CONT'D
What has been proposed is really very simple. We have added a single criteria to the usual concept of "life" which allows or enables us to eliminate different "kinds of life" that are usually postulated and accepted in the traditional concept. The criteria we have used to distinguish our concept of life is the distinction we have already discussed between man and biological organisms -- man's ability to think, which gives him the ability to know. The thoughts and knowledge are not 'material' entities but rather exist as non-material, or spiritual, entities which we have also discussed and referred to as the content, or substance of mind or soul. Thus the ability to know, to think, and to live, is the manifestation of a spirit, a soul, a mind which we have found to be a distinctive characteristic of man.
Perhaps from a theological point of view we can "give back" to animals and trees, their ability to live, to know, to think, by considering that animals have a different kind of soul -- as is done in traditional developments of theologians. But we then run into similar difficulties to those encountered by "life" as defined in the biological sense with the different 'kinds' of souls; e.g., "animal soul", and "vegetable soul". The theological difficulties become more acute by considering the Spirit of God as the One and Only Spirit which maintains both the organic and inorganic worlds. Our finding only a difference of degree between the organic and inorganic species is then simply a difference in the manifestation of this one common Spirit with which everything in the entire material world lives as parts of a single living organism. Our purpose is not to discuss theology. These thoughts, however, at least indicate that "life" can be considered to be dependent upon a spirit without creating any difficulties regardless of the point of view one wishes to assume; and that human life so considered is distinct from other forms or beings that one could postulate as living. The important difference in ths concept of life (or soul) developed here as compared to the traditional biological (or theological) concept, is that an entity either lives (is rational) or it does not live (is not a soul) -- but there are no "degrees of Life" or ("kinds of souls").
The theological view presented here is not one which has general acceptance. Its inclusion here, however, is not unwarranted since it supports contentions made regarding the inter-relationships of different areas of thought. Besides it should stimulate ideas that will have meaning for psychology which would not be feasible for us to explore together without clarifying many philosophical possibilities and misconceptions. We should at least appreciate the significance such considerations can have is certainly associated with man's ego, his view of himself, and his relationsip to his world and God. However, since our main discussion is not dependent solely on the theological views presented here, they can be considered as an extra added attraction or distraction.
Returning to a more strictly philosophical point of view we obtain similar results in differentiating man from animals by considering our basic premise to our theory of learning. If we learn through our senses, then "feeling" (as we do through our sense of touch) must be related to "knowing" at least in humans. Again, if feeling and knowing are necessarily related in the learning process, we have no justification for separating this necessary relationship in the realm of organisms other than human. Depending upon whether or not we make a distinction between man and animals, we are forced to accept that the only creatures that have feelings and knowledge are human; or, we must accept that everything organic and inorganic has the ability to know and feel. We must include the inorganic unless we can find some difference in nature between that which we call organic and that which we call inorganic such that the assignment of such ability to one class and not the other can be accounted for. Scientifically, there can be no evidence to postulate that animals or trees have such ability unless the ability is shared by physical systems since the only difference is one of degree. Nor is there any evidence to postulate that inorganic physical systems have such ability. But we know that we, who are human, have such ability.We therefore must be different from animals; the distinction we made between man and animals must be true -- unless inorganic things, e.g., rocks, also have the same abilities -- and we know that they don't.
In a few paragraphs it would be impossible for me to prove that animals have no feelings to people like those who are associated with the A.S.P.C.A., or to people who have ever had any pets, or worked with animals. I therefore shall not waste time, but shall indicate various phenomena, tests, and helps, so that the individuals who wish to do so can prove it to themselves. Ultimately proof depends on acceptance anyway. I shall simply beg the question and leave the final proof to you. The one thing that must be admitted by any rational creature is that the basis on which they believe that animals have feelings is intuitive, not rational, since no reason can support the attribution of feelings from the observation of responses to an infinite number of stimuli.
Most people would probably be willing to accept that we humans live with a different kind of life than animals and trees. They would also be willing to accept that we have an ability to know and feel that is different from that of the lower forms. Few people, if any, have ever considered the possibility of non-living matter having such ability. Even those who profess that animals or machines "think" are inclined to agree that our thinking is of a different nature. We might try to develop our theory assuming that animals "live", "feel", "think", and "know". This could be justified only on a psychological or subjective basis since we have found no real evidence to state this positively. Even if there were such evidence, we would have to differentiate between the nature of things that have no "feelings", for example, and those that do. For those who are unwilling now to accept that animals do not feel, think, or know, I shall suggest a terminology to allow them to distinguish between these phenomena as they appear in man and alledgedly in animals to a lessor degree. If one refers to anything as having any of these abilities, preface this ability with the prefix "homeo-" when using it with reference to human subjects: e.g., if an animal "feels", man "homeo-feels".
I will not employ such a clumsy terminology because it's unnecessary. If one wishes, he can do so. The results will be the same if he doesn't become confused. Rather than to employ such a clumsy terminology to indicate the possible differences between the nature of man's feelings and those of animals. I shall stick to the facts that are supported by evidence and reason and impose the difficulty of keeping track of such vague distinctions as "animal feelings" and "human feelings" on those who refuse to accept the facts.
The results we have obtained so far have very important consequences for our theory of learning, and for our theory of psychology. So far, we have found that our five senses are certainly important, but not sufficient, to give us knowledge. They could help us to respond to various stimuli without being necessarily associated with feeling or knowing. That is, we could define all the responses to physical stimuli in physical terms. We also found that the responses to stimuli in organic systems is very highly specialized. The response is such as to preserve the integrity of the system in much the same way as a buffer responds. Such a manner of response is the essential meaning of "homeostasis" as usually used, but we could also consider it to be a "sixth-sense". i.e., a sixth mechanism of response. The changes in behavior which occur through the operation of the five senses through the mechanism of the "sixth-sense" could not validly be called "learning", yet, it gives the appearance of learned behavior. There is a way out of this difficulty since learning implies knowing, while training does not. We have no difficulties if we refer to such changes in behavior to be training, or an unconscious transfer (or change) of information (or behavior).
Still we have not developed a theory of learning. We can not by considering only animals as subjects. We have, however, developed an important aspect of learning, i.e., training. Learning requires training, so that we haven't wasted our time. To continue we could consider a human subject in the same type of thought experiment. But before we do that, let's review the results we have obtained so far. They are extremely important, and not really difficult to understand, but we have established quite a break from traditionally accepted concepts, and would do well to discuss them somewhat now to remove some of the resistence to them.
The importance of the results obtained this far with respect to psychology is that we are enabled to develop an accurate idea of the unconscious, and therefore, conscious behavior as well. With this in mind, our discussion now has two purposes -- to justify the break from traditionally accepted concepts with the added view of throwing light on the true meaning and nature of the unconscious. We have only discussed the physical world, inorganic and organic animals, and therefore the following discussion also includes the animal characteristics of man; i.e., man without the spiritual entity of mind or soul. The corollaries which necessarily follow from our development are that animals cannot know, or feel, and therefore are incapable of conscious behavior. Their behavior is totally unconscious. The unconscious can therefore be studied and known. We can appreciate these results best by comparing physical and organic systems to remove the confusion which is usually associated with traditional concepts.
Consider a telephone, telegraph, or television system. These would be comparable to our systems of response through touch, hearing and sight. The usual concept of conscious behavior is confused with the idea of waking, or responsive state. But our telephone, telegraph, or television system is in a responsive state when it is being utilized. Both these inorganic and organic systems are "awake" and responsive when the stimuli impinging upon them are received by "sense" organs, transmitted to an integrating center from which they are transmitted again to various destinations in which they manifest their responses. During certain periods of the day (both) systems are made to respond more than during other periods of the day and represent the "waking" and "sleeping" periods.
As we can have excessive stimuli in the organic system, e.g., such as can be attributed to extreme damage, which can produce a lapse into "unconsciousness", we can have the exact same kind of response in these physical or inorganic systems; e.g., overloads of the circuits. etc. The damage done in both must be repaired if either of them are to return to a responsive or "waking" state. If the damage is irreparable, they can be, and have been referred to as being "dead".
This type of analogy does not show only similarity, but actually an identical kind of response. In both cases the failure is produced by the activation of too many receptors at one time, or a stimulation that is too intense, with the same kind of inability to handle such an intensity of stimulation. In both cases, erratic behavior can be the result of failure at various points; e.g., at the receptors, transmission line to and from the integrating center, at the integrating center, or at the receiver which will demonstrate the erratic behavior. In both cases, the intensity, extent, etc. of the damage done is related to the intensity, extent, etc. of the stimuli, as well as the point at which the stimuli is concentrated, and of course, on the nature of the stimuli and mechanism involved. This should be sufficient to yield the necessary insight. Admittedly, it may not be sufficient to satisfy everyone, but one has only to make similar comparisons to remove any doubts that exist.
By comparing the behavior of organic systems (other than human --e.g., animals) to inorganic systems (e.g., robots), one cannot find any behavior or response to stimuli that is essentially different, nor is there found any reason or basis for postulating any difference other than the obvious one of "differences of organization". The only differences between animals and machines that could be found is a differnce of degree, which, after all, should be expected since man cannot yet make any machine comparable to animals in their "degree of organization". The biggest difficulty -- the one that has caused the most confusion -- is the explanation of "thinking" processes in animals and machines. From our development this is also understandable since neither animals nor machines can "think".
To say therefore that animals or machines can "think" is at best a statement that some overt behavior of man, animals , and machines, is similar, or identical, -- and why shouldn't it be? Animals have been described as self-reproducing machines; man's machinary is essentially the same -- being derived therefrom; and computers were made expressly for the purpose of refining and specializing some of the mechanistic processes of man's thinking or behavior. But neither the machine, nor the animal, is "alive", aware of itself, its purpose, or its surroundings, though both can respond to stimuli in a changing environment, neither can feel, neither can think, though both can, and do, help man to live, to be aware of himself, his purpose, and his surroundings -- his awareness of his surroundings being emphasized through the mechanisms of his own body.
To say that animals or machines can "think" is merely an assumption that has no rational, or philosophical, basis, but merely a psychological one. It is interesting to note in this respect that not only the biologist, and psychologist, but also, the chemist, and physicist, define, or explain, various phenomena in "emotional" or "feeling" terms; "excited" states of molecules, "sympathetic" vibrations, etc. To appreciate the psychological necessity, and the extent of the psychological ability of "projection", one has only to consider his appreciation of a movie, or a TV program, in which the "feeling" or "emotions", etc., do not reside in the changing patterns of light on the screen, but rather, are drawn from the rich reservoir of the observer's experience, and exist within in his own consciousness.
Since we have not yet developed any real insight into the thinking process by considering only animals or machines, we can validly argue that the attribution of "thinking", or the application of the criteria of thinking, to animals or machines is invalid. The argument might be raised against us that since we have not gained any real insight into the thinking process, we have no justification for utilizing "thinking" as a distinction between man and animals. Such an argument is obviously spurious and self defeating. Obviously, if we are to make any distinction -- or to obliterate one -- between man and animals, we must do so on the basis of our ability to think. The question then which becomes immediately apparent is whether or not animals have such ability. Let us re-consider this problem from a subjective approach.
I (we) know that I (we) have feelings ... I (we) feel them. I do not know directly whether or not I am unique in this respect because I cannot see, taste touch, smell, or hear, a feeling, or an emotion, other than my own, and these I know simply because I am aware of them. I learn through my senses about my senses, and about the world around me. If anyone else has such ability, I can know about it if, and only if, my senses are stimulated so that I can become aware of this fact -- so that I can become aware of their feelings and emotions through my own feelings and emotions. But my senses can be stimulated by entities other than those which might have the same ability to "sense" as I do. Therefore, the only way I can validly determine, if I can determine it at all, whether I am unique in having feelings is through reason.
I, being a human being, am justified in assuming that ther human beings have the same ability as I do. Furthermore, this assumption with respect to other human beings is supported not only by the fact that I observe in other human beings similar reactions or responses to stimuli, but also by the fact that I am able to communicate feelings and emotions with these other human beings in some rather unique ways. Other human beings support my assumption by frankly, and spontaneously describing their feelings and emotions. Though I may never know whether or not a stimuli -- like a warm fire -- elicits the same feeling in others as it does in me, it appears quite certain that it does illicit a feeling in them. They tell me so. I therefore conclude that the ability to feel is one shared by all human beings, and that I am not a unique human being on the basis of the fact that I have the ability to feel, though I may be a unique human being on the basis of my feelings since my feelings are not necessarily identical with those of other human beings. Mind you, I have no conclusive proof that I am not unique in this respect at this time. It just seems more reasonable to assume that I am not. Since it is more abhorrent to me, as well as less reasonable, that all the people I love, my family, and friends etc. are merely robots.
I could also assume that animals have feelings. But to assume that they do also assumes implicitly that man and animals are essentially the same; i.e., that there is no essential difference between man and animals, which reduces man to a class of animals. Such an assumption is not as rational, nor justified, as is the assumption that other human beings have feelings. This should become perfectly clear by considering the preceding paragraph and the following.
If a human being has distinct characteristics from animals at all, the distinct characteristic by which they differ may be the ability to feel, or the necessarily related ability to think. This is the contention of the present argument. One cannot argue against this distinction rationally without also obliterating the distinction entirely because the preceding paragraph demonstrates adequately that there can be no conclusive, tangible evidence that even other human beings have feelings. In fact, the decision that other human beings have feelings was based on the "rational" assumption that things of the same class should be expected to exhibit the same properties, since they should be of the same essential nature to be grouped in a distinct class. What system of "logic" can I use to carry over, without evidence a characteristic from one distinct class to another distinct class without destroying the validity of the distinction between them?
Now, I may still assume that animals have feelings, if, and only if, I am willing to accept that man is one of the class of animals. But, if I do so, how can I separate, or distinguish between animals and plants, in such a way that animals could be shown to have feelings whereas plants do not? It is clear that I cannot. I therefore must accept that plants have feelings by the rationality that I accept that animals have feelings. But, if I do so, how can I distinguish between biologically "living" forms, and non-living forms (e.g., the virus, which biologically is both "living" and non-living depending upon its environment) in such a way that biologically "living" forms can be shown to have feelings whereas non-living forms do not? It is clear that I cannot. To accept, therefore, that animals have feelings, and to remain rational and consistent, I must accept also that even non-living forms have feelings by the same rationality. This is absurd.
The rationality then of assuming animals have feelings must be highly questionable at best. On the other hand, the rationality of stating that they are unable to feel can be clearly and logically delineated.
I feel a little silly at this point, but everyone with whom I have ever discussed this subject has asked: what do you mean by feelings? To make it perfectly clear what I mean by feelings, let me simply say that whatever definition or understanding you have of your own personal "feelings" is adequate and fine. I mean the same thing that you do by this term within our mutual ability to know what feelings are. The fact is that an animal has no more feelings -- indeed is no more alive -- than is say a rock. An animal experiences only as much pain as a rock does. A duck likes water only as much as the water likes the duck.
If there is any distinction between man and animal at all -- and there must be -- this distinction must be based on the ability to feel (and the necessarily related ability to think) which are non physical qualities, and which reside in the realm of spiritual or non-material entities. The distinction between man and animals must be such that man has a non-material, i.e., spiritual, aspect which we have called a soul, or mind, and which we might call by some other name. The distinction then between man and animals is not one of degree but must be a difference in nature. Man has a soul, or mind, animals do not. Man has all the characteristics of animals, but is not an animal because he has characteristics and a nature that animals do not possess.
If you can't accept these observations as sufficient evidence, make others yourself. You will find -- if your honest with yourself -- that the only difference you could observe between a biological system and a mechanical system by studying stimulus-response reactions is a difference in the degree of complexity, but no essential difference in nature. Especially with the technical advances today, you could (or you could get someone else to) construct a physical system to duplicate all of the types of reactions that were hitherto considered to be the exclusive domain of "living organisms".
There is just one further comment (or conclusion) that can be pointed out to those who refuse to accept the notion that the point of separation between man and animals is the possession of a mind, or soul, or spiritual aspect of the former. The need for redefining the concept of life to include the concept of spiritual association is in itself a somewhat drastic step. Adding to this the additional requirement of recognizing the spiritual quality and nature of pain, thereby discarding the pet idea of "physical pain" as absurd -- is too much to expect. But let it be understood that at some point the same distinctions must be made. If this point of separation is not accepted between man and animals because of a reluctance to believe that animals have no feelings, then the point must be established between animals and trees, or more reasonably between those entities considered to be living and those considered to be non-living. The distinction must necessarily be of the same nature. Why not make it at its proper place?
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