It seems as though my philosophy papers might take a little more effort and thought this semester. I'm sure that'll all start later in the class. This paper doesn't seem like much, but the truth is that it's a lot less than it seems. The prompt I was given, for this paper about Plato's first dialogue Euthyphro, pretty much spelled out exactly what I had to write about. Aside from maybe the last paragraph, I have some difficulty taking whatever small amount of credit is due for this paper. Nonetheless, I give to you, Euthyphro and Piety...
Tom Acton
29 January 2001
Ancient Philosophy
Dr. Davenport
Euthyphro is regarded as a very wise and knowledgeable man in the field of religion and knowing what the Gods love. He is skilled in many of the technical acts involved in pleasing the Gods, and is seen as an all-around intelligent man. It is for that reason that Socrates, who is currently being indited for corrupting the young minds of the city by teaching that which is not pious, seeks his assistance in learning of the nature of piety. If, by chance, Socrates can go before the court and claim that he has since been taught what piety really is by one of the greatest religious minds of the time, and is not a danger to corruptible minds anymore, he can walk free. The question Socrates asks of Euthyphro, what does it mean to be pious, should be an easy one for a theologian like Euthyphro to answer, but as they debate, it becomes clear that though they are able to get incredibly near to the answer, it will remain elusive.
The two have an incredibly difficult time trying to discover whether the Gods love something because it is pious, or if something is pious because the Gods love it. At first, Euthyphro makes the claim that anything pleasing to the Gods is, of course, pious. Socrates, who has to seriously be getting a kick out making such a well respected clergyman change his mind, gets Euthyphro to admit that the Gods often times disagree on issues where no deity can prove his side to be correct with any confidence. Obviously, if two Gods can disagree, as they often do, one thinking an act is pious and one thinking the act is anti-pious, then the opinions of the Gods cannot be the mark of piety.
The two near a decent answer when they come across the point that doing something that is pious is one part of Justice, and is doing something that is in care of the Gods. This is as close as they will get, however, because Euthyphro is unable to think of what goals of the Gods require the assistance of men. He says that they achieve "many fine things," (13 e) Again and again Euthyphro says that it would be a huge task to precisely analyze everything that the Gods achieve with the pious acts of men, alluding to his seemingly great knowledge of religion. The conclusion, that acts which are pious are pious because they are in care of the Gods, is slightly convoluted after the exchange because Euthyphro fails to sum up the achievements of the Gods, through piety, in any real way.
As their debate carries on, Euthyphro claims that piety is knowledge of how to pray (beg of the Gods) and how to sacrifice (give to the Gods appropriately). Essentially, he says, piety is the trading of services (begging and giving) between men and Gods. When asked, however, what are gifts that the Gods hold dear, he answers the typical "honor, reverence, and...gratitude,"which leads to the conclusion that what is pious is simply giving what the Gods hold dear. (15 a) Of course this isn't true, as is proven by the original statement that if Gods can disagree about what is pious, then their love cannot be the mark of piety.
What the two do not expand on, after claiming that piety is the part of justice that deals with the care of the Gods, is the other part of justice, that deals with the care of men. Though pure speculation, possibly Socrates feels that piety lies just as much in the side of justice that deals with the care of men. Is it not possible to act in a pious way towards men, when there will be little or no effect on the Gods? If there are no gifts other than honor, reverence, etc. that can be given to the Gods with any effect, that figure into the matter of piety, where do charitable acts towards men fit in? Is it not pious to help a friend who needs his car jump started or something simple along those lines?
The views of Socrates are difficult to ascertain because Socrates has not formed any solid belief at the time of this dialogue; he is simply asking questions and following the conversation wherever it may lead in the hopes of coming across the answer. It could be that the very questioning of commonly held, ill informed, beliefs is pious enough to please any God?