Tom Acton
Philosophy 335
Dr. Haugen
9/29/2001
Landesman's view is two pronged in nature. The first of those prongs deals with the biological evidence that our perceptions of colors are simply evolutionary tricks gained in order to help us navigate a world filled with danger and opportunity. Landesman feels that since animals of different species view color to varying degrees, and obviously some benefit from this, that color must be subjective. And, if color is subjective he concludes, than it must also be arbitrary and not even exist In his essay, "Why Nothing Has Color: Color Skepticism," . very little time is spent on this aspect of his theory. I think he knew the response coming.
If there is a marching band playing outside the window, and I'm standing there with two other guys. I decide to stuff my ears with cotton. One guy leaves his ears clear of debris. The third guy puts on a pair of headphones and listens to Nirvana's In Utero album. I am hearing only a muffled version of the band; the second guy hears them in painful clarity, and the third guy hears some weird mix of "When the Saints Come Marching In" and "Rape Me." Now one can argue for the evolutionary advantage of all three situations, but it is clear that one basic sound is being heard three different ways. Evolution, or in this case personal choice, has led to three different perceptions. That does not mean that the sound or existence of the sound should be questioned. It's still there, it is simply being perceived different ways. The stimuli that every animal comes in contact with is simply ignored by the eyes of some species; that does not mean that color is not real.
Landesman does an excellent job of showing that during the processes involved in actually seeing, actual color does not come up.
We are told by the physicist that, as a result of its atomic and molecular microstructure, the tomato [or any object being seen] absorbs some of the light that falls on it and reflects light of other wavelengths. Some of the changes in the retina, which then sends neural signals through the optic nerve to the brain, as a result of which you see the tomato and its bright red color.
Landesman would have us believe that since color does not actual come up in the explanation of vision, it does not exist. Apparently we should not trust our sight.
Without even getting into my own theories, Landesman points out flaws in his theory with poor examples. He says that a common argument against him is that by believing in size and shape and other properties, he puts faith in his senses, but then seems to not believe in color. He says he is accused of selectively believing his senses.
He fights off these attacks with an example showing that one cannot always trust his eyesight. Certainly most people know this. He tells of a small group of people that see spots all agreeing that the world must be spotted, and asks why we with perfect vision assume that our vision is the correct one to have, as opposed to the argument that the world is spotted.
Those that see spots are foolish to believe the world to be spotted for a couple reasons. The first reason is that the rest of the human population disagrees. If everyone's eyes sees something differently than I do, at least suspicion of an eye defect should arise. Secondly, the spots these people see do not appear to have any basis in reality. They move as a person turns his head. They do not always exist in objects after, say, blinking or when viewed from a different angle. Common sense would not allow spots to be on everything. Landesman would argue that most humans do not have supporting evidence for what they see, most of the time. Landesman might then craftily not mention how there is nothing contradicting the vision we normally have. The senses, as Landesman will agree, are usually reliable. They usually work. If I have no specific reason to not trust my sight, unlike the people seeing spots, then my belief in what I am seeing is founded.
When most people think of a color, they think of how they perceive the wavelengths of light reflected off an object. If Landesman wants to say that perception has no real meaning, I'll agree with him. If he wants to state that every species of animal probably perceives certain wavelengths in different ways, I'll agree. If he wants to say that because the perception a person has of an object being a certain color is subjective and varies from animal to animal, that no color exists, I will have to take issue with him.
Color is not, at least to me, the stop sign being red. Color is the wavelengths of light in a certain range being reflected off the stop sign. If light waves between X nanometers and Y nanometers hits my eyes, I think that I see red. That much is concrete. From that statement though, one can not say that my perception of red is the definition of that color. If an object reflects certain wavelengths, then that object is that color.
It is possible that I look at a stop sign and perceive one thing, and another person looks at it and sees another perception, but we both calmly saw red. Stop signs are red not because of what we think we see, but by what wavelengths they refuse to absorb. This view of color makes the debated blend away into the surroundings and disappear. Like many times in philosophy, it seems this debate centered not around some universal fact philosopher sought to discover, but around a common twist on words and definitions. If a person thinks of color is the perception one has of an object reflecting certain wavelengths, then they have a belief in something that is certainly subjective and largely meaningless. If a person thinks of color is the property of reflecting certain wavelengths of light, then that person finds himself without arguments against him. No person is influential enough to write out once and for all what the definition of "color" is, so the debate will continue to arise over what it means to be red, and that debate will continue to be quieted by each side explaining what definition of "color" they are using.