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I have read through the preceding material a number of times over the past five years, and of necessity, I have decided to make some changes in my original intentions. For five years I could do nothing but make false starts in trying to write this section. That's enough nonsense for anyone.
The fact of the matter is that thinking has already been defined. It is so simple it's hard to believe. But thinking involves nothing more than the formation of thoughts (even the primitive ones of "feelings" or simple sensation). In turn, the formation of thoughts and feelings involves nothing more than bridging the gap between the physical world and the spiritual world, and all of this is accomplished by the simple action of will.
Now, I have tortured myself to conceive of arguments that would answer all the questions you could raise, assuming that -- even after our long association up to this point -- you would be capricious enough to constantly propose alternate questions and possibilities to any argument I might propose to demonstrate the existence of free-will, and its operation and role in thinking. But isn't that silly? If it is capriciousness that would so direct your thinking, you have proved my point yourself. And, what possible argument could I offer to the statement: "I will not accept that I have a free-will"?
On the other hand, there are so few people who would honestly argue against free will that there is really no point in wasting time here. Let those who have objections raise them first, and then I, or perhaps we, can help them with their specific problem. I shall simply try to present some of the relevant relations of free will as that which gives direction and meaning to our thinking.
In the last section, the association, or abstraction, of awareness from the physical substratum was discussed as resulting from expressions of will which allowed only the consciousness of what was going on: i.e., whatever the behavior of man, he is capable of knowing about it by his ability 'to abstract' feelings -- the primitive thoughts -- in a passive manner. Since such passive behavior is not sufficient to explain the uniquely human behavior, the difference in behavior must be an expression of the will of man in a distinct manner, which, in turn, must be the manifestation of the soul, or spiritual portion of man, acting as a stimulus to bodily response. As soon as, and only if, a man expresses his will, the process becomes an active one and a fully conscious act: i.e., If I perform an act without intending to do it (by reflex response, or by accident perhaps), I would not be responsible -- nor guilty -- of the action because I was not conscious of performing it, prior to performing it. It is clear from the foregoing that man must express his will (he must have a free will) to be capable of uniquely human activity. The will must be free if it is to manifest itself in a manner different from purely passive behavior.
Every human has a free will, and must express it to be capable of any truly human activity. Since the subconscious is also distinctly human in nature, and since "passive" feelings and thoughts can be, and are, conscious, they too must be dependent upon man's will expressed in such a manner that does not give him the ability to control his responses.
There appears to be a problem here. There always is when a "free will" is mentioned. But in the same paragraph we also talk about the will being free, being passive, and being controlled. One could argue such points for centuries on the basis of considering the ideas of "free will" and "controlled will" to be mutually exclusive. They are not.
The first observation that could be made is one concerning our own wills. If my will is free, it is controlled by me, not by someone else. The ideas of "free will" and "controlled will", therefore, cannot be mutually exclusive ideas; they are complimentary, at least, in this one respect. Some questions which then arise are:
Is the will completely free from outside control?
Does the individual have complete control of his will?
If the will is completely free (i.e., under only that individual's control):
Why can't an individual express his will any way he wants to?, or,
Can he?
Why can't an individual do whatever he wants to do?
Is "free will" the same as "free expression"?
Is "free expression of a free will" the same as complete freedom of action?
If the will is not free, does it exist?
What is the meaning of a will that has no freedom?
Of what use could it be?
If it is not completely free,
How much is it controlled?
By whom?
How?
We could find many more questions, but that won't help much. We must answer some of these questions because our development forces the conclusion that man's will is free, and also that man's will and behavior can be controlled by himself, or someone else. The solution of the basic problem here is of the utmost importance to us because thinking, and all that it implies, rests on the solution. The entire development forces the conclusion that thinking is an expression of free will. Furthermore, if thinking is an expression of free will, not only our theory, but all possible theories of all kinds depend on an understanding of this problem.
The problem we now face is similar to the one we faced and solved concerning subjectivity vs objectivity. The problem is not only similar, but very closely associated, as can easily be seen by posing the contradictory statements to be resolved in the same form:
The resolution is obvious from the preceding resolution:
The will is both completely free and completely controlled, simultaneously.
The similarity of the two problems is deeper than a simple similarity of form. In fact the other problems of subjectivity vs objectivity were a result of different expressions of will involving the same phenomenon. We solved them by expressing our will to do so. The solution consisted of the establishment of a point of view, or a frame of reference, which could include all observations and maintain logical consistency. Logical consistency with the inclusion of all observations is the only valid test that can be applied to knowledge, and this too depends upon the expression of free will. We could therefore look for and find all sorts of examples to justify any idea. We could just as well look for all sorts of examples to condemn any concept. The choice we make depends upon whether we wish to accept or reject the idea. In other words, depending upon our will, our desire to look for, and find, better ways to do things, or just to accept the limited, and confusing concepts which have already been expressed by others.
There is one saving factor. "A rose is a rose, is a rose." Any idea we have is merely our interpretation of reality made in such a way that we can understand reality. Ideas, as well as words, are symbols for the reality, not the reality itself. We understand each other only by employing the same symbolism, which may be a difficult problem in itself, as the sophistication of semantics can well demonstrate. The acceptance of the idea of "free will" is demanded and justified by the maintenance of logical consistency. The rejection of the idea is explainable as a defense mechanism which is very general, unfortunately not very effective, and contradictory to the observed phenomena we refer to as guilt feelings and complexes, or anything resembling, resulting in, or resulting from "individual responsibility".
The acceptance of "free will" can also be explained in terms of a defense mechanism. In this case it is a defense of individual responsibility, the recognition that we can be "guilty" -- let's just say of error -- and a defense of our ability to achieve or accomplish something as individuals. It is not very easy to buck defense mechanisms. we cannot, we don't have time, to go through a full discussion of the theological, philosophical, or psychological problems that can be raised, and have been raised, on the subject of free will. This would probably be necessary to develop an understanding of the defense mechanisms involved to one who wishes to reject the idea of free will or of the existence of God. The two concepts are closely related and one is frequently used to deny the other. At this point, as far as I am concerned, we accept both. We shall leave those who wish to reject these ideas to their own devices, at least until they express an interest in resolving the contradictions they have created, or until we have the desire to review the fields of philosophy and theology to point out their errors to them. If you fall into this category, how did you get this far? I would be very much interested in knowing -- it would serve as a helpful guide when I review these areas of knowledge.
From our discussion of subjectivity vs objectivity, it should be clear that if there is any possibility of viewing everything objectively, there must be a Metaphysical Reality containing everything that can be known, or a Being, like God, Who knows everything we could possibly know. For, if such a Reality, or Being, does not exist, we must question whether everything, and therefore anything, has objective existence. From the theological point of view of free will, everything, including knowledge, is a product of the expression of God's Free Will, since the definition, or explanation, of creation from this point of view is simply "a manifestation of the Will of God". Therefore it would follow that we can know because we have a free will, by-passing the problem: How?, by the similarity of the nature of will; and, that valid knowledge can only be obtained and maintained by expressing one's will in a manner consistent with God's Will (or, consistent with Reality) since this is the only possible way to maintain complete consistency. This is generally true because all of the material, or physical world, or metaphysical reality, is also an expression of God's Will. We are still free to accumulate, if we wish, invalid and relatively useless knowledge. We are forced to accept, or express our will in a manner consistent with the Will of God, or Reality, only if we want to find valid and useful knowledge.
We are free to use our wills any way we like but we are damned fools if we express our will in contradiction to God's Will, and whatever knowledge we gain will be only partially valid and partially useful. This becomes more apparent by realizing that the laws of nature or the physical world are part of God's Will. ("Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.")
The most important single observation for us now is that the expression of God's Will is final and absolute: It has the power to create objectively what is Willed. Our wills initially gain knowledge through their expression; that is, they have the power to create subjectively what is willed. That's why a rose by any other name is still a rose. But once we have knowledge, we can use God's power to co-create objectively, provided of course, that our knowledge, even though incomplete, is consistent with God's Will. This is true because God's Power as well as His Will are incorporated in the physical world as the power and laws of nature. We can will to do something contrary to the Will of God, or the "will of nature", but we must express our will in a manner that is consistent with the laws of nature (or the Will of God) or pay the consequences: e.g.,
We can will to jump out a window. This is contrary to God's Will as He expressed it to us (Thou shalt not kill). This is contrary to His Will as expressed in Nature (Law of survival). We may pay the consequence in the physical world by death. We may pay the consequence in the spiritual world by damnation. Yet we cannot say that we succeded in performing an act contrary to the Will of God, but only contrary to that part of His Will which was made known to us. It should be obvious that no one, but God (or the angels), knows God's Will entirely. If he did, he would have all knowledge. This simply indicates that moral judgement is based on that portion of His Will which He made known to us.
Another important point is that coercion does not negate will, but simply establishes the consequences of choice. If you were offered a choice betweem vanilla and chocolate ice cream, let's say, and you were asked, or told, to take chocolate, you still have a choice -- even if the consequence of taking vanilla was the guillotine. From our point of view -- our wills are completely free in the sense that we can will to do whatever we want to do, and do it, if we can find a way to use the powers in nature to accomplish our ends. But we must then accept the consequences for it. Just because there are unfavorable consequences to an expression of will is no argument to prove that there is no freedom. Every single expression of will has a consequence even if the consequence is merely the subjective production of a feeling or a thought. In fact, we could define "meaning" in terms of consequences, if we will, and such a definition will prove to be extremely useful as a tool if we had the time to go into it further. Right now, there appears to be another problem which is of more immediate importance.
We said that the production of feeling and of thoughts were passive, which seems to imply that the individual does not, or cannot, control these expressions of will. But this is not quite true. The will is not free in the sense that it can choose to express itself or not. It must express itself. The very idea of will demands a functional existence as the first law of will (or as life as we define it -- in the special sense). The will, although it cannot remain inert, can express itself any way it wants (or wills) to, provided of course it wants to do something and has the knowledge necessary to want and to do. The will can refuse to feel, or to accept stimuli, but only after it has learned (through passive feelings and active thinking), that is by expressing itself to remain inert and finding a way to do so. An example of this could be "self-hypnosis"; auto-suggestion; or perhaps even deep sleep.
It is valid to say that the will itself is free completely, but that the expression of the will is not completely free. In the case just discussed, the will was not free to express itself initially because it has no knowledge, and therefore, the will had no freedom of expression at all. It has nothing to express. The will could not will or want anything in particular because it didn't know how. It could only express itself by accepting, or by merely associating feeling with the conditioned response mechanism. Once knowledge is obtained, and the will is conscious of itself, it can will or want anything. But it cannot express itself, or satisfy itself (the want) unless it follows, or remains consistent with, the laws of nature. This is the only restriction God places on the free expression of the free will. Or to phrase it another way, we have the power to do whatever we want, if we remain consistent with nature. Man has placed many more restrictions on himself, but he doesn't have to if he's willing to accept the consequences (other than the consequences he wants) which may be a result of an action: e.g.,
I want to know what it feels like to fall from a great height. I can defy the laws of nature and the expressed Will of God, and obtain this knowledge by jumping out a window. I obtain the desired result, but it may be short lived. The consequence I desired and expected was satisfied, but there were other consequences which were not desired. The reason such an action is silly is because the consequence I want, the favorable consequence, is far outweighed by the unfavorable. However, a little added knowledge, e.g., the use of a parchute, could have enabled me to obtain the desired consequence and avoid the unfavorable. In the last analysis, all of our expressions of will have more than one consequence. The will expresses itself in making a choice, after an evaluation of a situation. The choices may be good, or poor. One may far out balance the other. But the will is free to choose, always.
One other interesting note is that concerning a single expression of man's free will. For, if an individual makes one free choice of the nature of choosing to accept the will of another man, of a god, or of God, he could be actively and consciously following that will or Will. What is the same thing, he has freely decided to make his will the same as this other will (or Will) and seeks to determine what this will (or Will) is before making up his own mind what course of action to take. If he has already decided to accept this will (or Will) his course of action is already decided as soon as he determines what course of action this will (or Will) dictates. Furthermore, if the will (or Will) he chooses to accept is apparent to him, and to others, it is rather difficult to determine (difficult for someone other than the individual involved) whether he is responding actively or passively with regard to that will (or Will).
Regardless of what course of action is taken, it can be identified with someone else's will other than the individual's. In fact, since man is a rational creature, he has a reason for everything he does (no matter how irrational it may seem to someone else). The establishment of a reason for a course of action is essentially the same as identifying one's will with the will, (or Will), which seems to be presented by the environment or his surroundings.
Let us consider two choices: A and B. Let us consider A to be the choice God's Will dictates; B the choice that the devil's will dictates. We could also consider A to be the choice that our parents, or that society dictates; and B to be the choice that one of the passions dictate, e.g., lust. Regardless of which choice the individual makes, i.e., irrespective of what his will is, we can define, or refer to his choice, as being either God's Will, society's will, the devil's will, nature's will, etc. This is not only valid, but correct. The difficulty is that it is incomplete because whoever's will we attach his will to, it is his will as well. That is, every human action can be considered to be the product of more than one will -- the individual's, his parents', society's, God's, simultaneously. It is also contrary to other will's such as the devil's, society's which propose to replace the present one with better or worse choices, etc. No action then is only the expression of a single will unless we consider a being in a vacuum (e.g., God before creation). And every individual action can do two things: to "conform" to some "wills", and "rebel" against others; -- and it does this simultaneously. But it is the coice of the individual's will to choose which of these "wills" it will follow. Regardless of the choice, we can view it as someone else's will. In fact the process of rationalization is a process of association of my will with the will of some being whose will is accepted as more important than my own.
This association of will is the underlying force by which an individual molds himself to his society, and through which society molds the individual to conform, presumably for the benefit of both the individual and the society. The forces in the surroundings of any individual are many in number, and unfortunately, very contradictory in nature, so that it is necessary for the individuals to pick and choose which of these he will follow. Some are more apparent, or impose themselves more forcefully, than others, and tend to accumulate the greatest following. What is important from the individual's point of view is for him to recognize, and follow, that will (or Will) which represents the greatest good to him. The reason that this is the most important consideration from the individual's view point is simply that this is what his own will is bent on accomplishing. What makes life interesting, though complicated, is that everyone has somewhat different ideas of what represents the greatest good.
It could be said that the most important underlying force of man's activity, is the expression of his will in such a manner as to yield him the greatest good, or what he interprets as the greatest good; and this notionhas been expressed in many forms -- e.g., a "Search for Glory", or, a "Place in the Sun".
Indicated by the considerations we've mentioned so far is that the thinking process, although associated with, and actually having as its basis, the conditioned response mechanism associated with feelings, a "sense" (in the true sense of the word) is best defined as "an expression of will". This definition is the very essence of the thinking process. The feelings presented through the vital "sense" offer to the will the choices it can make. As there can be no expression of free will which will enable the individual to control his responses without there being something from which to choose, the thinking process, the expression of free will, cannot be separated from the mechanistic processes which present a choice.
We have not described the various mechanisms such as transfer of information, memory, imagination, etc. Such descriptions can be found in any basic psychology text. But throughout all of these mechanistic processes man asserts, or at least can assert, his will, which changes his thinking process to one of a different nature from that of animals and computing machines which have the same ability to transfer, store, and utilize past responses to stimuli. We shall spend the rest of this chapter discussing how we learn and know by expressing our free will and by drawing some associations to show what this means in terms of psychology and our original definition of psychology.
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