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Since the effects can be considered to be included in the term "relationships" (as being the particular relationship, or the particular aspect of any relationship that is of particular interest to the psychology student), we then have only three variables to consider: "values", "relationships", and "man".PS3 Defining or restricting one variable, defines or restricts the other two to some degree. This obviously must be so because they are related. But since the variable first defined or restricted is restricted by defining its limits only, it remains a variable itself, leaving the other two variables rather large limits. It is only by defining the limits of all three variables that we approach soecific relationships, defining one at a time progressively narrows the field. Furthermore, since we consider value systems, we can still introduce as many variables as we desire, after the three variables are defined, so as to elaborate a series of relationships, -- i.e., -- the term "values" represents a complex variable -- being composed of variable values not simple static ones.
So far we have restricted the term "individual" to man thereby restricting our study to man. We have also restricted the term "relationship" by emphasizing "effects". If we wish to discuss any other "individuals", we must consider them as entities having a value which affects man, or we remove ourselves from a study of psychology to a study of biology, physiology, etc. as previously noted. Therefore the substitution of an individual for the term "values" does not add another variable, even if the individual so substituted is a man (or group of men). They are added as part of the complex variable "values", or as a force attempting to produce a change in the value being considered. But to remain in the realm of psychology the values so related must occur within the framework of an individual man, or group of men, -- in which case, we would best consider the two "values" or "value systems" to be related in a composite value, or a value system of a higher order, -- and then further related to man. Since all the values so considered can be considered as a single complex variable, there are still only three variables under consideration.
The only term left unrestricted is the term "values". We have imposed no restrictions on this variable whatever, simply because the nature of man is such that all possible values we can consider can be conceptualized by man. In the last chapter it was noted that the ability of man to conceptualize establishes values; and since we did not restrict ourselves with regard to determining whether the values were real or imaginary, conscious or unconscious, psychotic or sane; and furthermore, we did not restrict ourselves with regard to time; -- we have included in essence all possible knowledge and literally, everything and anything that can -- or could have -- come into the mind of man from the beginning to the end of time. It is important to realize the far reaching significane of including in essence all possible knowledge in our discussion of values, as such, without restriction.
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The necessity for developing and accepting -- on a conscious level -- a point of view which includes both extremes can be appreciated by realizing that the confusion or conflict is not superficial, but very basic. It involves the problem of the nature of existence. But consider the importance of the implications of the previous chapter that the necessity to resolve contradictions is a psychological phenomena which can occur on a conscious, subconscious, or unconscious level; and that failure to resolve contradictions or "conflicts" adequately can (and does) lead to psychoses and/or neuroses, -- whether it is recognized or not.
We need not try to establish the meaning of "true or pure existence" here, nor need we concern ourselves with the nature of existence from a philosophical or metaphysical point of view. There is a serious question about the possibility of resolving the problem from either point of view alone, for it has been such attempts that have created our present problem.
For example:
Philosophically, one can argue that there is no "true" existence, if he wishes. Such a position would yield the extreme position, "Everything is Subjective". But to proceed, even philosophically, one must postulate existence at least as an assumption to develop any logical argument. And it is obvious that failure to produce a logical argument certainly eliminates the possibilities of:
1) Finding (or recognizing) contradictions (and conflicts), and
2) Resolving them on a conscious level; in which case there would be no rational criteria for recognizing any rational error (or neurotic or psychotic symptom) except possibly the absurdity of a blatant self-contradiction, or the subconscious, or "non-rational", feeling of revulsion for the the self-contradiction or conflict. The most important consideration here is that the very assertion of a premise asserts existence of a sort; -- that the assumption of existence of some kind is made to develop any logical argument. It is ths realization that the assumption of existence (existence of something other than the thoughts or concepts in the mind) is ever present that yields the other extreme position: "Everything is "Objective."
Despite the philosophical or metaphysical positions with regard to "existence", we must recognize that psychologically "true existence" is as real to the subject as it can possibly be. Such a simple appeal to psychology allows us to avoid the philosophical and metaphysical problem of just what "true existence" is; for, psychologically, "true existence" might have a different meaning for every individual. Considering even a philosophical concept of "non-existence" from a psychological point of view, the entity of "non-existence" exists -- truly exists -- at least, and if only, in thought. For, if it truly did not exist, not even in the manner of thought, could we talk about it?
It seems then that the best and the only way out of the difficulty is to recognize more than one kind of existing entities; or, by recognizing at least two different aspects of existence. This is by no means a new idea, for obviously different things exist in different ways, e.g., place and time, depending upon their natures. By utilizing this idea we can simply divide "everything conceivable" into two general classes or aspects of existence -- i.e., "subjective existence" and "objective existence". Our appeal to psychology simply establishes that "everything" conceivable exists, without infringing upon the realm of philosophy or metaphysics in trying to establish the nature of existence either in general or with respect to the particular entities; e.g., thoughts, material objects, spirits, God, etc.
Indeed, it would seem absurd to consider the nature of "something" which did not exist in any way whatever. For if nothing alone existed one could only consider the nature of "nothing". For: If we consider something that does not exist (we could do so only by defining existence in such a way as to exclude "something conceivable" from the class of existing things), it could not have any effect except on other "things" which did not exist. Yet "anything" conceivable has at least the effect of taking up the time and ability of the subject considering it. We are forced to choose between two alternatives. Either the nature of existence is such as to include "everything" conceivable; i.e., concepts, e.g., "Nothing"; or to exclude some conceivable entities from the class of existing "things". Yet, The second alternative yields the paradox of an existing subject being affected by a non-existent entity, or the self-contradiction of an existent subject being non- existent.
Our appeal to psychology, besides adding only two aspects of existence (or two more ways in which "things" from the general class of "everything conceivable" may exist), adds Nothing. Nor does it add anything new to the problem. From our earlier development of a principle of contradictions (upon which metaphysics and philosophy depend), the resolution of the problem of existence on metaphysical or philosophical grounds would involve the establishment of a common basis (the nature of existence) by considering all the different "kinds" or aspects of existence (or ways in which "things" may exist) and then by abstracting from them that aspect which is common to all of them. Such could then be called "pure existence" in a philosophic sense (i.e., existence irrespective of any particular "kind" of existence which is common to "everything" that exists). The metaphysical or ontological reality of existence might then be represented philosophically by capitalizing the philosophical notion of existence to indicate that it is not the idea (e.g., pure existence or being), but the Reality (Existence or Being) represented philosophically by the notion (pure existence) that is being considered.
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Before continuing further we might note that anything can be relevant to a subject in more than one way, even the subject himself. From a psychological point of view the relevance can be considered in terms of conscious, subconscious, or unconscious relevance as already indicated. Philosophically, relevance can be divided into two categories -- with or without the subject's knowledge. Let us clarify this position by defining relevant as: "a causal relationship involving a thinking subject". The statements above that some entity is relevant to a subject indicates a causal relationship without determing in which direction the relationship is to be considered, i.e., without determining which is the cause and which is the effect. The synthesis made above with respect to subjectivity in terms of "relevance" then indicates that the difference between what we call subjective or objective is a difference in the direction of the same relationship -- the causal relationship -- between a thinking subject and some entity. The criterion then for deciding that some entity is objective depends upon whether or not this entity can be a cause affecting, or producing an effect upon, something else we consider "objective". It should be clear that we could refuse to accept anything objective or subjective -- in which case we arrive back at the original extreme positions. But as soon as we recognize one entity as subjective and one entity as objective, we are forced (by logical consistency) to accept the synthesis.PS4
Consider, as an example, the relationship between a subject and a thought. The following possibilities can be elaborated:
1) The subject's behavior (thinking) can be the cause and the thought the effect, i.e., the subject causes or produces the thought.
2) The thought can be the cause and the subject's behavior, the effect, e.g., a consciously motivated behavior.
3) A mutual cause and effect relationship; i.e., the subject's behavior (thinking) causing the thought and the thought causing the subject to enjoy or detest the behavior (thinking) and possibly further causing him to continue or to stop thinking, etc.
The first possibility is clearly consistent with our usual idea of "subjective". The second is clearly "objective" in the usual scientific sense in that it produces observable behavior or phenomena. This becomes even clearer by realizing that a thought can produce "sense impressions" by which we claim to be aware of "real objects". The problem of separating hallucinations from reality is certainly relevant here, but for the time being, we will assume that we can separate them, and consider how this might be done later on. It is sufficient for us now to realize that there is a "rational" basis by which we can appreciate the "realness" of an hallucination.
The third possibility merely shows that that which we usually consider to be subjective is that which affects the subject from his point of view; i.e., in considering the subjective aspect of any entity, we are considering that entity in terms of the effects produced on the subject of which the subject himself is aware. That there is a mutual relationship between the two (the subject and the entity; or between the subjective and objective effects) is intrinsically recognized as evidenced by the fact that the discussion of anything in an objective sense may be biased; i.e., that an "objective" (or scientific) theory is affected by the effects produced on the subject in conceptualizing the theory.
That a thought can be both subjective and objective - both a cause and effect - simultaneously does not mean that the cause and effect are identically the same but only related. For, an entity cannot be the cause and effect of the same entity.
For example:
1) The subject can be the cause of the thought "god", or "God", (or gravity).
2) God (or gravity) can be the cause of the subject (or his falling).
3) God (or gravity) can cause the subject to cause the thought "God" (or gravity).
But: the subject cannot cause the thought "God" (or gravity) to cause the subject God (or his falling).
Yet: the subject can cause the thought "God" (or gravity) to cause trhe subject to feel the effect of (and to associate the feeling with) God (or his falling) which in turn causes him to gain some limited understanding of God (or gravity).
The case of a subject relevant to himself indicates the necessity for restricting "relevance" to thinking subjects. In the case of "pure" subjective relevance, the subject must cause some effect relative to his being, or he must be affected by some aspect of his being, in such a way that he is aware of the effect. Whether or not he knows what's happening is not as important in this respect as whether or not he can sense, or become aware of, the effects since it is absurd to say that something is relevant of which he could not be aware. In the case of a thinking subject anything that effects the subject can become known, if not immediately, as it effects his consciousness.
For example:
A subject is rendered unconscious (e.g., by some drug). A physically traumatic incident occurs while he is in this state (e.g., an operation). He doesn't know, nor is he aware of what's going on. He wakes up and feels fine. Assuming that all this was done without his knowledge or permission, he is still totally unaware of the incident. At this point the traumatic incident is consciously irrelevant to him. He's now told about it, but he doesn't notice any difference. The incident is relevant to him in an objective sense only: i.e., as if he was an outside observer. He simply knows the facts, but since he notices no difference they're meaningless to him: i.e., subjectively irrelevant. He might simply think that he's the victim of a bad joke. But now let us assume that this incident produced some cerebral damage which resulted in memory losses. Now, besides having been told, the subject could have become aware that something happened through these memory losses. Now the incident is relevant to him in an objective sense because he's aware that something happened whether or not he knows exactly what has happened. But now the incident is also subjectively relevant to him at this point because he knows the effects, and is still affected by them.
The relationship of subjectivity and objectivity in terms of relevance is relatively easy to appreciate in the case of a thinking subject particularly in view of the preceding paragraphs. It is impossible (unreasonable) to consider this relationship in the case of a non-thinking subject. The necessity for the involvement of a thinking subject to define "relevant" should therefore be made as clear as possible. We could justify the restriction by pointing out that we have already eliminated from our study the consideration of any entity except in its relationship to man, (a thinking subject). But rather than merely point out that the restrictions are justified, it is important to realize that it is necessary (to avoid being unreasonable, or illogical) by a similar argument.
It is totally meaningless to say that a table (a non-thinking subject) is relevant to itself, or that cutting the legs of the table is relevant to the table. The table is relevant to us or to another thinking subject. Cutting the legs is also relevant to us or to another thinking subject. The table is relative to itself (by identity) as the legs, or their severance from the table, is relative to the table, but not relevant to the table. The important result is that we can consider the relationship (or relevance) of the thinking, conscious faculty of man to the rest of his being, or the relationship (or relevance) of the rest of his being -- his physiology, unconscious, etc. -- to his thinking faculty in terms of cause and effect. Furthermore, the term "relative" could emphasize the objective aspect while "relevant" could emphasize the subjective aspect. These results are extremely important because they are essential to psychology if psychology is to ever achieve the status of any of the other scientific studies. These results are even more important because through them the other scientific studies can be made more scientific.
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It is possible to consider the notions of "pure subjectivity" and "pure objectivity" in a psychological, philosophical, or metaphysical sense, but even then the relationship between them exists and the "pure" considerations are made by extending or projecting reason or the imagination either logically or illogically by emphasizing only one aspect of the relationship between them. The fact that we are to consider the relationship rather than the "pure" concepts may appear to be more difficult, but since we can make neither "purely subjective" nor "purely objective" considerations except by emphasizing one of the aspects between them, it seems best (to avoid previous difficulties) to begin with the relationship rather than the "pure" concepts.
The first observation which presents itself in considering this relationship is that the very fact that "subjectivity" and "objectivity" are so closely related that the "pure" concepts are only an emphasis of one aspect of their relationship implies that that which we call "subjective" and that which we call "objective" exists simultaneously at some point in time; i.e., not only the notions but also that which the notions represent -- exist simultaneously. Though our knowledge of the subjective and the objective may not occur simultaneously -- the "sense impressions" from which our knowledge is derived must occur simultaneously with some physical phenomena. In fact it is our knowledge or our awareness or our "sense impressions" of the "objective" physical world that constitures the "subjective" world.
It might be easier to appreciate the necessity for considering the simultaneous occurence of subjective and objective phenomena by considering them as occuring simultaneously in the "inside" and "outside" world in terms of "images" or "objects" by using the analogy of a mirror; e.g., an image cannot exist in the mirror unless there is an object in front of that mirror.
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