Of the Information Bureau (IB, Cominform) of the communist parties about the state of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. (CPY) Bucharest. June 28th, 1948.

Summary:

1. The leadership of the CPY is straying from the right path, Marxism – Leninism.

2. It is implementing an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

3. CPY is avoiding a class struggle and the collectivization of villages.

4. It is diminishing the role of the Communist Party, practically dissolving the Party in the Non-Party National Front. CPY is a secret, illegal organization.

5. There is no inner party democracy in CPY, neither respect for the principle of re-election, nor critique nor self-critique. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia is in a semi-legal position. Military methods of leadership and a Turkish terrorist regime are cultivated in the party. The members of Central Committee (CC) of CPY Hebrang and Zujovic are arrested.

6. After the Resolution the leadership of CPY suddenly introduced ultra leftist laws (nationalization, cooperatives, the liquidation of capitalism).

7. The Leadership of CC believe that Soviet Union is a bigger danger to Yugoslavia than the Imperialists. Further, every party has to account to the Informbureau about its work and each party has the right to criticize the other parties. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia used this right to a great extent at the first meeting of the nine communist parties. The refusal to account for one's work is tantamount to a demand for a privileged position in the Informbureau.

8. The Informbureau condemns the anti-party politics and measures of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and feels that it has, with these actions, excluded itself from the Informbureau, giving up internationalism and starting on the path to nationalism. The Yugoslav leadership believes that the capitalist states are a lesser threat to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union.

There are enough healthy elements in CPY. Their duty is to force their leaders to admit their mistakes, to fix them, to return to internationalism or - if the current leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia do not feel up to it - to be replaced. End of the Resolution.

COMMENT: The Resolution is a convoluted document, a jumble of about three thousand words. The poor composition could only be the result of an impossible task: the document had to repeat the allegations from the Soviet letters but at the same time it had to look like an independent and original discovery of the Cominform. The Soviet letters, which had served as a basis for the document, though signed by Stalin, were not written in his concise style. Either his old speechwriter had taken leave or Stalin was already transformed due to his illness. It is a typical document of communist bureaucracy: generalizations, half-truths and threats. Certain "facts" were used as statements in tabulated paragraphs. A bit later, the same "facts" were reiterated as further illustrations of the next statement. The facts were so much mixed with lies and trumpeted accusations that they lost credibility. There was no rational relationship between the fact and its interpretation.

The diplomats in Soviet service were quoted as a source of information and their words were taken as the absolute truth, beyond discussion, let alone doubt. That introduced a degree of naivete into the Soviet documents, rather unexpected from the Kremlin. Having to use such an uninspiring source, the writers of the Resolution could not make a better job.

All that was expressed in Newspeak, the newly created communist jargon. It is understandable why many foreign commentators were confused by the Resolution, firstly because they did not understand it; secondly because they thought it was a conspiracy, which they could not unravel at that moment. Reading correctly the Soviet treatment of Yugoslavs up to that point they had believed the Yugoslavs were the best students of Stalin. On one occasion Stalin even hinted that his successor in Europe would be Josip Broz Tito.

Summary:

1. Untrue, unfounded accusations. It is strange that the CC of the Soviet Communist Party of Bolsheviks refuses to check, on the spot, its arguments, as the CC CPY suggested in its letter dated April the 13^th.

2. There is no evidence. On the contrary, it is true that Soviet intelligence agents are recruiting our citizens.

3. The accusations come too late. We are already forming cooperatives.

4. We protest vehemently. Regarding the National Front: this is a misunderstanding of the essence of the National Front. The illegality of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia? Laughable, untrue.

5. An unworthy accusation. Zujovic and Hebrang are brought into the defense. The former was kicked out of the CC CPY along with Gorkic, by the decision of the Comintern. Hebrang turned a traitor when arrested by the Ustasha police.

6. A ridiculous accusation. The reforms were planned six months before the accusation of the SKP (b).

7. The CC CPY believes that we need help from democratic countries. The Soviet Union is also in the process of developing socialism. However, instead of that, some democratic countries are instituting proceedings, which insult the people of Yugoslavia.

8. The CC CPY refuses to discuss mistakes of which it is not guilty. It refutes allegations that it has switched over to the nationalist side. Allegations about concessions made to the imperialists and deals made with them about the independence of Yugoslavia – the worst slanders made against the new Yugoslavia.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is certain that the accusations of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party of Bolsheviks will be used by enemies to slander the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other democratic countries. It does not accept any responsibility for these accusations since it has not provoked them. It calls on all its members to unite in building socialism, which is the only way to refute these allegations.

COMMENT: The Central Committee's answer is somewhat shorter than the Resolution, more coherent and logical. What is the truth?

1.The Resolution favors generalized allegation. What is straying from the proper path? Who is the arbitrator?

2.Strangely enough, the Agitprop of the CC CPY brought forward, gradually and much later, proofs about the different conceptions (real or fictitious), when it suited them.

3. The Yugoslav communists carried out the most widespread collectivization after the Resolution.

4. The Yugoslavs were right: the National front was a tool of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia; not vice-versa.

5. Lack of democracy in CPY? A ridiculous accusation. Communists all over the world know there is no democracy in communism and that is admitted in the statutes of every party. It is true that it was not known who was a member of the CPY. The Yugoslavs pointlessly emphasize that Hebrang behaved like a coward in the hands of the Ustasha police. When did they find it out? A similar argument is valid for Zujovic. Both of them occupied highest post after the alleged misdeeds.

6. "Leftist processes" (nationalization, cooperatives, the liquidation of capitalism) were enforced more vigorously after the Resolution as an attempt to make false the statements of the Resolution. Later some of them were discontinued (cooperatives) .

7. Yugoslavs wisely were silent about their leading, revolutionary roles at the first meeting of IB criticizing the Italian and French CP.

8. The Yugoslav communists became nationalists for the first time in the history of the CPY only after the Resolution showing their allegiance to Yugoslavia and not the Soviet Union. A proof? When Germany attacked the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, the CPY had remained silent. But when in June 1941 Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the CPY called on their people to rise up and fight the Germans.