertial energy in the rotor system will be available to cushion the landing. ground contact should be made wit some forward speed. Pitch attitudes up to 25º at the point of touchdown normally result in an adequate deceleration and safe landing. If a rough area is selected, a steeper deceleration and a touchdown speed as close to zero as possible should be used. With pitch attitude beyond 25º there is the possibility of ground contact with the stabilator trailing edge. It is possible that during the autorotative approach, the situation may require additional deceleration. In that case, it is necessary to assume a landing attitude at a higher altitude than normal. Should both engines fail at low airspeed, initial collective reduction may vary widely. The objective is to reduce collective as necessary to maintain RPM R within normal range. In some instances at low altitude or low airspeed, settling may be so rapid that little can be done to avoid a hard-impact landing. In that case, it is critical to maintain a level landing attitude. cushion the landing with remaining collective as helicopter settles to the ground. At slow airspeeds, where altitude permits, apply forward cyclic as necessary to increase airspeed to about 80 KIAS. Jettison external cargo and stores as soon as possible to reduce weight and drag, improve autorotational performance, and reduce the chance of damage to the helicopter on landing.

9.13 DUAL-ENGINE FAILURE.

WARNING: Do not respond to engine-out audio and warning lights until after checking TGT and RPM R.

Autorotate

9.14 DECREASING % RPM R.

If an engine control unit fails to the low side and the other engine is unable to provide sufficient torque, % RPM R will decrease.

CAUTION: When engine is controlled with engine power-control lever in lockout, engine response is much faster and the TGT limiting system is inoperative. Care must be taken not to exceed TGT limits and keeping % RPM R and % RPM 1 and 2 in operating range.

1. Collective - Adjust to control RPM R.

2. ENG POWER CONT lever - LOCKOUT low power / TGT engine. Maintain TRQ approximately 10% below the other engine.

3. Land as soon as practicable.

9.15 INCREASING % RPM R.

% RPM R increasing will result from an engine control system failing to the high side. % RPM 1 and 2 (Np) will increase with the rotor (% RPM R). Increasing the collective will probably increase the malfunctioning engine's TGT above 900°C. If an engine control unit fails to the high side:

1. ENG POWER CONT lever - Retard high power / TGT engine, maintain TRQ approximately 10% below other engine.

2. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

If the affected engine does not respond to ENG POWER CONT lever movement in the range between FLY and IDLE, the HMU may be malfunctioning internally.

If this occurs:

3. Establish single engine airspeed.

4. Perform Emer Eng Shutdown (affected engine).

5. Refer to single engine failure emergency procedure.

9.16 %RPM INCREASING/DECREASING (OSCILLATION).

It is possible for a malfunction to occur that can cause the affected engine to oscillate. The other engine will respond to the change in power by also oscillating, usually with smaller amplitudes. The suggested pilot corrective action is to pull back the ENG POWER CONT lever of the suspected engine until oscillation stops. If the oscillation continues, the ENG POWER CONT lever should be returned to FLY position and the other ENG POWER CONT lever pulled back until the oscillation ceases. Once the malfunctioning engine has been identified, it should be placed in LOCKOUT and controlled manually.

1. Slowly retard the ENG POWER CONT lever on the suspected engine.

If the oscillation stops:

2. Place that engine in LOCKOUT and manually control the power.

3. Land as soon as practicable.

If the oscillation continues:

4. Place the ENG POWER CONT lever back to FLY and retard the ENG POWER CONT lever of the other engine.

When the oscillation stops:

5. Place the engine in LOCKOUT, manually control the power.

6. Land as soon as practicable.

9.17 % TRQ SPLIT BETWEEN ENGINES 1 AND 2.

It is possible for a malfunction to occur that can cause a % TRQ split between engines without a significant change in % RPM R. The % TRQ split can be corrected by manual control of the ENG POWER CONT lever on the affected engines.

1. If TGT of one engine exceeds the limiter ((700) 849 C, (701C) 872 C with low power engine above 50% TRQ or 896 C with low power engine below 50% TRQ), retard ENG POWER CONT lever on that engine to reduce TGT. Retard the ENG POWER CONT lever to maintain torque of the manually controlled engine at approximately 10% below the other engine.

2. If TGT limit on either engine is not exceeded, slowly retard ENG POWER CONT lever on high % TRQ engine and observe % TRQ of low power engine.

3. If % TRQ of low power engine increases, ENG POWER CONT lever on high power engine - Retard to maintain % TRQ approximately 10% below other engine (The high power engine has been identified as a high side failure).

4. If % TRQ of low power engine does not increase, or % RPM R decreases, ENG POWER CONT lever - Return high power engine to FLY. (The low power engine has been identified as a low side failure).

5. If additional power is required, low power ENG POWER CONT lever, momentarily move to LOCKOUT and adjust to set % TRQ approximately 10% below the other engine.

6. Land as soon as practicable.

9.18 ENGINE COMPRESSOR STALL

An engine compressor stall is normally recognized by a noticeable bang or popping noise and possible aircraft yaw. These responses are normally accompanied by the rapid increase in TGT and fluctuations in Ng, TORQUE, and Np reading for the affected engine. In the event of a compressor stall:

1. Collective - Reduce.

If condition persists:

2. ENG POWER CONT lever (affected engine) - Retard. (TGT should decrease).

3. ENG POWER CONT lever (affected engine) - FLY.

If stall condition recurs:

4. Emer Eng Shutdown (affected engine).

5. Refer to single-engine failure emergency procedure.

9.19 ENGINE OIL FILTER BYPASS CAUTION LIGHT ON, ENGINE CHIP CAUTION LIGHT ON, ENG OIL PRESS HIGH/LOW, ENGINE OIL TEMP HIGH, ENGINE OIL TEMP CAUTION LIGHT ON, ENGINE OIL PRESS CAUTION LIGHT ON.

1. ENG POWER CONT lever - Retard to reduce torque on affected engine.

If oil pressure is below minimum limits or if oil temperature remains above maximum limits:

2. Emer Eng Shutdown (affected engine).

3. Refer to single-engine failure emergency procedure.

9.20 ENGINE HIGH-SPEED SHAFT FAILURE.

Failure of the shaft may be complete or partial. A partial failure may be characterized at first by nothing more than a loud high-speed rattle and vibration coming from the engine area. A complete failure will be accompanied by a loud bang that will result in a sudden % TRQ decrease to zero on the affected engine. Percent Np of affected engine will increase until overspeed system is activated.

1. Collective - Adjust.

2. Emer Eng Shutdown (affected engine). Do not attempt to restart.

3. Refer to single-engine failure emergency procedure.

9.21 LIGHTNING STRIKE.

WARNING: Lightning strikes may result in loss of automatic flight control functions, engine controls, and/or electric power.

Lightning strike may cause one or both engines to immediately produce maximum power with no TGT limiting or overspeed protection. Systems instruments may also be inoperative. If this occurs, the flight crew would have to adjust to the malfunctioning engine(s) power-control lever(s) as required to control RPM by sound and feel. If practical, the pilot should reduce speed to 80 KIAS. This will reduce the criticality of having exactly correct rotor speed 100%.

1. ENG POWER CONT levers - Adjust as required to control RPM.

2. Land as soon as possible.

9.22 ROTORS, TRANSMISSIONS AND DRIVE SYSTEMS.

9.22.1 Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust. Failure of the tail rotor gearbox, intermediate gearbox or tail rotor drive shaft will result in a loss of tail rotor thrust. The nose of the helicopter will yaw right regardless of the airspeed at which the failure occurs. Continued level flight may not be possible following this type failure. Loss of tail rotor thrust at low speed will result in rapid right yaw. At higher airspeed, right yaw may develop more slowly but will continue to increase. Autorotation should be entered promptly. ENG POWER CONT levers retard to OFF position during deceleration. Every effort should be made to establish and maintain an autorotative glide at or above minimum rates of descent airspeed. This will maximize the effectiveness of the deceleration during the landing sequence. If autorotation entry is delayed, large sideslip angles can develop causing low indicated airspeed with the stabilator programming down. This can make it more difficult to establish or maintain adequate autorotative airspeed.

1. Autorotate.

2. ENG POWER CONT levers - OFF (when intended point of landing is assured).

9.22.2 Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust at Low Airspeed / Hover.

Loss of tail rotor thrust at slow speed may result in extreme yaw angles and uncontrolled rotation to the right. Immediate collective pitch reduction should be initiated to reduce the yaw and begin a controlled rate of descent. If the helicopter is high enough above the ground, initiate a power-on descent. Collective should be adjusted so that an acceptable compromise between rate of turn and rate of descent is maintained. At approximately 5 to 10 feet above touchdown, initiate a hovering autorotation by moving the ENG POWER CONT levers - OFF.

1. Collective - Reduce.

2. ENG POWER CONT levers - OFF (5 to 10 feet above touchdown).

9.22.3 TAIL ROTOR QUADRANT Caution Light On With No Loss of Tail Rotor Control.

WARNING

If the helicopter is shut down and/or hydraulic power is removed with one tail rotor cable failure, disconnection of the other tail rotor cable will occur when force from the boost servo cannot react against control cable quadrant spring tension. The quadrant spring will displace the cable and boost servo piston enough to unlatch the quadrant cable.

Loss of one tail rotor cable will be indicated by illumination of TAIL ROTOR QUADRANT caution light. No change in handling characteristics should occur.

LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.

9.22.4 TAIL ROTOR QUADRANT Caution Light On With Loss of Tail Rotor Control.

a. If both tail rotor control cables fail, a centering spring will position the tail rotor servo linkage to provide 10-1/2 degrees of pitch. This will allow trimmed flight at about 25 KIAS and 145 KIAS (these speeds will vary with gross weight). At airspeed below 25 and above 145 KIAS, right yaw can be controlled by reducing collective. Between 25 and 145 KIAS, left yaw can be controlled by increasing collective.

b. A shallow approach to a roll-on landing technique is recommended. During the approach, a yaw to the left will occur. As the touchdown point is approached, a mild deceleration should be executed to reduce airspeed. As collective is increased to cushion touchdown, the nose of the helicopter will yaw right. Careful adjustment of collective and deceleration should allow a tail-low touchdown with approximate runway alignment. Upon touchdown, lower collective carefully. Use brakes to control heading.

1. Collective - Adjust.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

9.22.5 Pedal Bind / Restriction or Drive With No Accompanying Caution Light. If pedal binding, restriction, or driving occurs with no caution light the cause may not be apparent. A Stability Augmentation System/Flight Path Stabilization (SAS/FPS) computer induced yaw trim malfunction can produce about 30 pounds at the pedal. An internally jammed yaw trim actuator can produce up to 80 pounds until clutch slippage relieves this force. The pilot can override any yaw trim force by applying opposite pedal firmly and then turning off trim. A malfunction within the yaw boost servo or tail rotor servo can produce much higher force at the pedals and the affected servo must be turned off. Hardover failure of the yaw boost servo will increase control forces as much as 250 pounds on the pedals.

1. Apply pedal force to oppose the drive.

2. TRIM switch - Off.

If normal control forces are not restored:

3. BOOST switch - Off.

If control forces, normal for boost off flight are not restored:

4. BOOST switch - ON.

5. TAIL SERVO switch - BACKUP, if tail rotor is not restored.

a. If the tail rotor quadrant becomes jammed, collective control is available, except that low collective with right pedal or high collective with a left pedal will be restricted. With a quadrant jam, complete collective travel is available for most control combinations, provided the pedals are allowed to move as the collective is displaced.

b. If tail rotor pitch becomes fixed during decreased power situations (right pedal applied), the nose of the helicopter will turn to the right when power is applied, possibly even greater than complete loss of tail rotor thrust. Some conditions may require entry into autorotation to control yaw rate. If continued flight is possible, a shallow approach at about 80 Knots Indicated Airspeed (KIAS) to a roll-on landing should be made. As the touchdown point is approached, a mild deceleration should be executed at about 15 to 25 feet to reduce airspeed to about 40 KIAS. As collective is increased to cushion touchdown, the nose of the helicopter will turn to the right. Careful adjustment of collective and deceleration should allow a tail-low touchdown with approximate runway alignment. Upon touchdown, lower collective carefully and use brakes to control heading.

c. If tail rotor pitch becomes fixed during increased power situations (left pedal applied), the nose of the helicopter will turn left when collective is decreased. Under these conditions, powered flight to a prepared landing site and a powered landing is possible since the sideslip angle will probably be corrected when power is applied for touchdown. Adjust approach speed and rate of descent to maintain a sideslip angle of less than 20º. Sideslip angle may be reduced by either increasing airspeed or collective. Execute a decelerated touchdown tailwheel first, and cushion landing with collective.Upon touchdown, lower collective carefully and use brakes to control heading.

6. Land as soon as practicable.

9.22.6 #1 TAIL RTR SERVO Caution Light On and BACK-UP PUMP ON Advisory Light Off or #2 TAIL RTR SERVO ON Advisory Light Off. Automatic switch-over did not take place.

1. TAIL SERVO switch - BACKUP.

2. BACKUP HYD PUMP switch - ON.

3. Land as soon as practicable.

9.22.7 MAIN XMSN OIL PRESS Caution Light On / XMSN OIL PRESS LOW / XMSN OIL TEMP HIGH or XMSN OIL TEMP Caution Light On. Loss of cooling oil supply will lead to electrical and/or mechanical failure of main generators. If the malfunction is such that oil pressure decays slowly, the generators may fail before MAIN XMSN OIL PRESS caution light goes on.

1. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

If time permits:

2. Slow to 80 KIAS.

3. EMER APU START.

4. GENERATORS NO. 1 and NO. 2 switches - OFF.

9.22.8 CHIP INPUT MDL LH or RH Caution Light On.

1. ENG POWER CONT lever on affected engine - IDLE.

2. Land as soon as possible.

9.22.9 CHIP MAIN MDL SUMP, CHIP ACCESS MDL LH or RH, CHIP TAIL XMSN or CHIP INT XMSN / TAIL XMSN OIL TEMP or INT XMSN OIL TEMP Caution Light On.

Land as soon as possible.

9.23 FIRE.

WARNING: If AC electrical power is not available, only the reserve fire bottle can be discharged and fire extinguishing capability for the #2 engine will be lost.

The safety of helicopter occupants is the primary consideration when a fire occurs; therefore, it is imperative that every effort be made to extinguish the fire. On the ground, it is essential that the engine be shut down, crew and passengers evacuated, and fire fighting begun immediately. If time permits, a "May Day" radio call should be made before the electrical power is OFF to expedite assistance from firefighting equipment and personnel. If the helicopter is airborne when a fire occurs, the most important single action that can be taken by the pilot is to land. Consideration must be given to jettisoning external stores and turning FUEL BOOST PUMPS and XFER PUMPS off prior to landing.

9.23.1 Engine / Fuselage Fire On Ground.

1. ENG POWER CONT levers - OFF.

2. ENG EMER OFF handle - Pull if applicable.

3. FIRE EXTGH switch - MAIN / RESERVE, as required.

9.23.2 APU Compartment Fire.

1. APU fire T-handle - Pull.

2. FIRE EXTGH switch - MAIN / RESERVE, as required.

9.23.3 APU OIL TEMP HI Caution Light On.

APU CONTR switch - OFF. Do not attempt restart until oil level has been checked.

9.23.4 Engine Fire In Flight.

WARNING: Attempt to visually confirm fire before engine shutdown or discharging extinguishing agent.

1. ENG POWER CONT lever (affected engine) - OFF.

2. ENG EMER OFF handle - Pull.

3. FIRE EXTGH switch - MAIN / RESERVE, as required.

4. Land as soon as possible.

9.23.5 Electrical Fire In Flight. Prior to shutting off all electrical power, the pilot must consider the equipment that is essential to a particular flight environment which will be affected, e.g., flight instruments, flight controls, etc. If a landing cannot be made as soon as possible the affected circuit may be isolated by selectively turning off electrical equipment and / or pulling circuit breakers.

1. BATT and GENERATORS switches - OFF.

2. Land as soon as possible.

9.24 SMOKE AND FUME ELIMINATION.

WARNING: If battery overheats, do not remove battery cover or attempt to disconnect or remove battery. Battery fluid will cause burns, and an overheated battery could cause thermal burns and may explode.

Smoke or fumes in the cockpit / cabin can be eliminated as follows:

1. Airspeed - 80 KIAS or less.

2. Cabin doors and gunner's windows - Open.

3. Place helicopter out of trim.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

9.25 FUEL SYSTEM.

9.25.1 #1 OR #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS Caution Light On.

1. ENG FUEL SYS selector on affected engine - XFD.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

9.25.2 #1 and #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS Caution Lights On.

Land as soon as possible.

9.25.3 #1 FUEL LOW and #2 FUEL LOW Caution Lights On.

Land as soon as practicable.

9.25.4 #1 or #2 FUEL PRESS Caution Light On.

a. If the light illuminates, flameout is possible. Do not make rapid collective movements. This emergency procedure has been written to include corrective actions for critical situations. Critical situations are those where the loss of an engine represents a greater hazard than the possibility of pressurizing a fuel leak.

If the light illuminates and the situation is critical:

1. FUEL BOOST PUMP CONTROL switches NO. 1 PUMP and NO. 2 PUMP - ON.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

b. This portion of the emergency procedure has been written to provide the best method of isolating the cause of the failure and prescribing the proper corrective action when the situation is not critical. This portion of the emergency procedure assumes the FUEL BOOST PUMP CONTROL switches are OFF when the malfunction occurs.

If the situation is not critical:

1. ENG FUEL SYS selector on affected engine - XFD.

If light stays on:

2. FUEL BOOST PUMP CONTROL switches - NO. 1 PUMP and NO. 2 PUMP - ON.

If light stays on:

3. FUEL BOOST PUMP CONTROL switches - NO. 1 PUMP and NO. 2 PUMP - OFF.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

9.26 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

9.26.1 #1 and #2 Generator Failure (#1 and #2 CONV and AC ESS BUS OFF Caution Lights On).

1. SAS 1 switch - Press off.

2. Airspeed - Adjust (80 KIAS or less).

3. GENERATORS NO. 1 and NO. 2 switches - RESET; then ON.

If caution lights remain on:

4. GENERATORS NO. 1 and NO. 2 switches - RESET; then OFF.

5. EMER APU START.

6. SAS 1 switch - ON.

7. Land as soon as practicable.

9.26.2 #1 or #2 GEN Caution Light On.

1. Affected GENERATORS switch RESET; then ON.

If caution light remains on:

2. Affected GENERATORS switch - OFF.

3. EMER APU START.

9.26.3 #1 and #2 CONV Caution Lights On.

1. Unnecessary dc electrical equipment - OFF.

NOTE: When only battery power is available, battery life is about 22 minutes day and 14 minutes night for a battery 80% charged.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

9.26.4 BATTERY FAULT Caution Light On.

1. BATT switch - OFF; then ON. If BATTERY FAULT caution light goes on, cycle BATT switch no more than two times.

If light remains on:

2. BATT switch - OFF.

9.26.5 BATT LOW CHARGE Caution Light On. BATT LOW CHARGE caution light on indicates charge is at or below 40%.

If light goes on after ground APU start:

1. BATT switch - OFF; then ON to reset charger analyzer logic. About 30 minutes may be required to recharge battery.

If light goes on in flight:

2. BATT switch - OFF, to conserve remaining battery charge.

9.27 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.

9.27.1 #1 HYD PUMP Caution Light On.

1. TAIL SERVO switch - BACKUP, then NORMAL.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

9.27.2 #2 HYD PUMP Caution Light On.

1. POWER ON RESET switches - Simultaneously press; and release.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

9.27.3 #1 and #2 HYD PUMP Caution Lights On.

Land as soon as possible. Restrict control movement to moderate rates.

9.27.4 #1 or #2 HYD PUMP Caution Light On and BACK-UP PUMP ON Advisory Light Off. Loss of both the No. 1 hydraulic pump and backup pump results in both stages of the tail-rotor servos being unpressurized. The yaw boost servo is still pressurized and the mechanical control system is still intact allowing limited tail-rotor control. Because of the limited yaw control range available, a roll on landing 40 KIAS or above is required. Loss of both the No. 2 hydraulic pump and the backup pump results in the loss of pilot-assist servos.

1. Airspeed - Adjust to a comfortable airspeed.

2. BACKUP HYD PUMP switch - ON.

If BACK-UP PUMP ON advisory light remains off:

3. FPS and BOOST switches - Off (for #2 HYD PUMP caution light).

4. Land as soon as possible.

9.27.5 #1 or #2 PRI SERVO PRESS Caution Light On. Illumination of #1 or #2 PRI SERVO PRESS caution light, can be caused by inadvertently placing the SVO OFF switch on either collective control head in 1ST STG or 2ND STG position. Before initiating emergency procedure action, the pilots should check that both SVO OFF switches are centered.

Land as soon as possible.

9.27.6 #1 RSVR LOW and #1 HYD PUMP Caution Lights On With BACK-UP PUMP ON Advisory Light On.

1. Land as soon as practicable.

If the BACK-UP RSVR LOW caution light also goes on:

2. SVO OFF switch - 1ST STG.

WARNING: If #2 PRI SERVO PRESS caution light goes on, establish landing attitude, minimize control inputs and begin a descent.

3. Land as soon as possible.

9.27.7 #2 RSVR LOW and #2 HYD PUMP Caution Lights On With BACK-UP PUMP ON Advisory Light On.

1. POWER ON RESET switches - Simultaneously press; then release.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

If BACK-UP RSVR LOW caution light also goes on:

3. SVO OFF switch - 2ND STG.

WARNING: If #1 PRI SERVO PRESS caution light goes on, establish landing attitude, minimize control inputs, and begin a descent.

4. Land as soon as possible.

9.27.8 #2 RSVR LOW Caution Light On.

Pilot assist servos will be isolated; if they remain isolated, proceed as follows;

1. BOOST and FPS switches - Off.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

NOTE: Because logic modules will close valves supplying pressure to pilot-assist servos, BOOST SERVO OFF, SAS OFF, and TRIM FAIL caution lights will be on.

9.27.9 Collective Boost Servo Hardover / Power Piston Failure. Hardover failure of the collective boost servo will increase control forces (as much as 150 pounds) in collective. The increased control forces can be immediately eliminated by shutting off the boost servo. Resulting control loads will be the same as for in-flight boost servo off.

1. BOOST switch - Off.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

9.27.10 Pitch Boost Servo Hardover. Hardover failure of the pitch boost servo will increase the longitudinal cyclic control forces (approximately 20 pounds). The increased control forces can be immediately eliminated by shutting off SAS.

1. SAS (1 and 2) and FPS switches - Off.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

9.27.11 BOOST SERVO OFF Caution Light On. Lighting of the BOOST SERVO OFF caution light with no other caution lights on indicates a pilot valve jam in either the collective or yaw boost servo. Control forces in the affected axis will be similar to flight with boost off.

1. BOOST switch - Off.

2. Land as soon as practicable.

9.28 LANDING AND DITCHING

9.28.1 Emergency Landing in Wooded Areas. Power Off.

1. Autorotate. Decelerate helicopter to stop all forward speed at treetop level.

2. Collective - adjust to maximum before main rotor contacts tree branches.

9.28.2 Ditching - Power On. The decision to ditch the helicopter shall be made by the pilot when an emergency makes further flight unsafe.

9.28.3 Ditching - Power Off. If ditching is imminent, accomplish engine malfunction emergency procedures. During descent, open cockpit and cabin doors. Decelerate to zero forward speed as the helicopter nears the water. Apply all of the collective as the helicopter sinks and until it begins to roll; then apply cyclic in the direction of the roll. Exit when the main rotor is stopped.

1. Autorotate.

2. Cockpit doors jettison and cabin doors open.

3. Cyclic - Position in direction of roll.

4. Exit when main rotor has stopped.

9.29 FLIGHT CONTROL / MAIN-ROTOR SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS.

a. Failure of components within the flight control system may be indicated through varying degrees of feedback, binding, resistance, or sloppiness. These conditions should not be mistaken for malfunction of the AFCS.

b. Severe changes in lift characteristics and/or balance condition can occur due to blade strikes, skin separation, shift or loss of balance weights or other material. Airspeeds near 80 KTS will minimize loads on dynamic components. If the main rotor system malfunctions:

WARNING: Danger exists that the main rotor system could collapse or separate from the aircraft after landing. Exit when main rotor has stopped.

1. Land as soon as possible.

2. EMER ENG(S) SHUTDOWN after landing.

9.29.1 SAS Failure With No Failure / Advisory Indication. Erratic electrical input to a SAS actuator can result in moderate rotor tip path oscillations that are often accompanied with pounding sounds or "knocking" which may be felt in the cyclic or pedal controls. No SAS malfunction, however, can physically drive the pilots' flight controls. Failure of SAS 2 is usually but not necessarily followed by a failure/advisory indication. Failure of a SAS 1 component will not be accompanied by a failure/advisory indication as SAS 1 does not contain diagnostic capabilities.

If the helicopter experiences erratic motion of the rotor tip path without failure/advisory indication:

1. SAS 1 switch - Off.

If condition persists:

2. SAS 1 switch - ON.

3. SAS 2 switch - Off.

If malfunction still persists:

4. SAS 1 and FPS switches - Off.

9.29.2 SAS 2 Failure Advisory Light On.

POWER ON RESET switches - Simultaneously press and then release.

9.29.3 SAS OFF Caution Light On.

FPS switch - Off.

9.29.4 FLT PATH STAB Caution Light On.

a. An FPS malfunction will be detected by the SAS/FPS computer, which will disengage FPS function in the applicable axis and light the FLT PATH STAB caution light and corresponding FAILURE ADVISORY light.

b. EH With the Mode Select Panel switch in the IINS/IINS position, a failure of the IINS gyro will cause a failure of the FPS and may possibly cause FPS SAS 2 to become erratic in roll motion. In addition to the failure indications on the IINS Control Display screen, the GYRO segment on the Failure Advisory Panel will illuminate. The copilot's VSI will fail with a ATT warning flag and both HSI's will fail with HDG warning flags. The aircraft may drift in pitch, roll, and/or yaw axis due to FPS failure.

1. EH SYSTEMS SELECT - DG/VG.

2. POWER ON RESET switches - Simultaneously press and release.

If failure returns, control affected axis manually:

WARNING: If the airspeed fault advisory light is illuminated, continued flight above 70 KIAS with the stabilator in the AUTO MODE is unsafe since a loss of the airspeed signal from the remaining airspeed sensor would result in the stabilator slewing full-down.

If an airspeed fault light remains illuminated on the AFCS panel:

NOTE: Use of the cyclic stabilator slew-up switch should be announced to the crew to minimize cockpit confusion.

3. Manually slew stabilator - Adjust to 0º if above 40 KIAS. The preferred method of manually slewing the stabilator up is to use the cyclic stabilator slew-up switch.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

9.29.5 Pitch, Roll or Yaw/Trim Hardover.

a. A pitch FPS/trim hardover will cause a change in pitch attitude and a corresponding longitudinal cyclic movement of about 1/2 inch. This condition will be detected by the SAS/FPS computer which will disengage FPS and trim functions in the pitch axis and light the FLT PATH STAB and TRIM FAIL caution lights.

b. A roll FPS/trim hardover will be characterized by a 1/2 inch lateral stick displacement, resulting in a corresponding roll rate and a constant heading sideslip condition, caused by the yaw FPS attempting to maintain heading. The SAS/FPS computer will detect the hardover condition and disengage lateral trim and illuminate the FLT PATH STAB and TRIM FAIL caution lights.

c. A yaw FPS/trim hardover is characterized by an improper motion of the pedals, resulting in about 1/4 inch of pedal motion followed by a corresponding change in helicopter heading trim. This condition will be detected by the SAS/FPS computer, which will disengage trim and FPS functions in the yaw axis and light the FLT PATH STAB and TRIM FAIL caution lights.

If failure occurs:

POWER ON RESET switches - Simultaneously press and then release.

If failure returns, control affected axis manually.

9.29.6 Trim Actuator Jammed. Both yaw and roll trim actuators incorporate slip clutches to allow pilot and copilot inputs if either actuator should jam. The forces required to override the clutches are 80 pounds maximum in yaw and 13 pounds maximum in roll.

Land as soon as practicable.

9.30 STABILATOR MALFUNCTION - AUTO MODE FAILURE.

An Auto Mode Failure will normally result in the stabilator failing in place. The position of failure may vary from the ideal programmed position by 10º at 30 KIAS to 4º at 150 KIAS. If an approach is made with the stabilator fixed 0º , the pitch attitude may be 4º to 5 ºhigher than normal in the 20 to 40 KIAS range.

WARNING: If acceleration is continued or collective is decreased with the stabilator in a trailing edge down position, longitudinal control will be lost. The stabilator shall be slewed to 0 ºabove 40 KIAS and full-down when airspeed is less than 40 KIAS.

Pressing the AUTO CONTROL RESET button after a failure occurs results in the automatic mode coming on for one second. If a hardover signal to one actuator is present, the stabilator could move approximately 4º to 5º in that one second before another auto mode failure occurs. Subsequent reset attempts could result in the stabilator moving to an unsafe position.

If the stabilator AUTO mode repeatedly disengages during a flight, flight above 70 KIAS is prohibited with the stabilator in AUTO mode.

If an AUTO Mode Failure Occurs:

NOTE: Use of cyclic stabilator slew-up switch should be announced to the crew to minimize cockpit confusion.

1. Cyclic slew switch - Adjust if necessary to arrest nose down pitch rate.

2. AUTO CONTROL switch - Press ON once.

If automatic control is not regained:

3. Manually slew stabilator - Adjust to 0º for flight above 40 KIAS or full down when airspeed is below 40 KIAS. The preferred method of manually slewing the stabilator up is to use the cyclic slew-up switch.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

If manual control is not possible:

5. STAB POS indicator - Check and fly at or below KIAS LIMITS shown on placard.

6. Land as soon as practicable.

9.31 UNCOMMANDED NOSE DOWN/UP PITCH ATTITUDE CHANGE.

a. An uncomanded nose down/up pitch attitude change could be the result of a stabilator or other AFCS malfunction (SAS or FPS). There is a remote possibility that a stabilator malfunction could occur in the automatic or manual mode without audio warning or caution light illumination.

b. If an uncommanded nose down pitch attitude change is detected, the pilot should initially attempt to stop the rate with aft cyclic. Maintaining or increasing collective position may assist in correcting for a nose down pitch attitude. If the nose down pitch rate continues, and/or inappropriate stabilator movement is observed, activate the cyclic slew-up switch to adjust the stabilator to control pitch attitude. Continue to monitor the stabilator position when the slew-up switch is released to ensure movement stops.

c. Uncommanded nose up pitch attitude changes at airspeeds of 140 KIAS and less should not become severe even if caused by full up slew of the stabilator and can be corrected with forward cyclic. If the nose up pitch attitude is caused by full up slew of the stabilator at airspeeds above 140 KIAS, full forward cyclic may not arrest the nose up pitch rate.

d. If an uncommanded nose up pitch attitude change is detected, the pilot should initially attempt to stop the rate with forward cyclic. At airspeeds above 140 KIAS, a collective reduction of approximately 3 inches, simultaneously with forward cyclic will arrest the nose up pitch rate. If these control corrections are delayed and/or a large nose up attitude results, a moderate roll to the nearest horizon will assist in returning the aircraft to level flight. After the nose returns to the horizon, roll to a level attitude. After coordination with the pilot, the copilot should adjust the stabilator to 0º at airspeeds above 40 KIAS and full down at airspeeds below 40 KIAS.

If an uncommanded nose down pitch attitude occurs:

1. Cyclic - Adjust as required.

2. Collective - Maintain or increase.

3. Cyclic slew-up switch - Adjust as required to arrest nose down pitch rate.

4. MAN SLEW switch - Adjust to 0º at airspeeds above 40 KIAS and full down at airspeeds below 40 KIAS.

5. Land as soon as practicable.

If an uncommanded nose up pitch attitude occurs:

1. Cyclic - Adjust as required.

2. Collective - Reduce as required.

3. MAN SLEW switch - Adjust to 0º at airspeeds above 40 KIAS and full down at airspeeds below 40 KIAS.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

MISSION EQUIPMENT

9.32 EMERGENCY JETTISONING

When conditions exist which require the jettisoning of external loads to ensure continued flight or execution of emergency procedures, the crew should jettison the load as follows:

CARGO REL or HOOK EMER REL button - Press.

9.33 EMERGENCY RELEASE OF RESCUE HOIST LOAD.

If the rescue hoist becomes jammed, inoperative, or the cable is entangled and emergency release is required.

1. CABLE SHEAR switch - FIRE.

If release from rescue hoist position is required:

2. CABLE CUT switch - FIRE.

9.34 BLADE DEICE SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS.

9.34.1 MR DE-ICE FAULT or MR DE-ICE FAIL, or TR DE-ICE FAIL Caution Light On.

a. If the MR DE-ICE FAULT caution light goes on, the system will continue to function in a degraded mode. The pilot must be aware of vibration levels and % TRQ requirements, which could be a result of ice buildup.

b. If the MR DE-ICE FAIL caution light goes on, the main rotor deice will automatically turn off. Tail rotor deice will remain on.

c. If the TR DE-ICE FAIL caution light goes on, tail rotor deice will automatically turn off. Main rotor deice will remain on.

1. Icing conditions - Exit.

2. BLADE DEICE POWER switch - OFF, when out of icing conditions.

If vibrations increase.

3. Land as soon as possible.

9.34.2 PWR MAIN RTR and/or TAIL RTR MONITOR Light On.

If a PWR monitor light is on with BLADE DEICE POWER switch ON to stop power from being applied to blades:

1. Icing conditions - EXIT.

2. BLADE DEICE POWER switch - OFF.

If a PWR monitor light is still on with BLADE DEICE POWER switch OFF:

3. GENERATORS NO.1 or NO. 2 switch - OFF.

4. APU generator switch - OFF (if in use).

5. Land as soon as practicable.

9.34.3 Ice Rate Meter Fail or Inaccurate. Failure of the ice rate meter should be indicated by appearance of the FAIL flag on the meter face. Inaccuracy of the meter will be indicated by increased torque required and/or increase of vibration levels due to ice buildup. If failure or inaccuracy is suspected, with no other indicated failures, the system can be manually controlled.

1. BLADE DEICE MODE switch - MANUAL as required.

If vibration levels increase or % TRQ required increases:

2. Higher icing MODE - Select as required.

If ice buildup continues:

3. Land as soon as practicable.

9.34.4 Loss of NO.1 or NO. 2 Generator During Blade Deice Operation. Loss of one generator during blade deice operation will result in loss of power to the system. To restore system operation, the APU must be started and the APU generator switch ON. The APU GEN ON advisory light will not go on because one main generator is still operating. The APU generator will supply power only for blade deice operation.

Pilot not on the controls:

Emer APU start.

9.35 EXTERNAL EXTENDED RANGE FUEL SYSTEM FAILURE TO TRANSFER SYMMETRICALLY IN MANUAL MODE. ES

a. Total failure of a single external extended range fuel system tank to transfer fuel could be the result of a loose filler cap, bleed-air regulator/shutoff valve, fuel shutoff valve, or line blockage failure.

b. Total failure of one tank to transfer fuel will turn on the associated tank's NO FLOW light. Reduced flow from one tank may not cause a NO FLOW light to go on, but will change the lateral CG of the helicopter. The pilot will notice a migration of the lateral cyclic stick position as the lateral CG offset from neutral increases. For example, a fully asymmetric outboard 230-gallon tank set (one tank full, one tank empty), on an otherwise neutrally balanced H-60, will result in a level flight lateral stick position offset of approximately two inches. If asymmetric transfer is suspected, stop transfer on the selected tank set and initiate transfer on the other tank set, if installed.

If asymmetric fuel transfer is suspected:

1. Stop transfer on tank set.

2. Select other tank set and initiate transfer.

3. If applicable, use fuel crossfeed to operate both engines from heavy side main fuel tank.

4. Land as soon as practicable.

WARNING: With asymmetric fuel loading, lateral control margin will be reduced in the direction opposite the heavy side. The aircraft has been flown from hover to 138 KIAS, with lateral CG's equivalent to a fully asymmetric outboard 230-gallon tank set, (full right tank, no stores on left side). The most critical maneuvers are turns toward the heavy side and approaches with a crosswind from the lighter side. These maneuvers are not recommended. The most adverse condition for lateral controllability is right side heavy, in the 20 to 50 KIAS range. Do not exceed 30 degree angle of bank. If controllability is in question, jettison the asymmetric tank set.

Should controlled flight with one heavy external tank become necessary, proceed as follows:

1. Make all turns shallow (up to standard rate), and in the direction away from heavy side (particularly when a right tank remains full).

2. Avoid abrupt control motions, especially lateral cyclic.

3. If possible, shift personnel to the light side of the helicopter.

4. Select a suitable roll-on landing area, and make a roll-on landing with touchdown speed in excess of 30 KIAS. To increase control margin, execute the approach into the wind or with a front quartering wind from the heavy side and align the longitudinal axis of the aircraft with the ground track upon commencing the approach. If a suitable roll-on landing area is not available, make an approach to a hover into the wind, or with a front quartering wind from the heavy side.

9.36 EXTERNAL EXTENDED RANGE FUEL SYSTEM TANK JETTISON. ES

At high gross weights and with one engine inoperative, or in an emergency or performance limited situation, it may be necessary to jettison a tank set. Circuitry prevents the release of any individual tank even if a single tank jettison has been selected at the STORES JETTISON control panel. The helicopter will remain controllable even if a single tank fails to release because of a malfunction in the jettison system. In the case of a four tank configuration, and depending on the amount of fuel in the tanks, lateral control may be lost if both tanks on one side fail to release. For this reason the use of the EMER JETT ALL, or JETT ALL switches is not recommended. Only in circumstances where failure to do so would result in certain damage to aircraft and crew, should the use of these switches be considered, at the discretion of the pilot in command.

If jettisoning of tanks is required:

1. STORES JETTISON switch - Select INBD BOTH, OUTBD BOTH or ALL as applicable.

2. JETT switch - Actuate.

If primary jettison system does not operate:

3. EMER JETT ALL switch - Actuate.

9.37 FUEL FUMES IN COCKPIT/CABIN WITH EXTERNAL EXTENDED RANGE FUEL SYSTEM PRESSURIZED. ES

If the bleed air check valve(s) is stuck in the open position when the heater is turned on, the resulting bleed air manifold pressure drops due to the heater bleed air demands. This allows fumes/mist above the tanks to backflow through the bleed air manifold, through the heater, and into the cabin. If fuel fumes or mist are noted during external extended range fuel system operation, perform the following:

If heater is on:

1. HEATER switch - OFF.

If heater is off or fumes persist:

2. PRESS OUTBD and INBD switches - OFF.

3. MODE switch - OFF.

4. FUEL BOOST PUMP CONTROL switches - As required.

9.38 VOL LAUNCHER RACKS JETTISON.

At high gross weights and with one engine inoperative or in an emergency, it may be necessary to jettison the volcano launcher racks. Both lower launcher racks must separate from helicopter before upper racks are activated. If one lower rack remains, upper racks will not jettison.

If jettisoning of launcher racks is required:

1. JETTISON switch - JETTISON.

If jettison procedure above fails, do the following immediately:

2. EMER JETTISON switch - JETTISON.