Martin Hollis sets out an ambitious task for himself in his presentation of the development and major reoccurring themes. Some of the tasks he assigns to his book include reflecting on the ambitions of Reason and inquiries as to whether those ambitions need to be reassessed for the social sciences (p. 5); investigating the relationship between institutions and the practices of social life and the actors participating in them (p. 18); as well as an exploration of Explanation and Understanding as the bookâs major theme and Holism and Individualism as its minor one (p. 20). This makes assessment of The Philosophy of Social Science relatively straightforward ö assuming an agreement with his stated objectives as reasonable ones to pursue, how successful is the book in achieving them? The answer is not clear, nor is the explicit or implicit themes, due to the over-reaching tendencies of the book.

These over-reaching tendencies, an ambition that compels Hollis to aim higher than a coherent treatment of the subject should, manifests in a plethora of often-interchanging dichotomies thrown at the reader with regularity; an overall vagueness in many parts; a glossing-over of key concepts that clearly deserve more attention; and a presentation of both sides of debates defined dichotomously in such a way as to indicate that Hollisâ intention is to resolve long-standing issues by firmly taking sides, when this is almost never the case.

In the introduction, Hollis sets up a dichotomous debate concerning how social forces influence action between Karl Marx and John Stuart Mills (p. 10) ö an interesting debate, but a strange one to set up as dichotomous, given the array of others who have tacked this subject. Hollis never explains his selection of debating opponents in this or any other instance in the book, creating a disingenuous impression of only two (or, occasionally, a "third way") sides to any issue presented in the book.

Hollis refers continually to determinism and its conflict with individual freedom, but his attempt to convince that the two can mutually co-exist fails due to his murky explanations (p. 13). Equally vague is his continued exploration of a Marx/Mills clash (p. 15), in which he frames the debate in ontological, methodological and epistemological questions that bear more detail.

Chapter Two starts the bookâs thesis off as far back and the thinking of Descartes and Bacon, though it is previously stated that the social sciences were first devised by 18^th century thinkers (p. 5). Hollisâ inability to resist the temptation of starting much earlier than is necessary for the kind of exploration of the social sciences suggested by the title is an unwelcome headache that could easily have

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been avoided with a more efficient summation of the thinkers who influenced early social scientists like Hegel or Comte.

Chapter Three neatly outlines some of the issues particular to a Positivist approach to the social sciences, again using its ontology, methodology and epistemology as defining features ö a comparative device used throughout the book, but never summized.

Chapter Four begins with a quest for a "third way" beyond Baconâs axioms (p. 70), yet never appears to find it, instead dismissing Popperâs criterion of scientific theory, the "strong programme" position, and attempts to combine rationalist and empiricist methodology, leading finally to a suspicion "that science is never wholly objective"(p. 91 ö which Hollis will inexplicably dismiss at his conclusion of Chapter 10).

Chapter Five explores Durkheimâs conception of social facts using the familiar ontology/methodology/epistemology framework (leading one to desire a table which all the theories explored in the book laid out side-by-side on these three dimensions). This soon evolves (devolves?) into a dichotomous debate between Holists and Individualists over the feedback mechanism requires to influence individual action ö a debate that Hollis concludes with the unconvincing statement that Holists can claim victory for lack of a better explanation being provided by their individualistic adversaries.

Chapter Six launches into an examination of Rational Choice Theory and Game Theory and their treatment of rational actors, introducing Hobbesâ Leviathan to explain how these theories solve the "free-rider" problem and explain the introduction of the State. It concludes with the introduction of the Consensus/Conflict theories dichotomy, reducing the differences in position to one of where to start, with consensus theorists beginning with coordination and moving to an accounting of non-self-enforcing norms; conflict theorists preferring to investigate how cooperation is made possible when self-interests rarely coincide. An oversimplification of the issues at hand, the subject deserves at least a chapter in itself, which Hollis does not offer.

Chapter Seven begins by positing that that social sciences may require a unique methodology, calling for "a precise way to distinguish between explaining and understanding" (p. 147), but failing to provide one.

Chapter Eight examines the role of social norms and whether the social structure influences individual behaviour or is influenced by it. Here, he usefully points out limitations to Rational Choice/Game Theory.

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Chapter Ten debunks the Weberian/Positivist position of objectivity. It is confusing then, when he backpedals by the chapterâs end, suggesting that value-judgements must be excluded by social scientists, after carefully explaining how it is not entirely possible.

Chapter Eleven jumps back to the starting-point of scientific investigation, asking whether the social scientist should be a Relativist or a Universalist (another dichotomy), concluding after much conflicting evidence that "universalism takes priority" (p. 247), none-too-convincingly.

Hollis concludes the book in Chapter Twelve by describing what is now obvious to the reader ö there are no clear-cut answers to the questions he raised, which each position in the many dichotomies he presents leading in a "hermeneutic circle" , which he describes as a sort of dance. After considering a mix of each position, Hollis incredulously declares that any such compromise leading to the middle position "represents a black hold, into which social theories and philosophies vanish without a trace." (p. 257). If this is the case and the contrast between Explanation and Understanding cannot be resolved, Hollis could have saved the reader some time by concluding this a lot earlier in the proceedings.