Thomas Murrell Thornhill III
c/o Box 1755 U.S.P.S.
Nevada City, California, united States of America
No telephone service maintained.
[date]

COUNTY OF NEVADA
OFFICE OF THE JURY COMMISSIONER
201 Church St., Suite 9
Nevada City, CA 95959-2504

Memorandum of Applicable Law
concerning Jury Duty in California.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL NOTICE REQUESTED.

Declarant, ___________________________________________ a natural-born, white Man of sound mind, one of the People of the United States of America and currently one of the People of California; with all due Respect and in full Good Faith, does Declare and Affirm that:

1.a. April 12, 2000, I was delivered a TRIAL JURY SUMMONS in California.

1.b. The SUMMONS was captioned: "NEVADA COUNTY COURTS", but I have personal knowledge that the courts in Nevada county are currently doing business as "THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF NEVADA".

2. On the face of the "SUMMONS", it contained the information required by THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Section 210:

"The summons shall contain the date, time, and place of appearance of the prospective juror or, alternatively, instructions as to the procedure for calling the jury commissioner for telephonic instructions for appearance as well as such additional juror information as deemed appropriate by the jury commissioner." WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Section 210.
together with the following statement within a block on the face of the summons:
"... California Code of Civil Procedure Section 209 states: "Any prospective trial juror who has been summoned for service, and who fails to attend upon the court as directed or to respond to the court or jury commissioner and to be excused from attendance, may be attached and compelled to attend; and following an order to show cause hearing, the court may find the prospective juror in contempt of court, punishable by fine, incarceration, or both, as otherwise provided by law." "
3. I was curious about the explicitly stated Threat in the SUMMONS of "attached", so I decided to research this matter with specific emphasis on 209 C.C.P.

4.a. I started with WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1999), section 209, which is titled:
"Sec. 209. Failure to respond to summons; attachment; compelling attendance; contempt.".

4.b. Section 209 did not tell me what "attached" or "attachment" meant.

5.a. So I looked up "attached" in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 6th Ed., 13th Reprint (1998), p. 125, and found:

Attached. A term describing the physical union of two otherwise independent structures or objects, or the relation between two parts of a single structure, each having its own function. As applied to buildings, the term is often synonymous with "annexed". See also Fixture.
5.b. Since I did not believe that I was an "attached" structure or object, that definition did not seem exactly applicable or helpful.

6.a. So I read "attach" on the same page in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY and found:

Attach. Seizure of property under a writ of attachment. See Attachment.
To bind, fasten, tie, or connect, to make fast or join; its antonyms are separate, detach, remove.
6.b. Then I read "attachment" in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 126, and found:
Attachment. The legal process of seizing another's property in accordance with a writ or judicial order for the purpose of securing satisfaction of a judgment yet to be rendered. The act or process of taking, apprehending, or seizing persons or property, by virtue of a writ, summons, or other judicial order, and bringing the same into the custody of the court for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action. While formerly the main objective of attachment was to coerce the defendant debtor to appear in court by seizer of his property, today the writ of attachment is used primarily to seize the debtor's property in the event that a judgment is rendered. The remedy of attachment is governed strictly by state statutes, with such differing considerably as to when attachment is available (the majority of states providing that such is available at or after the commencement of the main action until entry of judgment). Federal courts follow the local rules or statutes relating to attachment. Fed. R. Civil P. 64.
A remedy ancillary to an action by which plaintiff is enabled to acquire a lien upon property or effects of defendant for satisfaction of judgment which plaintiff may obtain. Lipscomb v. Rankin, C.C.A.Tex., 139 S.W.2d 367, 369.
See also Execution; Garnishment; Levy; Lien of Attachment.
Commercial law. When the three basic prerequisites of a security interest exist (agreement, value, and collateral), the security agreement becomes enforceable between the parties and is said to "attach." U.C.C. sec. 9-203.
Distinguished from execution. See Execution.
Domestic and foreign. In some jurisdictions it is common to give the name "domestic attachment" to one issuing against a resident debtor (upon the special ground of fraud, intention to abscond, etc.) and to designate an attachment against a non-resident, or his property, as "foreign."
"Where the defendant is a non-resident, or beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court, his goods or land within the territory may be seized upon process of attachment; whereby he will be compelled to enter an appearance, or the court acquires jurisdiction so far as to dispose of the property attached. This is sometimes called "foreign attachment." In such a case, the proceeding becomes in substance one in rem against the attached property.
Persons. A writ issued by a court of record, commanding the sheriff to bring before it a person who has been guilty of contempt of court, either in neglect or abuse of its process or of subsequent powers. A capias (q. v.).
Property A species of mesne process, by which a writ is issued at the institution or during the progress of an action, commanding the sheriff to seize the property, rights, credits, or effects of the defendant to be held as security for the satisfaction of such judgment as the plaintiff may recover. It is principally used against absconding, concealed, or fraudulent debtors. Mass.R.Civil P. 4.1
7.a. I looked up "capias" in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 208 and found:
Capias. ... Lat. "That you take." The general name for several species of writs, the common characteristic of which is that they require the officer to take a named defendant into custody.
In English practice, the process on an indictment when the person charged is not in custody, and in cases not otherwise provided for by statute.
...
7.b. From the respective INDEXs, there does not seem to be any mention of "capias" in West's California GENERAL DIGEST; GENERAL DIGEST, SECOND EDITION; or THE CALIFORNIA CODES, so my necessary conclusion is that "capias" is not a legitimate part of California Law.

8.a. I was still confused by these definitions, so I began looking for a more extensive explanation of "attachment".
I looked in the INDEX to THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, which showed that "attachment" should be defined in 481.010 C.C.P. and in 488.300 C.C.P.
8.b. So I read these sections, but "attachment" is not defined in either one.
8.c. 482.010 C.C.P. reads: "This title shall be known and may be cited as "The Attachment Act.". It gives procedures to accomplish "attachment", but does not actually define "attachment".
8.d. I did find reference to one court case which says:

"The writ of attachment is a special statutory remedy to aid the creditor in satisfying the debt, and the statute must be strictly followed to entitle him to its benefits. (Gow v. Marshall, 90 Cal. 565 [27 P. 422]; Clyne v. Easton, Eldridge & Co., 148 Cal. 287, 293 [83 P. 36, 113 Am. St. Rep. 253].)" (emphasis added) Yosemite Etc. Assn. v. Case-Swayne Co. (1946), 73 Cal.App.2d 806, 812, 167 P.2d. 541.
9.a. I found an explanation of "attachment" in 16 CALJUR 3d.(REV.) [California Jurisprudence, Third Edition] Part 2, CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, Sec 61, p. 87:
"Sec. 61 In general; definition; purposes
"Attachment is a remedy for the collection of an ordinary debt, proceeding by a seizure, under legal process termed a writ or warrant of attachment, of the property of the debtor [fnt. 11. 6 Am Jur 2d, Attachment and Garnishment sec. 1.]. The remedy of attachment is not a distinct proceeding but one auxiliary to an action at law [fnt. 12. See sec. 65.] In effect it is an incipient execution--an execution, so to speak, in advance of trial and judgment [fnt. 13. Wither v. Morrison, 93 CA2d 608, 209 P2d 657, 49-2 USTC para. 9442, revd on other grounds 340 US 47, 95 L Ed 53, 71 S Ct 111, 50-2 USTC para. 9492.].
"Briefly, attachment is a means of securing payment of the judgment rendered in the principal action [fnt 14. 6 Am Jur 2d, Attachment and Garnishment sec. 12.]. The remedy serves a dual purpose. The basic purpose of the remedy is to aid in the collection of a money demand by seizure of property in advance of trial and judgment, as security for eventual satisfaction of the judgment [fnt. 15. National General Corp. v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc. (2d Dist) 15 CA3d 490, 93 Cal Rptr 343. "One purpose of attachment is to afford the creditor security for payment of unsecured debts and to prevent the debtor's sequestration of funds or fraudulent transfer of assets in an attempt to hinder or defeat payment of just claims." American Industrial Sales Corp. v. Airscope, Inc. 44 C2d 393, 282 P2d, 504, 49 ALR2d 1344. "The purpose served by the attachment scheme set forth by statute is simply to provide unsecured creditors with security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered." Randone v. Appellate Dept. of Superior Court, 5 C3d 536, 96 Cal Rptr 709, 488 P2d 13, cert den 407 US 924, 32 L Ed 2d 811, 92 S Ct 2452. "One of the purposes of the remedy of attachment is to afford an unsecured creditor of a debtor security for his demand." Utley v. United States (CA9 Cal) 304 F2d 746.] And in an action against an nonresident defendant, attachment has the additional purpose of obtaining jurisdiction quasi in rem [fnt. 16. Hanson v. Graham, 82 C 631, 32 P 56; Root v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2d Dist) 209 CA2d 242, 25 Cal Rptr 784; National General Corp. v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc. (2d Dist) 15 CA3d 490, 93 Cal Rptr 343; Nakasone v Randall (2d Dist) 129 CA3d 757, 181 Cal Rptr 324. As to the availability of remedy of attachment in actions against a debtor who is nonresident, see secs. 84, 85. As to jurisdiction quasi in rem, generally see COURTS (Rev) secs. 63, 84, 101, 102. Law Review: 2 SCLR 480 (jurisdiction over nonresident defendant by attachment).]" (emphasis added).
9.b. Then I read the reference (fnt. 11) cited above in AM.JUR.2d. [American Jurisprudence, Second Edition] and found:
"Sec. 1. definitions--"attachment."
Attachment is a remedy for the collection of an ordinary debt, proceeding by a seizure, under legal process termed a writ or warrant of attachment, of the property of the debtor [fnt 1. Wilder v Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co. 211 US 239, 53 L ed 164, 29 S Ct 58; Crisman v Dorsey, 12 Colo 567, 21 P 920; Union Bank & Trust Co. v Edwards, 281 Ky 693, 137 SW 2d 344; Russell v Fred G. Pohl Co. 7 NJ 32, 80 A2d 191; First International Bank v Brehmer, 56 ND 81, 215 NW 918, 61 ALR 1454; McKendall v Patullo, 52 RI 258, 160 A 202, 82 ALR 1111. "The word "attach" implies seizure. It is derived remotely from the Latin verb "attingo" and more immediately from the French "attacher," which signifies to take or touch. Bucheye Pipe Line Co. v Fee, 62 Ohio St 543, 57 NE 446.]. It is an involuntary dispossession of the defendant prior to any judgment of the rights of the plaintiff, that is, a seizure, in advance of trial and judgment [fnt. 2. Union Bank & Trust Co. v Edwards, 281 Ky 693, 137 SW 2d 344; Russell v Fred G. Pohl Co. 7 NJ 32, 80 A2d 191; Wall v Nolfolk & W. R. Co. 52 W Va 485, 44 SE 294.]. ..." (emphasis added).
10.a. So I asked myself:
1. Has the "court" somehow Presumed, in order to "attach" me (my body) for jury duty, that I am a "Debtor" or the "property" of a "Debtor"?
2. Would that make THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA the "Creditor" and me the "Debtor"?
3. Would that make some-entity-as-yet-undisclosed the "Creditor", THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA the "Debtor", and me the "property" of THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA?

10.b. This did not seem to me like the way I was raised to believe that the Law works.
This seemed to me like someone wanted to be able to hold my body or my property for Ransom. Lawfully, this kind of behavior properly should be called the crime of "Extortion" or "Kidnapping".
This was also beginning to sound an awful lot like Lewis Carrol's Through the Looking Glass, wherein the Red Queen is always rendering Judgment first ("Off with his head!") and then, maybe, holding trial second.

11.a. I concluded that I was apparently expected to appear in court to be qualified as an "impartial" juror under the explicit Threat expressed in 209 C.C.P. and under the undisclosed Presumptions that: (1) There was somehow a valid commercial obligation between myself and THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and (2) Under that obligation, I was automatically the debtor or the debtor's property in some undisclosed, hidden, or presumed Creditor-Debtor relationship.
11.b. I concluded that such a situation would automatically made me Prejudiced or Biased in favor of the "court" before the trial even began. (I mean, here I would be in court waiting to be selected as a juror because I have already acknowledged that I believed this court actually lawfully had such a power, instead of having questioned whether this Presumption-of-Relationship even existed and/or where such a Presumed Obligation lawfully derived from.)

12. I found legal definitions of 'grand jury' and 'jury' in California case law:
a.

The common law was adopted in this state at the meeting of its first legislature. Prior to that time the Constitution of 1849 had been adopted, which provided that, "No person shall be held to answer for a capitol or other infamous crime ... unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury." The grand jury system is a product of the common law. The civil law [of Mexico] made no provision for a body like the grand jury in its system of jurisprudence. The members of the first constitutional convention in providing for a grand jury must have had in mind the grand jury as known to the common law. This the respondents [note: the Superior Court] admit, but further contend that the constitutional convention of 1879 adopted an entirely different system than the common law system provided for in the Constitution of 1849. We find nothing to justify this conclusion either in the Constitution or in the debate of the constitutional convention of 1879. ... The Constitution of 1879 did not attempt to change the historic character of the grand jury, and the system its members had in mind was evidently the same system that had come down to them from the common law. It is in no sense a statutory grand jury as distinguished from the common-law grand jury as claimed by the respondents. Practically the only change made by the Constitution of 1879 was to provide an additional system of prosecution for the higher grades of crimes, when before all such crimes were to be prosecuted by indictment of the grand jury. No change whatever was made in the grand jury system as such. The legislature was given no additional powers over the grand jury than those it had under the Constitution of 1849. We must conclude, therefore, that the Constitution of 1879 when it refers to the grand jury refers to it as it had always been known and understood prior thereto. Fitts v. Superior Court (1936), 6 Cal.2d 230, 240-241.
b.
... At the time this indictment was found [1917], section 192 of the Code of Civil Procedure read as follows "A grand jury is a body of men, nineteen in number, returned in pursuance of law, from the citizens of a county, or city and county, before a court of competent jurisdiction, and sworn to inquire of a public offense committed or triable within the county, or city and county.
Since the first statutory enactment in 1863 defining a grand jury, the law has remained unchanged. A "jury" is defined by section 190 of the Code of Civil Procedure to consist of "a body of men." ...
"A jury is a body of men temporarily selected from the qualified inhabitants of a particular district, and invested with power (1) to present or indict a person for a public offense. ..." (Ann. Codes & Stats. [Or.] 1901, par. 959; Ballinger's Ann. Codes & Stats. [Wash.] 1897, par. 4730.)
"Forsyth in his History of Trial by Jury, published in 1852 says: "The distinctive characteristic of the system is this: That the jury consists of a body of men taken from the community at large, summoned to find the truth of disputed facts." " (Hopkins v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R., 96 Tenn. 409, [32 L.R.A. 354, 34 S.W. 1029, 1031].)
"Trial by jury is by twelve free and lawful men, who are not of kin to either party, for the purpose of establishing the truth of the matter in issue." (Smith v. Times Pub. Co., 178 Pa. St. 481, [31 L.R.A. 819, 36 Atl. 296, 297].)
" 'Jury,' as the term is used in the clause of the Constitution providing that the right of trial by jury shall not be denied, 'means twelve competent men, who are free from all ties of consanguinity, and of all other relations that would tend to make them dependent on either party. It means twelve men who are not interested in the event of a suit and who have no such bias or prejudice as would render them partial towards either party.' " (State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39, 46.)
"The terms 'jury' and 'trial by jury' are, and for ages have been, well known in the meaning of the law. They were used at the adoption of the Constitution, and always, it is believed, before that time, and almost always since, in a single sense. A jury for the trial of a cause is a body of twelve men, described as being upright, well qualified, and lawful men, disinterested and impartial, not of kin or personal dependents of either of the parties, etc." (Dennee v. McCoy, 4 Ind. Ter. 233, 237, [69 S.W. 858, 860].)... People v. Lensen (1917), 34 Cal.App 336, 337-338.
13. My further research indicated that if I would be sitting on a "Civil" jury in California, the court wanted me to enter into two "Agreements" (which used to be called Oaths of Office?) before I could be empanelled as a juror:
a. "Prior to the examination of prospective jurors in the panel assigned for voir dire, the following perjury *** acknowledgement and agreement shall be *** obtained from the panel, which shall be acknowledged by the prospective jurors with the statement "I do":
"Do you *** and each or you, understand and agree that you will accurately and truthfully answer, under penalty of perjury, all questions propounded to you concerning your qualifications and competency to serve as a trial juror in the matter pending before this court; and that failure to do so may subject you to criminal prosecution."
WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1999), section 233(a).

b. If I took this oath and survived the resulting voir dire, the court then would want me to "understand and agree" again:
"As soon as the selection of the trial jury is completed, the following acknowledgment and agreement shall be obtained from the trial jurors, which shall be acknowledged by the statement "I do":

"Do you *** and each of you understand and agree that you will well and truly try the cause now pending before this court, and a true verdict render according only to the evidence presented to you and to the instructions of the court.""
WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1999), section 233(b).

c. I found in WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES, RULES OF COURT (2000), JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION STANDARDS, APPENDIX, p. 656:
Section 8. "Examination of prospective jurors in civil cases.
"(c)(19) It is important that I have your assurance that you will, without reservation, follow my instructions and rulings on the law and will apply that law to this case. To put it somewhat differently, whether you approve or disapprove of the court's rulings or instruction, it is your solemn duty to accept as correct these statements of the law. You may not substitute your own idea of what you think the law ought to be. Will all of you follow the law as given to you by me in this case?"

d. I found in WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES, RULES OF COURT (2000),JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION STANDARDS, APPENDIX, Pocket Part, p. 235:
Section 8.5 "Examination of prospective jurors in criminal cases.
"(b)(9) It is important that I have your assurance that you will, without reservaton, follow my instructions and rulings on the law and will apply that law to this case. To put it somewhat differently, whether you approve or disapprove of the court's rulings or instructions, it is your solemn duty to accept as correct these statements of the law. You may not substitute your own idea of what you think the law ought to be. Will all of you follow the law as given to you by me in this case?"

14.a. My first Objection to this "statutory" scheme is that it appears to violate a holding of the United States Supreme Court:

"A talesman when accepted as a juror becomes a part or member of the court. Re Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 33 L. Ed. 150, 9 S. Ct. 699; United States v. Dachis (D.C.) 36 F.(2d) 601. ...
"A talesman, sworn as a juror, becomes, like an attorney, an officer of the court, and must submit to like restraints.
"Nothing in our decision impairs the authority of Bushell's Case, Vaughan, 135, 124 Eng. Reprint, 1006, 1670, with its historic vindication of the privilege of jurors to return a verdict freely according to their conscience. There was a trial of Penn and Mead on a charge of taking part in an unlawful assembly. The jurors found a verdict of acquital, though in so doing they refused to follow the instructions of the court. For this they were fined and imprisoned, but were discharged on habeas corpus, Vaughan, Ch. J., pronouncing "that memorable opinion which soon ended the fining of jurors for their verdicts, and vindicated their character as judges of fact." Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, p. 167. Bushell's case was born of the fear of the Star Chamber and of the tyranny of the Stuarts. Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law, p. 114. It stands for a great principle, which is not to be whittled down or sacrificed. ... There is a peril of corruption in these days which is surety [sic] no less than the peril of coercion. The true significance of Bushell's Case is brought out with clearness in declaratory statutes." (emphasis added). Clark v. United States (1933), 289 U.S. 1, 11, 16-17; 77 L.Ed. 993; 63 S. Ct. 465.
14.b. I did not understand the term "talesman", so I found definitions:
From Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1856):
TALE, Eng. law. The declaration or count was anciently so called in law pleadings. 3 Bl. Com. [Blackstone's Commentaries] 293.

TALES, Eng. law. The name of a book kept in the king's bench office, of such jurymen as were of the tales. See Tales de circumstantibus.

TALES DE CIRCUMSTANTIBUS, practice. Such persons as are standing round. When ever the panel of the jury is exhausted the court order that the jurors wanted shall be selected from among the bystanders which order bears the name of tales de circumstantibus. Bac. Ab. Juries, C.
2. The judiciary act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Story, L. U. S. 64, provides, Sec. 29, that: When from challenges, or otherwise, there shall not be a jury to determine any civil or criminal cause, the marshal or his deputy shall, by order of the court where such defect of jurors shall happen, return jurymen de talibus circumstantibus sufficient to complete the panel; and when the marshal or his deputy are disqualified as aforesaid, jurors may be returned by such disinterested persons as the court shall appoint. See 2 Hill, So. Car. R. 381; 2 Penna. R. 412; 4 Yeates, 236; Coxe, 283; 1 Blackf. 63; 2 Harr. & J. 426; 1 Pick. 43, n.)

15.a. My second Objection was exemplified by a Letter to the Editor which I wrote to the Sacramento Bee:
Re: "Is justice served when jurors disregard the law?" (Sacramento Bee, January 31, 1999).
If jurors were educated enough to take a lawful Oath of Office when they sit as jurors, there would probably be no conflict.
The Constitution for California, Article 20 (Miscellaneous Subjects), Section 3, specifies: "Members of the Legislature, and all public officers and employees, executive, legislative, and judicial, except such inferior officers and employees as may be by law exempted, shall, before they enter upon the duties of their respective offices, take [swear verbally] and subscribe [sign] the following oath or affirmation:
" "I, .........., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter."
" "Public officer and employee" includes every officer and employee of the State, including the University of California, every county, city, city and county, district, and authority, including any department, division, bureau, board, commission, agency, or instrumentality of any of the foregoing."

Since we collectively expect such an oath from our employees, why should we not expect the same oath from ourselves when sitting as jurors? Could the judge's demand and dismissal of the juror be un-Constitutional?"

15.b. It seemed reasonable to me that, if I were going to become "an officer of the court", I should swear and subscribe the exact same Oath of Office as the judge and attorneys are required by the State Constitution to have sworn. After, that is, and only after, they produced Evidence that they had ever sworn and subscribed their own respective Oaths of Office.
I could not determine for myself why the "agreement" set out in CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE section 233(b) would not be prima facie in violation of article XX, section 3 of the Constitution of the State of California and, hence, unconstitutional on its face.

16. My third Objection is financial. If I were going to be "an officer of the court" and lend my time and my good name to validating the proceedings of the "court", I believed I should be paid the same amount as the other "officers of the court": the judge, and the Attorneys. The sum of ten dollars ($10) per day, plus mileage one-way, was not only financially inadequate and totally unreasonable, but it was a direct and active insult to me and my efforts as "an officer of the court".

16. On the basis of the preceding information, I believe I am no longer qualified to be a impartial, unbiased juror in this court.

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Subscribed and Sworn this Day, the ______________ day of___________________ in the year of Our Lord, two thousand in ____________________________city, ________________________county, ____________________________state, The United States of America.

_______________________________________

Thomas Murrell Thornhill III

END